# Opposition Brief — Peeler v. Spartan Radiocasting, Inc.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1997
- **Citation:** 520 U.S. 1275

## Text

No. 96-1629

pete«

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United Bintes

October Term, 1996

HARVEY S. PEELER
Petitioner,
_ a
SPARTAN RADIOCASTING, INC.
AND ALLAN RAY TEDDER
Respondents.

On Petition For a Writ Of Certiorari
To The South Carolina Supreme Court

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

BRUCE W. SANFORD
Counsel of Record

HENRY S. HOBERMAN
DAVID S. WACHEN
MICHAEL J. LORENGER
Baker & Hostetler LLP
1050 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

(202) 861-1500

Counsel for Respondents

WILLIAM U. GUNN

PERRY D. BOULIER

Holcombe, Bomar, Gunn & Bradford, P.A.
P.O. Box 1897

Spartanburg, SC 29304

(864) 585-4273

Of Counsel

i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the Court should review the dismissal by the
Supreme Court of South Carolina of a libel action brought
by a public official when that court, after careful independent

review, found that the public official had failed to present
clear and convincing evidence of actual malice.

il
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner Harvey S. Peeler was the plaintiff in the
Court of Common Pleas of Spartanburg County, where this
case was initiated. Peeler was the respondent in the appeal
to the Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Respondent Spartan Radiocasting, Inc. , defendant and
appellant below, owns and operates WSPA-TV in
Spartanburg, South Carolina. It is a South Carolina
corporation with its principal place of business in
Spartanburg County, South Carolina.

Respondent Allan Ray Tedder, defendant and
appellant below, was a reporter at WSPA-TV during the
events at issue.

RULE 29.6 LISTING

Respondent Spartan Radiocasting, Inc. has no parent
companies or publicly held, nonwholly-owned subsidiaries.

ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

FS seb Bo py) rr i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS .......... il
SUNDER ek yo ike Wee 9 se a il
Bis OPE Ps PAD i Ke i ee we es Vv
wares Gr SPI CAGE ke ee l
A. NE oda ga G 6: 6 oa ek ee a 2

B. ME a ac 8b ew eS 6

_ it We NI oo tion ak sk Se ee 9
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT ........ 11

I. RATHER THAN PRESENT A
COMPELLING REASON TO
GRANT CERTIORARI,
PETITIONER MANUFACTURES A
PHANTOM OPINION OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH
CAROLINA THAT IS AT ODDS.
WITH THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF
SHE REAL OPINION .......-%:; 1]

1V

Table of Contents Continued

Page

II. THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH
CAROLINA PROPERLY FOUND
THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO
PROVE BY CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT
RESPONDENTS ACTED WITH
ACTUAL MALICE

A. The August 29 Report ...... 15

B. The September 1 Report ..... 18

CONCLUSION

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Page

Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 115 S. Ct.

RU CRUE oe es ere ae eee 13
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union,

SG 23S. Se. ies OEE 16
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323

Eee ase e dea s o R se 14
Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton,

SOs Si. Seer Cee sa ss hs Seas 14, 16
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496

SUES an 5-0 oO 8 ee ks RC 8, 19, 20
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254

‘4. Be rarerereerar gree ree crs ms Sars ca 14, 19

Peeler v. Spartan Radiocasting, Inc., 478 S.E.2d 282
a6 See. 5 ek ea ke ees Ae passim

Perez v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,
520 N.E.2d 198 (Ohio), cert. denied,
SEB SES. See Cee 6 ch Reh ews 17, 19

Reuber v. Food Chem. News, Inc. , 925 F.2d 703
(4th Cir.), cert. denied,
Se Sh GE UE 6 a Sakediee sees 14, 17

Vi

Table of Authorities Continued
Cases

Secord v. Cockburn, 747 F. Supp. 779
RGR An SO Bik ope ete e wee viet

Silvester v. American Broadcasting Cos.,
650 F. Supp. 766 (S.D. Fla. 1986),
aff'd, 839 F.2d 1491 (11th Cir. 1988)
St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) .

Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 (1987) ...

Texas v. Mead, 465 U.S. 1041 (1984) .....
In re UPI, 106 Bankr. 323 (D.D.C. 1989)...

