# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Hampton v. Illinois

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1997
- **Citation:** 520 U.S. 1156

## Text

PTL ED (1)
961305 DEC 3 1 19%

No. office Ur tHe CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1996

JOSEPH W. HAMPTON,
Petitioner,
Wi

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Appellate
Court of Illinois, Second Judicial District

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

DAVID E. CAMIC
Counsel of Record
MARVIN BLOOM
CAMIC, JOHNSON, WILSON
& BLOOM, P.C.
546 West Galena Boulevard
Aurora, Illinois 60506
(630) 859-0135

Counsel for Petitioner

Midwest Law Printing Co., Chicago 60610, (312) 321-0220

i

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether defendant was denied his right to defend
against the cnarges against him and the right to the
effective assistance of counsel when the trial judge
declared him guilty without affording him an oppor-
tunity to present closing argument?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Question Presented for Review ............... i
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i.

THE APPELLATE COURT IN THIS CASE
HAS DEPRIVED MR. HAMPTON OF HIS
RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL AS GUARANTEED UNDER
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION BY FINDING THAT
THIS COURT’S OPINION IN HERRING v.
NEW YORK, 422 U.S. 858, 45 L.Ed.2d 593, 95
S.Ct. 2550 (1975) ALLOWS FOR WAIVER OF
THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PRESENT
CLOSING ARGUMENT MERELY BECAUSE
THE OPINION DOES NOT EXPLICITLY
REJECT WAIVER. ADDITIONALLY, EVEN
IF THIS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT CAN BE
WAIVED, WAIVER WAS WRONGLY AP-
PLIBD TO ‘SOR CAR oc edvcnwesvascsseees 4

Comebesie. ... oek cecscteccatendisneee 6

ill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page
Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 858, 45 L.Ed.2d
ee a ee 4,5
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 106 S.Ct. 1404,
BP Sete GOk CIGOD) oo ccc ccccccndcccwsece 6
People v. Coleman, 212 Ill. App. 3d 997, 571 N.E.
Be ee We TODD caine sc vcccnvevecces 5
People v. Riley, 219 Ill. App. 3d 482, 579 N.E.2d
oo ee ee 5

Constitutional Provision

United States Constitution—Sixth Amendment ... 2

1

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner, Joseph W. Hampton, respectfully prays that
a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the judgment and
order of the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second Judicial
District, which was entered on July 3, 1996.

OPINION BELOW

The modified Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 (unpub-
lished) order of the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second
District, on deniai of petitioner’s petition for rehearing
entered on July 3, 1996, is reproduced in the Appendix
to this Petition.

JURISDICTION

The order and judgment of the Appellate Court of
Illinois, Second Judicial District, was entered on July 3,
1996. On October 2, 1996, the Illinois Supreme Court
denied a Petition for Leave to Appeal. This Petition for
Writ of Certiorari is filed within 90 days of that date.
United States Supreme Court Rule 13(1). The decision of
the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second Judicial District
was in contravention of federal constitutional law, in
particular the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Accordingly, the jurisdiction of this Court
is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257.

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED
United States Constitution - Sixth Amendment

“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury .. .[,] to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his de‘ense.”

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On August 20, 1991, petitioner Joseph W. Hampton,
pleaded guilty to two counts of Attempted Murder, two
counts of Armed Robbery and two counts of Aggravated
Battery. (C. 49). Following sentencing defendant made a
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and to vacate the
judgments of convictions which was denied. Mr. Hamp-
ton appealed to the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second
District, and that court reversed and remanded the case
finding the trial court did not properly admonish defen-
dant pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402.
People v. Hampton, 249 Ill. App. 3d 873, 620 N.E.2d 3
(2nd Dist. 1993).

Upon remand the case proceeded to a bench trial. A
Motion to Suppress Evidence was also heard simulta-
neous to the trial. The evidence at trial was that on
August 24, 1990, Michael Lichter and his eleven-year-old
daughter went outside for a walk. As they walked they
were attacked and robbed by two men and both were
seriously injured. The investigation led to Mr. Hampton
who ultimately gave a written statement.

