# Opposition Brief — Maier v. Environmental Protection Agency

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1997
- **Citation:** 522 U.S. 1014

## Text

Supreme Court, U-S.

FILED
NOV 3 1997

No. 97-378 | co
In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

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e

PETER MAIER, ETAL., PETITIONERS
Vv.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

SETH P. WAXMAN

Acting Solicitor General
Lois J. SCHIFFER

Assistant Attorney General
DAVID A. CARSON

Attorney

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

(202) 514-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Environmental Protection Agency
acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner by re-
fusing to amend its secondary treatment regula-
tions for publicly owned treatment works under
the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq., to include
technology-based limitations on nitrogenous _bio-
chemical oxygen demand.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992) ............ 3

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
a a aoisepetiebieieaiaaiion 6, 7,8

E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S.
I oir eihidk Gace nial dicanamabatebacesnabsuaciansadevices 2

EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources
Control Board, 426 U.S. 200 (1976) ................. ae Si

Statutes and regulations:

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seg. ................000 1-2
DNR SP A Re MPMI D shccscdncesvevesnsaceconencconconssen 2
I ao anheamininuhens 2
§ 301(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. 1311(b)(1)(B) ......... 3, 7, 8, 9, 10
§ 301(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. 13811(b)U)(C) ........ ee. $, 5
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40 C.F.R.:

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Miscellaneous:

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IV

Miscellaneous—Continued: Page

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48 Fed. Reg. (1983):

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49 Fed. Reg. (1984):
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3

Jn the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

No. 97-378

PETER MAIER, ET AL., PETITIONERS
Vv.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. Al-
A52) is reported at 114 F.3d 1032.

JURISDICTION

The court of appeals entered its decision on May 28,
1997. The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on
August 26, 1997. The jurisdiction of this Court is
invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATEMENT

Petitioners Peter Maier, et al., petitioned the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) to initiate a new
rulemaking to amend regulations that the agency had
issued under the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C.

(1)

1251 et seq., governing secondary treatment for pub-
licly owned treatment works (40 C.F.R. Pt. 130). See
Pet. App. B1-B21. The EPA denied petitioners’ re-
quest. Jd. at C1-C30. Petitioners sought review of
that decision in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit, which upheld the agency’s deci-
sion. Jd. at Al-A52.

1. Congress enacted the Clean Water Act (CWA)
to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”
CWA § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. 1251(a). To achieve that goal,
the CWA makes the discharge of pollutants by any
person unlawful unless the discharge is in compliance
with the CWA and regulatory requirements. CWA
§ 301, 33 U.S.C. 1311. Those requirements include
effluent limitations, which are restrictions “on quan-
tities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physi-
cal, biological, and other constituents which are
discharged from point sources.” CWA § 502(11), 33
U.S.C. 1362(11). The CWA imposes permitting re-
quirements under a program known as the National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).
See CWA § 402, 33 U.S.C. 1342. NPDES permits
“transform generally applicable effluent limitations
and other standards—including those based on water
quality—into the obligations * * * of the individual
discharger.” EPA v. California ex rel. State Water
Resources Control Board, 426 U.S. 200, 205 (1976).
See Pet. App. A2-A3. :

NPDES permits typically include technology-based
limitations, which represent the degree of control
that can be achieved by point sources using various
levels of pollution control technology. See CWA
§§ 301, 304, 33 U.S.C. 1311, 1314; E.L. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Train, 480 U.S. 112, 126-136 (1977).

3

For publicly owned treatment works (POTWs), Sec-
tion 301(b)(1)(B) specifies the applicable technology-
based control standard as effluent limitations based
upon “secondary treatment.” 33 U.S.C. 1311(b)(1)(B).
The CWA does not define the term “secondary treat-
ment” and, instead, delegates that task to the EPA.
See CWA § 304(d)(1), 33 U.S.C. 1314(d)(1). The EPA
has published regulations to define “the degree of
effluent reduction attainable through the application
of secondary treatment.” Jbid.; see generally 40
C.F.R. Pt. 133. In addition to technology-based limi-
tations, NPDES permits, including those for POTWs,
typically require dischargers to comply with any
more stringent limitations, including those neces-
Sary to meet water quality standards established
by state law. See CWA §301(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C.
1311(b)(1)(C); see also Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503
U.S. 91, 100 (1992). See generally Pet. App. A3-A4.
The EPA promulgated secondary treatment regula-
tions in 1973, and it revised those regulations in 1976,
1977, 1984, and 1985." The EPA’s regulations describe
sewage treatment processes as “primary” or “secon-
dary” based on the pollutant and the associated re-
moval technology. 40 Fed. Reg. 34,522 (1975). As
a general matter, primary treatment removes pol-
lutants through liquid-solid separation techniques,

