# Opposition Brief — MMP Investments, Inc. v. Lander Co.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1997
- **Citation:** 522 U.S. 811

## Text

~~

\%) FILED

JUN 172 4997

No. 96-1844 |
| oseMe oF ne CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1996
.

MMP INVESTMENTS, INC.,
Petitioner,

LANDER CO., INC.,

Respondent.
7
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Seventh Circuit

+

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION
¢

ARTHUR H. SEIDEL
Counsel of Record
SEIDEL, GONDA, LAVORGNA
& Monaco, P.C.
1800 Two Penn Center Plaza
Philadelphia, PA 19102
(215) 568-8383

Peter B. Ritz

1225 Gilbert Road
Meadowbrook, PA 19046
(215) 886-4083

Counsel for the Respondent

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

Supreme €ourt, U.S.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. May a party who started an arbitration and lost
on counterclaims, challenge venue for its enforcement for
the first time in this Court and thereby protract recovery
by urging mandatory venue in the place of the award,
given that permissive venue where the party resides bet-
ter advances twin goals of arbitration as quick and cheap
commercial dispute resolution?

2. Whether the Court of Appeals properly held that
an arbitral award made in the United States, involving
transactions abroad between U.S. companies, may be
enforced in the United States under the Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (“the New York Convention”), given that its
implementing legislation, 9 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., provides
inter alia that transactions abroad between U.S. citizens
fall under the New York Convention?

3. Whether a party, who agrees to binding arbitra-
tion, commences arbitration under the terms of the agree-
ment and loses on counterclaims, has waived all
jurisdictional objections to the other party’s right to
recover under the arbitral award?

li

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner MMP Investments, Inc., was the claimant
before the International Chamber of Commerce Court of
International Arbitration, was the respondent in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, and
was the appellee in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, the court whose judgment it now seeks
to reverse.

Respondent Lander Co., Inc., was the respondent and
counter-claimant before the International Chamber of
Commerce Court of International Arbitration, was the
petitioner in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, and was the appellant in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

Respondent Lander Co., Inc. is wholly owned by
Claneil Enterprises, Inc., a Delaware corporation, which
is privately owned.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ........... i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING .................. ii
pe 8 Co eyo) 8 sy 6 |. ae rn v
eee va peo pais ope sve o.ap.cie ee oe 1
ene eee GP BREE CAS io. ccc eee eee 3
EEE SN ae ae 7

I. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ENDORSE A
BELATED CHALLENGE TO VENUE CON-
TRARY TO THE GOALS OF ARBITRATION AS
QUICK AND CHEAP COMMERCIAL DISPUTE
IT ais wahiain an siiepen sku etwas hiws eee 7

A. As MMP Failed to Seasonably Challenge
Venue For Enforcement of Arbitration
Award, This Court Should Deny the Peti-
tion for Writ of Certiorari................ 7

B. Enforcement of a New York Arbitration
Award In Illinois Advances Twin Goals of
Arbitration To Provide Quick and Cheap
iF inicu iiss tu binon a ny.c0s«s0- 7

II. AMERICAN-MADE ARBITRAL AWARDS
MUST BE ENFORCED HERE UNDER THE
NEW YORK CONVENTION AS THIS IS
CLEARLY CONTEMPLATED BY THE PUR-
POSE OF THE CONVENTION, ITS IMPLE-
MENTING LEGISLATION, AND THE
AE UOTE Ce er ee ee ee 10

A. History, Text, and Purpose of the Conven-
tion Mandate Interpretation of Non-
Domestic Awards To Include Performance
Abroad under 9 U.S.C. § 202............. 10

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued
Page

B. Territorial Principle Embodied in Article
I(3) Focuses on Reciprocity of Signatories
Not On Awards Made in Different Con-
COU DUN pose akon ceeen esi bs dees 13

C. MMP May Not Have the New York Con-
vention construed for U.S. Citizens as a
Limitation Wrapped in a Restriction Inside
a Cen ics ei ee 21

D. Informed by its Purpose, the Convention,
Its Implementing Statute 9 U.S.C. § 202,
and the Precedent, Are in Harmony...... 24

Ill. A PARTY, WHO AGREES TO BINDING ARBI-
TRATION, THEN COMMENCES ARBITRA-
TION UNDER THE TERMS OF THE
AGREEMENT AND LOSES ON COUNTER-
CLAIMS, HAS WAIVED ALL JURISDIC-
TIONAL OBJECTIONS TO THE OTHER
PARTY’S RIGHT TO JUDICIAL RELIEF TO
ENFORCE THE ARBITRAL AWARD .......... 25

COW AMIE bt pak esas ube Ree hens cned ux ce cwes cits 27

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page
CASES
Bergesen v. Joseph Miller Corp.,
gw Be” Ge Ae.) an passim
Cargill Intern. S.A. v. M/T Paavel Dybenko,
oo MO ie” Ee | Gar ee 11, 14
Corcoran v. Ardra Insurance Co., Ltd.,
Gli: Pn. DD GPE. BOOT) oo ee cee ccc wee 18
E.A.S.T., Inc. of Stamford, Connecticut v. M/V Alaia,
G70: Rupee anew Coen Cer, TIGR)... 2 ccs cc cece ccc eee 17
Edye v. Robertson,
BO I a ie Ga veda as cGncwsesavecnececss 13
Flexible Manufacturing Systems Pty, Ltd. v. Super
Products Corp.,
1996 WL 304858 (7th Cir. 1996) ................000. 8
Fuller Co. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee,
G2t Fanon Foe (W-DPa. 1976) ...... 22.00 ..cccee. 19
Hill v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co.,
BO Ba Be ky er eee 8
Hoffman v. Blaski,
i nis vee sav asencebcewasecoesss 7
In re VMS Securities Litigation,
oe Be Be 8 ee ee ee er 9
Lander Co., Inc. v. MMP Investments, Inc.,
ge 6
Lander Co., Inc. v. MMP Investments, Inc.,
pe es Se Oe. y re 1, 6, 26
Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno,
684 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1982)............ 17, 18, 24, 25

Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Lauer,
oe ge By ee ene 9

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page
Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran
v. Gould, Inc.,
887 F.2d 1357 (th Cir. 1909). ..)5..:......... 11, 16, 25

Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Construction Corp.,
MB US. F CER Re Rea re ac eit s ied ane’ 8, 9

Motion Picture Lab Technicians Local 780 v.
McGregor & Werner, Inc.,

904 - F2e BE Ce Ge Se res ee verde csesceencacce 9
National Iranian Oil Co. (NIOC) v. Ashland Oil, Inc.,

S17 F.2d 326 Ge Ce, Be bes ssiccevenvccecs 16, 23, 24
NII Metals Services, Inc. v. ICM Steel Corp.,

514 FStapp. 166 CGRP. TE Fee ed snc cscccy ccc cc cae. 9
O’Brien v. R.J. O’Brien & Assoc., Inc.,

oe we ey Bk Ge. he ee yo ee ere 7
PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond,

eS BY Ee, Bo eee 22,. 25
Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co.,

Pivas BF | RE e rT eT Tr eT TS 14, 19, 22
SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.,

S06 UES. TED Se ks os ceceta sts es NS eds 23

Sedco v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican National Oil
Co. (Pemex),
767 FAG TEED Tae GI Sa Wht a bcc tcc ceases 18

Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,
ee Pe rr tr Ce ar. CP ee eee 8

Smiga v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
766 R20 GOS Gi Ga Tabi k sa hee eect ceweeee 9

Vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Sumitomo Corp. v. Parakopi Compania Maritima,

477 ©. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y.. 1979) 20... .cccccccccces 15
Tag v. Rogers,

EERO, RUUD voc bcccccceacesccnvene 13
Tennessee Imports, Inc. v. Filippi,

745 F.Supp. 1314 (M.D. Tenn. 1990)............... 18
United States v. Bacto-Undisk,

een cawcscccccccvacecccose 23
Widell v. Wolf,

Bo es Bee Ea. | rr 8

STATUTES
EE, cick Gave dheRianeckcescvasdzecs 1, 5, 8
Ue oon hese hae eus thes ebusesvane 5, 9, 10
Ee ai es isis c kU Kd dp eee kaw enekeeekes 3
EE OU. 6 bicin 6 vie hava see esses ecernee passim
IES NV 3 So ccc wctcbbisdaesecceisocciees’ passim
i cule OAs ec ieca db asd eeeke nek bos Lewes 2
ea ete u boned sdbneen sicaceene seus 18
ee ache cab oben estan as se sedbacs eee 5
gd di aS ka Valcwets adiceii ad céieiie sd cbt 8
Ps oo ee chansccanueears dt tb isadcs« 5, 8
MISCELLANEOUS

Presidential Proclamation 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S.

I SPI aso oS Wika bb 04 CESS ii9s 05% koe deb b'e c's 12

The Random House Dictionary of English Language
SP IC SVU G Seis Peseta Sides deceeecacbes 21

Viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES —- Continued

The Oxford English Dictionary (2d Ed. 1961).......... 22

Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (9th ed.
ODD. in vk s ontvcncccvarddeuscersncess.NQuiebanees 22

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Respondent Lander Co., Inc., respectfully prays that
the Petition for Writ of Certiorari sought in this matter be
denied.

¢

OPINION BELOW

Petitioner MMP Investments, Inc., seeks review of
the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit of February 18, 1997. That court’s opinion is
reported, see Lander Co., Inc. v. MMP Investments, Inc., 107
F.3d 476 (7th Cir. 1997), and is reprinted in Appendix 1-11
to the Petition for the Writ of Certiorari.

The Seventh Circuit’s opinion addressed the follow-
ing three issues:

(a) What is the proper scope of waiver in enforcing
a binding arbitration award, where a party who started
the arbitration and lost on counterclaims, attempted to
challenge its enforcement as lacking subject matter juris-
diction?

(b) What is the proper interplay between Chapters 1
and 2 of Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. 1 et
seq. and 201 et seq. respectively, where a party who
defended and won on counterclaims in arbitration sought
to enforce it under both Chapters, by alleging jurisdiction
under Chapter 1 as based on the parties’ diversity and
under Chapter 2 as based on federal question?

(c) What is the proper application of the Conven-
tion on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards (“the New York Convention”), where a party
to a dispute involving transactions abroad between two

U.S. companies sought to enforce U.S.-made arbitral
award in the United States under the New York Conven-
tion, given that its implementing legislation, 9 U.S.C.
§ 201 et seq., provides inter alia that a commercial relation-
ship between U.S. citizens which contemplates perfor-
mance abroad or some reasonable relation with a foreign
state falls under the New York Convention?

The Seventh Circuit held:

(a) A party’s conduct, beginning with agreement to
binding arbitration and subsequently followed by the
party’s invocation of arbitration pursuant to the agree-
ment, means the party’s agreement to be- bound by the
outcome. That is, to agree to binding arbitration is to
agree that if your opponent wins the arbitration he can
obtain judicial relief if you refuse to comply with the
arbitrator’s award, i.e., a waiver to dispute the jurisdic-
tional right to judicial relief to enforce the award.

(b) Nothing in the New York Convention or its his-
tory, or in the U.S. implementing legislation or its history,
suggests exclusivity of Chapter 2 of the FAA, which
implements the New York Convention, over Chapter 1 of
the FAA, which deals with typical arbitration. Such exclu-
sivity is particularly perverse in this case involving two
U.S. companies, whose dispute falls squarely within the
scope of Chapter 1 of the FAA. There is no reason to
assume that Congress did not intend to provide overlap-
ping coverage between Chapters 1 and 2 of the FAA.

