# Appendix — Ellington v. Superior Court of California

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386012_1648%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1995
- **Citation:** 515 U.S. 1143

## Text

la
Second Appellate District, Division Four, No. Bo73682
$043368

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

IN BANK

JOY ELAINE ELLINGTON Et Al. Petitioners

LOS ANGELES COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT. Respondent

ROBERT BARBER STULL Et Al. Rea! Parties In Interest

Petition for review DENIED

Chief Justice

2a
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR
JOY ELAINE ELLINGTON et al. No. B073682

Petitioners. (Super.Ct.
No. KC009085)
( Gregory C. O'Brien,
V. Jr., Judge)

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
LOS ANGELES COUNTY,

Respondents:

ROBERT BARBER STULL et al.
Real Parties in Interest

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING from a judgment of the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County. Being treated as writ of mandate. Denied.

Joy Elaine Ellington and Azariah Michael Ellington. in pro
per.. for Petitioners.

No appearance for Respondent.

Law Offices of Charles Crismier III, Michael E. Maning.
Bakken and Koester, Richard P_ Delatorre. Hawkins, Schnable, Lindahl
& Beck and Patrick T. Barrera for Real Parties in Interest

2al
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiffs appeal from the trial court's order denying
their motion to amend their complaint adding defendants and
causes of action. Ultimately plaintiffs settled their case against
the original defendant and filed a request for dismissal of the
entire action. An order of dismissal was was entered by the
court on February 16, 1994. Although plaintiffs appeal from a
nonappealable order, was shall treat the appeal as a petition for

writ of mandate and decide the case
(Califormia Dental Assn. v. California Dental Hygienists’ Assn.
(1990) 222 Cal App.3d 49 )
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Joy Ellington wa injured in an automobile
accident with defendant Robert Stull on January 13, 1992. She
and her husband, Plaintiff Azanah Ellington, engaged in
negotiations with defendant Stull's insurance carrier,
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co

Plaintiffs commenced this action by filing in propna

persona a Judicial Council form personal injury complaint on

2a2
March 23, 1992, against the driver of the other vehicle, Robert

Stull and his insurance carrer, Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Co. The complaint contained four causes of action against
both Stull and Nationwide for property damage, personal
injury, "infliction of emotional distress" and loss of
consortium. Plaintiffs alleged that Stull was negligent and
caused the collision, which resulted in Joy Ellington suffering
personal injuries and the Nationwide inflicted emotional
distress by contending Joy Ellington was contributorily
negligent

Defendants demurred to the complaint on May 18.
1992. The parties engaged in correspondence about the
pleadings. As a result of these negotiations, plaintiffs and
defendants stipulated that plaintiff would file and amended
complaint, naming as defendants Stull and Does | through 10,
deleting Nationwide Mutual Insurance as defendant, and
Clarifying that their infliction of emotional distress cause of

action was for negligent infliction of emotional distress

Defendant Stull demurred to the amended complaint. The

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jemurrer was set for hearing on July 16, 1992. The record

contains an undated stipulation signed by the Ellingtons and
John Walker. attorney for Stull. with respect to the filing of an
amended complaint. which defendant Stull would answer
A"Second Amended Complaint", dated July 5, 1992, was filed
and served by mail on Defendant Stull's attorney on August to
plaintiffs’ second-amended complaint, which contains a
general denial and eight affirmative defenses.

Thereafter the parties apparently engaged in
settlement negotiations and discovery. On December 17, 1992.
plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file a third amended
complaint, which was set for hearing on January 11, 1993
The proposed third amended complaint added as parties the
lawyer who represented defendant Stull. John Walker: the
lawyer who represented defendant Stull, John Walker. the
lawyer who represented Stull as cross-complainant. Michael
Manning (although the record contains no cross-complaint)
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.. plus Does | through 3

Plaintiffs added a fourth cause of action for intentional

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infliction of emotional distress and a fifth cause of action for
perjury. Plaintiffs’ three children are added as plaintiffs in the
second cause of action for loss of consortium and the third
cause of action for negligent infliction for emotional distress.
Finally, the prayer seeks punitive aamages. The reasons stated
in plaintiffs’ declaration supporting the motion were that
defendant Stull, his insurance company, and his lawyers all
participated in a scheme to have defendant Stull commit
perjury in order to defeat plaintiffs’ claims

Defendant Stull, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,

and attorney John Walker together filed an “opposition” to

plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file an amended complaint,
contending. inter alia. there 1s no cause of action for perjury.
that plaintiffs previously agreed not to allege intentional
infliction of emotional distress. and that neither Nationwide
nor Walker had anything to do with the collision or any
claims arising therefrom

There are two filings opposing the plaintiffs’ motion

for leave to amend -- one filed on behalf of "Defendant Robert

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Stull", by Bakken and Koester, and another on behalf of

"Defendant and cross-complainant" Robert Barber Stull filed
by Michael Manning, a proposed defendant in the third
amended complaint. of the law offices of Charles Crismier III
Plaintiffs filed a reply to the “oppositions”. The trial court
denied the motion to file a third amended complaint at the
hearing held on January 11, 1993. From the order denying
their motion, plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal on February
4, 1993

The case was arbitrated, plaintiffs requested trial de
novo; the case was set for trial on September 29. 1993 and for
mandatory settlement conference on September 15, 1993. At
that settlement conference, plaintiffs agreed to accept
defendant Stull's $50,000 insurance policy limits plus
additional amount for property damage. Subsequently. they
raised questions about the loss of consortium claim and
whether it would afford additional insurance policy proceeds:
the tnal court brought the matter before it for further hearing

on October 15, 1993. at which time plaintiffs settled their

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personal injury claims against Stull for $50.000 plus $5,000 for

property damage. They preserved their claims against the
additional defendants proposed to be added in their third
amended complaint. the subject of this mandate petition. |/
DISCUSSION

The test for determining if the trial court correctly
decided the motion to amend the complaint is whether abuse of
discretion is shown. The trial court's ruling will be disturbed
only upon a showing of a "‘clear case of abuse" [of discretion]
and a “miscarriage of justice." (Denham v. Supenor Coun
(1970) 2 Cal. 3d557, 566: California Casualty Gen. Ins. Co. v

Superior Court (1985) 173 Cal. App 3d 274, 279.)

