# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1995
- **Citation:** 516 U.S. 807

## Text

Supremé Court, 0.3.
FILED

941 807 MAY | - 1995
No

" “OFFICE OF THE CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1994

¢

McCLELLAN ECOLOGICAL SEEPAGE SITUATION,
MARY FISHER, and CHARLES YARBROUGH,

Petitioners,

WILLIAM J. PERRY, SECRETARY,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,

Respondent.

¢

Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Ninth Circuit

+

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

3

MICHAEL AXLINE
Counsel of Record for Petitioners

MARIANNE DUGAN

Western Environmental Law
Center

44 West Broadway, Suite 200

Eugene, Oregon 97401

Phone: (503) 485-2471

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that sec-
tion 113(h) of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42
U.S.C. section 9613(h), bars suits to enforce the Clean
Water Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act at facilities engaged in remedial actions under
CERCLA.

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29.1, petitioners
state that they are a not-for-profit organization and indi-
viduals and have no parent companies or subsidiaries.

ee wns

ST Ba ts

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ..... wk Ey
OPINIONS DELIVERED IN THE Serer eee l
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS __ ore
STATUTE INVOLVED IN THE ME og ty Chet vs go: 2
SIATEMENT OF THE CASE...................__ 2
JURISDICTION IN THE DISTRICT CAPM onesie. is
cn Ua ae 6
EES RS SS ae ee ree Ss

l. THE NINTH, THIRD, SEVENTH, AND EIGHTH
CIRCUITS’ OPINIONS ADDRESSING § 113(h)
OF CERCLA CONFLICT WITH THE FIRST, SEC-
OND, AND TENTH CIRCUITS’ OPINIONS
ADDRESSING § 113(h) OF CERCLA.........___ 9

li. THIS CASE INVOLVES AN IMPORTANT ISSUE
OF FEDERAL LAW THAT HAS NOT YET BEEN
ADDRESSED, BUT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED,

gi oo tig sg Eee ees 14
A. CERCLA Was Not Intended to Preempt Other
Pollution Control Statutes................__ 16

1. The Ninth Circuit improperly ignored the
express savings provisions of CERCLA.... 18

2. The legislative history of CERCLA indicates
that Congress did not intend § 113(h) to
impliedly repeal the citizen suit provisions of
MR 20

B. EPA Recognizes that RCRA Enforcement Actions at
Sites Engaged in Remedial Action Under CERCLA
Are Not Precluded by § 113(h).........__ 24

iV

TABLE OF CONTENTS -—- Continued
Page

C. The Fact That Complying with RCRA and the
CWA Would Require the Expenditure of
Resources Does Not Make This Case ¢ Challenge
$0 CRP CUD FOR inns cca cienes Geena ew 27

D. The Fact That EPA and California Will Have
Additional Regulatory Authority at the Base If
Respondent Complies With RCRA and the CWA
Does Not Make This Case a Challenge to the
RN NE ove co's oe a hers pene een ceeee 29

CP ASUS ikaw nancies cscs te ce etea sera eurenens 30

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page
CASES
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 87 S.
Cas Gee ee O60 a es ki bcd oe ee eee 16, 20
Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 112 S. Ct. 515, 116
Sade Ne LOPES bok doy Soe 6 ie AA a 20

Arkansas Peace Center v. Arkansas Dept. of Pollution
Control, 999 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1993), cert.
dented, ... US. ..., 113 3. Cth: 1907 11996)

i onse separ geen Sata eek enien: 3 @ 7,-9.2,

American Lung Ass‘n v. Kean, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15158, 26 ERC 1865, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,317
(D.N.J., Civ. No. 87-288, Nov. 19, 1987), aff'd, 871
Pi: BAP Bets WOE 5 wicca caenderekedaesy Maes

Barnes v. United States District Court, 800 F.2d 822
OPE Rae SRR a gichg tisk a Relecce al ook cheat eee

Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340,
Se: De AE. Qe CRO oe hes bs Cko eb s eee een Overs 14

Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir.
i | ee ee he et ee er Err ee es 4, 7, 9, 12,

Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA, 673
¥. Ren. BOGS TD. Oh. SI asks s ckikn eee vn cdaws

County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of
Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 112 S. Ct. 683
REM MED 6 Neb Sams Vane ben pee wae bene bie ee nes

Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 110 S. Ct.
er COs hee eee ee eee ore as Can

13

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

EPA v. Nat'l Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 101
BE Se Cs on. 0 6004 d0055os wee ee ele tedsentas 28

In re -eieetttected Corp., 944 F.2d 997 (2nd Cir.
| ee Pree rere: re ec eye 7, 9, 10, 11

] V. Peters & Co. v. EPA, 767 F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1985) .... 22

King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 112 S. Ct.
Ds SEAS vere ere ee ee Per 21

Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 102
ie Gk: TR Cs boas 0 cxns'kn ce ndbnnekeesvnakweks 17

McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation (MESS) v.
Cheney, 763 F. Supp. 431 (E.D. Cal. 1989) .......... 1

McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Cheney, 20
Envti. L. Rep. 20,870 (E.D. Cal. 1990) .............. 1

McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Cheney, 20
Envtl. L. Rep. 20,877, 1990 WL 117920 (E.D. Cal.
i PERRET ESET es Cee Ce ee eek ULE PT OT ET PRE 1

McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry, 47
F.3d 325, 63 USLW 2543, 39 ERC 2089 (9th Cir.
SOE iti < 0b hoon no cae eR ea 1, 6, 7

McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation (MESS) v.
Weinberger, 655 F. Supp. 601, 25 ERC 1480, 17
Envtl. L. Rep. 20,344 (E.D. Cal. 1966).............. 1

McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation (MESS) v.

Weinberger, 707 F. Supp. 1182, 28 ERC 1282, 19
Envti. L.. Rep. 20,124 (E.D. Cal. 1968) .............. 1

enamel

Vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page
Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v.
Top Notch Metal Finishing Co., 1987 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15163, 26 ERC 2012 (D.N.J., Civ. No.
eee 29
Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509 (1st Cir.
PE Std bin bb hbase ike Chie 6 4dNS eos dane 8, 9, 11
Reynolds v. Lujan, Civ. No. 90-902, 1992 WL 39789
ee BO BD Ki cd hele cedsecnesbtadnceiuas +
Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 82 S. Ct. 787 (1962)...... 21
Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
Pe Ms I SE 6rd 5-5 6 nis snes 0k www ft ee
United States v. Allegan Finishing Co., 696 F. Supp.
eee I SN BUND oo keds cond bie ob dess ous cs 28
United States v. Ciampitti, 583 F. Supp. 483 (D.N_J.
PC a0 55 04S nus ERUS KO4 WER Se wie RRR Ob kes cecal 28

United States v. Colorado, 22 ELR 20,008 (D. Colo.
1991), rev'd, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993), cert.
Gum, .... US... 1145S. Cu SAP C1998)... 5 2c 4

United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 922

SPP Sohniv abcd 6 caGNNA bc4ewse dec eesees passim
United States v. Liviola, 605 F. Supp. 96 (N.D. Ohio
Pe aie b t o nck ki uawchesce en Ges en ak 28

United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 789 F.2d 497
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 961, 107 S. Ct. 457
St rk watches €6u cane oiek oie ioe een oo c: 22

United States v. T & S Brass and Bronze Works, Inc.,
681 F. Supp. 314 (D.S.C. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part on other grounds, 865 F.2d 1261 (4th Cir.
ee EE EPO PL A le A 28

Vill
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310 (2d Cir.
PRON ead nin 60 0.08:440 14 WEN Ob ee BE hee be 22

Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887 (D. Minn.
i eT PerL Seer Ere eee Tere crore Ter mee Tre re 4

Wheaton Indus. v. EPA, 781 F.2d 354 (3d Cir. 1986) .... 22

Yslava v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 845 F. Supp. 705 (D.
SU Se i kc eb Rew hee eeces cei e ie rae eves 53, ba

pS ft oe oe Pare re ry Pers pete 6
Be Sc BE Sa cS eae oe bee 6
TO OE Bs Gs os oo kde ee 2
WUE Sie eee 15
SD Was Se Bh es ck enki keke eves ede ad eee 9, 15, 16
WiSE 6 es a 6, 15
CFSE DO 03 ae eee 14
CR RS 8 es Aa ae eee 15
Oe we. a a 8, 15, 16
OF Bo is nion teesoeencan 6, 15, 19
Ga Se Ds 6 Asbo hc de nco duced suweneck 19
TS I. 2 vo vk ccs eee 14
a2 USC. CMD ©. .6. 562s eck Se Oe ee 14
eRe a I os 36s oo 5 odok on oaks wa aw ee passim

~

WUsr 6A... ee 18

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page
gtk Fae Df erg creer Terre rrr rrr 8, 15, 16, 18
OE UGA GPP ec cccisseccs bcd ce Aha We eee ET LET 24

Calif. Water Code, Div. 7, Ch. 4, Art. 4 § 13260(c).... 15

REGULATIONS

Ge Fs EE OEE A ope im 9. 4-06 00 bb 4 Kear he Oe 15
RuLes

I INS WON CU eres Vnkscsavedecnsneveaers 2

pera SAUNT Ce Pe a voce avai acvesscdedeseres ii

LEGISLATIVE History

132 Cong. Rec. H9600 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986,
IEE OE FH. TRO 6.5 vis sted vevdeue'e: 22, 23

132 Cong. Rec. $14814 (Oct. 3, 1986, comment of
BSE Ei rd 6 eda cu ibn aw ae cithan ee inl we 23

132 Cong. Rec. $14895, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (daily
Se a NG oa p90 a bs hve eds oes ee ews 23, 24

H.R. Rep. No. 253(1), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 266
(1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. &
a I re 21, 23

Superfund Reauthorization: Judicial and Legal
Issues: Hearings on H.R. 2817 Before the Sub-
comm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Rela-
tions of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong., Ist Sess., House of Representatives 57
(1985) (statement of F. Henry Habicht II, U:S.

Ass’t Att’y Gen., Dept. of — Land & Natu-
ee I I a eas 21

52 Fed.
54 Fed.
54 Fed.
55 Fed.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

OTHER AUTHORITIES
roe Bg errr: ere errr ee 3
ae ES eee ee err ee Ty 15, 25
et | re err er 25

eS EPP eR UCTS TET ee ree fs

ip ei eal desea eae al nee fotraatod

NR ERR fate ts Caen Pe RED Latte tne” Dye aids

OPINIONS DELIVERED IN THE CASE

The references to the official and unofficial reports of
opinions delivered in this case are as follows:

McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Weinberger,
655 F. Supp. 601, 25 ERC 1480, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,344
(E.D. Cal. 1986).

McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Weinberger,
707 F. Supp. 1182, 28 ERC 1282, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,124
(E.D. Cal. 1988).

McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Cheney, 763 F.
Supp. 431 (E.D. Cal. 1989).

McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Cheney, 20
Envtl. L. Rep. 20,870 (E.D. Cal. 1990).

McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Cheney, 20
Envtl. L. Rep. 20,877, 1990 WL 117920 (E.D. Cal. 1990).

All five opinions were appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
Ninth Circuit orders and opinions include:

McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Aspin,
unpublished Order, 91-16467/91-16308 (9th Cir., Jul. 8,
1993), remanding.

McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Aspin,
unpublished “Findings and Determination Re: Jurisdic-
tion” on remand, Civ. No. S-86-475-WBS (E.D. Calif., Oct.
28, 1993).

All vacated by:

McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry, 47 F.3d
325, 39 ERC 2089 (9th Cir. 1995).

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS

The Ninth Circuit entered judgment in this case on
January 30, 1995. This Court has jurisdiction to review the

1

2

case by writ of certiorari pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
This case is appropriate for review on writ of certiorari
under Supreme Court Rule 10.1(a), because the Ninth
Circuit’s decision conflicts with decisions of the First,
Second, and Tenth Circuits on the same matter. This case
is also appropriate for review on writ of certiorari under
Supreme Court Rule 10.1(c), because the Ninth Circuit’s
decision addresses an important question of federal law
which has not been, but should be, settled by this Court.

STATUTE INVOLVED IN THE CASE

This case turns on the proper interpretation of
§ 113(h) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h), which provides:

Timing of review

No Federal court shall have jurisdiction

under Federal law other than under section 1332

of Title 28 (relating to diversity of citizenship

jurisdiction) or under State law which is appli-

cable or relevant and appropriate under section

9621 of this title (relating to cleanup standards)

to review any challenges to removal or remedial

action selected under section 9604 of this title, or

to review any order issued under section 9606(a)

of this title, in any action except one of the

following: [listing five exceptions which are not

relevant in this case].

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Since the 1930’s, McClellan Air Force Base in Sacra-
mento, California, has served as an aircraft depot and
maintenance center for the Department of Defense.
Respondent has disposed of enormous quantities of toxic
and hazardous wastes by burying the wastes in unlined
earthen pits on the Base. Some of the wastes are now

ee ee, eee

3

leaching into the groundwater beneath the Base, and
discharging into surface waters that cross the Base. These
wastes include industrial solvents, caustic cleaners, heavy
metals, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), oils and lubri-
cants, contaminated jet fuel, low-level radioactive wastes,
electroplating chemicals and several volatile organic com-
pounds (VOCs). Petitioners live on the edge of the Base
and their domestic water supplies have been contami-
nated by toxic pollutants from the Base.

