# Appendix A — Bustamante v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix A
- **Published:** January 1, 1995
- **Citation:** 516 U.S. 973

## Text

App. 1

UNITED STATES of America,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

V.

Albert G. BUSTAMANTE,
Defendant-Appellant.

No. 93-8705.
United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit
Feb. 13, 1995.
Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing
En Banc Denied April 5, 1995.

Former United States Representative was convicted
in the United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Texas, Edward C. Prado, J., of violating Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and
he appealed. The Court of Appeals, W. Eugene Davis,
Circuit Judge, held that evidence supported conviction.

Affirmed.

Nancy Barohn, Bernard Campion, San Antonio, TX,
for appellant.

Michael A. Attanasio, Trial Atty., Crim. Div., Jackie
M. Bennett, Jr., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC, for
appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court For the
Western District of Texas.

Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE and STEWART, Circuit

Judges.

App. 2

W. EUGENE DAVIS, Circuit Judge:

Bustamante appeals his conviction and sentence on
two counts of a ten count indictment charging RICO and

related offenses. We affirm.

I.

Albert G. Bustamante was elected to the United
States House of Representatives in November 1984 and
served until his defeat in 1992. In 1993, a federal grand
jury returned a ten-count indictment against Bustamante,
accusing him of using his public office for personal
enrichment.

Count One alleged that Bustamante conducted the
affairs of an enterprise, his congressional office, through
a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of the Rack-
eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) stat-
ute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). The alleged pattern of
racketeering activity consisted of nine predicate acts:
accepting a bribe in violation of former 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)
(now § 201(b)) and accepting eight illegal gratuities in
violation of current 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) and its predecessor,
18 U.S.C. § 201(g). Count Two charged Bustamante with
conspiring to violate the RICO statute. In Counts Three
through Ten, the same eight acts of accepting illegal
gratuities were charged as individual violations of the
gratuity statutes.

After a two-week trial, the jury found Bustamante
guilty of Counts One and Four and acquitted him of the
other charges. To support the RICO conviction, the jury
found that Bustamante had committed Predicate Act One

App. 3

(accepting the bribe) and Predicate Act Three (accepting
the same illegal gratuity charged in Count Four).

Using the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the
district court sentenced Bustamante to concurrent terms
of incarceration of 42 months on Count One and 23
months on Count Four, and concurrent terms of super-
vised release of two years on Count One and one year on
Count Four. Bustamante was also ordered to pay total
fines of $55,000 and a $100 special assessment.

Bustamante challenges his convictions and sentence
on numerous grounds which we consider below.

Il. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Bustamante contends that the government failed to
produce sufficient evidence to support his conviction on
either the bribery charge (Predicate Act One) or the ille-
gal gratuity charge (Predicate Act Three/Count Four). As
Bustamante correctly points out, his RICO conviction is
based on only two predicate acts, the minimum number
required to establish a pattern of racketeering activity. 18
U.S.C. § 1961(5). If the evidence is insufficient to support
the jury’s finding that Bustamante committed either pred-
icate act, his RICO conviction must be overturned.

This Court will uphold a conviction as long as a
rational trier of fact could have found that the evidence
established the elements of the crime beyond a reason-
able doubt. United States v. Pofahl, 996 F.2d 1456, 1467 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 114 S.Ct. 266, 126 L.Ed.2d
218 (1993). The jury is free to choose among reasonable
constructs of the evidence, which need not exclude every

App..4

reasonable hypothesis of innocence. United States v. Mas-
eratti, 1 F.3d 330, 337 (5th Cir.1993), cert. denied, __ US.
__, 114 S.Ct. 1096, 127 L.Ed.2d 409 (1994). We view all
inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable
to the jury verdict. United States v. Basey, 816 F.2d 980,
1001 (5th Cir.1987). With these ground rules in mind, we
turn to the particular facts and proof of each predicate
act.

A. The Bribe

As Predicate Act One, the indictment alleged that in
February 1986, Bustamante accepted a $35,000 bribe in
exchange for using his official influence on behalf of
Falcon Food Services and Management, Inc. (Falcon
Foods). Since 1983, Falcon Foods had held the food ser-
vice contract for Lackland Air Force Base (Lackland) in
San Antonio, Texas. This contract was set to expire in
1986, when the Air Force planned to conduct a competi-
tive bidding process to award a new multi-million dollar
contract. Hoping to win the renewed contract, Falcon
Foods enlisted Bustamante’s aid.

In late 1985, Bustamante invited Brigadier General
Richard Gillis to lunch at a private club in San Antonio.
At that time, General Gillis was in charge of the San
Antonio Contracting Center, which handled all procure-
ment for military bases in the region, including Lackland.
At trial, General Gillis testified that he believed he would
be having lunch only with Bustamante and did not expect
to discuss the Lackland contract.

When General Gillis arrived at the club, Bustamante
introduced him to Douglas Jaffe, Jr., owner of Falcon

App. 5

Foods, Evaristo “Eddie” Garcia, president of Falcon
Foods, and Morris Jaffe, Douglas Jaffe’s father. During
lunch, Douglas Jaffe (Jaffe) persistently tried to persuade
General Gillis that Falcon Foods was doing a good job at
Lackland and should have its contract renewed. Prohib-
ited by regulations from discussing a contract that was
open to bidding, General Gillis became increasingly
uncomfortable with Jaffe’s lobbying effort. When his
repeated attempts to change the subject were unsuccess-
ful, General Gillis left the club.

In January of 1986, a $223,000 promissory note bear-
ing Bustamante and his wife’s signatures came due. By
mid-February, the Bustamantes had paid (or made
arrangements to pay) all but $35,000 of the amount owed.
On February 15, although he had not yet received the
remaining $35,000 from any source, Bustamante wrote a
check that completely satisfied the promissory note.