United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220 (1925)

Rules

Nc Ws OP is ae ee Sa eceleca kala

No. 96-1629

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1996.

HARVEY S. PEELER
Petitioner,
Vv.

SPARTAN RADIOCASTING, INC.
AND ALLAN RAY TEDDER
Respondents.

On Petition For a Writ Of Certiorari
To The South Carolina Supreme Court

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This Petition challenges the unremarkable
application by South Carolina’s highest court of this Court’s
well-settled constitutional profections in a public official
libel action. In reversing the judgment of the trial court, the
Supreme Court of South Carolina held that Petitioner failed
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondents
acted with actual malice in broadcasting allegedly false and
defamatory statements about him.

Rather than offer a compelling reason for this Court
to grant his Petition, as required by Supreme Court Rule 10,
Petitioner ignores the plain language of the lower court’s
opinion and contends that the court below “‘made a de novo
review of falsity, [and erroneously] applied a clear and
convincing evidence standard to the issue of falsity... .’

,’

2

Pet. at 13. The majority of Petitioner’s Argument section is
devoted to this proposition.

In fact, in a 7-page per curiam decision, the Supreme
Court of South Carolina explicitly states no less than four
times that it was steering clear of falsity and, instead, was
conducting a de novo review of the record to determine
whether Petitioner had proved actual malice by clear and
convincing evidence. See, e.g., Peeler v. Spartan
Radiocasting, Inc., 478 S.E.2d 282, 284 (S.C. 1996) (per
curiam) ("[W]e are required to conduct an independent de
novo review of the record only on the issue of actual
malice.") (emphasis added). The court went on to
recognize, correctly, that the record in this case contains
nothing that even approaches clear and convincing evidence
of actual malice. But this Court need look no further than
the four corners of the decision below to dispatch the
Petition.

A. The Facts

This lawsuit arises from two news reports broadcast
by Respondent Spartan Radiocasting’s television station,
WSPA-TV in Spartanburg, South Carolina, concerning the
acrimonious 1988 campaign for the District 14 seat in the
South Carolina Senate.

When it appeared that Petitioner Harvey S. Peeler
would be reelected in an unopposed election, former
Cherokee County Councilman J.R. Stroupe decided to mount
a late petition drive to put his name on the ballot as a
challenger to Peeler. On August 29, 1988, three days before
the September 1 petition deadline, several local newspapers
reported that there were questions about the authenticity of
some of the signatures on Stroupe’s petition, resulting in an

—_—— >

3

investigation by the State Law Enforcement Division
("SLED"). (R. at 142-45, 505S.)' On that same day, WSPA
assigned Respondent Allan Ray Tedder, a WSPA reporter
for nearly ten years, to cover the story for that evening’s
newscast. (R. at 142-43, 242, 328.) Tedder contacted the
South Carolina Election Commission, the Cherokee County
Election Office, and SLED, which confirmed its
investigation. (R. at 144-45.) He also spoke with Stroupe
on three separate occasions -- first over the telephone,
second in person but off-camera, and finally on-camera; he
also interviewed Stroupe supporters. (R. at 169-71, 231-32.)
According to Tedder, during his in-person, off-camera
conversation with Stroupe, Stroupe said he believed either
Peeler or his supporters had caused the forgeries to occur.
(R. 151, 171.) Stroupe’s supporters echoed the same
sentiment, with two supporters also opining that Peeler was
involved. (R. at 151, 170-71, 228, 231-32.) Tedder also
contacted Peeler, who denied any involvement. (R. at 328-
29.)

Tedder prepared a one-minute summary for that
evening’s six o’clock news. (R. at 332-33.) The report
followed a typical television news format for day-to-day
campaign coverage: (1) issue; (2) accusation; (3) denial; and
(4) "stand-up" closing by reporter. Tedder reported the
following:

Ray Tedder: These SLED agents are poring over
petitions that have been filed by J.R. Stroupe, a
former Cherokee County Councilman who wants to
run for the State Senate. The State Election
Commission says that twenty people have signed

' “R." refers to the Record On Appeal submitted to the Supreme
Court of South Carolina.

