# Opposition Brief — Ball v. Gasho

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1995
- **Citation:** 515 U.S. 1144

## Text

—-

Suarem Court, U.S.
Sia ED

po Pwete

No. 94-1777

In the :
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1994

WILLIAM L. BALL; ROGER MANNHALTER:
JOHN J. HOWE, JR.,
Petitioners,

v.
JOHN R. GASHO, SR.; SHARON L. GASHO,
Respondents.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Ninth Circuit

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Christine R. Taradash

Maria Crimi Speth*

Beus, Gilbert & Morrill, P.L.L.C.
3200 North Central Avenue

1000 Great American Tower
Phoenix, AZ 85012-2417
Counsel for Respondents

*Counsel of Record

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Consistent with this Court’s decisions in Harlaw v.
Fitzgerald, 475 U.S. 800 (1982), and Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635 (1987), the Ninth Circuit determined that the
Customs Agents were not entitled to qualified immunity
because, based on clearly established law, no reasonable
Customs agent could have believed that there was probable
cause to arrest John and Sharon Gasho. Thus, this case
presents the following questions:

1. Whether Petitioners’ argument that the Ninth Circuit
did not apply an objective standard of reasonableness to
determine the qualified immunity issue is frivolous.

2. Whether Petitioners’ argument that the Ninth Circuit
did not apply clearly established principles of constitutional
law to defeat Petitioners’ qualified immunity defense is
frivolous.

iil

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
eu yy eB) rere a i
TARE GP ALTE cc beck cenwseuwes iv

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

DEVEINED wnowcaveecetateke uta 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........ccese- 3
A. See ee in ve bv kA Oe ee 3
B. District Court Proceedings ....... ee: 9
CG. Fee Gee Se ks obs a we bee eee 10
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT ........ 12

I. PETITIONERS’ ARGUMENT THAT THE NINTH
CIRCUIT’S DECISION IS INCONSISTENT WITH
RULINGS OF THIS COURT IS FRIVOLOUS .. 12

A. The Ninth Circuit Properly Applied an Objective
Standard to Determine the Qualified Immunity
WR ac cctadnbusdseee bane 12

B. The Ninth Circuit Clearly and Expressly Articu-
lated the Specific Constitutional Right at Issue
and Properly Held that Based on Clearly
Established Law the Officers Were Not Entitled
to Qualified Immunity ............... 15

iil
Il. THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
WAS FILED SOLEY TO DELAY PROCEEDINGS

LONG ENOUGH TO BAR THE BIVENS
GEE SRE Soho eee w es ces Hester 22

iV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635
EE a Bou ae eee a a ihe 12, 15, 19, 20

Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents,
ee ee: Ge OE es os 0 es re we 9

Duran v. City of Douglas, 904 F.2d 1372
I St ho oa 0 eee ee wee 18

Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991) .......... 17

Gasho v. United States, 39 F.2d 1420

RI ge hos otha is oe. a ae passim
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 475 U.S. 800 (1982) ..... 4. 33
Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987) ............ 18
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224(1991) .......... 20

United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343
URE ig Ur Ae A er 17, 18

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Se ais a te a ea eae a
th Be” Sl CS 9, 15, 18, 19, 21
OR Re OS | er er rr a ae ee 9

ee eT

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Continued)

STATUTES Page
ee Se 5 a 4 OR oe OA ee 8,9
ea EE 4 6 6 Oe CK Ra eee 10
Oe an EE 4 Oe ek eee eee 2, 10, 20
- Gk io 0 ee eee eee re 2, 9, 20
ee ee Oe 8S eb 4 ee dea 9
ee ees EE bck beeen es 2, 9, 10, 22
og Fe | ear are Ur a 6

REGULATIONS AND RULES

Rule 41(b), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure ... 23
Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ..... 9
Rule 42.2, Rules of the Supreme Court of

Re ee rar as ie ee ee ee 25

In the
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1994

WILLIAM L. BALL; ROGER MANNHALTER;
JOHN J. HOWE, JR.,
Petitioners,
v.
JOHN R. GASHO, SR.; SHARON L. GASHO,
Respondents.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Ninth Circuit

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

TO THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT:

Respondents John R. Gasho, Sr. and Sharon L. Gasho
respectfully request that this Court deny the Petition for Writ
of Certiorari submitted by Petitioners William L. Ball, Roger
Mannhalter, and John J. Howe, Jr.

2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED

In addition to the constitutional and statutory provisions
cited by Petitioners, Respondents refer this Court to the
Statutory provisions cited below.

Title 18, Section 2233, of the United States Code
provides:

Rescue of seized property.

