# Appendix — Sanders v. Los Angeles Unified School District

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386012_1722%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1995
- **Citation:** 515 U.S. 1161

## Text

Supreme Oourt, Us.
®iTED

941835 may 8 1995

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

NO.

In The
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1994

COLUMBUS SANDERS,
Petitioner,

Ve

UNITED TEACHERS-LOS ANGELES,
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT,

Respondents

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
To The United States Court of Appeals

For the Ninth Circuit

APPENDIX

Columbus Sanders
In Pro Per
P. 0. Box 4040
Sunland, California 91041

(818) 897-8841

)

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Order of the Unites States
District Court of the

Central District of

California, Cases Nos.
CV90-2703KN, CV 91-0172KN,

CV 92-2352KN

(February 1,1993) ...-ccccesseces la

Order and Opinion of the

United States District Court

of the Central

District of California,

Cases No. CV 92-2352KN

(March 16, 1993) ..csecccccccaves 58a

Order and opinion of the

United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
Cases Nos. 93-55397, 93-55569
(November 21, 1994) .....ceceeees 62a

Order and Opinion of the

United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
Cases Nos. 93-55397, 93-55569
(February 7, 1995)... eeeeeees 73a

ic

be-
be

Determination and Opinion

of the United States

Government Equal

Employment Opportunity

Commission Charge No.:

340901317

(September 28, 1990) ..ccceccecss 76a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NTERED

~ 4
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
BY DEPUTY

FILED FEB 1 1993
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
BY DEPUTY

COLUMBUS SANDERS,

)
)
Plaintiff, ) CV 90-2703
) KN
Vv. )
)
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED )
SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.)
)
Defendants. )
)
COLUMBUS SANDERS, )
)
Plaintiff, ) CV 91-0172
) KN
v. )
)
UNITED TEACHERS - )THIS
LOS ANGELES, et al., ) CONSTITUTES

2a

LOS ANGELES, et al., ) NOTICE OF
) ENTRY AS
Defendants. ) REQUIRED BY
) FPCP, RULE
COLUMBUS SANDERS, ) T7(d).
)
Plaintiff, ) CV 92-2352
) KN (Ex)
Vv. )
)
LOS ANGELES BOARD OF ) ORDER Re
EDUCATION, et al. ) Motion for
) Summary
Defendants. ) Judgment

The Court, having received and
considered plaintiff Columbus
Sanders' Motion for summary
judgment, and defendants' Los
Angeles Unified School

District/United Teachers-Los

Angeles Cross Motions for summary

3A

judgment, and the papers filed in
support thereof and in ws#pposition
thereto, GRANTS defendant's motion

and DENIES plaintiff's motion.

I. FACTS
Plaintiff Columbus Sanders
(herein-after "Sanders" ) started

working for the Los Angeles Unified
School District (Hereinafter
"LAUSD" ) in 1968. Since that
time, he has been represented by
the United Teachers-Los Angeles
(Hereinafter "UTLA") (Sanders Depo.
©. 1351-134) «

During the 1987-1988 school

year, Sanders taught at the Liggett

4

Elementary School in the San
Fernando Valley. On February 11,
1988 Sanders was temporarily
transferred from Liggett to an
assignment in the District's Region
F office as a result of a
disruptive incident with a parent
(hereinafter “the incident").
(Decl. of Tony Rivas, LAUSD Exh. F,
S. Aes

After the incident, Sanders
con-sulted Gary Campbell, a full-
time member of the UTLA, and Doris
Rangel, the Chapter Chair of the
UTLA at Liggett. On February 22,

1988 Campbell filed a grievance on

behalf of Sanders concerning the

transfer (Sanders Depo. p. 134,
UTLA Exh. B p. 32). On March ll,
1988, the LAUSD returned Sanders to
his former position at Liggett, and
Campbell withdrew the grievance in
a letter to the LAUSD dated March
14, 1988 (Sanders Depo. 136-137,
UTLA Exh. B p. 33).

Following his reassignment in
March, Sanders wrote to District
officials and School Board members
alleging that Ed Krojansky and Tony
Rivas (his principal and regional
Super-intendent, respectively)
were racists (Decl. of Ed Krojansky

and Tony Rivas, LAUSD Exhibits E

6A

and F., During this period
(Spring, 1988 semester), Sanders
waS absent from his classroom at
Liggett for 69 school days because
of illness. (Sanders Exhibit BA,

p.4).

In late Spring 1988, Tony

Rivas requested a review of
Sanders’ assignment at Liggett
school by LAUSD’ s school

operations office. According to

Rivas, the review was
motivated by three factors:
concer about the continued
working relationship between
Sanders and Krojansky, Sanders’

admitted unhappiness with the

la

assignment at Liggett school,
and Sanders’ high rate of
absenteeism in the Spring 1988

semester (Decl. of Tony Rivas, LAUSD Exh.

Pe).

On September 13, 1988, Sanders
was notified by LAUSD adminis-
trative consultant, Edward Sams,
that he was being transferred
fran Liggett to Broadus
Elementary School in Pacoima
(Sanders Depo.p. 139) . Sams

explained that the transfer Broadus
elementary school, which was
closer to Samders’ hare, was

not penal in nature and would

not result. in any reduction in

8a

salary or employee benefits

(Decl. of Ed Sams, LAUSD Exh. C pgs. 7-8).
Subsequently, Sanders spoke to
Campbell and Rangel of the
UTLA about’. the transfer, and on
September 16, 1988, Campbell filed
a grievance on Sanders’ behalf
(Sanders Depo. p. 145; UTIA Exh. B pp.
ao)

In accordance with the

collective bargaining and UTLA, a
Step I grievance conference’ was

held at the District office of

9a

Ed Sams on April 18, 1989.’ (Sanders

. UTLA’s grievance procedure
involves two levels before a
grievance is submitted to
arbitration. Step I involves the

filing of a formal grievance.
Within five days of presentation
of the grievance in writing to the
immediate administrator, a meeting
is held between the grievant and
the immediate administrator to
discuss the grievance. Within
five days, the immediate
supervisor is required to reply to
the grievance. After the grievant
receives the reply, Step I is
concluded.