4

affidavits saying that they didn’t sign the petitions;
that someone forged their signatures. These agents
are trying to find out if there are more. At Stroupe’s
Service Station near Thickety Mountain, supporters
are claiming it’s just dirty politics.

J.R. Stroupe: Everything was fine until I asked to
see them.

Tedder: Stroupe says he has hundreds of people
working for him trying to get enough signatures to
get him on the ballot in November, opposite
incumbent State Senator Harvey Peeler. He says he
doesn’t know who might have forged the signatures,
but he claims Peeler or his supporters engineered this
problem. Peeler says that’s nonsense.

Harvey Peeler: The first I heard about it, Ray, was
yesterday afternoon. It took me totally by surprise.
Tedder: For election officials, finding out who did
it is not as important as finding out how many
signatures are valid. They have to certify the petition
by September the first. In Gaffney, Ray Tedder,
TV-7, Eyewitness News.

Peeler, 478 S.E.2d at 283. Three days later, on September
1, Tedder prepared a one-minute follow-up report about the
failure of Stroupe’s petition drive. It again followed the
familiar campaign coverage format, and contained reactions
from the public:

Tedder: According to South Carolina Election
Officials, twenty people claim their names were
forged on these petitions. That helped keep J.R.
Stroupe twenty-seven away from having enough to
get on the ballot opposite incumbent State Senator
Harvey Peeler. These SLED agents sorting the
petitions are continuing to investigate hoping to find

5

out who committed the crime. J.R. Stroupe is
conducting his own investigation. Stroupe wan*: tc
prove he had nothing to do with the forgeries, and
the supporters who gathered at his service station
believe someone in the Peeler camp set Stroupe up.
Peeler says he had nothing to do with it. But Peeler
will be hard pressed to convince a lot of people.
They believe it’s just Cherokee County politics as
usual.

John Gimball: It wouldn’t surprise me. I mean,
there’s so much things that go on that people won’t
say nothing about. —

Arthur Hall: My opinion is that Harvey’s got
something to do with it.

Tedder: Stroupe says he’s not decided whether to
wage a write-in campaign, but his supporters say they
will carry on one with or without his active
participation. In Cherokee County, Ray Tedder, TV-
7, Eyewitness News.

Id. at 283-84. Although Peeler did not contact Respondents
following the airing of the August 29 report, in which he
was quoted (R. at 333-34), he visited WSPA on September
2 to complain that he was not contacted for comment prior
to the September 1 report. (R. at 334-44, 346, 348.) He
did not, however, complain that any of the statements in
either broadcast was false. (R. at 369-73.) When the news
director at the time, Harvey Cox, offered to broadcast a
follow-up report to allow Peeler another opportunity to
respond, Peeler declined the offer. (R. at 275.)

Senator Peeler was reelected to the South Carolina
Senate in November 1988. (R. at 360-61.)

B. The Lawsuit

For nearly two years after Senator Peeler’s reelection,
WSPA heard nothing further about the broadcasts from
Peeler. On August 8, 1990, he filed a Complaint alleging
that he had been defamed by the two broadcasts, but failed
to identify the specific statements alleged to be false and
defamatory. On June 5, 1992, Respondents moved for
summary judgment on the grounds that neither broadcast
contained any false statement, and that even if there had
been a false statement, there was no evidence that it had
been made with actual malice. The trial court denied the
motion with little explanation.

On June 15, 1992, a five-day trial began. Peeler
introduced the videotape of the two reports. As to the
August 29 report, Tedder testified that Stroupe had told him
during their off-camera conversation that he believed Peeler
or his supporters had committed the forgeries. (R. at 151,
171.) Because Peeler neglected to call Stroupe as a witness,
Peeler was unable to offer any affirmative evidence that
Stroupe had not made the accusation against Peeler.’

? Thus, Petitioner misrepresents the evidence when he claims that
"the evidence presented at trial showed that Stroupe never made the
accusation and that Tedder knew this." (Pet. at 2.) Indeed, later in the
Petition he concedes that Tedder testified at trial that the accusation
occurred off-camera, and that Haynes Mullinax, who was “present at the
grocery store when Tedder talked with Stroupe,” was not privy to that
conversation, having “observed the on-camera interview" only. (Pet. at
3 (emphasis added).) In addition, Petitioner neglects to mention that, at
one time, he sued Stroupe for libel based solely on the statement that he
now claims Stroupe never made. (R. at 517-29.) In support of his
motion for summary judgment in that case, Petitioner stated in a sworn
affidavit that Stroupe had in fact accused him of forgery. (R. at 530
2(b).)