3

In his statement, Mr. Hampton said that he and his
co-defendant, Jayme Sebers, were at Hampton’s house
drinking when they started to drive around. They saw a
man and a girl walking and Sebers said they should hit
the man with the car in order to rob him. Sebers drove
the car and struck the man and Sebers and Mr. Hamp-
ton then got out of the vehicle. Sebers robbed the man as
Hampton struck the girl on the head with an axe handle
because she was crying. The two men continued to beat
the victims and then left. Mr. Hampton’s car was found
with blood on it which could have matched the victims’.

Following the testimony regarding the evidence about
the crime, Terry Tichava, Chief Deputy of the Kendall
County Sheriff’s Office, testified regarding the arrest of
Mr. Hampton for the Motion to Quash and Suppress.
Tichava testified he was voluntarily allowed into Hamp-
ton’s home while Hampton’s mother testified that
Tichava walked in uninvited.

The court found that Mr. Hampton’s confession was
voluntary and not the fruit of an unlawful arrest or
search of his car. The court found there was no expecta-
tion of privacy in the car and overruled objections to Mr.
Hampton’s confession on the basis of chain of custody.
The court then immediately found Mr. Hampton guilty
of the attempted murder of Michael Lichter, the at-
tempted murder of Lauren Lichter, armed robbery and
two counts of aggravated battery. Following a hearing
the court sentenced Mr. Hampton to 30 years for each
attempted murder to run consecutive to each other and
to the armed robbery sentence of 30 years for a total of
90 years, and a concurrent term of 10 years for aggra-
vated battery.

4

REASON FOR GRANTING THE
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

I.

THE ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT IN THIS CASE
HAS DEPRIVED MR. HAMPTON OF HIS RIGHT TO
THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS
GUARANTEED UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION BY FINDING
THAT THIS COURT'S OPINION IN HERRING v. NEW
YORK, 422 U.S. 853, 45 L.Ed.2d 593, 95 S.Ct. 2550 (1975),
ALLOWS FOR WAIVER OF THE FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT TO PRESENT CLOSING ARGUMENT MERELY
BECAUSE THE OPINION DOES NOT EXPLICITLY RE-
JECT WAIVER. ADDITIONALLY EVEN IF THIS FUN-
DAMENTAL RIGHT CAN BE WAIVED, WAIVER WAS
WRONGLY APPLIED TO THIS CASE.

The Appellate Court of Illinois, Second Judicial Dis-
trict, incorrectly interpreted and applied this Court’s
opinion in Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 45 L.Ed.2d
593, 95 S.Ct. 2550 (1975), and the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. It found that because
Herring did not explicitly reject waiver in its opinion, a
defendant’s fundamental right to present closing argu-
ment can be waived by actions or inaction on the part of
counsel.

In reaching its decision in People v. Hampton, No. 2-95-
0123 (filed July 3, 1996), the Appellate Court, Second
District, stated:

“Because we do not believe that Herring stands for
the proposition tliat the right to present closing
argument is unwaivable, we hold that defense coun-
sel waived the right to closing argument.”
Hampton, No. 2-95-0123, p. 3. However the court failed
to address the question of whether Herring allows for the

a

5

waiver of this fundamental right. Although two Illinois
cases relied upon by the Hampton court cite Herring for
the proposition that the right to closing argument can be
waived by the failure of counsel to seek closing argument
(People v. Riley, 219 Ill. App. 3d 482, 494, 579 N.E.2d
1008 (1st Dist. 1991); People v. Coleman, 212 Ill. App. 3d
997, 1004, 571 N.E.2d 1035 (1st Dist. 1991)), a clear
reading of Herring reveals that nowhere in the decision
does this Court state that this fundamental right can be
waived.

Additionally, even if the right to present closing argu-
ment can be waived it clearly was not in this case.
Where the trial court improperly curtails a defense coun-
sel’s closing argument, thereby denying him the full
benefit of his constitutional right to effective assistance
of counsel, reversal of that conviction is proper. In this
case the trial court ruled on a motion to suppress and
several evidentiary issues and then immediately declared
defendant guilty. No opportunity was afforded counsel to
present argument. The Appellate Court, Second District,
stated:

“Defense counsel did not attempt, at trial, to seek
closing argument. Defense counsel did not object at
the time the trial court began to make findings nor
did he request to make closing argument.”

However, the trial court never “began” to make findings,
it simply declared defendant guilty. At that point any
opportunity for closing argument was gone.