See 38 Fed. Reg. 22,298 (1973) (initial regulations); 41
Fed. Reg. 30,786 (1976) (deleting limitation on fecal coliform
and limiting applicability of pH limitation); 42 Fed. Reg. 54,664
(1977) (allowing upward adjustment of suspended solids limita-
tion for certain POTWs); 49 Fed. Reg. 36,986 (1984) (allowing
substitution of five-day carbonaceous biochemical oxygen de-
mand (CBOD,) test for five-day biochemical oxygen demand
(BOD;) test); 50 Fed. Reg. 23,382 (1985) (modifying percent
removal requirement).

while secondary treatment eliminates remaining pol-
lutants (particularly degradable organic materials)
through biological treatment systems. Jbid. The
EPA imposes specific effluent parameters under the
POTW secondary treatment regulations. For exam-
ple, the current regulations limit total suspended
solids (TSS) on both a monthly and weekly basis, they
specify a pH range (which indicates the acidity or
alkalinity of the wastewater), and they impose limita-
tions on biochemical oxygen demand (BOD). See 40
C.F.R. 133.102. See generally Pet. App. A4-A5.

The BOD parameter measures “the amount of oxy-
gen used by microorganisms in metabolizing (con-
suming) wastewater constituents during a specified
time period.” 48 Fed. Reg. 52,258, 52,274 (1983). It
provides an indication of the effluent’s effect on the
receiving water’s dissolved oxygen content, which
must be sustained to support fish and other oxygen-
consuming aquatic organisms. BOD in wastewater
has two distinct components: carbonaceous biological
oxygen demand (CBOD) and nitrogenous oxygen
demand (NOD). CBOD is “the amount of oxygen
consumed by various microorganisms in metabolizing
organic (carbon) matter in the wastewater.” Ibid.
NOD is “the oxygen consumed by other types of
bacteria * * * in converting ammonia to nitrite and
then to nitrate, a process known as nitrification.”
Ibid. The EPA has historically focused on the CBOD
component of BOD in formulating secondary treat-
ment regulations because CBOD normally poses
the more serious water quality threat and because
POTWs have encountered greater difficulties in
developing and implementing effective NOD control
technology. Jd. at 52,275. See Pet. App. A5-A6.

5

The EPA initially adopted a specific BOD parame-
ter as the appropriate standard for BOD in its secon-
dary treatment regulations, and it rejected other
parameters, including a specific NOD parameter, that
it concluded were not useful measures of effective
secondary treatment because, due to the nature of the
parameter, NOD would not be removed at consistent
levels. 48 Fed. Reg. 52,273 (1983). In the course of the
EPA’s 1984 rulemaking, which revised the BOD
parameter in certain respects, one of the petitioners
in this case commented that the secondary treatment
standards should include direct limitations on NOD.
49 Fed. Reg. 36,999 (1984). The EPA concluded that
NOD was an inappropriate parameter for a generally
applicable technology-based standard. It reasoned
that the variation in local conditions, particularly the
characteristics of the receiving waters, prevented the
NOD parameter from providing, as a general matter,
an effective measure of the effluent’s impact on water
quality. Ibid. Accordingly, the EPA decided that re-
quirements for NOD control should be determined on
a case-by-case basis for each receiving water segment
under Section 301(b)(1)(C) and should not be applied
across-the-board through secondary treatment stan-
dards. Ibid. See Pet. App. A6-A8.

2. In 1993, petitioners filed the petition for rule-
making that is the subject of this case. Petitioners
renewed the past request that the EPA amend its
secondary treatment regulations to include standards
for NOD. See Pet. App. B1-B21. EPA denied the
petition. Jd. at C1-C30. It noted, among other things,
that the usefulness of the NOD parameter depended
on local water quality characteristics and that the
federal and state governments were successfully
regulating NOD through water-quality based effluent

limitations in individual NPDES permits. Jd. at C19-
C25. See id. at A8-A9,

3. Petitioners filed a petition for review in the
court of appeals challenging the EPA’s denial of its
petition for a rulemaking. The court of appeals denied
petitioners’ request for relief. The court first ascer-
tained its jurisdiction over the subject matter. Pet.
App. A9-A17. It then turned to the merits and re-
viewed the agency’s denial of the rulemaking petition
under the Administrative Procedure Act’s “arbitrary
and capricious” standard of review. Jd. at A18-A21.