(c) Article I(1) of the New York Convention applies
not only to arbitral awards made in a different country
from the one in which enforcement is sought but also to
non-domestic arbitral awards. In acceding to the New

York Convention, the United States made a declaration
under Article I(3) authorizing it to apply the New York
Convention, on the basis of reciprocity, to the recognition
and enforcement of only those awards made in the terri-
tory of another Contracting State. This means the United
States will enforce pursuant to the New York Convention
only arbitral awards made in nations which also adhere
to the New York Convention. Chapter 2 of the Act, 9
U.S.C. § 201 et seq., which implements the Convention,
supports this reading by authorizing enforcement of arbi-
tral awards in disputes wholly between U.S. citizens if, as
here, the dispute arose out of a contract involving perfor-
mance abroad. Accordingly, the New York Convention
applies to suits in the United States to enforce arbitracion
awards made here.

In reaching its decision, the Seventh Circuit agreed
with the only other appellate court to have addressed the
latter issue. Bergesen v. Joseph Miller Corp., 710 F.2d 928
(2d Cir. 1983). In applying the rules set forth above, the
Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment of the district
court with instructions to reinstate Lander Co., Inc.’s suit.

*

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Lander Co., Inc. (“Lander”) initiated this suit against
MMP Investments, Inc. (“MMP”) to enforce an arbitration
award. The parties are American companies agreeing
since 1991 to have MMP distribute in Poland shampoos
and other products manufactured by Lander in the
United States, or produced by MMP under Lander’s qual-
ity control. Their agreements provided that all disputes

should be settled by binding arbitration in New York City
pursuant to the arbitration rules of the International
Chamber of Commerce.

The parties had a falling out in 1993. In early 1994,
Lander notified MMP that it was terminating the distri-
bution agreements, and MMP filed a request for arbitra-
tion with the International Court of Arbitration (“ICC
Court”), an arm of the International Chamber of Com-
merce. Lander answered, counterclaimed and did not
contest the jurisdiction of the ICC Court. According to the
terms of the parties’ agreements, the dispute proceeded
to arbitration in New York City before Steven A. Ham-
mond, Esq. of Hughes Hubbard & Reed, One Battery Park
Plaza, New York, NY, as Sole Arbitrator designated by
the ICC Court.

Arbitrator Hammond decided for Lander. After five
days of evidentiary hearings, including testimony of
eight witnesses, over one hundred exhibits, the hearing
transcript exceeding 1,300 pages, and the parties’ pre-
hearing and post-hearing briefs and memoranda of fact
and law, he awarded Lander over $500,000 USD plus
interest in a meticulously detailed 38 page arbitral award.
He found that Polish “sale[s] of counterfeit Lander sham-
poo by MMP constitute[d] a serious breach of contract,”
“MMP’s counterfeiting constituted common law infringe-
ment and unfair competition. . . . As such Lander is
entitled to the full measure of damages arising from the
[MMP] counterfeiting activity.”

The arbitration rules of the International Chamber of
Commerce make arbitration awards final and deem the
parties by submitting their dispute to arbitration “to have

waived their right to any form of appeal insofar as such
waiver can validly be made.” ICC Rules of Arbitration
Art. 24(2).

When MMP refused to pay the award, Lander
brought this suit to enforce it in the federal district court
in Illinois, where MMP resides. Lander asserted jurisdic-
tion under both Chapters 1 and 2 of FAA, and noted that
the United States is a party to the New York Convention.
More specifically, it claimed that district court “has juris-
diction under 9 U.S.C. Secs. 1, 9, 201, 202, 203 and 207,
and under 28 U.S.C. sec. 1332” and that the amount in
controversy (exclusive of interest and costs) exceeds
$50,000.1

In response, MMP first moved to dismiss the suit on
the ground the New York Convention and thus Chapter 2
of the FAA was inapplicable to the parties’ arbitration.
Then, MMP moved to vacate the award under Chapter 1.
Chapter 1 of the FAA allows only three months for chal-
lenging an arbitration award subject to the Act, 9 U.S.C.
Sec. 12, and MMP was concerned, as it explained to the

1 Lander requested relief under both Chapters 1 and 2 of
Title 9 U.S.C. Under Chapter 1, it pleaded jurisdiction on the
basis of diversity of citizenship as would be required in a typical
contract enforcement cause of action. Allegations pertaining to
28 U.S.C. § 1332 and 9 U.S.C. §§ 1, 9 are directed to this. Under
Chapter 2, Lander pleaded that its award arose under the
Convention, namely 9 U.S.C. 201, 202, 203 and 207. Section 203
provides for original jurisdiction of the federal district courts
for actions arising under the Convention. However, it does not
eliminate either explicitly or by implication the Chapter 1
jurisdiction asserted by Lander. Lander’s jurisdictional
statement was styled to reflect this combined approach.
Nothing in the Convention or the rules of pleading prohibits it.

district court, that although Lander takes the position
now that the Arbitral Award is covered by the New York
Convention, Chapter 2 of the FAA, other allegations in
Lander’s Petition to Confirm suggest that if it is unsuc-
cessful under the Convention, it will seek to enforce the
award under Chapter 1 of the FAA. Under Chapter 1,
failure to move to vacate an arbitration award forfeits the
right to oppose its enforcement if sought later by the
other party. In contrast, Chapter 2 contains no provision
for seeking to vacate an award, although it contemplates
the possibility of the awards being set aside in a proceed-
ing under local law, Art. V(1)(e), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, and
recognizes defenses to the enforcement of an award.

MMP asked the district judge to defer ruling on its
motion to vacate under Chapter 1 of the FAA until the
judge decided whether the New York Convention was
applicable. Lander vigorously opposed MMP’s motion to
dismiss and the contention that the New York Conven-
tion did not apply here. Without any other filings or oral
argument, the district judge ruled on the motions. He
held that the New York Convention did not apply, and
went on to dismiss the suit for want of federal jurisdic-
tion, without mention of Chapter 1 of the FAA. See 927
F.Supp. 1078 (N.D.IIl. 1996). The decision is reprinted in
Appendix pages 13 to 21.