By finding waiver in this case, the Appellate Court,
Second District, has effectively placed in the hands of the
trial court the decision of whether to hear or not to hear
closing argument. If the court declares defendant guilty

6

before argument, it is waived. Such a holding is impossi-
ble to reconcile with this Court’s decisions placing the
burden on the State in a criminal case of establishing a
valid waiver of a fundamental right. See, e.g., Michigan
v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 1409, 89
L.Ed.2d 631 (1986). Since this Court has not expressly
stated that the right to present closing argument can be
waived, or in what manner a waiver can occur, the peti-
tioner respectfully asks this Court to give its guidance on
this important issue.

CONCLUSION

For all the reasons discussed herein, a Writ of Cer-
tiorari should issue to review the decision of the Illinois
Appellate Court, Second District.

Respectfully submitted,

DAVID E. CAMIC
Counsel of Record
MARVIN BLOOM
CAMIC, JOHNSON, WILSON
& BLOOM, P.C.
546 West Galena Boulevard
Aurora, Illinois 60506
(630) 859-0135

Counsel for Petitioner

APPENDIX

App. 1

[Filed July 3, 1996]

THIS ORDER IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND Is Not To BE CITED

2-95-0123

IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE ) Appeal from the
STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Circuit Court of
) Kendall County,
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) No.: 90 CF 91
v. ) 90 CF 92
) 90 CF 93
) 91 CF 20
JOSEPH W. HAMPTON, ) Honcrable
) James L. Wilson,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.

MODIFIED RULE 23 ORDER ON DENIAL
OF PETITION FOR REHEARING

On August 20, 1991, Joseph W. Hampton (defendant),
along with Jayme P. Sebers, pleaded guilty to two counts
of attempted murder, two counts of armed robbery, and
two counts of aggravated battery. Defendant’s motion to
withdraw guilty pleas and to vacate judgments of con-
victions and defendant’s motion to reconsider sentence
were denied. Defendant appealed. On September 2, 1993,
this court reversed, finding the trial court failed to prop-
erly admonish defendant pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 402.

App. 2

On October 27, 1994, after a bench trial, the tria! court
found defendant guilty of two counts of attempted mur-
der, two counts of aggravated battery, and armed rob-
bery. Defendant was sentenced to consecutive prison
terms of 30 years for each count of attempted murder
and for the armed robbery count for a total of 90 years’
imprisonment with a concurrent term of 10 years’ im-
prisonment for aggravated battery. Defendant appeals.

On appeal, defendant argues: (1) he was denied his
right to defend against the charges against him when the
trial judge declared him guilty without affording him an
opportunity to present closing argument; (2) the trial
court erred when it (a) denied him the opportunity to
impeach a State’s witness for purposes of his motion to
quash arrest and suppress evidence, (b) admitted irrele-
vant and incompetent evidence, and ( c ) determined that
defendant’s sentence for armed robbery must be served
consecutively to his sentences for attempted murder; and
(4) the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him
to consecutive extended term sentences totalling 90
years’ imprisonment where the court failed to consider
mitigating factors. We disagree and we affirm.

First, defendant argues that he was denied his right to
defend against the charges against him when the trial
judge declared him guilty without affording him an op-
portunity to present closing argument.

“The right to present closing argument at trial is of
constitutional magnitude, regardless of whether the trial
is before a judge or jury or whether the defendant is
represented by counsel of represent himself.” People v.
Smith, 249 Ill. App. 3d 460, 465 (1993), citing Herring v.
New York, 422 U.S. 853, 45 L. Ed. 2d 593, 95 S. Ct. 2550

lesaemmeindniaetiininemiieaiaciiniaiiaiasisiiaiiaeiiii

App. 3

(1975). Therefore, where the trial court improperly cur-
tails “defense counsel’s closing argument, thereby deny-
ing him the full benefit of his constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel,” reversal is compelled.
People v. Smith, 205 Ill. App. 3d 153, 156 (1990). Never-
theless, “[tJhe right to closing argument can be waived.”
People v. Riley, 219 Ill. App. 3d 482, 494 (1991).