Applying the analytical framework set out in Chev-
ron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the
court of appeals determined that Congress had not
precisely addressed the question whether the EPA
must regulate NOD in its secondary treatment re-
gulations. Pet. App. A22-A30. It concluded that the
agency’s decision to regulate NOD on a case-by-case
basis through the NPDES permitting process rested
on a reasonable construction of the statute and was
entitled to deference. Jd. at A30-A37. The court noted
that the EPA’s decision was appropriate in light of
the agency’s uncontroverted determinations that the
effects of NOD are highly variable and site-specific
and that NOD can be effectively controlled on a case-
by-case basis through the permitting process. Id. at
A32-A33. Judge Lucero dissented in part. Jd. at A38-
A52.

ARGUMENT

The decision of the court of appeals is correct, it
does not conflict with any decision of this Court or
another court of appeals, and it presents no recurring
legal issue of general importance warranting review

a

by this Court. Accordingly, the petition for a writ of
certiorari should be denied.

1. Petitioners assert that the court of appeals’ de-
cision is in conflict with this Court’s decision in
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984). That contention is incorrect. Chevron directs
that when a court reviews an agency’s interpretation
of a statute, it must first examine “whether Congress
has directiy spoken to the precise question at issue.”
467 U.S. at 842. If the statute “is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
eourt is whether the agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.” Jd. at 843.
The court of appeals correctly applied those princi-
ples in upholding the EPA’s action in this case.

Applying the first step of the Chevron framework,
the court correctly determined that Congress had not
directly addressed the precise question at issue here.
Pet. App. A23-A30. The court specifically examined
the relevant CWA provisions, Sections 301(b)(1)(B)
and 304(d)(1), and correctly determined that they do
not resolve the question whether EPA is required to
impose a generally applicable parameter for NOD in
its secondary treatment regulations. Jbid. Section
301(b)(1)(B) provides that POTWs must achieve efflu-
ent limitations “based upon secondary treatment as
defined by [EPA] pursuant to [Section 304(d)(1)].” 33
U.S.C. 1311(b)(1)(B). Section 304(d)(1) requires EPA
to publish “information, in terms of amounts of con-
stituents and chemical, physical, and biological char-
acteristics of pollutants, on the degree of effluent
reduction attainable through the application of secon-
dary treatment.” 33 U.S.C. 1314(d)(1). Those provi-
sions do not resolve whether EPA must regulate
NOD under its secondary treatment regulations.

8

Under the second step of the Chevron framework,
the courts must defer to the agency’s reasonable con-
struction of a statute that it is charged with ad-
ministering. 467 U.S. at 843. The court found that
the EPA had properly exercised its discretion in con-
cluding that a generally applicable standard for NOD
is inappropriate. As the agency explained in rejecting
petitioners’ request for a rulemaking, the effects
of NOD are site-specific and variable, and NOD
should therefore be regulated on a case-by-case basis
through water-quality-based effluent limitations. See
Pet. App. C1-C30. The court of appeals specifically
considered and rejected petitioners’ various chal-
lenges to the agency’s exercise of its discretion. /d.
at A30-A37.

Petitioners mistakenly assert that the court of ap-
peals erred in the second step of the Chevron analy-
sis. See Pet. 7-10. According to petitioners, the court
of appeals set forth an interpretation of Section
301(b)(1)(B) of the CWA that was not offered by EPA
and that (according to petitioners) is inconsistent
with the EPA’s view of the statute. Pet. 8n.3. Peti-
tioners specifically point to the court’s reliance on
the term “based upon” in Section 301(b)(1)(B) for its
conclusion that the CWA does not require EPA to
develop generally applicable effluent limitations for
all pollutants that could be addressed by secondary
treatment. See [bid.

Petitioners fail to recognize that the court inter-
preted Section 301(b)(1)(B) in the course of determin-
ing, under the first step of the Chevron analysis, that
the CWA does not address the precise question at
issue. The court concluded that the CWA does not

9

require that the EPA regulate all pollutants poten-
tially subject to secondary treatment, stating: —

The statute requires that generally-applicable
effluent limitations for POTWs be “based upon
secondary treatment.” 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(B)
(emphasis added). Contrary to [petitioners’] as-
sertion, the statute does not on its face require
that the generally-applicable effluent limitations
address all pollutants that might be reduced by
secondary treatment.

Pet. App. A29. As that passage indicates, the court
construed Section 301(b)(1)(B) in response to the con-
trary analysis offered by petitioners under the first
step of the Chevron analysis.

