# Opposition Brief — Word of Faith World Outreach Center Church v. Sawyer

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1997
- **Citation:** 520 U.S. 1117

## Text

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No. 96-1056 Supreme at} ig
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FEB 5
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Ani

OCTOBER TERM, 1996

_

WORD OF FAITH WORLD OUTREACH CENTER CHURCH, et ai.,

Petitioners,

DIANE SAWYER, CAPITAL CITIES/ABC, INC., et ai.,
Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Of Counsel: FLOYD ABRAMS

80 Pine Street

New York, New York 10005
(212) 701-3000

SUSAN BUCKLEY
EDWARD P. KRUGMAN
DAVID G. JANUSZEWSKI

JONATHAN R. DONNELLAN Counsel of Record for Respondents

CAHILL GORDON & REINDEL Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., ABC

(a partnership including News, Inc., American Broadcasting
a professional corporation) Companies, Inc., Diane Sawyer,

80 Pine Street Roberta Gordon, Kelly Sutherland

New York, New York 10005 and Jeff Cooke

(212) 701-3000

(Counsel continued on inside front cover)

oF Vera rere ak

FRANK C. VECELLA
JACKSON & WALKER, L.L.P.
901 Main Street

Suite 6000

Dallas, Texas 75202

(214) 953-6000

Of Counsel:

RICHARD A. ROHAN

CARRINGTON, COLEMAN, SLOMAN
& BLUMENTHAL, L.L.P.

200 Crescent Court

Suite 1500

Dallas, Texas 75201

(214) 855-3000

BARBARA M.G. LYNN
200 Crescent Court
Suite 1500

Dai.as, Texas 75201
(214) 855-3000

Counsel of Record for Respondents
The Trinity Foundation, Inc., Ole
Anthony, Harry Guetzlaff and
Powell Holloway

/

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether this Court should reject the teaching of Bray v.
Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993), and
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America,
Local 610, AFL-CIO v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983), that pri-
vate conspiracies to infringe First Amendment rights are not
actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), to expand the reach of
§ 1985(3) to private conspiracies, motivated by religious ani-
mus, to infringe First Amendment rights.

2. Whether the court of appeals erred in its application of
the law to the facts alleged by petitioners when it held that
petitioners failed to allege a “pattern” within the meaning of
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act as
defined by this Court in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tele-
phone Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989).

ee

ii
LIST OF PARTIES AND RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

The parties to the appeal in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that is the subject of the petition
were:

Plaintiffs-Appellants:

Word of Faith World Outreach Center Church, Inc.
Word of Faith World Outreach Center Church

Defendants-Appellees:

Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.
ABC News, Inc.

American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.
Diane Sawyer

Roberta Gordon

Kelly Sutherland

Jeff Cooke

The Trinity Foundation, Inc.
Ole Anthony

Harry Guetzlaff

Powell Holloway

Pursuant to Rule 29.6, the corporate respondents state as
follows:

On September 19, 1996, Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. was
renamed ABC, Inc. ABC, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary
of Disney Enterprises, Inc., which is itself a wholly-owned
subsidiary of The Walt Disney Company, a publicly held cor-
poration. ABC, Inc. has no nonwholly-owned subsidiaries
except the following (all of which are nonwholly-owned indi-
rect subsidiaries of ABC, Inc.): DSC Videos, Inc.; ESPN,
Inc.; New York Farm Show, Inc.; Worldwide Television News
Corporation; ABC/EA Home Software, Inc.; and ABC Radio
Partners International Limited.

ABC News, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of ABC
News Holding Company Inc., which is itself a wholly-owned

;
!
i

ill

subsidiary of ABC Holding Company Inc., which is itself a
wholly-owned subsidiary of ABC, Inc. ABC News, Inc. has
no nonwholly-owned subsidiaries.

American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of ABC Holding Company Inc. which is itself a
wholly-owned subsidiary of ABC, Inc. American Broad-
casting Companies Inc. has no nonwholly-owned subsidiaries.

The Trinity Foundation, Inc. has no parent companies and
no subsidiaries.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CT TORII ED gu io cacns cs binccasdstbtancnctas
LIST OF PARTIES AND RULE 29.6 STATEMENT ........
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ET UP” SE CMD is vin nk dav unaescunnertas
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Sh I, COIN soa 5 a 0:00 sesbunne chucwaex cen
PN. 55s sn cchesanccacudertckekeadeunameenl

nara’ Gar DCIOGET g « o:c.caucsvccdewcedctacuccies

I. THE DISMISSAL OF PETITIONERS’ SECTION
1985(3) CLAIM WAS CONSISTENT WITH AND
REQUIRED BY THIS COURT’S DECISIONS AND
PRESENTS NO QUESTION WORTHY OF THE
EXERCISE OF THIS COURT’S JURISDICTION......

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ AFFIRMANCE OF
THE DISMISSAL OF PETITIONERS’ RICO CLAIM
PRESENTS NO QUESTION WORTHY OF THIS
SE We UN sion bacccneccccxc enews tt eiesousedes

PAGE

A. The Courts Below Properly Applied This
Court’s Decision in H.J. fmc. ...........6+... 14

B. No Split in the Circuits is Created by the
Fact that Other Courts Have Found Different
Facts to Constitute RICO “Patterns” ........ 17

Re ee Yo OREM RC Ae aE

21

vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases PAGE
Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. i) 12,13
Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710 (Sth

Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 908 6.2: ee 6n
Blank v. Heineman, 771 F. Supp. 1013 (D. Neb.

