# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Sheehan v. Whitley

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1997
- **Citation:** 522 U.S. 860

## Text

Supreme Court, U.8.
rin Ss D

97-67 JUL 8 1997,

No. __o¢sict Of THE CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1996

¢

JOHN ANTHONY SHEEHAN,

Petitioner,

versus

JOHN P. WHITLEY, WARDEN AND
STATE OF LOUISIANA,

Respondents.

¢

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Fifth Circuit
Civil Appeal No. 96-30008

¢

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

¢

Lewis O. UNGLEsBy

Unc.essy & Kocu

246 Napoleon Street

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70802
Telephone: (504) 387-0120

CHartes A. RIppte, III
Counsel of Record

Post Office Box 315
Marksville, Louisiana 71351
Telephone: (318) 253-4551

Attorneys for Petitioner,
John Sheehan

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The Constitutional violations in this case are so basic, so
fundamental, so compelling, that it is astonishing that Peti-
tioner has to request discretionary review by this Court.

John Sheehan was convicted by a 10 to 2 vote — the
minimum necessary to convict — and the jury foreman hid the
fact that he is an active reserve deputy with the very Sheriff’s
Department that investigated the alleged offense, and that he
is the friend of the prosecution’s key police witness. The
foreman had even consulted an attorney about the effect of his
deputy status before reporting for jury duty.

The District Court found that the extreme and extraordin-
ary nature of the case required the application of the implied
bias doctrine.

The First, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
have ruled that implied bias is a question of law beyond the
reach of the presumption of correctness whereas the Fifth
Circuit below reversed the District Court on the issue by
applying the presumption of correctness to the state court’s
ruling. The Fifth Circuit panel’s ruling has created a dan-
gerous split of authority among the various circuit courts of
appeals which threatens the interests of persons legitimately
deserving of habeas relief:

1. Is implied bias a question of law which falls
outside the presumption of correctness, enti-
tling petitioner to independent federal review?

ii
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW - Continued

2. Does Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in
Smith v. Phillips, 102 S.Ct. 940, 948-949
(1982), accurately reflect the applicable stan-
dard that in exceptional situations, like this one,
which require a finding of implied bias, that the
lower federal courts should not be deterred
from independent review by the presumption of
correctness?

3. Do the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments per-
mit an innocent man to be condemned to life in
prison based upon a conviction orchestrated by
a jury foreman who lied about critical facts
going to the heart of potential juror partiality to
get on the jury?

ian a AK RANI 4

jen dime etna: nna enn

iil
PARTIES

The parties appearing in the United States Court of
Appeal were, John Anthony Sheehan, plaintiff-appellee, rep-
resented by Lewis O. Unglesby and Aidan C. Reynolds of the
law offices of Unglesby & Koch, 246 Napoleon Street, Baton
Rouge, Louisiana 70802 and Charles A. Riddle, III, Post
Office Box 315, Marksville, Louisiana 71351; and John P.
Whitley, Warden of the Louisiana State Penitentiary and the
State of Louisiana, respondents-appellants, represented by
Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General; Eddie Knoll, District
Attorney, and David Lafarque, Assistant District Attorney, of
the Office of the District Attorney, Twelfth Judicial District.

In light of the Court of Appeal’s reversal of the District
Court’s judgment in his favor, John Sheehan now petitions
this Honorable Court for writ of certiorari to correct the split
of authority among the circuits and the patent legal error
made by the Court of Appeal below.

iV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Questions Presented for Review.................se00- i
a re ee ee © Pte ee Poe eee ere ili
, ge Pe reer ry rer Tree eee iv
Te: GE I ou i v5 hs ka e's Fee ART vi
Citations to Opinions BelOw..............s0cc0860% 1
PTT eT ee eee eee TT ee 1
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved .... 2
IE Me ok i hacia sa nh ieneuweheenns 3
5 NE IIIS kao pc sdan ace de eweeaes 3

Re I os havin ch arau conn tacansens 3
III. Action of the District Court and Court of Appeals 13
Summary of the Argument ..........cccscseccceess 14
Reasons For Granting the Writ .................... 16

I. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S APPLICATION OF
THE PRESUMPTION OF CORRECTNESS TO
A QUESTION OF LAW IS IN CONFLICT WITH
SEVERAL DECISIONS OF OTHER COURTS
OF APPEALS NECESSITATING CORRECTION
AND CLEAR GUIDANCE FROM THIS COURT
PETC ee ee, ee eee Peet er ee 18

II. THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENTS DO NOT PERMIT AN INNOCENT
MAN TO BE CONDEMNED TO LIFE IN
PRISON BASED ON A CONVICTION
ORCHESTRATED AND INFECTED BY A PRE-
SUMPTIVELY BIASED JURY FOREMAN .... 21

Ce aa ul aeeeud sues be oreeer ae 30

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

Page
PII ire soe anny gus ncsen gods cued as App. 1
1. Unpublished Decision of Court of Appeal, Fifth
Citomit, Miapoh 11, 1997. ois. ccs cacceseds. App. 1
2. Minute Entry Referring Petition to Magistrate, May
Fai + bed brent basin wean Gan eck eee App. 35
3. Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge,
SINT iG I gC bins hl Teds ok k. App. 36
4. Judgment of U.S. District Court, November 21,
ie PELEEELEEESUEE ESO TET OT i eT ee App. 60
5. Ruling of Court of Appeal On Suggestion For
Rehearing En Banc (Treated as a Petition for Panel
Rehearing), April 9, 1997................... App. 61
6. Local Rule 35 and Internal Operating Procedure for
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal — Treatment of
Suggestions for Rehearing En Banc As Petitions for
ae pee er ne App. 63
7. State v. Sheehan, 515 So.2d 670 (La. App. 3rd Cir.
ds EE ee TOE Oe ee ae tte App. 64
8. State v. Sheehan, 519 So.2d 129, 3 (La.
Ws ete ab oe arctan teeters puch aeeee App. 80
9. State v. Sheehan, 533 So.2d 4, 1 (La. 1988)..App. 81
10. State v. Sheehan, 558 So.2d 758 (La. App. 3rd Cir.
SPU Heh Heddend eke kieecae bades ocak conga App. 82
11. State v. Sheehan, 566 So.2d 394, 2 (La.
POY FETS eas Cv oe VEN Behe buds bak tek App. 100
12. 28 U.S.C.A. 2254(d) (pre-ADEPA

ie te cage, BEE ELITE App. 101

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page
FEDERAL CASEs:
Amirault v. Fair, 968 F.2d 1404 (1st Cir. 1992)........ 20
Burton v. Johnson, 948 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1991)..... 19
Crawford v. United States, 29 S.Ct. 260 (1909) ........ 24
Gonzales v. Thomas, 99 F.3d 978 (10th Cir. 1996),

cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1342 (1997).............. 18, 19
Hunley v. Godinez, 975 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1992) (per

| rr rrr ere rer 19
McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood,

104 S.Ct. 845, 849 (1984) .............000.. 13, 16, 20
Smith v. Phillips, 102 S.Ct. 940, 948 (1982)....16, 17, 18, 19
Swain v. Alabama, 85 S.Ct. 824, 835 (1965)........... 29
Thompson v. Koehane, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1997)........... 21
Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1990)....... 19, 20
Tumey v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 520, 532 (1927)...... 18
United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68 (9th Cir. 1977).... 20
United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. at p. 50, No.

14692 g. (C.C. Va. 1807) ..cccccccccsccscvcsoees 18, 28
United States v. Bynum, 634 F.2d 768, 771 (4th Cir.

rm marr ae semen apc yr * i 5 rao Fe ae 23
United States v. Haynes, 398 F.2d 980, 984 (2nd Cir.

TU dk ceccnsweesnenedigpanieswdssne ee sitenaees 28

United States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519, 1533 (ilth
ek SED cv n'vnecécdedennceekenphaeeeekeeieaeess

United States v. Scott, 854 F.2d 697 (Sth Cir.
BE acoko-0ee ces esanbanens teEteeereae a 20, Bee

29

Vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page

LoulIsIANA CAsEs:

State v. Mitchell, 475 So.2d 61 (La. App. 2nd Cir.
nad SUERTE ELECTR EET TTT EET C ET eT Terre eee 24

State v. Simmons, 390 So.2d 1317, 1318 (La. 1980) .... 24

Unrrep States ConstItTuTION:

Sixth Amendment........................2--... 2, 13, 28
Fourteenth Amendment.................... 0.00 cccuee. 2
STATUTES:

Oe ey > I
28 U.S.C.A. 2254... 0c ccc cece ce ueues 13
BO WBA ZEIGE) ig cc ccc ccccccccccccccccevcccuccecs 2

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CITATIONS TO OPINIONS BELOW

The Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge for the
United States District Court, Western District, is unreported, Civil
Action No. 94-2249 (Appendix 2).

The Judgment of the United States District Court, Western
District, is unreported, Civil Action No. 94-2249. (Appendix 3).

The Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is
unreported, No. 96-30008. (Appendix 4).

The Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, reversing
petitioner’s conviction and sentence is reported at 515 So.2d 670
(La. App. 3rd Cir. 1987). (Appendix 7).

The subsequent denial of the state’s application for certiorari
and/or review to the Louisiana Supreme Court is reported at 519
So.2d 129, 3 (La. 1988). (Appendix 8).

The Opinion of the Louisiana Supreme Court remanding the
case back to the district court for evidentiary hearing on the motion
for a new trial because of newly discovered evidence is reported at
533 So.2d 4, 1 (La. 1988). (Appendix 9).

The Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, affirming
petitioner’s conviction and sentence is reported at 558 So.2d 758
(La. App. 3rd Cir. 1990). (Appendix 10).

The denial of petitioner’s application for writ of certiorari to
the Louisiana Supreme Court on the issues raised in petition for
writ of habeas corpus is reported at 566 So.2d 394, 2 (La. 1990).
(Appendix 11).

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This federal action began with a petition for writ of habeas
corpus filed in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Louisiana. The Magistrate Judge and District Court
Judge concluded that John Sheehan’s 1988 conviction was uncon-
stitutional. The District Court entered judgment on November 27,
1995, granting Sheehan a conditional writ of habeas corpus from
his invalid 1988 conviction with an order for his release upon the
state’s failure to re-try him within sixty days of the entry of
judgment.

The State appealed and the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction
over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. 2253. On March 11, 1997,

2

the panel reversed the District Court. On April 9, 1997, the Court
of Appeal, treating his timely filed Suggestion for Rehearing En
Banc as a Petition for Panel Rehearing in accordance with the
Court’s local rules and IOPs governing rehearings, denied John
Sheehan’s request for rehearing. Accordingly, this Honorable Court
has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. 2254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This case involves egregious violations of the Sixth Amend-
ment, Constitution of the United States, which provides:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assis-
tance of Counsel for his defense.

and the Fourteenth Amendment which provides in relevant part:

. . . [NJor shall the State deprive any person .of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of the law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.

This case also involves the misapplication of 28 U.S.C.A.
2254(d), as the provision read before the recent AEDPA amend-
ment. (See App.12) As well as, the misapplication of the presump-
tion of correctness now contained in § 2254(d), which provides in
pertinent part that a writ of habeas shall only issue where the
petitioner shows that the state court adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly estab-
lished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unrea-
sonable determination of the facts in light of the evi-
dence presented in the State court proceeding.

SAA MERE Bia K A SNE

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. Preliminary Statement.

John Sheehan is innocent. Nevertheless, he is serving a life
sentence in the Louisiana State Penitentiary without ever receiving
the fair trial promised to him by our Constitution. This is an
extraordinary and extreme case that cries out for the habeas relief
ordered by the District Court below. The constitutional violations
are so fundamental and egregious that the petition must be granted
to correct the split of authority in the circuits, and finally provide
clear guidance for the Courts of Appeals in future cases.

The Fifth Circuit panel’s reversal of the District Court’s
judgment has tured the standard of review governing the legal
question of implied juror bias on its head in favor of blind
adherence to the tortured rulings of the elected trial judge in the
small, country town of Marksville, Louisiana.

John was narrowly convicted for the accidental death of his
wife led by a foreman who lied to get on the jury. The foreman,
David Trimbur, was an active reserve police officer with the
Sheriff’s Office which investigated the alleged offense, and as it
turns out, the friend of the lead detective in the case, Detective
Venable. Trimbur even sought out the advice of a local attorney
concerning the possible effect of his deputy status before reporting
for jury duty.

The case was built almost solely upon the circumstantial bits
and pieces of the lead detective’s memory of the “crime scene”,
after he “lost” and/or “accidentally destroyed” critical Pieces of
evidence such as photos of the so-called “crime scene” and the
blouse John’s wife was wearing. Detective Venable’s credibility
and memory was the primary issue at trial. Had all of these items
of evidence not been lost or destroyed before trial, they could have
been used to tangibly refute the prosecution’s case.

Il. Factual Background.