Petitioners alleged below that respondent violated
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the
Clean Water Act (CWA), and California hazardous waste
and water laws by storing and discharging hazardous
waste at the Base without informing the Environmental _
Protection Agency (EPA) and the California Department
of Health Services of such discharges, and without
obtaining permits required by RCRA and the CWA.

Petitioners filed their complaint in 1986. At the time
the complaint was filed the Base was not on the CERCLA
National Priorities List (NPL) and no CERCLA removal or
remedial action had been selected.! Petitioners’ complaint
alleged only that respondent had violated RCRA and the

1 On July 27, 1987, more than a year after this case was
filed, EPA listed the Base on the NPL. 52 Fed. Reg. 27,620, 27,641
(1987). On May 2, 1990, more than four years after this case was
filed, EPA, respondent, and the state signed an Interagency
Agreement (IAG) for cleanup of some of the hazardous waste at
the Base. Under the IAG, respondent is primarily responsible
for the cleanup while EPA and the state “have important advi-
sory and oversight roles.” The document that describes how
cleanup will be accomplished at the Base is the Management
Action Plan (MAP), which was not formally adopted until July,
1993, after this case had already been appealed and submitted
for decision to the Ninth Circuit.

4

CWA, and sought relief only under those two statutes. At
no time have petitioners sought an injunction against
CERCLA remedial action at the Base. The district court for
the rnost part rejected petitioners’ RCRA and CWA claims,
and petitioners appealed to the Ninth Circuit.

On appeal respondent argued for the first time that
§ 113(h) of CERCLA barred the court from hearing peti-
tioners’ claims. Section 113(h) of CERCLA bars challenges
to EPA approved remedial actions prior to completion of
those actions. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). Respondent argued
that although petitioners’ complaint did not refer to or
seek to enjoin respondent’s remedial actions, if peti-
tioners prevailed on their CWA and RCRA claims those
claims might “affect” respondent’s remedial actions and
petitioners’ claims therefore constituted a “challenge” to
respondent’s remedial actions within the meaning of
§ 113(h) of CERCLA.?

The case was argued on November 3, 1992. On July 8,
1993, the Ninth Circuit issued an order remanding the
case to the district court with instructions to decide in the
first instance whether § 113(h) precludes review of peti-
tioners’ RCRA and CWA claims.

After oral argument in the Ninth Circuit but before
remand, the Tenth Circuit held, in United States v.

2 Respondent raised this issue for the first time in its
response brief on appeal and at that time relied on four opinions
interpreting § 113(h): Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011,
1018-1024 (3d Cir. 1991); Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp.
887, 894 (D. Minn. 1990); United States v. State of Colorado, 22 ELR
20,008 (D. Colo. 1991), rev'd, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, __ U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994); and Reynolds v. Lujan,
Civ. No. 90-902, 1992 WL 39789 (D.N.M. Jan. 15, 1992).

en hth sR Bei es Sa

ok a Ca EK

Fans hes. 4 Bint

5

Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, ___
U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994), that § 113(h) of CERCLA
does not bar actions to enforce RCRA at facilities with
approved CERCLA remedial plans. The Eighth Circuit
then decided, in Arkansas Peace Center v. Arkansas Dept. of
Pollution Control, 999 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
2 ge, 2, 3 S. Ce Tar ere, et 113(h) of
CERCLA does bar efforts to enforce environmental laws at
facilities with approved CERCLA remedial plans.

On October 28, 1993, the district court in this case
found that § 113(h) of CERCLA deprived the court of
jurisdiction to consider petitioners’ RCRA and CWA
claims, at least to the extent that those claims applied to
“inactive” waste sites at the Base.? The court found,
however, that § 113(h) did not deprive the court of juris-
diction over RCRA claims involving ongoing hazardous
waste storage and disposal operations at the Base. The
case then returned to the Ninth Circuit.

On January 30, 1995, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court, holding that petitioners’ RCRA, CWA, and
state water quality law claims constitute “challenges” to
respondent’s CERCLA remedial actions. The court con-
cluded that ordering respondent to comply with the

3 On remand, respondent submitted two declarations from
Mario lerardi, Chief, Environmental Restoration Division of the
Environmental Management Directorate, McClellan Air Force
Base. Mr. Ierardi stated that compliance with the notification and
permitting requirements “would waste the time and resources”
of the Air Force. Second declaration of Ierardi at 3, 4, 7. Mr.
lerardi also hypothesized that if respondent complied with the
notification and permitting requirements of RCRA and the CWA,
EPA or the state might decide to deny a permit or halt CERCLA
cleanup operations, or order cleanup actions that conflict with
the CERCLA plan. Second declaration of lerardi at 4, 7, 8.

6

reporting and permitting requirements of RCRA and the
CWA would lead to “[t]he injection of new requirements
for dealing with the inactive sites that are now subject to
the CERCLA cleanup,” and the court was unable “to
fashion any remedy that would not interfere with
McClellan’s CERCLA groundwater extraction system.”
App. at 15, 17 (McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v.
Perry, 47 F.3d 325, 330-31 (9th Cir. 1995)).

JURISDICTION IN THE DISTRICT COURT

The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over
this matter pursuant to the citizens’ suit provisions of
RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a), and the CWA, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365; under the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, and under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, providing supplemen-
tal jurisdiction over petitioners’ state law claims involv-
ing the “same case or controversy” as the federal claims.

INTRODUCTION

\

There is a disagreement among the various Circuits
of the United States Court of Appeals over whether
§ 113(h) of CERCLA bars enforcement of environmental!
laws at sites engaged in CERCLA remedial actions. This
Court has been asked on three prior occasions to review
this issue; one of these requests came from the Solicitor
General.4

4 See Arkansas Peace Center v. Arkansas Dept. of Pollution
Control, 999 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, US. __,
114 S. Ct. 1397 (1994); United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565
(10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994);
Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981
(1990).

7

The Ninth Circuit in the instant case, the Third Cir-
cuit in Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir.
1991), the Seventh Circuit in Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990), and the Eighth
Circuit in Arkansas Peace Center v. Arkansas Dept. of Pollu-
tion Control, 999 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, ___
U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 1397 (1994), all held that § 113(h) of
CERCLA bars efforts to enforce environmental laws at
facilities with approved CERCLA remedial plans. See
App. at 15-18 (McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation, 47
F.3d at 330-31); Boarhead Corp., 923 F.2d at 1018-1024;
Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d at 1095; Arkansas Peace Center, 999
F.2d at 1217-18.°

In United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994),
however, the Tenth Circuit found that § 113(h) of
CERCLA does not bar the enforcement of RCRA at sites
engaged in remedial actions under CERCLA, and con-
cluded:

While CERCLA citizen suits cannot be brought
prior to the completion of a CERCLA remedial
action . . . RCRA citizen suits to enforce
[RCRA’s] provisions at a site in which a
CERCLA response action is underway can be
brought prior to the completion of the CERCLA
response action.

990 F.2d at 1577 (emphasis added). The First and Second
Circuits also have rejected arguments that § 113(h) of
CERCLA bars litigation that might affect a site engaged
in CERCLA remedial action. See In re Chateaugay Corp.,

5 In holding that petitioners’ claims were barred by
§ 113(h), the Ninth Circuit relied upon Arkansas Peace Center and
Boarhead.

8

944 F.2d 997, 1006 (2nd Cir. 1991) (in the context of a
challenge to a CERCLA-based property lien “CERCLA’s
prohibition of pre-enforcement review is simply inappli-
cable. The Court is not being called upon to ‘review any
challenges to removal or remedial action selected under
section 9604 of this title, or to review any order issued
under section 9606(a) of this title.’ ”); Reardon v. United
States, 947 F.2d 1509, 1513, 1515 (1st Cir. 1991) (hearing
constitutional challenge to EPA’s lien authority under
CERCLA would not impair underlying purposes of
§ 9613(h)).

In addition to the disagreement among the Circuits
over the proper interpretation of § 113(h) of CERCLA,
this case presents an important question of federal law
that has not previously been addressed by this Court. If
the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in this case is allowed to
stand, sites that are by definition some of the worst
hazardous waste facilities in the country will be immune
to enforcement of environmental laws once they adopt a
CERCLA cleanup plan. It is clear that Congress did not
intend such a result. Rather, Congress expected CERCLA,
RCRA, and other environmental statutes to work in con-
junction.® See 42 U.S.C. § 9652(d) (“nothing in CERCLA
shall affect or modify existing laws with respect to haz-
ardous substances”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (federal
agencies must comply with the substantive and pro-
cedural requirements of RCRA to the same extent as any

© EPA “has a number of options for harmonizing operation
of RCRA and CERCLA,” in order to avoid “duplicative orders
and overlaps.” App. at 201 (EPA memorandum of Lisa Fried-
man).

tae — i at Pee ee tied ’

9

other person); 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (same, with respect to the
CWA).

ARGUMENT

I. THE NINTH, THIRD, SEVENTH, AND EIGHTH
CIRCUITS’ OPINIONS ADDRESSING § 113(h) OF
CERCLA CONFLICT WITH THE FIRST, SECOND,
AND TENTH CIRCUITS’ OPINIONS ADDRESS-
ING § 113(h) OF CERCLA

The Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that § 113(h) of
CERCLA bars enforcement of RCRA and the CWA in this
case, and similar conclusions by the Third Circuit in
Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1991), the
Seventh Circuit in Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981, and the Eighth Circuit in
Arkansas Peace Center v. Arkansas Dept. of Pollution Control,
999 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. __, 114
S. Ct. 1397 (1994), conflict with the Tenth Circuit’s conclu-
sion in United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994) that
§ 113(h) does not bar RCRA enforcement actions at
CERCLA remedial sites. The Ninth, Third, Seventh, and
Eighth Circuit opinions also conflict with the First Cir-
cuit’s opinion in Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509
(1st Cir. 1991) and the Second Circuit’s similar opinion in
In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997 (2nd Cir. 1991), both
holding that § 113(h) does not bar challenges to EPA liens
even if the challenges affect CERCLA remedial actions.

In United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994), the
Tenth Circuit held that Colorado’s efforts to enforce a
final compliance order issued through the state’s EPA-
delegated RCRA authority against a hazardous waste site

10

involved in a CERCLA cleanup (the Rocky Mountain
Arsenal) was not a “challenge” to the cleanup within the
meaning of § 113(h). 990 F.2d at 1576. Noting that Con-
gress intended CERCLA to work in conjunction with
other environmental statutes, the Tenth Circuit concluded
that “to hold otherwise would require us . . . to find that
CERCLA implicitly repealed RCRA’s enforcement provi-
sions contrary to Congress’ expressed intention.” 990 F.2d
at 1575. Although the lawsuit at issue in Colorado was
presented by a state rather than by citizens, the Tenth
Circuit expressly stated that the government's interpreta-
tion of § 113(h) “is also inconsistent with RCRA’s citizen
suit provision.” 990 F.2d at 1577.7

The First and Second Circuits also rejected arguments
that § 113(h) bars all claims that could in some way affect
a CERCLA cleanup. In In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997
(2nd Cir. 1991), EPA argued that § 113(h) barred plain-
tiffs’ claim because if plaintiffs prevailed EPA “would be
forced to litigate in the bankruptcy proceedings to liqui-
date and fix any claims it might conceivably have against
[plaintiffs] for post-confirmation response costs” and
even trying to estimate the claims would “embroil the
parties and the bankruptcy court in disputes over the

” The court noted some citizen suits are explicitly barred by
§ 113(h) - CERCLA citizen suits and RCRA “imminent hazard”
Suits — but that the type of RCRA suit brought by petitioners in
the instant case are not barred by section 113(h). United States v.
Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1577-78. The Ninth Circuit in the instant
case inexplicably failed even to mention United States v. Colo-
rado, despite the fact that the Colorado opinion directly supports
petitioners’ argument, was extensively briefed to the Ninth Cir-
cuit, in this case, and directly contradicts the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion.

11

wisdom and scope of possible remedies.” 944 F.2d at
1006.

The Second Circuit rejected this argument and held
that “CERCLA’s prohibition of pre-enforcement review is
simply inapplicable. The Court is not being called upon
to ‘review any challenges to removal or remedial action
selected under section 9604 of this title, or to review any
order issued under section 9606(a) of this title.’ ” Id.

In Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509 (1st Cir.
1991), the First Circuit rejected a similar argument. In
Reardon, landowners brought an action challenging a lien
filed against their property by the EPA pursuant to
CERCLA. Although the First Circuit held that some of the
claims were barred by § 113(h), it held that the plaintiffs’
constitutional due process claim was not barred. The
court held that § 113(h) civests federal courts of jurisdic-
tion only “over challenges to EPA’s administration of the
statute — claims that EPA did not ‘select[ ]’ the proper
‘removal or remedial action.’” 947 F.2d at 1514. The
plaintiffs’ due process claim was not barred by § 113(h)
because it did not challenge the way in which EPA
administers the statute and did not “concern the merits of
any particular removal or remedial action,” but rather
was a constitutional challenge to CERCLA itself. Id.*

8 See also Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA, 673 F.
Supp. 1043 (D. Kan. 1987) (suit challenging EPA’s CERCLA
procedures was not barred by § 113(h)); Yslava v. Hughes Aircraft
Co., 845 F. Supp. 705 (D. Ariz. 1993) (suit to recover medical
monitoring costs not barred by § 113(h)).

