# Opposition — Thomas v. Metropolitan Life Insurance

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1997
- **Citation:** 522 U.S. 863

## Text

i . |
Suprema Court, Us
FILED

MUG 15 1997

CLERK

+f

No. 97-106

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED.STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

MARY THOMAS and IVY THOMAS.
Petitioners
VS.

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
and

DONNA POWELL-THOMAS
Respondents

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI FROM
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Natalie O. Ludaway

Counsel of Record

LEFTWICH & DOUGLAS, P.L.L.C

1401 New York Avenue, N.W.

Suite 600

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 434-9100

Attorney for Respondent Donna Powell-Thomas

i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether the District Court properly applied the “strict
compliance” standard under 5 U.S.C. Section 8705(a)
where the insured, who on two separate occasions
previously completed and signed his name on the
beneficiary designation forms in the box marked
“Signature of Insured,” naming Respondent Donna
Powell-Thomas as the beneficiary, subsequently
prepared a third beneficiary designation form naming
Petitioners as the beneficiaries and did not sign the
box marked “Signature of Insured.”

Is there a compelling reason for this Court to grant
the petition for writ of certiorari, where the
Petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the insured signed the contested form?

Should this Court grant the petition for writ of
certiorari to allow Petitioners to demonstrate that the
insured intended to sign the contested designation of
beneficiary form when they failed to conduct
discovery and develop the record below.

ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioners, Mary Thomas and Ivy Thomas a/k/a Ivy
Dotson were the Plaintiffs in the United States District Court
and Appellants in the United States Court of Appeals.
Respondent Metropolitan Life Insurance Company was a
Defendant in the District Court and Appellee in the Court of
Appeals. Respondent Donna Powell-Thomas was a
Plaintiff/Intervenor in the District Court and Appellee in the
Court of Appeals. Stewart Funeral Home, Inc. was joined as
a Plaintiff in the District Court. Stewart Funeral Home, Inc.,
has not actively participated in the proceedings.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Questions Presented ............. 0: eee e eee eee i
a) li
er ke Te ala celal 4 « aus.s eens Vv
Opinions Below ..... 2... 6. eee eee ee ees 2
EE EPCOT TTC ECE TEE 2
a” es ee 2
EES 0 ee ee 3
Reasons for Denying the Writ .............-.--.-55: 6
I. The Federal Employees Group Life
Insurance Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8705(a),
Requires Strict Compliance with its
eS RE i bag 4 29:0 6
II. The Designation of Beneficiary
Form of October 13, 1993, is
Invalid as Decedent Failed to Sign
REE CS ae 8
Ill. The Decision below does not
Conflict with the Decision of
the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida......... 10
12

ry ha gs wk ao we en

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Adams v. Macy,

314 F. Supp. 399 (D.Md. 1970) . .

Burleson v. Burleson,

277 A.2d 647 (D.C. 1971) ......

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317 (1986) ..........

Fair v. Moore,

397 A.2d 976 (D.C. 1979) ......

Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers
National Pension Fund,

493 U.S. 365(1990) ..........

Huff v. Metropuiitan Life Ins. Co.,

675 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1982) ....

In re Estate of Hall,
328 F. Supp. 1305 (D.D.C. 1971)

Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v.

Zenith Radio,

475 U.S. 574(1986) ..........

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Christ,

979 F.2d 575 (7th Cir. 1992) ....

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Manning,

568 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1977) ....

v

litan Life Ins. v. Trainor,

754 P.2d 427 (Colo. Ct App. 1988) ............. 6, 7,8

"Neal v nzalez,
839 F.2d 1437 (Lith Cir. 1988) .................... 7
People v. Stephens,
297 N.E. 2d 224 (Ill. App. 1973) a takers os bes hrc ote ee 9
Plemens v. Diddle-Glaser, Inc.,
224 A.2d 464 (Md. 1966) ......................... 9
Sears v. Austin,
gna ae Gee Ce Gr, 196)... oc ec wdc cee. 6, 7
State v. Schell,
224 N.E.2d 49 (Ind. 1967)... ........ 0000 cece eee 11
United States v. Wexler,
657 F. Supp. 966 (E.D. Pa. 1987) ................... 9
Ward v. Stratton,
ee le S| ce 6

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

5 U.S.C. Section 8705(a) (1994) .... 0.000000... passim
48 U.SA.. Section EAGT CFOS) 2... cc wc ce cwees 5
28 U.S.C. Section 1335.(1994) .................0--. 4
28 U.S.C. Section 1254(1) (1994) .................04. 2

Pere. Ger, Pe We os ec eee ce See 13

vi
Dene, Oe: a OE er ee ea et 4

LEGISLATIVE MATERIAL

H.R. 2579, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954),
reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3052 ................ 6

S. Rep. No. 1064, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966),
pei 2 U.S.CCAN, 2070 2. cece cece 6

No. 97-106

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

MARY THOMAS and IVY THOMAS,
Petitioners
VS.