On April 30, 1986, John Sheehan and his wife, Monica, and
their infant son, were visiting John’s grandparents in the tiny
Louisiana town of Dupont near Marksville. While his grandfather
was out crawfishing, John decided to help him by cleaning his

4

grandfather’s shotgun with oil and a rag. His wife left the den
briefly to put their infant son down for a nap. When she returned,
she seated herself, cross-legged, on the den floor facing John as he
continued to rub the oily cloth over the gun. Unknown to John; his
grandfather had left two shells in the gun which to John’s knowl-
edge and experience, he’d never done.

While John was wiping the gun down, John, his wife, and his
grandmother were visiting and talking about their family crawfish-
ing business, the gun accidently discharged striking his wife in the
upper left shoulder and chest.

John’s severely handicapped brother, Martin, who was sitting
right by Monica was unhurt. John’s grandmother, who was stand-
ing in the kitchen just off the den (the two rooms being separated
by a bar rather than a wall) sent John to find his grandfather and
telephoned for help. John’s wife died before help could arrive.

The coroner and Detective Venable on the case ruled the death
accidental, but because Sheehan had recently increased the life
insurance on his wife, Venable, urged on by Mrs. Sheehan’s family,
pursued his theory that Sheehan had purposely killed his wife for
the insurance proceeds.

In November of 1986, John Sheehan was tried for the death of
his wife in Marksville. The state’s circumstantial case developed,
sponsored, and recreated from memory by Venable resulted in
John’s narrow ten to two conviction, the minimum required for
conviction. The Louisiana Court of Appeals, however, reversed and
remanded in light of Detective Venable’s violation of Miranda.
State v. Sheehan, 515 So.2d 670 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1987) (App.7). —

Given the extensive, sensational media coverage of his arrest,
trial, and conviction in this small community, Sheehan then filed a
Motion to Change Venue. The judge denied the motion. Sheehan
was retried in Marksville in April 1988, again before the same
judge. On April 30, 1988, he was convicted by a narrow ten to two
verdict.

After the trial, the defense learned that foreman Trimbur had
concealed the fact that he was an actively commissioned reserve
deputy with the Avoyelles Parish Sheriff’s Office. The defense also
learned that he was in fact a close personal friend and confidante of
the lead detective in the case, Detective Venable. During jury

bed
1 0 an 2h a ecb aL NEN roan ER,

ie

5

selection, Trimbur denied any telationship with the prosecuting
authorities and any close relationship with the state’s key witness.
The defense also discovered that members of the jury had learned
from news coverage that Sheehan had been tried and convicted
before, and they had discussed these facts before and during their
deliberations.

In light of the extraordinary manipulation of the jury selection
process and the jury’s exposure to the highly prejudicial extrinsic
information regarding his prior conviction, Sheehan filed a Motion
for New Trial.

At Sheehan’s trial, the trial court asked the following ques-
tions and received the following answers from Trimbur:

Q. Are you or any members of your family or close

friends employed by the District Attorney’s Office or by

the Sheriff's Office?

A. No sir.

(Tr., Vol. 4, p. 918) (Emphasis supplied).

Q. Is there any personal, business, family, or health

reason that you know of why you could not serve as an

impartial juror in this case?

A. None that I know of.

(Tr., Vol. 4, p. 919-20) (Emphasis supplied).

Q. Alright then Rev. Trimbur the district attorney of
Avoyelles Parish is Eddie Knoll. He just left here
for a few minutes. He’ll be back. The assistant
district attorney for this trial is David Lafargue.

The administrative assistant is Mr. Freeman Ford.
Do you know any of these people?

I know Eddie Knoll by name. But, I mean, I know
him, but not,

You know him as the district attorney?

Yes sir.

Have you ever had any dealings with him?

No sir.

rPOPrO >

(Tr., Vol. 4, p. 917)

Additionally, Trimbur had led the Court and counsel to
believe that he was merely a passing acquaintance of Detective
Venable:

6

Q. Let me ask you some names and see if you know
these folks.

A. Yes sir.

Q. Detective Robert Venable with the Sheriff’s Office?

A. Yes sir.

Q. And how do you know Detective Venable?

A. I performed his wedding a year and a half ago.

Q. All right. And, did you have to — when I got
married, I met with the preacher in advance, and he
kind of counselled you and stuff, did you do any of
that, or did you just do the ceremony?

A. I just did the ceremony.

Q. All right. Do you know his wife?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Was she a member of your congregation, or he?

A. She was. That was in Evergreen.

Q. All right have you had any contact with him since
that time?

A. I saw him yesterday for a few minutes in the hall,

and I asked him about his marriage.
Q. Other than that?
A. No sir. Not really.
(Tr., Vol. 4, p. 930) (Emphasis supplied).

The first hearing on the Motion for New Trial was held on
June 28, 1988. (Tr., Vol. 7-8, pp. 1525-1653). Venable’s hearing
testimony revealed that he and his wife attended Trimbur’s small
congregation (Tr., Vol. 7, p. 1533); that they saw each other
“numerous” times in 1986 (Tr., Vol. 7, pp. 1533-34); that Trimbur
would just “drop by” and visit with Venable in the Detective’s
Office at the Sheriff’s Office before the trial (Tr., Vol. 7, pp.
1535-36); that Venable’s wife also worked for the Sheriff’s Office,
and was commissioned with Trimbur (Tr., Vol. 7, pp. 1538); that
Venable had in fact assisted Trimbur in becoming an auxiliary
deputy by making a recommendation to the Sheriff on his behalf
(Tr., Vol. 7, pp. 1539-40); that, in 1987, through January 1988,
Venable saw Trimbur at least once a month (Tr., Vol. 7, pp.

eee

Lc ine a RR,

7

1540-41); Venable recalled seeing Trimbur at the Sheriff’s Office
before the trial, probably in his sheriff’s deputy uniform, and
remembered Trimbur being admitted through the locked back door
after knocking because he had “every reason to be around there”
and only police officers or employees of the District Attorney’s
office are allowed in this way (Tr., Vol. 7, p. 1541-1542); that
Venable had visited in the Trimbur home at least half a dozen times
before the trial; further, he had coffee with the Trimburs at their
home two or three months before the hearing (just before
Sheehan’s trial) and he could just drop by to visit at any time (Tr.,
Vol. 7, p. 1543); Venable saw Trimbur at least three or four times
between January 1988 and April 1988 to discuss Venable’s marital
problems (Tr., Vol. 7, p. 1545); and Venable was very comfortable
confiding in Trimbur as a friend and as a pastor (Tr., Vol. 7, p.
1546).

Sergeant Malcolm LaBorde, a veteran with the Avoyelles
Parish Sheriff’s Office, also testified at the hearing. He told the
court that he had personally been on patrol with Trimbur at least
five or six times in 1987 (Tr., Vol. 7, pp. 1549-50); that he had seen
Trimbur patrolling with many other deputies usually on the twelve
hour evening shift (Tr., Vol. 7, p. 1550); that regular and auxiliary
deputies wore the same uniforms; you could not tell the difference
between the two (Tr., Vol. 7, p. 1550); Trimbur had ridden with
him to make arrests and to check out complaints (Tr., Vol. 8, p.
1551); Trimbur received officer training; he knew how to book
suspects, write reports, handcuff suspects, and he carries a gun on
patrol (Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1551); Trimbur had to be qualified for fire
arms training by the Alexandria Police Department, and had to re-
qualify twice a year (Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1552); Trimbur was required to
attend monthly training meetings at the Sheriff’s Office (Tr., Vol. 8,
p. 1553); and Trimbur was often at the Sheriff’s Office even if he
was not on duty (Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1555).

Deputy LaBorde also testified that he had asked Trimbur how
he had managed to get on the Sheehan jury. He was curious
because people working at the Sheriff’s Office do not serve on
juries. Deputy LaBorde stated that Trimbur told him that “some-
body had asked him some questions, you know, if he was working
with [the Sheriff’s Office], and he said yes.” (Tr., Vol. 8, pp.
1555-56).

8

Gano Bergeron, a captain with the Sheriff’s Office, testified
that he was responsible for training and dispatching all auxiliary
deputies. (Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1598); that Trimbur was one of the more
concerned deputies and he worked more than the required mini-
mum 16 hours a month. (Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1599-1600). While he was
in charge of training, Trimbur and the others received training in
how to work car accidents, the law governing searches and sei-
zures, how to secure crime scenes, and “shoot, don’t shoot” firearm
safety. (Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1600).

At the hearing, Trimbur was forced to admit he was commis-
sioned as a reserve deputy in October of 1985 (Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1562),
and that he kept his commission at home in a drawer; that he was
required to wear a sheriff’s deputy uniform and hat and the same
badge as regular sheriff’s deputies (Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1557); that he
owned a gun which he only carried while on patrol, although when
asked during voir dire whether he “used guns” he said he did not
(Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1558; Vol. 4, p. 932); that he attended monthly
training meetings at the Avoyelles Parish Sheriff's Office through-
out 1986, 1987, and 1988 (Tr., Vol. 8, pp. 1560-61); that he rode
around with various deputies on patrol, and while on patrol he and
his partners had arrested suspects, transported them to jail, and
interrogated them in jail (Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1559); that he was required
to work at least eight hours every month in addition to his eight
hours of monthly training to maintain his deputy position (Tr., Vol.
8, pp. 1562-63); and he admitted that he had been called up for
duty during the Cuban inmate crisis at Oakdale, and was paid by
the Sheriff’s Office for guarding an inmate at Humana Hospital
(Tr., Vol. 8, pp. 1563, 1590-91). All of this occurred while John
Sheehan was a trustee in the tiny Avoyelles Parish Jail, where
Trimbur and Venable worked.

After the hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Thereafter,
Sheehan applied for writs to the Louisiana Supreme Court because
of newly discovered evidence that Trimbur had contacted an
attorney when he received his summons, seeking legal advice
regarding his minister exemption and questions about the possible
effect of his position with the Sheriff’s Office on his ability to
serve as a juror or to get out of service altogether.

a

De heen RAPES A AD: SN ak ld tt DMPO

Anak Ab om Mit PKA

9

In November of 1988, the Louisiana Supreme Court granted
writs and remanded the case to the trial court with an order for a
second evidentiary hearing. (App.9).

At the second hearing on the motion for new trial, Trimbur
admitted that as soon as he received his jury summons he sought
out the advice of a local attorney, Claire Sharpe, who attended his
church. (Tr. Supplement, p. 24-25). He said he called Ms. Sharpe
to see if he had to show up for jury duty since he had a minister
exemption, but claimed he did not remember asking if his service
as a deputy would prevent him from jury service. He testified that
he called her because of his “busyness . . . I just wanted to not
bother with it.” (Tr. Supplement, p. 25-26). Ms. Sharpe advised
him to call the judge. He said he did so, but he did not tell the
judge he was a deputy. (Tr. Supplement, pp. 26-27)

Claire Sharpe testified that Trimbur called her and asked her if
a minister was prohibited from serving on a jury:

And I told him that I felt like it’s not an automatic thing,
that he can be exempted if he wanted to be. And he said
— we talked a while and then [Trimbur] said something
about, what about being an auxiliary deputy? And, |
said, again, I think it’s basically the same thing . . . And
I said, well, if you’re extremely worried about it, you
can just tell them, when you’re asked questions ... I
explained to him that he would be asked many ques-
tions by the defense and by the prosecution, concern-
ing his relationships . . . I said, it’s difficult for you to
determine what’s important because you’re not an
attorney; and I said, you needn’t worry. If you’re
willing to serve, they’ll ask you those questions and
just answer them.

(Tr. Supplement, pp. 35-36) (Emphasis supplied).

Ms. Sharpe stated that on at least two occasions she distinctly
remembered Trimbur reflecting concern, interest, curiosity, and the
like over the possible effect of his deputy status. At one point, he
told her that it would probably be best for him to take his minister
exemption, but she urged him to serve, suggesting to him that he
would be a good juror. (Tr. Supplement, p. 36). She further testified
that she specifically advised Trimbur that the lawyers would know

10

what to ask and for him to just make sure he completely and
truthfully answered their questions. (Tr. Supplement, p. 37).

Ms. Sharpe testified that during her conversation with Trimbur
he had even voiced concern about the possibility of a mistrial or
multiple appeals if he decided to serve on the jury:

Q. Now, do you remember why that term, “mistrial” or
“appeal” came into the conversation? In what con-
text was that used?

A. Well, that would relate to what I just told Mr. Knoll
concerning his being a minister and a deputy, if, for
some reason, down the line, whether or not he’s
asked the question, that there would be repetitive
appeals and possibly the word “mistrial;” I really
don’t remember, but we did talk about something

like that.
Q. As regards to his status as a minister and deputy?
A. Yes.

(Tr. Supplement, p. 42).

At the prior hearing, Trimbur testified that “he was never
asked” whether or not he was a reserve deputy, but would have
admitted it, if specifically asked. (Exhibit A, Vol. 8, p. 1593). He
also said that he did not recall the trial judge asking him if he
worked for the Sheriff’s Office, but stated that he had not told the
judge that he was a deputy sheriff because he “felt” his involve-
ment with the Sheriff Office was minimal and of no consequence.
(Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1573).