Lander appealed. The Seventh Circuit reversed the
judgment of the district court with instructions to reins-
tate Lander’s suit. Its opinion is reported, see 107 F.3d 476
(7th Cir. 1997), and is reprinted in Appendix pages 1 to
11.

7

ARGUMENT

I. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ENDORSE A BELATED

- CHALLENGE TO VENUE CONTRARY TO THE

GOALS OF ARBITRATION AS QUICK AND CHEAP
COMMERCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION

| A. As MMP Failed to Seasonably Challenge Venue

For Enforcement of Arbitration Award, This
Court Should Deny the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari

MMP has waived venue objections by failing to urge
them below. MMP did not timely assert F.R.C.P. 12(b)(3),
and hence waived venue under F.R.C.P. 12(g) & (h),
O’Brien v. R.J. O’Brien & Assoc., Inc., 998 F.2d 1394,
1400-1401 (7th Cir. 1993). The record is completely want-
ing of any challenge to venue in MMP’s motions, briefs,
and arguments until the subject challenge. Having failed
in its other delay tactics, MMP now seeks to further delay
enforcement of its bargained-for result by attacking
venue. This cannot stand. It is well settled that venue like
personal jurisdiction may be waived when a party fails to
seasonably assert it. Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343
(1960) (“Of course, venue, like jurisdiction over the per-
son, may be waived. A defendant, properly served with
process by a court having subject matter jurisdiction,
waives venue by failing seasonably to assert it, or even
simply by making default.”)

B. Enforcement of a New York Arbitration Award
In Illinois Advances Twin Goals of Arbitration
To Provide Quick and Cheap Resolution

When a party starts and actively prosecutes an arbi-
tration it is bound by the results. Post-award renege

tactics, such as MMP’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari
challenging venue for the first time before this Court, are
not tolerated by the law. They frustrate the goal of arbi-
tration to provide a “quick and cheap” commercial dis-
pute resolution, Widell v. Wolf, 43 F.3d 1150, 1151 (7th Cir.
1994), see also Flexible Manufacturing Systems Pty, Ltd., v.
Super Products Corp., 1996 WL 304858, *3 (7th Cir. 1996)
(holding that it was for the arbitrator to decide who
breached the agreement first and what damages to award
as a consequence, and imposing sanctions for a frivolous
challenge to an arbitral award); Hill v. Norfolk & Western
Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, at 1203 (7th Cir.1987) (“The promise
of arbitration is spoiled if parties disappointed by its results
can delay the conclusion of the proceeding by groundless litiga-
tion in the district court followed by groundless appeal to
this court; we have said repeatedly that we would punish
such tactics and we mean it.”) [emphasis added]

Chapter 1 of the Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., establishes a
“federal policy favoring arbitration.” Shearson/American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (quoting
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). MMP voluntarily entered into
an arbitration agreement with Lander, requested arbitra-
tion in New York and lost on counterclaims. Given the
well-settled federal policy favoring arbitration as a quick
and cheap mechanism for dispute resolution, MMP’s lat-
est delay tactic should not be entertained by this Court.

Simply put, Lander’s award made in New York, is
enforceable in Illinois, MMP’s residence. A Federal court
may hear this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, Title 9
federal question, and/or 28 U.S.C. § 1332, diversity of

citizenship and 9 U.S.C. § 9. MMP’s latest delay tactic by
way of the subject Petition has demonstrably wasted time
and money; by the time this matter will be heard the
award will likely reach its second anniversary.

The venue for bringing the confirmation of a New
York award in Illinois is permissive under 9 U.S.C. § 9.
Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Lauer, 49 F.3d 323,
329 (7th Cir. 1995); In re VMS Securities Litigation, 21 F.3d
139, 144-45 (7th Cir. 1994); Smiga v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 766 F.2d 698, 706 (2nd Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1067 (1986); Motion Picture Lab Technicians Local 780 v.
McGregor & Werner, Inc., 804 F.2d 16, 18-19 (2nd Cir. 1986).
VMS reaffirmed the leading case NII Metals Services, Inc.
v. ICM Steel Corp., 514 F.Supp. 164 (N.D. Ill. 1981), holding
that a federal court which otherwise has jurisdiction over
the parties may confirm an arbitral award made within a
different district. NII involved an Illinois contract claim
against ICM, who successfully invoked the arbitration
clause contained in the parties’ agreement. After NII pre-
vailed at the arbitration hearings in New York, it moved
for enforcement under § 9 in the Northern District of
Illinois. ICM resisted on the grounds that § 9 limits juris-
diction for confirmation to the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, where the
arbitration was held. It lost, as should MMP’s argument.

MMP’s belated position stymies the purposes of the
FAA. This Court has deemed the “statutory policy” of the
Act to be “rapid and unobstructed enforcement of arbi-
tration agreements.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v.
Mercury Const., 460 U.S. 1, 23 (1983). Denying jurisdiction
or restricting venue here without any mandate or reason
to do so thwarts this policy. See, VMS, 21 F.3d at 145. As

10

fully established above, Lander is entitled to enforcement
of its bargained-for award under 9 U.S.C. § 9. For these
reasons, this Court should not hear MMP on its belated
venue challenge.