If the grievance is not
resolved at Step I, the grievant
may within five days after the
conclusion of Step I, present the
grievance to the appropriate
superintendent, division or
designee. After the administrator
responds in writing, the receipt
of the response by the grievant
terminates Step HII. If the
grievance is not resolved at Step
+e UTLA may, but it is not

Ta

10a
Depo. 151). Sanders was represented at
that meeting by UTLA’s Campbell. (Sanders
Depo. 153).

The LAUSD’s response to the Step I
meeting was unfavorable to Sanders. (UTIA
Exh. B, p. 39). Consequently, Campbell
sent LAUSD a letter indicating that
sanders wished to move the grievance to
Step II. (Sanders Depo. 162; UTLA Exh. B,
p. 40). Sanders was not present at the
Step II meeting due to illness, but
Campbell represented him on behalf of

UTLA. (Sanders

Collective Bargaining Agreement;
Sanders Exh. A, p. 1241).

lla

Depo. 169). Sanders’ grievance was again
denied by LAUSD after the Step II meeting.
(Sanders Depo. 170).

In a letter to Sanders dated November
3, 1989, UTLA’s Grievance Review Cammittee
Chair, Jim Weber, explained that after
reviewing the language of the collective
bargaining agreement, UTLA had decided not
to pursue Sanders’ grievance to
arbitration. (Sanders Depo. 174; UTIA Exh.
B, p. 41). The letter also stated that
Sanders could appeal this decision to the
UTLA Grievance Review Cammittee. Sanders
appealed the decision. (Sanders depo.
178).

In denying the appeal for

arbitration, the Grievance Review

12a
Cammittee explained to Sanders that the
plain language of the collective
bargaining agreement specifically
prohibited review of charges of racial
discrimination.* Consequently, on June 21,
1990, Sanders received a letter fran UTIA
re-iterating that the union would not be
pursuing his grievance to arbitration.

(UTLA Exh. B, p. 42).

. Article vV, Sect. 1.1 of the

1986-1988 Collective Bargaining
Agreement between UTLA and LAUSD
provides that: “Also exluded from
this grievance procedure are those
matters so indicated elsewhere in
this agreement. Claimed
violations of Article VII _ (Non-
Discrimination) are handled under

appropriate statutory and/or
judicial procedures (where
available) rather than under this
grievance procedure. (Emphasis

Added}.

13a

After receiving the June 21 letter,
Sanders filed a complaint against the UTIA
with the Federal Equal Employment
Opportunity Cammission (hereinafter EEOC)
on August 6th, 1990. (Sanders Exh. A, p.
1222). After reviewing the case, the EEOC
determined that the facts did not support
a finding that UTIA had discriminated
against Sanders. Specifically, the EEOC
concluded that “(t]he facts did not show
that, but for his race, Charging party
would have been treated differently.”
(UTLA Exh. B, p. 43).

Thereafter, Sanders filed suit
against UTILA and LAUSD in Federal District
Court, alleding violations of Title VII,

42 U.S.C. Sects. 1981-Sects. 1986, as well

l4a

42 U.S.C. Sects. 1981-Sects. 1986, as well
as intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Currently, both Sanders and
IAUSD & UTIA have filed motions for

summary judgment.

II. DISCUSSION

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, summary § judgment is
appropriate only if there is “no geniune
issue as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

The Ninth Circuit has elaborated that:

The very object of summary judgment
is to separate real and geniune
issues fran those that are formal
or pretended, so that only the
fommer may subject the
moving party to the burden of
trial citation amitted]. Here we are

l5a

convinoed that the issues of fact

created by [the non-moving party] are
not issues which this Court could
reasonably characterize as geniune;

rather, they are sham issues which
should not subject the [moving party]
to the burden of the trial.

Radobenko v. Automated Equipment

Corp., 520 F. 2d 540, 544 (9th Cir

1975).

In the present case,
defendants LAUSD and UTLA have
presented overwhelming and
uncontroverted evidence to rebut
allegations of racial
discrimination and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
Plaintiff Sanders, on the other

hand, has only presented. self-

serving and speculative assertions
to support his accusations; he has
not demonstrated that geniune
issues of material fact remain to
be resolved or that he is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.

ait. 42 U.8.C. SECTS. 1981-SECTS.

1986 ACTIONS

A. LAUSD

Eleventh Amendment

Sanders’ 42 U.S.C. Sects. 1981-
Sects. 1986 claims against the LAUSD are
barred pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment
of the United States Constitution as

enunciated in Belanger v. Madera Unified

sonol Dist., 963 F.2d 248 (Sth Cir.

lia

1992). Belanger involved an action against

a Califomia public. school. district
alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. Sect.

1983. The Belanger court held that

California school districts are agencies
of the state and are thus protected by
Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Despite its straight-forward
language, the exact boundaries of the
Eleventh Amendment are far fran clear. In
attempting to discern the limits of the
Amendment, the Supreme Court traditionally
looks toward whether the substance of the
relief sought is prospective or retro-
spective in nature. As was explained in

Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985),

18a

“{rjemedies designed to end a
continuing violation of federal law are
necessary to vindicate the federal
interest in assuring the supremacy of that
law. But the compensatory or deterrence
interests are insufficient to overcame the
dictates of the Eleventh Amendment.”

Here, Sanders seeks campensatory and
punitive damages for LAUSD’s alleged
violations of 42 U.S.C. Sects. 1981-Sects.
1986. Clearly, these claims are barred
pursuant to the dictates of the Eleventh
Amendment .

Sanders also seeks “equitable relief”
and back pay. Regarding the latter, it is
hard to understand how Sanders could have

a claim for backpay when he was merely

til

19a
transferred fram Liggett to Broadus
elementary schools (with full pay and
benefits) instead of fired.

Sanders claim for “equitable relief,”
however, merits more discussion.
Specifically, Sanders alleges that LAUSD
discriminated against him and continues to

do so against other Afro-Americans.?