The following exchange occurred during Trimbur’s voir dire
testimony:

Q. Ok. Now, the other thing is, being in the city like
you have, I’m curious, have you had any kind of —
I don’t want to say outrage or up-roar, but conflict
about drinking in one of the neighboring towns,
and teenage drinking; and Mr. Rabalais is involved
in that. Are you — does that refresh your memory?
Have you been to any meetings that Mr. Rabalais
attended or you’ve attended, or Mr. Knoll’s
attended, on that issue?

A. Yes.

11

Tell me about that.

I went to see what was going to transpire in the

way of exchange of dialogue with the gentleman

representing out ABC Board Camp. Mr. Rabalais’

connection with that has no bearing on me, Ok? I

wouldn’t — I don’t portray myself with this word,

“outrage.” Ok?

Q. Well, I don’t know what the right word is, Ok? I’m
just looking for a word. . . . conflict...

A. I attended one meeting at the Concerned Parents
for Better Avoyelles, if that’s what you’re referring
to.

I don’t know.

Yes sir, that, I think, is what you’re referring to. Mr.
Rabalais was present at that meeting; I know that.

Ok, and what about Mr. Knoll?
Yes sir.

> ©

> ©

> ©

Ok, where is — what is your interest in that issue?

You know, I can follow up and you can answer all

the questions. And, does that come from just a

personal interest as an individual, or is that

4 through your representing the interest of your

; congregation, or of your religion or, you know,
whatever?

A. Through my church. . . . that was through per-

sonal interest as an individual.
(Tr., Vol. 4, pp. 928-29) (Emphasis supplied).

At the hearing, however, Trimbur corrected his voir dire
testimony. He stated that during the meeting at District Attorney
Eddie Knoll’s house approximately a month before Sheehan’s trial,
he “spoke up and said in that meeting . . . I said, I have a
commission, I am a deputy, I have a uniform, if you ever need

help in this parish, in this area, call me and I will see if I can
work out a way to be of assistance to you.” (Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1572).
He did not ever mention this critical information during voir dire.

Trimbur testified that he did not think the fact that he assumed
a law enforcement role at this meeting was important. Trimbur

©

Sabie ND RR ins OE

12

testified that since the District Attorney prosecuting Sheehan knew
he was a deputy, and he assumed Sheehan’s counsel, Rodney
Rabalias and Tucker Melancon (now a sitting federal district court
judge), knew he was a deputy, he thought someone would bring it
up “if it was of any consequence”. (Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1573). This
testimony prompted the following colloquy between defense coun-
sel, Lewis Unglesby, and Trimbur:
Q. Now, Rev. Trimbur, were you confused about the
fact that I was interested in what happened, and
what you were doing at that meeting?
A. Yes.
Q. You were? Well, why did you not think to volun-
teer that you had taken on the role at that meeting
of a volunteer police officer who would help those
in the community concerned about the drinking of
under-aged children, and that you, yourself, are
willing to report that to the deputies or the District
Attorney, or whomever was the appropriate author-
ity. Why didn’t you tell me that?
A. I absolutely didn’t feel it had any consequence at
all, in this trial.
(Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1574). He did, however, admit that the trial court
had told him and other potential jurors that there might be ques-
tions during voir dire that might not seem important or might even
seem silly, but each juror needed to answer those questions hon-
estly and completely to the best of his ability. (Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1575).

After the hearing, the trial court denied Sheehan’s motion
because in his mind there was an issue as to whether Trimbur was
technically “employed” by the Sheriff’s Office, since, although he
was paid for guarding inmates, he was “only” a reserve deputy.
While the judge admitted Trimbur’s answer during voir dire was
“arguably less than a full disclosure”, he excused Trimbur’s answer
because “he did not intentionally mislead anyone.” (Tr., Vol. 8, p.
1657). The judge further reasoned that the only way the defense
could show bias was to show, in the abstract, that law enforcement
personnel are prosecution oriented, since Trimbur claimed that he
had no prior knowledge of the case. (Tr., p. 1657). Further, the
judge found Trimbur had not “intentionally misled” the defense
about his friendship with Venable, stating the attorneys should have

13

asked more questions about it to unearth this information. (Tr., pp.
1661-2).

Following the second hearing on the motion, the trial court
again denied the motion. (Tr. Supplement, p. 43).

Itt. Action of the District Court and Court of Appeals.

Following the exhaustion of his state court remedies, John
Sheehan filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254 on December 8, 1994. By memorandum order dated
February 1, 1995, the state was ordered to answer the petition and
submit the entire state court record with the court. On May 15,
1995, the District Court referred the petition to Magistrate Judge
Simon for his report and recommendation. (App.2).

After thorough briefing of the issues, the Magistrate Judge
issued his written recommendation that the writ of habeas corpus
be granted because John Sheehan’s Sixth Amendment right to a
fair trial before an impartial jury was violated. (App.3).

After an exhaustive review of the record, the Magistrate Judge
found that “Trimbur’s testimony was riddled with inconsisten-
cies.” (App.3, p.9). The Magistrate found proven evidence of
actual bias under McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Green-
wood, 104 S.Ct. 845 (1984), as well as, implied bias:

The facts and circumstances of this case, taken as a
whole, show that Trimbur deliberately concealed his
employment with the Sheriff’s Office because he
wanted to be on the jury; in fact, he was the jury
foreman. Trimbur was asked to state his employment
with the Sheriff’s Office and did not do so because he
‘did not think it was important’. Trimbur did not take
his minister’s exemption because ‘he wanted to serve on
this jury’. Whether or not Trimbur believed his job as an
auxiliary deputy would not influence his judgment as a
juror, and through him, the other jurors, is irrelevant;
that was not his decision to make. See Scott, 854 F.2d at
699 (juror’s conscious censoring of the information that
his brother was a deputy sheriff created a strong infer-
ence that he wanted to serve on the jury and thought it
unlikely that the court or defense counsel would permit
him to do so).

14

While fully cognizant of the presumption of correctness, the
Magistrate further ruled:

However, in the instant case, the trial judge made no

finding as to whether the circumstances indicated that

Trimbur was biased; he only found that a deputy sheriff

was not disqualified from serving as a juror because he

could not be considered biased per se which is actually

an erroneous statement of the law. An inference of bias

was created by Trimbur’s conscious censoring of the

information that he was an auxiliary Deputy Sheriff

and that he was friends with Detective Venable; but, as

an active auxiliary deputy sheriff, he was considered to

be biased as a matter of law. (App.3, p.15)

On November 27, 1995, after a full review of the record, the
District Court entered judgment granting Sheehan a conditional
writ of habeas corpus. The state appealed claiming the District
Court erred in every respect. The Court of Appeal reversed, ruling
that “the lower courts failed to defer properly to the state court
findings of fact”. (App.1, p.2).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The fundamental issue raised by these proceedings is whether
any juror, who neglects, conceals, or fails to disclose the fact that
he is an actively commissioned, badge-wearing, gun carrying
reserve deputy sheriff with the very agency responsible for investi-
gating and charging petitioner and a friend of the lead detective,
can ever be considered a fair juror, despite his post-trial protesta-
tions of impartiality, and the trial judge’s blind acceptance of his
claimed freedom from bias. Particularly where, the objective,
undisputable evidence shows that he was so concerned about the
effect of his deputy status on the possibility of getting out of jury
service that he sought out the advice of a local attorney before he
ever walked through the courthouse doors and discovered that he
had the opportunity to participate in the most sensationalized
murder case in the history of his small, rural community.

It is petitioner’s contention that, given the proven, objective
reality presented by the evidentiary record, it is impossible as a
matter of law, for such a juror to be impartial, and that the trial
judge’s finding that the foreman sincerely believed he could be

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15

impartial despite these undisclosed relationships to the prosecuting
agency flies in the face of all logic, psychology, and human
experience.

This Court should finally and squarely address the question of
whether implied bias is a pure question of law or a mixed question
of law and fact beyond the reach of the presumption of correctness.
The Court should correct the resulting split of authority among the
circuits on this issue.

The First, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have
ruled that implied bias, as opposed to actual or admitted bias, is a
question of law beyond the reach of the presumption of correctness
whereas the Fifth Circuit below applied the presumption to this
purely legal issue, or at a minimum, this mixed question of law and
fact.

The lead detective was the state’s key police witness against
John Sheehan. He was a very important witness. He testified that
he took photos of the alleged crime scene, but that the film was
destroyed because he left the camera in the sun. The jury had to
test Venable’s credibility. Trimbur and Venable had coffee together
in Trimbur’s home some time just before the trial and discussed the
detective’s marital problems. Trimbur could not impartially judge
this case in light of his relationships and natural allegiances to the
Sheriff’s Department and the detective who had helped him get his
commission. Trimbur got the job because his friend, Venable,
recommended him to the Sheriff.

Trimbur had even called an attorney after receiving his jury
summons, seeking advice. His attorney testified they he had men-
tioned his relationship with the sheriff’s office and raised concerns
about the effect of this relationship upon his ability to sit on this
jury and the possibility of a mistrial or repeated appeals. His
attorney told him to tell the trial court and the attorneys involved if
he was extremely worried about it, and to just answer the questions
honestly and completely. He did not.

Trimbur wore the same uniform, badge, and hat as full time
deputies. He carried a gun on patrol and had to qualify and re-
qualify twice a year to carry his weapon although when asked in
voir dire if he “used guns” he said: “No.” At every turn, informa-
tion which could have lead to the discovery of his being a deputy
was suppressed.

16

Had Trimbur honestly answered the direct questions put to
him, the defense would have had a valid basis to challenge him
for cause under well settled Louisiana law. A reserve deputy
sheriff is too likely to be influenced as a juror by that associa-
tion and should be disqualified from jury service. Accordingly,
he was denied the right to a fair trial before an impartial jury
under McDonough, and regardless of whether the pre- or post-
AEDPA standard is employed, petitioner proved by clear and
convincing evidence that the state court findings on the issue
of actual bias were incorrect. Moreover, the District Court was
correct in granting John Sheehan the habeas relief required by
the United States Constitution under the implied bias doctrine.
The District Court’s resolution of this purely legal or mixed
question of law and fact is not subject to the presumption of
correctness.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

An accused’s right to be tried by an impartial jury of his
peers is one of the hallmarks of our constitutional heritage. The
Sixth Amendment commands that “[ijn all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 2.:d public
trial, by an impartial jury .. .” U.S. Const. amend. VI. Every
member of any jury must be “capable and willing to decide the
case solely on the evidence before it. . . . ” Smith v. Phillips,
102 S.Ct. 940, 946 (1982). The voir dire process protects this
inviolate principle “by exposing possible biases, both known
and unknown, on the part of potential jurors.” McDonough
Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 104 S.Ct. 845, 849
(1984).

As the Court noted in McDonough:

Demonstrated bias in the responses to questions on

voir dire may result in a juror’s being excused for

cause; hints of bias not sufficient to warrant chal-
lenge for cause may assist parties in exercising their
peremptory challenges. The necessity of truthful
answers by prospective jurors if this process is to
serve its purpose is obvious.
McDonough, 104 S.Ct. at 849. This critically important process
of rooting out biased jurors is thwarted, however, when jurors

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17

fail to honestly and completely answer the questions put to
them during the voir dire examination.

The authority to accept jurors for service is vested by law
in the court and counsel. By withholding information, prospec-
tive jurors effectively usurp this critical decision-making
authority. When this occurs, the verdict is infected by bias and
constitutionally unreliable. The opportunity for prejudice to the
accused is obvious. Justice O’Connor aptly observed these
difficulties in Smith v. Phillips, 102 S.Ct. 940, 948 (1982):

Determining whether a juror is biased or has pre-
judged a case is difficult, partly because the juror
may be unaware of it. The problem may be com-
pounded when a charge of bias arises from a charge
of juror misconduct. . . . Whether or not the state
proceedings result in a finding of “no bias,” the
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury should
not allow a verdict to stand under such circum-
stances [where bias is implied].

As the District Court properly held below, that is what pre-
cisely happened in this case.

Given the extreme facts of this case, it is impossible as a
matter of law, for such a jury foreman to be considered impar-
tial. The trial judge’s apologia for Trimbur’s inexcusable fail-
ure to fully and frankly answer direct questions flies in the face
of all logic, psychology, and human experience. Without ques-
tion, one biased juror destroys the integrity of any verdict.

Given the natural, and often subconscious, human propen-
sity for self-justification, it is difficult, at best, if not impossi-
ble to learn from a juror’s own testimony whether he was in
fact impartial. In the instant case, it would be virtually impos-
sible to expect that any juror, in Trimbur’s position, could
admit that his undisclosed law enforcement history had indeed
affected or influenced his verdict and behavior as foreman.
Nearly 200 years ago, Chief Justice Marshall, in words partic-
ularly appropriate to this case, stated that a person “may
declare that he feels no prejudice in the case; and yet the law
cautiously incapacitates him from serving on the jury because
it suspects prejudice, because in general persons in a similar

18

situation would feel prejudice.” United States v. Burr, 25 Fed.
Cas. at p. 50, No. 14692 g. (C.C. Va. 1807). Only cynics or
sophists could possibly declare — much less believe — that the
foreman in this case would not be subject to “a possible
temptation . . . not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true
between the state and the accused . . .” Tumey v. State of Ohio,
273 U.S. 520, 532 (1927). Undoubtedly, the extreme nature of
this case is precisely the kind Justice O’Connor had in mind in
Smith v. Phillips, supra.

I. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S APPLICATION OF THE
PRESUMPTION OF CORRECTNESS TO A QUES-
TION OF LAW IS IN CONFLICT WITH SEVERAL
DECISIONS OF OTHER COURTS OF APPEALS
NECESSITATING CORRECTION AND CLEAR
GUIDANCE FROM THIS COURT.

The decision of the Fifth Circuit has created a dangerous
split of authority among various circuit courts of appeal
regarding the application of the presumption of correctness to
the legal question of implied or presumptive juror bias. The
Fifth Circuit below decided that the doctrine of implied bias is
a question of fact not law; and therefore, governed by the
presumption of correctness. In doing so, the court reversed the
District Court’s finding that John Sheehan was entitled to
independent federal review of his constitutional challenges.
The First, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have
ruled that implied bias is a question of law beyond the reach of
the presumption of correctness.

In Gonzales v. Thomas, 99 F.3d 978 (10th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S.Ct. 1342 (1997), the Tenth Circuit ruled in a
state prisoner’s habeas case that whether implied bias exists in
a juror is a legal determination that turns on an objective
evaluation of the challenged juror’s background and relation to
the case being tried. Drawing on Justice O’Connor’s concur-
rence in Smith v. Phillips, supra, the court noted that such
extreme circumstances requiring a finding of implied bias
which might include a revelation that the juror is an employee
of the prosecuting agency like we have as in this case. The
court further noted:

19

Thus, juror bias may he found even though a juror
denies any partiality. A vinding of implied bias in the
face of a juror’s denials is not, however, tantamount
to a finding that the juror has lied. As Justice O’Con-
nor has observed, ‘[djetermining whether a juror is
biased or has prejudged the case is difficult, partly
because the juror may be unaware of it.’ Though a
juror might honestly believe she can be impartial,
she nevertheless may have ‘such a close connection
to the circumstances at hand that bias must be pre-
sumed’.

Gonzales, 99 F.3d at 987 (Citations omitted).

Likewise, in another state prisoner habeas case, the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that a woman con-
victed for the first degree murder of her spouse was entitled to
a new trial in light of a juror’s dishonest responses to voir dire
questioning regarding intra-family abuse. The court held that
whether a juror’s bias may be implied from circumstances is a
question of law. Any doubts regarding bias must be resolved
against the juror, and a juror’s dishonesty, of itself, was evi-
dence of juror’s bias. Burton v. Johnson, 948 F.2d 1150 (10th
Cir. 1991).

In another state prisoner habeas action, the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Hunley v. Godinez, 975 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1992) (per
curiam), the Seventh Circuit rejected the state’s contention that
the district court erroneously invoked the doctrine of implied
bias in order to evade the presumption of correctness. While
noting that this Court has held that actual bias is a question of
fact entitled to deference on review, this Court “ ‘has never
precluded the use of the conclusive presumption of bias’ in
‘extreme’ or ‘extraordinary cases,’ ” citing Justice O’Connor’s
concurring opinion in Smith. Hunley, 975 F.2d at 318. Accord-
ingly, the court succinctly held that whether a juror’s partiality
may be presumed from the circumstances is a question of law
beyond the reach of the presumption of correctness. Hunley,
975 F.2d at 318-319.

The Ninth Circuit in Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520 (9th
Cir. 1990), involved a claim of implied bias rejected by the
district court. The court clearly would not have been deterred

20

“personal connection” between the challenged juror and the
litigation as was presented in United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d
68 (9th Cir. 1977). The court concluded that the circumstances
did not warrant a presumption of bias:

Neither juror Smith herself nor a close relative had
been a rape victim or rapist. There was no personal
connection between Smith and the defendant, the
victim, or any other witness. Smith had no prejudi-
cial information about the defendant himself. This
situation differs significantly from that presented in
Allsup. In Allsup, the jurors in question worked for
the very bank which had been robbed . . . Not only
was there this employment relationship, but as bank
employees they had a well-founded, ‘reasonable
apprehension of violence’ by offenders such as the
defendant because ‘violence, or the threat of vio-
lence, is a frequent concomitant of the offense’ of
bank robbery . . . This combination added up to
presumed bias.

Tinsley, 895 F.2d at 529 (Emphasis supplied).

The First Circuit in Amirault v. Fair, 968 F.2d 1404 (lst
Cir. 1992), noted that state court findings on claims of actual
bias are presumed correct under 28 U.S.C.A. 2254(d). None-
theless, the court further noted

Although we read the majority vote in McDonough
Power Equipment v. Greenwood . . . to require a
further determination on the question of juror bias
even where a juror is found to have been honest, we
find that bias should not be implied here. As the
federal district court observed, the situation pre-
sented here of a juror found to have locked the
memory of an unrelated forty-year old rape does not
rise to the level of ‘exceptional’ or ‘extreme’ cir-
cumstances which may permit a finding of implied
bias.
Amirault, 968 F.2d at 1405-1496 (Citations omitted).

Although the full Court has yet to squarely decide the
issue and clear guidance is needed from the Court, the analysis

|
by the presumption of correctness had there been evidence of a

21

should be no less than that employed in Thompson v. Koehane,
116 S.Ct. 457 (1997). There, Justice Ginsburg, writing for a
solid majority, held that a state court decision as to whether a
suspect is “in custody” for purposes of Miranda is not entitled
to the statutory presumption of correctness, but is a mixed
question of law and fact warranting independent federal habeas
review. “What happened” issues of historical fact warrant the
presumption of correctness, but the “ultimate question” — Was
the foreman on John’s jury presumptively biased under the
totality of the circumstances? — falls outside of § 2254(d)’s
domain because of its “uniquely legal dimension” requiring the
court to apply an objective test to resolve “the ultimate
inquiry”. Thompson, 116 S.Ct. at 465. At a minimum, implied
juror bias must by necessity present a mixed question of law
and fact. Otherwise the doctrine would have little efficacy and
vitality in egregious situations like the one at bar.

Il. THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
DO NOT PERMIT AN INNOCENT MAN TO BE
CONDEMNED TO LIFE IN PRISON BASED ON A
CONVICTION ORCHESTRATED AND INFECTED
BY A PRESUMPTIVELY BIASED JURY FOREMAN.

The foreman of John Sheehan’s jury deliberately denied
the fact that he was a reserve criminal sheriff’s deputy. This
was critically important information because this office was
the very agency that investigated the death of John’s wife. He
also decided to consciously censor any information, like gun
use, which could have led the defense to the truth about his
connection with the investigating and prosecuting agencies
involved. Even though he was directly asked to reveal this sort
of information, he chose not to do so. Further compounding the
problem, when he was asked whether he knew a Detective
Venable, Trimbur’s answers led the court and the defense to
believe he was merely an acquaintance of Detective Venable.
In fact, he was the close personal friend, confidante, and
spiritual counsellor to Venable — the very detective who was
vigorously challenged at trial for his mishandling of critical
evidence and credibility problems. Once on the jury, a juror

22

who denied, concealed, and consciously censored critical infor-
mation about his relationship with both the Sheriff’s Office and
the state’s key police witness became its foreman and led the
jury to convict John Sheehan. This is presumptive bias in itself,
requiring habeas relief.

Even giving the foreman every benefit of the doubt, the
circumstances point so sharply to bias that even his own
denials of partiality must be discounted. United States v. Nell,
526 F.2d 1223, 1229 n. 8 (Sth Cir. 1976). He may to this day
sincerely believe that his undisclosed law enforcement rela-
tionships would not taint his judgment, but that is why Justice
O’Connor’s observations in Smith are so critical:

Determining whether a juror is biased or has pre-

judged a case is difficult, partly because the juror

may have an interest in concealing his own bias
and partly because the juror may be unaware of it.
Smith, 102 S.Ct. at 948.

In United States v. Scott, 854 F.2d 697 (Sth Cir. 1988), the
Fifth Circuit ruled that prospective jurors cannot be permitted
to censor material information during voir dire examination. In
Scott, the issue of juror bias arose when it was discovered that
the foreman of the jury failed to disclose the fact that his
brother was a deputy sheriff in the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s
Office. Scott moved for a new trial.

At the hearing, the foreman admitted his brother was a
deputy sheriff, but attempted to justify his actions by stating
that he had not furnished the information because he did not
think that it would affect his judgment in the case. Scott, 854
F.2d at 698. The trial court found that his failure to disclose
this relationship was “unreasonable”. Nevertheless, the trial
court excused his breach of faith because in the court’s opinion
the foreman “sincerely” believed that his brother’s position
would not affect his impartiality as a juror.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit pointed out that “sincerity” is
not the proper constitutional test. There, the court held that the
constitution required a new trial due to implied bias: “The
dispute here, as the trial court and [the government] couched it,
is whether [the foreman] “failed to answer honestly. At bottom,
however, the issue is whether [the foreman] was biased

email

23

because of his relationship with his brother.” Scott, 854 F.2d at
699. Further, this Court pointed out:
The district court found that [the foreman] was “sin-
cere”. That is an insufficient basis for the court to
accept [the foreman] as a juror. A finding of “sin-
cerity” is not the same as a finding that the juror
was unbiased. A juror may not conceal material
facts disqualifying him simply because he sincerely
believes that he can be fair in spite of them.
Continuing, the Scott court recognized the tension, if not the
contradiction, inherent in the trial court’s findings. On the one
hand, the court found his failure to respond “unreasonable”,
and on the other, excusable given his “sincere” belief that he
could be an impartial juror. The court found that the foreman
“consciously censored” his relationship to law enforcement,
noting there was a strong inference that he wanted to serve on
the jury because he “believed it was his place, and not the
place of the court or defense counsel, to determine whether his
relations were a bar to jury service in this case.”
The court concluded its ruling, saying:
[The foreman] was hostile to what he correctly per-
ceived to be the interests of the defense and the
court. This in itself constitutes bias. As other cir-
cuits have recognized, “[c]Jertainly, when possible
non-objectivity is secreted and compounded by the
untruthfulness of a potential juror’s answer on voir
dire, the result is a deprivation of the defendant’s
right to a fail trial.”

Scott, 854 F.2d at 699-700, citing United States v. Perkins, 748
F.2d 1519, 1533 (11th Cir. 1984), quoting United States v.
Bynum, 634 F.2d 768, 771 (4th Cir. 1980).

Scott should have decided this case. The only real differ-
ence between Scott and the case at bar is that the jury foreman
in Scott hid the fact that his brother was a deputy sheriff. Here,
the jury foreman in John’s trial concealed not only the fact that
he was a deputy, but also that he was the social friend of the
prosecution’s star witness. One’s relationship to law enforce-
ment or persons in law enforcement are “challenge for cause”
questions; their implications for potential juror bias have been

Jo

recognized for centuries in Anglo-American jurisdictions. See
generally, Crawford v. United States, 29 S.Ct. 260 (1909).

The questions put to Trimbur demanded complete and
honest answers. The trial judge in his instructions had told
Trimbur that candor was required. He decided not to comply
with the rule of law. His “sincere” belief that he was not biased
is objectively unreasonable as the Magistrate and District
Court judges found.

Had Trimbur disclosed his relationships with the Sheriff's
Office and Detective Venable he would never have been
allowed to sit on this jury. Clear Louisiana jurisprudence at the
time of John’s trial supported challenging Trimbur for cause
had the defense known of his law enforcement relationships.
An active or reserve polic. officer at the time of trial is too
likely to be influenced as a juror by that association and should
be disqualified from the jury. In State v. Simmons, 390 So.2d
1317, 1318 (La. 1980), the Louisiana Supreme Court held:
7 . an actively employed criminal deputy sheriff is not a
competent criminal juror. Any jurisprudence to the contrary is
expressly overruled.” In State v. Mitchell, 475 So.2d 61 (La.
App. 2nd Cir. 1985), the court held:

[OJur review of the extensive Supreme Court juris-

prudence on the issue of jury service by one assoaci-

ated with law enforcement activities causes us to
determine that the trial court erred in failing to
sustain the challenges for cause by the defendants to

this juror. We conclude that our Supreme Court has

deemed that one serving in the capacity as an active

or reserve peace officer, such as a deputy sheriff or

police officer, is too likely to be influenced as a

juror by that association and should be disqualified

from jury service.
Mitchell, 475 So.2d at 65.

Trimbur’s inconsistent explanations of why he failed to
answer raise alarming questions about his actual bias and
personal motivations. His “explanations” are so riddled with
inconsistencies that it is difficult to ascertain what his actual
testimony is at times. The Magistrate Judge and District Court
agreed.