1. On October 15, 1993, plaintiffs signed a request for
dismissal of the entire action with prejudice. The request for dismissal
wa ordered entered in the record on February 16, 1994. At oral
argument. plaintiffs asserted they intended to dismiss defendant Stull
only. having reserved their rights to proceed against the other proposed
defendants both at the mandatory settlement conference and in the
release document they signed. Plaintiffs also asserted the dismissal
request form was prepared by defendant Stull's attorneys. While we are
mindful of the fact that the trial court may have no further subject matter
or personal jurisdiction over the parties once the voluntary dismissal 1s
filed. (Harris v. Billings (1993) 16 Cal App4th 1396, 1405). plaintiffs
filed and perfected their “appeal” with this court prior to

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dismissal. Thus. this court has jurisdiction to decide the matter
Abuse of discretion will not be found unless the trial court
“exceeds the bounds of reason. all of the circumstances before
it being considered." (Denham v Supenor Court. supra, 2
Cal.3d at p. 566.)

We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in denying plaintiffs’ motion to file their third amended
complaint

With respect to the proposed addition of defendant
Stull's insurance carrier, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. it
has long been the rule in California that the injured plaintiff
Cannot join the insured tortfeasor's insurance carrier in the
same action. (See Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court
(1979) 23 Cal.3d 880, 891-892, overruled on other grounds in
Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46
Cal.3d 287, Spencer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins Co (1957)
152 Cal App.2d 797.) The essence of the emotional distress
claim arises out of the conduct of the defense of plaintiffs’

lawsuit. Even a separate action may not be brought against the
tortfeasor's insurance carner on these facts. (See

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Moradi-Shalal v_ Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46

Cal.3d 287.)

Plaintiffs also sought to add their children as plaintiffs
seeking loss of consortium. This cause of action is available
only to spouses. (Elden v Sheldon (1988) 46 Cal 3d 441.
446.) The children were not present at the scene of the
accident. Since they had no contemporaneous awareness of
any harm which their mother suffered. neither may they allege
a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress
(Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal 3d 644 )

Finally. plaintiffs sought to add a cause of action for
“perjury” against the insurance carrier and defendant Stull's
attorneys. John Walker and Michael Manning. This claim is
based on plaintiffs’ contention that the insurance company.
defendant Stull, and his lawyers conspired to have him he
about the facts of the collision in response to discovery
propounded by plaintiffs Even if perjury were a recognized
civil cause of action (it is a crime under Penal Code. § 118).

the conduct plainuffs allege 1s absolutely privileged pursuant

2a9
to Civil Code section 47 (b). (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50

Cal 3d 205, 211-212, 218.) Thus plaintiffs may not sue the
insurance carrier or defendant Stull's lawyers. either in this case
or in a separate action, for the conduct alleged in the proposed

cause of action for perjury

DISPOSITION

The petition for writ of mandate is denied.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

NEWMAN, J.*

We concur

VOGEL (CS), Acting P. J

HASTINGS. J

* Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council

3a
COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION: 4

Azanah Ellington
18470 Bellefont Drive
Azusa, CA. 91702
RE: Ellington. Joy E

VS

Stull, Robet B

2 Civil BO73682

Los Angeles NO. KC009085

* * REMITTITUR NOTICE * *
Notice is hereby given that the Remittitur has been issued this

date and that the opinion, decision or order entered in the above entitled
cause on 10/17/94 is now final

* * Petition Summarily Denied By Opinion * *

Respondent To Recover Costs

JOSEPH A. LANE, Clerk
By: R. Mayfarth
Deputy Clerk

da
RICHARD P DELATORRE BAR NO 110563
BAKKEN AND KOESTER
701 North Haven Avenue, Suite 230-A
Ontario, CA 91764-4903
Telephone (714) 466-6977

Attorneys for Defendant.
ROBERT BARBER STULL

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES. EAST DISTRICT

JOY ELAINE ELLINGTON AND CASE NO-KC009085
AZARIAH MICHAEL ELLINGTON

Plaintiffs. Notice of Ruling
vs

ROBERT BARBER STULL and
Does | through 10. Inclusive.

Defendants

TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS

OF RECORD

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to
File a Third Amended Complaint came before the Honorable Judge
Gregory O'Brien in Department G of the East District. county of Los
Angeles Superior Court at 8:30 a.m. on Monday. January 11, 1493
Plaintiffs Motion was denied

Dated January 14. 1993 BAKKEN AND KOESTER

RICHARD P DELATORRE

Sa

1 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

2 FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

3 DEPARTMENT G HON. GREGORY C. O'BRIEN JUDGI
4

5 JOY ELAINE ELLINGTON, ET. Al

6 PLAINTIFF

7 VS NO. KC009085

® ROBERT BARBER STULL, ET. AI

9 DEFENDANT

10

1] REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OI
12 ‘OURT PROCEEDINGS
13 MONDAY, JANUARY 11, 1993

14 APPEARANCES

15 FOR THE PLAINTIFI AZARIAH AND JOY ELLINGTON
IN PROPRIA PERSONA

16 18470 BELLEFONT DRIVE
AZUSA, CALIF. 91702

17 FOR THE DEFENDANT BAKKEN & KOESTER
ATTORNEY AT LAW

18 BY: MR._RICHARD P. DELATORRI
701 N. HAVEN AVE., STE. 230-A

19 ONTARIO, CALIF. 97164

2) FOR THE CROSS-DEFENDANT

ELLINGTON HILL, GENSON, EVEN, CRANDALI
21 & WADE
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
22 BY: MR. MARC W. HAWKINS
3401 CENTRELAKE DRIVE, #650
23 ONTARIO, CALIF. 91764
24 FOR THE DEFENDANT CHARLES CRISMIER III
AND CROSS-DEFENDANT ATTORNEY AT LAW
25 BY: MR. MICHAEL MANNING
424. N. LAKE AVE., SUITE 304
26 PASADENA, CALIF. 91101
27 REPORTER LYNN A. BARBSCH., C.S.R. 2457

OFFICIAL REPORTER

Sal

4
i MR. ELLINGTON: MR. - | DON'T MEAN TO BE TEDIOUS.
2 YOUR HONOR, IF YOU JUST BEAR WITH ME FOR A MOMENT,
IF WITHIN
3 A DEPOSITION UNDER THE PENALTY OF PERJURY —
4 THE COURT: UH-HUH
| s MR. ELLINGTON: AND THEIR ATTITUDE, THE
EVIDENCE HAS
6 BEFORE THE INDIVIDUALS AND THEY CHOOSE TO -
7 THE COURT: MR. ELLINGTON, IF YOU FEEI
SOMEBODY IS
8 LYING IN THE COURSE OF A DEPOSITION, AND THE CASE
RESOLVES
9 ITSELF BEFORE TRIAL AND YOU REALLY THINK THE
DISTRICT
10 ATTORNEY WOULD BE INTERESTED IN DOING SOMETHING
ABOUT THAT,
11 YOU MAY TALK TO THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY
12 FRANKLY ITS MY EXPERIENCE THAT YOURE
13 PROBABLY NOT GOING TO GET VERY FAR WITH THAT,
BUT I'M NOT
14 GOING TO - I'M NOT GOING TO MAKE A PROSECUTORIAL
DECISION,
1S THAT'S NOT MY FUNCTION
16 IF YOU THINK THEY'RE TELLING A LIE, AND THEY
7 TELL IT AGAIN ON THE WITNESS STAND, YOU CAN POINT
OUT TO THE
18 JURY, "LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY. THESE
PEOPLE ARE
19 LYING.” OBVIOUSLY BUT YOU DON'T FILE AND
AMENDED COMPLAINT
20 SAYING, "LLAR, LIAR, PANTS ON FIRE." OKAY? YOU JUST
DON'T
21 DO THAT
22 OKAY. MR. AND MRS. ELLINGTON, I'M GOING TO
23 DENY YOUR MOTION TO FILE YOUR AMENDED COMPLAINT
AND COUNSEL,
24 WHO'S GOING TO GIVE NOTICE? MR. DELATORRE?
25 MR. MANNING: I'D BEEN HAPPY TO
26 THE COURT: MR. MANNING
27 MR. DELATORRE: I'LL GIVE NOTICE REGARDING THE
28 REQUEST FOR FEES, YOUR HONOR