As the Yslava court recognized:

Even assuming medical monitoring programs
qualify as removal or remedial action, the jurisdic-
tional bar of § 9613(h) still does not preclude this

12

Despite these opinions from the First, Second, and
Tenth Circuits, the Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits,
like the Ninth Circuit, have adopted a broad interpreta-
tion of § 113(h) of CERCLA that precludes enforcement of
non-CERCLA laws at CERCLA remedial action sites. In
Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1991), the
owner of a CERCLA site sued under the National Historic
Preservation Act to halt the destruction of archaeological
artifacts through soil cleanup at his property. The Third
Circuit held that § 113(h) barred the claim, and that
Congress had balanced the importance of cleaning up
hazardous waste against the need to preserve archae-
ological artifacts and had tipped the balance in favor of
cleanup. 923 F.2d at 1013, 1018-19.

In Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 981, citizens sued EPA under the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) because EPA failed to
prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for a
CERCLA cleanup. The Seventh Circuit held that the suit
was barred by § 113(h). 900 F.2d at 1095.

In Arkansas Peace Center, citizens attempted to enforce
RCRA provisions at a CERCLA site. Although the district

Court’s jurisdiction. . . . Plaintiffs’ state law medical
monitoring claims in no way challenge a response
action.

845 F. Supp. at 709. The Yslava court thus held that suits seeking
remedies unrelated to issues of liability for cleanup costs are not
challenges to ‘removal or remedial action’ and thus § 9613(h)
does not apply. The underlying structure and purpose of
CERCLA supports this conclusion. Given the purposes of
CERCLA, § 9613(h) only properly precludes jurisdiction in
actions where a potentially responsible party seeks to litigate
either the existence or extent of liability for response costs.
845 F. Supp. at 711.

13

court enjoined incineration of dioxin-laden wastes on the
site because it clearly violated EPA’s regulations, the
Eighth Circuit held that § 113(h) barred the suit and
overturned the injunction. 999 F.2d at 1215. The Eighth
Circuit attempted to distinguish United States v. Colorado
by asserting that “[t]he Tenth Circuit {in Colorado] limited
its holding to an action brought by a state.” Arkansas
Peace Center, 999 F.2d at 1218. But the Tenth Circuit in
Colorado made no distinction between state enforcement
and private enforcement. In fact, the Colorado court speci-
fically held: |
While CERCLA citizen suits cannot be brought
prior to the completion of a CERCLA remedial
action . . . RCRA citizen suits to enforce
[RCRA’s] provisions at a site in which a
CERCLA response action is underway can be
brought prior to the completion of the CERCLA
response action.
United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1577 (emphasis
added). The Eighth Circuit’s opinion also ignores the
Tenth Circuit’s explicit finding that “Congress clearly
intended that a CERCLA response action would not pro-
hibit a RCRA citizen enforcement suit. . . . Congress did
not intend a CERCLA response action to bar a RCRA
enforcement action or an equivalent action by a state.”
United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1578 (emphasis
added).?

9 This case is, of course, a RCRA enforcement action and
thus falls squarely within the Colorado holding. The Tenth Cir-
cuit noted that “RCRA itself expressly prohibits imminent haz-
ard suits by citizens where the EPA is engaged in CERCLA
removal actions, . . . while not expressly so prohibiting citizen
enforcement suits.” United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1578
(emphasis added).

14

When a party claims that a particular statute pre-
cludes judicial review, courts look to not only the stat-
ute’s express language, but also “the structure of the
statutory scheme, its objectives, its legislative history, and
the nature of the administrative action involved.” Block v.
Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345, 104 S. Ct.
2450, 2453-54 (1984). The reasoning of the First, Second,
and Tenth Circuits properly interpret the scope of
§ 113(h) in light of the “structure of the statutory scheme,
its objectives, [and] its legislative history.” The opinions
of the Ninth, Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits do not
attempt to reconcile their results with the structure and
objectives of CERCLA. Petitioners respectfully request
that this Court issue a writ of certiorari to resolve a
disagreement among the Circuits and to decide whether
the Ninth, Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits’ inter-
pretation of § 113(h) is correct, or whether the First,
Second, and Tenth Circuits’ interpretation of § 113(h) is
correct.

Il. THIS CASE INVOLVES AN IMPORTANT ISSUE
OF FEDERAL LAW THAT HAS NOT YET BEEN
ADDRESSED, BUT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED, BY
THIS COURT

CERCLA was adopted to address the worst hazard-
ous waste sites in the United States. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9605(a) (establishing “national contingency plan for
the removal of . . . hazardous substances”); 9604(a)(1)
(providing for hazardous waste removal and remedial
action consistent with the national contingency plan).
RCRA and the CWA also apply to activities at these sites.
See 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a) (RCRA requires EPA to establish

15

performance standards applicable to owners and opera-
tors of hazardous waste treatment, storage and disposal
sites); 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (prohibiting “the discharge of
any pollutant by any person” unless such discharge is
specifically permitted by a NPDES permit).’° RCRA, the
CWA, and California hazardous waste and water quality
laws all require notification and permitting when hazard-
ous substances are released into the environment. See,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6930(a); 40 C.F.R. § 270.13(h); Calif. Water
Code, Div. 7, Ch. 4, Art. 4 § 13260(c). Federal facilities are
subject to all requirements respecting the control and
abatement of hazardous waste or water pollution. 42
U.S.C. § 6961 (RCRA); 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (CWA).

The interrelationship between CERCLA, RCRA, the
CWA, and other environmental statutes has caused con-
siderable confusion in the lower courts, particularly with
respect to the effect of § 113(h) of CERCLA on the appli-
cation of RCRA and the CWA at hazardous waste sites
engaged in remedial actions. The Ninth Circuit’s opinion
in this case, for example, ignores the statutory citizen suit
language in RCRA and the CWA authorizing citizens
such as petitioners to prosecute cases such as this. 42
U.S.C. § 6972(a) (citizens’ suit provisions of RCRA); 33
U.S.C. § 1365 (citizens’ suit provisions of CWA). The
Ninth Circuit’s opinion also ignores the specific savings
provision in CERCLA stating that Congress did not
intend to repeal other laws regulating toxic waste. See 42
U.S.C. § 9652(d) (“nothing in CERCLA shall affect or

10 EPA has noted that “the great majority of Federal facility
sites that could be placed on the NPL have RCRA-regulated
hazardous waste management units within the Federal facility
property boundaries.” 54 Fed. Reg. 10,520, 10,521 (1989).

16

modify existing laws with respect to hazardous sub-
stances.”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (federal agencies must
comply with the substantive and procedural require-
ments of RCRA to the same extent as any other person);
33 U.S.C. § 1323 (same, with respect to CWA).

The only Circuit to address the relationship between
§ 302(d) of CERCLA (the savings clause), § 113(h) of
CERCLA, and the statutory authorization of citizen suits
in RCRA, concluded that Congress did not intend to
impliedly repeal the citizen suit provision of RCRA when
it adopted § 113(h) of CERCLA. See United States v. Colo-
rado, supra, 990 F.2d at 1575. The Ninth Circuit in this
case, and other Circuits that have addressed § 113(h),
simply failed to analyze the relationship between § 113(h)
of CERCLA, § 302(d) of CERCLA, and the citizen suit
provisions of other laws, such as RCRA and the CWA.

A. CERCLA Was Not Intended to Preempt Other
Pollution Control Statutes

Congress explicitly provided that CERCLA was not
intended to preempt other environmental laws. See
CERCLA § 302(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9652(d) (“nothing in
CERCLA shall affect or modify existing laws with respect
to hazardous substances”). The practical result of the
Ninth Circuit’s opinion, however, is to “affect or modify”
the citizen suit provisions of RCRA and the CWA by
making those provisions inapplicable at CERCLA sites
engaged in remedial action.

As this Court stated in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136, 140, 87 S. Ct. 1507, 1511 (1967), even in the
absence of a savings clause there is a presumption that
Congress does not intend to prohibit judicial review
“unless there is nersuasive reason to believe that such

17

was the purpose of Congress.” And as the Court has also

stated:
Whether and to what extent a particular statute
precludes judicial review is determined not only
from its express language, but also from the
structure of the statutory scheme, its objectives,
its legislative history, and the nature of the
administrative action involved.

Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345, 104
S. Ct. 2450, 2453-54 (1984)."

The plain language and legislative history of
CERCLA demonstrate that, far from intending that
§ 113(h) impliedly repeal the citizen enforcement provi-
sions of RCRA and the CWA, Congress intended to pre-
serve the citizen suit provisions of RCRA and the CWA.
Section 113(h) was intended only to limit challenges by
potentially responsible parties seeking to reduce their
financial liability by interfering with ongoing cleanup
efforts through litigation. The Ninth Circuits’ opinion
expanding § 113(h) beyond this limited purpose runs

11 Courts must give effect if possible to apparently compet-
ing statutes, “absent clearly expressed congressional intent[] to
the contrary.” County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of
Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 112 S. Ct. 683, 692 (1992)
(“Courts are not at liberty to pick and choose among congres-
sional enactments, and when two statutes are capable of co-
existence, it is [our] duty . . . absent clearly expressed congres-
sional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.”).
Even when a later enacted statute is not entirely harmonious
with an earlier one, courts are reluctant to find repeal by impli-
cation unless the text or legislative history of the later statute
shows that Congress intended to repeal the earlier statute and
simply failed to do so expressly. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp.,
456 U.S. 461, 470, 102 S. Ct. 1883, 1892 (1982) (“an implied repeal
must ordinarily be evident from the language or operation of
the statute”).

18

afoul of the rule against implied repeal of statutory provi-
sion for judicial review.

1. The Ninth Circuit Improperly Ignored The
Express Savings Provisions of CERCLA

Congress explicitly preserved the application of other
statutes in § 302(d) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9652(d).
Section 302(d) states:

Nothing in this chapter shall affect or modify in

any way the obligations or liabilities of any

person under other Federal or State law, includ-

ing common law, with respect to releases of

hazardous substances or other pollutants or

contaminants.
42 U.S.C. § 9652(d). Both RCRA and the CWA were in
existence when CERCLA was adopted, and plainly qual-
ify as federal law “with respect to releases of hazardous
substances or other pollutants or contaminants.”

Congress added an additional savings clause to
CERCLA to ensure that federal facilities such as the
respondent in this case do not evade RCRA respon-
sibilities. This clause states:

Nothing in this section shall affect or impair the
obligation of any department, agency, or instru-
mentality of the United States to comply with
any requirement of the Solid Waste Disposal Act
[RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq.] (including cor-
rective action requirements).

42 U.S.C. § 9620(i).

The Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that CERCLA § 113(h)
precludes the enforcement of RCRA and the CWA due to
ongoing CERCLA removal and remedial activities would
eviscerate the explicit statements in §§ 302(d) and 120(i)
of CERCLA that RCRA, the CWA and other pollution

19

laws continue to apply at CERCLA sites, and particularly
~ at federal facility CERCLA sites.

That Congress did not intend to preclude citizen
enforcement actions at CERCLA sites engaged in reme-
dial actions is also demonstrated by the fact that Con-
gress did consider and explicitly limited RCRA’s reach at
CERCLA sites under circumstances not present in this
case. RCRA provides two separate citizen causes of
action. The first, “citizen enforcement suits,” allow any
person to sue any other person, “alleged to be in viola-
tion of any permit, standard, regulation, condition,
requirement, prohibition, or order” pursuant to RCRA. 42
U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A). The second, “imminent and sub-
stantial endangerment” suits, allow any person to sue
any other person to abate an “imminent and substantial
endangerment to health or the environment.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a)(1)(B).

Petitioners’ action is a citizen enforcement suit under
42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A), and not an “imminent and
substantial endangerment suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a)(1)(B). Because Congress was concerned that
imminent and substantial endangerment suits would
involve courts in remedial actions under CERCLA, it
expressly provided in RCRA that imminent and substan-
tial endangerment actions are precluded at sites where
remedial or removal actions under CERCLA §§ 104 or 106
are proceeding. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B). If Congress had
intended to preclude RCRA citizen enforcement suits (as
opposed to imminent and substantial endangerment
suits) during a CERCLA remedial action, it would have
specifically said so in RCRA’s citizen enforcement provi-
sion. Instead, Congress carefully limited its preclusion to
the imminent endangerment section and left the citizen

20

enforcement provisions of RCRA available for enforce-
ment actions at sites engaged in CERCLA remediation.
See United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1578 (holding that
substantial endangerment suits are barred during
CERCLA cleanup, while enforcement suits such as the
instant suit are not).

If Congress had intended to preclude RCRA or CWA
citizen enforcement suits during a CERCLA remedial
action, the logical place to do so would have been the
citizen enforcement provisions of the RCRA and CWA.
Since the enactment of CERCLA in 1980, Congress has
had the opportunity to amend RCRA, the CWA, and
CERCLA and has chosen not to repeal the statutory pro-
visions for citizen enforcement of RCRA and the CWA.

2. The legislative history of CERCLA indi-
cates that Congress did not intend § 113(h)
to impliedly repeal the citizen suit provi-
sions of RCRA and the CWA

The Ninth Circuit refused to address the legislative
history of § 113(h), stating:

Because the statutory language is so clear, MESS
must Overcome a strong presumption that the
plain language of the statute expresses Con-
gress’ intent. See Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129,
135-37, 112 S. Ct. 515, 520, 116 L.Ed.2d 496
(1991). For MESS’s purposes, the legislative his-
tory of Section 113(h) is, at best, unclear.