25

Trimbur admitted he attended a meeting of a civic group
called “Concerned Parents for a Better Avoyelles” at the Dis-
trict Attorney’s home just weeks before Sheehan’s trial. Trim-
bur stated that, at this meeting he “spoke up and said in that
meeting ... I said, I have a commission, I am a deputy, I
have a uniform, if you ever need help in this parish, in this
area, call me and I will see if I can work out a way to be of
assistance to you.” (Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1572). He attempted to
justify his failure to disclose this information during jury
selection, saying he thought someone would bring it up “if it
was of any consequence”. (Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1573). Even if he
“sincerely” believed it was not important, and even if he
“sincerely” believed his law enforcement relationships would
not influence his judgment, and, through him, the other jurors,
his beliefs are irrelevant. It was not his decision to make. It
was the duty of counsel and the trial court to do so. As in Scott,
this creates a strong inference that he wanted to serve on the
jury and thought it unlikely that the court or defense counsel
would permit him to do so.

When pressed to explain this obvious omission he claimed
he was confused by the questions about the meeting and did
not think it was important:
Q. Now, Rev. Trimbur, were you confused about
the fact that I was interested in what happened,
and what you were doing at that meeting?

A. Yes.

Q. You were? Well, why did you not think to
volunteer that you had taken on the role at that
meeting of a volunteer police officer who
would help those in the community concerned
about the drinking of under-aged children, and
that you, yourself, are willing to report that to
the deputies or the District Attorney, or whom-
ever was the appropriate authority. Why didn’t
you tell me that?

A. I absolutely didn’t feel it had any consequence
at all, in this trial.

(Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1574). It just was not his job to decide if this
was important information.

26

Again and again inconsistencies arise. On June 28, 1988,
he said he just didn’t feel this information was important
enough to bring up. But we know that he called an attorney,
who testified that Trimbur was very concerned about the issue
of his deputy status. She said she told him that if he was
“extremely worried about it” he should just tell the court or the
attorneys. Why he chose to ignore her advice is unclear, but the
fact that he consciously did so and decided to hide this fact is
uncontroverted.

Other aspects of Trimbur’s attorney’s testimony are partic-
ularly alarming. Revealing Trimbur’s prescience, she said he
voiced real concern that his service might provoke a mistrial or
repetitive appeals. Why? This was on his mind before Trimbur
ever shows up at the courthouse, before he knows that he
would be a member of the jury venire for Sheehan’s highly
publicized trial. Is this not an admission of bias — to think he
might have caused a mistrial or repetitive appeals?

Trimbur testified that he wanted to avoid jury service
altogether — that he wanted to “get it off his calendar”, and did
not want to be bothered with it (Tr. Supplement, p. 25) He even
called the trial judge to see if he even had to show up at the
courthouse to claim his statutory exemption.

When asked during voir dire why he had not exercised his
exemption, he said: “Because I’m not just a member or servant
of my church; I’m a member of my community; and I feel
strongly an obligation in my community.” (Tr., Vol. 4, p. 925).
Contrast that with his testimony during the second hearing,
where he testified “I didn’t want to serve on the jury. I draw a
distinction between wanting to serve and being willing to
serve.” (Tr. Supplement, p. 28). Contrast that with his explana-
tion of why he had not claimed his exemption after he had gone
to the trouble of seeking legal advice regarding his status as a
minister and a deputy sheriff and his call to the judge to make
sure he had an exemption: “I saw no reason to claim it. I was
asking whether I would even have to bother coming in.” (Tr.,
Vol. 8, p. 26).

Trimbur came to court to exercise his automatic exemp-
tion, but ended up sitting through two long days of voir dire,
and a week long trial. What sparked his sudden interest? He

27

was the last juror chosen. He had heard the questions asked of
the other jurors over and over. He had plenty of time to reflect
upon his status and relationships, and to decide how he planned
to respond when his turn came up. Nonetheless, Trimbur testi-
fied that his only contact with Venable in a year and a half was
in the hall of the courthouse on the first day of jury service.
(Tr., Vol. 4, p. 930). Unless Venable was not telling the truth,
we know that this is not true. Venable testified that he had been
in Trimbur’s home several times and was probably there during
March and April 1988. (Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1545). The trial was held
the last week of April 1988.

Although Trimbur offered several inconsistent stories
about why he did not disclose he was a reserve deputy and
tried to minimize his role in his work for the Sheriff’s Office,
he never attempted to explain why he concealed the true nature
of his relationship with Detective Venable. This was critically
important information. The defense in this case was that the
shooting was accidental. The direct evidence indicated that it
was accidental, and the coroner initially ruled it accidental.

The case against John Sheehan was totally circumstantial,
and the state relied heavily on Venable’s testimony. Critical
elements of the so-called crime scene changed between the
moment of the incident and the time the coroner’s office
photographed the scene because Venable, the first officer to
arrive, failed to preserve the scene. He failed to seize the
shotgun shells out of the gun for fingerprint analysis which he
even conceded could have proven that John did not load the
gun and further prove his innocence! (Tr. pp. 1339-41). It was
Venable who testified from memory alone as to what he
remembered where, what “evidence” was found where, what
Sheehan allegedly told him, and as to what the physical evi-
dence involved because all of the photographs Venable took of
the scene were “lost” after he somehow allowed them to be
exposed to sunlight.

Other critical pieces of physical evidence like the shirt
John’s wife was wearing were also lost. The shirt could have
been aligned to the exit wounds to further corroborate John’s
statement of how this tragedy occurred and to disprove the
prosecution’s “pellet path” arguments.

28

John’s freedom or conviction rested almost solely on Ven-
able’s credibility; the jurors had to test his credibility. Only
impartial jurors could have done so. As the record so thor-
oughly demonstrates, given Trimbur’s undisclosed relation-
ships and natural allegiances, he was certainly not fit to do so.
As the District Court held, the trial court’s blanket acceptance
of Trimbur’s protestations of “sincerity” simply cannot be
accepted at face value. The trial court’s rulings are entitled to
no deference from any court. It would be asking far too much
of human nature to expect anyone in Trimbur’s position to
admit his undisclosed connections affected his verdict or
behavior. What person can be expected to admit that he had
violated his oath to tell the truth, his oath to be an impartial
juror and, in essence, admit he committed a crime, or at least, a
serious breach of faith? This is why Chief Justice Marshall
concluded so many years ago that:

[I]n determining whether a prospective juror should
be excluded on this ground [implied bias] his state-
ments upon voir dire are totally irrelevant; a person
‘may declare that he feels no prejudice in the case;
and yet the law cautiously excludes him from serving
on the jury because it suspects prejudice, because in
general persons in a similar situation would feel
prejudice,’ United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. at
50.”

United States v. Haynes, 398 F.2d 980, 984 (2nd Cir. 1968).

It is axiomatic that such jurors could hardly be expected to
afford a criminal defendant “the right to . . . trial, by an
impartial jury,” as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Other-
wise, if state court judges can hide behind the presumption of
correctness with a finding of “no bias” the constitutional guar-
antee of an impartial jury would truly become a hollow pledge.

The record makes Deputy Malcolm LaBorde’s testimony
all the more telling and alarming. Sergeant LaBorde testified
that he had asked Trimbur how he had managed to get on the
Sheehan jury. He was curious because people working at the
Sheriff’s Office do not serve on juries. Deputy LaBorde testi-
fied that Trimbur told him that “somebody had asked him

scniiaeesiiiiiiia imei

29

some questions, you know, if he was working with [the Sher-
iff’s Office], and he said yes.” (Tr., Vol. 8, pp. 1555-56).

We do not know the precise reasons why Trimbur chose to
conceal his relationships. Nor do we know what prompted the
dramatic change of heart in Trimbur’s willingness to serve on
this jury. But, given the human considerations at play here and
the applicable case law, we do know that John Sheehan did not
end up with a fair, unbiased, impartial juror.

As the Court noted in Swain v. Alabama, 85 S.Ct. 824, 835
(1965) (citations omitted):

The persistence of peremptories and their extensive
use demonstrate the long and widely held belief that
peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by
jury ... the challenge is “one of the most important
rights secured to the accused . . . The denial or
impairment of the right is reversible error without a
showing of prejudice . . . “For it is, as Blackstone
says, an arbitrary and capricious right; and it must be
exercised with full freedom, or it fails of its full
purpose.” The function of the challenge is not only
to eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides, but

_ to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they
trust the case will decide on the basis of the evidence
placed before them, and not otherwise.

Trimbur would have never served on John’s jury had he
answered the questions put to him honestly. Petitioner would
have invariably exercised his remaining peremptory challenge
to remove Trimbur from the panel if this information had been
revealed.

The very purpose of voir dire was destroyed by Trimbur’s
actions. He ignored the trial court’s instructions to answer all
questions completely and truthfully. He ignored his attorney's
advice to answer all questions completely and truthfully. Trim-
bur “believed it was his place, and not the place of the court or
defense counsel to determine whether his relations were a bar
to jury service in this case.” Scott, 854 F.2d at 699. Trimbur
was hostile to what he correctly perceived to be the natural
concerns of the defense and the court.

30

As the court said in United States v. Nell, 526 F.2d 1223,
1229 (Sth Cir. 1976): “The jury box is a holy place. To ensure
that those who enter are purged of prejudice, both challenges
for cause and the full complement of peremptory challenges
are crucial.” The Magistrate Judge and the District Court
properly ruled that Trimbur was presumptively biased. Trim-
bur, although a man of the cloth, was not fit to enter the holy
place and pass judgment upon John Sheehan.

CONCLUSION

The jury sitting in judgment of John Sheehan’s guilt or
innocence was infected by the presence of a presumptively
biased foreman. The evidentiary record speaks for itself. These
are fundamental constitutional violations going to the heart of
the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee that all persons are entitled
to a fair trial before an impartial jury based solely on admissi-
ble evidence introduced at trial. This constitutional defect
warrants a new trial, and cries out for habeas relief. The
District Court properly granted the writ. John has already spent
over 10 years in prison without ever receiving a fair trial.

Accordingly, John Sheehan, prays that this Honorable
Court issue a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the
Court of Appeals’ reversal of the District Court’s order of
habeas relief.

Respectfully submitted,

Lewis O. UNGLEsBY

Unciessy & Kocu

246 Napoleon Street

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70802
Telephone: (504) 387-0120
Facsimile: (504) 336-4355

Cuaries A. Rippie, III
Counsel of Record

P.O. Box 315

Marksville, Louisiana 71351
Telephone: (318) 253-4551

APPENDIX 1

App. 1

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-30008

JOHN ANTHONY SHEEHAN
Petitioner - Appellee
v.

JOHN P WHITLEY, Warden, Louisiana
State Penitentiary;

RICHARD P IEYOUB, Attorney General,
State of Louisiana

Respondents - Appellants

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
(94-CV-2249-A)

(Filed March 11, 1997)

Before JONES, DUHE, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Cir-
cuit Judges

EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:*

Appellee John Anthony Sheehan was convicted of
second degree murder and sentenced to life imprison-
ment without benefit of parole for killing his wife,
Monica Jeansonne Sheehan in 1986. After his conviction

* Pursuant o [sic] Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule
47.5.4.

App. 2

was affirmed on direct and collateral review in the state
courts, Sheehan sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal
court. The district court referred the matter to a magis-
trate judge, who recommended granting the writ based
on Sheehan’s claims that he was denied a fair trial before
an impartial jury. The district court adopted the magis-
trate judge’s recommendation and ordered the state to
release Sheehan if he was not retried within sixty days.
Pending appeal, the order was stayed. We conclude that
the lower courts failed to defer properly to the state court
findings of fact. With that error corrected, there was no
basis for issuance of the writ. Accordingly, we reverse
and render judgment that relief be denied to appellee.

I. BACKGROUND

Monica Sheehan was killed in April 1986 when her
husband fired a 12-gauge pump shotgun into her chest.
Sheehan admitted that he was holding the shotgun when
it fired, but he contended at trial that he was merely
cleaning the gun and the shooting was accidental. Two
Louisiana juries disagreed, and appellee was twice found
guilty of second degree murder. The Louisiana appellate
court reversed Sheehan’s first conviction, finding that a
statement by appellee had been introduced against him in
violation of the constitution. State v. Sheehan, 515 So.2d
670 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987), writ den., 519 So.2d 129 (La.
1988,. Appellee’s second trial led to the confinement of
which he now complains.

At that trial, Michelle Bordelon testified that after an
argument in December 1984, Sheehan “told her that he
didn’t love her [Monica Sheehan], and didn’t know why

App. 3

he married her, and wish [sic] he would have never
married her.” Exhibit A, Trial Transcript (“Exh. A”) at
1178. Ms. Bordelon also testified that Sheehan abused
Monica, forcing her to visit the emergency room. Id. at
1176-79. Monica’s father testified that the marriage was
troubled and recounted a phone call from Monica in
which he overheard Sheehan threaten to kill her.? Id. at
1196. Monica’s mother also testified to marital difficulties
between Sheehan and Monica. Id. at 1209-11. Monica’s
step-father testified that Sheehan talked to him in July or
August of 1985 about marital difficulties, indicating that
he wanted out of the marriage.? Id. at 1220-21.