Three days later, Bustamante received a check for
$35,000 from Garcia, which he deposited into his bank
account. This check bore the handwritten notation “sale
of note.” This notation allegedly referred to a $35,000
second lien note that Bustamante held on a former home.
Bustamante claimed that he sold this second lien note to
Garcia to raise the money to pay off the balance of the
$223,000 promissory note. However, no other written
documentation of the alleged sale was produced as trial.
Additionally, though it had a face value of $35,000, in
February 1986 the second lien note’s present value was
only $22,000.

At the time he wrote the check to Bustamante, Garcia
only had $493.42 in his checking account; within a few

App. 6

days, Garcia’s account had overdrawn by more than
$34,000. Douglas Jaffe wrote Garcia a $35,000 check from
Jaffe’s personal account, which Garcia deposited on Feb-
ruary 24.

At some point in February, Bustamante also applied
for a $35,000 loan from San Antonio Savings Association
(SASA). On February 25, SASA approved the loan. Busta-
mante took no prompt action on the loan.

On March 4, Bustamante placed a telephone call to
Isodoro Leos, the officer assigned to handle the Lackland
contract, and left a message complaining about the fact
that the Air Force had delayed bidding on the Lackland
contract. Returning the call, Leos informed Bustamante’s
secretary that the Congressman should make his future
inquiries in writing.!

The next day, Bustamante closed on the SASA loan
and executed a $35,000 promissory note. Bustamante
secured the loan with the same second lien note he
claimed to have sold to Garcia weeks earlier. On March
14, SASA issued a $35,000 cashier’s check to Bustamante,
representing the principal of the loan. The back of the
check showed that Bustamante endorsed both his and his
wife’s names. The check also bore a typewritten notation
stating “Deposit Only to the HSB Construction Inc.
Account” and listing an account number. HSB Construc-
tion belonged to Douglas Jaffe. Unlike most of Jaffe’s

1 The government argued that this event made Bustamante
realize that his illicit advocacy might be exposed, causing him to
take action to cover up the money he had received.

App. 7

companies, however, HSB Construction was not a subsid-
iary of Jaffe’s corporate umbrella, the Jaffe Group, Inc.

On March 18, the Air Force opened the sealed bids
for the Lackland Contract. Falcon Foods had submitted
the highest of seven bids. Following standard procedure,
the Air Force began to work its way up from the bottom
of the list, looking for the lowest bidder that was also
“responsive and responsible,” factors having to do with
the contractor’s ability to carry through on its promised
performance. After disqualifying the two lowest bidders,
the Air Force found itself running out of time to hire a
new contractor before the existing Falcon Foods contract
expired on April 30.

To ease the time crunch, on April 17 the Air Force
attempted to exercise its contractual option to tempo-
rarily extend its existing contract. Unfortunately for the
Air Force, the notification deadline had expired two days
earlier. No longer bound by the contract, Falcon Foods
responded with a counter-offer that was $150,000 more
per month than it had previously charged. The Air Force
rejected the counter-offer. Afraid that it would not find a
qualified bidder by April 30, the Air Force decided to
place the new contract through a faster minority set-aside
program operated by the Small Business Administration.
In this manner, the Air Force awarded the Lackland con-
tract to Aleman Food Service (Aleman Foods). Aleman
Foods had been the fourth lowest bidder.

On April 24, the day of the award to Aleman, Leos
received a call from Bustamante, who insisted that Leos
explain why the original bidding process had been scut-
tled. Dissatisfied with Leos, Bustamante next berated

App. 8

Leos’ boss, the deputy director for contracting. Still
unplacated, Bustamante telephoned General Gillis and
expressed his anger that Falcon Foods had not been
awarded the Lackland contract. Bustamante threatened
General Gillis that he had “better turn this around” or
Bustamante would end his career. On April 25, Busta-
mante wrote to the General Accounting Office demand-
ing an explanation of the award to Aleman Foods. At
approximately the same time, another disgruntled bidder
obtained a restraining order that prohibited Aleman
Foods from serving food until all protests to the award
were resolved. Left with no food service contractor, the
Air Force fed its troops prepackaged meals from its war
reserve stock from May 1 to July 31, when Aleman Foods
was finally allowed to begin meal service.

To find bribery, the jury is required to find that a
public official accepted a thing of value in return for
being influenced in the performance of an official act.
United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 480-81 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 870, 99 S.Ct. 200, 58 L.Ed.2d 182 (1978).

Bustamante first contends that the government pro-
duced insufficient evidence for the jury to decide that his
actions on behalf of Falcon Foods were “official acts.”
This contention is spurious. Without question, Busta-
mante took action in his official capacity as a congress-
man on a “matter” (the award of a government food
service contract) which was “then pending.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 201(a)(3).

Bustamante next argues that the jury could not legit-
imately find that the $35,000 payment from Garcia was a
quid pro quo for any assistance he gave to Falcon Foods.

App. 9

First, Bustamante maintains that he provided an entirely
innocent explanation for the $35,000 that he received
from and returned to Garcia. Bustamante testified that he
was on his way to SASA to borrow the $35,000 he needed
to pay off his promissory note when he told Garcia, a
long time friend, about the planned loan. Garcia offered
to buy Bustamante’s second lien note instead. Bustamante
accepted, not knowing that Garcia did not have enough
money to make the purchase himself. Bustamante bought
back the second lien note, however, because his wife did
not approve of the sale. Bustamante had already used
Garcia’s $35,000 to pay off his own promissory note, so he
went to SASA for a loan after all, to get the money to
reimburse Garcia. Bustamante asserts that he did not
know that the money for the purchase really came from
Jaffe, nor that the money he repaid to Garcia ended up in
Jaffe’s account. However, Bustamante’s explanation is the
type of alternative hypothesis of innocence that the jury
need not exclude when reaching a guilty verdict. Mas-
eratti, 1 F.3d at 337.