We note that Sanders is no
longer employed by LAUSD, and he
is not seeking re-instatement.
Indeed, the gravamen of Sanders’
complaint is that LAUSD
discriminated against him in the
past. Accordingly, Sanders cannot
claim that he is seeking
injunctive relief against LAUSD,
thus permitting him to make an
end-run around the Eleventh
Amendment limitation.

We also note that Sanders does
not have proper standing to file a
Claim against LAUSD on behalf of
those Afro-Americans who he

ee

20a
Therefore, he seeks “equitable relief” by
the court to bring an end to what he
perceives as present violations of 42
U.S.C. Sects. 1981-Sects. 1986 by the
LAUSD.

However, in Edelman v. Jordan, 415

U.S. 651, 668 (1974), the Court suggested
that it is appropriate to look to the
Substance rather than to the form of the
relief sought. Here, Sanders’ claims for
back pay and equitable relief appear to
serve merely as a pretext for an otherwise
Straight-forward claim of damages against
LAUSD. Consequently, Sanders’ claims for

“equitable relief” and back pay also are

alleges are still discriminated
against.

2la
properly barred pursuant to the Eleventh
Amendment .
B. UTLA
Sanders alleges that UTLA
violated 42 U.S.C. Sect. 1981 by
refusing to process his grievance
to arbitration. Although Sanders’
claim appears timely, it nonetheless
fails on the merits.

Statute of Limitations

Sanders’ 42. U.S.C. Sect. 1981 claim
against UTIA is timely-filed under the
applicable statute of limitations.
Specifically, CA code of Civ. Pro. Sect.
340(3) states that the statute of

limitations applicable to a cause of

action arising under 42 U.S.C. Sects.

22a
1981-Sects. 1986 is one year after the

date of accrual. Del Persio v. Thornsley,

877 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying
Sect. 340(3) to a Sect. 1983 claim).

Here the date of accrual for Sanders’
cause of action against UTLA was 6/6/90
(the day Sanders was notified of UTIA’s
refusal to process his grievance to
arbitration). In order for Sanders’ 42
U.S.C. Sect. 1981 claim to be considered
timely, he must have filed it by 6/6/91.
in fact, Sanders’ claims were filed with
the EEOC on 8/6/90, well-within the

applicable limitations period.

23a

Therefore, Sanders’ 42 U.S.C. Sect. 1981
action is considered timely.‘

Tne Merits of Sanders’ 42 U.S.C. Sect.

1981 Action

* Although we do not reach the

issue of the limitations period
due to our dismissal of Sanders’
claims based on the Eleventh
Amendment, we note that Sanders’
42 U.S.C. Sects. 1981-Sects. 1986
claims against LAUSD would also be
time-barred.

Specifically, the date of
accrual for Sanders’ cause of
action against LAUSD would be
9/13/88 (the day Sanders’ was
notified of his transfer).

Consequently, in order for
Sanders’ 42 U.S.C. Sects. 1981-
Sects. 1986 claims to be

considered timely, he must Nave
filed them by 9/13/89. in fact,
Sanders’ claims were filed with
the EEOC on 8/6/90, eleven months
after the applicable statute of
limitations.

24a

Sanders alleges that UTLA violated 42
U.S.C. Sect. 1981 by refusing to process
his grievance to arbitration. By making a
42 U.S.C. Sect. 1981 claim against a
union, Sanders in fact alleges a violation
of the union’s duty of fair representation

to its members.” Courts have held that the

> On the Federal tier, “the duty

of fair representation is a

judicially established rule
imposed n labor organizations
because of their Status as
exclusive bargaining repre-

Sentative for all of the employees
in a given bargaining unit.”
Peterson _v. Kennedy, 771 F. 2d
1244, 1253 (9th Cir. 1985). A
union breaches its duty of fair
representation to its members when
its conduct is “arbitrary,
discriminatory, or in bad faith.”.
Vaca vs.Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190
(1976).
In California, the duty of
fair representation is Statutorily

|

— a
—— —_—-

25a
plaintiff must prove three elements in
order to establish a prima facie claim of
discrimination against a union:

(1) that the company committed a
violation of the collective
bargaining agreement with

respect to the plaintiffs;

(2) that to go unrepaired,

thus breaching its own duty of
fair representation; and

(3)that there was same indication
that the Union’ s actions
were motivated by racial animus.

Bugg _v. Int’l Union of Allied Industrial

Workers of America, 674 F.2d 595, 598 n.5

(7th Cir. 1982) (summarizing Hines v.

Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554

(1976); Veca_v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171

imposed on labor unions
representing public sector
employee. Cal. Gov. Code, Sect.
3544.9 (Educational Employment

Relations Act).

ee

26a

(1967); and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).

Bugg Analysis

Applying the three-pronged' test
enunciated in Bugg to the present case, it
is clear that Sanders’ allegations fail to
assert a prima facie claim of
discrimination against UTLA.

First, Sanders offers no evidence
that UTILA committed a violation of the
collective bargaining agreement by
refusing to process his grievance to
arbitration. Instead, he alleges only

broad assertions of racial discrimination

in violation of Article VII of the

27a

UTLA/LAUSD collective bargaining
agreement .°

Second, Sanders cannot prove that
UTLA breached its own duty of fair
representation. No evidence exists
demonstrating that UTIA acted toward
sanders in an “arbitrary, discriminatory,
or...bad faith” manner. Vaca, 386 U.S.

171, 190 (1966). Instead, existing

' A typical example of Sanders’

“proof” of racial discrimination
is contained in his Declaration in
Support of Summary Judgment #18.
Specifically, Sanders refers to
language contained in Mr. Sams
9/26/88 transfer letter (“We also
want to state that this transfer
is in no way a punitive measure”)
to prove that “the idea of being
punitive was in [plaintiff’s]
mind... or could be understood to
be punitive by all persons.

28a

evidence indicates that UTLA went out of
its way to accammodate Sanders’ grievance.’