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
and

DONNA POWELL-THOMAS
Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI FROM
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Respondent, Donna Powell-Thomas respectfully
requests that Petitioners' request that a writ of certiorari be
issued to review the judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia entered on February 24,
1997, be DENIED.

2

OPINIONS BELOW

The Order of the District Court is reported at 921 F.
Supp. 810 (D.C. 1996). The Judgment of the Court of
Appeals is reported at 111 F.3d 963 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The
Court of Appeals’ Orders denying the Petition for Rehearing
and Suggestion for Rehearing en Banc are not reported.
However, complete copies have been included in Appendix A
through Appendix B of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit was entered on February
24, 1997. A Petition for Rehearing and a Suggestion en
Banc, was filed on March 25, 1997, and denied on June 11,
1997. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28
U.S.C. Section 1254(1) (1994).

LEGAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED IN THIS CASE

Federal Employee’s Group Life Insurance Act
(“FEGLIA”), 5 U.S.C. Section 8705(a) (1994).

3

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF CASE

Decedent Gerald C. Thomas, Jr. was employed by the
District of Columbia Lottery and Charitable Games Control
Board (“Board”) at the time of his death on February 2, 1994.
Employees of the Board, including Decedent, were entitled to
participate in the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance
(“FEGLI”) program, which was managed by Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company (“MetLife”). Decedent’s policy
benefits amounted to One Hundred Ninety-Seven Thousand
Dollars ($197,000.00).

On August 21, 1989, and April 7, 1993, Decedent
completed two (2) Designation of Beneficiary forms naming
Respondent Donna Powell-Thomas as the sole beneficiary of
100% of his death benefits. Both Designation of Beneficiary
forms were fully completed and properly executed by
Decedent with Decedent signing his name in cursive in the
box on the forms -- Signature of Insured, witnessed, and
received in the appropriate office prior to Decedent’s death.
Despite the fact that Respondent had initiated divorce
proceedings, Respondent was Decedent’s wife at the time of
his death.

On October 13, 1993, Decedent purportedly filled out
a third Designation of Beneficiary form in which Petitioners
Mary and Ivy Thomas were listed as the beneficiaries of his
FEGLI policy proceeds. The form contains Decedent’s name
and address. It is undisputed that the Decedent did not sign
the Designation of Beneficiary form in the space marked
“Signature of Insured” as required -- this area was left blank.
The only markings on the form which appear to be signatures
are those contained under the spaces marked “Signature of
Witness[es]”. There is no evidence in the record by the
individuals who allegedly signed as witnesses that they

naa Ni

4

observed Decedent "sign" the form. In several places, the
form instructs the policy holder that it must be signed.
Specifically, the instructions on the back of the form state that
“Tall entries on the form except signatures should be typed
or printed in ink (typewriting preferred).” (Emphasis added).

After Decedent's death, Petitioners and Respondent
Powell-Thomas filed claims for the insurance proceeds.
Thereafter, on August 31, 1994, Petitioners filed a Complaint
in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia to collect the insurance proceeds pursuant to the
purported Designation of Beneficiary dated October 13,
1993. Respondent Donna Powell-Thomas subsequently
moved to and was granted leave to intervene in the suit.
Respondent Powell-Thomas filed a Motion for Declaratory
Judgment on December 19, 1994, based on Decedent’s
properly executed Designation of Beneficiary form dated
April 7, 1993.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1335 and Rule 67 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Respondent MetLife
deposited the policy proceeds into the Registry of the District
Court. Upon the Motion of MetLife, Stewart Funeral Home
was added as a party Plaintiff, but has not otherwise
participated in this case.