Whoever forcibly rescues, dispossesses, or attempts
to rescue or dispossess any property, articles, or
objects after the same shall have been taken,
detained, or seized by any officer or other person
under the authority of any revenue law of the United
States, or by any person authorized to make searches
and seizures, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.

Title 28, Section 2676, of the United States Code
provides:

Judgment as bar.

The judgment in an action under section 1346(b) of
this title shall constitute a complete bar to any action
by the claimant, by reason of the same subject
Matter, against the employee of the government
whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.

3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Factual Statement.

John and Sharon Gasho own an aircraft restoration
company in Tucson, Arizona. On June 24, 1988, the Gashos
flew a McDonnell Douglas DC-3 aircraft from Tucson to the
Scottsdale Municipal Airport in order to meet with John
Zarcone, a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
inspector.' The Gashos were selling the aircraft to
Millardair, Ltd., a Canadian corporation, and needed to
terminate the United States registration of the aircraft before
export.

At the airport, Zarcone issued the Gashos several docu-
ments, including a Special Flight Authorization allowing the
aircraft to be flown to the United States-Canada border with
Canadian registry markings. The Special Flight Author-
ization stated that Canada would not issue a valid Canadian
registration until the aircraft actually entered into Canada.
Millardair had applied to Canadian authorities for a Canadian
registration and had been assigned a Canadian number:
however, official registration was contingent upon the
aircraft's entry into Canada.

The Gashos with the assistance of Zarcone removed the
U.S. registration markings and affixed the Canadian

' There is absolutely no evidence that John and Sharon Gasho have
ever participated in smuggling contraband across the United States-
Mexico border. In fact, the Customs Service concluded after their
investigation of the Gashos that they are honest, law abiding citizens who
are “as clean as a whistle."

4

markings to the aircraft. The Gashos then returned to their
room at a nearby hotel in Scottsdale, Arizona. It was the
Gashos’ intention to return to Tucson the following day to
await issuance of a provisional certificate of registration and
flight permit before exporting the aircraft to Canada.

Later that day, an air traffic controller at the airport
noticed that the registration markings on the aircraft had been
changed after its arrival. He alerted William Gately, the
Customs agent in charge. Based solely on the report of the
air traffic controller and without any further investigation,
Gately, Special Agent William Ball and others decided that
"the aircraft would not be permitted to depart, and should be
seized because of registration irregularities." Gately dis-
patched Special Agents Ball and Roger Mannhalter to investi-
gate.

2 Gately claims that he telephoned a friend, Corporal Karol
Waversfeld of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in Vancouver. Gately
claims Waversfeld told him the registration markings were invalid prior
to seizure of the aircraft. Waversfeld gave a different account in a
deposition. He testified that Lorraine Gray of the Canadian Transport
Ministry in Toronto told him thai an application for Canadian registry
was pending and that the numbers could not be used in Canada until the
application was approved. Waversfeld testified that he relayed this
information to Gately or his representative. There is also a dispute
regarding when the information was relayed to Gately. Petitioners claim
that Gately knew the information before the seizure of the aircraft.
Waversfeld, however, testified that he could not have called Gray on the
afternoon of June 24, 1988, because there is a four hour time difference
between Vancouver and Toronto and therefore Gray would not have been
at her office when Waversfeld received the call from Gately in the
afternoon of June 24, 1988.

5

The Customs Agents learned from officials at the
Scottsdale Airport that the Gashos were staying at a local
hotel. The Customs Agents easily located the Gashos at the
hotel. When the Agents confronted the Gashos at their hotel
room, John Gasho explained the ownership history of the
aircraft, that he obtained the Canadian registry markings
from the aircraft’s owner, Millardair, and that the FAA
inspector John Zarcone had assisted in changing the regis-
tration markings. He explained that the FAA issued several
documents, including a special authorization permit, which
was inside the aircraft, allowing the aircraft to be flown to
Canada. After hearing John Gasho’s explanation, Customs
Service Pilot Will Willbanks, who was also present at the
hotel, informed Agents Ball and Mannhalter that the proce-
dure described by John Gasho for changing registration
markings before export was consistent with the customary
FAA procedures for exporting an aircraft to Canada. Never-
theless, Agent Ball advised John Gasho of his Miranda
rights. The Gashos then summoned their daughter, Pamela
Vining, a Phoenix attorney, for legal counsel.