Og 8 Sa AOE PPI EAR | 0a OR 13
Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506

SP MU EY oe ci ewido vc Livan tees bedioe eka. ds 7, 8-14
In re Burzynski, 989 F.2d 733 (Sth Cir. i) ee 15
Buschi v. Kirven, 775 F.2d 1240 (4th Cir. Lh) ee 13

Calcasieu Marine National Bank v. Grant, 943
te WEDS CF Cie. BOD onc onc ove ceases occccxne 15

Delta Truck & Tractor, Inc. v. J.1. Case Co., 855
F.2d 241 (Sth Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
Oe OE es sic Bas ype Ch daa eek iad lek 15

Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971)..... 8, 8n, 9, 10
H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492

Ae Ae CR PE Ki i capagvedbed veer vcariaacs 5, 7, 14-20
Ikuno v. Yip, 912 F.2d 306 (9th Cir. 1990) ....... 17n, 18, 19
Jarvis v. Regan, 833 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1987)......... 20n

J.D. Marshall Int’l, Inc. v. Redstart, Inc., 935 F.2d
Or 0 Oe BE Bais oie in oe ck 18

LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412 (2d Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2546 th.) 13

Vil

PAGE

Lewis v. Pearson Foundation, Inc., 908 F.2d 318 (8th

Cir. 1990), vacated on rehearing, 917 F.2d 1077

(8th Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 507 U.S.

ft. Perr GOI RNP Ns eae eee 13
Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir.

ral ine re RR ee as De a a ak ag a 13
Medallion Television Enterprises, Inc. v. SelecTV of

California, Inc., 833 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1987),

cert. denied, 492 U.S. 917 (1989) .............. 19n-20n
National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler,

Se ae, ee AED iN dcubceereraedsncbuneesdusass 16n
Olive Can Co. v. Martin, 906 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.

Sy 52 cau eee eee ds CL aN aaeeeRea abana nehubesws 18
R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350 (Sth

ee cer cu vene thane arbueh ce aineese a eet eee 19

Ward v. Connor, 657 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1981), cert.
dented, 4355 U.S. FST CP9RZ) «a cccercccdsiccccccyes 13

Constitutional Provisions

TS Cee eS 5 i cei akackadsanwebieenenneeee 7,9

Pec

PAGE
Statutes
Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871
42 U.S.C. $ 1985(2) (1994) .......ccccccserseeesse 2,4
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1994) ...... 1-2, 3, 4, 5, 6-7, 8-13
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994), as amended ............ l
18 U.S.C. $ 1962(c) CEDDS) .... ecw wcccccccncces: 1,4
18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1994) ......... cece eee e ee eeee 1,4
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994), as amended ......... l
Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Ann.
16.002 (West 1986) ........... cece ccccecesecceees 4n
Rules
Federal Rules of Civil of Procedure
Pe SI oo cc dhe cons seses ceaicaswecseasiees 4, 5n-6n
Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States
or. i ae eeneeeaeeswen 7

Pe nent renal

te ina din

xt

hati Mn

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1996
No. 96-1056

-

WORD OF FAITH WORLD OUTREACH
CENTER CHURCH, et al.,
Petitioners,

—\

DIANE SAWYER, CAPITAL CITIES/ABC, INC., et al.,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

>

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Respondents respectfully submit that a writ of certiorari to
review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit entered on August 7, 1996 should not issue
because no question worthy of the exercise of the Court’s cer-
tiorari jurisdiction is presented and because the decision
below is in all respects correct.

STATUTES INVOLVED

The statutes at issue in the court of appeals were the Rack-
eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961 (1994), as amended, 1962(c) & (d) (1994), 1964(c)
(1994), as amended (“RICO”), and the Ku Klux Klan Act of

2

1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1994). Contrary to petitioners’
Suggestion (see Pet. at 1: Pet. App. at 23a),! 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(2) (1994) was not at issue in the court of appeals. Peti-
tioners did allege a claim under § 1985(2) in the district court,
and that claim was dismissed. Petitioners did not appeal that
dismissal to the court of appeals.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Statement of Facts

Through the 1980s and into the 1990s, Robert G. Tilton
(“Tilton”), as pastor of petitioners Word of Faith,? became one
of the most popular and successful televangelists in the coun-
try. Notwithstanding his prominence and the media scrutiny
accorded some other televangelists, Tilton prospered without
attracting much attention by the national press and media. In
the spring of 1991, however, journalists working for ABC’s
weekly news program PrimeTime Live (“PrimeTime”) began
an investigation into Tilton. In the course of their research,
the ABC journalists received the assistance of Dallas minis-
ter Ole Anthony, president of The Trinity Foundation, Inc., a
religious community and charitable Organization.

On November 21, 1991, PrimeTime broadcast a report
about three televangelists, including Tilton, that was highly
critical of Tilton and his fund-raising practices. A week later,
PrimeTime broadcast a brief update reporting on reactions to
the earlier broadcast. On July 9, 1992, the original Prime fime
report was rebroadcast, with certain minor changes, together
with a follow-up report. No other ABC broadcasts are at
issue.

; References herein to “Pet. at _” are to the Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari. References herein to “Pet. App. at __” are to the Appendix
thereto.

2

Petitioners Word of Faith World Outreach Center Church, Inc.
and Word of Faith World Outreach Cer* >> Church are referred to herein
collectively as “Word of Faith.”

Tilton’s Other Litigations

As a result of the PrimeTime broadcasts, Tilton began a
legal assault on ABC, its journalists, and the Trinity Foun-
dation.?

First, in May 1992, Tilton filed an action in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma
against the Trinity Foundation and various lawyers repre-
senting individuals in numerous suits against Tilton. Tilton
sued for libel and for alleged violations of the Ku Klux Klan
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). His claims were dismissed, and that
dismissal was unanimously affirmed by the Tenth Circuit.
Tilton v. Richardson, 6 F.3d 683 (10th Cir. 1993). This Court
denied Tilton’s petition for a writ of certiorari. 510 U.S. 1093
(1994).