We determine that the trial court did not improperly
curtail defense counsel's closing argument. Defense coun-
sel made no attempt, at trial, to seek closing argument.
Defense counsel did not object at the time the trial court
began to make findings nor did he request to make clos-
ing argument. Although defendant did raise the issue in
his post-trial motion, it cannot be said that defense coun-
sel was denied the opportunity to make closing argu-
ment. See People v. Coleman, 212 Ill. App. 3d 997, 1004
(1991). Because we do not believe that Herring stands for
the proposition that the right to present closing argu-
ment is unwaivable, we hold that defense counsel waived
the right to closing argument.

Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred in
denying him the opportunity to impeach a State’s wit-
ness for purposes of his motion to quash arrest and sup-
press evidence. Specifically, defendant contends that it
was error for the trial court to not allow into evidence a
University of Illinois State Water Survey (Survey) at-
tempting to impeach Officer Tichava’s (Tichava) testi-
mony that it “started to rain” or “started to sprinkle” on
the date in question.

It is well established that

“where a witness’ credibility is crucial, the trial court
should permit the parties wide latitude in impeach-

App. 4

ing and rehabilitating the witness’ credibility so that

the jury can gain access to all necessary information

and impressions in order to evaluate credibility. '
[Citation.] Matters of impeachment are within the

trial court’s sound discretion, and a reviewing court

should not interfere unless there has been a clear

abuse of discretion resulting in manifest prejudice to

the defendant.” People v. Morando, 169 Ill. App. 3d

716, 730 (1988).

It has recently been stated that “a defendant has the
right to question a prosecution witness regarding any
matter which goes to explain, modify, or discredit the
witness’ testimony ***.” People v. Harris, 262 Ill. App. 3d
35, 45 (1994).

However, “[t]he purpose of impeaching evidence is to
destroy the credibility of a witness, not to establish the
truth of the impeaching evidence.” People v. Redd, 135
Ill. 2d 252, 316-17 (1990). “The exclusion of evidence is
neither prejudicial nor grounds for reversal where the
same or substantially the same evidence is admitted at
some stage of the trial.” People v. Campbell, 126 Il. App.
3d 1028, 1052 (1984).

We determine that the trial court did not err when it
denied defendant the opportunity to impeach Tichava for
purposes of defendant’s motion to ouash arrest and sup-
press evidence. First, it is arguable that the proposed
evidence is irrelevant. The proposed evidence declared
that there was no precipitation on the date in question
at the reporting station at Aurora College. However, de-
fendant was attempting to prove that it did not rain at
his home in Boulder Hill, Illinois. Furthermore, it can be
argued that the issue of whether it was raining on the
date in question is a collateral matter and may not be

a ee enn aT ee

App. 5

impeached. See People v. Breton, 237 Ill. App. 3d 355,
364 (1992).

Second, any error that may have resulted from the
exclusion of the Survey from evidence must be viewed as
harmless. Testimony which was substantially similar to
the Survey was admitted at trial. Specifically, Officer
Harris testified that on the date in question the weather
was “clear.” Defendant’s mother testified that on the date
in question, the weather was “pleasant.” The Survey can
only be viewed as cumulative evidence and its admission
would not have changed the result of the motion to
quash arrest and suppress evidence. We conclude that
the exclusion of the Survey from evidence was neither
prejudicial to defendant nor does it constitute grounds
for reversal. See Campbell, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 1052.

Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by
admitting irrelevant and incompetent evidence.

“Real evidence is admissible when an adequate foun-
dation is laid to establish that the item is the one in-
volved in the alleged offense and is substantially un-
changed since its seizure by authorities. [Citation.]
When the evidence is not readily identifiable or is
susceptible to alteration, the State must show a
chain of custody of sufficient completeness to render
it improbable that the item has been tampered, ex-
changed, or contaminated.” People v. Slaughter, 149
Ill. App. 3d 183, 186 (1986).

However, “[wJhen the competent evidence in the record
establishes the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt and it can be concluded that retrial without the
erroneous admission of the challenged evidence would
produce no different result, the conviction may be af-
firmed.” People v. Arman, 131 Ill. 2d 115, 124 (1989).