App. at 11 n.4 (47 F.3d at 329 n.4). But determining what
constitutes a “challenge” for purposes of § 113(h) requires
the court to look at the legislative history, particularly in
light of this Court’s admonition in Abbott Laboratories that
“only upon a showing of ‘clear and convincing evidence’
of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict

Neti see

ee ee Ee ie ee Ee

™ ee Tes ee

21

access to judicial review.” 387 U.S. at 141, 87 S. Ct. at 1511
(citing Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-380, 82 S. Ct. 787,
794 (1962)).}2

Congress intended CERCLA’s first priority to be the
swift cleanup of hazardous waste sites. Determining
financial responsibility for cleanup was deliberately
given a lower priority than actually accomplishing the
cleanup. See Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011, 1019
(3d Cir. 1991) (“Congress concluded that disputes about
who is responsible for a hazardous site... or . . . for its
costs should be dealt with after the site has been cleaned
up”).

Congress’ purpose in enacting § 113(h) was “to pre-
vent private responsible parties from filing dilatory,
interim lawsuits which have the effect of slowing down
or preventing the EPA’s cleanup activities.” H.R. Rep. No.
253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 266 (1985), reprinted in 1986
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2835, 2941 (section-by-
section analysis in Energy and Commerce Committee
Report). In fact, the proponents of § 113(h) of CERCLA
explicitly stated that § 113(h) was intended to codify the
case law which had interpreted CERCLA to bar pre-
enforcement review of claims by responsible parties. See
Superfund Reauthorization: Judicial and Legal Issues:
Hearings on H.R. 2817 Before the Subcomm. on Admin.

12 Even in cases that do not involve the potential preclusion
of judicial review, when courts engage in any statutory con-
struction they must look not only to the language of the statute
but also to the design of the statute as a whole and to its object
and policy. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158, 110 S. Ct.
997, 1001 (1990); see also King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215,
112 S. Ct. 570. 574 (1991) (statute must be read as a whole
because “meaning, plain or not, depends on context”).

22

Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., House of Representa-
tives 57 (1985) (statement of F. Henry Habicht II, U.S.
Ass’t Att’y Gen., Dept. of Justice, Land & Natural
Resources Div.) (giving section-by-section explanation of
amendments and stating: “Our proposed amendment to
CERCLA [§ 113(h)] would simply codify these holdings
and ensure that court challenges would not delay
cleanups.”) See, Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310,
315 (2d Cir. 1986) (CERCLA responsible party may not
bring pre-enforcement challenge); Wheaton Indus. v. EPA,
781 F.2d 354, 356-57 (3d Cir. 1986) (same); United States v.
Outboard Marine Corp., 789 F.2d 497, 505-06 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 961, 107 S. Ct. 457 (1986) (same); Barnes v.
United States District Court, 800 F.2d 822, 822 (9th Cir.
1986) (same); J.V. Peters & Co. v. EPA, 767 F.2d 263, 264-65
(6th Cir. 1985) (same).

There is absolutely no indication in the legislative
history of CERCLA that Congress intended § 113(h) to
preclude enforcement actions specifically authorized by
RCRA and the CWA. Congress did clearly state, however,
that it intended courts to distinguish “between
. . . lawsuits by potentially responsible parties involving
only monetary damages and legitimate citizens’ suits
complaining of irreparable injury that can be addressed
only if a claim is heard during or prior to response
action.” 132 Cong. Rec. S14898 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986)
(comment of Sen. Stafford). See also 132 Cong. Rec. H9600
(daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (comment of Rep. Roe) (same).}3

13 The district court relied primarily upon a statement
made by Senator Thurmond during floor debate. App. at 183-85
(McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation (MESS) v. Aspin,

23

The fact that Congress envisioned citizen suits being filed
under CERCLA itself strongly suggests that Congress did

unpublished “Findings and Determination Re: Jurisdiction” on
remand, Civ. No. S-86-475-WBS (E.D. Calif., Oct. 28, 1993), at
15-16 (§ 113(h) “covers all issues that could be construed as a
challenge to the response”)). That statement, however, is much
broader in its reach than the plain wording of the statute and
than any of the statements made in Committee reports or by
other members of Congress.

The views expressed by Senators Stafford and Roe, that
§ 113(h) is aimed at lawsuits brought by potentially responsible
parties in order to delay CERCLA cleanup, were echoed repeat-
edly throughout the legislative history of the CERCLA amend-
ments. See 132 Cong. Rec. H9600 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986,
comment of Rep. Roe); 132 Cong. Rec. $14814, 14814 (Oct. 3,
1986, comment of Sen. Mitchell) (“The conferees agreed that
some preimplementation review would be provided so that
citizens would not be disadvantaged by having to wait until
cleanup was complete.”); H.R. Rep. No. 253(I), 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 266 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 2835, 2941; 132 Cong. Rec. $14898 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986)
(citizens must be allowed to sue “before such plans are imple-
mented because otherwise the agency could proceed in blatant
violation of the law and waste millions of dollars of Superfund
money before a court had considered the illegality.”) (comment
of Sen. Stafford).

Senator Stafford, who chaired the Committee on Environ-
ment and Public Works during its extensive hearings on the
Superfund amendments, also coordinated the conference com-
mittee process and gave the section-by-section analysis in the
Conference Report to accompany H.R. 2005. 132 Cong. Rec.
S$14895, S14895, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). In Senator Chafee’s
words:

Our chairman [Sen. Stafford] worked long and
hard for this legislation. Despite innumerable obsta-
cles, he never gave up hope or slackened in his tire-
less efforts to achieve the goal of a new, improved
Superfund. For months and months, the conference
meetings went on and on. At each and every meeting

24

not intend CERCLA to preclude suits under other inde-
pendent statutes. See 42 U.S.C. § 9659.

Because potentially responsible parties can be made
financially whole by litigating after the completion of the
cleanup, Congress intended § 113 primarily to bar suits
by such parties seeking to interfere with cleanup activ-
ities in order to avoid or reduce future liability. Congress
did not, however, intend to bar enforcement actions
against ongoing violations of RCRA or the CWA until
after CERCLA cleanup is completed, which in this case
will not occur until some time in the 21st century, if ever.

In United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1575 (10th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994),
the Tenth Circuit found that Congress intended CERCLA
to work together with other statutes and that CERCLA
§ 113(h) does not impliedly repeal RCRA enforcement
provisions. This Court should grant a writ of certiorari to
reverse the Ninth Circuit’s opposite conclusion.

B. EPA Recognizes that RCRA Enforcement
Actions at Sites Engaged in Remedial Action
under CERCLA Are Not Precluded by § 113(h)

EPA has given considerable attention to the possi-
bility of overlap between RCRA and CERCLA and has
stated that such overlap was intended by Congress and
will not interfere with CERCLA response actions.

EPA recognizes that when it takes action under
CERCLA to address a facility that is also subject

- small private sessions or large public meetings — he

was there.
132 Cong. Rec. $14895, S14924, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
Senator Stanford’s statements with request to § 113(h) plainly
should be given significant weight.

ee a a ee a ee ee ee

25

to RCRA authorities, there is some risk of over-
lap. . . . However, this potential overlap . . . is
the result of Congressional design, not site list-
ings. . . . The questions of which authority
should control, and of how to avoid potential
duplication or inconsistency, are . . . to be
resolved in light of the facts of the case and after
consultation between EPA and the concerned
State.

54 Fed. Reg. 10,520, 10,522-23 (1989). See also 54 Fed. Reg.
41,000, 41,007 (1989) ("RCRA authorities may be used by
themselves or in conjunction with CERCLA removal and
enforcement authorities”); 55 Fed. Reg. 8,696 (1990) (EPA
“nas the discretion to use its authorities under CERCLA,
RCRA, or both to accomplish appropriate cleanup action
at a site, even where the site is listed on the NPL”).

Obviously, EPA does not view RCRA enforcement
actions as inherently incompatible with CERCLA cleanup
actions. To minimize any overlap between RCRA and
CERCLA, EPA has identified “a number of options for
harmonizing operation of the two authorities and avoid-
ing duplicative orders and overlaps.” App. at 201 (Fried-
man memo). EPA notes that “[s]uch conflict situations are
not a problem where EPA is responsible for carrying out
the requirements of both RCRA and CERCLA (since any
jurisdictional overlaps can be managed within EPA).” 54
Fed. Reg. 10,520, 10,522 (1989).

There will be no conflict between EPA issued RCRA
and CWA permits and ongoing cleanup activities at the

Base because “EPA is responsible for carrying out the
requirements of both RCRA and CERCLA [and]... any
jurisdictional overlaps can be managed within EPA[].” Id.

26

When the Department of Energy asked EPA: “Does
CERCLA section 121(e)(1) relieve DOE from the require-
ment to apply for [RCRA] post-closure permits at NPL
sites?” EPA answered: “No; CERCLA does not relieve
DOE from the requirement to obtain [RCRA] post-closure
permits for pre-existing, RCRA-regulated units at NPL
sites.” (App. at 199 (Friedman memo)), EPA noted that
§ 113(h) does not bar the enforcement of “RCRA orders or
permits that do not conflict with the CERCLA-selected
remedy.” App. at 200 (Friedman memo). “[I]t is clear,”
EPA concluded, “that the simple issuance of an FFA
[Interagency Agreement] . . . does not, without more, act
to preempt the effect of permits required under
RCRA .. . for non-CERCLA activities.” App. at 205
(Friedman memo).

The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in this case ignored the
extensive consideration given by EPA to the relationship
between RCRA permit requirements and CERCLA
cleanup activities. In particular, the Ninth Circuit took it
upon itself to determine that RCRA permitting require-
ments would detract from cleanup efforts at the Base,
despite the fact that such a determination is plainly the
province of EPA, not the courts. Under the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation of § 113(h), every time a CERCLA removal
and remedial action begins at a new site, that site
becomes immunized from the permitting and enforce-
ment provisions of pollution prevention statutes such as
RCRA and the CWA. As even the Ninth Circuit acknowl-
edged, such immunization could last for decades, or
sometimes forever. See App. at 13 (47 F.3d at 329)
(because cleanup at the Base will last at least several
decades, “[w]e recognize that the application of Section
113(h) may in some cases delay judicial review for years,

27

if not permanently.”). This result is plainly inconsistent
with EPA’s views of the proper interaction of CERCLA
and RCRA.

C. The Fact That Complying with RCRA and the
CWA Would Require the Expenditure of
Resources Does Not Make This Case a Chal-
lenge to the Cleanup Plan

The Ninth Circuit apparently accepted respondent's
argument that the “additional study, documentation and
substantiation” that would be required to comply with
the notification and permitting requirements of RCRA
and the CWA “could delay the ongoing cleanup activities
while resources were redirected toward the application
effort.” See App. at 187 n.7 (Unpublished “Findings and
Determination Re: Jurisdiction,” Civ. No. S-86-475-WBS
(E.D. Calif., Oct. 28, 1993), at 19 n.7). The district court
found that such costs made this case a “challenge” to the
cleanup plan, and the Ninth Circuit, while not explicitly
basing its holding on the costs of compliance, stated:

The injection of new requirements for dealing

with the inactive sites that are now subject to

the CERCLA cleanup (or McClellan’s defense

against imposition of such requirements) would
clearly interfere with the cleanup.

It is true, as MESS argues, that every action
that increases the cost of a cleanup or diverts
resources or personnel from it does not thereby
become a “challenge” to the cleanup. The
enforcement of minimum wage requirements,
for example, might increase the cost of a
cleanup and even divert personnel from cleanup
duties without becoming a challenge to the
cleanup. MESS’s lawsuit, however, is far more
directly related to the goals of the cleanup itself

28

than is the hypothetical minimum wage action.

MESS, for all practical purposes, seeks to

improve on the CERCLA cleanup as embodied

in the Interagency Agreement. Its action quali-

fies as a “challenge” to the cleanup.
App. at 15 (47 F.3d at 330). The court’s acceptance of this
argument is puzzling. There is no principled way to draw
a line between spending resources to comply with envi-
ronmental laws and spending resources to do anything
else. Allowing a CERCLA site to argue that it cannot
comply with non-CERCLA environmental laws because
to do so would divert resources from a CERCLA cleanup
effort would exempt every CERCLA site from all non-
CERCLA laws.

The fact that compliance with RCRA may require
expending additional! resources is no defense to the law.
EPA’s Office of General Counsel (OGC) properly rejected
the “cost” argument when it was raised by the Depart-
ment of Energy. See App. at 199-200 (Friedman memo).
Hazardous waste operators are strictly liable for RCRA
violations. See United States v. Allegan Finishing Co., 696 F.
Supp. 275, 287 (W.D. Mich. 1988); United States v. Liviola,
605 F. Supp. 96, 100 (N.D. Ohio 1985). This is because
“[e]conomic loss to polluters is far outweighed by the
benefit to the community from enjoining of [polluting]
activities.” United States v. Ciampitti, 583 F. Supp. 483, 499
(D.N.J. 1984). See also EPA v. Nat'l Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449
U.S. 64, 101 S. Ct. 295, 304 (1980) (Clean Water Act
imposes “additional costs which must be borne or the
point source eliminated”); United States v. T & S Brass and
Bronze Works, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 314, 321 (D.S.C. 1988),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 865 F.2d 1261
(4th Cir. 1988) (“Compliance with the statutory deadline
was mandatory, even if the defendant[s’] only option was

29

to cease its business. . . . Congress had already deter-
mined that protection of the public health and the envi-
ronment was paramount”); American Lung Ass‘n v. Kean,
1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15158, *14-15, 26 ERC 1865, 18
Envtl. L. Rep. 20,317 (D.N.J., Civ. No. 87-288, Nov. 19,
1987), aff'd, 871 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1989) (“It is perhaps
understandable that intervenor-defendants wish to avoid
the costs of .. . compliance, but the law . . . will not allow
[them] to hide behind those costs”); Public Interest
Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Top Notch Metal Finish-
ing Co., 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15163, *14, 26 ERC 2012
(D.N.J., Civ. No. 87-3894, Nov. 6, 1987) (“[I]f to stay in
business Top Notch must expend a large sum of money to
come into immediate compliance with toxic substance
limitations, that is a balance Congress has struck in favor
of the environment”).