In November 1992, Tilton commenced a libel action against
ABC in the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Oklahoma. Shortly thereafter, Tilton moved for a pre-
liminary injunction against any rebroadcast of allegedly false
and defamatory statements contained in the November 21,
1991 and July 9, 1992 PrimeTime broadcasts. After a five-day
evidentiary hearing in June 1993, the district court held that
Tilton had failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the
merits and denied the requested relief. Tilton v. Capital
Cities/ABC Inc., 827 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Okla. 1993).

On June 19, 1995, the district court issued its ruling grant-
ing ABC’s motion for summary judgment as to all claims
made in the libel case. Tilton v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 905
F. Supp. 1514 (N.D. Okla. 1995). The district court carefully
reviewed each of the numerous alleged falsehoods in ABC’s

3

The respondents here include three of ABC’s corporate entities,
together with journalists Diane Sawyer, Roberta Gordon, Kelly Suther-
land and Jeff Cooke. These respondents are referred to herein collectively
as “ABC.” The additional respondents are The Trinity Foundation, Inc.
and three individuals affiliated with it, Ole Anthony, Powell Holloway
and Harry Guetzlaff. These respondents are referred to herein collectively
as the “Trinity Foundation.”

4

PrimeTime reports and concluded that no reasonable jury

could find that the PrimeTime broadcasts were false and/or

published with actual malice. That decision was unanimously
affirmed by the Tenth Circuit. Tilton v. Capital Cities/ABC,
Inc., 95 F.3d 32 (10th Cir. 1996), petition for certiorari filed,
65 U.S.L.W. 3401 (U.S. Nov. 25, 1996) (No. 96-817).

This Litigation

Having suffered setbacks in his two actions before the
Oklahoma federal courts, Tilton turned to the federal courts
of Texas. On November 17, 1993, he instituted this action in
the name of the church he controls and directs, Word of Faith,
challenging the very same PrimeTime broadcasts he had chal-
lenged in Oklahoma. Having let the statute of limitations
expire for any libel claim,‘ however, Word of Faith was
forced to dress up its libel claims in federal statutory clothing.

Word of Faith’s initial complaint asserted claims under the
Ku Klux Klan Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(2) and 1985(3), based
on the investigation and broadcast of ABC’s PrimeTime
reports. All defendants thereafter filed timely motions to dis-
miss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In
an Order dated March 16, 1994, the district court granted
defendants’ motions and dismissed the complaint in its
entirety.

After twice more amending its complaint, on August 2,
1994, Word of Faith filed its third amended complaint, assert-
ing new claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) & (d) (“RICO”).
ABC moved to dismiss the third amended complaint for fail-
ure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The
Trinity Foundation filed a similar motion, moving in the alter-
native for summary judgment on the grounds of res judicata
based on the final disposition of the Oklahoma federal court

4

The Texas statute of limitations for defamation claims is one
year. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.002 (West 1986).

action brought against it by Tilton. By Order dated Febru-
ary 8, 1995, the district court granted respondents’ motions to
dismiss the third amended complaint. (Pet. App. at 17a-22a)
The district court entered a final judgment dismissing the
action with prejudice. (Pet. App. at 16a)

Word of Faith appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. On August 7, 1996, the Fifth
Circuit unanimously affirmed the judgment of the district
court. Word of Faith World Outreach Center Church, Inc. v.
Sawyer, 90 F.3d 118 (Sth Cir. 1996). With respect to Word of
Faith’s claims under RICO, the Fifth Circuit, applying this
Court’s decision in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone
Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989), held:

the alleged predicate acts occurred during the production
and airing of PrimeTime broadcasts concerning Tilton
and his Church. The alleged acts were all part of a sin-
gle, lawful endeavor—namely the production of televi-
sion news reports concerning a particular subject. We
agree with the district court that the Church has failed to
plead a “continuity of racketeering activity, or its
threat.”

90 F.3d at 123, Pet. App. at 12a-13a (quoting H.J. Inc., 492
U.S. at 241). The Fifth Circuit also affirmed dismissal of Word
of Faith’s claims under § 1985(3) of the Ku Klux Klan Act
on the ground that Word of Faith failed to allege that defen-
dants were motivated by racial animus. The court of appeals
concluded: “We decline the Church’s invitation to extend the
reach of section 1985(3) to include conspiracies motivated by
religious, as opposed to racial, animus.” 90 F.3d at 124, Pet.
App. at 14a.°

. Because the district court assessed Word of Faith’s complaints

on defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motions, the courts below were required
to—and did (Pet. App. at 9a, 19a)—assume that Word of Faith’s alle-
gations were true. For example, a central feature of Word of Faith’s com-
plaints is the allegation that defendants stole prayer requests and planted
them in the trash. Such allegations—and virtually all others—have been
shown to be false in Tilton’s libel suit against ABC. After extensive dis-

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In the wake of the ABC PrimeTime reports that were crit-
ical of him, televangelist Robert Tilton has litigated and lost
libel and civil rights claims against ABC and the Trinity
Foundation. In this action, commenced by the church he con-
trols, Tilton pursues additional claims based on the same ABC
broadcasts brought pursuant to the Ku Klux Klan Act and
RICO. All of Word of Faith’s claims were properly dismissed
by the district court, and that dismissal was properly affirmed
by the Fifth Circuit.

With respect to Word of Faith’s claims under § 1985(3) of
the Ku Klux Klan Act, Word of Faith now asks this Court to
hold for the first time that a private conspiracy motivated by

covery, the district court in that case granted ABC’s motion for summary

judgment. With respect to the allegation of stolen prayer requests, the

district court found:
Plaintiff also claims that the reports were false because the prayer
requests were stolen and then planted in the trash dumpsters. Dis-
covery, however, has failed to uncover any factual basis for the
allegations that Defendants stole and planted the prayer requests in
the trash dumpsters or in fact suspected that others stole and
planted the prayer requests in the trash dumpsters.