7

With regard to the September | broadcast, which
was taped by WSPA and voluntarily provided to Petitioner
by WSPA at the September 2 meeting, (R. at 112, 349-50),
Petitioner insisted that the report on the videotape was not
the one that actually aired. The "real" broadcast, he told the
jury, was worse because the station’s tape did not include the
anchor’s "lead-in." (R. at 247-48, 349.) To support his
contention that the "real" broadcast was worse than the one
before the jury, Peeler offered hearsay testimony that his
mother told him that the September 1 newscast contained a
still picture of him in addition to Tedder’s report. (R. at
334-35.) Since he had not seen the news that evening,
Peeler was unable to confirm his mother’s recollection. (R.
at 334-35.)

Peeler then suggested to the jury that Tedder and
WSPA had destroyed the supposed "worse" videotape.
Peeler brought back former news director Harvey Cox, who
had since been terminated by WSPA. (R. at 267, 275.)
Cox testified that an air-check tape’ of the September |
newscast could not be located. He speculated that the air-
check might have been erased, but did not explain how he
eliminated the equally plausible possibility that the
September 1 newscast had never been recorded. (R. at 249-
50.) However, he did testify that “he did not mean to
suggest that he thought that Tedder had [erased it.]" (R. at
268.)

At the close of Peeler’s case, Respondents moved for
a directed verdict, arguing that Peeler had not met his

> Many television stations make a real-time tape of their programs
as they are broadcast, called an “air-check.". There is no legal
requirement that television stations make or retain "air-check" tapes, and
such tapes often are unavailable or of poor quality. (R. at 271.)

8

burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a
false and defamatory statement had been made with actual
malice. (R. at 387-91, 393-401.) The motion was denied.
(R. at 408-09.) Convinced that Peeler had not come close
to meeting the weighty constitutional burdens facing a public
official libel plaintiff, Respondents chose not to offer any
testimony. (R. at 410.)

The trial court’s instructions to the jury were long
and complex. The trial judge gave the jury two different
definitions of "actual malice." First he instructed the jury
that “actual malice" means knowingly or recklessly
publishing false statements.* Later in his instructions, he
told the jury that actual malice means conduct that is
"willful, wanton, or reckless or a conscious indifference or
a reckless disregard of the rights of others." (R. at 421,
430.)

Not surprisingly, after approximately two hours of
deliberations, the jury was baffled. It asked the court for
"(t]he definitions such as defamatory, preponderance, words
like that that were called out in here," and a copy of the
written charge. (R. at 459-60.) Instead of providing one,
the judge read the entire charge again, including the
instructions on presumed damages and both definitions of
actual malice. (R. at 459-74.) Respondents’ counsel
requested that the jury be provided with a written copy of
the definition of actual malice as it relates to liability. The
trial court rejected the request. (R. at 475.)

* The trial judge failed to abide by this Court’s admonition that "[i}n
place of the term actual malice, it is better practice that jury instructions
refer to publication of a statement with knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard as to truth or falsity." Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 501
U.S. 496, 511 (1991).

9

The same day, the jury returned a verdict for Peeler
and awarded $50,000 in actual damages and $625,000 in
punitive damages. (R. at 476-77.) Respondents promptly
moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a new trial,
a new trial nisi as to both actual and punitive damages, and
an independent review of the punitive damage verdict. (R.
at 477-79.)

On December 22, 1992, the trial court denied all of
Respondents’ post-trial motions with no explanation other
than the conclusory statement that there was "sufficient
evidence" to support the jury’s verdict. (R. at 6.) The trial
court also reviewed the punitive damage verdict and held that
it was "proper." (R. at 14-15.)

hes The Appeal

On January 13, 1993, Respondents appealed to the
Supreme Court of South Carolina. After full briefing by the
parties, the court heard argument on November 16, 1994.
Thirteen months later -- on December 19, 1995 -- the court
informed the parties that Justice Toal, a member of the panel
who had heard argument, had decided to recuse herself.
Justice Toal’s husband, an attorney in private practice, had
been retained by Petitioner’s counsel to handle his domestic
relations situation shortly after the court heard oral argument
in this case. See Motion for Reargument and Memorandum
in Support, filed Jan. 31, 1996. This served as the basis for
Justice Toal’s recusal.