App. 6

After reviewing the record, we find it unnecessary to
determine whether the trial court improperly admitted
the following into evidence: (1) testimony regarding Offi-
cer Harris’ search for a one hundred dollar bill at de-
fendant’s home; and (2) testimony regarding the gym
shoe found at the scene. This is true because we de-
termine that even without the admission of the alleged
improper evidence, overwhelming evidence exists that
proves defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In
other words, even if the trial court improperly admitted
the evidence, we determine that “retrial without the er-
roneous admission of the challenged evidence would pro-
duce no different result.” Arman, 131 Ill. 2d at 124.
Therefore, we may affirm defendant’s conviction. See
Arman, 131 Ill. 2d at 124. |

Defendant further argues that the trial court erred
when it determined that his sentence for armed robbery
must be served consecutively to his sentences for at-
tempted murder. The relevant statute states:

“The court shall not impose consecutive sentences for
offenses which were committed as part of a single
course of conduct during which there was no substan-
tial change in the nature of the criminal objective,
unless, one of the offenses for which defendant was
convicted was a Class X or Class 1 felony and the
defendant inflicted severe bodily injury, ***, in which
event the court shall enter sentences to run consecu-
tively.” 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West 1994).

“In determining whether the defendant’s actions consti-
tuted a single course of conduct, courts will often exam-
ine the motivations behind those actions.” People v.
Morris, 237 Ill. App. 3d 140, 146 (1992). “Thus, in im-
posing consecutive sentences, the court in Stokes [People

eR

App. 7

uv. Stokes, 172 Ill. App. 3d 534, 537 (1988)] examined the
record for the existence of separate and distinct acts and
then sought to determine whether separate motivations
existed behind those acts.” Morris, 237 Ill. App. 3d at
146. Nevertheless, “[nJot all crimes involving multiple
acts are deemed to be the result of independent motiva-
tions.” Morris, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 146. Furthermore, “we
note that there is no need to object to a sentencing error
in order to preserve the error for review.” People v. Allen,
268 Ill. App. 3d 947, 951 (1994).

The relevant part of the sentencing order states:

“4, that the Class X offenses of Armed Robbery ***
and the two (2) separate offenses of Attempt Murder
*** were committed by the defendant as part of a
single course of conduct during which there was no
substantial change in the nature of the defendant’s
criminal objective AND that the defendant inflicted
severe bodily injury upon both victims.” (Emphasis in
original.)

Defendant argues that at the sentencing hearing the
trial court did not make appropriate determinations re-
garding course of conduct, motivation, and bodily injury.
However, the plain language of the sentencing order
demonstrates otherwise. Furthermore, the trial court
made an explicit finding that defendant inflicted severe
bodily injury upon both victims. Therefore, the consecu-
tive sentencing provision was mandatory.

We find defendant’s reliance on the case of People v.
Bole, 155 Ill. 2d 188 (1993), to be misplaced. In that case,
the defendant’s convictions stemmed from three counts
of criminal sexual assault which occurred on three sepa-
rate dates. The Bole court found the defendant’s acts
were committed in separate courses of conduct thereby

App. 8

precluding application of section 5-8-4(a). Bole, 155 Ill. 2d
at 199. After a careful review of the entire record and the
case law, we determine that the trial court did not err
when it determined defendant’s sentence for armed rob-
bery must be served consecutively to the similarly con-
secutive sentences for attempted murder.

Furthermore, Defendant argues that under People uv.
Ivey, 267 Ill. App. 3d 310 (1994), his consecutive sen-
tences were improper. However, we find Ivey to be dis-
tinguishable from the case at bar. In Ivey at page 312,
the court held that were the defendant has been convict-
ed of multiple offenses committed as part of a single
course of conduct, including one which triggers the
mandatory consecutive sentencing provision of section
5-8-4, the sentence for every offense need not be consecu-
tive to every other offense arising from that course of
conduct, even where only-one is a “triggering” offense. In
other words, section 5-8-4 (a) mandates consecutive sen-
tencing only for the triggering offence. In this case, each
offense constitutes a triggering offense. Therefore, under
the plain language of the statute, the trial court had the
authority to impose consecutive sentences for each of-
fense.

Last, defendant argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in sentencing him to consecutive extended
term sentences totaling 90 years’ imprisonment where
the court failed to consider mitigating factors. Specifical-
ly, defendant argues that the trial court failed to consid-
er that (1) he completed his high school education while
in jail despite a learning disability; (2) he expressed re-
morse; and (3) he had been an exemplary prisoner while
in the penitentiary.