The court also made that point explicitly in re-
sponse to the dissent’s claim that the court was
substituting its interpretation for that of EPA under
the second step of the Chevron analysis:

The dissent suggests that our analysis of sec-
tion [301] substitutes our own construction of the
statute for that advanced by the agency. In so
doing, the dissent fails to distinguish between the
source of agency discretion, which we must deter-
mine in the first instance under Chevron, and the
basis for the agency’s exercise of its discretion,
for which the dissent correctly observes we may
not supply our own rationale.

Pet. App. A30 n.17. As that passage indicates, the
court performed its judicial function under the Chev-
ron framework of determining whether the statute
confers discretion. Even if the EPA disagreed with
the court’s interpretation of the phrase “based upon”
in Section 301(b)(1)(B), the court was entitled under

10

Chevron to rely on its own judgment in determining
whether that provision addresses the precise issue
here. Having found that the provision does not
address the issue, the court properly deferred to the
agency’s reasonable interpretation of its statutory
obligations under the CWA.

In any event, petitioners’ assertion that the EPA
disagrees with the court of appeals’ construction of
Section 301(b)(1)(B) is incorrect. Petitioners rely on
the dissent’s representation of the EPA’s views. See
Pet. 9. The dissent, in turn, states that “the relevant
regulatory history strongly suggests” that the EPA
would take the position that secondary treatment
standards must be promulgated for any pollutant that
could be reduced through secondary treatment. Pet.
App. A41-A42. The dissent, however, is in error in its
assessment of the agency’s views.

The EPA specifically concluded that a generally-
applicable secondary treatment standard for NOD is
not appropriate—despite the fact that technologies
exist to reduce NOD—because the effects of NOD are
extremely variable and subject to local water condi-
tions. Pet. App. A32-A33, C16-C22. If the EPA held
the view suggested by the dissent, then the agency
would have to require all municipalities with POTWs
to expend resources on technologies that may not be
necessary to control pollution. The EPA has indi-
cated instead that water-quality-based effluent limita-
tions should be developed for POTWs on a case-by-
case basis where NOD actually leads to an impair-
ment of water quality. That point was not lost on the
majority:

The fact that Congress has * * * provided for
[water] quality-based permitting as a gap-filling

11

measure gives strong support to the EPA’s exer-
cise of delegated authority to fill the gap where it
has concluded that NOD should not be part of
standard secondary treatment. The fact that sec-
ondary treatment controls are technology-based
does not preclude the EPA from deciding that
certain technologically-attainable standards are
necessary and appropriate only for some POTWs.
We should not order the agency to develop
generally-applicable parameters based on the use
of new technology, even if cost-effective, in the
face of the agency’s reasoned judgment that the
use of such technology is irrelevant to the attain-
ment of water quality standards in many cir-
cumstances.

Id. at A834. In short, the court of appeals’ construction
of the relevant provisions of the CWA is consistent
with that of the EPA.

2. Petitioners also argue that the court of appeals’
decision conflicts with this Court’s decision in EPA
v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control
Board, 426 U.S. 200 (1976), which held that the
provisions of the CWA then in force did not subject
federal facilities to state permitting requirements.
426 U.S. at 227-228. The Court’s decision in that case
did not address POTW secondary treatment require-
ments. Petitioners nevertheless assert a “direct
conflict” based on a passage of the Court’s opinion
that describes the CWA’s regulatory scheme. Pet. 10.

As petitioners note, this Court observed that the
CWA differs from previous water pollution control
programs because it subjects point sources to
technology-based effluent limitations as well as to
limitations derived from water-quality standards.

12

Pet. 10 (citing EPA v. California, 426 U.S. at 204-
205). See 426 U.S. at 205 n.12. The Court did not sug-
gest, however, that the CWA requires the EPA to im-
pose technology-based effluent limitations on POTWs
in every instance in which they might conceivably be
applied. As the court of appeals correctly stated, the
specific provisions of the CWA that are applicable to
POTWs provide that “effluent limitations for POTWs
must be ‘based upon’ secondary treatment technology,
not co-extensive with it.” Pet. App. A383. There
is nothing in the CWA, or in this Court’s decisions
interpreting that statute, that would require the
EPA to impose generally applicable technology-based
effluent limitations on POTWs without examining
whether circumstances warrant applying those limi-
tations to all POTWs.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
denied.

Respectfully submitted.

SETH P. WAXMAN
Acting Solicitor General

LOIS J. SCHIFFER
Assistant Attorney General

DAVID A. CARSON
Attorney

NOVEMBER 1997

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386013_1328%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