After fully considering all positions, the District Court
entered an Order on January 2, 1996, denying Petitioners’
Motion for Summary Judgment and Request for Hearing, and
granting Respondent Powell-Thomas’ Motion for Declaratory
Judgment (treated by the Court as a Motion for Summary
Judgment). In its opinion, the District Court, relying on prior
case law requiring “strict compliance” with FEGLIA, ruled
that “the decedent’s acts of printing his name and checking

5

the box indicating that he had signed the form are insufficient
to constitute a signature as contemplated by the statute.” (A.
8a)

The Petitioners, relying upon 28 U.S.C. Section 1291,
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit on January 29, 1996. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s grant of Summary
Judgment to Respondent Donna Powell-Thomas. In its
judgment, the Court of Appeals stated that “[g]iven that the
insured signed his name by writing it in cursive on three of
four designation of beneficiary forms in evidence . . . the
evidence as a whole does not support concluding that
Thomas intended his name . . . to constitute his signature.”
(A. la) Accordingly, the panel determined an opinion was
not needed, and entered its per curiam order on February 24,
1997.

On March 25, 1997, Petitioners submitted a Petition
for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing en Banc to the
United States Court of Appeals. After full consideration, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit denied both the Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion
for Rehearing En Banc. In its judgment, the Court stated in
pertinent part that:

“[T]}his court affirmed the judgment of the
district court because the evidence proffered in
the summary judgment pleadings failed to
demonstrate the existence of sufficient
evidence from which a reasonable jury could
conclude by a preponderance that the insured
in this case intended to sign the contested form
merely by printing his name in the
informational entries. Appellant would have
the burden at trial of establishing that fact.”

6

(A. 3a) Accordingly, the panel determined that “there [were]
no genuinely disputed issues of material fact,” and entered its
per curiam judgment on June 11, 1997.

meee apnence ne

.

I. REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE
INSURANCE ACT, 5 U.S.C. § 8705(a),
REQUIRES STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH ITS
PROVISIONS.

a nel ese

The trial court found that the form at issue dated
October 13, 1993 had not been signed by Decedent. The
lower court followed the law that FEGLIA requires "strict
compliance" with its provisions. See Ward v. Stratton, 988
F.2d 65, 67 (8th Cir. 1993); Adams v. Macy, 314 F.Supp.
399, 401 (D.Md. 1970); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Trainor, 754 P.2d 427, 428 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Burleson
v. Burleson, 277 A.2d 647, 648 (D.C. 1971). In summary,
the Petition for writ of certiorari should be denied because
Petitioners submitted no evidence that the Decedent signed or
even intended to sign the October 13, 1993, form when he |
printed his name in the informational entries. _ |

In an effort “to provide low cost group life insurance |
to Federal employees,” Congress established the Federal
Employee’s Group Life Insurance Act (“FEGLIA”) in 1954. )
H.R. 2579, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprinted in 1954
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3052. According to the statute, FEGLI
proceeds are to be paid: “First, to the beneficiary or
beneficiaries designated by the employee in a signed and
witnessed writing received before death in the employing )
office.” 5 U.S.C. § 8705(a). (Emphasis added.) In 1966, ,
Congress amended FEGLIA to include language that “a
designation, change, or cancellation of beneficiary in a will or |
other document not so executed and filed has no force or

ee)

7

effect.” Id. This language was added after the ninth circuit
court held that a beneficiary designated in a will which had
not been executed or filed in accordance with FEGLIA was
valid. See S. Rep. No. 1064, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966),
reprinted in 2 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2070, 2071; see Sears v. Austin,
292 F.2d 690 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 929
(1961). Congress amended FEGLIA to make clear that the
statute is to be strictly construed and that “the order of
precedence . . . shall prevail over any extraneous document
designating a beneficiary.” Id.; O’Neal v. Gonzalez, 839 F.2d
1437, 1440 (11th Cir. 1988). Hence, the case at bar turns on
whether, vel non, Decedent signed the October 13, 1993
Form in accordance with FEGLIA.

Congress has forcefully and clearly identified to whom
and how FEGLI benefits are to be paid. For reasons of
administrative convenience, Congress established an inflexible
rule that a beneficiary must be named strictly in accordance
with the statute, irrespective of the equities in the case;
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Manning, 568 F.2d 922, 926
(2d Cir. 1977). Congress created no exceptions to its
statutory scheme, and "courts should be loath to announce
equitable exceptions to legislative requirements or
prohibitions that are unqualified by the statutory text."
Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund, 493
U.S. 365, 376 (1990), remanded, 10 F.3d 700 (10th Cir.
1993). Congress’ general intent in enacting FEGLIA was to
avoid administrative difficulties for the government and
insurance companies, and more importantly, to avoid delay in
paying benefits to the survivors. Id. S. Rep. No. 1064 at
2071; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Christ, 979 F.2d 575,
578-79 (7th Cir. 1992) (Congress has reacted promptly to
foreclose any T equities in the statute interpreted by federal
courts in order to further federal interests of administrative

8

convenience and avoidance of delay in payment of proceeds
that results from litigation).