Respondents moved for reargument, which was
granted. A judge from the South Carolina Court of Appeals
sat in Justice Toal’s place at the second argument. The
reconstituted panel heard argument on April 16, 1996.

10

On November 18, 1996, the court reversed the jury’s
verdict for Petitioner, finding after conducting de novo
review that Petitioner had failed to prove actual malice by
clear and convincing evidence. Peeler, 478 S.E.2d at 285.
As to the August 29 report, the court found that,

At best, Tedder may have practiced sloppy
journalism by referring to Peeler rather than only his
supporters, however, there is no evidence in the
record that he did so with actual malice.

Id. As to the September | follow-up report, the court said,

The testimony of [Hall and Gimball] does not clearly
show that Tedder deliberately misrepresented his
interviews with them. Tedder’s comment prior to
airing these quotes may have been ambiguous ["a lot
of people . . . believe it’s just Cherokee County
politics as usual."], but without additional evidence,
we hold this does not amount to clear and convincing
evidence of actual malice.

Id. In announcing its decision, the court explicitly rejected
Respondents’ argument that it was required to conduct an
independent review of the record to determine whether
Petitioner had proven falsity by clear and convincing
evidence. Instead, the court accepted Petitioner’s argument
that it was "required to conduct an independent de novo
review of the record only on the issue of actual malice." Jd.
at 284 (emphasis added). On January 13, 1997, the Supreme
Court of South Carolina denied Petitioner’s request for a
rehearing. This Petition followed.

11
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

I. RATHER THAN PRESENT A COMPELLING
REASON TO GRANT CERTIORARI,
PETITIONER MANUFACTURES A PHANTOM
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
SOUTH CAROLINA THAT IS AT CDDS WITH
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE REAL
OPINION.

Petitioner asks this Court to re-do the careful, de
novo work of South Carolina’s highest court in assessing
evidence of actual malice in an ordinary public official libel
case. Peeler, 478 S.E.2d at 284. Petitioner does not
quarrel with the existing constitutional standard. He does
not dispute that he is a public official, that he bears the
constitutional burden of proving actual malice, that he must
prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence, that
the Supreme Court of South Carolina properly defined the
term actual malice, or that the court was required to conduct
an independent review of the record on actual malice. Nor
does he advocate a departure from, or even an extension of,
these established principles.

Instead, he puts words in the mouths of South
Carolina’s Justices, asserting that they conducted a de novo
review of the evidence of falsity, not actual malice, and
erroneously applied the clear and convincing standard to
their phantom falsity analysis. The Justices said, and did, no
such thing. Petitioner ignores at least 4 unambiguous
statements by the court:

12

* We agree our scope of review on the issue of
actual malice is a de novo review to
determine if there is clear and convincing
evidence. However, we do not agree this is
the proper scope of review on the issue of
falsity. Id. at 284 (emphasis added).

e [W]e are required to conduct an independent
de novo review of the record only on the issue
of actual malice. Jd. (emphasis added).

e At oral argument, appellants in essence stated
if we declined to adopt a de novo review on
the evidence of falsity, [which the court has
cone,] the focus of this appeal should be on
whether there is clear and convincing evidence
of actual malice. Id. at 284 n.5 (emphasis
added).

® Pursuant to a de novo review of the record,
we hold there is not clear and convincing
evidence to support a finding of actual
malice. Jd. at 285.

This Court simply does not disregard the plain
language of lower court decisions, or re-plow fields that
have already been tilled by a State’s highest court. See
Texas v. Mead, 465 U.S. 1041, 1043 (1984) ("We do not
grant a certiorari to review evidence and discuss specific
facts") (quoting United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220,
227 (1925)); Sup. Ct. R. 10 ("A petition . . . is rarely
granted when the asserted error consists of erroneous factual
findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of
law."). Petitioner’s plea for relief amounts to nothing more
than an argument that the lower court did not mean what it

13

actually said, and that it misapplied a properly stated rule of
law.° These are hardly the “compelling" reasons for
certiorari contemplated by Rule 10.