II. AMERICAN-MADE ARBITRAL AWARDS MUST
BE ENFORCED HERE UNDER THE NEW YORK
CONVENTION AS THIS IS CLEARLY CONTEM-
PLATED BY THE PURPOSE OF THE CONVEN-
TION, ITS IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION, AND
THE PRECEDENT

Article I(1) of the Convention mandates confirmation
and enforcement of non-domestic arbitral awards. Chap-
ter 2 of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., implementing the
Convention, defines “non-domestic” as an arbitral award
arising out of a relationship which envisages a perfor-
mance abroad between U.S. citizens and provides that
such non-domestic awards fall under the Convention. To
the extent the U.S. accession declaration under Article
I(3) limits the enforcement of arbitral awards, it does so
on the basis of reciprocity. That is, the accession declara-
tion encourages recognition of the awards made within a
Contracting State to the Convention. Accordingly, the
award made in the United States, a Contracting State,
based on the parties’ transactions in Poland, clearly falls
under the Convention.

A. History, Text, and Purpose of the Convention
Mandate Interpretation of Non-Domestic
Awards To Include Performance Abroad under
9 U.S.C. § 202

The Second Circuit explored the purpose and history
of the Convention in Bergesen v. Joseph Miller Corp., 710

11

F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that an arbitral award
obtained in New York involving two foreign entities falls
under the Convention). See also, Ministry of Defense of the
Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould, Inc., 887 F.2d 1357, 1363
(9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990) (holding
that the Iran-U.S.A. Claims Tribunal awards were
enforceable under the Convention).

In New York in 1958, the United Nations facilitated
the creation of an international agreement, the Conven-
tion or the New York Convention, providing for enforce-
ment of foreign arbitral awards. Party-States to the
Convention agreed to recognize arbitral awards as bind-
ing and enforce them in accordance with their own rules
of procedure. Id. 887 F.2d at 1362 citing to Article III of the
Convention. The Convention reflects the efforts of busi-
nesses involved in international trade to provide a work-
able mechanism for the swift resolution of their day-to-
day disputes. International merchants often prefer arbi-
tration over litigation because it is faster, less expensive,
private and more flexible. Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 929.

The United States attended and participated in the
1958 conference, but did not sign the Convention. Ten
years later, the Senate gave its consent, but accession was
delayed until 1970 in order for Congress to enact the
necessary implementing legislation. There was no opposi-
tion to the proposed legislation, H.R.Rep. No. 91-1181,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S.Code Cong. &
Ad.News 3601, 3602, which became 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208
(1976). Bergesen, at 929. See also, Gould, 887 F.2d at 1362;
Cargill Intern. S.A. v. M/T Pavel Dybenko, 991 F.2d 1012,
1018 (2d Cir. 1993) (reversing a dismissal for lack of

12

subject matter jurisdiction where petitioner made out a
prima facie claim under the Convention).

Article I(1) of the Convention provides:

This Convention shall apply to the recogni-
tion and enforcement of arbitral awards made in
the territory of a State other than the State
where the recognition and enforcement of such
awards are sought, and arising out of differ-
ences between persons, whether physical or
legal. It shall also apply to arbitral awards not
considered as domestic awards in the State where
their recognition and enforcement are sought.
[emphasis added]

In acceding to the Convention, the United States
made a declaration under Article I(3) of the Convention, 9
U.S.C. § 201, see also, Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 932-933 (citing
Presidential Proclamation 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997
(1970)), reprinted at notes following 9 U.S.C. § 201:

The United States will apply the Conven-
tion, on the basis of reciprocity, to the recognition
and enforcement of only those awards made in
the territory of another Contracting State.
[emphasis added]

The implementing legislation Section 202 of Title 9
U.S.C., which is entitled “Agreement or award falling
under the Convention,” in turn provides:

An agreement or award arising out of such
a relationship which is entirely between citizens
of the United States shall be deemed not to fall
under the Convention unless that relationship
involves property located abroad, envisages perfor-
mance or enforcement abroad, or has some other

13

reasonable relation with one or more foreign states.
[Emphasis added]

Focusing these rules on the subject case means the
Convention applies to any arbitral award made within
the territory of a Contracting State, including the United
States, involving commercial transactions between U.S.
citizens abroad.

B. Territorial Principle Embodied in Article I(3)
Focuses on Reciprocity of Signatories Not On
Awards Made in Different Contracting States

This Court as well as the Second, the Ninth, the Fifth,
the Seventh, and the First Circuits focuses on the point
which MMP has missed. The adoption of the declaration
does not give rise to a narrow interpretation of the Con-
vention.? Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 933. Rather, the Convention

2 To the extent there is an ambiguity, if any, the 1972
implementing legislation clarifies the 1970 accession
declaration. It is well settled that a later enactment supersedes a
prior Treaty. Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1885) (“so far as
a treaty made by the United States with any foreign nation can
become the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of this
country, it is subject to such acts as congress may pass for its
enforcement, modification, or repeal”); Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d
664, 667-668 (D.C.Cir. 1959) (Mr. Justice Burton, retired), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 904 (1960) (holding the treaties and statutes are
on the same level and, thus the latest action expresses the
controlling law):

Once a policy has been declared in a treaty or statute,
it is the duty of the federal courts to accept as law the
latest expression of policy made by the constitutionally
authorized policy-making authority ...When,...a
constitutional agency adopts a policy contrary to a

14

should be interpreted broadly to effectuate its purpose.
Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 933; Cargill, 991 F.2d at 1018; both
citing to Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.
15 (1974), rehearing denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974), and other
cases.