905 F. Supp. at 1530-31. Accordingly, even if Word of Faith’s com-
plaints in this case had survived defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motions,
they would have been subject to dismissal on summary judgment
motions.

Additionally, because Word of Faith and Tilton are in privity, Word of
Faith’s action would have been subject to dismissal under the doctrines
of res judicata and collateral estoppel in light of the dismissal of Tilton’s
other actions against ABC and against the Trinity Foundation. See South-
west Airlines Co. v. Texas International Airlines, Inc., 546 F.2d 84, 95
(Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 832 (1977); Aerojet-General Corp. v.
Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 719 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 908 (1975).
Because Word of Faith’s complaints failed to state a claim, and because
the district court ruled before the Oklahoma federal court had dismissed
Tilton’s suit against ABC, the res judicata and collateral estoppel issues
were not addressed by the court of appeals below. (90 F.3d at 124: Pet.
App. at 15a)

religious animus is actionable under § 1985(3). In so doing,
Word of Faith mischaracterizes to the point of misrepresen-
tation this Court’s prior decisions in Bray v. Alexandria
Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993), and United
Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local 610,
AFL-CIO v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983). In those decisions,
this Court not only declined to extend the reach of § 1985(3)
beyond conspiracies motivated by racial animus, but it also
established that private conspiracies to infringe First Amend-
ment rights are not actionable under § 1985(3). Word of
Faith’s attempt to circumvent this Court’s decisions in Bray
and Carpenters should be rejected.

With respect to Word of Faith’s claims under RICO, Word
of Faith also mischaracterizes the decision of the Fifth Cir-
cuit, claiming that the court created a new test to assess a
“pattern” under RICO. In fact, the Fifth Circuit properly
applied the test established by this Court in H.J. Inc. v. North-
western Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989), to the facts
alleged by Word of Faith and found that the allegations were
insufficient to satisfy the H.J. “pattern” requirement. By cit-
ing cases from other circuits in which courts have found the
“pattern” requirement satisfied, petitioners argue that there is
a split between the circuits. In fact, such decisions merely
reflect different outcomes reached under H.J. based on dif-
ferent factual allegations. Such differing results do not war-
rant a grant of a writ of certiorari. See Supreme Court Rule 10
(“A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the
asserted error consists of . . . the misapplication of a prop-
erly stated rule of law.”).

8

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
I.

THE DISMISSAL OF PETITIONERS’ SECTION
1985(3) CLAIM WAS CONSISTENT WITH
AND REQUIRED BY THIS COURT’S DECISIONS
AND PRESENTS NO QUESTION WORTHY OF THE
EXERCISE OF THIS COURT’S JURISDICTION

Petitioners claim that this Court should grant certiorari to
clarify whether § 1985(3) applies to conspiracies motivated by
religious animus. (Pet. at 12-17) Urging that this Court’s deci-
sions in Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S.
263 (1993), United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of
America, Local 610, AFL-CIO v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983),
and Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), established
that § 1985(3) does extend beyond the protection of racially-
motivated conspiracies, petitioners disingenuously urge that
this case presents a unique opportunity to make clear that a
private, religious-based conspiracy is actionable under the
Statute.

For petitioners to maintain that this Court “has held that
§ 1985(3) is not limited to racially motivated conspiracies”
(Pet. at 12) and that the Court has never “rejected or
retreated” from its view that § 1985(3) encompasses “other-
than-race class-based conspiracies” (Pet. at 13) is a blatant
misrepresentation of this Court’s decisions. This Court has
never so held.® While the question of whether § 1985(3) could
be interpreted to extend to private conspiracies motivated by
religious animus is one that spawned considerable debate and
disagreement following this Court’s decision in Griffin, to
Suggest that it was not resolved by the decisions in Carpen-
ters and Bray so completely ignores the fundamental holdings
of those cases as to border on the frivolous.

6

See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102 n.9; Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 835-
37; Bray, 506 U.S. at 69.

As both Carpenters and Bray held, although § 1985(3)
applies to private conspiracies, see Griffin, 403 U.S. at 10i,
it only may do so where the particular right at issue is con-
stitutionally protected against not only government but also
private encroachment. Bray, 506 U.S. at 267-68, 278; Car-
penters, 463 U.S. at 833. As the Bray Court noted:

There are few such rights (we have hitherto recognized
only the Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from
involuntary servitude, and, in the same Thirteenth
Amendment context, the right of interstate travel).

506 U.S. at 278.

Petitioners’ claim here is based on their allegation that
defendants conspired to deprive them and their members of
their rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to the free

xercise of religion. (Pet. App. at 221a 41)’ But that right—
as fundamental and important as it and the other First Amend-
ment rights assuredly are—is only enforceable against the
state. It does not protect against private encroachment. See
Bray, 506 U.S. at 278; Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 833. To sug-
gest, as petitioners do, that this Court’s decisions have left
open the question of whether private conspiracies to violate
First Amendment rights are actionable under § 1985(3) is sim-
ply to ignore their very holdings.