At this point, the Agents, the Gashos and Vining went to
Scottsdale airfield. At the airport, the Gashos showed the
Customs Agents the documents issued by the FAA, including
the Special Flight Authorization allowing them to fly the
aircraft with Canadian markings. The Special Flight Author-
ization signed by Zarcone expressly provided that the aircraft
could display the foreign (Canadian) registration markings
for the purpose of flying the plane to the Canadian border
and that "the aircraft . . . had a current and valid standard
airworthiness certificate . . . but will not be issued a current

6

and valid Canadian airworthiness certificate until after its
entry into Canada.”

While the documentation expressly provided that the
aircraft was authorized by the FAA to fly with the Canadian
markings within the United States, the Agents decided that
the documents did not establish the validity of the Canadian
markings. The Agents placed a lock on the aircraft's
propeller, claiming they had probable cause to seize the
aircraft for the "knowing[ ] and willful[ |" display of "false
or misleading” markings, in vioiation of 49 U.S.C. § 1472.

After seizing the aircraft, the Customs Agents gave
Sharon Gasho permission to enter the aircraft to remove
personal belongings and the aircraft's radio. The Customs
Agents did not tell her that anv items inside the aircraft were
seized. Among the items she removed were the aircraft’s
logbooks. Sharon Gasho then exited the aircraft, carrying
the items in a plastic bag. At that time, John Gasho and the
Customs Agents were standing on the tarmac near the air-
craft. In the presence of the Customs Agents, John Gasho
called out to his wife in a loud, clear voice and asked her
whether she removed the logbooks. She replied, "Yes, |
did." Sharon Gasho then placed the plastic grocery bag
containing the logbooks and other personal belongings into
Vining’s automobile. Neither Agent Ball nor Agent
Mannhalter made any effort, either physical or verbal, to
stop Sharon Gasho from removing the logbooks and placing
them in the vehicle. In a deposition, Agent Ball was cross-
examined as follows:

Q. Did you stop her at that time?

A. No.

Q. Did you say anything to her at that time?

A. No.

Q. Did you protest in any way?

A. No.

Q. All right. What happened next?

A. Shortly thereafter we went inside the aviation center.

The subject of the logbooks was not raised until after the
parties entered the Scottsdale Aviation Center to make photo-
copies of the FAA documents. Ball and the other Agents
then told the Gashos that the seizure of the aircraft included
the logbooks and demanded that the Gashos return them.°
When Agent Ball threatened to search the vehicle, the
Gashos called the local police to prevent a breach of the
peace. The Agents warned the Gashos that they would be
arrested if they refused to turn over the logbooks.

3Customs Service Pilot Willbanks, who was present during the entire
play of events at the Scottsdale Airport on June 24, 1988, told Agent
Mannhalter, prior to the handcuffing of the Gashos, that the logbooks
were not a "big issue.” In fact, according to Customs Service policy,
normally logbooks are never seized with an aircraft and are not necessary
to the operation of an aircraft. Willbanks testified that the logbooks are
only important when the aircraft is put in service. However, when the
Customs Service seizes an aircraft, the logbooks are not important
because the aircraft is not put in service, but, rather, is put in a storage
facility pending forfeiture proceedings.

8

At Vining’s request, the Agents allowed Vining to meet
with the Gashos in a glass-enclosed office at the avaiation
center, where the Gashos were visible to the Customs
Agents. Immediately prior to the Gashos’ confere..ce with
Vining, Agent Ball telephoned his supervisor John Howe to
advise him of the situation. Mr. Howe ordered Agent Ball
to arrest the Gashos for theft from Customs’ custody and told
Ball that if he did not effect the arrest, he (Howe) would
come down and do it himself.

During the conference with Vining, the Gashos reached
the decision to give the logbooks to the Customs Agents.
Just as Vining was opening the office door to inform the
Agents of this decision, the Agents pushed open the door and
handcuffed the Gashos. Vining retrieved the logbooks from
her car and gave them to the Customs Agents. Although the
Gashos acquiesced in relinquishing the logbooks, the
Customs Agents handcuffed John and Sharon Gasho, unneces-
sarily paraded them through the lobby of the aviation center,
and loaded them into a squad car which transported them to
the Madison Street jail.

The Gashos were booked for violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 549, which forbids unlawful removal of property from
Customs custody. During booking, an Assistant United
States Attorney told Agent Mannhalter that his office would
not prosecute the Gashos. Nevertheless, Agent Mannhalter’s
supervisor, John Howe, ordered Mannhalter to continue the
booking process and to tell the Gashos that charges would be
filed. In October 1989, sixteen months after the arrests, the
United States Attorney formally declined to prosecute the
Gashos.

we Festina ti te aan a aa

)
B. District Court Proceedings.