Nm

6a
2nd Civil No. BO73682
Superior Court No. KC 009085
(Hon. Gregory C. O'Brien, Judge)

IMMEDIATE STAY REQUESTED
TRIAL DATE: SEPTEMBER 29, 1993
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION
JOY ELAINE ELLINGTON CIVIL NO. B073682
AZARIAH MICHAEL ELLINGTON
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs
ROBERT BARBER STULL and

Does | through 10 inclusive,

Defendants and Respondents

APPELLANTS’ OPENING BRIEt

On Appeal from the Judgment of the Superior Court of
Califorma, Los Angeles County

JOY ELAINE ELLINGTON
AZARIAH MICHAEL ELLINGTON
18470 Bellefont Drive
Azusa, California 91702
(818) 339-8348

Appellants
IN PROPRIA PERSONA

a

aA

INDEX

Page No
eatmanestt OF Cane. .......c<.ccccecoecocss.-. ral aes haa ]
CCE Uc ae ]
I a vintstanicaciicsacin crasbaisutorsaeioac cae . 22

Point! THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED DISCRETION. -7
WHEN IT DID NOT ALLOW PLAINTIFFS
TO AMEND COMPLAINT TO JOIN MINOR
CHILDREN AS CO-PLAINTIFFS TO THE
INSTANT ACTION

Point I! THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE DISCRETION ...7 -9
WHEN IT DID NOT ALLOW PLAINTIFF TO
AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT TO JOIN OTHER
DEFENDANTS WHO MAY BE LIABLE TO
PLAINTIFFS

Point IIi TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION..9 - 11
WHEN IT DENIED PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO
AMEND BASED ON COMPLAINT'S FAILURE
TO STATE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE
A CAUSE OF ACTION

Point IV. TRIAL COURT ABUSED JUDICIAL...... 11 - 13
DISCRETION WHEN DENYING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION TO AMEND, BASED ON INEXCUSABLE
DELAY AND PREJUDICE TO THE OPPOSING
PARTY

Point V TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN..13 - 16
DENYING LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT
WHEN PLAINTIFFS HAVE STATED MERITORIOUS
CAUSES OF ACTION

Point VI. TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION... 17 - 20
BY NOT ALLOWING PLAINTIFFS TO
AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT TO STATE A
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INTENTIONAL
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

Pomt VI] TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION... 20 - 23
WHEN IT DENIED PLAINTIFFS’ AMENDED
COMPLAINT FOR THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PERJURY

od

oo

6a2
INDEX
(continued)
Page No

Point VIII. TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION.. 24 - 35
IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO
AMEND, INDICATING THAT THERE IS
NO CIVIL REMEDY FOR CRIMINAL
ACTIVITY AND IF SO PLAINTIFFS MUST
WAIT UNTIL TRIAL TO SEEK SUCH
REMEDY

Rc diiicttinni ks ee BisicasR needs a

7a

] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

2 California Statues: Page No

3 Code of Civil Procedure, section 378... Chicane
4 Code of Civil Procedure, section $76... Briel Mel
5 Code of Civil Procedure, section 379... 9
6 Business & Professional Code, section a iataicchannasetiingseccs a
7 Penal Code, section 9 oo..........cccccsscccsssssssssssscsssssessessossssses... 27
8 Penal Code, section 118.0000... cccccecccccssscecseseeeeeeeeeec. 28
9 Cases:

10 Estate of Hunter, 194 Cal. App.2d 849, 865.

1] BFR, SIG once cnsseiessetevceccenc. Cidsailemboapinn paca 7

12 California Cas. Gen. Ins. Co. (1985) 173 Cal App. 3d 274,
130-218 Cal. Rptr. 817.0000. sososananannansnesessscssceccees 9,11,25
14 Avedissian v. Manukian (1983) 14] Cal. App.3d 379, 383.
15 PING MDT ev tiistinec meine 12

16 Higgins v. Van R. Dental Prod., Inc. (1981) 123 Cal.
17 App.3d 558, 176 Cal.Rptr. 704, 708... 13, 22

18 Binning, Inc. v. Safeco Ins. Co (1977) 74 Cal. App.3d

19 617, 141 Cal. Rpt. $47,548.00 ieee Re
20 Murphy v Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal.3d 937. 941.

21-132 Cal. Rptr. 424... isitiendenedidiaices ieee ae

22 Roberts v. Ball, Hunt. Hart, Brown & Baerwitz. 57 Cal
23 App.3d 104, 109, 128 Cal.Rptr. 901, 905.0000. 16

24 Dector's Co. Ins. Services v. Superior Court (1990)

25 225 Cal. App.3d 1284, 275 Cal.Rptr. 674 iiehnetion ee
26 Weiner v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (1991) 9] Daily

27 ae daca sO EAS te 18

tw

Tal
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

(CONT.)
Cervantez v. J.C. Penny Co. (1979) 24 Cal. 3d $79,
593 ’ 18
Wolfrich Corp. v. United Services Auto Ass'n (1983)
149 Cal. App.3d 1211, 197 Cal. Rptr. 392 19
Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co. (1979) 24 Cal 3d 773.
777, 784, 187 Cal. Rptr 392 19
Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exchange (1972) 7 Cal. 3d 616. 681.
102 Cal _Rptr. 815 , 19
Black v. Sullivan, 48 Cal. App 3d 566-567,
122 Cal. Rptr. 119. 20
Burke v. Compania Meticana De Aviacion (1970) 433
F.2d 1031, 1033, 1034 21
Wyndotte v. Transportation Co. v. United States (1967)
389 U.S. 191. 88 S.Ct 379, 19 L.Ed 2d 407 21
J.1. Case Co. v. Borak (1964) 377 US 426.848.
1555, 12 L.Ed.2d 423 21
Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby (1916) 241 US. 33
36 S. Ct. 482. 60 L.Ed 874 2)
Maclsaac v. Pozzo, 26 Cal. 2d 809. 161 P 24449. 22
Herrera v. Lisnmek (| 984) 158 Cal App 3d 255,
204 Cal. Rptr. $$3, $56 22. 23
Klopstock v. Superior Court (1941) 17 Cal 2d 13
19 20, 108 P.2d 906 22

Nw

wa

7a2
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(CONT.)