App. 9

“(Ojur decisions have firmly established that the im-
position of a sentence is a matter of judicial discretion
and that, absent an abuse of this discretion, the sentence
of the trial court may not be altered upon review.” People
v. Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d 149, 153 (1977).

“This court will not disturb a sentence imposed by
the trial court unless it clearly appears that the pen-
alty constitutes a great departure from the funda-
mental law and its spirit and purpose. [Citation.] In
this State, the spirit and purpose of the law are up-
held when a sentence reflects the seriousness of the
offense and gives adequate coiisideration to the re-
habilitative potential of the defendant.” People uv.
Heflin, 71 Ill. 2d 525, 545 (1978).

Furthermore,

“[w]Jhen a reviewing court is requested to exercise its
power to reduce a sentence, that power must be ex-
ercised cautiously and the court will not engage in
mere judicial clemency. [Citation.] A reviewing court
cannot substitute its judgment for that of the trial
court simply because it would have balanced the
factors differently.” People v. Green, 233 Ill. App. 3d
298, 303 (1992).

This is true because,

“[a] trial judge is in a far better position than an
appellate court to fashion an appropriate sentence,
because such judge can make a reasoned judgment
based upon firsthand consideration of such factors as
‘the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral
character, mentality, social environment, habits, and
age’ [citations]; whereas the appellate court has to
rely entirely on the record [citation].” People v. Streit,
142 Ill. 2d 13, 19 (1991), quoting Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d
at 154.

App. 10

Finally, a trial judge’s sentencing decision is presumed
to be based on proper legal reasoning “unless there is
some statement in the record, aside from the sentence
imposed, which would tend to indicate otherwise.” People
v. Goodman, 116 Ill. App. 3d 125, 128 (1983).

Defendant’s argument relies almost entirely on the fol-
lowing statement made by the trial court. “That the only
possible mitigating factor as to the defendant Hampton
who was only 19 years of age at the time of the present
crimes is that he has no history of a prior delinquency or
criminal activity.” A careful review of the record indi-
cates that the trial court considered defendant’s potential
for rehabilitation before making this statement.

Furthermore, the plain language of the sentencing
order demonstrates that the trial court properly consid-
ered mitigating factors in sentencing defendant. The rele-
vant portion of the sentencing order states:

“2. That the Court has considered all the relevant
factors in aggravation, *** as well as having consid-
ered the relevant factors in mitigation, including but
not limited to the defendant’s age (19 at the time of
these offenses) and the lack of a history of prior
delinquency or criminal activity.”
The order states that the mitigating factors are not lim-
ited to the ones enumerated in the order. Therefore, it
cannot be stated that the trial court failed to consider
other mitigating factors. Defendant’s argument must fail.

In terms of the actual sentence imposed, it must be
remembered that it is not this court’s function to reweigh
the relevant sentencing factors. Nevertheless based on
the facts of the present case, we determine that it was
eminently reasonable for the trial court to sentence de-

App. 11

fendant to consecutive extended term sentences totalling
90 years’ imprisonment. The mitigating factors defendant
discusses all have one thing in common: They all oc-
curred after the commission of a particularly brutal and
heinous crime. It is not out of the realm of possibility
that the sole impetus for defendant’s “exemplary” be-
havior was the desire to receive a favorable sentence. In
light of the great deference bestowed upon a trial court’s
sentencing decision, we conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit
court of Kendall County is affirmed.

HUTCHINSON, J., with DOYLE and THOMAS, JJ.,
concurring.

App. 12

(Letterhead of)

ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT
JULEANN HORNYAK, CLERK
SUPREME COURT BUILDING

SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS 62701
(217) 782-2035

October 2, 1996

Mr. David E. Camic

Camic, Johnson, Wilson & Bloom, P.C.
546 West Galena Boulevard

Aurora, IL 60506

No. 81494 — People State of Illinois, respondent, v.
Joseph W. Hampton, petitioner. Leave to
appeal, Appellate Court, Second District.

The Supreme Court today DENIED the petition for
leave to appeal in the above entitled cause.

The mandate of this Court will issue to the Appeilate
Court on October 24, 1996.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386013_0277%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.