The Gashos filed suit against the United States under the
FTCA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680, seeking damages
for false arrest and false imprisonment, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, and abuse of process.‘ The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the government
on the false arrest and imprisonment claims and the inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress claim. By subsequent
order, the district court dismissed the abuse of process claim
for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).

Prior to entry of judgment on the FTCA claims, the
Gashos filed suit under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal
Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), against Agents Ball
and Mannhalter, and Howe, the Agents’ supervisor. The
Gashos claimed that the Agents arrested them without
probable cause, violating their Fourth and Fifth Amendment
rights.

The defendants moved to dismiss the Bivens claims
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and also moved for
summary judgment, arguing that because of the judgment
entered in the FTCA action, 28 U.S.C. § 2676 operates as
a complete bar to the Bivens action and, alternatively, that
the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The

“The Gashos also filed a claim against Northrop Worldwide Aircraft
Services, Inc. ("Northrop") for damage incurred to the aircraft while in
Customs’ custody. The Gashos settled the claim with Northrop.

10

district court dismissed the claims, concluding that they were
barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2676.

C. Ninth Circuit Decision.

The Ninth Circuit consolidated the appeals in the FTCA
action and the Bivens action. In addressing the false arrest
claims in the FTCA action, the Ninth Circuit held that there
was no probable cause for the arrests of the Gashos under 18
U.S.C. §§ 2232 or 2233 because no agent could have
reasonably believed that the Gashos intended to steal the
logbooks from Customs’ custody or that the Gashos intended
to prevent seizure of the logbooks.* Gasho v. United States,
39 F.3d 1420, 1427-1432 (9th Cir. 1994) (Petitioners’ Brief
at pp. 7a-18a). The Ninth Circuit reasoned that no probable
Cause existed because the Agents gave the Gashos no notice
that they intended to seize the logbooks and there was no
evidence that the Gashos knew the removal of the logbooks
was forbidden. /d. The Ninth Circuit further determined
that the Gashos’ mere passive refusal to consent to a
warrantless search did not provide probable cause to arrest
the Gashos under §§ 2232 or 2233. /d.

With respect to the Bivens claims, the Ninth Circuit held
that since the judgment was reversed on the false arrest
claims in the FTCA action, the Bivens claims based on the
Gashos’ wrongful arrests were not barred by operation of 28
U.S.C. § 2676. Id. at 1437-38 (Petitioners’ Brief at pp. 29a-

° Although the Gashos were arrested under 18 U.S.C. § 549, the
United States conceded that no probable cause for the arrests existed
under § 549.

ANS

BR IY INN 8 Btls aah MIN TS ti ie a AN ET Hk

11

30a). Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Respondents
could pursue both their FTCA and Bivens claims on remand.
Id.

After finding that the Bivens claims for wrongful arrest
were not barred, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the Agents’
qualified immunity claim and found that based on clearly
established principles of constitutional law, no reasonable
agent could have believed that the Gashos’ arrests were
lawful. Jd. at 1438-39 (Petitioners’ Brief at pp. 31a-32a).
The Ninth Circuit employed a two-step analysis. First, the
plaintiff must show that a clearly establish constitutional right
exists. Second, the defendant must show that based on well
settled law, he could have believed he was not violating that
constitutional right. Jd.

Under the first step of the analysis, the Ninth Circuit
found that the Gashos had a clearly established constitutional
right to refuse consent to a warrantless seizure. Jd. The
Ninth Circuit then found that based on an objective review
of the information known to the Agents at the time of the
arrests, not on their subjective motives for the arrests, no
reasonable agent could have believed that the arrests were
lawful. Jd. The Ninth Circuit determined that the officers
should have known the arrests were unlawful because there
was no evidence the Gashos had the specific intent to prevent
Customs’ seizure of the logbooks or to steal them from
Customs’ custody. /d. The Agents had no facts to support
a belief that the Gashos knew that the logbooks were an
appurtenance to the aircraft and they should have known, in
light of the clearly established law, that the Gashos’ passive
refusal to turn over the logbooks was privileged conduct

12

which could not serve as a basis for finding criminal intent.
Id,

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

The questions of qualified immunity on which review is
sought involve no conflict with any decision of the Court.
Petitioners’ arguments to the contrary are frivolous and
imposed solely for the purpose of delaying any action on the
Bivens claims on remand to the district court. The decision
below properly applied the rulings of this Court on qualified
immunity. Consistent with Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 475 U.S.
800 (1982), the Ninth Circuit held that no reasonable officer
could have believed the arrests of the Gashos were lawful.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision is also consistent with this
Court’s ruling in Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635
(1987).