Bustamante also argues that the evidence does not
persuasively support the government's cover-up theory -
that Leos’ instruction to communicate in writing spurred
Bustamante to incur the SASA loan for the purpose of
hiding the $35,000 payment. However, disregarding the
government’s cover-up theory, the evidence was more
than sufficient for the jury to find that Bustamante
accepted a bribe in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b). Busta-
mante received a large amount of money from the princi-
pals of Falcon Foods at a time when Falcon Foods needed
Bustamante’s assistance and when Bustamante needed
the funds. Neither Bustamante nor Garcia documented

App. 10

the “sale” of the second lien note in any standard manner.
Garcia, a successful businessman, supposedly purchased
this second lien note at a price $13,000 higher than its
present value. Though Garcia appeared to make this pur-
chase, it was Jaffe who actually supplied the money.
Additionally, Bustamante telephoned a brigadier general
and threatened to end his career if the Lackland contract
was not re-awarded to Falcon Foods. Given these facts,
the jury’s guilty verdict must stand. See United States v.
Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 683-84 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499
U.S. 904, 111 S.Ct. 1102, 113 L.Ed.2d 213 (1991).

B. The Illegal Gratuity

As Predicate Act Three and Count Four, the indict-
ment alleged that Bustamante accepted an illegal gratuity.
Unopposed in the 1984 general election, Bustamante’s
seat in Congress was a foregone conclusion once he won
the primary election. In the period between the primary
and general elections, Bustamante was invited to partici-
pate in a fledgling company called San Antonio Video
Corporation (SAVC). SAVC had been organized by Oliver
S. Heard and R. Lawrence Macon, both local attorneys
and friends of Bustamante. Heard and Macon formed
SAVC to compete for the Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC) license for a commercial television station.

On November 29, 1984, a few weeks after the general
election, SAVC filed its licensing application with the
FCC. Although the application listed Bustamante as own-
ing 18.5 percent of SAVC, he had not actually contributed
any money at that time.

App. 11

To purchase his share of SAVC, Bustamante was
expected to make an initial pro rata contribution of
approximately $15,000. This would entitle Bustamante to
16 percent of the non-voting stock; Heard, Macon, and
Heard’s law firm also owned portions of the non-voting
stock. SAVC also issued voting stock which was owned
by three minority women.?

In the event the SAVC was fortunate enough to win
the FCC license, Bustamante was expected to make a
second contribution of $650,000 toward the roughly $5
million start-up cost. Like several of the other investors,
Bustamante did not have the financial strength to contrib-
ute such a substantial sum. Heard and Macon planned to
borrow the start-up cost using the FCC license as collat-
eral, then lend this money to the other investors, includ-
ing Bustamante. Macon testified at trial that, if push came
to shove, he would not have forced Bustamante to repay
this loan.

Bustamante did not even have the initial $15,000 on
hand. To make his up-front stock purchase, Bustamante
applied for a $20,000 loan from Groos Bank in San Ant-
onio in April 1985 (the Groos Bank loan). According to an
internal bank document entitled “Loan Application” the
loan was needed to “[i]nvest in a new television broad-
casting company” and was “made as a result of a specific
request on the part of Oliver S. Heard, Jr., Guarantor.”
The Loan Application included Heard’s financial state-
ment, his net worth and annual income. Just three days

* The fact that SAVC would be controlled by minority
women entitled it toa “comparative preference” during the FCC
licensing process.

App. 12

earlier, Groos Bank had granted the Bustamantes another

$20,000 loan, for personal purposes, which was also
“based on the specific request and financial strength of
guarantor Oliver S. Heard, Jr.”

As part of the FCC’s licensing procedure, SAVC and
its rivals litigated their claims before an administrative
law judge (ALJ). In May 1985, as part of this process,
Bustamante testified about his initial stock purchase as
well as the potential $650,000 future payment. Busta-
mante testified that he had taken out the Groos Bank loan
to make his initial stock purchase in the fall of 1984.
Bustamante denied that Heard had guaranteed this loan.

The FCC litigation extended over a number of years.
During this time, three installments on Bustamante’s
Groos Bank loan became due in April 1986, 1987, and
1988. Bustamante missed all three of these payments. On
April 20, 1988, Groos Bank allowed Bustamante to renew
the loan by relying on Heard’s original guaranty. At the
same time, Bustamante took out another loan to cover the
accumulated interest on the original Groos Bank loan;
this loan was also covered by the Heard guaranty. In July
1988, Bustamante combined both of these loans into a
single $20,140.69 obligation. Like each of the previous
loans, this consolidation loan relied on Heard’s guaranty.
Bustamante made two of the monthly installment pay-
ments on this loan.

In October 1988, the FCC litigation finally ended.
SAVC was not awarded the FCC license, but did get
$175,000 in settlement from the company that did receive
the license. On October 27, 1988, three days after SAVC
received the settlement, Heard issued Bustamante a check

App. 13

for $19,467.53, the exact amount that Bustamante still
owed to Groos Bank. Bustamante immediately repaid the
consolidated Groos Bank loan in full.

SAVC’s other investors did not receive such priority
treatment. On October 31, 1988, Macon wrote a letter to
Heard stating that before the shareholders would receive
refunds of their pro rata contributions, the settlement
money would be used to pay off SAVC’s outstanding
bills. This included loans that Heard and Macon had
made to SAVC during its lengthy effort to obtain the FCC
license. The record does not reflect whether the other
SAVC shareholders ever received their share of the settle-

ment proceeds.