Il. THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH
CAROLINA PROPERLY FOUND THAT
PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE BY CLEAR
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT
RESPONDENTS ACTED WITH ACTUAL
MALICE.

Spirited accusations of political chicanery, trenchant
barbs between candidates, finger pointing, lawsuits -- this,
unfortunately, is the familiar face of politics and
electioneering in America today. The District 14 race for
State Senate in South Carolina had it all, and reporter Ray
Tedder did his best to report on the accusations, the ensuing
investigation by a state agency, and the predictable denials
from both camps. This is not the stuff of actual malice.

The decades-old actual malice rule was virtually
tailor-made to protect news reporting about hard-fought,

° After erroneously arguing that the Supreme Court of South

Carolina conducted a review of falsity, not actual malice, Petitioner
suggests that the court should not have used the clear and convincing
standard in its falsity analysis. Even if the court had conducted a review
of falsity, which it did not, and had applied the higher evidentiary
standard for that review, which it did not, such a decision would fall
within the court’s discretion and this Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence. This Court has set the minimum standards required to
satisfy the Constitution; "[S]tate courts are absolutely free to interpret
state constitutional provisions to accord greater protection to individual
rights than do similar provisions of the United States Constitution.”
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1190 (1995).

le

14

emotionally-charged local elections like this one. The actual
malice yardstick in part reflects the recognition that the press
must be free to cover even the most raucous political
campaigns and activities without fear of liability for mere
negligence. See Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. Vv.
Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 687 (1989); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). As the Fourth
Circuit recently observed:

In the hurly burly of political and scientific
debate, some false (or arguably false)
allegations fly. The press, however, in
covering these debates, cannot be made to
warrant that every allegation that it
[publishes] is true. If this burden were
imposed through the law of defamation, news
organizations would become ever more
officious referees in the ring of robust debate,
and the free exchange of views would be
diminished to the public detriment.

Reuber v. Food Chem. News, Inc., 925 F.2d 703, 717 (4th
Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1212 (1991).

To recover for libel, therefore, a public official has
the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that
any allegedly defamatory statements about him were
published with knowledge that the statements were false or
with "a *high degree of awareness of . . . [their] probable
falsity.’" St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968)
(citation omitted); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 334 n.6 (1974) (reckless disregard is "equated
. . . With subjective awareness of probable falsity"); New
York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80.

15

After full briefing, two oral arguments, and a de novo
review of the complete record, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina found that a public official embroiled in a tough re-
election campaign had failed to meet his heavy burden of
proving actual malice by clear and convincing evidence.
The record fully supports the court’s determination.

A. The August 29 Report

In his August 29 report, reporter Ray Tedder
described some of the developments in the heated District 14
State Senate race to the viewers of Cherokee County. In a
one-minute report, he conveyed the allegations of campaign
fraud, the pending investigation by the state agency charged
with overseeing the election, and the positions of both
candidates on the allegations. See In re UPI, 106 Bankr.
323, 330 (D.D.C. 1989) (publishing accused’s denial
eliminates risk publisher will be viewed as endorsing
reported charge). He paraphrased a private, off-camera
conversation he had with J.R. Stroupe, in which Stroupe told
Tedder that he believed that Peeler or his supporters had
"caused these forgeries to occur." (R. at 151, 169-71.)

Petitioner does not dispute that Stroupe and his
supporters accused Peeler’s supporters of having “engineered
this problem." Pet. at 4. The only issue he raised at trial,
and again on this appeal, was whether Stroupe also accused
Peeler himself. Petitioner even concedes that four local
newspapers had previously reported that "Stroupe had
accused Peeler’s supporters of involvement in the forgeries."
Pet. at 5.