D. The Fact That EPA and California Will Have
Additional Regulatory Authority at the Base If
Respondent Complies With RCRA and the
CWA Does Not Make This Case a Challenge to
the Cleanup Plan

The Ninth Circuit also accepted respondent's argu-
ment that this case challenges the cleanup because noti-
fication and permitting under RCRA, the CWA, and state
water quality laws might lead to “[t]he injection of new
requirements for dealing with the inactive sites that are
now subject to the CERCLA cleanup (or McClellan’s
defense against imposition of such requirements).” App.
at 15 (47 F.3d at 330). Specifically, in regards to the
discharges to groundwater and surface water, the Ninth
Circuit held that requiring respondent to provide proper
notification to the state, EPA, and the public, and to

30

obtain a CWA discharge permit, might somehow interfere
with “the leaching process [which] is a necessary compo-
nent of the CERCLA plan’s groundwater extraction sys-
tem.” App. at 17 (47 F.3d at 330).

The Ninth Circuit assumed that if respondent gave
such notification, federal and state regulatory bodies
would order respondent to alter its cleanup activities in
ways that would interfere with the cleanup. But there is
no basis for assuming that EPA or the state of California
will order respondent to do something inconsistent with
its cleanup. Rather, as discussed, above EPA recognizes
the overlap of the statutes and has mechanisms to harmo-
nize. In fact, the Interagency Agreement (IAG) prepared
for the Base specifically recognizes that compliance with
the notification and permitting requirements of RCRA
and the CWA are required independent of the CERCLA
cleanup.

CONCLUSION

There is a significant conflict between the various
Circuits over the proper interpretation of § 113(h) of
CERCLA. The extent to which § 113(h) of CERCLA pre-
cludes enforcement of other environmental laws at sites
engaged in CERCLA remedial actions is an important
question of federal law that has not previously been
addressed by this Court. For these reasons, petitioners
respectfully request that the Court issue a writ of cer-
tiorari to the Ninth Circuit to review the Ninth Circuit's
opinion in this case.

Respectfully submitted,
MICHAEL AXLINE

Counsel of Record for Petitioners
MarIANNE DUGAN

Dated this 1st day of May, 1995.

App. 1

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

)
McCLet_tan EcoLoGicAL SEEPAGE )
SITUATION; Mary FisHeR; CHARLES __)
YARBROUGH, ) No. 91-16308
ee )
Plaintiffs-Appellants, D.C. No.
v. ) CV 86-00475-RAR
WitutaM J. Perry,* Secretary of )
the United States Department of )
Defense,
Defendant-Appellee. )
)
)
McCLettan ECOoLocicat SEEPAGE )
SITUATION; Mary FisHer; CHARLES )
YARBROUGH, ) No. 91-16467
Plaintiffs-Appellees, D.C. No.
V. ) CV 86-00475-RAR
WitttaM J. Perry,* Secretary of ) OPINION
the United States Department of )
Defense,
Defendant-Appellant. )
).

* William J. Perry is substituted for his predecessor, Les Aspin,
as Secretary of Defense. Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(1).

* William J. Perry is substituted for his predecessor, Les Aspin,
as Secretary of Defense. Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(1).

App. 2

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Raul A. Ramirez, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted
August 9, 1994 - San Francisco, California

Filed January 30, 1995

Before: Betty B. Fletcher, Arthur L. Alarcon
and William C. Canby, Jr., Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Canby

SUMMARY

Environmental Law/Hazardous Waste/
Litigation and Procedure

The court of appeals vacated a judgment of the dis-
trict court and remanded. The court held that federal
courts lack jurisdiction over all contemporaneous chal-
lenges to hazardous waste cleanups undertaken pursuant
to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation and Liability Act (CERCLA).

Since 1979, the Department of Defense (DOD) has
taken steps to remediate environmental damage caused
by toxic and hazardous waste pollution at McClellan Air
Force Base and its environs. The cleanup program is
governed by CERCLA and an interagency agreement
between the Air Force, the Environmental Protection
Agency and the State of California. The agreement’s Man-
agement Action Plan (MAP) incorporates the require-
ments of the Resource Conservation Recovery Act
(RCRA), the Clean Water Act (CWA) and California envi-
ronmental statutes.

App. 3

In 1986, McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation
(MESS) sued appellee Secretary of Defense, alleging that
McClellan’s past and present cleanup activities violated
RCRA, CWA and related California laws. Primarily, MESS
sought to compel McClellan’s compliance with RCRA’s
reporting and permitting requirements, require it to
obtain a CWA permit for leaching from its inactive waste
pits, and meet state notification requirements for contam-
inant discharge.

The district court found that MESS’s claims directed
at McClellan’s ongoing cleanup efforts were challenges to
CERCLA remedial and removal actions and therefore
barred by CERCLA section 113(h). With respect to current
and future waste disposal operations, the court con-
cluded that section 113(h) did not preclude MESS’s
claims.

Section 113(h) deprives federal courts of jurisdiction
to review “... any challenges to removal or remedial
action. .. . ” undertaken pursuant to CERCLA, except
citizen suits alleging that a cleanup action “taken” or
secured” under the statute “was” in violation of its provi-
sions.

On appeal, MESS contended that section 113(h) does
not apply to citizen suits or actions brought under non-
CERCLA statutes. MESS argued that waste storage and
disposal site operators like McClellan might try to avoid
RCRA liability by hiding under a CERCLA umbrella
unless challenges under non-CERCLA statutes were not
permitted.

[1] ON its face, section 113(h) precludes any con-
temporaneous challenge to a CERCLA cleanup, [2] not

App. 4

just those brought under other provisions of CERCLA. [3]
Nor does the prohibitory language of section 113(h) dis-
tinguish between plaintiffs. If it did not include citizen
suits, there would be little need for its exception for
citizen suits challenging past cleanup actions.

[4] Whatever theoretical potential there was for eva-
sion of RCRA in other cases, it did not exist in this one.
McClellan’s MAP incorporated the requirements of all
relevant hazardous waste legislation. [5] Although it was
true that MESS was unable to obtain immediate judicial
review of McClellan’s compliance with RCRA, CWA and
like statutory requirements during the course of the
cleanup, Congress determined that swift execution of
CERCLA cleanup plans outweighed this concern.

[6] The compliance with RCRA that MESS sought
[7] would constitute the kind of interference with the
cleanup plan that Congress sought to avoid or delay with
section 113(h). [8] To a greater degree, an injunction or
declaration requiring compliance with RCRA permitting
requirements would also interfere with the cleanup. [9]
Because MESS sought to improve on the cleanup embod-
ied in the Interagency Agreement, its action qualified as a
“challenge” to the cleanup.

[10] The leaching process was a necessary compo-
nent of the CERCLA plan’s groundwater extraction sys-
tem. Claims focusing on it could not be sustained until

the cleanup was completed. [11] The source of surface
water contaminants was not dispositive. The court's
inability to fashion a remedy that would not interfere
with McClellan’s cleanup action was, however.

App. 5

[12] The Interagency Agreement did not cover
McClellan’s active sites. Section 113 thus did not bar
MESS’s claims asserting RCRA noncompliance at them.
(13] It was unclear what claims remained relating to
active sites. [14] The district court was in the best position
to make that determination.

COUNSEL

Michael Axline, Western Natural Resource Law Clinic,
Eugene, Oregon, counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants-
appellees.

Ellen J. Durkee, United States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C., counsel for the defendant-appellee-
appellant.

OPINION
CANBY, Circuit Judge:

This is an action brought by McClellan Ecological
Seepage Situation (“MESS”) to require McClellan Air
Force Base to comply with various environmental laws.
The district court ruled against MESS and MESS
appealed. The Secretary of Defense cross-appealed on the
ground that MESS’s appeal was untimely - a contention
that we reject.!

1 The district court granted MESS’s motion to extend the
time for appeal on the ground of excusable neglect. The govern-
ment’s motion to dismiss the appeal was denied by a motions
panel of this court on the ground that the appeal time had not

App. 6

After hearing argument, we remanded the case to the
district court for certain findings regarding the jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts to entertain many of MESS’s
claims. The district court determined that most of MESS’s
claims, brought under the Resource Conservation Recov-
ery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (“RCRA”), the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387, and several California
state environmental statutes, must be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction. The findings indicate that the Department
of Defense is engaged in a cleanup at McClellan Air Force
Base, conducted pursuant to the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of
1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (“CERCLA” §§ 101-175).2
and that the bulk of MESS’s claims constitute an imper-
missible challenge to that cleanup.

After again hearing argument, we accept the district
court's Findings and Determination with respect to all of
MESS’s claims relating to inactive waste storage sites
being cleaned up by McClellan pursuant to CERCLA. We
therefore vacate the original judgment, and instruct the

begun to run because the entry date of the final judgment did
not appear on the court docket. The government correctly states
that we may revisit the decision of the motions panel. See United
States v. Houser, 804 F.2d 565, 568-69 (9th Cir. 1986). We do sO,
but reject the government's cross-appeal because we conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in implicitly
finding excusable neglect. See Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick
Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 113 S. Ct. 1489, 1496-98 (1993).

? As amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reau-
thorization Act of 1986, codified as amended at 42 US.
§§ 9601-9675.

App. 7

district court to dismiss those claims for lack of jurisdic-
tion. We agree with the district court that jurisdiction
exists over the remaining claims, which are all challenges
relating to active sites excluded by the CERCLA Plan. We
remand those claims for further consideration by the
district court.

BACKGROUND

Since the 1930’s, McClellan Air Force Base has served
as an aircraft depot and maintenance center for the Army,
and subsequently the Air Force. The repair and mainte-
nance of our military aircraft have always required the
use of toxic and hazardous materials which, after they
have served their purpose, become hazardous wastes
requiring disposal.* Until 1976, McClellan disposed of
large quantities of its wastes by burying them in earthen
pits on the Base. During the several preceding decades,
operations at McClellan generated a great deal of uncon-
tained hazardous waste, some of which leached into the
groundwater beneath the Base.

In 1979, McClellan began a groundwater monitoring
program as a first step in its cleanup of Base contamina-
tion. When Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980, the
McClellan cleanup continued under the authority of the
Department of Defense’s Installation Restoration Pro-
gram, pursuant to CERCLA Section 104. In compliance

3 Some of the wastes generated at McClellan over the years
include industrial solvents, caustic cleaners, heavy metals, poly-
chlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), oils and lubricants, contaminated
jet fuel, low-level radioactive wastes, electroplating chemicals
and several volatile organic compounds (VOCs).

App. 8

with requirements of the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986, which amended CERCLA.
McClellan again modified its cleanup program to con-
form to a now-required Interagency Agreement between
the Air Force, the federal Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) and the State of California. The Agree-
ment bound McClellan to incorporate all applicable legis-
lative requirements into its cleanup through a
Management Action Plan. McClellan’s cleanup effort has
proceeded under the authority of both CERCLA and the
Interagency Agreement since the Agreement’s effective
date of May 2, 1990.

A major component of McClellan’s CERCLA cleanup
plan is its groundwater extraction system. The system
allows contaminants to leach from the inactive waste pits
into the groundwater. The groundwater is then mechan-
ically extracted and treated. Through this “leach-extract-
treat” cycle, all contaminants are expected to be removed
from the inactive pits, and migration of contaminated
groundwater away from the Base to be prevented.

On April 23, 1986. MESS brought this action against
the Secretary of Defense, alleging that McClellan’s past
and present treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous
wastes violated RCRA, the Clean Water Act, the Califor-
nia Health and Safety Code, the California Water Code,
and the California Fish and Game Code. MESS sought
declaratory relief, civil penalties, and an injunction
against any further treatment, storage, discharge or dis-
posal of hazardous wastes at McClellan until all federal
and state hazardous waste requirements were met. The
district court, as we have said, denied MESS’s claims on
the merits.

App. 9

On appeal, the Secretary raised for the first time a
threshold jurisdictional issue, arguing that CERCLA Sec-
tion 113(h) denies federal courts the jurisdiction to enter-
tain MESS’s challenge to the ongoing CERCLA cleanup
action at McClellan. We remanded to the district court to
develop the record further with regard to the progress
and scope of CERCLA activities at McClellan, and to
determine whether MESS’s claims constituted a challenge
to the CERCLA cleanup, placing them beyond federal
court jurisdiction. The district court found that “a com-
prehensive cleanup effort is currently underway at
[McClellan],” and determined that each of MESS’s claims
for relief that were directed at sites now undergoing
cleanup activities constituted challenges to CERCLA
remedial and removal actions. The court thus concluded
that CERCLA Section 113(h) bars those challenges. With
respect to RCRA compliance for current and future waste
disposal operations at McClellan, the district court found
that Section 113 does not bar MESS’s claims.