I, PETITIONERS’ ARGUMENT THAT THE NINTH
CIRCUIT’S DECISION IS INCONSISTENT WITH
RULINGS OF THIS COURT IS FRIVOLOUS.

A. The Ninth Circuit Properly Applied an Objective
Standard to Determine the Qualified Immunity
Issue.

Petitioners contend that the Ninth Circuit improperly
applied a subjective test to determine the issue of qualified
immunity. In making the argument, Petitioners completely
ignore the analysis of the Ninth Circuit on the qualified
immunity issue. Not only did the Ninth Circuit not apply a
subjective test, the court thoroughly analyzed the reasonable-

13

ness of the Agents’ conduct objectively in light of clearly
established law.°

In its decision, the Ninth Circuit pointed out that the
Gashos presented evidence that Agent Howe told another
Customs official that the Gashos were arrested because their
refusal to turn over the logbooks "made [the Agents] mad."
Gasho, 39 F.3d at 1438 (Petitioners’ Brief at p. 31a).
Petitioners point to this single sentence in the Ninth Circuit’s
Opinion to support their argument that the Ninth Circuit
applied a subjective test. Petitioners have taken this sentence
out of context and ignore the remainder of the Ninth
Circuit’s opinion wherein the court thoroughly analyzed the
Agents’ conduct in accordance with an objective standard.

Respondents argued before the Ninth Circuit that they
were arrested in retaliation for refusing to turn over the
logbooks. /d. As evidence of the Agents’ retaliation, the
Gashos cited to Agent Howe’s comment that the Gashos
"made [the Agents] mad." /d. The Ninth Circuit referred
to Howe’s comment to explain the Gashos’ argument that
they were arrested solely for refusing consent to a

* Petitioners erroneously argue that an officer’s subjective intent is
irrelevant to determining whether the officer is entitled to qualified
immunity. In fact, in Harlow, this Court did not hold that an officer's
intent is irrelevant, but rather the Court held that allegations of an
officer’s malice is not sufficient to subject that officer to liability unless
it is shown that the officer knew or should have known that his conduct
violated clearly established law. Harlow, 475 U.S. at 817-818. This
point, however, is irrelevant because the Ninth Circuit in this case
applied an objective test to determine that the agents could not have
believed that the arrests of the Gashos were lawful in light of clearly
established law.

14

warrantless search and refusing to turn over the logbooks.
The Ninth Circuit did not rely on Howe’s comment or the
Agents’ subjective retaliatory motives in concluding that the
Agents were not entitled to the qualified immunity defense.

In analyzing the qualified immunity defense, the Ninth
Circuit examined the facts known to the Agents at the time
of the Gashos’ arrests, not their subjective motives. The
Ninth Circuit found that no reasonable Customs agent could
have believed the arrests were lawful because there was no
evidence that the Gashos had the specific intent to steal the
logbooks from Customs’ custody or to frustrate or prevent
their seizure. Jd. at 1438-1439. (Petitioner's Brief at pp.
31la-32a). The Agents allowed Sharon Gasho to enter the
aircraft specifically for the purpose of removing objects from
inside. The Agents never gave her notice that she could not
take the logbooks or that the logbooks had been seized. The
Ninth Circuit determined that absent such warning, the
Agents had no reason to believe that the Gashos knew the
logbooks were an appurtenance to the aircraft, that the
logbooks had been seized or that their removal was
forbidden. Further, the Ninth Circuit determined that the
Gashos’ mere passive refusal to consent to a warrantless
search and immediately turn over the logbooks was not
grounds for finding criminal intent.

The Ninth Circuit’s analysis is based solely on what the
Agents knew and observed prior to and at the time of the
arrests and what a reasonable agent should have done under
the circumstances. Nothing in their analysis suggests that the
Ninth Circuit reached its conclusion that the Agents were not

15

entitled to a qualified immunity defense because it believed
the Agents were angry with the Gashos.

B. The Ninth Circuit Clearly and Expressly Articu-
lated the Specific Constitutional Right at Issue and
Properly Held that Based on Clearly Established
Law the Officers Were Not Entitled to Qualified
Immunity.

There is no question that the Ninth Circuit’s finding that
the Agents were not entitled to qualified immunity was a
decision well grounded in this Court’s rulings. The Ninth
Circuit recognized that Respondents had a duty to show that
the constitutional right at issue was clearly established.’
Contrary to the Petitioner’s assertion, the Ninth Circuit
analyzed the specific principles of constitutional rights at
issue in holding that the Respondents satisfied that duty.