Petitioners urge that this Court should grant a writ of cer-
tiorari because the decision below is “contrary to the clear
legislative history of the [Ku Klux Klan Act],” citing the
remarks of Senator Edmunds on the Senate floor in 1871.
(Pet. at 13) Petitioners misleadingly suggest that this Court
has attributed great significance to Senator Edmunds’ remarks

. Although their complaint made reference to various investiga-

tions of Tilton conducted by government agencies, petitioners did not
allege that any government agencies or actors were members of the
alleged conspiracy to deprive them of their First Amendment rights. (Pet.
App. at 220a-253a) Petitioners’ allegations concerning government inves-
tigations do not alter the application of Bray to bar their claims. See
Tilton v. Richardson, 6 F.3d 683, 687 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 1093 (1994).

es em Nae eI ET Oe

10

by making “specific reference” to them in Griffin, Carpenters
and Bray. (Pet. at 13) While the holdings of these cases surely
govern Over the snippets of legislative history cited in them,
it is in any event the case that in Carpenters the Court con-
sidered the very argument made by petitioners here and
refused to rely upon Senator Edmunds’ remarks at all. After
noting that the remarks were made on the Senate floor, this
Court explained:

The provision that is now § 1985(3), however, originated
in the House. The narrowing amendment, which changed
§ 1985(3) to its present form, was proposed, debated, and
adopted there, and the Senate made only technical
changes to the bill. Senator Edmunds’ views, since he
managed the bill on the floor of the Senate, are not with-
out weight. But we were aware of his views in Griffin,
403 U.S., at 102 n.9, and still withheld judgment on the
question whether § 1985(3), as enacted, went any farther
than its central concern—combatting the violent and
other efforts of the Klan and its allies to resist and to
frustrate the intended effects of the Thirteenth, Four-
teenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. Lacking other evi-
dence of congressional intention, we follow the same
course here.

463 U.S. at 837.8

In a final effort to invoke this Court’s certiorari jurisdic-
tion, petitioners predictably invoke the specter of a conflict
between the circuit courts of appeals. Petitioners maintain
that other circuits “interpret[ ] § 1985(3) to reach conspiracies
based on religious bigotry.” (Pet. at 13) The conflict cited by
petitioners is illusory, however, because decisions of some of
the circuits referred to by petitioners do not support their

8

Although petitioners claim the Court made “specific reference”
to Senator Edmunds’ remarks in Bray, petitioners cite only to the con-
curring and dissenting opinions. (Pet. at 13) Justice Scalia’s opinion for
the Court made no reference to Senator Edmunds’ remarks.

1]

claims at all, and others can no longer be considered defini-
tive in light of this Court’s decisions in Carpenters and Bray.°

For example, in support of their contention that the Fifth
Circuit’s decision conflicts with the law of other circuits,
petitioners rely on the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Jaylor v.
Gilmartin, 686 F.2d 1346 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1147, 463 U.S. 1229 (1983). In Taylor, decided before
this Court’s decisions in Carpenters and Bray, the Tenth Cir-
cuit reversed a dismissal of a § 1985(3) claim aileging a con-
spiracy to violate the plaintiff’s “first amendment right to
freely practice his religion” that was motivated by “animus
against religious minorities.” 686 F.2d at 1358. In Tilton v.
Richardson, 6 F.3d 683 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 1093 (1994), however, (which petitioners relegate to a
footnote (Pet. at 15 n.36)) the Tenth Circuit reexamined Tay-
lor in the light of this Court’s intervening decisiors in Car-
penters and Bray and affirmed dismissal of Tilton’s § 1985(3)
claim based on allegations of religious animus. The Tenth Cir-
cuit explained:

Taylor was decided in 1982, nearly one year prior to
Carpenters, and well before Bray. Carpenters enunciates
the principle that § 1985(3) does not apply to private
conspiracies unless they interfere with rights that are
protected against private, as well as official, encroach-
ment. The issue of whether § 1985(3) covers private con-
spiracies aimed at rights that are by definition only
applicable to public encroachment was not decided in
Taylor, and to the extent that it might have been, . .
Carpenters and Bray have effected a change in this
evolving area of the law.

6 F.3d at 687.'°

9

Although petitioners include the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia in their discussion of the purported split in the circuits,
petitioners cite no decision from that court, only a decision of a district
court. (Pet. at 14-15)

© Tilton, represented by the same counsel who appears of counsel

in this case, petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari in Tilton

12

The pre-Bray (and sometimes pre-Carpenters) rulings of
other circuits, as well, hardly provide a basis for a grant of
the writ. Like the Tenth Circuit, some circuits have begun to
reexamine and question their decisions in light of Carpenters
and Bray. Compare Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227, 1235
(8th Cir. 1971) (upholding religious animus claim based on
finding, contrary to subsequent decisions in Carpenters and
Bray, that “First Amendment rights of freedom of assembly
and worship” are protected against not only public but private

v. Richardson. The questions presented by the petition in that case
were:
|. Whether a conspiracy to deprive a pastor of his fundamental.
natural right to exercise his religion freely is actionable under
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1981).

2. Whether a conspiracy between private individuals to deprive
a person of constitutional rights which conspiracy involves,
affects or is aimed at influencing the activities of the State, is
actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1981).

Whether allegations of a conspiracy resulting in actions by the
Texas Attorney General, allegations of a conspiracy intended
to influence, pressure and induce action by state officials, and
allegations of a conspiracy using state courts to further the
aims of conspiracy sufficiently allege state involvement to
support a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1981) (Petition for
Certiorari filed December 3, 1993 in No. 93-882: see 62
U.S.L.W. 3475 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1994) (No. 93-882)).

The Court denied Tilton’s petition. 510 U.S. 1093 (1994).