Cases Page No

Densy v. Wilder (1956) 46 Cal.2d 715, 75].

299 P.2d 257. Beis , 22
Wells v. Lloyd IV (1936) 6 Cal.2d 70, 88

56 P.2d $17....... 23
Gagne v. Bertran (1954) 43 C.2d 481,

275 P.2d 15. i ndtv 23
Kreutzer v. San Diego County (1984) 153 Cal App.3d
62, 100 Cal. Rptr. 322 23
Peterson v. Peterson (1946) 74 Cal. Anp.2d 312.

168 P.2d 358 26
Crouser v. Boice (1942) 51 Cal. App.2d 198

124 P 2d 358 26
Merlino v. West Coast Macaroni Mfg. Co. (1949)

90 Cal. App.2d 106, 202 P.2d 748 26
Hicks v. Sanders (1940) 40 Cal. App.2d 211,

104 P.2d 549... 26
Bundy v. Maginess (1888) 76 C. 532, 18 P._ 773 27
Wilson v. Middleton (1852) 2.C. 54 a7

Fenelon v. Superior Court (1990) 223 Cal App.3d 1476,
273 Cal. Rptr. 367, 368-371 27,2

Laczko v. Jules Meyers, Inc. (1969) 276 Cal App.2d
293, 80 Cal Rptr. 798, 799 29
Hudson v. Craft, 33 Cal.2d 654. 660

204 P.2d 1.7 AL.R.2d 696 29

Ta3
l Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 651,

Nm

320 P.2d 16, 64 AL.R.2d 1358000000000... ss 29
3 Wetherton v. Growers Farm Labor Ass'n. 275 AC.A. 188.
4 I 29 |
5 Mc Ivor v. Mercer-Fraser Co., 76 Cal App.2d 247.

6 253 - 254, 172 P.2d 758. , snelhiconl a 29
7 Agnew v. Parks (1959) 172 Cal. App.2d 756,

8 343 P.2d 118...... mae siete 29, 31

) Taylor v. Bidwell, 65 Cal 489.4 P. 491... 30
10 Mox Incorporated v. Woods, 202 Cal. 675,

1] $e 6 ayen 30

12 Smith v. Superior Court (1984) 151 Cal App.3d 491

13 eS: — =
14 Parchment Co. v. Paterson P. Paper Co. (1931)

15 282 U.S. $64. $1 S.Ct 251 aiiiahon oie 33
16 Gilbert v. Kennedy (1871) 22 Mich 117, 130 33

17 Buckaloo v. Johnson (1975) 14 Cal. 3d 815, 822 - 823.

18 122 Cal Rptr. 745, 537 P.2d 865 34
19 Lowell v. Mother's Cake & Cookie Co. (1978)

20 79 Cal. App.3d 13, 17, 144 Cal Rptr. 664 34
21 Asia Investment Co. v. Borowski (1982)

22-133 Cal. App.3d 832, 840 - 841, 184 Cal. Rp. 42 34

23 Worldwide Commerce, Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp. (1978)
24 84 Cal. App.3d 803, 811, 149 Cal. Rp 42 34

25 Howard v. Superior Court (1992) 2 C A 4th 745, 3
26 Cal. Rptr 2d 575, 577 36

8a
1 JOY ELAINE ELLINGTON
AZARIAH MICHAEL ELLINGTON
2 18470 Bellefont Drive
Azusa, California 91702
3 Telephone (213) 339-8348

4 IN PRO PER

8 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

9 JOY ELAINE ELLINGTON, and CASE NO: KC 009085
AZARIAH MICHAEL ELLINGTON NOTICE OF MOTION
10 Plaintiffs, FOR LEAVE TO FILE
AMENDED COMPLAINT:
ll vs. DECLARATION AND
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
12 IN SUPPORT
ROBERT BARBER STULL, and DATE: JANUARY 11, 1993
13 Does | through 10, inclusive TIME: 8:30 a.m
DEPT: G
14 ___ Defendants. - TRIAL DATE: NONE

15 TO EACH PARTY AND ATTORNEY OF RECORD IN THIS
ACTION
16 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT on January 11, 1993. at 8:30 am.

17 or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, Plaintiffs JOY ELAINE

18 ELLINGTON and AZARIAH MICHAEL ELLINGTON will move this
19 court in Department "G" thereof. at the above entitle Court, located

20 at 400 East Civic Center Plaza. Pomona, California,

21 for an order permitting Plaintiffs to file an amended

22 complaint, which is attached hereto and a copy of which is

23 served herewith

24

F

8al

| This motion will be made upon the ground that it is in

2 furtherance of justice to allow the filang of such amended
} complaint. and will be based upon this notice, the attached
4 pomts and authorities. and the attached declaration of

S Azanah M. Ellington

6 Dated December 17. 1992

Azanah M. Ellington
& In Pro Per

l

6

~

1¢

8a2

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING MOTION
| The court may, in furtherance of justice. and on
such terms as may be proper. allow a party to amend any
pleading or PROCEEDING. THE court may likewise. in its
discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon
such terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or
proceeding in other particulars..." (CCP section 473)
2. It is judicial policy to resolve all disputes
between the parties on their merits, and to allow amendment
of the pleadings to put all such disputes at issue at the
tume of trial
"While a motion to permit an amendment to a pleading

to be filed is one addressed to the discretion of the

court. JUS 4 tate case in which a court will be
dusiilied in refusing a party leave to amend his

pleadings so that he may properly present his case___ If
the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of
the motion will not prejudice the Opposing party. it is
error to refuse permission to amend and where the

refusal also results in a party being deprived of the

right to assert a meritorious cause of action or a

meritorious defense, it 1s not only error. but an abuse

of discretion "

8a3

"Trial courts are vested with the discretion to

2 allow amendments to pleadings in furtherance of

3 justice..... That trial courts are to liberally permit such

4 amendments at any stage of the proceeding, has been

5 established policy in this state.... resting on the fundamental
6 policy that cases should be decided on their merits."

7 {Hi Ss ior C Vickers) (1981) 118 CA3d 486. 173
8 Cal Ror 418)

9 4. Where change in law subsequent to filing original
10 complaint demonstrates possibility of recovery on new legal
11 theory, but same general set of facts, courts should permit
12 amendment of complaint to set forth such theory.