Finally, Sanders offers no evidence
indicating that UTLA’s failure to process
his grievance to arbitration was motivated
by racial animus. Rather, the apparent
reason why UTIA refused to arbitrate
sanders grievance was based upon explicit
language in the collective bargaining
agreement which prohibited resolution of

claims based on racial discrimination.®

: As explained in the FACTS

section, UTLA acted in full
accordance with the collective
bargaining agreement when

processing Sanders’ grievance.
Specifically, Sanders was granted
Step I & II review meeting, as
well as a chance to appeal the
Step II decision.

lis aaeneaeeiiaiiiiaii ial

29a

A Union’s Duty to Process Grievances

The gravamen of Sanders’ camplaint is
that UTLA refused to pursue his grievance
to arbitration. However, it is well
established that a union is umder no
Obligation to take a all cases to
arbitration. Indeed, the Supreme Court
has stated that “(w]e do not agree that an
individual employee has an absolute right
to have his grievance taken to arbitration
regardless of the provisions of the
applicable bargaining agreement.” Vaca,
386 U.S. 171, 191 (1966). Therefore,
While Sanders may disagree with UTIA’s

decision not to pursue his case to

See: Article V, Sect. 1.1 of
the UTLA/ LAUSD collective

a
.
i

30a
arbitration, UTLA may legitimately refuse
to do so in accordance with the language
of the collective bargaining agreement.
UTLA’s decision not to take Sander’s
grievance to arbitration should stand even
if they erred in reaching the

determination. The court in Peterson v.

Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1253, 1254 (9th
Cir. 1985) held that “negligent conduct on
the part of a union does not constitute a
breach of the umnion’s duty of fair
representation” and that “{a] union’s
repres-entation of its members ‘need not
be error free’ .” Therefore, absent a

showing that racial animus was linked to

bargaining agreement.

|

3la
UTLA’s refusal to process his grievance,
Sanders’ discrimination claim fails.

Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.

To support his claim that UTIA acted
in a racially discriminatory manner by
refusing to process his grievance, Sanders

relies solely on Goodman v. Lukens Steel

Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1986). The holding of
Goodman, however, is clearly
distinguishable fram the present
Situation.

In Goodman, plaintiff union members
brought suit against their union,
asserting racial discrimination claims
under 42 U.S.C. Sect. 1981. It was

established that the union systematically

refused to assert instances of racial

lea iii

32a

discrimination as grievances, in spite of
language in the oollective bargaining
agreement that would allo ffor§ such
Claims. The Supreme Court held that “a
collective-bargaining agent could
not...follow a policy of refusing to file

Qrievable racial discrimination claims
however strong they might be and however
Sure the agent was that the employer was
discriminating against blacks...on the
ground that the employer looks with
disfavor on and resents such grievances.”
Id., at 668-669. The facts of the present
case make it readily distinguishable fran
Goodman. Specifically, Article V, Sect.

1.1’s express prohibition of pursuing

33a
grievances based on Article VII® differs
dramatically with the collective
bargaining agreement found in Goodman,
which allowed grievances to arbitration,
the claim would have ultimately been

dismissed as outside the jurisdiction of

. Article VII (Non-
Discrimination): Sect. taf
Pursuant to applicable Federal and
State laws, the District and UTLA
agree not to discriminate against
any employee based upon race,

color, creed, national origin,
sex, age, marital Status,
handicap, or political or UTLA
affiliation, and to have - due

regard for employee’s privacy
(including sexual orientation) and
constitutional rights as citizens.

34a
the UTIA.” Consequently, | Sanders’
reliance upon Goodman is illfounded.

IV TITLE VII ACTION (42 U.S.C. SECT. 200E)

A. LAUSD

Sanders argues that conduct by
LAUSD officials Ed Krojansky and
Tony: Rivas, which resulted in his
transfer from Liggett to Broadus
Elementary school, violated the
non-discrimination provisions of
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sect. 2000e et
seq. The reasoning articulated in
section B.I. (Eleventh Amendment

bars Sanders’ 42 U.S.C. Sects. 1981-

9 ~—so Gee: Article V, Sect. 1.1 of

the UTLA/ LAUSD collective
bargaining agreement.

a Lt

35a
sects. 1986 actions against LAUSD) is
just as applicable here. Therefore
Sanders’ 42 U.S.C. Sect. 2000e actions
against LAUSD are barred pursuant to the
Eleventh Amendment.

II. UTLA

Sanders alleges that UTLA
discriminated against him in
violation of 42 U.S.C. Sect. 2000e
et seq. by refusing to process his
grievance to arbitration. Here
again, while Sanders’ action appears
timely, it nonetheless fails on the
merits.

Statute of Limitations

As a pre-requisite to pursuing a

Title VII action in Federal Court, a

36a
party must file a Title VII charge
with the EEOC within 180 days (300 on
certain occasions) after the
occurrence of the alleged unlawful
employment practice pursuant to 42

U.S.C. Sect. 2000e-5(e). See Mohasco

Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S 807, 100

S.Ct. 2486, 65 L.Ed.2d 532 (1980);

EEOC v. Commercial Office Products

Co., $86 U.S. id?; i88 &.Ct. 1666,

100 L.Ed.2d 96 (1988); Zipes v. Trans

World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385,

Aue SCE. Liki, Th & ee OO OSM
(1982).

In Delaware State College v.

Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 101 S.Ct. 498,

66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980), the Supreme

a a

37a

Court stated that the minitation
period for actions arising under
Title VII begins to run at the
occurrence of the alleged

discrimination. See also Chardon v.

Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6 (1981) (per

Curiam opinion).

In his declaration in support of
summary Judgment #13e, Sanders
appropriately argues that the
relevant date of accrual for his 42
U.S.C. Sect. 2000e action was June 6,
1990, the date which the UTLA
informed him that it would not pursue
his grievance to arbitration.
Because 6/6/90 is the date of UTLA’s

alleged discrimination against Sanders, it

38a

properly becomes the date of accrual under
the Ricks~ analysis. Consequently,
Sanders’ filed his EEOC complaint well
within Sect. 2000e-5(e)’s prescribed
limitations period to preserve his Title

VII action.”

" Although we do not reach the

issue of the limitations period as
to LAUSD due to our dismissal of
Sanders’ action based on the
Eleventh Amendment, we note that
Sanders’ 42 U.S.C. Sect. 2000e et
seq. claim against LAUSD would
also be time barred.