This Court has taught the intended purpose of the
Convention is to encourage the recognition and enforce-
ment of commercial arbitration agreements in interna-
tional contracts, Scherk, 417 U.S. at 520 n. 15 (an
international commercial agreement to arbitrate a dispute
under the ICC Court rules in Paris, France, should be
respected and enforced by the U.S. courts despite alleged
violations of U.S. securities laws):

The goal of the Convention, and the princi-
pal purpose underlying American adoption and
implementation of it, was to encourage the recog-
nition and enforcement of commercial arbitration
agreements in international contracts and to unify
the standards by which agreements to arbitrate
are observed and arbitral awards are enforced in
the signatory countries. See Convention on the Rec-
ognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, S. Exec. Doc. E, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1968); Quigley, Accession by the United States to
the United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70
Yale L.J. 1049 (1961). [emphasis added]

The Second Circuit applied that purpose in Bergesen,
710 F.2d at 933, and held that Congress spelled out the

_.trend in international law or to a treaty or prior
“statute, the courts must accept the latest act of that
agency. [emphasis added]

15

definition of what constitutes a non-domestic award
under Article I(1) in the implementing legislation embod-
ied in 9 U.S.C. § 202:

The legislative history of this provision [9
U.S.C. § 202] indicates that it was intended to
ensure that “an agreement or award arising out
of a legal relationship exclusively between citi-
zens of the United States is not enforceable
under the Convention in [United States] courts
unless it has a reasonable relation with a foreign
state.” H.R.Rep. No. 91-1181, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
2, reprinted in 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News
3601, 3602. Inasmuch as it was apparently left to
each state to define which awards were to be
considered nondomestic, see Pisar at 18, Congress
spelled out its definition of that concept in section
202. Had Congress desired to exclude arbitral
awards involving two foreign parties rendered
within the United States from enforcement by our
courts it could readily have done so. It did not. See
Sumitomo Corp. v. Parakopi Compania Maritima,
477 F.Supp. 737, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd mem.,
620 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1980); Aksen, American
Arbitration Accession Arrives in the Age of
Aquarius: United States Implements United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, 3 Sw.U.L.Rev. 1, 16
(1971) (Under implementing legislation Conven-
tion should apply when foreign contacts are
substantial, i.e., “where a foreign person or cor-
poration is a party to an agreement involving
foreign performance, or where the business deal
has some other ‘reasonable relation with one or more
foreign states.’ ”); see also McMahon at 740-43.
[emphasis added]

16
Rr

The Ninth Circuit applied the same purpose in Gould,
887 F.2d at 1362. Construing the territorial provision of
Article (3), Gould, at 1362, held that jurisdictional
requirements under the Convention are satisfied for an
award issued in The Hague, Netherlands, because
Netherlands is a Contracting state:

The United States imposes an additional
related condition on the award: it must be “made
in the territory of another Contracting State”, 21
U.S.T. 2566, reprinted at notes following 9
U.S.C.A. Sec. 201. Because of the “shall apply”
language of Article I, we read these requirements
into the jurisdictional mandate of section 203.

The Tribunal’s award satisfies these require-
ments as well. That is, the Tribunal sits at The
Hague, which is in the Netherlands, which is a
contracting State. In addition, the award is obvi-
ously not domestic in nature because Iran is one
of the parties to the agreement. [emphasis
added]

The Fifth Circuit explained Congress’ purpose in
adopting the Article I(3) declaration in National Iranian
Oil Co. (NIOC) v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 817 F.2d 326 (5th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987). Upholding an
agreement between Iranian and U.S. companies to hold
arbitration in Iran, NIOC, at 335, held that concerned with
reciprocity, Congress’ purpose in adopting the Article I(3)
declaration was to allow signatory States to reap the
benefits of the Convention, and thus to give further

incentives to non-signatory States to join:
When the United States adhered to the Con-

vention, it expressly chose the option available
in Article I(3), to “apply the Convention, on the

_

17

basis of reciprocity, to the recognition and
enforcement of only those awards made in the
territory of another Contracting State.” Declara-
tion (emphasis added). While the House and
Senate Committee reports do not inform us as to
the purpose of adopting this reservation, its pur-

| pose seems obvious. Concerned with reciprocity,

| Congress must have meant only to allow sig-

: natories to partake of the Convention's benefits in

U.S. courts and thus to give further incentives to ~

non-signatory nations to adhere to the Conven-

: tion. [emphasis added]

.

|

|

See also, E.A.S.T., Inc. of Stamford, Connecticut v. M/V Alaia,
876 F.2d 1168, 1172 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding an agreement
involving a party from a non-signatory State falls under
the Convention since the agreement provides that arbitra-
tion will occur within a signatory State):

The principle of reciprocity is thus con-
cerned with the forum in which the arbitration
will occur and whether that forum state is a signa-
tory to the convention — not whether both parties
to the dispute are nationals of signatory states.
La Societe Nationale pour la Recherche, la Produc-
tion, le Transport, la Transformation et la Commer-
cialisation des Hydrocarbures v. Shaheen Natural
Resources, Inc., 585 F.Supp 57, 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1983),
affirmed on basis of district court opinion, 733 F.2d
260 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 883
(1984). [emphasis added]

The First Circuit dealt with the scope of the Conven-
tion and the U.S. declaration un~ er the Article I(3) in the
context of jurisdictional analysis involving a request for
arbitration. Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184, 186-187
(1st Cir. 1982), construed the Convention Articles I(1) and

18

I(3) to ask whether the agreement provides for arbitration
“in the territory of a signatory of the Convention,”
affirmed a dismissal based on an agreement to arbitrate a
dispute in Italy, a signatory of the Convention, and set
out the following test:

(1) Is there an agreement in writing to arbitrate
the subject of the dispute? Convention, Articles
TI(1), I(2).

(2) Does the agreement provide for arbitration
in the territory of a signatory of the Convention?
Convention, Article I(1), I(3); 9 U.S.C. § 206; Dec-
laration of the United States upon accession, . . . 9
U.S.C.A. at 154 n.29 (1982 Supp.)

(3) Does the agreement arise out of a legal
relationship, whether contractual or not, which
is considered as commercial? Convention, Arti-
cle 1(3); 9 U.S.C. § 202.