13 [Marasco v, Wadsworth (1978) 21 C3d. 82.146 Cal. Rptr 8431)

14

15

Page 10 of Petition for Writ of Certiorari
Supreme Court Rule 10.1 (c)

1. A review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of
right, but of judicial discretion A petition for a writ of
certiorari will be granted only when there are special and
important reasons therefor The following, while neither
controlling nor fully measuring the Court's discretion, indicate

the character of reasons that will be considered:

(c) When a state court or a United States court of
appeals has decided an important question of federal law
which has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or
has decided a federal question in a way that conflicts with
applicable decisions of this Court

Private individual may be subject to liability under § 1983 if he
or she willfully collaborated with official state actor in
deprivation of federal right, while state actor may be subject
to liability for action physically undertaken by private actors in
violation of plaintiff's liberty or property rights if state actor
directed or aided and abetted the violation Duares v. City of
N.Y., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1993, 985 F3d 94

Mere recourse to state or local court procedures does not, by
itself, amount to “joint activity" with state that would be
sufficient to subject private party to liability under § 1983:
"joint activity" theory requires, at minimum, some overt and

significant state participation in challenged action Hoai v. Vo,
CADC 1991, 935 F 2d 308

10a

Private parties who corruptibly conspire with state officials to
maliciously prosecute an individual act under color of state
law and can be sued by the individual under federal civil rights
Statute, plaintiff attempting to prove such a conspiracy must
show that the parties reached an understanding to deny
plaintiff his or her rights, the conspiratorial acts must impinge
upon the federal right, and the plaintiff must prove an
actionable wrong to support the conspiracyN.A.A.C.P. v.
Hunt, C A 11 (Ala ) 1990, 891 F 2d 1555

As the language itself makes clear, the central purpose of §
1983 is to "give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional
rights, privileges and immunities by an official's abuse of his
position” Monroe v Pape, 365 US 167, 172 5 L Ed 2d 492. 8]
S Ct 473 (1961) The United States Constitution among other
things, places substantial limitations upon state action, and the
cause of action provided in 42 USC § 1983 [42 USCS §
1983] is fundamentally one for "misuse of power, possessed
by virtue of state law and made possible only because the
wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law" United
States v Classic, 313 US 299, 326, 85 L Ed 1368. 61 S Ct
1031 (1941) It is manifest then that all state officials as a
class cannot be immune absolutely from damage suits under
42 USC § 1983 [42 USCS § 1983] and that to extend
absolute immunity to any group of state officials is to negate

pro tanto the very remedy which it appears Congress sought
to create Scheuer v Rhodes, 416 US 232, 243. 40 L Ed 2d
90,

Ila

94S Ct 1683 (1974) Thus, as there is no language in 42
USC § 1983 [42 USCS § 1983] extending any immunity to
any state officials, the Court has not extended absolute
immunity to such officials in the absence of the most
convincing showing that the immunity is necessaryimbler v.
Pachtman 424 US 409, 47 L Ed 2d 128, at 145.96 S Ct
984

In considering a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of
the complaint must be taken as true and all reasonable
inferences must be indulged in favor of the plaintiffA/itchel/
v. King, 537 F2d 385 (10th Cir 1976), Dewell v. Lawson, 489
F2d 877 (10th Cir 1974) A complaint should not be
dismissed unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief Conley v. Gibson, 355 US 41. 45-46. 78
S.Ct 99, 101-102, 2 L Ed2d 80 (1957) The question is not
whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether he is
entitled to offer evidence to support his claimScheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S 232, 236, 94S Ct 1683, 1686, 40 LEd2d
90 (1974) Steele v. Stephan, 633 F Supp 950

Thus, we concluded that it is "not unfair to hold liable the
official who knows or should know he is acting outside the

law," and that “insisting on awareness of clearly established

constitutional limits will not unduly interfere with the exercise
of official judgment " Butz v. Economou, 438 U S 478. 98 §
Ct 2894, at 2911, 57 LEd 2d 895 (917M).S. v. Stanley
483 US 669, at 697, 107 SCt 3054, at 3071, 97 LEd 2d
550

12a
We therefore hold that government officials performing
discretionary function generally are shielded from liability for
civil damage insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known. S@eocunier vy.
Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565 98 §.Ct. 855, 861, 55 LEd2d
24 (1978); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S., at 322, 95 S.Ct , at
1001. Harlow v. Fitzgerald 457 U.S. 800, 817, 102 S.Ct
2727, 2738, 73 L._Ed2d 396.

Allegation that defendants knowingly and willfully conspired
and agreed among themselves to interfere with plaintiff's
privacy and committed acts in controversy in furtherance of
conspiracy, resulting in damages set forth in incorporated
causes of action, was sufficient to state a cause of action for
conspiracy to interfere with the contractual relationships and
to invade privacy H & M Associates v. City of El Centro
(1980) 167 Cal Rptr. 392, 09 C._A 3d 399

Federal and State Constitutions guarantee that no state shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law In re Marilyn H. (1993) 19 Cal Rptr.2d 544,
5 Cal 4th 295, 851 P. 2d 826

l3a
Not all speech is protected by First Amendment, as speech,
fraud, misrepresentation, and deceit are unprotected by First
Amendment State v. Monastero 1988, 424 N W.2d 837,
228 Neb. 818, appeal dismissed 109 S Ct. 358, 488 US. 936,
102 L_ Ed2d 349

In general, speech mixed with conduct may be more
significantly regulated than pure speecWarina v. U.S.
D.C. App.1993, 622 A 2d 50

Where individual violates otherwise valid criminal statute,
First Amendment does not act as shield to preclude
prosecution of that individual simply because his criminal
conduct involves speecHJU.S. v. Riggs N D Ill 1990, 743
F Supp. 556

Fact that speech of newspaper and reporter may have been
constitutionally privileged under First Amendment did not
automatically protect them from private action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress based on publication of
article Upchurch v. New York Times Co.S C_ 1993, 431
S.E.2d 558

Rule which provided that it is professional misconduct for
lawyer to engage in conduct that is prejudicial to

administration of justice is not vague, so as to have chilling
effect on First Amendment rights Matter of Anderson, 1990.
795 P.2d 64, 247 Kan 208, certiorari denied 111 S Ct 985,
498 US 1095, 112 L Ed 2d 1069

l4a

Speech which ts critical of court or judge is protected by First
Amendment unless it presents clear and present danger that it
will influence court's decision in pending caseColeman v.
Caddo Parish School Bd, La App 2 Cir 1994, 635 So 2d
1238

"Actual malice," in defamation context, does not mean "ill
will," but means knowledge that statement was false, or
doubts about its truth couple with reckless disregard of
whether it was false Underwager v. Salter C A. 7 (Wis)
1994, 22 V.3d 730