It is clear that Congress has chosen to favor
administrative efficiency over equitable considerations.
FEGLIA's order of payment preference sets forth an
inflexible, mandatory procedure which must be strictly
adhered. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Christ, 979 F.2d
575 (7th Cir. 1992) (FEGLIA establishes procedure to be
followed regardless of other documents or the equities of the
case); Huff v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 119 (6th
Cir. 1982) (compliance with FEGLIA policy, not intent of
insured, is controlling); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Trainor,
754 P.2d 427, 428 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (Congress has
indicated its clear intention to make strict compliance with the
statutory provisions mandatory). Courts should not second-
guess or seek to modify that intent.

Even Appellants concede that the Beneficiary
Designation Form is to be governed by the “strict
compliance” standard. Moreover, unlike in Fair v. Moore,
397 A.2d 976 (D.C. 1979), which dealt with whether the
insured's personnel office qualified as an "employing office"
within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 8705(a), here, Decedent
failed to properly execute the Form as he did not place his
signature on the document. Consequently, the October 13
Form is defective and cannot be validated through alleged
"internal integrity and consistency" or any other means.

II. THE DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY FORM
OF OCTOBER 13, 1993, IS INVALID AS
DECEDENT FAILED TO SIGN THE
DOCUMENT

The sole point of contention is whether Decedent

9

"signed" the beneficiary form in accordance with the FEGLIA
requirements. Decedent made no mark in the box on the
Form where he should have signed. It is undisputed that on
two previous occasions Decedent had properly completed a
designation of beneficiary form and signed his name in cursive
in the signature box on the form. Regardless of Petitioners’
claims, Petitioners failed to demonstrate the existence of
sufficient evidence that Decedent's act of printing his name in
the informational entries of the Form constituted a signature
Petitioners are seemingly arguing that the court below failed
to recognize that something other than a cursive, hand-
written name can act as a signature. Petitioners miss the
point. Petitioners cannot establish that Decedent did the act
of signing the Form. They failed to submit any evidence that
Decedent placed a symbol in the box labeled "Signature of
Insured" which could be construed as a signature. See United
States v. Wexler, 657 F. Supp. 966, 971 (E.D. Pa. 1987),
where "the documents in question were under seal, had
stamped signatures, and bore ink initials."

Had Decedent made a marking in the space rather
than leaving it blank, perhaps Petitioners’ argument have
some credence. Decedent did nothing more than identify
himself by name, social security number, date of birth, and
address, as the insured employee. As the court In re Estate of
Hall, 328 F.Supp. at 1309, stated, "a signature must indicate
something more than the mere act of identifying the maker of
the document in question." Petitioners’ argument that strict
compliance with the requirement that Decedent have signed
the Form in the signature box is unnecessary because
FEGLIA does not require that a particular form be used is
without merit. The fact is that Decedent used a standard
form which clearly indicated the proper place to affix his
signature." In a matter such as this where strict compliance
is mandated, Petitioners cannot seek a “careful application" of
the statute's terms when it suits their position. Decedent
failed to place his signature on the Designation of Beneficiary
form dated October 13, 1996. As such, that Form has "no
force or effect." 5 U.S.C. § 8705(a). In order to refrain from

10

directly contravening the FEGLIA statute as written and as
interpreted, Respondent Powell-Thomas must be
acknowledged as the sole beneficiary of Decedent's insurance
proceeds.

Iii. THE DECISION BELOW DOES NOT |
CONFLICT WITH THE DECISION OF THE
UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE MIDDLE
DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

The decision by the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia does not conflict with the decision
the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida. The Florida Court, as well as the District of
Columbia Court applied the requisite standard for issuing
summary judgment. The evidence in the case at bar, unlike
the Florida case, failed to demonstrate the existence of
sufficient evidence necessary to demonstrate any genuine
issue as to material facts. Accordingly, the District Court
granted Respondent Powell-Thomas’ Motion for Declaratory
Judgment.