(4) Is a party to the agreement not an Ameri-
can citizen or does the commercial relationship have
some reasonable relation with one or more foreign
states? 9 U.S.C. § 202. [emphasis added, parallel
citations omitted]
See also, Sedco v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican National Oil
Co. (Pemex), 767 F.2d 1140, 1144-1145 (5th Cir. 1985); Ten-
nessee Imports, Inc. v. Filippi, 745 F.Supp. 1314, 1321-1322
(M.D. Tenn. 1990); Corcoran v. Ardra Insurance Co., Lid.,
657 F.Supp. 1223, 1227 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), appeal dismissed,
842 F.2d 31 (2nd Cir. 1988), all applying the Ledee test. See

19

also, Fuller Co. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 421
F.Supp. 938 (W.D.Pa. 1976).5

The cited precedent magnifies the point missed by
MMP. The avowed purpose of the Convention to encour-
age the recognition and enforcement of international
commercial arbitration agreements is met by enforcing in
the United States, the American-made arbitral award
involving transactions in Poland between U.S. citizens.
As the United States is a signatory to the Convention, the
awards made in its territory, for its citizens, may not be
excluded from the Convention. Any other result plainly
contradicts the implementing legislation embodied in 9
U.S.C. § 202. Cf., Scherk, 417 U.S. at 520 n. 15: “Congress
passed Chapter 2 of the United States Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. § 201 et seq., in order to implement the Convention.
Section 1 of the new chapter, 9 U.S.C. § 201, provides
unequivocally that the Convention ‘shall be enforced in
United States courts in accordance with this chapter.’ ”
[emphasis added]

3 A request to commence arbitration springs from the same
well as the right to enforce the resulting arbitral award, i.e. the
parties’ agreement to arbitrate. An unconfirmed award is a
contract right which may be used as the basis for a cause of
action. A request to commence arbitration runs from the
arbitration clause in a contract. An action to confirm an arbitral
award after a losing party reneges (as here) runs from the
identical arbitration clause in the contract. Moreover, a request
for arbitration carries no force without enforcement. By
definition, a contract is an enforceable promise, and thus there
can be no valid contract without meaningful enforcement.

20

The interpretation of Section 202 as urged by MMP is
impermissibly narrow. Manifestly, many global com-
panies take advantage of arbitration to resolve interna-
tional commercial disputes within the territory of the
United States. To hold, as MMP asks here, that these
companies must go elsewhere to enforce American-made
awards is inefficient and limits the choices available for
enforcement. Indeed, MMP’s reasoning places the pur-
pose of the Convention on the horns of a dilemma. Under
one choice, Lander would have to confirm the award in
Poland, or Canada, or France, or anywhere but the
United States to fall under the Convention. Since MMP
probably has no assets in any of these States, Lander
would have to get a foreign judgment under the Conven-
tion, say in Poland (a signatory to the Convention) which
would then have to be recognized in the U.S. courts
through an additional mechanism for recognition of for-
eign judgments. This undoubtedly means further delay
and additional costs: the very results which the Conven-
tion and its implementing Chapter 2 of the FAA work
hard to avoid. Under another choice, Lander would have
to specify a non-U.S. forum to conduct the arbitration so
as to obtain the benefits of U.S. courts for enforcement of
the award under the Convention. Manifestly, this option
is especially unfair to U.S. citizens, since it forces them to
arbitrate abroad to take advantage of home court during
enforcement. Again, this spawns costly delays.

21

C. MMP May Not Have the New York Convention
construed for U.S. Citizens as a Limitation
Wrapped in a Restriction Inside a Qualification

MMP argues that because the award was made in
New York it cannot be enforced in the United States, and
that the Article I(3) declaration when read with Article
I(1), is conclusive that the award here is not covered by
the Convention. That is, while Article I(1) clearly pro-
vides that non-domestic awards fall under the Conven-
tion, MMP claims that Article I(3) excludes confirmation
in the territory where the award was made. Thus, MMP
asserts that as the implementing legislation in 9 U.S.C.
202 does not define “non-domestic” awards set forth in
Article I(1), U.S. citizens are limited to confirming only
foreign made awards under the Convention.

The meaning of the word “another” is ambiguous in
Article I(3), as modifying the “Contracting State.” MMP
relies on this ambiguity and hangs its entire argument on
the one interpretation of the word “another” which runs
afoul of the purpose of the Convention as taught by this
Court. The word “another”* could mean either “addi-
tional, similar” or “different.” MMP imputes the latter

* See e.g. The Random House Dictionary of English Language 85
(2d Ed. 1987), defining “another” as:

1. being one more or more of the same; further;
additional: another piece of cake. 2. different; distinct; of
a different period, place or kind: at another time;
another man. 3. very similar to; of the same kind or
category as: What we need today is another Thomas
Jefferson. 4. one more; an additional one: That first hot
dog tasted so good I'd like another. 5. a different one;
something different: going from one house to another. 6.
one like the first: one copy for her and another for

22

meaning to “another.” It urges that in the subject case the
Convention only applies to those awards made outside the
United States. Such reading squarely contradicts the prin-
cipal purpose underlying American adoption and imple-
mentation of the Convention. See, Scherk, 417 U.S. at 520
n. 15, supra. :

MMP would have the Convention construed for U.S.
citizens as a limitation wrapped in a restriction inside a
qualification. This cannot stand. Obstructing the enforce-
ment in the United States of American-made awards
involving transactions abroad discourages the mandated
recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitral
agreements in international contracts.5 That the restric-
tion invites expense, delay, and inefficiency into the arbi-
tration system is also at odds with the purpose. Informed
by the clear purpose of the Convention, “another” in
Article I(3) must mean “additional” or “similar”, not “dif-
ferent.” Indeed, MMP concedes this critical point because
its Petition is silent on the issue of Convention’s purpose.
PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1271 (7th Cir. 1995)

him. 7. a person other than oneself or the one
specified: He told her he loved another. [emphasis in

original]
See also, The Oxford English Dictionary (2d Ed. 1961); Webster's
Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (9th Ed. 1983).

5 Cf., Scherk, at 516-517: “A parochial refusal by the courts
of one country to enforce an international arbitration agreement
would not only frustrate these purposes, but would invite
unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to
secure tactical litigation advantages.” [emphasis added] That
MMP is jockeying after it lost the arbitration it started
aggravates the situation.