The Ninth Circuit first stated generally that the Fourth
Amendment right to be free from arrests without probable
cause is clearly established and specifically held that "it is
clearly established that a person’s Fourth Amendment rights
are violated if the sole basis for his arrest is his challenge to
the officer’s authority absent a warrant." Gasho, 39 F.3d at

’ The Petitioners attempt to confuse this issue by directing attention
to whether the law was clearly established that the seizure of a vehicle
did not include the contents of the vehicle. Whether the seizure includes
its contents is not the issue. Under this Court’s analysis in Anderson, the
issue was whether the constitutional right asserted by the Gashos was
clearly established and whether a reasonable Customs agent could have
believed that Sharon Gasho knew the logbooks were seized with the
aircraft.

16

1439 (Petitioner’s Brief at p. 32a). The Ninth Circuit
recognized that the heart of the issue was whether the
Customs Agents should have known that probable cause was
obviously lacking when the reason for the arrest was the
arrestee’s verbal challenge of the Agents’ authority to effect
a seizure Or arrest.

Defendants, with an apparent recognition that their
argument that the Ninth Circuit applied only general constitu-
tional standards was contrary to the text of the opinion on its
face, then argue that the Ninth Circuit, in assessing what is
clearly established law relied on irrelevant and inapplicable
law.

In both its discussion on probable cause and qualified
immunity, the Ninth Circuit cited ample authority demonstra-
ting that the law was well settled on this point. The Petition-
ers make a weak assertion that such law was not clearly
established at the time of the arrest because the cases holding
that passive refusal of a search or seizure is a clearly estab-
lished constitutional right are not factually identical to the
situation the Customs Agents were presented with. It is
important to stress that the Customs Agents had no statutory
authority for the arrests. The very wording of the statutes
cited by the Petitioners as justification for the arrests
precludes application of those statutes to the conduct of the
Gashos. That alone gave the Agents knowledge that there
was a lack of probable cause for the arrests and thus the
arrests violated the constitutional rights of the Gashos.

Additionally, the passive refusal to turn over property for
a warrantless seizure, had previously been held by the courts

lial clans

17

to be an improper reason for arrest. In fact, in 1978, the
Ninth Circuit held exactly that: "The passive refusal to
consent to a warrantless search is privileged conduct which
cannot be considered as evidence of criminal wrongdoing."
United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1351 (9th Cir.
1978).

Petitioners argue that the Ninth Circuit was wrong in
holding that this law was clearly established because the
Prescott case was not factually similar enough. Prescott
arose out of a passive refusal to allow a warrantless search
at an apartment, while here the arrests occurred as a result
of the passive refusal to allow a warrantless search of a car
and warrantless seizure of the logbooks which were in that
car. The Ninth Circuit expressly stated that while there is a
lower expectation of privacy when searches involve auto-
mobiles rather than houses, “the citizen nevertheless retains
the right to refuse consent to a warrantless search of the bag
containing his personal effects, even if consent is given to
search the vehicle." 39 F.3d at 1432 (Petitioners’ Brief at
pp. 17a-18a) (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 252
(1991)). The holding in Prescott was squarely on point.
The Petitioners here argued that the refusal to return the
logbooks was evidence of Sharon Gasho’s specific intent to
prevent the seizure when she moved the logbooks. The
defendants in Prescott argued that the plaintiff's passive
refusal to allow entry into her apartment for a search was
evidence of the plaintiff's intent to harbor a criminal. The
court held in Prescott that such passive, privileged conduct
could not be offered as evidence of intent because it would
place an unfair and impermissible burden on the assertion of
a constitutional right. Prescott 581 F.2d at 1350-51.

18

The Ninth Circuit’s ruling that the constitutional right to
passively refuse a warrantless search or seizure was well
established is also based on this Court’s holding in Houston
v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462-63 (1987). Hill’s holding was on
point and constituted clearly established law upon which the
customs officers should have based their actions. This
Court’s statement in Hill that "the freedom of individuals
verbally to oppose or challenge police action without thereby
risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which
we distinguish a free nation from a police state” should
certainly serve as a guideline for law enforcement officers.

Finally, the Ninth Circuit cited Duran v. City of
Douglas, 904 F.2d 1372, 1378 (9th Cir. 1990) as additional
support of its holding*. Gasho, 39 F.3d at 1437
(Petitioners’ Brief at p. 31a). The Duran Court followed this
Court’s holding in Hill and held that no reasonable officer
could have believed there was probable cause to stop the
vehicle of an individual merely because the individual had
challenged his authority by verbally insulting and making
obscene gestures at the officer as his car passed the officer’s.
The focus in Duran was not, as Petitioners argue, the First
Amendment right to free speech, but rather was the Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and
seizure.