At trial, Petitioner did not produce any direct
evidence that Tedder had deliberately misreported Stroupe’s
accusation. Tedder testified that Stroupe had told him

16

shortly before broadcast that he suspected that Peeler or his
supporters were behind the forgeries. (R. at 170-71.)
Remarkably, Petitioner did not call Stroupe as a witness to
refute Tedder’s recollection that Stroupe had told Tedder that
he believed Peeler was involved. In fact, Petitioner offered
no evidence that anyone at WSPA questioned whether
Stroupe had made the charge. And Tedder testified that,
even after four years, he still believed that the broadcasts
were fair and accurate reports of what Stroupe told him.°
(R. at 151, 167.)

Petitioner’s only evidence that purported to show
actual malice was second-hand testimony about Stroupe’s
bias and state of mind (not Tedder’s) at the time of the
interview, and allegations that Tedder somehow "staged" the
on-camera appearance. Alone or collectively, these
allegations do not come close to proving actual malice by
clear and convincing evidence.’

° Petitioner calls into question Tedder’s credibility in an attempt to
bolster his sagging actual malice argument. But, questioning Tedder’s
credibility is not tantamount to providing affirmative evidence of actual
malice. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 512 (1984)
("discredited testimony is not considered a sufficient basis for drawing
a contrary conclusion"); Secord v. Cockburn, 747 F. Supp. 779, 793
n.10(D.D.C. 1990) (questioning plausibility of defendant’s testimony is
not sufficient for fulfilling “affirmative duty" to prove actual malice).
Moreover, Petitioner distorts the record in saying that Tedder, at his
deposition, could only remember Stroupe accusing Peeler’s supporters.
(Pet. at 3-4.) In fact, Tedder remembered Stroupe saying “what we said
in the story." (R. at 154.)

” Petitioner also urges that Respondents’ supposed motive to "scoop"
the competition is evidence of actual malice. (Pet. at 22.) This Court
has rejected a similar theory. See Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 667.

17

Stroupe’s bias or state of mind is irrelevant to the
publisher’s subjective belief that the accusation was made.
See Reuber, 925 F.2d at 715 ("[a]ctual malice cannot be
proven simply because a source of information might also
have provided the information to further the source’s self-
interest"). Likewise, Petitioner’s assertion that Stroupe’s on-
camera appearance was "staged," simply because Stroupe
donned a clean shirt and sunglasses for the broadcast, is, at
best, irrelevant hyperbole. Petitioner did not even establish
at trial that Tedder had orchestrated Stroupe’s appearance.
(R. at 181, 229-30.) Even if Petitioner had proven that
Tedder provided a shirt and sunglasses to Stroupe, these
actions would be inconsequential. Taking reasonable steps
to improve the quality of a broadcast is "essentially neutral,"
and certainly far afield of the clear and convincing evidence
required to prove actual malice. See, e.g., Perez v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co., 520 N.E.2d 198, 204 (Ohio)
(rehearsal of questions does not affect actual malice
determination), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988); Silvester
v. American Broadcasting Cos., 650 F. Supp. 766, 779
(S.D. Fla. 1986) (allowing witnesses who support reporter’s
"thesis" to rehearse and retape without giving same
Opportunity to others does not “rise to the level of
constitutional malice"), aff'd, 839 F.2d 1491 (11th Cir.
1988).

Based on this record, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina reached the unsurprising conclusion that evidence
about the state of mind of someone other than the publisher,
coupled with the unproven allegation that a reporter took
steps to make his broadcast look better, is not clear and
convincing proof of actual malice.

18
B. The September 1 Report

In his follow-up report of September 1, Tedder again
included comments from both camps, as well as “sound-
bites" from two citizens -- Gimball and Hall -- supporting
the unremarkable conclusion that some members of the
public viewed the petition controversy as "Cherokee County
politics as usual." Petitioner claims that Tedder acted with
actual malice because he edited the interviews with Gimball
and Hall and, Petitioner claims, took portions of the
interviews “out of context."

The record does not support Petitioner’s claims.
Tedder testified that he asked Gimball and Hall open-ended
questions. (R. at 192-93.) He also stated that he understood
Hall to say that Peeler might have had something to do with
the forgeries or the investigation. (R. at 186-87, 196-97.)
Although Hall testified that he had not intended to refer to
the forgeries, he admitted that Tedder could have asked
about them. (R. at 239-40.) The broadcast itself is at best
ambiguous as to whether Hall’s statement refers to the
investigation or forgeries. Gimball testified that his principal
gripe was that his sound-bite "was just one little segment of
what we had discussed." (R. at 129.) He did, however,
acknowledge that at the time he was interviewed, there were
people who would have thought that Peeler or his associates
were involved in the controversy. (R. at 136-37.)