23

(“silence on the issue in its . . . brief indicates that it
concedes the point”).

MMP’s disregard for the purpose of the statute clearly
conflicts with this Court’s instruction that where the lan-
guage of the statute (or treaty) is ambiguous its purpose
informs the meaning. See, e.g., United States v. Bacto-Undisk,
394 U.S. 784, 799 (1969) (“where the statute’s language
seem[s] insufficiently precise, the ‘natural way’ to draw
the line ‘is in light of the statutory purpose’ ”, quoting SEC
v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-125 (1953)). The
context of the purpose and the Article I(3) language as to
reciprocity, establish that “another” deals with reciprocity,
i.e. the “additional” meaning of the word. That is, con-
cerned with reciprocity, Congress’ purpose in adopting the
Article I(3) declaration was to allow signatory States to
reap the benefits of the Convention, and thus to give
further incentives to non-signatory States to join. NIOC,
817 F.2d 326. As the United States is a signatory, the New"
York arbitral award here falls under the Convention.

The Convention itself excludes MMP’s reading. Thus,
in the first sentence of Article I(1), the “territorial”
restriction as to the awards as urged by MMP is
expressed as “awards made in the territory of a State other
than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such
awards are sought. [emphasis added].” In contrast, Article
I(3) uses “awards made only in the territory of another
Contracting State. [emphasis added].” Manifestly, had the
drafters of the Article I(3) meant to assign the meaning
urged by MMP, they would have used the same language
as that appearing in the first sentence of Article I. The
fact they did not is a strong indication of the “additional”
meaning which further defeats MMP’s interpretation.

24

D. Informed by its Purpose, the Convention, Its
Implementing Statute 9 U.S.C. § 202, and the
Precedent, Are in Harmony

Article I(3) and the implementing legislation of 9
U.S.C. § 202 should be read together rather than one to
the exclusion of the other. Article I(1) and the purpose of
the Convention must also be considered in the calculus.
And all of these provisions must be read together -
without conflict, and as they have been interpreted by the
courts. See e.g., Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184 (1st
Cir. 1982). In this way, all material meanings agree and
the words mean what they say. Article I(1) means non-
domestic awards fall under the Convention. Article I(3)
means The United States will recognize and enforce
awards made in any Contracting State, including itself.
The precedent, as illustrated by Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 933,
Ledee, 684 F.2d at 186-187, NIOC, 817 F.2d at 335, and
others cited supra, means the courts uphold agreements
to arbitrate in international contexts, and recognize and
enforce arbitral awards under the Convention on the
basis of reciprocity. The purpose of the Convention is
fulfilled, when more non-domestic awards are recognized
and enforced rather than less. Such inclusive, consistent
reading erases MMP’s position.

Simply put, MMP’s unwarranted restrictions of the
New York Convention for U.S. citizens are trumped by
the inclusive reading of its terms, its implementing legis-
lation, and clear precedent. MMP may not avoid this

bargained-for result by arguing that courts or Congress
overrule international law. This diversion fails.

25

MMP similarly fails in its characterization of the clear
precedent weighing against its position. By way of exam-
ple, at page 17 of its Petition it attempts to spin the
holding of Gould, 887 F.2d 1357, citing it for the proposi-
tion that Article I(3) must be read-together with Article
I(1). However, MMP omits the next paragraph in Gould, at
1362, which explains both the effect and the reasoning of
this inclusive reading: jurisdictional requirements under
the Convention are satisfied for an award issued in The
Hague, Netherlands, because Netherlands is a Contracting
state. Finally, MMP has no response to the teaching and
holding in Ledee, 684 F.2d at 186-187, and the many cases
which followed it.© Again, under PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1271,
MMP’s silence concedes that reciprocity controls the
meaning of “another.”

Ill. A PARTY, WHO AGREES TO BINDING ARBI-
TRATION, THEN COMMENCES ARBITRATION
UNDER THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT AND
LOSES ON COUNTERCLAIMS HAS WAIVED
ALL JURISDICTIONAL OBJECTIONS TO THE
OTHER PARTY’S RIGHT TO JUDICIAL RELIEF
TO ENFORCE THE ARBITRAL AWARD

MMP commenced this arbitration in accord with its
agreements with Lander. The agreements provided that
the arbitration would be binding.

By commencing the arbitration and contesting it fully
to an arbitral award, MMP has waived all jurisdictional

© Instead, it focuses on a proposed interpretation of what
makes a New York award non-domestic by a Dutch lawyer (see
Petition at 19).

26

objections to Lander’s right to judicial relief to enforce
the arbitral award.

This cannot be more eloquently expressed than was
done by Chief Judge Posner in Lander at 107 F.3d 480:

To agree to binding arbitration is to agree that if
your opponent wins the arbitration he can
obtain judicial relief if you refuse to comply
with the arbitrator’s award. Were there a rule
that no one could be ordered by a court to pay
an arbitration award unless he agreed to submit
himself to the court’s jurisdiction, the signing of
the agreement to binding arbitration would be a
waiver of the rule. To invoke arbitration pur-
suant to such an agreement, as MMP also did, is
further to agree to be bound, if necessary
through court action, by the arbitrator’s award,
provided, of course, that the award does not
have any infirmity of a sort that a court can use
to invalidate an arbitration award. Imagine
MMP’s indignation if it had won the arbitration
and Lander had denied that any court in the
United States had jurisdiction to enforce the
award (Emphasis present)

?

27

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny
MMP’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

ArTHUR H. SeIDeEL
Counsel of Record
Serpe, GonpA, LAVORGNA
& Monaco, P.C.
1800 Two Penn Center Plaza
Philadelphia, PA 19102
(215) 568-8383

Peter B. Rirz

1225 Gilbert Road
Meadowbrook, PA 19046
(215) 886-4083

Counsel for the Respondent

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386013_0773%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.