Specifically, Sanders became

aware of the alleged
discriminatory decision to
transfer him on September 13,
1988. Inorder to preserve a Title

VII action in accordance with 42
U.S.C. Sect. 2000e-5(e), Sanders
would had to have filed an EEOC
charge prior to July 15, 1989. In
fact, Sanders filed a complaint
with the EEOC on August 6, 1990,
approximately thirteen months

Vj Da i AT Wesabe, «

, ‘

39a

The Merits of Sanders’ 42 U.S.C. Sect.

2000e et seq. Action

Because Sanders’ 42 J.5.C.
Sect. 2000e claim is timely filed, it
is necessary to consider the merits
to his claim. Specifically, Sanders
alleges that the UTLA discriminated
against him by refusing to process
his grievance to arbitration. In

Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), the

Supreme Court held that Title VII

discrimination claims based on

after the applicable limitations
period.

Additionally, Sanders’ EEOC
complaint named only UTLA (not
LAUSD) as defendants.

40a

Opposition to an unlawful employment
practice must be assessed according
to a three-stage procedure.
Specifically, these steps are:

(1)The plaintiff has the burden
of proving a prima facie case
of discrimination based on
Opposition to an uniawful
employment practice.

(2) If plaintiff succeeds in
proving the prima facie case,
the burden shifts to the
defendant to articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the adverse
employment action.

(3) If the defendant carries its
burden of articulating a proper
reason, the plaintiff has an
Opportunity to prove by
preponderance of the evidence
that the stated reason was not
the defendant’s true reason for
acting, but a pretext for
discrimination.

(1)Prima Facie Case

Ree thine mao arenes CURE: aie erat

4la

Plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case of discrimination based
on opposition to an unlawful
employment action if he shows three
elements:

(1)He has expressed in
statutorily protected
expression;

(2)He has suffered an adverse
employment action; and
(3)There is a causal link
between the protected
expression and the

adverse action.

A Fe op £ Crown Zellerbach

Corp.,/20 F.2d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir.

1983) quoting Payne v. McLemore’s

Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d

1130, 1136 (5th Cir. 1981).
Here, it is conceded that

Sanders’ grievance about LAUSD’s alleged

42a

Here, it is conceded that
Sanders’ grievance about LAUSD’s alleged
campaign of discrimination against him is
a statutorily protected expression.
Furthemnore, it is conceded that /he
suffered an adverse employment action as a
result of UTILA’s failure to process his
grievance to arbitration. However,
Sanders cannot prove that a causal link
exists between the protected expression
and the adverse action. Specifically,
Sanders has not shown that the reason why
UTIA did not process his grievance to
arbitration was due to UTIA’s desire to
retaliate against Sanders for filing the

grievance against the LAUSD.

Consequently, Sanders’ prima facie claim

43a
of discrimination based on an unlawful
employment practice fails.

(2)Reasonableness of the Opposition

Even if Sanders were able to
establish a _- prima facie case of
discrimination based on unlawful
employment practice, UTIA can meet its
burden of showing a _ legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason why it chose not to
process Sanders’ grievance. Specifically,
UTLA can point to Article V, Sect. 1.1 of
the LWWASD/UTIA' oollective bargaining
agreement, which expressly prohibits
pursuit of grievances based upon racial
discrimination. Consequently, UTILA can
legitimately argue that the sole reason it

chose not to pursue Samder’s grievance to

44a

arbitration was due to the explicit
language in the collective bargaining
agreement.

(3)True Intent Behind Defendant’s Actions

Assuming that Sanders established a
prima facie case, and that UTIA meets its
burden of articulating a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action, Sanders must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that UTIA’s
stated reason for its action was merely a
pretext for discrimination.

Here, Sanders did not allege a single
fact to substantiate his beliefs that

UTLA’s decision not to take his grievance

to arbitration was based on racial animus.

45a

Indeed, all existing evidence proves
otherwise -- UTIA did everything that it
possibly could on Samders’ behalf.”
Therefore, Sanders fails to carry his
burden.

(4)Result

In light of Sanders’ failure to
establish a _ prima facie case of
discrimination based on opposition to an
unlawful employment practice, UTLA’ s

successful effort to articulate a

2 In short, UTLA filed the
grievance on behalf of Sanders
against LAUSD as well as
represented him through the Steps
I & II of the grievance procedure
established by the collective
bargaining agreement.

For a comprehensive summary of
UTLA’s actions on behalf of
Sanders, see the FACTS section.

46a

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
its adverse action, and Sanders’ inability
to prove that UTILA’s action was merely a
pretext for discrimination, Sanders’ Title
VII/42 U.S.C. Sect. 2000e et seq. action
against UTIA fails.

V.__ INTENTIONAL ~INFLICTION CE EMWOTIQAL

DISTRESS

A. LAUSD

Sanders alleges that the
inappopriate conduct of LUASD
officials Ed Krojansky and Tony
Rivas was motivated by racial
animus. Sanders also claims that

this conduct caused him emotional

distress. Here again, the

47a

reasoning discussed in section B.I.
(Eleventh Amendment bars Sanders’
42 U.S.C. Sects. 1981-Sects. 1986
actions against LAUSD) is applicable.
Therefore, Sanders’ IIED action is
barred pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment.
B. UTLA
Sanders claims’ that racial
discrimination motivated UTLA’sS
failure to fully process his
grievance. Sanders further alleges
that this conduct caused him
emotional distress. The general rule
in California is that conduct arising
from a normal part of the employment

relationship (including IIED claims

against an employer) is barred by the

48a

against an employer) is barred by the
exclusivity provisions of the

Workers’ Campensation Act. Livitsanos v.

Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th “44, #267

Cal.Rptr. 808, 828 P.2d 1195 (1992): Cole

V. Fair Qaks Fire Protection Dist., 43

Cal. 3d 148, 233 Cal.Rptr. 308, 729 P.2d

743 (1987). See also CA Lab. Code, Sects.
3600, 3601.