Petitioner apparently quibbles with Tedder’s editing
decisions, suggesting that the broadcast should have
contained more of the Gimball and Hall interviews. This
argument ignores the realities and constraints of television
news, and also threatens the time-honored tradition of
leaving editing decisions to those in newsrooms, not
courtrooms. See Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 796

19

(D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (Courts “do not sit ’as some kind of
journalism review seminar offering our observations on
contemporary journalism and journalists.’") (citation
omitted), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 (1987). As one court
explained, "In any broadcast, there will be a selection made
as to what is newsworthy. The relevant question is whether
that selection is made with a view toward dissemination of
false information." Perez, 520 N.E.2d at 204 (citations
omitted). Here, the record contains ample evidence that
only two factors were considered when the broadcast was
edited: clarity and length of time. (R. at 168, 201.) There
is no evidence that Tedder edited the Gimball and Hall
interviews with anything but good faith, let alone "with a
view toward dissemination of false information," Perez, 520
N.E.2d at 204, or with the intent to quote Gimball and Hall
out of context.*

This Court’s decision in Masson v. New Yorker
Magazine, 501 U.S. 496 (1991), prominently featured in the
Petition, is not to the contrary. In Masson, the petitioner,
seeking reversal of the lower court’s grant of summary
judgment, pointed to evidence in the record of wholesale and

* The "missing" air-check tape and the testimony of a fired news
director add nothing of constitutional significance to the Petition.
Petitioner claims that Respondents intentionally erased the air-check to
hide unfavorable evidence, but he failed to prove at trial that the tape was
deliberately erased. See Peeler, 478 S.E.2d at 285 (Petitioner failed to
prove erasure was not routine, negating possibility of actual malice).
Even the former news director, Harvey Cox, fired by the station before
trial, did not believe that Tedder had erased the air-check. (R. at 268-
69.) Similarly, Cox’s “expert" opinion that Gimbal] and Hall’s
comments may have been taken out of context, based entirely on his
impressions of what Hall and Gimball said at trial, (R. at 255), does not
address state of mind at the time of the broadcast. See New York Times
Co., 376 U.S. at 287.

20

deliberate fabrication of quotations that the petitioner
brought to the attention of the respondent-magazine’s fact-
checker prior to publication. Jd. at 500. This Court found
that the evidence in the record, taken in the light most
favorable to the petitioner, raised a genuine issue of material
fact as to actual malice and falsity, precluding summary
judgment. Jd. at 521. In making this determination, the
Court held

that a deliberate alteration of the words uttered by a
plaintiff does not equate with knowledge of
falsity . . . unless the alteration results in a material
change in the meaning conveyed by the statement.

Id. at 517 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

Here, unlike Masson, there is no evidence of
fabrication or alteration, no evidence of deliberate
fabrication or alteration, no evidence of pre-publication
knowledge of falsity, and no evidence of any “material
change in meaning" of the broadcast resulting from Tedder’s
editing decisions. Jd. As the Supreme Court of South
Carolina correctly recognized, the testimony in this case
"does not clearly show that Tedder deliberately
misrepresented his interviews with [Gimball and Hall],"
Peeler, 478 S.E.2d at 285 (emphasis added), and therefore
does not rise to the level of clear and convincing evidence
that Tedder edited the September | broadcast with actual
malice.

Aeron ocinenan

——— mn

21
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny the
Petition.

Respectfully submitted,

Bruce W. Sanford
Counsel of Record

Henry S. Hoberman

David S. Wachen

Michael J. Lorenger

Baker & Hostetler LLP

1050 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 861-1500

Counsel for Respondents

William U. Gunn

Perry D. Boulier

Holcombe, Bomar, Gunn & Bradford, P.A.
P.O. Box 1897

Spartanburg, SC 29304

(864) 585-4273

Of Counsel

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386013_0571%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