Interestingly, in that petition Tilton asserted that the Tenth Circuit's
decision created a conflict between the circuits “as to whether a con-
Spiracy between private individuals to deny freedom of religion is
actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).” (Petition for a Writ of Certio-
rari in No. 93-882 at 7) Now, in this petition, petitioners claim that it
is the Fifth Circuit's decision that stands alone and is “contrary to. .
. ¢very other circuit that has addressed the issue,” including the Tenth
Circuit. (Pet. at 14) Having previously argued that Tilton v. Richardson
created a conflict by affirming dismissal of a religious animus
§ 1985(3) claim, petitioners now portray the decision as if it were a nul-
lity, relegating it to a footnote and misrepresenting Taylor v. Gilmartin
to be the law of the Tenth Circuit. (Pet. at 15 & 15 n.36)

Ww

13

action), with Lewis v. Pearson Foundation, Inc., 917 F.2d
1077 (8th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (vacating Lewis v. Pearson
Foundation, Inc., 908 F.2d 318, 327 (8th Cir. 1990) (wherein
dissenting judge had written that Action “is no longer viable
because [its] reasoning was rejected by the Supreme Court in”
Carpenters)), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 908 (1993). Compare
Ward v. Connor, 657 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 907 (1982), with Buschi v. Kirven, 775 F.2d 1240, 1258
(4th Cir. 1985) (“Measured by the construction given the
statute in [Carpenters], it is doubtful that the expansive view
of the statute reflected in [Ward and other cases] could be
considered of continued precedential reliability.”).

Other circuit court decisions relied upon by petitioners have
rested as much on findings of racial animus as religious ani-
mus. See Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d 1057, 1060 (6th
Cir. 1973) (noting district court holding that “prejudice
against Jews is based upon race as well as religion”); Action,
450 F.2d at 1232 (“It seems clear from the facts in this case
that the defendants were stimulated to disrupt the church ser-
vices by racial and economic motives.”); see also Blank v.
Heineman, 771 F. Supp. 1013, 1017 (D. Neb. 1991) (dis-
missing claim of evangelical Christians based on religious
animus, distinguishing Action as a case involving a racially
motivated conspiracy).

Finally, with respect to the Second Circuit, while observing
that “the judicial landscape of § 1985(3) was radically
altered” by Bray, Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue,
991 F.2d 1039, 1045 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 865
(1993), that court has not yet had occasion to reexamine its
religious animus precedents in light of Bray. Although
LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412 (2d Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2546 (1996), was decided after Bray,
in that case the Second Circuit addressed a conspiracy claim
asserted against a local government and its officials, not a pri-
vate conspiracy. The Second Circuit has not yet considered
the extent to which its precedents are consistent with Car-
penters and Bray.

14

In sum, this Court’s decisions in Carpenters and Bray make
clear that petitioners’ complaint cannot state a claim under
§ 1985(3). To the extent that any of the circuit court decisions
cited by petitioners suggest to the contrary, those circuits
should be given the Opportunity to reassess the continuing
validity of their decisions in light of Carpenters and Bray. As
the foregoing demonstrates, each of the circuits that has had
the opportunity to do so has clearly understood and applied
the holdings of this Court.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS’ AFFIRMANCE
OF THE DISMISSAL OF PETITIONERS’
RICO CLAIM PRESENTS NO QUESTION

WORTHY OF THIS COURT’S REVIEW

A. The Courts Below Properly Applied This Court’s
Decision in H.J. Inc.

With respect to the dismissal of its claims under RICO,
Word of Faith asserts that the decision below in some way
contravenes this Court’s decision in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern
Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989). (Pet. at 18-22) In
H.J., this Court addressed the “pattern” requirement of RICO,
holding that in order to Satisfy the “pattern” element a RICO
plaintiff “must show that the racketeering predicates are
related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued
criminal activity.” 492 U.S. at 239. In dismissing Word of
Faith’s RICO claim, the courts below properly applied H.J.,
correctly determining that Word of Faith did not plead a
“ “continuity of racketeering activity, or its threat.’ ” 90 F.3d
at 123, Pet. App. at 13a (quoting H.J., 492 U.S. at 241).

Word of Faith claims that in its decision below the Fifth
Circuit “resurrect[ed]” the restrictive and inflexible “multi-
ple scheme” standard rejected in H.J. as the touchstone for
pattern continuity. (Pet. at 19) The Fifth Circuit has never

15

subscribed to that or any other restrictive RICO pattern
requirement,'' and this case is no exception.

The court of appeals faithfully applied the H.J. analysis,
citing that ruling no fewer than ten times in its pattern ruling.
(90 F.3d at 122-23; Pet. App. at 10a-13a) In its opinion, the
concepts of open-ended and closed period continuity set forth
in H.J. and this Court’s articulation of congressional concerns
are recounted at length. (/Jd.) Also relied upon were three
Fifth Circuit decisions with facts analogous to this case. In
each of those cases, the Fifth Circuit had determined that a
single, discrete and otherwise lawful commercial transaction
was complete and presented an insufficient threat of repetition
to establish pattern continuity. Two of those cases, In re
Burzynski, 989 F.2d 733 (Sth Cir. 1993), and Calcasieu
Marine National Bank v. Grant, 943 F.2d 1453, 1463-64 (Sth
Cir. 1991), feature extensive quotations from H.J. in their
analyses of pattern continuity and follow its principles
closely. The same continuity concept was employed in the
third case, Delta Truck & Tractor, Inc. v. J.I. Case Co., 855
F.2d 241. 244 (Sth Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1079
(1989), which, although predating H.J., is entirely consistent
with H.J.’s approach.

Applying H.J. and its own decisions reflecting H.J.’s teach-
ing, the Fifth Circuit concluded that respondents’ newsgath-
ering concerning Tilton and his church lacked sufficient
continuity to constitute a RICO pattern. The court held that
“It}he alleged acts were all part of a single, lawful endeavor—
namely the production of television news reports concerning
a particular subject,” and did not present a continued threat of
illegal activity. (90 F.3d at 123-24; Pet. App. at 13a)

11

As noted by this Court in H.J., the Fifth Circuit had rejected the
multiple scheme standard years before H.J. and adhered to a liberal pat-
tern pleading requirement of only two predicate acts before that test was
held insufficient in H.J. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 235 n.2 (citing R.A.G.S.
Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350, 1355 (Sth Cir. 1985)); id. at
236-37.