Where information is from a source known to be hostile to
subject against whom material is to be used, failure to
investigate truth of allegations solely received from such
source may support finding that publication has been made in
wanton and reckless disregard of veracity. Fisher v. Larsen
(1982) 78 L_Ed2d 335, 464 US. 959, 138 C A 3d 627, 188
Cal Rptr 216

Privilege for publications or broadcasts made in_ judicial
proceeding applies only to communicative acts and does not
privilege tortious courses of conduct. West's Ann
Cal Civ Code 47(b)(2Kupiec v. American Intern.
Adjustment Co. (1991), 235 Cal App. 3d 1329 | Cal Rptr 2d
37)

15a

"Privilege" for statements made in course of judicial
proceeding did not preclude court from making evidentiary
use of statements made during negotiation sessions in prior
lawsuit in determining whether defendant in abuse of process
action acted for improper "ulterior" purpose Oren Royal
Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karms,
Inc. (1986) 42 C.3d 1157, 232 Cal. Rptr. 567.

"In all such instances the unsuccessful party is really
prevented, by the fraudulent contrivance of his adversary,
from having a trial; but when he has a trial he must be
prepared to meet and expose perjury then and there. He
knows that a false claim or defense can be supported in no
other way; that the very object of the trial is, if possible, to
ascertain the truth from the conflict of evidence, and ihat
necessarily the truth or falsity of the testimony must be
determined in deciding the issue. The trial is his opportunity
for making the truth appear...Kachig vy. Boothe22

Cal. App.3d 626, 634, 99 Cal Rptr. 393,397

Privilege for publications or broadcasts made in judicial
proceedings applies to any communication (1) made in judicial
Or quasi-judicial proceeding, (2) by litigants or other
participants authorized by law, in or out of court, (3) to
achieve objects of litigation, and (4) has some connection or
logical relation to action. West's Ann Cal Civ. Code Kupiec v.
American Intern. Adjustment Co.235 Cal App.3d 1329,
Cai Rptr.2d 371

16a

We conclude that Williams and Heninger correctly held that
an injured claimant has a right of recovery underRoyal Globe
only upon proof that the insured was actually liable to the
third party claimant. If the insured is not liable for the
claimant's injury, the claimant has no right to damages from
the insured, and the claimant cannot be permitted to recover
for “unfair conduct" by the insurer in refusing to settle and
underlying unmeritorious claim. Moradi-Shala v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. 46 Cal 3d 287,308,250 Cal Rptr. 116, 129, 758
P 2d 58

"To deny the injured party the right to recover any actual
damages in such cases, because they are of a nature which
cannot be thus certainly measured, would be to enable parties
to profit by, and speculate upon, their own wrongs, encourage
violence and invite depredation. Such is not and cannot be the
law..." Parchment Co. v. Paterson P. Paper Co. (1931) 282
US. at p 564, 51 S.Ct. at p251, citindsilbert v. Kennedy
(1871) 22 Mich. 117, 130

Attorneys would not be provided especially broad application
of this section rendering privileged publication or broadcast
made in judicial proceeding, the litigation privilege, to avoid
conflict of interest that might result if attorney were forced to
defend against invasion of privacy or illegal conduct claim as
codefendant with clients, so as to immunize attorney from
liability for alleged misconduct in aiding and abetting violation
of Privacy Act [Penal Code Section 630 et seq.]. Kimmel v.
Goland (1990) 51 Cal 3d 202, 793 P.2d 524, 271

Cal Rptr 191

17a
Title 28 § 1257. State courts; certiorari
(a) Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest

court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be
reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where the
validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in
question or where the validity of a statute of any State is
drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the
Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, or where
any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or
claimed under the Constitution or the treaties or statutes of, or
any commission held or authority exercised under, the United
States

The profession of the law possesses extraordinary powers
Lawyers can make the arrogant humble and the weak strong
In control of the course of litigation and armed with the
knowledge of right and wrong, they are most able to abjure
illegal or tortious conduct, it is their duty to do so. As
occupants of a high public trust and officers of the court, they
are expected to conform their behavior in legal affairs to a
higher standard of rectitude and spirit of obedience than those
who are willing to endure the dust of transgression.

Guided by oath, duty and obligation, the lawyer's path avoids
the vices from which the virtuous abstain. Thus, it ill suits the
profession to seek immunity for injuries inflicted while
engaged in legal warfare under the protective tarpaulin of the
privilege for "judicial proceedings Kimmel v. Goland
(1990) 51 Cal.3d 204, 213,271 Cal Rptr 191, 198

-?

18a

Finally, in immunizing participants from liability for torts
arising from communications made during judicial
proceedings, the law places upon litigants the burden of
exposing during trial the bias of witnesses and the falsity of
evidence, thereby enhancing the finality of judgments and
avoiding an unending roundelay of litigation, an evil far worse
than an occasional unfair result. Silberg v. Anderson (1990)

50 Cal.3d. 205, 214: 266 Cal. Rptr. 638, 643

As indicated above, a reviewing court, should not disturb the
exercise of a trial court's discretion unless it appears that there
has been a miscarriage of justice. This, in Loomis v. Loomis,
181 Cal App2d 345, 348-349 [4-6], 5 Cal Rptr 550, 552
[2-4], it was said: “it is fairly deducible from the cases that one
of the essential attributes of abuse of discretion is that it must
clearly appear to effect injustice Discretion is abused
whenever, in its exercise, the court exceeds the bounds of
reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered.
The burden is on the party complaining to establish an abuse
of discretion, and unless there has been a miscarriage of justice
a reviewing court will not substitute its opinion and thereby
divest the trial court of its discretionary power." (See also City
of Los Angles v. Superior Court, 271 Cal.App. 292, 294 [1],
76 Cal. Rptr. 256, Ordway v. Arata, 150 Cal.App2d 71, 78
309 P.2d 919, Estate of Hart, 119 Cal App2d 310, 318 [12],
259 P.2d 703 )Denham v. Superior Court of Los Angeles

County, 2 Cal. 3d 557, 568, 86 Cal Rptr 65, 71, 468 P.2d 193

19a

If the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the
motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to
refuse permission to amend and where the refusal also results
in a party being deprived of the right to assert a meritorious
cause of action or a meritorious defense, it is not only error
but an abuse of discretion. Cal.CasGen. Ins. v. Superior
Court 173 Cal App.3d 274, 279, 218 Cal. Rptr. 817, 819

Although it would have been preferable for plaintiff to have
specified the basis for amendment in addition to stating the
relief requested on motion to amend complaint, the error was
not a ground for denying the motion to ameRdtya v.
Maryatt Industries, N_D Cal.1993, 829 F.Supp. 1169