The entry of summary judgment is appropriate when:

pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(c). This Court has stated that the ‘
moving party always bears the initial responsibility of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion and
identifying those portions of the record which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 91 L. Ed.
2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). This Court has also
explained that summary judgment is appropriate, no matter

eT

11

which party is the moving party, where a party fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will
bear the burden of proof at trial. See Id. at 322. Once the
moving party has carried its burden, the responsibility then
shifts to the nonmoving party to show that there exists a
genuine issue of material fact. The nonmoving party “must
do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Industrial

Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89
L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986) (citations omitted)

If a person "intended the mark or the name, printed or
written, when it is imprinted upon the document, to be his
signature and he so adopts it as his act and intends to be
bound thereby, it meets the requirements of the law" and
constitutes a signature. See State v. Schell, 224 N.E.2d 49,
53 (Ind. 1967). There is no evidence in the record that
Decedent adopted some other signature or intended the
October 13, 1993 form to be effective. Indeed, in support of
this Motion for Summary Judgment Petitioners offered
affidavits from two employees at the D.C. Lottery and
Charitable Games Control Board: Carolyn V. Osbourne and
Deborah L. Roberson. Ms. Osbourne and Ms. Roberson only
stated in their affidavits that Decedent, "in their
presence...completed, in his own hand, a Designation of
Beneficiary form. He completed in his own hand the entire
top portion of the form above, "Witness to Signature"...
Petitioners’ only had generalized evidence that Decedent
completed the October 13, 1993 Form. This was insufficient
to show that Decedent intended _ to sign the Form. It did not
contradict the more specific evidence of the Decedent’s
signing two prior forms. The District Court therefore
properly determined that there was no genuine issue as to the
fact that the October 13, 1993 form was not signed.

In order to withstand a summary judgment motion
once the moving party has made a prima facie case to support
its claims, the nonmoving party must come forward with

12

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(e). For this reason and because
Petitioners failed to come forward with such facts, relying
instead on bare assumptions and arguments, the District
Court made its decision and the Court of Appeals affirmed
that decision.

Of note, Petitioners Mary and Ivy Thomas suggest
that their due process rights were violated because “due
process necessitates that they have an opportunity to

~ demonstrate the decedent’s purpose and intent in preparing
the [contested] document.” This argument is, at best,
specious. Petitioners had ample time between August 31,
1994, when the Com: '*int was filed, until January 22, 1996,
when the district court issued its opinion, to use numerous
discovery methods to develop their case and demonstrate the
decedent’s purpose and intent. Petitioners chose not to
conduct any discovery. Furthermore, Petitioners suggestion
that the Court of Appeals decision to affirm the District Court
decision without a hearing or oral argument is also flawed. A
Court’s decision whether or not to afford a hearing or oral
argument is discretionary.

CONCLUSION

The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, as well as, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit correctly decided that as a
matter of law Respondent Donna Powell-Thomas is the sole
beneficiary to the FEGLI policy of the Decedent. The courts
correctly applied the traditional summary judgment standard
and analysis in complete conformity with the law. .

The United States District Court decided in favor of
Respondent Donna Powell-Thomas, based on the record.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision, ruling
that “the evidence as a whole does not support concluding
that [Decedent] intended his name as printed . . . on the

ee Ty

13

contested form to constitute his signature.” The Court of
Appeals denied the Petitioners’ Motion for Rehearing and
Suggestion for Rehearing en Banc. In denying the motion
the Court stated that:

>

“[petitioners] have failed to demonstrate that
rehearing is warranted. This court affirmed
the judgment of the district court because the
evidence proffered . . . failed to demonstrate
the existence of sufficient evidence from which
a reasonable jury could conclude by a
preponderance that the insured . . . intended to
sign the contested form... .”

(A. la)

The rulings in this matter do not conflict with any
decisions of this Court or any other court. The decisions are
correct in light of applicable legal principles and FEGLIA
case authority. Petitioners only seek another chance to
reargue their case before this Court. Therefore, Respondent
Powell-Thomas requests that the petition be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Natalie O. Ludaway,

Counsel of Record

LEFTWICH & DOUGLAS, P.L.L.C.
1401 New York Avenue, N.W.

Suite 600

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 434-9100

Attorney for Respondent

Donna Powell-Thomas
Date: August 15, 1997.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386013_1077%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.