To find a public official guilty of accepting an illegal
gratuity, a jury must find that the “official accepted,
because of his position, a thing of value ‘otherwise than
as provided by law for the proper discharge of official
duty.’ ” Evans, 572 F.2d at 480. Generally, no proof of a
quid pro quo is required; it is sufficient for the govern-
ment to show that the defendant was given the gratuity
simply because he held public office. Id. at 479; United
States v. Secord, 726 F.Supp. 845, 847 (D.D.C.1989) (suffi-
cient for government to show that gratuity was given
“simply because of [a person's] official position, in appre-

ciation for their relationship, or in anticipation of its
continuation”). In addition, the jury need not find that
the official accepted the gratuity with the intent to be
influenced. The jury must only conclude that the evi-
dence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the
official accepted unauthorized compensation. Evans, 572
F.2d at 480.

App. 14

Bustamante’s challenges to his illegal gratuity convic-
tion rely on his interpretation of the charge against him.
According to Bustamante, the indictment alleges only
that he accepted two specific things of value: Heard’s
Groos Bank loan guaranty for the initial loan to purchase
SAVC stock and the promise of future loans in the
amount of $650,000, both at no risk to himself. Busta-
mante argues that his conviction for accepting these two
things of value is invalid because the government failed
to prove (1) that he knew of Heard’s loan guaranty and
(2) that the Groos Bank loan was actually risk-free.

Bustamante views the charge too narrowly. Busta-
mante was not merely accused of accepting these particu-
lar guarantees and promises, but of allowing Macon and
Heard to shoulder the responsibility for his SAVC invest-
ment from start in 1984 to finish in 1988. Bustamante is
correct that the indictment alleges that he accepted “Loan
Guarantees ($20,000) and Promises of Loans ($650,000)”,
and “a loan guarantee for the purchase of stock and the
promise of future loans for additional investment in
[SAVC], all at no personal risk. ” However, the
indictment also describes the broader investment scheme
of which these loans were a part. For example, the indict-
ment alleges “{[Bustamante] was invited by SAVC’s con-
trollers to participate in SAVC at no personal risk to
himself.” The government’s counsel, without objection
from Bustamante, succinctly explained its theory to the
jury in closing argument: “[t]he crime is a carry, a carry of
Albert Bustamante in this transaction.”%

3 Bustamante does not argue that this characterization or
the proof at trial were fatally at variance with the indictment. In

App. 15

Viewed in this light, the proper question is whether
Bustamante knew that Heard and Macon were giving him
a risk-free investment in SAVC. We are convinced that the
above evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to find
that Bustamante rested firmly on Heard and Macon’s
shoulders for the SAVC investment. In addition, the
Groos Bank officer who handled Bustamante’s loans,
Neyland Allen, testified that he knew of only one
instance in Groos Bank history in which the bank had
purposefully kept a guarantor secret from the borrower.
Given Bustamante’s long friendship with Heard and the
context of this entire transaction, the fact that Allen could
not specifically remember informing Bustamante of
Heard’s guaranty is not fatal. Bustamante also emphas-
izes that he himself testified that he did not know of the
guaranty. However, the jury was free to reject this testi-
mony. United States v. Anderton, 679 F.2d 1199, 1202 (5th
Cir.1982).

Likewise, Bustamante’s argument that the govern-
ment failed to prove that the Groos Bank loan was risk-
free misses the mark. The government was required to
prove what it alleged — a risk-free investment carry, not a
risk-free loan. Heard and Macon gave Bustamante the
precise amount needed to repay his investment loan,
which exceeded the amount he actually invested, at a
time when they were not repaying other investors. This
fact alone strongly supports the jury’s conclusion that
Bustamante’s SAVC investment was risk-free.

fact, in another section of his own brief, Bustamante argues that
Count Four described a “single, continuing gratuity violation”
that ended in 1988.

App. 16

Leaving no stone unturned, Bustamante also suggests
that the government was required to prove that the gratu-
ity was given in exchange for an official act. As we noted
above, this is not the government’s burden.

The jury was also entitled to conclude that Busta-
mante received the SAVC gratuity because of his status as
a congressman. Bustamante was invited to invest after his
seat in Congress was assured. He brought no broadcast-
ing experience to SAVC. Because he owned non-voting
stock, his Hispanic ethnicity did not contribute to the
minority preference. His inclusion certainly added no
financial strength to the venture. The government pro-
duced evidence that Heard’s firm called on Bustamante
to assist them in his official capacity, demonstrating that
Heard had reason to appreciate his relationship with the
Congressman and anticipate its continuation. Consider-
ing these circumstances, the jury was entitled to find that
Heard and Macon sustained Bustamante throughout his
SAVC investment because he was a member of the United
States Congress.

C. The Pattern of Racketeering Activity

Bustamante argues next that, even if the evidence
establishes both predicate racketeering acts, the govern-
ment did not prove a pattern of activity within the mean-
ing of the RICO statute. To establish a pattern of
racketeering activity, the government must show a series
of at least two related predicate acts that constitute a
threat of continuing racketeering activity. Tel-Phonic Ser-
vices, Inc. v. TBS Intern., Inc., 975 F.2d 1134, 1139-40 (5th
Cir.1992) (citing H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell, 492 U.S. 229,

App. 17

109 S.Ct. 2893, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989)). At the time of his
trial, Bustamante was no longer in office. Thus, to satisfy
the continuity requirement, the government had to estab-
lish “a closed period of repeated conduct,” which it could
do by showing “a series of related predicates extending
over a substantial period of time.” H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at
241, 242, 109 S.Ct. at 2901, 2901.