Leave to amend pleading should be freely granted to correct
or clarify insufficient statement of court's jurisdictional basis
over suit. Jacobi v. Blocker. ED. Va.1994, 153 F.R.D. 84

Fact that plaintiff pleads improper legal theory in complaint
does not preclude recovery under proper theory and selection
of improper remedy in demand is not fatal if claim indicates
that pleader is entitled to some other relief, sufficiency of
pleading 1s tested by statement of claim, and demand for
judgment is not considered part of clddimuccio v.
D'Ambra, M _D Fla.1991, 779 F Supp. 1318

Short and plain statement of claim showing that pleader is
entitled to relief, need not be factually detailed, but it must
give defendant fair notice of what plaintiff's claim is and
grounds upon which it restGallardo v. Board of County
Com'rs, Kearny County Kan. DKan 1994, 857 F Supp
783

20a

Despite statutory language indicating "reasonableness"
standard, statutory sanctions for vexatious filings are not
awarded unless attorney acted recklessly or in bad faith;
however, unlike sanctions under Rule 11, pleading does not
have to be entirely frivolous for statutory sanctions to attach,
so long as finding of bad faith or recklessness is madeln re
Keegan Management Co., Securities Litigation
N.D Cal.1994, 154 F R.D. 237

Fraud in the factum is such fraud in procurement of the
execution of an instrument as results in the signer's being
ignorant of the nature of the instrument he is signing The
theoretical basis of the defense of fraud in the factum is the
absence of a meeting of the minds, the mutual assent
necessary to the creation of a binding contract. If the signer
of a contract misapprehends the terms of a document, then he
has not, in fact, assented to its true terms. Signatures to
written releases obtained by fraud in the factum render such
releases void. Such a fraud or misrepresentation may be
deemed to have induced a party's signing of a release if it
substantially contributes to his decision to manifest his
consent. A release of a claim of personal injuries may be
rendered void on the grounds of fraud or misrepresentation
regarding the nature of the claim covered by the release so
long as the releasor's failure to learn the nature of the terms
was not attributable to his own negligence. Where a release
was obtained by fraud in the factum, the failure of a releasor
to read the contracts does not prevent courts from declaring
such contracts void. Frusetta v. Hauben(1990, 2nd Dist)
217 CA3d 551, 266 Cal Rptr. 62

2la

Where part of an act, declaration, conversation, or writing is
given in evidence by one party, the whole on the same subject
may be inquired into by an adverse party; when a letter is read,
the answer may be given, and when a detached act,
deciaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence, any
other act, declaration, conversation, or writing which is
necessary to make it understood may also be given in
evidence. Evidence Code Section 356.

In negligence action, statement by police officer that witness
to automobile accident had told him that first driver had gone
by fast was admissible as part of conversation that had already
been admitted regarding second driver's ability to go through

intersection. Carson v. Facilities Development Co.
(1984) 36 C. 3d 830, 206 Cal Rptr 136

Further testimony of insured regarding remainder of
conversation between insured and insurance representative
was admissible as having some bearing upon, or connection
with, admission of part of conversation in evidence and as
prior consistent statements. Sprague v. Equifax Inc. (App. 2
Dist. 1985) 166 C.A.3d1012,213 Cal.Rptr. 69.

Conviction for perjury requires that accused have specific
intent to make false statement under penalty of perjury,
statement must be known by accused to be false at time it was
made and must be willfully made. West's Ann. Cal. Penal
Code Section 118 - People v. Story(1985 2 Dist) 168
C.A.3d 849, 216 Cal Rptr. 158.

22a

Police officer who would deliberately lie in affidavit in support
of issuance of search warrant to mislead magistrate would be
subject to prosecution for perjury, and any officer who would
willfully procure another officer to commit such perjury
would be guilty of subornation of perjury. West's Ann. Cal.

Penal Code Sections 118, 119, 127. -People v. Truer(1985

5 Dist) 168 C.A. 3d 437, 214 Cal. Rptr. 869

In perjury prosecutions, material false statement is one which
is relevant to any subsidiary issue under consideration 8
U.S.C.A. Section 1621. - U.S. v. Clark (1990 Cal.) 918 F.2d
843.

Defect, if any, in complaint charging that first driver on certain
date a certain place drove tractor and trailer combination on
highway in speed in excess of 50 miles per hour in violation of
certain section of Vehicle Code was entirely procedural in
nature and was effectively waived for all purposes in absence
of objection, and therefore information charging that first
truck driver and second truck driver concocted story designed
to clear first truck driver of speeding charge, and that second
truck driver gave false testimony preventing conviction of first
truck driver sufficiently state perjury, subornation of perjury,
and conspiracy to obstruct justice West's Ann. Vehicle
Code, Sections 15, 22406, 40300, 40503. - Brown v.
Superior Court (1965) 234 C.A 2d 628, 44 Cal. Rptr. 519

The root requirement of the Due Process Clause is that an
individual be give an opportunity for a hearing before he is
deprived of any significant protected interest, hearing required
before termination of employment. Zinermon v. Burch 494
US. 126; 110 S Ct. 984.

23a
Due Process clause of Fourteenth Amendment protects an
individual's rights of access to civil courts, and deprivation if
this right is actionable undGSection 1983, Woodard v.
Mennella, (EDNY 1994) 861 F Supp 192

The right to sue and defend in the courts is the alternative of
force, and it is one of the highest and most essential privileges
of citizenship, and must be allowed by each state to the
citizens of all other states to the precise extent that it Is
allowed to its own citizens Chambers v. Baltimore, etc. R.
Co., (Ohio 1907) 28 S.Ct. 34, 207 US 142, 52 L.Ed. 143.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim may arise when a private actor
conspires with a state actor to deprive a person of a
constitutional right under color of state law. Dixon v. City
of Lawton, Oki, C A 10 (Okl.) 1990, 898 F.2d. 1443

Justice, indeed, must satisfy the appearance of justice, and this
stringent rule may sometimes bar trial even by judges who
have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh
the scales of justice equally between contending parties
Concrete Pipe & Prod. v. Const. Laborers Pen. Tr. (1993)
113 S.Ct. 2254, 2277

Since the causes of action in the amended complaint were
different legal theories arising from the same basic facts, the
alleged improper treatment of plaintiffs foot, the trial court
erred in refusing to allow the complaint to be amended
Herrera v. Superior Court (1984) 158 Cal App.3d._ 255; 204
Cal Rptr 553, 556

24a
Allegations in state court defendant's pro se complaint, that
state trial judge had acted out of spite or annoyance in
refusing to sign journal entry to permit defendant to appeal,
was sufficient to state claim under § 1983 for violation of
defendant's due process rights. Olson v. Hart, C_A.10 (Kan)
1992, 965 F2d. 940.