In livitsanos, plaintiff employee

sued defendant employer alleging
defamation and negligent and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The
Camplaint arose fram an alleged campaign
of harassment conducted by the employer
resulting in the wrongful termination of

the employee. In assessing plaintiff's

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49a
emotional injury claims, the Court held
that emotional distress claims against an
employer are pre-empted by the exclusivity
provisions of the Workers’ Campensation
Act., notwithstanding the absence of any
campensable physical disability.

Similarly in Cole, plaintiff brought
an action against his employer for IIED.
The camplaint arose fram an alleged
campaign of harassment oonducted by the
employer which included unjustified
institution of disciplinary proceedings
against plaintiff, procuring plaintiff’s
temporary demotion, and attempting to
force plaintiff’s retirement. In
affirming the appellate court, the

California Supreme Court held that an

50a

employee cannot maintain a civil cause of
action for IIED against an employer when
the employee’s claim is based on conduct
normally occurring within the workplace.
Sanders’ kien appears substantially
similar to those IIED claims found to ke

pre-empted in Livitsanos and Cole.

However, Sanders, might assert (although
in this case he has not) that the alleged
discriminatory grievance procedures
utilized by UTIA falls outside the scope
of his nommal employment duties. While
potentially colorable, Sanders’ ITED
r ing the UTIA’s grievance procedures
are problematic for two reasons. First,

Sanders offers no proof of actual

discrimination by the UTIA; he merely

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speculates that racial discrimination
motivated the decision not to proceed to
arbitration with his grievance.

Second, it is reasonable to consider
that Sanders’ filing of a grievance with
UTLA is regarded as common workplace
conduct. eee as such, Sanders IIED
Claim would statutorily be excluded

pursuant to the exclusivity provision of

the Worker’s Campensation Act.%

‘3 Although we do not reach the

issue of IIED due to our dismissal
of Sanders’ action based on the
Eleventh Amendment, we note that
Sanders’ IIED claim against LAUSD,
like his claim against UTLA, would
be barred.

Specifically, Sanders’ IIED
Claim could partially arise from
the alleged racist conduct of his
principal and regional
Superintendent, Ed Krojansky and

52a

E. CONCUUSICN

Despite the voluminous amount of
paper submitted by Sanders in support of
his motion of summary judgrent, he
presents no hard evidence showing that
either UTIA or LAUSD discriminated against

him. Instead, most of Sanders’ pleadings

principal and regional
Superintendent, Ed Krojansky and
Tony Rivas, respectively. Assuming
that a teacher regularly deals
with dis/her principal and is kept
informed of district matters by
his/her regional superintendent,

then Krojansky’s and Rivas’
conduct would be considered
normally occurring in the

workplace. Consequently, the rule
established in Livitsanos and Cole
(i.e. claims of IIED against an
employer arising from conduct
inherent within the workplace are
barred under the exclusivity
provision of the Workers’
Compensation Act) is applicable.

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53a

contain either: (1) documentation of

relevant dates, events, amd encounters
with various administrative agencies; (2)
speculative amd oonclusory allegations
about the discriminatory practices of UTIA
and LAUSD. While Sanders’ category #1
documentations were helpful in obtaining a
picture of what actually happened in the
case, they offered absolutely no hard
proof to substantiate his allegations of
racism.

All of Sander’s actions against LAUSD
(42 U.S.C. Sects. 1981-Sects. 1986, 42
U.S.C. Sect. 2000e, amd IIED) are barred
due to the District’s Eleventh Amendment
immunity. However, even if the Court were

to assume that LAUSD does not qualify for

a iii

94a

to assume that LAUSD does not qualify for
Eleventh Amendment Immunity, Sanders’
racial discrimination claims against the
District fail because they are time-
barred, and his IIED claim fails because
workers’ campensation is his exclusive
remedy .

Sanders’ allegations against UTIA (42
U.S.C. Sect. 1981, 42 U.S.C. Sect. 2000e,
ITED) must also fail. Specifically, the
evidence dramatically shows that UTIA,
instead of refusing to help Sanders based
on his race, bent-over-backward to help
him process his grievance. Indeed, even
Sanders repeatedly praised UTILA’s efforts

on his behalf. (Sanders Depo. 138, 184-

186; UTLA Exh. 3). Were it not for the

§

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55a
express prohibition of processing
grievances based on discrimination, this
Court has little doubt that UTIA would
have sent Sanders’ case to arbitration (if
for no other reason than to settle the
matter).

Ssander’s IIED claim against UTIA
fails for the same reasons as it does
against LAUSD (i.e. Workers’ Camnpensation
is the exclusive remedy for IIED claims
occurring in the workplace).

Defendants’’ LAUSD and UTIA motions
for summary judgment are therefore
GRANTED.

Related Case

Sanders has filed a related case, CV

92-2352 KN, in which he seeks declaratory

56a

relief to the effect that the UTIA’s
written policy of not pursuing Title VII
claims to arbitration is wunlawful.

Although the question raised my be an
interesting one, it is not clear that
Sanders has standing to raise it.

However, it is unclear whether Sanders
intends to pursue this related case. The
last paper filed by Sanders is dated
August 25, 1992. No papers have been
filed by the named defendants, yet
plaintiff has not moved for entry of
Default. Plaintiff is therefore ordered
to show cause (within fourteen days of the
date of this order) why CV 92-2352 should

not be dismissed for failure to prosecute.

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 41(b).

57a

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 1, 1993

s\David V. Kenyon

DAVID V. KENYON
UNITED STATES
DISTRICT JUDGE

58a

FILED
March 10, 1993
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT
OF CALIFORNIA
BY DEPUTY

ENTERED
CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT
MAR 16, 1993
CENTRAL DISTRICT
OF CALIFORNIA
BY DEPUTY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
COLUMBUS SANDERS,

Plaintiff, 92-23552

(Ex)

)
)
)
)
) CV
) KN
)
)ORDER Re:
)Dismissal for
)Failure to
LOS ANGELES BOARD )Prosecute.
OF EDUCATION, et al. )
)

THIS

CONSTITUTES

)NOTICE OF
)ENTRY AS
)REQUIRED BY
FRCP, RULE
77 (qd)

Defendants.