Bustamante concedes that Predicate Acts One and
Three are related but argues that they are not sufficiently
continuous. Again, Bustamante’s argument depends pri-
marily on his constricted interpretation of the acts com-
prising his acceptance of the SAVC gratuity. Bustamante
argues that the gratuity offense was completed in 1985,
when he accepted the loan guaranty and the promise of
future loans. He contends that when the gratuity is added
to the 1986 Falcon Foods bribe, his racketeering activity
occurred over a short, isolated period of approximately
eleven months. On this basis he maintains that the evi-
dence was insufficient to permit the jury to find either
that his racketeering acts covered a substantial period of
time or posed a threat of ongoing activity.

Bustamante’s argument is belied by the record. As
discussed above, the record reveals that Bustamante did
more than accept the loan guaranty and promise of future
loans in 1985 — he continued to allow Heard and Macon
to carry him. This gratuity did not end until Bustamante
accepted the 1988 loan repayment. Bustamante’s rack-
eteering acts therefore continued for a period of nearly
four years. This time period is substantial. See United
States v. Pellulo, 964 F.2d 193, 209 (3d Cir.1992); Metro-
media v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 369 (2d Cir.1992), cert.
denied, __ U.S. __, 113 S.Ct. 2445, 124 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993).

App. 18

In addition, the jury was entitled to conclude that Busta-
mante’s actions amounted to a threat of continuing crimi-
nal activity. Indeed, the gratuity itself threatened to
continue as long as the SAVC investment continued; had
SAVC obtained the FCC license, Heard and Macon proba-
bly would have sustained Bustamante’s investment for a
much longer period of time. Bustamante makes much of
the fact that the jury found him not guilty of the other
seven alleged racketeering acts. However, these acquittals
are not inconsistent with the jury’s conclusion that Busta-
mante’s criminal behavior threatened to continue, at least
during the closed-end four year period of activity. See
United States v. Freeman, 6 F.3d 586, 596 (9th Cir.1993) (by
their nature, crimes such as bribery suggest the threat of
long term activity).

Ill. Statute of Limitations

Bustamante argues that his prosecution for the SAVC
gratuity is barred by the five year statute of limitations in
18 U.S.C. § 3282.4 He contends that the limitations period
started to run when he first accepted the gratuity in 1985
and that it expired in 1990 long before his 1993 indict-

ment.

Bustamante relies on United States v. Hare, 618 F.2d
1085 (4th Cir.1980), in which the defendant accepted an

4 At trial, Bustamante first raised this defense in a post-
verdict motion for acquittal. Because we find that the gratuity
charge is not barred by the statute of limitations, we decline to
address whether, under the circumstances of this case, Busta-
mante’s failure to raise this issue earlier amounts to waiver.

App. 19

illegal gratuity in the form of a loan with favorable inter-
est and payment provisions. Hare accepted the loan in
1970 and made periodic payments on the loan until 1975.
Because Hare was not indicted until 1979, he argued that
the five year limitations period had expired. The court
agreed, holding that the gratuity was complete when
Hare received the loan and that the statute of limitations
could not be extended simply because Hare continued to
benefit from the favorable terms every time he made a
payment. The court based its decision on Toussie v. United
States, 397 U.S. 112, 90 S.Ct. 858, 25 L.Ed.2d 156 (1970),
which held that the doctrine of continuing offenses
should be applied sparingly, to avoid undermining the
congressional policy of repose.

Hare is distinguishable from Bustamante’s case. The
Hare Court itself limited its holding to the specific facts
alleged in Hare’s indictment, which asserted that Hare
committed one act of accepting a gratuity in 1970. Hare,
618 F.2d at 1087. In contrast, Bustamante’s indictment
charges that his acts of accepting the SAVC gratuity
extended over a period of years. As we explained in the
previous section, Bustamante is not accused of commit-
ting a crime that has continuing effects after its comple-
tion. Rather he was charged with accepting illegal
gratuities over an extended period of time. Unlike Hare,
Bustamante was therefore charged with continuing crimi-
nal behavior. Accordingly, we find that Bustamante’s
acceptance of the SAVC gratuity occurred within the five

App. 20

year limitations period.> See United States v. Morales, 11
F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir.1993).

IV. Defense Witness Immunity

Bustamante argues next that the district court erred
by not granting immunity to a trial witness, Eddie Garcia,
pursuant to a grand jury immunity order. In September
1992, the government subpoenaed Garcia to testify before
the grand jury investigating Bustamante. The government
applied for and received an order compelling Garcia to
testify under a grant of immunity. Both the application
and order were captioned “IN RE GRAND JURY PRO-
CEEDINGS” and given the cause number “SA92CR270.”
Under this order, Garcia testified before the grand jury
twice.

In February 1993, the indictment against Bustamante
was returned, creating cause number “SA93CRO039.” Gar-
cia was subpoenaed by the government to testify at Bust-
amante’s trial. When he received his trial subpoena,
Garcia’s attorney wrote a letter to the government stating
that, if called at trial, Garcia would invoke the fifth
amendment and refuse to testify because “it is our belief
the [former immunity order] does not extend to any
testimony, other than grand jury testimony, requested of
After receiving no response, Garcia

47

him in this case.

5 This holding precludes Bustamante’s argument that the
district court should not have sentenced Bustamante under the
United States Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Devine, 934
F.2d 1325, 1332 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 929, 112 S.Ct. 349,
116 L.Ed.2d 288 (1991) (guidelines apply to offense initiated but
not completed before October 31, 1987).

App. 21

filed a motion with the trial court requesting a protective
order immunizing his trial testimony and stating that the
former immunity order “did not specifically require or
compel [Garcia] to testify in [SA93CR039].”