MESS disputes the district court’s determination,
arguing first that Section 113 applies neither to citizen
suits nor to actions brought under non-CERCLA statutes.
MESS also contends that even if Section 113 does apply to
the present action, none of MESS’s claims constitute
“challenges” to the CERCLA cleanup effort at McClellan,
because MESS merely seeks compliance with existing
RCRA and Clean Water Act standards that McClellan is
already bound to follow. WE address each argument in

turn.

App. 10

ANALYSIS
I. Scope of CERCLA § 113(h)

[1] Section 113(h) of CERCLA provides:
(h) Timing of review

No Federal court shall have jurisdiction
under Federal law . . . or under State law .. . to
review any challenges to removal or remedial
action selected under section 9604 of this title, or
to review any order issued under section 9606(a)
of this title, in any action except one of the
following:

* ** + *

(4) an action under section 9659 of this
title (relating to citizen suits) alleging that the
removal or remedial action taken under section
9604 of this title or secured under section 9606 of
this title was in violation of any requirement of
this chapter. .

+ + + *

42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (emphasis supplied). On its face, then,
section 113(h) precludes contemporaneous challenges to
CERCLA cleanups. MESS interprets this section, how-
ever, to mean that federal courts are jurisdictionally
barred from reviewing only those challenges to CERCLA
cleanup actions brought under CERCLA provisions. In our
view, however, section 113(h) is not so limited.

[2] Section 113(h) is clear and unequivocal. It
amounts to a “blunt withdrawal of federal jurisdiction.”
North Shore Gas Co. v. E.P.A., 930 F.2d 1239, 1244 (7th Cir.
1991). Contrary to MESS’s position, the unqualified lan-
guage of the section precludes “any challenges” to

App. 11

CERCLA Section 104 cleanups, not just those brought
under other provisions of CERCLA. See Arkansas Peace
Ctr. v. Department of Pollution Control, 999 F.2d 1212, 1217
(8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1397 (1994) (holding
that section 113(h) bars a challenge based upon RCRA);
North Shore Gas, 930 F.2d at 1244 (same).

[3] MESS alternatively contends that Section 113(h)
withdraws federal jurisdiction only for challenges
brought by potentially responsible parties, and does not
affect actions brought under the citizen suit provisions of
environmental statutes. This argument is contradicted by
the plain words of the statute. The prohibitory language
of Section 113(h) does not distinguish between plaintiffs.
The statute divests federal courts of jurisdiction over “any
challenges” to removal or remedial actions under
CERCLA. If the prohibitory language did not include
citizen suits, there would have been little need for the
exception in subsection (h) for citizen suits challenging
past cleanup actions. MESS’s reliance on legislative his-
tory to show that congressional intent differs from the
statute’s plain wording is not persuasive.* We therefore
conclude that Section 113 withholds federal jurisdiction
to review any of MESS’s claims, including those made in
citizen suits and under non-CERCLA statutes, that are
found to constitute “challenges” to ongoing CERCLA
cleanup actions.

4 Because the statutory language is so clear, MESS must
overcome a strong presumption that the plain language of the
statute expresses Congress’ intent. See Ardestani v. INS, 112 S.Ct.
515, 520 (1991). For MESS’s purposes, the legislative history of
Section 113(h) is at best, unclear.

App. 12

MESS expresses concerns that waste storage and dis-
posal site operators like McClellan might try to avoid
RCRA liability by hiding under the protective umbrella of
a CERCLA cleanup plan. MESS and amici° argue that in
this situation, affected citizens would never have
recourse for the resulting RCRA violations, and pollution
would go unchecked.

[4] Whatever the theoretical potential for an evasion
of RCRA in other cases, it does not exist here. McClellan's
Management Action Plan incorporates the requirements
of all relevant hazardous waste legislation. See McClellan
Air Force Base Interagency Agreement §§ 1.2(e), 6.1, and
17 (signed July 21, 1989); Finding and Determination RE:
Jurisdiction, p. 11 (October 23, 1993). The parties to the
agreement clearly intended that McClellan be bound by
these requirements. The Management Action Plan is a
comprehensive scheme that takes into account all applica-
ble statutory requirements, including those of RCRA and
the Clean Water Act, and coordinates compliance with
each. McClellan therefore has, without question, an oblig-
ation to comply with substantive RCRA and Clean Water
Act requirements.

[5] It is true that MESS is now unable to obtain
immediate judicial review of McClelian’s compliance
with RCRA, the Clean Water Act, and similar statutory
requirements during the course of the cleanup program,
but this inability was Congress’s choice. Although judi-
cial review is an important element in the enforcement of

> Amici States of Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, IIli-
nois, Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas and
Utah filed a brief on behalf of MESS.

App. 13

laws such as RCRA and the Clean Water Act, Congress
has determined that the need for swift execution of
CERCLA cleanup plans outweighs this concern. Section
113(h) protects the execution of a CERCLA plan during its
pendency from lawsuits that might interfere with the expe-
ditious cleanup effort. This result furthers the policy
underlying CERCLA by allowing a quick response to
serious hazards. See Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d
1011, 1018-19 (3d Cir. 1991). Congress concluded that the
need for such action was paramount, and that peripheral
disputes, including those over “what measures actually
are necessary to clean-up the site and remove the haz-
ard,” may not be brought while the cleanup is in process.
Id. at 1019.

We recognize that the application of Section 113(h)
may in some cases delay judicial review for years, if not
permanently,® and may result in irreparable harm to other
important interests. Whatever is likelihood, such a possi-
bility is for legislators, and not judges, to address. We
must presume that Congress has already balanced all
concerns and “concluded that the interest in removing
the hazard of toxic waste from Superfund sites” clearly
outweighs the risk of irreparable harm. Id. at 1023.

Having concluded that Section 113(h) would bar any
of MESS’s claims that challenge the CERCLA effort at
McClellan, we must now determine which, if any, of the
claims actually comprise “challenges” to the cleanup
within the meaning of the statute. Because the effects of

6 We do not here decide whether or to what extent the
district court can entertain MESS’s various claims after imple-
mentation of the CERCLA cleanup at McClellan is complete.

App. 14

each of MESS’s claims upon the cleanup are distinct, we
analyze them separately.

II. The “Inactive” Waste Pits and RCRA Compliance

[6] Although MESS’s complaint sought various
forms of injunctive relief, MESS now seeks primarily to
compel McClellan’s compliance with RCRA’s individual
reporting and permitting requirements, in addition to the
Interagency Agreement’s comprehensive requirements.”
MESS argues that, in seeking such relief, it does not
challenge the CERCLA cleanup plan.

[7] We agree with McClellan, however, that such
relief would constitute the kind of interference with the
cleanup plan that Congress sought to avoid or delay by
the enactment of Section 113(h). The Interagency Agree-
ment now integrates RCRA obligations into its own
reporting requirements. The parties to the Agreement
deemed those reporting requirements to be sufficient;
MESS clearly wants more. The additional reporting
requirements that MESS would have us impose would
second-guess the parties’ determination and thus inter-
fere with the remedial actions selected under CERCLA
Section 104.

[8] To an even greater degree, an injunction or dec-
laration requiring McClellan to comply with RCRA per-
mitting requirements would also interfere with the

7 42 U.S.C. § 6930 (RCRA § 1031) requires the operator of a
hazardous waste treatment, storage or disposal facility to file
specific reports: 42 U.S.C. § 6925 (RCRA § 1026) requires a
permit for any such facility.

App. 15

CERCLA cleanup. As McClellan points out, the entire
purpose of a permit requirement is to allow the regulat-
ing agency to impose requirements as a condition of the
permit. The injection of new requirements for dealing
with the inactive sites that are now subject to the
CERCLA cleanup (or McClellan’s defense against imposi-
tion of such requirements) would clearly interfere with
the cleanup.

[9] It is true, as MESS argues, that every action that
increases the cost of a cleanup or diverts resources or
personnel from it does not thereby become a “challenge”
to the cleanup. The enforcement of minimum wage
requirements, for example, might increase the cost of
cleanup and even divert personnel from cleanup duties
without becoming a challenge to the cleanup. MESS’s
lawsuit, however, is far more directly related to the goals
of the cleanup itself than is the hypothetical minimum
wage action. MESS, for all practical purposes, seeks to
improve on the CERCLA cleanup as embodied in the
Interagency Agreement. Its action qualifies as a “chal-
lenge” to the cleanup.

III. Inactive Waste Pits and Clean Water Act Compli-
ance

MESS alleges, and McClellan does not dispute, that
contaminants from the inactive pits continue to leach
downward into groundwater beneath the Base. This
leaching, according to MESS, constitutes a “point dis-
charge” of pollutants into “waters of the United States”
which, without an authorization permit, violates 33
U.S.C. § 1311 (Clean Water Act). MESS would require

App. 16

McClellan to procure a Clean Water Act permit authoriz-
ing all leaching from the inactive pits. The relief sought
would also compel McClellan’s compliance with individ-
ual state notification requirements for contaminant dis-
charge. Absent the permit and compliance. MESS would
prohibit any discharges.

[10] McClellan has amply demonstrated that the
leaching in question is closely connected to the CERCLA
action. The leaching process is a necessary component of
the CERCLA plan’s groundwater extraction system,
which was designed to prevent migration of contami-
nants away from McClellan. Any delay or interruption of
the process will slow the cleanup action, a result that
Congress sought to avoid in enacting Section 113(h). The
district court found that claims focusing on the ground-
water underlying the Base were “directed at an integral
part of the cleanup and, as such, may not be sustained
until cleanup is completed.” We agree with the district
court that MESS’s Clean Water Act and state water law
claims, as they pertain to leaching of contaminants, are
challenges to the continuing CERCLA response and are
consequently beyond federal jurisdiction.

A slightly different question exists with regard to
McClellan’s alleged discharges of pollutants into surface
waters. MESS asserts in its complaint that contaminants
from the inactive pits discharge laterally, through
perched groundwater, seeps and pipes, into the Magpie
Creek at points where it crosses the Base. McClellan
responds that because the sources of the alleged contami-
nants, the inactive pits, are subjects of the CERCLA
response action and its attendant Management Action

|

App. 17

Plan, the surface water contamination claims also should
be barred. We agree.

[11] The source of the alleged surface water contam-
inants is not dispositive of MESS’s claim. What is disposi-
tive, however, is the court’s inability to fashion any
remedy that would not interfere with McClellan’s
CERCLA groundwater extraction system. While the con-
taminants allegedly destined for Magpie Creek are mov-
ing laterally through the soil, unlike the downward-
leaching pollutants, it is impossible to require any Clean
Water Act compliance measure to remedy lateral contami-
nant discharges from the pits that would not actively
“challenge” CERCLA activities directed at remedying the
downward discharges. MESS’s claims pertaining to dis-
charge via seepage and pipes into Magpie Creek therefore
are excluded from federal court jurisdiction.

IV. McClellan’s Current Operations

[12] MESS also claims that “current operations” at
McClellan are not in compliance with RCRA permitting
requirements. We accept the district court’s determina-
tion that the Interagencv Agreement does not cover
McClellan’s active sites. Findings and Determination RE:
Jurisdiction, p. 26, Section 113 thus does not bar MESS’s
claims asserting RCRA noncompliance at those active
sites. Some dispute existed between the parties both in
briefing and at oral argument over what the term “cur-
rent operations” included. In order to clarify the limits of
our holding, we also adopt the district court’s character-
ization of “current operations” as those involving active

App. 18

waste treatment and storage sites not covered by the
Interagency Agreement.

[13] When the district court entered its original
judgment, it purported to determine all claims. Because
the jurisdictional bar of Section 113(h) of CERCLA had
not been asserted before the district court at that time, the
court did not differentiate in its opinions between those
sites that were subject to the CERCLA cleanup plan and
those “active” sites that were not. It is accordingly not
clear to us now just what claims remain relating to the
“active” sites not covered by the cleanup plan, and what
disposition, if any, the district court already may have
made of those claims.

[14] That determination is a difficult one no matter
who makes it. We conclude, however, that the district
court is in the best position to secure the active participa-
tion of the litigants in determining exactly what, if any-
thing, is left of this case. We therefore remand the matter
to the district court for determinations concerning: (1) the
extent of MESS’s claims not precluded by Section 113(h)
of CERCLA or otherwise abandoned; (2) the degree to
which the district court has already ruled on those claims;
and (3) any further determinations (with or without evi-
dentiary proceedings) that the district court deems
appropriate or necessary to dispose of this case and enter
a new final judgment.

CONCLUSION

The district court correctly determined that CERCLA
Section 113(h) withholds federal jurisdiction to review
citizen suits and actions brought under other, non-

App. 19

CERCLA statutes that challenge ongoing CERCLA
cleanup actions. The court was also correct in finding that
all of MESS’s claims for relief connected with McClellan’s
inactive pits and sites were challenges to McClellan’s
CERCLA cleanup. Finally, we accept the district court's
determination that MESS’s claims against the active
waste storage sites are not barred by Section 113(h).

We vacate the original judgment of the district court
and remand this matter to the district court with instruc-
tions to dismiss MESS’s claims relating to the inactive
sites for lack of jurisdiction, and to conduct any further
proceedings the district court deems necessary or appro-
priate to resolve and enter final judgment regarding
MESS’s claims relating to active sites. Each party will
bear its own costs.