The Court, having received and
considered Plaintiff’s Motion to
Show Cause why CV 92-2352 KN (Ex)
should not be dismissed for failure
to prosecute, and the papers filed in
Support thereof, hereby DISMISSES
Plaintiff’s action.

Sanders argues that he has standing
to pursue his action for declaratory

relief’ based upon his continuing

. In CV 92-2352, Sanders seeks
declaratory relief to the effect
that the UTLA’s written policy of

60a

employment with LAUSD.* However, Sanders
does not appear to be interested in
pursuing the instant action.
Specifically, Sanders states “the court
may choose {to} close the case and allow
the Department of Justice to do whatever
it likes concerning the case.” see,
Sanders’ Response to 2/1/93 Order, p. 2.
Given that Sanders presents no compelling
evidence or argument in support of his

Claim for declaratory relief, the Court

that the UTLA’s written policy of
nor pursuing Title VII claims to
arbitration is unlawful.

2

Due to the confusing and
unorganized nature of the papers
previously submitted by Sanders,
the Court erred in stating that he
was no longer employed by LAUSD.
See, 2/1/93 Order, p.7,n.3).

3
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sees no reason why it should ignore
sanders’ instruction. Accordingly, CV No.

92-2352 is DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 10, 1993

S\ David V. Kenyon
DAVID V. KENYON
UNITED STATES
DISTRICT JUDGE

Pe ey

62a
FILED
Nov 21, 1994
CATHY A. CATTERSON, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
COLUMBUS SANDERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 93-55397

. BO. C¥=
0-02703-DVK

VS.

oO ©

LOS ANGELES UNIFIED
SCHOOL DISTRICT; ED
SAMS; TONY RIVAS,
Supervisor; UNITED
TEACHERS LOS ANGELES,

Defendants-Appellees.

COLUMBUS SANDERS, No. 93-55569

Plaintiff-Appellant, O.0. 8. C¥-
92-02352 KN
vs. CENTRAL

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CALIFORNIA

63a

LOS ANGELES BOARD OF )MEMORANDUM’
EDUCATION, LOS ANGELES)
UNIFIED SCHOOL )
DISTRICT; DR. TONY )
RIVAS; DR. ED SAMS;
UNITED TEACHERS LOS )
ANGELES GRIEVANCE
RESOLUTION COMMITTEE; )
UNITED TEACHERS LOS
ANGELES BOARD OF )

)

DIRECTORS,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the Decision of the
United States District Court for
the Central District of California,
David V. Kenyon, District Judge,
Presiding

Submitted August 4, 1994**

*

This disposition is not
appropriate for publication and
may not be cited to or by the
courts of this circuit except as
provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-
ae

64a

Pasadena, California
Before: D.W. NELSON AND NOONAN,
Circuit Judges, and KING,
District Judge.

In this consolidated appeal,
Columbus Sanders challenges pro se
the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of the Los
Angeles Unified School District

(“LAUSD”), United Teachers Los Angeles

(“UTLA”), and others (No. 93-55397), and

**

The panel unanimously finds
this case suitable for decision
without oral argument. Fed. R.
App. P. 34(a) and Ninth Circuit
Rule 34-4.
ty Honorable Samuel P. King,
Senior United States District
Judge for the District of Hawaii,
sitting by designation.

65a

dismissal of his action against the Los

Angeles Board of Education and others (No.
93-55569) . The actions arise out of
Sanders’ employment with LAUSD as an
elementary school teacher, and involve
alleged violations of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
Sect. 2000e, and 42 U.S.C. Sects. 1981-
1986, as well as claims of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sect.

/

1291, review de novo the grant of summary

4 a

judgment, Matter of McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395

(9th Cir. 1984) (en banc), review for

abuse of discretion the dismissal for

failure to prosecute, Link v. Wabash R.R.

Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633 (1962), and affim.

66a
The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of LAUSD in No. 93-55397
because all of Sanders’ claims against
LAUSD are barred by the Eleventh Amendment
to the United States Constitution.

We recognized in Belanger v. Madera

Unified School Dist., 963 F.2d 248 (9th

Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1280

(U.S. Feb 22, 1993), that a California
school district is oonsidered a_ state
agency for purposes of the Eleventh
Amendment . Thus, LAUSD cannot be sued
absent a waiver of its immunity. None is
alleged here. The district court thus
properly dismissed all claims against

LAUSD which seek retrospective relief.

67a

Sanders also seeks “equitable
relief”. Apparently he believes that
discrimination by LAUSD is ongoing and
wants the court to bring an end to that
discrimination. The district court called
this claim “merely...a pretext for an
otherwise straight-forward claim of
damages against LAUSD.” (Citing Edelman
Vv. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974)).

Finding no error in the district court’s
Characterization of Sanders’ claim for
“equitable relief”, we affirm the court’s
dismissal of all claims against LAUSD in
No. 93-55397.
II.
The district court dismissed Sanders’

42 U.S.C. Sect. 1981 action against UTIA

68a
on the grounds that Sanders failed to make
out a prima facie claim of discrimination
against the Union.

Bugg v. International Union of Allied

Indus. Workers of America, 674 F.2d 595

(7th Cir.), appeal dismissed, cert.

denied, 459 U.S. 805 (1982), set out a
three-pronged test for establishing a
prima facie claim of discrimination
against a union:

(1) that the campany committed a
violation of the collective
bargaining agreement with respect
to the plaintiff; (2) that the
Union permitted that breach to go
unrepaired, thus breaching its own
duty of fair representation; and
(3) that there was same indication
that the Union’s actions were
motivated by racial animus.

69a

Id. at 598 n.5 Under this test, Sanders’
claim against UTIA must fail because he
did not show that UTIA’s refusal to
process his grievance was due to racial
animus. Rather, UTLA refused to process
the nen ‘ because the explicit
language of the collective bargaining
agreement prohibited resolution of claims
based on racial discrimination.

Sanders’ Title VII claim against UTIA
fails for the same reason. A prima facie
case for Title VII discrimination requires
a showing that:

(1) He has engaged in Statutorily

protected expression;

(2) He has suffered an adverse

employment action; and

(3) There is a causal link between

the protected expression and the
adverse action.