Although the government never called Garcia as a
witness during the trial, Bustamante did. When Busta-
mante was ready to call Garcia to testify, Bustamante’s
attorney informed the trial court that Garcia wished to
speak with the court. Garcia told the court that he wanted
to testify but that “I’d like to have .. . immunity ... I
think it’s only fair for me to have immunity.” When the
court asked if Garcia would be receiving immunity, the
government responded that Garcia had been given immu-
nity before the grand jury but that he would not be
granted immunity for his testimony at trial. The govern-
ment explained that it believed that Garcia had perjured

himself in his grand jury testimony.

Garcia’s attorney then appeared in court to explain
that, despite his earlier statements, he believed that the
language of the immunity order granted Garcia immunity
throughout the grand jury proceedings and the trial. Gar-
cia’s attorney explained that at the time he had written
the letter and motion, he did not possess a copy of the
immunity order and had only seen it briefly, immediately
before Garcia’s grand jury appearance. After listening to
both Garcia’s attorney and the government, the trial court
ruled that the immunity order only applied to Garcia’s
testimony before the grand jury. Believing that Garcia

would not testify without immunity, Bustamante did not
om

~ call him as a witness.

App. 22

Bustamante now argues that the district court incor-
rectly interpreted Garcia’s immunity order. Bustamante cites
several decisions holding that the court must interpret an
immunity agreement generously to protect the witness’s fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination. However, these
decisions describe the rights of the party to the immunity
agreement, not the rights of a third party. Garcia’s personal
rights under the agreement cannot form the foundation for
Bustamante’s own claim on this issue.®

Neither party cites, nor can we find, any case
describing a defendant's right to assert error based on a
trial court’s interpretation of another person’s immunity
order. Our review of the existing case law makes clear
that a defendant’s rights are only implicated by a third
party’s immunity status when that status intrudes on the
defendant’s due process protections. In United States v.
Chagra, 669 F.2d 241, 259-61 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
846, 103 S.Ct. 102, 74 L.Ed.2d 92 (1982), we held that the
sixth amendment compulsory process right does not
enable a defendant to “demand that the government
shield a witness from the consequences of his own testi-
mony.” It is also settled that, unless the government has
abused its immunity power, a defendant has no due
process right to have the trial court immunize defense
witnesses. United States v. Follin, 979 F.2d 369, 374 (5th

6 Neither Bustamante nor the government frames this as an
issue of standing. It is sufficient for us to note that Bustamante
has provided no reason why he should escape the general rule
that a litigant cannot base her own claim on the legal rights and
interests of a third party. United States v. Shaw, 920 F.2d 1225,
1229 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 926, 111 S.Ct. 2038, 114
L.Ed.2d 122 (1991).

App. 23

Cir.1992), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 113 S.Ct. 3004, 125
L.Ed.2d 696 (1993); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616,
638-41 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008, 102 S.Ct. 2300,
73 L.Ed.2d 1303 (1982). In addition, a defendant cannot
prevent the government from revoking a prior grant of
immunity when the government has a good faith belief
that the witness testified falsely. United States v. Taylor,
728 F.2d 930 (7th Cir.1984). These decisions illuminate the
underlying principle that a defendant only has grounds
to complain about the treatment of a witness’s immunity
when the government is using its immunity privilege to
unfairly skew the facts presented to the jury, thereby
breaching the defendant’s right to due process of law.
Accordingly, we evaluate Bustamante’s claims under this
standard.

Bustamante maintains that the government’s inter-
pretation of Garcia’s immunity order is unfair because it
is inconsistent with the manner in which the government
treated another witness. Bustamante contends that the
government informed the trial court that this witness’s
immunity order, identical to Garcia’s, extended to testi-
mony at trial. However, we do not read the government’s
statements in this way; in fact, it appears that the govern-
ment was asking the court to extend the former order to
apply to the trial.”

? The actual interchange was:

GOVT: In March of 1992, Jerry Hoyack called before
the grand jury and was given a grant of immuni-
ty ... and we would like your Honor to essentially, for
counsel’s purposes, sort of refresh your order com-
pelling his testimony.

COURT: Okay. Does the same order, is the Govern-
ment saying that the same order of immunity that

App. 24

Bustamante also points out that the government
never charged Garcia with perjury. However, this fact is
not sufficient to allow this Court to infer that the govern-
ment was concealing Garcia’s truthful testimony because
it would have helped Bustamante. See Taylor, 728 F.2d at
936. In fact, the record reveals that before the government
was aware that Bustamante wanted to call Garcia as a
witness, the government had disclosed Garcia as an unin-
dicted co-conspirator. This detail supports the govern-
ment’s statement to the trial court that it declined to
further immunize Garcia because he had “outstanding
criminal liability.”

In sum, nothing in the record causes us to believe
that the government was acting in bad faith by advocat-
ing its limited interpretation of Garcia’s immunity. The
record also does not in any way suggest that the trial
court itself violated Bustamante’s due process rights in
making its ruling on Garcia’s immunity. Accordingly, we
conclude that Bustamante’s due process rights were not
implicated by the trial court’s decision that the immunity
order was limited to testimony before the grand jury.

Bustamante also argues that, even if the trial court
correctly interpreted Garcia’s immunity order, the court
should have ordered immunity to stem the government’s
misbehavior. See, e.g., Follin, 979 F.2d at 374. As discussed

took place before the grand jury, the Government
intends to follow in trial, as well?

GOVT: Precisely.

COURT: So immunity is still being granted to the
witness.

GOVT: Precisely.

App. 25

above, the record does not support this argument. More
importantly, Bustamante did not ask the trial court to
grant immunity on any ground other than the existing
immunity agreement. Bustamante makes no attempt to
establish that the trial court was obligated to order immu-
nity on its own initiative and we decline to bear this
burden for him. See Taylor, 728 F.2d at 934 n. 3.

V. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Bustamante argues next that government counsel
made numerous improper comments which caused the
jury to be prejudiced against him. He contends that these
instances of misconduct so permeated the trial that this

Court should reverse his convictions.

A. Opening statement

Bustamante complains that, during its opening state-
ment, the government maligned the defendants and cer-
tain witnesses, misstated evidence, attempted to establish
Bustamante’s guilty by association, and suggested that
certain witnesses might lie. However, because Busta-
mante made no objection to any of these statements we
will review only for plain error. United States v. Andrews,
22 F.3d 1328, 1341 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, __. U.S. __, 115
S.Ct. 346, 130 L.Ed.2d 302 (1994); United States v. Bermea,
30 F.3d 1539, 1564 (5th Cir.1994). To meet this standard,
Bustamante must prove:

(1) an error;

(2) that is obvious or “so conspicuous that
‘the trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in
countenancing [it], even absent the defendant’s

App. 26

timely assistance in detecting [it],’” United
States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 163-64 (5th
Cir.1994) (en banc) (quoting United States v.
Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d
816 (1982)); and

(3) that affected the defendant’s substantial
rights, usually by affecting the outcome of the
proceeding, id. (citing United States v. Olano, __
U.S. __, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)).

In addition, we will correct a plain error affecting
substantial rights only if it “ ‘seriously affect[ed] the fair-
ness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceed-
ings.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157,
56 S.Ct. 391, 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936)). See also United States v.
Rodriguez, 15 F.3d 408, 414-15 (5th Cir.1994).

We have carefully reviewed the above statements of
which Bustamante complains. Even if the district court
abused its discretion in allowing them, which we doubt,
such error certainly did not rise to the level of plain error.

B. Improper closing argument

Bustamante argues that, during its closing argument,
the government improperly suggested that Jaffe, Garcia
and Heard were guilty of criminal conduct and called
attention to Bustamante’s decision not to call them as
witnesses. However, as the government points out, Busta-
mante’s own counsel had already repeatedly highlighted
the fact that the government did not call these witnesses.
The district court overruled Bustamante’s objection to
this argument. The district court did not err in permitting

ee

Ate dae eed

App. 27

the government to respond to Bustamante’s own argu-
ment suggesting that the jury draw unfavorable infer-
ences from the government’s failure to call these

witnesses.

C. Improper cross-examination of Bustamante

Bustamante first complains that the government sug-
gested that he had received other uncharged illegal gratu-
ities by asking him twice “You've never gotten anything
from Doug Jaffe?” At trial, Bustamante’s attorney objec-
ted on the ground that the government was trying to
introduce evidence of extraneous bad acts prohibited by
Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 404(b). The government
responded that these inquiries were directly relevant to
the Falcon bribe, in addition to being fair impeachment
questions. The district court apparently agreed, but lim-
ited the government's questioning to Jaffe’s involvement
in the $35,000 payment Bustamante received from Garcia.
Bustamante now argues that the question itself was
improper because it implied Bustamante had received
other gratuities from Jaffe. We disagree. The record leads
us to conclude that a reasonable jury would interpret this
question as referring to the gratuity with which Busta-
mante had been charged, a matter which the government
was entitled to explore.

Bustamante next complains that the government
twice asked questions intimating that Bustamante had
done other improper things in his past, then stated in the
jury’s presence that it had outside evidence to support
these questions. Bustamante contends that the govern-

ment thus gave unsworn testimony about his prior bad

App. 28

acts. However, the record reveals that the government
made these statements after Bustamante’s attorney sug-
gested in front of the jury that the government asked
these questions in bad faith. In this context, the govern-
ment’s statements were not improper. In any event, these
statements certainly do not amount to plain error, which
is the applicable standard given that Bustamante never
objected to them.

Bustamante also complains about two series of ques-
tions the government asked regarding two other specific
instances of uncharged prior conduct: Bustamante’s fail-
ure to report or pay taxes on certain income, and Busta-
mante’s solicitation of an unrelated bribe in 1987. At trial,
Bustamante objected that the government was introduc-
ing FRE 404(b) evidence without first disclosing it to the
defense as required by a pretrial order. The government
correctly responded that, because it was using this evi-
dence to impeach Bustamante’s credibility, FRE 404(b)
did not apply. United States v. Tomblin, 42 F.3d 263, 282-83
(5th Cir.1994). The district court allowed both lines of
questioning. Bustamante now contends that these ques-
tions were highly prejudicial.

Bustamante’s argument places the cart before the
horse. We assess the prejudicial quality of these questions
only if we conclude that they were improper. United
States v. MMR Corp., 907 F.2d 489, 501 (5th Cir.1990), cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 936, 111 S.Ct. 1388, 113 L.Ed.2d 445
(1991). They were not. FRE 608(b) allows the government
to inquire into specific instances of conduct relevant to
Bustamante’s character for truthfulness. Both the failure
to report income and the solicitation of bribes are rele-
vant to the issue of honesty. E.g., Tomblin, 42 F.3d at

Sr wigan a

App. 29

282-83. The record reveals that, prior to embarking on
each series of questions, the government informed the
district court of the factual support for its inquiries, thus
establishing a good faith basis for its questions. We con-
clude that the district court did not err in permitting
these questions.

Lastly, Bustamante asserts that the government com-
mented on his assertion of his fifth amendment rights
before the grand jury. At the start of his direct examina-
tion, Bustamante stated “I’ve been waiting a long time for
this day to come.” On cross-examination, the government
asked “You were given an opportunity to come in and tell
the government your version [of the facts], weren’t you?”
and “I sent your attorney a letter inviting you to come in
to the grand jury and tell your story under oath, at that
time, didn’t I?” The district court sustained Bustamante’s
objections to both questions.