VACATED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUC-
TIONS.

App. 20

McCLELLAN ECOLOGICAL SEEPAGE SITUATION
(MESS), Mary Fisher, Charles and Sandy Yarbrough,
Plaintiffs,

V.

Caspar Willard WEINBERGER, Secretary of the United
States Department of Defense, Defendant.

No. CIV S-86-475-RAR.

United States District Court,
E.D. California.

Dec. 9, 1986.

Claim was brought against Secretary of Defense for
various types of relief from air force base’s alleged viola-
tion of certain provisions of Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act and Clean Water Act. Government move to
dismiss. The District Court, Ramirez, J., held that United
States had not waived sovereign immunity regarding
imposition of civil penalties against federal facilities
under either statute.

Motion granted.

Michael Axline, John E. Bonine, Western Natural
Resources Law Clinic, University of Oregon School of
Law, Eugene, Or., Victor Sher, San Francisco, Cal., Step-
hen L. Samuels, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C.,
for plaintiffs.

F. Henry Habicht II, Asst. Atty. Gen., Stephen L.
Samuels, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., Peter A.
Nowinski, U.S. Atty., Yoshinori H.T. Himel, Asst. U.S.
Atty., Sacramento, Cal., for defendant.

App. 21

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION
OF DEFENDANT TO DISMISS CLAIM
FOR CIVIL PENALTIES

RAMIREZ, District Judge.

This matter came on for hearing on November 3, 1986
on defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim for
civil penalties. The Court rendered an oral ruling grant-
ing the motion to dismiss at the conclusion of that hear-
ing, and this opinion specifically incorporates by
reference the reasons articulated in that ruling.

This action was commenced on April 23, 1986 when a
group of citizens calling themselves McClellan Ecological
Seepage Situation (“MESS”) filed a complaint against
Caspar Willard Weinberger, Secretary of the United States
Department of Defense, alleging that McClellan Air Force
Base violated certain provisions of the Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) and the Clean Water
Act (“CWA”). In the complaint, MESS seeks declaratory
relief, injunctive relief, and the payment of civil penalties.
The present motion relates only to the request for civil
penalties.

This matter involves an issue of sovereign immunity.
It is axiomatic, of course, that the United States is sover-
eign. It cannot be sued unless it consents to be sued. Block
v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 287, 103 S.Ct. 1811, 1819, 75
L.Ed.2d 840 (1983). There cannot be a waiver of sovereign
immunity unless the waiver is clear, concise, and
unequivocal. Army & Air Force Exchange Service v. Sheehan,
456 U.S. 728, 734, 102 S.Ct. 2118, 2122, 72 L.Ed.2d 520
(1982). When there is any doubt, waiver will not be
found. Waiver cannot be implied. It cannot be assumed. It

App. 22

cannot be based on speculation, surmise, or conjecture.
United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4, 89 S.Ct. 1501, 1502, 23
L.Ed.2d 52 (1969). Ambiguous language will not equate to
waiver. Any limitation on the United States’ consent to be
sued must be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign
and may not be modified by implication. Ruckelshaus v.
Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 683-85, 103 S.Ct. 3274, 3276-77,
77 L.Ed.2d 938 (1983).

In this case, there are four potential areas for waiver
of sovereign immunity, two under RCRA and two under
the Clean Water Act. Turning first to RCRA, the relevant
provisions are the federal facilities provision set forth in
RCRA § 6001, 42 U.S.C. § 6961, and the citizen suit
provision in RCRA § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972.

The RCRA federal facilities provision states in rele-
vant part that federal agencies shall be subject to and
comply with “all Federal, State, interstate, and local
requirements, both substantive and procedural (including
any requirement for permits or reporting or any provi-
sions for injunctive relief and such sanctions as may be
imposed by a court to enforce such relief).” The plain
face, common-sense reading of this provision convinces
this Court that there has not been a waiver of sovereign
immunity regarding the imposition of civil penalties
against federal facilities under RCRA. The plain face
reading of this legislation demonstrates that Congress

intended to waive sovereign immunity on behalf of the
United States, insofar as process or sanctions is con-
cerned, only as required for the enforcement of injunctive
relief. As argued by the government in its moving papers,
this language infers, implies, and requires a preexisting
order of the Court to be enforced - no more, no less.

App. 23

The Court recognizes that this is an issue of first
impression. There are several cases that do not speci-
fically and succinctly apply to the facts but are neverthe-
less instructive, and therefore the Court will make brief
reference to them.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision in California v. Walters,
751 F.2d 977 (9th Cir.1984), is the only case to examine
RCRA § 6001 in the context of waiver of immunity for
criminal penalties. The Court, in finding no wavier, speci-
fically found that RCRA § 6001 plainly waives immunity
to sanctions but only as imposed to enforce injunctive
relief. What is significant is the Court’s statement that
“this only makes more conspicuous its failure to waive
immunity to criminal sanctions.” 751 F.2d at 978. While
Walters is not directly on point since it does not involve
civil penalties or a citizen suit, a waiver is a waiver
whether it be for criminal and/or civil penalties.

That leads to an even more instructive case, Meyer v.
United States Coast Guard, 644 F.Supp. 221 (E.D.N.C.1986),
wherein Judge Britt, again reviewing RCRA § 6001, found
that there has not been a clear and unambiguous waiver
on behalf of the United States regarding the imposition of
fines and/or other civil penalties. Meyer, unlike Walters,
dealt specifically with civil penalties as opposed to crimi-
nal penalties.

But whether or not Walters or Meyer is applicable, the
Court finds that RCRA § 6001 on its face does not provide
clearly and succinctly for a waiver of sovereign immunity

for civil penalties, and none will be implied.

App. 24

We turn then to MESS’ alternative argument that the
citizen suit provision, RCRA § 7002, provides the neces-
sary vehicle for waiver of sovereign immunity. Again, the
Court disagrees. While RCRA § 7002 specifically defines
“person” to include the United States for purposes of
administration of the statute and/or jurisdiction, the citi-
zen suit provision specifically refers to civil penalties
under subsections (a) and (g) of RCRA § 3008, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6928(a) and (g). A cursory review of subsections (a) and
(g), which are the federal enforcement provisions relating
to compliance orders and civil penalties, reveals that they
do not refer to the United States but to “persons.” The
Court must then take into consideration the general defi-
nition of “person” in RCRA § 1004(15), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6903(15), which seems to name everyone under the sun
save for the United States of America. The Court there-
fore adopts the reasonable interpretation set forth by the
government that indeed Congress did not intend, nor did
it legislate specifically, a waiver of sovereign immunity
for civil penalties under the citizen suit provision.

This Court cannot believe that if Congress wished to
waive immunity for civil penalties it could be so careful,
so all-knowing, so engaged in foresight and insight as to
define “person” to include the United States for purposes
of jurisdiction in the RCRA citizen suit provision, and yet
could forget, misappropriate, or be so negligent as to
decline to include the United States in its overall, all-
encompassing definition of “person” in RCRA § 1004(15),
which is applicable to compliance orders and civil penal-
ties. If I were to accept what has been espoused by
plaintiff in this case, we would have a unique and absurd
result whereby the Administrator of the Environmental

App. 25

Protection Agency would not be able to seek penalties
against the United States because the United States is not
a “person” within the meaning of RCRA § 3008(g), yet a
private citizen could seek and be awarded the imposition
of civil penalties under RCRA § 7002. If that is what
Congress intended, it certainly escapes this Court. It is
the opinion of this Court that that is not what Congress |
intended.

Rather than focusing my decision on intent per se, I
look to the face of the legislation and thereafter to the
legislative history, and I do not find the necessary clear
unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity for civil pen-
alties under RCRA.

We turn next to the Clean Water Act. And although
counsel have been very able in both their written and oral
argument, I take great exception to counsel for plaintiff
who indicates that here, at last, we have a clear enuncia-
tion of a waiver of sovereign immunity. If anything, the
mud gets muddier when we look to the Clean Water Act.

The federal facilities provision - CWA § 313(a), 33
U.S.C. § 1323(a) - is a compilation of ambiguity. The
sentence that is specifically at issue reads “the United
States shall be liable only for those civil penalties arising
under Federal law,” if there be any, “or imposed by a
State or local court to enforce an order or the process of
such court.” The use of the word “or” as advocated by
counsel for plaintiff, or the substitution of “and” for “or”
as advocated by counsel for defendant, leads to very
interesting results. If in fact a state law has been pat-
terned “i” for and “t” for “t” on federal law, under a

“sur
1

disjunctive reading of the word “or” we would have a

App. 26

scenario where civil penalties could not be applied under
state and/or local court provisions, even under a state or
local ordinance that was an exact carbon copy duplicate
of the Clean Water Act, but could be imposed under the
provisions of the Clean Water Act itself. How Congress
envisioned that to be a vehicle to end the poilution which
this country is facing escapes this Court.

On the other hand, if we were to read the phrase in
the conjunctive so that “to enforce an order or process of
such court” applies both to federal law and to state or
local court law, the sentence in itself is an absurdity — it
makes no sense whatsoever. Under that reading, the
Court does not know what to do with the terminology
“such court” since the only court mentioned is state or
local court.

Either reading, then, appears to be an absurdity. Fur-
thermore, the remainder of CWA § 313 does not waive
sovereign immunity for civil penalties for the same rea-
sons discussed in relation to RCRA § 6001.

As rightfully argued by counsel for plaintiff, Con-
gress is not held to the standard of writing its statutes in
an all-knowing and all-encompassing manner. This pro-
ceeding is not a grammar or semantics course on how to
write a statute. Rather, the Court should look to the four
corners of the statute and obtain and apply the clear
meaning of the statute. Although the Court sympathizes
with the plaintiff, that is exactly what the Court is
attempting to do. But it is not possible to find a clear
meaning to CWA § 313. Since the statute is not clear on its
face, we must look to the legislative history.

App. 27

Here, of course, we have a problem because the
Clean Water Act’s legislative history is of no assistance. If
there is any assistance for plaintiff’s position, it comes
from the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642. The
question then is do we bootstrap the legislative history of
the Clean Water Act by reference to the Clean Air Act.
The Court does not believe that that is what Congress
envisions or the Supreme Court envisions when we are
called upon to make a waiver of sovereign immunity.

As indicated earlier, a waiver of sovereign immunity
must be clear and concise and unequivocal. It will not be
based upon ambiguities. There will not be a waiver
brought about by implication or by bootstrapping or by
borrowing. That does not mean that Congress has a duty
to write a waiver in a certain or specialized way. But it
must write with a clear hand, an unequivocal hand. And
the Court must assume that the learned members of
Congress, some of whom are learned members of various
bars, can say waiver of sovereign immunity for civil
penalties just as easily as any eighth grader writing the
same type of legislation. They have not done that.
Instead, they have inserted conjunctive and disjunctive
references that bring about absurd and contradictory
results. From this absurdity and contradiction, the Court
is asked to capture reason. It cannot.

Since the Court cannot capture reason from the writ-
ten word, I have to conclude that plaintiff has not met its
burden of demonstrating a waiver of sovereign immunity.

Similarly, with respect to the citizen suit provision of
the Clean Water Act -- CWA § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) -
for the very same reasons that the Court finds no waiver

App. 28

in the citizen suit provision of RCRA, there is no waiver
in the Clean Water Act. Again, there is a definition of
“person” that includes the United States in the jurisdic-
tional provision of CWA § 505(a). And again, CWA
§ 505(a) refers to another civil penalties provision, CWA
§ 309(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d). And again, there is an all-
encompassing introductory definition - CWA § 502(5), 33
U.S.C. § 1362(5) - which defines “person” as everybody
under the sun save for the United States.

This Court believes that although for twenty years
Congress has been attempting to raise some definite
reliance and response by federal facilities to get in line to
clean up their water, air, etcetera, it has been very slow
and cautious in its movements. Congress has finally got-
ten to the point where it has waived sovereign immunity
so as to force federal facilities to be brought into compli-
ance by way of injunctive relief only. It has not jumped
the magical line, however, and waived sovereign immu-
nity for purposes other than injunctive relief. Congress
could easily have stated that federal facilities would be
liable not only to injunctive relief but also to civil or
criminal penalties. It is easier written than said. It is not
written.

Defendant's motion to dismiss that portion of the
complaint praying for civil penalties both under RCRA
and the Clean Water Act is therefore granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

App. 29

McCLELLAN ECOLOGICAL SEEPAGE
SITUATION (MESS), Mary Fisher, Charles and
Sandy Yarbrough, Plaintiffs,

Vv.

Caspar Willard WEINBERGER, Secretary of the
United States Department of Defense, Defendant.

No. CIV S-86-475-RAR.

United States District Court,
E.D. California.

June 20, 1988.

Group of concerned citizens who lived near Air Force
base brought action against Secretary of Department of
Defense, alleging that base’s practices and procedures
with respect to industrial and domestic wastes violated
and threatened to violate various environmental laws. On
cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court,
Ramirez, J., held that: (1) claim for injunctive relief from
use of treated waste-water in cooling towers was moot;
(2) court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act citizen suit pro-
vision over counts alleging violations of California solid
waste laws; (3) state statutory and regulatory provisions
referred to in other counts did not constitute “require-
ments” as that term was used in Clean Water Act waiver
of sovereign immunity provision, and court lacked juris-
diction over those counts under Act's citizen suit provi-
sion because provisions involved were not “effluent
standards or limitations”; and (4) court would follow
strict jurisdictional approach to notice provisions of envi-

ronmental statutes.