16

Word of Faith takes the Fifth Circuit to task for concluding
that the alleged predicate acts constituted a “single, lawful
endeavor.” Maintaining that H.J. in some way prohibits the
Fifth Circuit’s analysis, Word of Faith recites the word “sin-
gle” as if this Court’s rejection in H.J. of an inflexible and
overly restrictive “multiple scheme” test merely paved the
way for an equally inflexible rule that entitles a plaintiff to
maintain a claim so long as any scheme can be alleged. Noth-
ing could be further from the essential lesson of A.J.

The central teaching of H.J. is that the concept of pattern,
and particularly pattern continuity, may not be reduced to any
rigid or fixed rule. 492 U.S. at 241. What is required, rather,
is a flexible approach to the analysis of an alleged RICO pat-
tern, so that “[w]hether the predicates proved establish a
threat of continued racketeering activity depends on the spe-
cific facts of each case.” Jd. at 242. The need for flexibility
and case-by-case review is paramount:

The limits of the relationship and continuity concepts
that combine to define a RICO pattern, and the precise
methods by which relatedness and continuity or its threat
may be proved, cannot be fixed in advance with such
clarity that it will always be apparent whether in a par-
ticular case a “pattern of racketeering activity” exists.

A.J., 492 U.S. at 243.

H.J. does not suggest, much less hold, that every “single”—
or even multiple—scheme or transaction will suffice to State
a RICO claim. It held that some may and some may not.
Moreover, the factors considered by the Fifth Circuit—that
the transaction in question was “single”, “discrete”, and “oth-
erwise lawful”—are, on their face, highly relevant to the pat-
tern analysis mandated by H.J. Underthe ordinary language
analysis this Court has repeatedly used in H.J. and other
RICO cases,'? it matters a great deal that “single” and “dis-

ss E.g., H.J., 492 U.S. at 238; National Organization for Women,
Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 260-61 (1994); United States v. Turkette,
452 U.S. 576, 580-81 (1981).

17

crete” are virtual antonyms of the word “pattern”. If, as this
Court held in H.J., the central question is whether the alleged
acts “amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activ-
ity,” 492 U.S. at 239 (emphasis added), it likewise matters
that the acts in question are “otherwise lawful.”

Guided by the broad precepts this Court “beg[a]n to delin-
eate” in H.J., 492 U.S. at 241, the district court and the Fifth
Circuit below undertook precisely the kind of case-specific
factual evaluation contemplated in H.J. in their review of
Word of Faith’s claim. Petitioners’ tortured reading of the rul-
ing below cannot translate that decision into a rejection of
this Court’s decision in H.J.

B. No Split in the Circuits is Created by the Fact that
Other Courts Have Found Different Facts to Consti-
tute RICO “Patterns”

Seeking yet again to demonstrate a split in the circuits,
Word of Faith clings to a slender reed of dicta, set forth in a
footnote and articulated in the conditional tense, in the Fifth
Circuit’s opinion. In its footnote, the Fifth Circuit observed
that “(t]he law in other circuits might have allowed this case
to proceed further.” (90 F.3d at 123 n.4; Pet. App. at 13a n.4)
(emphasis added)'* That terse observation provides no occa-
sion to revisit this Court’s decision in H.J.

The Fifth Circuit characterized its own rulings as “consis-
tently different” from cases in the Sixth, Seventh and Ninth
Circuits.'* (90 F.3d at 123 n.4; Pet. App. at 13a n.4) These

cases involved forgery (Ticor), embezzlement (Busacca),

13 Word of Faith mischaracterizes the Fifth Circuit’s footnote as an

open concession that this action “would likely have been allowed to pro-
ceed under the law of other circuits.” (Pet. at 22 (citation omitted;
emphasis added))

sa Shields Enterprises, Inc. v. First Chicago Corp., 975 F.2d 1290
(7th Cir. 1992); Ticor Title Insurance Co. v. Florida, 937 F.2d 447 (9th
Cir. 1991); United States v. Busacca, 936 F.2d 232 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied. 502 U.S. 985 (1991); Ikuno v. Yip, 912 F.2d 306 (9th Cir. 1990).

18

extortion (Shields) and soliciting investments in a fraudulent
commodities trading corporation (/kuno). Applying H.J. in
each case, the courts in those cases determined that the defen-
dants’ criminal acts carried an implicit threat of continuity
because they were part of defendants’ regular way of doing
business or accomplishing goals before their enterprises were
put to a stop. Shields, 975 F.2d at 1295-96: Ticor, 937 F.2d at
450-51; Busacca, 936 F.2d at 237-38; Ikuno, 912 F.2d at 309.
In other words, the activities in those cases were neither “sin-
gle”, “discrete”, nor “otherwise lawful”. Despite the different
outcomes, these decisions and those of the Fifth Circuit are in
complete harmony in their fidelity to the H.J. approach to pat-
tern analysis. The different outcomes are attributable to the
dissimilar facts of the cases and a necessary consequence of
the careful, case-by-case evaluation required by H.J.'5

Indeed, in Shields itself, the Seventh Circuit distinguished
its finding of a “pattern” in that case from four earlier cases
which “involv[ed] only one scheme directed toward achiev-
ing one goal.” 975 F.2d at 1295 (citing J.D. Marshall Int’l,
Inc. v. Redstart, Inc., 935 F.2d 815, 821 (7th Cir. 1991);
United States Textiles, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., Inc., 911
F.2d 1261, 1268-69 (7th Cir. 1990); Olive Can Co., Inc. v.
Martin, 906 F.2d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir. 1990); Sutherland v.
O'Malley, 882 F.2d 1196, 1204-05 (7th Cir. 1990)). In each of
those four cases the Seventh Circuit applied this Court’s anal-
ysis from H.J. and, stressing the fact-specific nature of the |
inquiry, concluded that there existed insufficient pattern con-
tinuity to state a RICO claim given the short-lived, focused

|
|
|

” In the courts below, petitioners cited newspaper reports and

other lawsuits of parties unhappy with various ABC news reports over
the years to argue that petitioners’ allegations constituted ABC’s “reg-
ular way of doing business.” The Fifth Circuit held:

Pleading the mere existence of lawsuits is not the same as pleading
the facts that demonstrate predicate illegal acts as the defendant’s
regular way of doing business. The Church has not in this respect |
sufficiently alleged a continuing threat of illegal activity by ABC.