The state also introduced a $50,000 John Hancock
insurance policy on Monica’s life purchased on April 17,
1986, thirteen days before she died. The agent, Thomas
McCullom, testified that Sheehan already had a policy on
Monica’s life dating from 1984 in the amount of $25,000,
and the increase in insurance coverage ordered by
Sheehan was unsolicited. The John Hancock application
indicated that appellee did not contemplate acquiring any
other insurance on Monica’s life. Appellee made the pol-
icy effective immediately by delivering a military allot-
ment to Mr. McCullom.

1 “Anthony Sheehan was hollering over the phone that if
you tell your daddy anything about what’s going on over here,
I’m going to kill you; and if he comes down over here, I’m going
to fight with him and I’m going to kick him on his bad leg.” Id. at
1196.

2 “Well, I asked him [Anthony Sheehan] what their problem
was, and he told me that he just didn’t love her; that he thought
he did, but he didn’t. And that he would do anything that it took
to get her out of his life.” Id. at 1221.

App. 4

On April 23, just seven days before Monica’s death,
Sheehan initiated steps to secure an additional $75,000
insurance policy covering Monica’s life. The State Farm
representative, Phyllis Heser, testified that appellee
arrived at her office on April 24 without Monica, despite
Mrs. Hester’s admonition that Monica’s signature would
be necessary. Id. at 1057. Mrs. Hester sent the policy,
complete except for blanks requiring Monica’s signature,
home with Sheehan. When Sheehan returned the policy
early the next morning, the space contained Monica’s
purported signature.* Id. at 1059. To make the policy
effective immediately, Sheehan paid premiums for two
months in cash and returned to pick up the signed binder
that day, instead of accepting Mrs. Hester’s offer to mail
the binder once the agent had signed it. Id. at 1063-64.
The parties stipulated that the state’s handwriting expert
would testify that the signature purporting to be Mon-
ica’s on the State Farm policy application was actually
Sheehan's forgery. Id. at 1252.

When the shooting occurred, Monica was sitting on
the floor in front of her husband playing a game. He was
sitting in a chair and allegedly began to clean a 12 gauge
pump shotgun with an oily rag when the gun fired.
Monica was shot in the chest. The doctor who performed
the autopsy on Monica’s body testified that appellee’s

3 “Mr. Sheehan arrived at our office the next morning, on
the 25th, very early. Our office opens —- we work at 8:00, but we
don’t open to the public until 8:30. And he was sitting in the
parking lot when we unlocked the doors.” Exh. A at 1059.

App. 5

explanation that the shooting was accidental was incon-
sistent with Monica’s injuries and the trajectories of the
buckshot. Id. at 1108-1128.

Detective Robert Venable testified that three unspent
shotgun shells were found - two on the floor and one in
the chamber of the shot gun. Id. at 1325-26. A nurse who
arrived at the scene soon after the shooting testified that
two unspent shells and a spent shotgun shell were lying
on the floor near Monica’s body. Detective Venable did
not find a spent shell on the floor but found a spent shell
in the chamber of the shotgun.

The jury, by a 10-2 vote, found Sheehan guilty of
second degree murder. Appellee subsequently filed a
motion for new trial on the grounds that David Trimbur,
the jury foreman, had concealed his position as an auxil-
iary sheriff and his relationship with Detective Venable.
Appellee also alleged that members of the jury had
learned of his prior conviction on this charge. After an
evidentiary hearing, the trial judge denied the motion for
new trial. Appellee obtained a writ from the Louisiana
Supreme Court ordering the trial court to reopen the
hearing on the motion for new trial on the grounds that
appellee had newly discovered evidence. On remand, the
trial court heard the new evidence and again denied the
motion for new trial. This time, appeals were unsuccess-
ful. State v. Sheehan, 558 So.2d 758 (La. App.3d Cir. 1990).

Sheehan filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus,
alleging a denial of the right to trial by an impartial jury
because 1) Trimbur concealed information that would
have supported a challenge for cause and 2) the jurors
learned of appellee’s prior conviction for the same crime.

App. 6

The magistrate judge found that the state court applied
the wrong legal standard to appellee’s claim and thus
disregarded the state court’s findings of fact. The district
court concurred, leading to a conditional grant of the writ
and this appeal.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review.

The President signed the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) on April 24, 1996.
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). This circuit has
held that the AEDPA applies to appeals pending as of the
effective date of the act. Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751,
754 (5th Cir. 1996). AEDPA amended the substantive stan-
dards of review applicable to habeas cases.

In Drinkard, the panel determined that applying
§ 2254(d)(1) as amended by the AEDPA to pending cases
did not raise retroactivity problems since the amendment
is a “change in procedural rules” involving “federal stan-
dards of review of sate court decisions.” 97 F.3d at 766. A
habeas petitioner cannot demonstrate reliance on the
“former federal standards of habeas review in making
strategic, tactical, or other decisions during the state
court litigation.” Id. AEDPA has codified standards for
reviewing both the legal and factual determinations of
state courts pertinent to a habeas case. With respect to
any claim “that was adjudicated on the merits in state
court proceedings,” a writ shall not be granted unless the
petitioner shows that the state court adjudication

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of,

App. 7

clearly established Federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.

AEDPA § 104, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (emphasis
added). AEDPA shields state court findings of fact from
reversal in federal court by a presumption of correctness,

which may be rebutted only by clear and convincing
evidence. AEDPA § 104, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

The following analysis will demonstrate that the
lower courts’ grant of relief did not satisfy these high
standards, but it will also show that, even under pre-
AEDPA standards, the lower courts failed to give the
appropriate deference to the state court findings. State
courts of competent jurisdiction, after a hearing on the
merits, made written factual findings supported by the
record as a whole. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) pre-AEDPA.
We must defer to the state court findings in the absence
of any proof that deference was unwarranted; the lower
federal courts’ mere disagreement with state court fact-
findings did not confer authority to disregard them.

B. Reverend Trimbur

The magistrate judge decided that Sheehan’s Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial before an impartial jury
was violated because the jury foreman, Reverend David
Trimbur, concealed on voir dire that he was a reserve
deputy sheriff. This concealment allegedly created an
inference of bias which, according to the magistrate

App. 8

judge, would have supported a challenge for cause. The
alleged concealment also rendered Sheehan's counsel
unable to exercise their peremptory strikes intelligently.
The state argues that the magistrate judge failed to give
proper deference to the state court findings that Trimbur
was not biased. We agree with the state.

To demonstrate that he is entitled to a reversal, a
federal defendant who complains that a juror mistakenly
responded to a question on voir dire must first demon-
strate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material
question, and then further show that a correct response
would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for
cause. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464
U.S. 548, 555-56, 104 S.Ct. 845, 849-50 (1984). We will
assume, arguendo, that appellee must at least meet this
standard to justify relief in a federal habeas proceeding.
See Montoya v. Scott, 65 F.3d 405, 419 (5th Cir.) (“[Wle
assume, arguendo, that a McDonough theory of juror bias
would be sufficient to obtain federal habeas relief.”), cert.
denied, __ U.S. __, 116 S.Ct. 1417 (1995).

1. Voir dire.

Juror Trimbur was pastor of the Marksville Baptist
Church and an auxiliary deputy with the Avoyelles Par-
ish Sheriff’s office. During voir dire, Trimbur was asked:

Q: Are you or any members of your family, or
close friends, employed by the District
Attorney’s Office, or by the Sheriff’s Office?

A: No sir.

App. 9

* * *

Q: Is there any personal, business, family or
health reason, that you know of, why you
could not serve as an impartial juror in this
case?

A: None that I know of.

Exh. A at 918, 919-20. Trimbur was also asked about a
Concerned Parents for Better Avoyelles meeting that he
attended approximately five weeks prior to trial. Trimbur
indicated that he was there in his capacity as a minister
and for personal interest and made no mention of any
official role he might have played.*

4 The relevant examination of Trimbur by defense counsel
was:

Q. OK. Now,... I understand there’s some kind of
community - I don’t want to say outrage or up-
roar, but conflict about drinking in one of the
neighboring towns, and teenage drinking; and
Mr. Rabalais [one of the defense attorneys] is
involved in that. . . . Have you been to any
meetings that Mr. Rabalais’s attended or you've
attended or Mr. Knoll’s [the district attorney]
attended, on that issue?

Yes.
Tell me about that.

>O >

; I went to see what was going to transpire in the
j way of exchange of dialogue with the gentleman
| representing our ABC Board Camp. Mr.
: Rabalais’s connection with that has no bearing on
me, OK? I wouldn’t -I don’t portray myself with
this word, ‘outrage.’ OK?

App. 10

Later, Trimbur was asked about his knowledge of
people involved with the investigation or trial of the case.

Q. Well, I don’t know what the right word is, OK?
I’m just looking for a word .. . conflict...

A. Iattended one meeting at the Concerned Parents

for Better Avoyelles, if that’s what you’re

referring to.

I don’t know.

Yes sir, that, I think, is what you’re referring to.
Mr. Rabalais [one of the defendant’s lawyers]
was present at that meeting; I know that.

Q. OK, and what about Mr. Knoll [the district
attorney]?

A. Yes sir.

> O

* * *

Q. I’mnot from here, and I don’t know the history of
all this. But I understand that there are some
interest — I don’t — I won’t use a catch word, that
there’s some “interests” and there may be a
problem with teenage drinking and driving in
particular area[s] of the parish. Is that accurate?

A. That’s accurate.
cs * co

Q. OK, where is - what is your interest in that
issue? . . . And, does that come from just a
personal interest as an individual, or is that
through your representing the interest of your
congregation, or of your religion or, you know,
whatever?

A. Through my church .. . that was through
personal interest as an individual.

Q. OK. And, has the - is the District Attorney, does
he have anything to do with that issue, to your
knowledge?

App. 11

Examination by defense counsel relating to Detective
Robert Venable proceeded as follows:

Q. Let me ask you some names and see if you
know these folks.

A. Yes sir.

Q. Detective Robert Venable with the Sheriff's
Office?

A. Yes sir.

Q. And how do you know Detective Venable?

‘“

I performed his wedding a year and a half
ago.

% Q. Allright. And, did you have to - when I got

married, I met with he [sic] preacher in
advance, and he kind of counseled you and
stuff, did you do any of that, or did you just
do the ceremony?

A. I just did the ceremony.

Oo

All right. Did you know his wife?
Yes, I did.

>

A. I think as a corcerned parent, he was at the
meeting.

Q. OK. But not in an official - there’s no official
request to him, that you’re aware of, or none by
you, that...

A. None by me.

Q. Allright, and none that you’re aware of, that you
have any action upon?

A. Not that I know of.
Exh. A at 927-929.

App. 12

Q. Was she a member of your congregation, or
he?

>

She was. That was in Evergreen.

Q. All right, have you had any contact with
him since that time?

A. I saw him yesterday for a few minutes in
the hall, and I asked him about his mar-
riage.

Q. Other than that?
A. No sir. Not really.

Exh. A at 930.

2. Motion for new trial.

In considering Sheehan’s motion for new trial, the
Louisiana trial court held an evidentiary hearing during
which it heard the testimony of Detective Venable, Ser-
geant Malcolm LaBorde, Trimbur, and Captain Gano
Bergeron. The testimony focused on the extent of Trim-
bur’s participation as an auxiliary deputy, Trimbur’s rela-
tionship with Detective Venable, and Trimbur’s
explanation of his answers given in voir dire.

Trimbur’s service with the Sheriff’s Department.
Trimbur had been an auxiliary deputy since 1985. His
involvement appeared to peak in 1986, but tapered off in
1987 as his job at a new congregation required more of his
time. However, he still served as a deputy up to and after
the April 1988 trial. Auxiliary deputies are required to
spend 16 hours per month serving the department and
are not generally paid. However, Trimbur had been paid

App. 13

$38.53 in November 1987 for one day’s work guarding an
inmate at a local hospital. Trimbur had ridden in a patrol
car with regular deputies, wore a uniform identical to
that of a regular deputy, carried a badge, carried a gun,
had officer training, and sometimes visited the Sheriff's
office when he was not on duty. The Sheriff’s office is
adjacent to the jail, and Trimbur had counseled prisoners
and deputies on spiritual issues. Trimbur had also been
called to assist with a crisis relating to Cuban refugees at
the jail. Trimbur testified that he had not seen Sheehan at
the jail.

At the Concerned Parents for a Better Avoyelles
meeting five weeks before the trial, Trimbur had volun-
teered to the entire group that he was an auxiliary deputy
and would relay any concerns that individuals had to the
district attorney, sheriff or other appropriate authority.

Trimbur’s relationship with Detective Venable.
Detective Venable had at least some role in facilitating
Trimbur’s appointment as an auxiliary sheriff in 1985. In
1986, Trimbur was the pastor of the Evergreen Baptist
Church, which Detective Venable attended with his wife,
and Trimbur occasionally visited Detective Venable at the
Sheriff’s office. In 1987, Detective Venable saw Trimbur
about once a month, and he had also seen Trimbur at the
Sheriff’s office in 1988. Detective Venable testified that he
had been to Trimbur’s home approximately six times; the
most recent visit occurred several months before the
trial.5 Detective Venable had seen Trimbur about three or

5 Trimbur only recalled two visits when Venable
accompanied other parishioners to Trimbur’s home for coffee.

App. 14

four times between January 1988 and April 1988, the time
of the trial, and they had discussed the detective’s marital
problems. However, Trimbur was unaware as of the hear-
ing in June 1988 that Detective Venable had separated
from his wife in January 1988. Trimbur had not talked to
Detective Venable since the trial began.