Petitioners argue that a reasonable law enforcement
officer who was fully aware of Hill, Duran and Prescott

*The Defendants point out that Duran was decided after the Gashos’
arrest. Duran, however, did not establish new law, but merely
recognized already clearly established rights.

19

would not know that the arrests violated the constitutional
rights of the Gashos. That argument is outrageous. The
holdings and pronouncements of the courts in those cases are
precisely on point and leave no question that the arrest for a
passive refusal to allow entry into a vehicle and/or turn over
property for seizure violated a clearly established
constitutional right. That Customs agents who make
decisions every day regarding people’s personal liberty and
freedom and who are empowered to deprive a person of that
liberty and freedom would not be cognizant of that law is a
frightening thought for law abiding citizens such as the
Gashos. If these officers were to be immune from liability
for their wrongful arrests merely because a case factually
identical had not yet been published, law enforcement
officials would have unfettered power to act unreasonably in
all but the most common scenarios.

Having held that it is clearly established that a person’s
Fourth Amendment rights are violated if the sole basis for
his arrest is his challenge to the officer’s authority absent a
warrant, the Ninth Circuit turned to the second step of its
inquiry. Relying on this Court’s analysis in Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987), the Court considered
whether a reasonable Customs agent could have believed that
the arrests of the Gashos were lawful in light of clearly
established law and the information the arresting agents
possessed. 39 F.3d at 1439 (Petitioners’ Brief at p. 32a).
The Ninth Circuit recognized that its holding that probable
cause was lacking for the arrests was not determinative
because under the qualified immunity doctrine the agents
would be immune if they mistakenly believed there was

20

probable cause to arrest the Gashos if they could have
reasonably believed that their actions were lawful. Jd.’

The Ninth Circuit held that the Agents failed to
demonstrate that a reasonable Customs agent could have
believed that the Gashos’ arrests were lawful. /d. The
Ninth Circuit carefully analyzed both grounds which the
Agents cited as justification for the arrests--the removal of
the logbooks and the refusal to turn the logbooks over upon
demand. /d. As discussed by the Ninth Circuit in its
analysis of the probable cause issue and in the qualified
immunity discussion, there was no probable cause to arrest
the Gashos under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2232 or 2233, the statutes
cited by Petitioners for the arrests. Jd. at 1427-1432
(Petitioners’ Brief at pp. 7a-18a).

18 U.S.C. § 2233 prohibits forcible rescue of property
which has been seized. The Ninth Circuit recognized that
ample case law as well as the language of the statute itself
made clear that the offense required: (1) knowledge that the
property was seized; (2) knowledge that removal was unlaw-
ful; (3) forcible and willful removal of the property from the
dominion and control of the government; and (4) specific
intent to frustrate the seizure. 18 U.S.C. § 2232 prohibits
physical interference with a search. It is concerned with the
destruction or removal of property before it is seized and
requires a specific intent to prevent a seizure.

® Petitioners’ attempt to discredit the Ninth Circuit by reference to
this Court’s reversal of the Ninth Circuit in Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S.
224 (1991), is unwarranted. The Ninth Circuit in the case at bar
followed the Hunter decision and used the identical test set forth in
Anderson and quoted in Hunter.

21

Sharon Gasho was given permission to enter the plane
and remove her belongings, the logbooks were in no way
secured by Customs, the Gashos were not advised that the
logbooks were seized, and the agents did not attempt to
prevent Sharon Gasho from moving the logbooks from the
airplane to her attorney’s car even though they were aware
she did so. Based on these undisputed facts, the Ninth
Circuit found that there were no grounds to support a belief
that the Gashos had the specific intent required by the
Statutes. 39 F.3d. at 1439 (Petitioners’ Brief at p. 32a).
Alternatively, if the Gashos were arrested for their refusal to
return the logbooks upon demand, a reasonable officer would
have known their conduct was privileged and could not serve
as a basis for finding intent.'°

The Ninth Circuit held that the passive refusal to hand
Over property cannot be grounds for inferring criminal intent
because the Fourth Amendment gives citizens the right to
refuse to consent to warrantless searches and seizures. /d.
at 1427-1432 (Petitioners’ Brief at pp. 7a-18a). Later, in
discussing this same issue in the context of qualified
immunity, the court pointed out that this proposition is a
matter of clearly established constitutional law. /d. at 1438-
1439 (Petitioners’ Brief at pp. 3la-32a). "It is Clearly
established that a person’s Fourth Amendment rights are
violated if the sole basis for his arrest is his challenge to the
Officer’s authority absent a warrant.” Jd. at 1439
(Petitioners’ Brief at p. 32a).