(90 F.3d at 124: Pet. App. at 13a)

19

nature of the conduct at issue and the lack of evidence that the
scheme would be repeated in the future. Jd. As explained by
the court in U.S. Textiles:

In H.J. Inc., the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff or
prosecutor need not prove multiple schemes to show a
pattern for purposes of the RICO statute. This, however,
does not mean that the fact that there is only one scheme
involved is of no consequence to the “pattern” determi-
nation. To the contrary, “[w]hile a RICO pattern can be
established, in some circumstances, by proof of a single
scheme, it is not irrelevant, in analyzing the continuity
requirement, that there is only one scheme.”

911 F.2d at 1269 (citations omitted).

Similarly, proceeding with the fact-specific analysis
required by H.J., the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, in decisions
subsequent to those relied upon by petitioners, have reached
the same conclusion the Fifth Circuit did here when faced
with analogous allegations of a single, focused episode of
allegedly improper activities with no suggestion of repetition.
Vild v. Visconsi, 956 F.2d 560, 569-70 (6th Cir.) (allegations
of marketing agreement scheme amounted “at best to a breach
of contract with a single customer”), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
832 (1992); Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1535-
36 (9th Cir. 1992) (retaliatory actions by employer amounted
to single episode having a singular purpose). In Sever, the
Ninth Circuit distinguished its earlier opinions in Ticor and
Ikuno as inapplicable, stating that the conduct alleged in those
cases “could not be characterized as a single episode with a
single purpose which happened to involve more than one act
taken to achieve that purpose.” Sever, 978 F.2d at 1535 (cita-
tion omitted).'®

16 The Sever court cited three earlier Ninth Circuit cases which

reached the same conclusion on similar facts. Jd. at 1535-36, citing
Medallion Television Enterprises, Inc. v. SelecTV of California, Inc., 833
F.2d 1360, 1364 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 917 (1989) (no
pattern where plaintiff fraudulently induced defendant to enter a tele-

20

As this Court anticipated in H.J., courts’ analyses of alle-
gations of RICO patterns are highly fact specific. That some
decisions of the courts of appeals have found allegations suf-
ficient to satisfy the pattern requirement, while others have
found other allegations insufficient, does not constitute a split
in the circuits. The court below, along with all the other deci-
sions relied upon by petitioners, applied the legal framework
established by H.J. That different results were reached does
not provide a basis for invocation of this Court’s certiorari
jurisdiction.

Finally, even if this Court were to conclude that, in an
appropriate case, it would revisit H.J., this would hardly be
the case which lends itself to that reappraisal. The case is, at
its core, a subterfuge—a libel case in disguise precisely
because (as the Tenth Circuit has already held) there is no
merit to the libel claim itself. If this Court were to remand
this case to the district court, that court would in all likeli-
hood dismiss the action based on principles of res judicata or
collateral estoppel. See supra, p.5 n.5. Such a case, rooted in
claims already determined to be without merit and on the very
lip of being dismissed, is hardly worthy of plenary consid-
eration by the Court.

vision contract; “Once the [contract was entered into], the fraud, if
indeed it was a fraud, was complete.”); Jarvis v. Regan, 833 F.2d 149,
152-53 (9th Cir. 1987) (pattern requirement not satisfied by allegations
that legal aid organizations committed three predicate acts of mail and
wire fraud in obtaining a single federal grant to defray costs of opposing
a ballot initiative); Schreiber Distributing Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co..
806 F.2d 1393, 1399 (9th Cir. 1986) (pattern requirement not established
where defendant had fraudulently obtained a single shipment of goods in
violation of plaintiff's exclusive distribution agreement for lack of threat
of continuing activity).

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Dated: February 5, 1997

Of Counse!:

SUSAN BUCKLEY

EDWARD P. KRUGMAN

DAVID G. JANUSZEWSKI

JONATHAN R. DONNELLAN

CAHILL GORDON & REINDEL

(a partnership including a
professional corporation)

80 Pine Street

New York, New York 10005

(212) 701-3000

FRANK C. VECELLA
JACKSON & WALKER, L.L.P.
901 Main Street

Suite 6000

Dallas, Texas 75202

(214) 953-6000

Respectfully submitted,

FLOYD ABRAMS

80 Pine Street

New York, New York 10005
(212) 701-3000

Counsel of Record for
Respondents Capital Cities/
ABC, Inc., ABC News, Inc.,
American Broadcasting
Companies, Inc., Diane
Sawyer, Roberta Gordon,
Kelly Sutherland and Jeff
Cooke

22

Of Counsel:

RICHARD A. ROHAN

CARRINGTON, COLEMAN, S).OMAN
& BLUMENTHAL, L.L.P

200 Crescent Court

Suite 1500

Dallas, Texas 75201

(214) 855-3000

BARBARA M.G. Lynn
200 Crescent Court
Suite 1500

Dallas, Texas 7520]
(214) 855-3000

Counsel of Record for
Respondents The Trinity
Foundation, Inc., Ole

Anthony, Harry Gueizlaff
and Powell Holloway

- REAR TENET HRI AT eT Br eae
’ - POLL TS LF i, TEL OS AEE: i
ETE a Be : :

E

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386013_0041%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.