Trimbur’s explanation of his voir dire testimony.
Trimbur stated that he did not reveal his commission as
an auxiliary deputy because no one directly asked him
about it and he did not consider himself to be
“employed” by the Sheriff’s office. Trimbur testified that
he considered the question about employment by the
sheriff’s office as a follow-up to the earlier instruction by
the court that “members of paid fire and police depart-
ments” are entitled to claim an exemption, and he did not
consider himself a paid policeman. Trimbur felt that his
involvement with the sheriff’s department was minimal,
and that he was looked upon as an unofficial chaplain
rather than an officer. He had forgotten about the one day
on which he supervised a hospitalized inmate and was
paid $38. Furthermore, Trimbur did not report in voir
dire that he had revealed his deputy status at the Con-
cerned Parents For a Better Avoyelles meeting because
the district attorney, Mr. Knoll, and two of the defense
lawyers, Mr. Rabalais and Mr. Melancon, were present
when he made the announcement.®

6 Trimbur’s extensive explanation was contained in the
following testimony:

Q. And please tell me where the meeting was, what
the meeting was about and what statement you
made.

App. 15

Sergeant LaBorde testified that he had asked Trimbur
how he had been selected for jury service, since, in his

> 0

The meeting was Concerned Parents For a Better
Avoyelies, is the name under which they were
meeting. It was the second meeting that they had,
the only meeting that they have had that I
attended. I was present, two men from the church
I serve was present and my wife was present. It
was at Mr. Knoll’s [the district attorney] home on
March 15th. I went in for the purpose of getting
information for my own curiosity about matters
related to problems of under-aged drinking in
our parish.

Finish your answer, please.

Well, I was at that meeting, and that’s when I
made a statement about being an auxiliary . . .

I'd like for you to tell us if you can, please, the
specifics, as you recall them, relating to what
caused ou to make that statement who you were
talking to, who was present, what was the
context of the statement, and what you said. I
want you to tell us about your actions, not
anyone else’s.

The meeting was called for the purpose of
hearing from board member or official of the
ABC Board of our State, as to ways that could be
explored so that the established laws about
under-aged drinking could be better enforced.
The gentleman from the ABC Board was there
and was telling us of his frustrations from
problems that he had in relation to manpower,
not being able to get out into the community, and
so forth. He made a statement that - something
to the effect — and I don’t remember the exact
words — something to the effect that if there were
people in the parishes that he could call upon for

App. 16

assistance, it would facilitate their being able to
follow up on complaints about business
establishments, selling intoxicating beverages to
under-aged youth. There was between 35 and 40
people at that meeting. I spoke up, there wasn’t a
lot of us talking; we were listening to Mr. . . . the
man who was - the ABC Board man. I spoke up
and said in that meeting, in the presence of these
people, and I know they heard me, I said, I havea
commission, I am a deputy, I have a uniform, if
you ever need help in this parish, in this area, call
me and I will see if I can work out a way to be of
assistance to you. And at that meeting, the
prosecuting attorney was there; he was hosting
the meeting, and so was both attorneys for the
defense present. Mr. Rabalais was sitting
immediately to my left, I was immediately to this
gentleman’s left, that was there; I was sitting on
the steps; he was standing; I remember distinctly
Mr. Rabalais, the attorney, and Mr. Melancon, the
attorney, being at that meeting. So, when I came
to court, having been called for jury selection, I
listened very carefully to Judge Brouillette’s
discourse to us about qualifications,
disqualifications, and exemptions. I heard him
very clearly say that a minister of religion could
claim an exemption. I heard him say very clearly
that a member of paid fire or police department
could be exempted. I did not, when the line
formed at his bench, come up and tell him I was a
minister of religion. I did not come up and tell
him I was an auxiliary deputy, in any capacity. I
felt that my involvement with the Department
was minimal; I thought that I was looked upon
more as a chaplain there, than I was as a
policeman. And so, I didn’t say anything about

App. 17

view, “if somebody’s working at the Sheriff’s Office, they
don’t serve on the jury.” Exh. A at 1555. Sergeant LaBorde
testified that Trimbur responded:

“somebody has asked him some questions, you know, if
he was working with them, and he said yes.” Id. at 1556.

State court findings. The state trial court denied the
new trial motion, crediting Trimbur’s explanation that he
associated the question about employment with the sher-
iff’s office with the exemption available for paid members
of police departments. The trial court found that Trim-
bur’s interpretation of the questioning was reasonable.
The court noted:

It may be argued that Trimbur’s answer to the
question was less than full disclosure, even if
technically correct. However, his testimony
makes it very clear that he did not intentionally
mislead anyone. He considered his service as a
volunteer auxiliary deputy to be such common
knowledge that it did not deserve special com-
ment in the voir dire questioning.

* * e

being a minister, either, until it came out in the
questioning, positively I knew, both, the
prosecuting attorney and both local defense
attorneys, heard me made [sic] that statement,
just five weeks before that I was an auxiliary.
And I felt if it was of any consequence, they
would bring it up. It wasn’t to me. And sol...

Q. Rev. Trimbur...
A. I know it’s a long answer, but I’m trying to
explain to you why I didn’t say anything.
Exh. A at 1571-73.

App. 18

The testimony of Rev. Trimbur depicts, in the
court’s opinion, a very civic-minded individual
who wanted to be a good citizen and to partici-
pate in civic activities. In voir dire by defen-
dant’s counsel, when asked why he did not avail
himself of his exemption as a minister, he
answered as follows:

Because I’m not just a member or servant of
my church; I’m a member of my commu-
nity; and I feel strongly an obligation to the
community.

Exh. A at 1657-58.

The trial court reasoned that since Trimbur had no
knowledge of or connections to the crime, the only way
to show he was biased and, consequently, disqualified
would be if law enforcement officers were disqualified
per se.? Reviewing the relevant Louisiana law, the trial
court held that a volunteer auxiliary deputy would not be

7 The court evaluated whether Trimbur’s activities
categorized him as a law enforcement officer:

The factors which show him to be in the law
enforcement community are that he had a uniform; he
occasionally went on patrol with paid deputies; he

. had a badge; and he had a firearm. The factors which
suggest that he was not truly a law officer are that he
never made an arrest; he never interrogated a
witness; he never used a firearm and never had
firearm training; and he never participated in any
investigation. While he did not have the title of
chaplain, he considered his position to be essentially
that. He counseled deputies; he counseled prisoners
in the jail; he conducted prayer services when a
deputy died in a plane crash.

Exh. A at 1657-58.

App. 19

automatically disqualified. See State v. Ballard, 337 So. 2d
481, 483 (La. 1976) (denial of challenge for cause against
unpaid volunteer deputy sheriff was not error; “We find
no prohibition against jury service by an unpaid volun-
teer [auxiliary policeman] who peripherally and occa-
sionally assisted in law enforcement.”).

In addition, the trial court found that the motion
should be denied because Sheehan had not established
that he and his counsel were unaware of Trimbur’s com-
mission. See State v. Baxter 357 So. 2d 271 (La. 1978)
(“ ... in order for a defendant to avail himself of the lack
of qualification of a juror, it must be made to appear that
the disqualification of the juror was not known to defen-
dant, or his counsel, when the juror was accepted by him
and could not then have been ascertained by due dili-
gence; and it must be made to appear that such diligence
was exercised by an examination of the juror, on his voir
dire, touching his qualifications, and that he answered
falsely.”). The trial court noted that only one of appellee’s
lawyers, Rodney Rabalais, testified that he was unaware
that Trimbur was an auxiliary deputy. Lewis Inglesby and
Tucker Melancon, appellee’s other two trial lawyers, did
not testify to a lack of knowledge. The trial court also
noted Trimbur’s testimony that he was sure that Rabalais
and Melancon knew Trimbur was a deputy. Further, as in
Baxter, the trial court found that “if it was error for
Trimbur to answer that he was not employed by the
sheriff’s office - and that is certainly not clearly estab-
lished - then it should be recognized that he was entirely
honest.” Exh. A at 1660.

As to Trimbur’s relationship with Detective Venable,
the trial court first noted that this relationship was not

App. 20

urged as a basis for a motion for new trial. The trial court
recounted the short voir dire examination of Trimbur
regarding Detective Venable, and concluded that defense
counsel was aware of the friendship and should have
probed it further. The court further found that “[tJhere is
nothing to suggest, in the court’s opinion, that Trimbur
intentionally misled or deceived defense counsel.” Exh. A
at 1662.

3. Remand from the Louisiana Supreme Court.

Before his appeal was heard by the intermediate
court of appeals, Sheehan obtained a writ from the Loui-
siana Supreme Court ordering the trial court to reopen
the hearing on the motion for new trial based on an
allegation of newly discovered evidence. At the reopened
hearing, appellee presented the testimony of Claire
Sharp, a local attorney and member of Trimbur’s congre-
gation, who testified that Trimbur had contacted her after
receiving a jury summons. Ms. Sharp testified that Trim-
bur asked for advice about the effect of his religious
profession as well as his auxiliary commission on his
ability to serve. Ms. Sharp told Trimbur to tell the court
and the attorneys about his positions, or to at least
answer the voir dire questions openly and honestly. Ms.
Sharp also testified that Trimbur told her that “I guess it
doesn’t matter; everybody knows I’m a minister and an
auxiliary deputy anyway,” and she responded “yes, I
suppose that’s true; this is a small town.” Exh. A. Supple-
ment at 40.

After hearing this new testimony as well as addi-
tional testimony from Trimbur, the trial court again

App. 21

denied the motion for new trial. The trial court con-
cluded:

There is certainly nothing ominous, as such,
about a prospective juror, calling an attorney,
prior to serving, to find out what it’s all about,
particularly in this case, a member of his congre-
gation. I would suppose it’s probably a common
occurrence, especially summoned for the first
time. Now, if the purpose of talking with an
attorney would be to conspire, to do anything
improper, then, of course, that would be most
significant. The record shows Rev. Trimbur’s
explanation for the call. It is totally consistent
with the testimony of Mrs. Sharp. I have no
difficulty accepting his explanation. And I cer-
tainly don’t feel that he was attempting to calcu-
late a way to mislead anybody in order to serve
on the jury. My findings in the reasons for
denial of the first motion for a new trial, that he
did not attempt to mislead anybody, is certainly
still my finding. There’s absolutely nothing to
suggest that there was any improper reason. In
fact, the evidence shows just the opposite.

Exh. A Supplement at 42-43.

4. Appeal to the Louisiana Court of Appeals.

In affirming the denial of the new trial motion, the
court of appeals opined at length:

We have examined this record closely and find
that there is nothing in it, nor in the nature of
Trimbur’s function with the sheriff’s office,
which would disqualify him from service on the
jury. It is apparent that he was a clergyman first,
and an auxiliary deputy second. His responses

App. 22

on voir dire were not misleading, and did not
conceal any information. His relationship to the
sheriff’s office, as well as his relationship with
Detective Venable, were not such as could be
expected to destroy the otherwise impartial atti-
tude of this juror. Trimbur was subjected to
intense interrogations in an effort to prove spec-
ific facts showing such a close connection to the
sheriff’s office and Detective Venable that bias
for the prosecution should be presumed. Trim-
bur’s consistent responses in the record reflect
his voir dire commitment to fairness and impar-
tiality. Nothing he said at the hearings sup-
ported a finding of bias, actual or implied. What
comes across most strongly in the record of all
three examinations - the voir dire, the new trial
hearing, and the remand hearing - is his rela-
tionship with the community and its citizens in
his capacity as a minister of religion. He neither
sought nor avoided jury duty. He answered
every question candidly and without rancor,
openness characterizing his every response.
Only by a strained manipulation of his words
can bias be wrung from his testimony. We agree
with the trial court.

Sheehan, 558 So.2d at 763-64.

5. Findings of the magistrate judge.

Contradicting the state court’s credibility evalua-
tions, the magistrate judge concluded that Trimbur
“deliberately concealed” his auxiliary deputy status and
friendship with Detective Venable during voir dire
because he did not think it was important and “because
he wanted to be on the jury.” The magistrate judge drew

App. 23

an inference of bias, citing United States v. Scott, 854 F.2d
697, 699 (5th Cir. 1988) (juror’s censoring of fact that
brother was a deputy sheriff created inference that he
wanted to serve on jury and thought he would not be
allowed to serve if he answered completely). The magis-
trate judge chided the trial court for having “no good
basis” to believe that Sheehan’s attorneys knew Trimbur
was an auxiliary deputy. The magistrate judge then con-
cluded that Sheehan satisfied the first prong of
McDonough - that a juror had falsely answered a material
question on voir dire.