App. 30

Motions granted in part and denied in part.

Michael Axeline, Western Natural Resources Law
Clinic, Eugene, Or., for plaintiffs.

Steve Samuels, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington,
D.C., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

RAMIREZ, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

On April 23, 1986, plaintiffs McClellan Ecological
Seepage Situation, Mary Fisher, and Charles and Sandy
Yarbrough (hereinafter “MESS”) brought this action seek-
ing declaratory and injunctive relief as well as civil penal-
ties against the Secretary of the Department of Defense
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987; the Clean Water Act
(“CWA”), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376; California hazardous
waste laws; and California water quality laws. The com-
plaint, which originally included twenty-three counts,
alleges violations of those statutes by McClellan Air Force
Base (“McClellan”) in Sacramento, California. On Decem-
ber 9, 1986, this Court granted the Government’s motion
to dismiss MESS’ request for civil penalties. McClellan
Ecologica! Seepage Situation v. Weinberger, 655 F.Supp. 601
(&.D.Cal.1986). Moreover, by stipulation and order,
Counts 1, 4(A), 7, and 19(C) of the complaint have been
dismissed without prejudice. (Orders dated August 4,
1987 and September 25, 1987.)

App. 31

On July 2, 1987, MESS filed a motion for partial
summary judgment with respect to Counts 2, 3, 4(B and
C), 6, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 22, and 23 of its complaint.
On October 26, 1987, the Government filed a motion for
summary judgment, which relates to all counts of the
complaint except those previously dismissed by stipula-
tion and order. After full briefing of the cross-motions for
summary judgment, oral argument was held on February
8, 1988. At the conclusion of the argument, the Court
ruled from the bench on the cross-motions. This mem-
orandum opinion formalizes that bench ruling.

MESS is a group of concerned citizens who live near
McClellan Air Force Base. McClellan is a major aircraft
maintenance facility operated by the Department of
Defense. In its complaint, MESS alleges that McClellan’s
practices and procedures with respect to industrial and
domestic wastes have violated and threaten to violate
various environmental laws. Specifically, MESS alleges
that McClellan’s generation, treatment, and disposal of
wastes are in conflict with RCRA (Counts 2 through 5);
provisions of the California Health and Safety Code
(Counts 6 through 11 and 21); the Clean Water Act
(Counts 12 through 15, 22, and 23); provisions of the
California Water Code (Counts 16 through 19); and the
California Fish and Game Code (Count 20). Counts 2
through 11 are brought under the citizen suit provision of
RCRA, RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A),
and Counts 12 through 23 are brought under the citizen
suit provision of the Clean Water Act, CWA § 505(a)(1), 33
U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1).!

1 On April 1, 1988, the Court granted MESS’ motion for
leave to file an amended complaint. The amended complaint

App. 32

By agreement of counsel and the Court, proceedings
in this action were bifurcated. The present round of
motions for summary judgment involves purely legal
issues, undisputed facts, or facts the development of
which have not required extensive discovery. Any issues
not resolved in this round of motions will be subject to
additional discovery and a second round of motions for
summary judgment at a later date.

This opinion will address the remaining counts in
MESS’ complaint one-by-one. Each major section below
(RCRA and the Clean Water Act) will be preceded by a
brief overview of the relevant statutory provisions.

CLAIMS BROUGHT UNDER RCRA

Subtitle C of RCRA creates a “cradle-to-grave” man-
agement system which is intended to ensure that hazard-
ous wastes are safely treated, stored, and disposed of
after November 19, 1980. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6934. Section
3005 of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6925, requires facilities that
treat, store, or dispose of hazardous waste after Novem-
ber 19, 1980 to obtain a permit from EPA or from a state
authorized by EPA to administer its own hazardous
waste program. There are two parts to a permit applica-
tion — Part A and Part B. Part A requires general back-
ground information regarding the management of
hazardous wastes at a facility, while Part B requires a
much more extensive report. See 40 C.F.R. § 270.14.

adds a cause of action based upon the Administrative Procedure
Act. However, Counts 2 through 23 of the amended complaint
are identical to Counts 2 through 23 of the original complaint.

seri ioe eared

App. 33

Congress recognized that if every hazardous waste
management facility in existence on November 19, 1980
was immediately subject to the permit requirements of
RCRA, a bureaucratic nightmare would exist for the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), the agency
charged with administering RCRA in coordination with
the states. Therefore, in order to provide for an ample
amount of time to set up the administrative machinery
necessary to accommodate all the requirements of RCRA,
Congress established a program of interim status for
facilities already in operation, such as McClellan. Under
this program, certain existing hazardous waste manage-
ment facilities are treated as having been issued a RCRA
permit until final administrative disposition of their per-
mit applications can be made. RCRA § 3005(e), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6925(e).

,

In order to obtain this “interim status,” a hazardous
waste management facility must fulfill three conditions.
See RCRA § 3005(e)(1). First, the facility must have been
in existence on November 19, 1980 or on the effective
date of the statutory or regulatory changes which render
the facility subject to the permit requirement. Second,
where applicable, the owner or operator must have sub-
mitted preliminary notification to EPA stating the loca-
tion and general description of its hazardous waste
activity and listing the hazardous wastes involved in its
operation. Finally, the owner or operator must have
applied for a permit under RCRA § 3005. EPA has inter-
preted this third condition as requiring submission only
of Part A of the permit application; Part B is submitted
when EPA initiates the final permitting process for an
individual facility. 40 C.F.R. § 270.1(b). Facilities with

App. 34

interim status must comply with self-implementing tech-
nical standards that are analogous to but less stringent
than the standards for permitted facilities. See 40 C.F.R.
Part 270.1(b) and Part 265.

Congress was also concerned that the Federal gov-
ernment might not be able to administer the RCRA pro-
gram effectively in all states. Accordingly, Congress
enacted provisions which allow the various states to
receive full or partial authorization to administer their
own hazardous waste programs “in lieu of” the Federal
program. Specifically, section 3006 of RCRA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6926, provides that any state wishing to administer and
enforce a hazardous waste program under RCRA may
apply to the EPA Administrator for authorization. If the
Administrator determines that the state program satisfies
specified standards, the state is authorized to administer
its program “in lieu of” ‘ie federal program. California
received partial interim authorization in 1981 and 1983
but that authorization expired on January 31, 1986. 51
Fed.Reg. 4128 (Jan. 31, 1986).

Congress also provided for a limited waiver of sover-
eign immunity in RCRA. Specifically, section 6001 of
RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6961, provides that facilities operated
by the federal government are subjected to all federal,
state, interstate, and local “requirements” respecting the
control and abatement of solid waste or hazardous waste
disposal. Moreover, section 7002(a) of RCRA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a), authorizes any person to commence a civil
action against any other person, including the United
States, who is alleged to be in violation of an obligation
“which has become effective pursuant to” RCRA. How-
ever, such a citizen suit may be maintained only if the

App. 35

plaintiff has provided sixty days notice of its claims to the
alleged violator, the state, and EPA. RCRA § 7002(b)(1).

Waivers of sovereign immunity, of course, are not to
be liberally interpreted. As this Court previously stated
in dismissing MESS’ claim for civil penalties, the United
States cannot be sued unless it consents to be sued. Block
v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 287, 103 S.Ct. 1811, 1819, 75
L.Ed.2d 840 (1983). There cannot be a waiver of sovereign
immunity unless the waiver is clear, concise, and
unequivocal. Army & Air Force Exchange Service v. Sheehan,
456 U.S. 728, 734, 102 S.Ct. 2118, 2122, 72 L.Ed.2d 520
(1982). When there is any doubt, waiver will not be
found. Waiver cannot be implied. It cannot be assumed. It
cannot be based on speculation, surmise, or conjecture.
United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4, 89 S.Ct. 1501, 1502, 23
L.Ed.2d 52 (1969). Ambiguous language will not equate to
waiver. Any limitation on the United States’ consent to be
sued must be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign
and may not be modified by implication. Ruckelshaus v.
Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 683-85, 103 S.Ct. 3274, 3276-77,
77 L.Ed.2d 938 (1983).

Count 2 —- RCRA § 3005(a)

In Count 2 of the complaint, MESS alleges that
McClellan has violated section 3005(a) of RCRA. That
section prohibits the treatment, storage, or disposal of
hazardous wastes after the effective date of regulations
promulgated by EPA, except in accordance with a permit.
MESS asserts that McClellan “has been discharging, stor-
ing, and treating hazardous wastes without a permit to
do so since November 19, 1980, when the regulations
identifying the characteristics of hazardous wastes (40

App. 36

C.F.R. § 261.31) became effective.” Complaint { 45. Speci-
fically, MESS contends that McClellan’s Part A applica-
tion did not mention “storage of hazardous wastes in the
base cooling system and in unlined underground burial
pits” (MESS Memorandum at 21) and that McClellan
therefore lacks interim status with respect to those sites.

Cooling Towers

With respect to the cooling towers, McClellan states
that in the past it has used treated wastewater from the
base’s reclamation system in approximately one hundred
cooling towers that are used to cool buildings on the
base. The treated wastewater was circulated through the
cooling towers and then returned to the treatment facility.
However, that practice was discontinued in October 1985
with respect to most of the cooling towers and in March
1986 — one month prior to the filing of the present suit -
with respect to the remaining cooling towers. See Affi-
davit of Paul G. Brunner, attached to McClellan’s motion
for summary judgment, { 8. MESS does not dispute
McClellan’s assertion that it has not used any treated
wastewater in the cooling towers since March 1986.

McClellan’s termination of the use of treated waste-
water in the cooling towers makes Count 2 moot insofar
as it relates to the towers. The citizen suit provisions of
RCRA and the Clean Water Act are forward-looking; they
are intended to remedy present and future harmful
impacts, not conduct that has occurred entirely in the

past and cannot reasonably be expected to result in future
harm.

App. 37

The Supreme Court recently addressed the purposes
of the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act in
Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49, 108
S.Ct. 376, 98 L.Ed.2d 306 (1987). For present purposes,
that provision is almost identical to the RCRA citizen suit
provision. Based upon the actual language of that provi-
sion as well as the definition of “citizen,” the Court
concluded that “the harm sought to be addressed by the
citizen suit lies in the present or the future, not in the
past.” 108 S.Ct. at 382. In order for a district court to have
jurisdiction over a citizen suit claim, the Court con-
cluded, the underlying complaint must contain a good-
faith allegation that the conduct complained of is
continuing in nature.

Here, the conduct complained of - use of treated
wastewater in the cooling towers — was discontinued one
month prior to the filing of the complaint. Therefore, the
question might arise whether MESS’ allegation that the
conduct was continuing as of April 1986 was made in
good faith. I need not reach that issue, however, because
even where there is a good-faith allegation of a continu-
ing violation, the claim might be moot where that allega-
tion turns out to be in error. As the Supreme Court stated
in Gwaltney;

Longstanding principles of mootness .

prevent the maintenance of suit when ” ‘there is
no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be
repeated.’ ” United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345
U.S. 629, 633, 73 S.Ct. 894, 897, 97 L.Ed. 1303
(1953) (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416, 448 (CA2 1945). In seeking
to have a case dismissed as moot, however, the
defendant’s burden “is a heavy one.” 345 U.S.,

App. 38

at 633, 73 S.Ct., at 897. The defendant must
demonstrate that it is “absolutely clear that the
allegedly wrongful behavior could not reason-
ably be expected to recur.” United States v. Phos-
phate Export Assn., Inc., 393 U.S. 199, 203, 89
S.Ct. 361, 364, 21 L.Ed.2d 344 (1968).

108 S.Ct. at 386 (emphasis added by Gwaltney Court).

The Court concludes that the Government here has
met the heavy burden of demonstrating mootness.
McClellan has provided evidence by means of the Brun-
ner affidavit - and MESS has not disputed that evidence -
that it has not used treated wastewater in the cooling
towers for nearly two years. There is simply no reason to
believe that McClellan has any intention of using treated
wastewater in the cooling towers any time in the future.
Accordingly, the Court grants the Government’s motion
for summary judgment on that part of Count 2 that seeks
injunctive relief with respect to the use of treated waste-
water in the cooling towers.

MESS has also requested declaratory relief on this
and all other issues. The Court is not prepared to rule at
this time on whether declaratory relief is appropriate
with respect to claims that are dismissed on mootness
grounds. Instead, the Court will ask that the parties brief
that issue in the context of the next round of dispositive
motions in this proceeding.

Waste Pits

MESS also alleges that McClellan is storing hazard-
ous wastes in unlined waste pits in violation of RCRA.
The crux of MESS’ contention is that McClellan’s Part A

App. 39

application did not mention certain unlined burial pits on
the base and therefore McClellan does not have interim
status with respect to those pits. The Government’s posi-
tion is that all the waste pits not identified in its Part A
have been inactive since at least November 19, 1980 and
ther “>re a RCRA permit is not required with respect to
those disposal sites.

RCRA is not a model of clarity in this respect. On the
one hand, certain provisions suggest that the permit
requirements are intended to apply only to the treatment,
storage, or disposal of hazardous wastes occurring after
November 19, 1980, the effective date of the RCRA imple-
menting regulations. Section 3005(a) of RCRA specifically
requires permits only for the management of hazardous
wastes “after such date” that EPA’s permit regulations
take effect. In addition, EPA’s regulations provide that
permits are requ

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386012_1695%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