10a

E.E.0.C. v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720

F.2d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir, 1983). The
district court found that Sanders’ was
able to make out the first two elements.

Sanders failed on the third element,
however, because “he has not shown that
the reason why UTIA did not process his
grievance to arbitration was due to UTIA’s
desire to retaliate against Sanders for
filing the grievance against the LAUSD.”

We agree that Sanders failed on his proof
as to the third element, not because he
failed to show UTIA had a desire to
retaliate against him, but rather because
Sanders failed to show that similarly

situated non-minority employees would have

7la
received arbitration. In other words,
Sanders’ adverse emplyment action was not
the result of discrimination; it was the
result of adherence by UTIA to the tenmns
of the collective bargaining agreement.
Finally, Sanders claim of
intentionial infliction of motional
distress against UTIA must also fail.
Once again, Sanders offered no proof of
actual discrimination by UTIA. We
therefore affirm the district ocourt’s
dismissal of all claims against UTIA.
Iii.
In No. 93-55569 the district court
ordered Sanders to show cause why the case
should not be dismissed for failure to

prosecute. Sanders responded that “the

72a

prosecute. Sanders responded that “the
court may choose [to] close the case and
allow the Department of Justice to do
whatever it likes concerning the case.”
That is what the court did. We find
no abuse of discretion and therefore
affirm the dismissal for failure to
prosecute.

For the foregoing reasons,’ the
decisions of the district court are

AFFIRVED.

73a

FILED
FEB - 7, 1995

CATHY A. CATTERSON, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

UNITED STATED COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

COLUMBUS SANDERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v,

LOS ANGELES UNIFIED
SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.,

COUMBUS SANDERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

LOS ANGELES BOARD OF
EDUCATION, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

et ee ee ee ee

No. 93-55397
D.C. No. CV-
90-02703=KN:

No. 93-55569
D.C. No. CV-
92-02352-KN

ORDER

74a
Before: D.W. NELSON and NOONAN, Circuit
Judges, KING, District Judge

The members of the panel that
decided this case voted unanimously
to deny the petition for rehearing
and to reject the suggestion for
rehearing en banc.

The full court has been
advised of the suggestion for
rehearing en banc and no active
judge has requested a vote on
whether to rehear the matter en

banc. (Fed.R. App. P. 35.).

Honorable Samuel P. King,
Senior United States District
Judge for the District of Hawaii,
sitting by designation.

75a
The petition for rehearing is
denied and the - suggestion for

rehearing en banc rejected.

76a

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION

3660 WILSHIRE

_ BLVD.,
5TH FLOOR
LOS ANGELES,
CALIFORNIA
90010
1-800-USA-EEOC
(213) 251-7278
TDD# (213) 251-7384

Charge No.: 340901317

COLUMBUS SANDERS Charging Party
Post Office Box 4040
Sunland, CA 91041

United Teachers of Respondent
Los Angeles

2511 West 3rd Street

Los Angeles, CA 90057

DETERMINATION

Under the authority vested in me by

the Commission, I issue the

77a

following determination as to the
merits of the subject charge filed
under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended.

All requirements for coverage have
been met. Charging Party alleged
that he was discriminated against
in violation of Title VII in that
he was denied Union representation
regarding a grievance filed in
September of 1988, because of his
race, Black.

Examination of the evidence
indicates that Charging Party filed
a grievance with Respondent’s Union
against the employer alleging race

discrimination. The Collective

78a

Bargaining Agreement does not contain
procedures for grieving
discrimination of any type covered by
Title VII. Specifically, the CBA
states that “claimed violations of
Article VII (non-Discrimination) are to be
handled under appropirate statutory and/or
judicial procedures (where available)
rather than under this grievance
procedure.”

It is undisputed that Respondent’ s
Union failed to process Charging
Party’s grievance upon determining that
the claims were of race dicrimination.
The facts did not show that, but for his
race, Charging party would have been

treated differently.

79a

Based on this analysis I have determined
that the evidence obtained during the
investigation does not’ establish a
violation ot the statute.

This determination does not conclude the
processing of this’ charge. If the
charging party wishes to have this
determination reviewed, he must submit a
signed letter to the Determinations Review
Program which clearly sets forth the
reasons for requesting the review and
which lists the Charge Number” and
Respondent’s name. Charging Party must
also attach a copy of this Determination

to her letter.

DETERMINATION

80a

Charge No.: 340901317

Page 2 of 2

These documents must be personally
delivered or mailed (postmarked) on or
before Oct 12, 1990 to the Determinations
Review Program, Office of Program
Operations, EEOC, 1801 L Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20507. It is recommended
that sane proof of mailing, such as 4a
certified mail receipt, be secured.

If the Charging Party submits a request by
the date shown above, the Cammission will
review the determination. Upon campletion
of the review, the Charging Party and

Respondent will te issued a final

determination which will contain the

8la

results of the review and what further
action, if any, the Cammission may take.

The final determination will also give
notice, as appropriate, of the Charging
Party’s right to sue.

If the Charging Party does not request a
review of this deterination by Jan ll,
1991, this determination will became final
the following day, the processing of this
charge will be complete, and the charge
will be dismissed. (This letter will ke
the only notice of dismissal and the only
notice of the Charging Party’s right to
sue by the Canmmission. FOLLOWING

DISMISSAL, THE CHARGING PARTY MAY QULY

PURSUE THIS MATIER FURTHER FILING SUIT

82a

AGAINST THE RESPONDENT(S) NAMED IN TE
CHARGE IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT WITHIN 90
DAYS OF THE EFFECTIVE DATE Cf DISMISSAL.

Therefore, in the event a request for
review is not made, if a suit is not filed
by Jan 11, 1991, the Charging Party’s
right to sue will ft lost. The
Cammission’s regulations governing no
cause determinations are printed in Title
29, Code of Federal Regulations, Section

1601.19.

On Behalf of the

Cammission:

9/28/90 s\Dorothy J. Porter
Date Dorothy J. Porter,
Director

Los Angeles

District Office

Encl:Information Sheet on Filing
Suit in Federal District Court

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386012_1722%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.