The magistrate judge also decided that a challenge
for cause against Trimbur would have been granted
because he was an auxiliary deputy. “Louisiana jurispru-
dence is clear on that point,” he stated, citing State v.
Simmons, 390 So.2d 1317, 1318 (La. 1980) (“an actively
employed criminal deputy sheriff is not a competent
criminal juror”) and State v. Mitchell, 475 So.2d 61, 63-4
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1985) (active or reserve police officer is
too likely to be influenced as a juror and should be
disqualified).

After reciting the concept of deference to state court
findings. the magistrate judge concluded that the trial
court did not actually find that Trimbur was not biased.
And since the magistrate judge read Louisiana law as
automatically disqualifying auxiliary deputy sheriffs
- from jury service, he disagreed with the state courts’
application of state law.

App. 24

6. Analysis.

Whether analyzed under the old or new federal
habeas standards, the magistrate judge clearly erred in
failing to give appropriate deference to the findings of
the Louisiana courts.

The magistrate judge held that the trial court made
no express finding whether Trimbur was biased and that
Trimbur deliberately concealed information on voir dire,
supporting an inference of bias. Yet the trial court explic-
itly found that Trimbur did not “intentionally mislead
anyone,” that he “was entirely honest in his answer,” and
that “there is nothing to suggest . . . that Trimbur inten-
tionally misled or deceived defense counsel.” The trial
court so ruled after observing voir dire, the entire trial,
and two motions for new trial. The record amply sup-
ports the state trial court’s conclusions. The trial court
credited Trimbur’s explanation that he reasonably associ-
ated the question about employment with the sheriff’s
office with the exemption for paid policemen, an exemp-
tion he believed was not available to him. The trial court
found that Trimbur reasonably believed he was not
“employed” by the sheriff’s department in the common
usage of that term. Further, the trial court credited Trim-
bur’s testimony that he believed that all the attorneys
knew of his status as an auxiliary deputy, because he had
announced it in the attorneys’ presence just five weeks
before trial. Thus, even if an inference of bias can be
drawn from deliberate censoring during voir dire, the
trial court found, contrary to the magistrate judge, no
deliberate censoring on Trimbur’s part. The state court
made explicit findings, adequately supported by the

App. 25

record, that are contrary to the inferences drawn by the
magistrate judge. Deference was owed to the state court
fact findings, particularly because they were reached
after painstaking, meticulous efforts to uncover the rele-
vant facts. Under the AEDPA standard, Sheehan did not
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the state
court findings were incorrect. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)
(as amended by AEDPA).

Moreover, the Louisiana court of appeals explicitly
found a lack of bias. Sheehan, 558 So.2d at 764 (“Nothing
he said at the Hearings supported the finding of bias,
actual or implied.”). Findings of state courts at all levels
must be given appropriate deference. Rushen v. Spain, 464
U.S. 114, 120, __ S.Ct. __, __ (1983) (per curiam). The
magistrate judged erred by not even addressing this find-
ing.

Also contrary to the magistrate judge’s conclusion,
the Louisiana courts correctly applied Louisiana law in
the issue of disqualifying auxiliary deputies. While the
magistrate judge quotes language from Simmons, 390
So.2d at 1318, and Mitchell, 475 So.2d at 62-63, that sup-
ports his interpretation of Louisiana law,® compelling
caselaw justifies a conclusion that someone in Trimbur’s
position would not be automatically disqualified from
jury service. The trial court cited the decision in Ballard,
in which the Louisiana Supreme court held that it was

8 However, Simmons involved a paid, full-time investigator
with the Sheriff’s department 390 So.2d at 1318, and Mitchell
involved an active reserve police officer, and although it is not
clear from the opinion, it appears that the officer was a paid
employee. Mitchell, 475 So.2d at 62-63.

App. 26

unnecessary to grant a challenge for cause against an
unpaid volunteer deputy sheriff. 337 So.2d at 43. But
perhaps most relevant is the decision of the court of
appeals in this very case, which the Louisiana Supreme
Court declined to reverse, holding that “there is nothing
in [the recor?], nor in the nature of Trimbur’s function
with the Sheriff’s office, which would disqualify him
from service on the jury.” Sheehan, 558 So.2d at 763.

Thus, the magistrate judge erred in disregarding the
state court findings in this case and in concluding that
Sheehan met the two prongs of McDonough. We must
defer to the state court findings that Trimbur did not
intentionally mislead the court or defense counsel, and
that even full information regarding Trimbur’s position
with the Sheriff’s department and his relationship with
Detective Venable would not support a challenge for
cause.®

Alternatively, the denial of the motion for. new trial
can be sustained on the independent state law ground
that Sheehan’s trial attorneys knew of Trimbur’s status as
an auxiliary deputy sheriff and failed to use reasonable
diligence to pursue further information about his rela-
tionship with the sheriff's department. The magistrate
judge erroneously concluded that the trial court “had no
good basis” for believing that the defense attorneys heard
Trimbur announce his auxiliary deputy status at a “noisy
public meeting” five weeks earlier, remembered it, and

9 Even if Louisiana law would have supported a challenge
for cause based on Trimbur’s auxiliary deputy status, Sheehan
has still not shown that he is constitutionally entitled to a
challenge for cause on that basis.

App. 27

“deliberately concealed the fact of Trimbur’s employment
as a deputy sheriff as a trial strategy.” First, the state trial
judge had ample basis: Trimbur testified that one of the
attorneys sat right next to him at the meeting, that he
made the announcement loudly, and that “no one else
was speaking at that time. I cannot conceive of everyone
in that room not having heard what I said.” The trial
judge was not required to believe Mr. Rabalais’ testimony
that he never heard Trimbur’s announcement. Second,
Trimbur’s wife worked for a company owned by Tucker
Melancon, one of appellee’s attorneys. Finally, the trial
judge never found that appellee’s attorneys deliberately
concealed their knowledge of Trimbur’s background as a
trial strategy. Louisiana law requires the defendant to
show that he and his lawyers had no knowledge of the
facts supporting disqualification and used reasonable dil-
igence to pursue these facts. The trial court found that
Sheehan had not met this burden, not that his attorneys
deliberately concealed the information as trial strategy.
The magistrate judge’s contrary conclusion is a clear
error. Sheehan’s challenge to Trimbur’s service on the
jury fails on this adequate and independent state law
ground as well.

C. Prejudicial extraneous information.

The magistrate judge also decided that Sheehan’s
right to a fair trial before an impartial jury was violated
because, before reaching the verdict, one or more jurors
learned of Sheehan’s prior trial and conviction for this
same crime. The state again objects that the magistrate

App. 28

judge failed properly to defer to the state-court findings
of fact and applied the wrong legal standard.

The Supreme Court’s cases in this area “cannot be
made to stand for the proposition that juror exposure to
information about a state defendant's prior convictions or
to news accounts of the crime with which he is charged
alone presumptively deprives the defendant of due pro-
cess.” Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799, 95 S.Ct. 2031,
2036 (1975). In federal trials, exposure of the jury to
information about prior felony convictions is presumed
to be prejudicial, but this is a rule based on a federal
court’s inherent power to control its proceedings and is
not constitutionally required. Id. at 797, 95 S.Ct. at 2035
(rejecting the application of Marshall v. U.S., 360 U.S. 310
(1959) to a state prisoner’s claim on federal habeas
corpus). Instead, “we must turn . . . to any indications in
the totality of the circumstances that petitioner’s trial was
not fundamentally fair.” Id. at 799, 95 S.Ct. at 2036.
Although a juror may be presumed to be biased if
exposed to “inherently prejudicial facts about the defen-
dant” so that “the court deems it highly unlikely that the
juror can exercise independent judgment,” the “court will
not readily presume that a juror is biased solely on the
basis that he or she has been exposed to prejudicial
information about the defendant outside the courtroom.”
Willie v. Maggio, 737 F.2d 1372, 1379 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1002 (1984). Thus, we must decide if “the actions
called into question were such as to reasonably result in
the possibility of prejudice.” Durr v. Cook, 589 F.2d 891,
894 (5th Cir. 1979). Evaluation of a claim requires findings
relating to the impact of the extraneous information on
the verdict. Id. at 894.

App. 29

In considering appellee’s motion for new trial, the
trial court conducted a hearing’ at which Terri Taylor, a
juror who voted not guilty, testified that she was told of
the prior trial and conviction at church. Mrs. Taylor testi-
fied that although she did not tell any other jurors about
what she learned, she heard other jurors discuss appel-
lee’s previous trial and conviction. Mrs. Taylor also testi-
fied that David Gauthier, another juror, spoke about
appellee’s prior trial and conviction." Exh. A at 1639.
Mrs. Taylor also testified that another juror, Burnette
Bordelon, related to Mrs. Taylor that Mrs. Bordelon’s
husband read aloud a newspaper article about the trial at
breakfast. Id. at 1641. Mrs. Taylor did not indicate
whether the newspaper accounts discussed a prior trial.’
However, Mrs. Bordelon denied that she had read any

10 The trial court sustained the state’s objections to
testimony about juror misconduct under La. R.S. 15:470
(replaced by La. C. Art. 606), which allows testimony by jurors
as to misconduct by third persons but not as to juror
misconduct. However, the trial court allowed Sheehan to offer
testimony of juror misconduct as a proffer, recognizing that this
evidentiary rule must give way to a defendant’s constitutional
right to a fair trial. State v. Senigal, 393 So.2d 684 (La. 1981). The
trial court’s discussion of prejudice assumes that the proffered
evidence is admissible. Exh. A at 1665.

11 Mrs. Taylor testified that “ . . . it was in the jury room on
Saturday morning, and he had said he knew a friend of a friend,
or a relation somewhat to that nature, that had served on the
previous jury, and that he had considered that night calling and
speaking with him, but he had changed his mind; he decided
not to, because he didn’t want to be prejudiced.” Exh. A at 1639.

12 The trial court noted that it had monitored news
accounts of the trial and that none had mentioned the prior trial
or conviction while the trial was in progress.

. App. 30

article about the trial or that her husband had read aloud
any article about the trial. Id. at 1618.

Gwendolyn Small, an alternate juror, testified that
she overheard other jury members say that the defendant
had been tried before, but not that the defendant was
convicted. Exh. A at 1626. She could not remember who
said it or when. Trimbur also testified that he learned at
the end of the day on the last day of deliberations that
Sheehan had previously been tried, but not that he had
been previously convicted. Id. at 1586-87.

The trial court found that the only evidence that the
jury heard of appellee’s prior conviction came from the
testimony of Mrs. Taylor, who voted to acquit and thus
was not prejudiced, and who stated that she did not
discuss the prior convictions with other jurors. The trial
court also pointed to its instructions to the jury to con-
sider only the evidence introduced at trial, recognizing
that such an instruction could not cure all error but was a
factor in the overall consideration of prejudice. Further,
the trial court considered evidence that a previous jury
had convicted the defendant for the same conduct to be
less prejudicial than evidence suggesting a pattern of
conduct, such as that the defendant had been convicted
of similar conduct in the past.!> The trial court did not
believe that a defendant had an absolute constitutional
right to have a jury that had not heard of this prior
conviction and concluded that any extraneous influence

13 “There is no reason for a juror to believe that another jury
had more or better evidence than in the present case.” Exh. A at
1667.

App. 31

on the jury “was not prejudicial to the extent of requiring
a new trial.”

The magistrate judge decided that the trial court’s
ruling was based on an erroneous conclusion of law -
that juror knowledge of a prior conviction for the same
offense was not a per se constitutional violation — and
gave the trial court findings no deference. The magistrate
judge inferred that other jurors must have participated in
the discussions of appellee’s prior trial and conviction,
and thus inherently prejudicial extrinsic information was
considered by the jury. The magistrate judge relied pri-
marily on cases reviewing federal criminal convictions.
See, e.g., United States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865 (5th Cir.
1975) (post-conviction proceedings for federal prisoner);
United States v. Williams, 568 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1978)
(direct appeal of federal conviction).

The magistrate judge’s decision to disregard the state
court findings was erroneous. Juror exposure to extra-
neous information must be examined on case-by-case
basis to determine if there is a reasonable probability of
prejudice. See Murphy, 421 U.S. at 797, 95 S.Ct. at 2035;
Durr, 589 F.2d at 894. Thus, the state court did not err in
considering all the circumstances in evaluating prejudice,
rather than concluding that the jury’s exposure to infor-
mation about appellee’s prior conviction was a per se
constitutional violation.

The state court found that the only evidence of extra-
neous influence on the jury’s deliberations was the infor-
mation passed on to Mrs. Taylor at church, that Mrs.
Taylor did not pass on the information to other jurors,
and that Mrs. Taylor voted to acquit. The trial court also

App. 32

specifically found that press coverage during the trial did
not reveal appellee’s prior trial and conviction. The trial
court considered that Trimbur and Ms. Small, the latter
an alternate juror, heard about Sheehan’s prior trial but
not his conviction. The only evidence that any juror other
than Mrs. Taylor learned of Sheehan’s prior conviction is
the testimony of Mrs. Taylor that David Gauthier spoke
about appellee’s prior trial and conviction. Based on this
evidence, the magistrate judge inferred that other

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386013_1038%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