On appeal, the government argues that these questions
were properly designed to impeach Bustamante’s earlier
testimony. We disagree. The rule is well established that a
witness generally may not be cross-examined about her
choice to invoke the fifth amendment privilege in grand jury
proceedings. United States v. Robichaux, 995 F.2d 565, 568 (Sth
Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 114 S.Ct. 322, 126 L.Ed.2d
268 (1993). We need not consider the relationship between
this rule and the government’s right to impeach a wit-
ness, because in Bustamante’s case the government was
not fairly impeaching his earlier statement. Bustamante’s
general introductory remark that he had been waiting a
long time for his trial date to arrive cannot be interpreted

as a complaint that he had never before had a chance to

App. 30

speak to the government or the grand jury. The govern-
ment’s remarks were thus improper.

This, however, is not the end of the inquiry. We will
only find reversible error if the government’s improper
comments cast serious doubt on the jury’s verdict. United
States v. Rocha, 916 F.2d 219, 234 (5th Cir.1990), cert.
denied, 500 U.S. 934, 111 S.Ct. 2057, 114 L.Ed.2d 462
(1991). In making this evaluation, we consider (1) the
likelihood and degree that the jury was prejudiced by the
remarks; (2) the effectiveness of any cautionary instruc-
tions given by the court; and (3) the strength of the
legitimate evidence of the defendant’s guilt. Id.; Andrews,
22 F.3d at 1341. In assessing prejudice, we consider sev-
eral factors, including whether defense counsel objected
to the improper remark, asked the court for a curative
instruction or moved for a mistrial on the ground of the
misconduct. United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161,
175 (5th Cir.1986). We consider the error in the overall
context in which it occurred. See Bermea, 30 F.3d at 1564.

For a number of reasons, we conclude that these
statements do not cast the jury’s verdict into serious
doubt. First, they were brief and the court sustained
Bustamante’s objections. Second, the court instructed the
jury to disregard any questions or answers that it ruled
improper. Third, counsel did not move for a mistrial or a
curative instruction. Finally, the government’s proof of
guilt was strong. In the context of this three-week trial we
are satisfied that these brief remarks did not prejudice
Bustamante’s substantial rights.®

8 Bustamante identifies several other questions as
improper. First, he complains that, in its cross-examination of

App. 31

VI. Brady Review

Bustamante asks this court to review the transcripts
of the grand jury proceedings for exculpatory evidence
that the government should have disclosed. Before trial,
the district court reviewed these transcripts in camera and
concluded that they contained no Brady evidence. With-
out arguing that the district court erred, Bustamante asks
this Court to conduct its own review of the transcripts.
However, we decline to scour the grand jury record with-
out some showing either that the district court failed to
identify Brady material or that the government failed to
disclose it. Jones v. Butler, 864 F.2d 348, 356 (5th Cir.1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1075, 109 S.Ct. 2090, 104 L.Ed.2d 653
(1989) (after district court holds in camera hearing, we
will ordinarily not go beyond court's finding that records
contain no Brady material). See also United States v. Regis-
ter, 496 F.2d 1072, 1081 (5th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1120, 95 S.Ct. 802, 42 L.Ed.2d 819 (1975).

Laurence Macon, the government asked questions designed to
inform the jury of evidence that the trial court had previously
excluded. Second, he complains that, during Rebecca Busta-
mante’s cross-examination, the government insinuated that
Bustamante had used his official influence to advance Mrs.
Bustamante’s career. Lastly, he complains that the government
attempted to elicit testimony about Bustamante’s bad character
from another defense witness. At trial, Bustamante’s attorney
objected to each of these remarks and the court sustained each
objection. Counsel asked for neither curative instruction nor a
mistrial. We are not persuaded that these isolated questions
prejudiced Bustamante’s substantial rights.

VII. Sentencing

Bustamante argues that the sentence for his RICO
conviction was impermissibly enhanced by double count-
ing. The district court determined Bustamante’s base
offense level of 19 from the RICO sentencing guideline,
U.S.S.G. § 2E1.1, then increased that level by two for
Bustamante’s abuse of a position of public trust, under
§ 3B1.3. Bustamante argues that, because his congres-
sional office was already used to satisfy the RICO enter-
prise element, the district court could not also properly
enhance his sentence for abusing that office. This argu-
ment is meritless.

We agree with the analysis of the Seventh Circuit in
United States v. Ford, 21 F.3d 759 (7th Cir.1994). In Ford,
the court held:

The crime of racketeering, [unlike simple bribery],

does not in all cases entail an abuse of trust, so that

the minimum base offense level of 19 already

established for all RICO offenses does not already

incorporate that element. Instead, the Sentencing

Commission has determined that all RICO offenses

merit a minimum offense level of 19, and those

RICO offenses that entail an abuse of trust must,

under the logic of the Guidelines, be distinguished

on the basis of that additional element by receiving

the two-level enhancement.

Id. at 766. See also United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 89 (1st
Cir.1992).? The district court did not err in arriving at its
sentence.

9 The RICO sentencing guideline allows a sentencing court
to derive the base offense level either form the RICO guideline
or by using the offense level from the underlying racketeering
acts. In Bustamante’s case, the district court used the base

App. 33

VIII.

For the reasons stated above, Bustamante’s convic-

tion and sentence are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

offense level specified by the RICO sentencing guideline. We do
not address whether our decision would be different had the
court taken the base offense level from the underlying bribery
and gratuity offenses, §§ 2C1.1 and 2C1.2, which do not allow
the abuse of public trust enhancement.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386012_2059%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