'° The Gashos’ refusal was based upon the advice of their attorney
at the time.

22

Petitioners’ argument that the Ninth Circuit applied only
general and irrelevant principles of constitutional law is
frivolous. The Ninth circuit applied the analysis established
by this Court. The constitutional right to passively refuse
consent to a warrantless search is obviously neither general
nor irrelevant.

Il. THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
WAS FILED SOLEY TO DELAY PROCEEDINGS
LONG ENOUGH TO BAR THE B/VENS CLAIMS.

Petitioners filed their Petition for Writ of Certiorari not
because they believed that this matter was worthy of review
by this Honorable Court, or with even a remote expectation
that it would be granted. Rather, the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari was one step in a clever but unsuccesful plan by
Petitioners to delay proceedings on remand to the district
court until judgment was entered in the FTCA action so they
could then invoke the judgment bar of 28 U.S.C. § 2676.

A major issue in the appeal to the Ninth Circuit was the
application of 28 U.S.C. § 2676. In its opinion, the Ninth
Circuit determined that if a judgment was entered in the
FTCA action, whether in favor of or against the United
States on the FTCA claims, § 2676 would act as a complete
bar to the Gashos’ Bivens claims. 39 F.3d at 1437-1438
(Petitioners’ Brief at pp. 27a-30a). The Ninth Circuit ruled
that, "because we have reversed the district court’s summary
judgment on the FTCA claim involving the arrest, a prior
‘judgment’ no longer bars the subsequent Bivens claim on the
arrest. Thus, the Gashos are permitted to pursue either the
Bivens claim or FTCA claim, or both claims. If they pursue

23

both remedies in separate actions, they may secure judgments
on both claims only if the Bivens judgment is entered first."
39 F.3d at 1438.

Following remand, the Gashos elected to pursue both the
FTCA and Bivens claims and sought and obtained an order
of the district court consolidating the Bivens and FTCA
claims for discovery and a contemporaneous trial. The
district court’s decision to consolidate the actions prevents
the Petitioners from intentionally delaying trial of the Bivens
action until after trial and judgment in the FTCA action.
Unable to do so in the district court, Petitioners attempted to
delay the Bivens action in the appellate courts.

A stay of proceedings pending petition for writ of
certiorari is normally requested before the mandate issues.
Had Petitioners, however, sought a stay of the action before
January 11, 1995 (the date the mandate was issued), they
would have had only until February of 1995 to petition for
writ of certiorari.’

A Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed in February would
likely have been decided before the end of this court’s
October 1994 term in June. The district court has indicated
that at the June scheduling conference it will set both actions
for trial. Thus, if Petitioners had timely requested a stay of
the Bivens claims, there probably would not have been a long

'' The United States has not joined in this Petition and the agents
request review of only the Bivens claim.

'? Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(b) provides that a stay is
only in effect for 30 days unless the petition for writ of certiorari is filed.

24

enough delay for the FTCA action to result in a judgment in
the interim. Instead, Petitioners did not request a stay before
the mandate was issued but rather waited four months after
the mandate was filed to request a recall of the mandate and
a stay. The Petitioners then sought a 60-day extension of
time for filing the Petition, which, if granted, would have
resulted in the Petition being filed on May 26, 1995, and the
responsive brief being due at the end of June, guaranteeing
that the Petition would not have been decided until the
October 1995 term, after the trial on the FTCA action.”

It did not matter to Petitioners’ plan that the Petition
would be denied. Had the Ninth Circuit granted a stay, the
Petitioners would have succeeded in barring the Bivens claim
even though the Petition was denied. The only way the
Petitioners could request a stay from the Ninth Circuit was to
file a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which they did without
regard to the merits of the Petition.

‘Petitioners were unsuccessful. First, this court only granted a 30-day
extension for filing the Petition, and on May 15, 1995, after their
Petition was filed, the Ninth Circuit denied their request to recall the
mandate and stay the Bivens portion of the action pending a decision from
this court.

25
CONCLUSION

There was no error in the Court of Appeals’ decision and
further review by this Court is not warranted. Respondents
respectfully request that the Court deny the Petition for Writ
of Certiorari and award Respondents just damages and
double costs pursuant to Rule 42.2, Rules of the Supreme
Court of the United States, for responding to the Petition.

Respectfully submitted,

Christine R. Taradash

Maria Crimi Speth*

Beus, Gilbert & Morrill, P.L.L.C.
3200 North Central Avenue

1000 Great American Tower
Phoenix, AZ 85012-2417
Attorneys for Respondents

*Counsel of Record

Dated: Phoenix, Arizona, May 30, 1995.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386012_1666%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