Purpose of rule depriving trial court of jurisdiction pending
appeal in civil actions is to protect jurisdiction of appellate
court, the rule prevents trial court from rendering the appeal
futile by changing the judgment into something different;
accordingly, whether a matter is embraced in or affected by a
judgment within the meaning of this section providing that the
perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial court
upon the judgment or order or upon the matters embraced
therein or affected thereby, depends on whether postjudgment
proceedings on the matter would have any effect on the
effectiveness of the appeal. In re Marriage of Horowitz
(App. | Dist. 1984) 159 C_.A.3d 377,205 Cal. Rptr. 880

I perceive no substantial countervailing reason why at the
certiorari stage this federal policy should not be applied to
state cases presenting arguably substantial federal questions
American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. et al. v.
American Broadcasting - Paramount Theatres, Inc. (1966)
873.Ct. I

The Anglo-American system of law is based not upon
transcendental revelation but upon the conscience of society
ascertained as best it may be by a tribunal disciplined for the
task and evironed by the best safeguards for disinterestedness
and detachment. Bartkus v. Illinois,359 US 121, 79 S.Ct

676

-25a-
Some of the apparent confusion over the meaning of "sham"
may stem from our use of the word "genuine" to denote the
opposite of "sham". The word "genuine" has both objective
and subjective connotations. On one hand, "genuine" means
“actually having the reputed or apparent qualities or
character." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 948
(1986). "Genuine" in this sense governs Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56, under which a "genuine issue" is one "that
properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because [it]
may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." On the
other hand, "genuine" also means " sincerely and honestly felt
or experienced." Webster's Dictionary,supra, at 948. To be
sham, therefore, litigation must fail to be "genuine" in both

senses of the word.6
6. In surveying the "forms of illegal and reprehensible practice which
may corrupt the administrative or judicial processes and which may result in
antitrust violations," we have noted that "unethical conduct in the Setting of
the adjudicatory process often results in sanctions" and that "[mjisrepresent-
ations, condoned in the political arena, are not immunized when used in the
adjudicatory process." California Motor Transport, 404 US., at $12-513,

92 S.Ct, at 613. We need not decide here whether and, and if so, to what
extent Noerr permits the imposition of antitrust liability for a litigant's fraud
or other misrepresentations. Cf Fed Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b)(3) (allowing a federal
court to "relieve a party ... from a final judgment" for "fraud ..., musrepresentation, or
other misconduct of an adverse party"); Walker
Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 US.

172, 176-177, 86 S.Ct. 347, 349-350, 15 LEd 2d 247 (1965); id., at 179-

180, 86 s.Ct., at 351-352 (Harlan, J., concurring)

Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures
Ind., Inc. (1993) 113 §.Ct. 1920, 1928-1929.

Mislabeling cause of action is immaterial, if facts that justify
imposition of liability on defendant are alleged and proved
Gagne v. Bertran (1954) 43 C.2d. 481, 275 P.2d. 15

26a

Nature and character of a pleading are to determined from its
allegations, regardless of what they may be called, and the
subject matter of the action and issues involved are
determined from the facts alleged than from the title of the
pleading. Kreutzer v. San Diego County (1984) 153 CA 3d
62, 100 Cal Rptr. 322

However, not all speech is protected by the first amendment.
The U.S. Supreme court stated, in Konigsberg v. California
State Bar, 366 US. 36, 49, 81 S.Ct. 997, 1006, 6 L.Ed. 2d
105 (1961):
At the outset we reject the view that
freedom of speech and association ... as
protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, are "absolutes," not only in the
undoubted sense that where the constitutional
protection exists it must prevail, but also in the
sense that the scope of that protection must be
gathered solely from at literal reading of the
First Amendment.
The Konigsburg Court noted at 49-50 n. 10, 81 S.Ct. at 1006
n. 10.
That view [freedom of speech is
absolute], which of course cannot be reconciled
with the law relating to libel, slander,
misrepresentation, obscenity, perjury, false
advertising, solicitation of crime, complicity by
encouragement, conspiracy, and the like, is said to
be compelled by the fact that the commands of the
First Amendment are stated in
unqualified terms: "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech..."
Consequently, as speech, fraud,
misrepresentation, and deceit are unprotected by the first
amendment. State v. Monastero (Neb. 1988) 424 N.W 2d
837, 843

California Civil Code Secti 7
and
lifornia Civil ion 47, amend
as of January 1, 1995

Re: The Malice Element

A privileged publication or broadcast is one made:

(a) In the proper discharge of an official duty

(b) In any (1) legislative or (2) judicial
proceeding, or (3) in any other official proceeding authorized
by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other
proceeding authorized by law and reviewable pursuant to
Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 1084) of Title | of Part
3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, except as follows

(2) This subdivision does not make privileged any
communication made in furtherance of an act of intentional
destruction or alteration of physical evidence undertaken for
the purpose of depriving a party to litigation of the use of that
evidence, whether or not the content of the communication is
the subject of a subsequent publication or broadcast which is
privileged pursuant to this section. As used in this paragraph,
"physical evidence" means evidence specified in Section 250
of the Evidence Code or evidence that is property of any type
specified in Section 2031 of the Code of Civil Procedure

(3) A goer lis gna is not a 20
li V1
scat al ceeds aaiaies ahh dinnia the te aes
of possession of real property. as authorized or required by
law

-27a I-

(c) In a communication, without malice, to a
person interested therein, (1) by one who is also interested, or
(2) by one who stands in such a relation to the person
interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the
motive for the communication to be innocent, or (3) who 1s
requested by the person interested to give the information

(d) By a fair and true report in a public journal, of
(1) a judicial, (2) legislative, or (3) other public official
proceeding, or (4) of anything said in the course thereof, or
(5) or a verified charge or complaint made by any person to a
public official, upon which complaint a warrant has been
issued

(e) By a fair and true report of (1) the proceedings
of a public meeting, if the meeting was lawfully convened for a
lawful purpose and open to the public, or (2) the publication
of the matter complained of was for the public benefit.

CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE SECTION 47, AMENDED
JANUARY 1, 1995.

The people of the State of California do enact as follows:

SECTION 1. It is the intent of the Legislature in
amending Section 47 of the Civil Code to overturn the
decision inCalifornia Dredging Company v. Insurance
Company of North America, 18 Cal. App. 4th 572.

Section 2. Section 47 of the Civil Code is amended
to read

47 A privileged publication or broadcast is one
made

(a) In the proper discharge of an official duty

-27a 2-

(b) — In any (1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial
proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by
law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding
authorized by law and reviewable pursuant to Chapter 2
(commencing with Section 1084) of Title 1 of Part 3 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, except as follows:

(2) This subdivision does not make privileged any
communication made in furtherance of an act of intentional
destruction or alteration of physical evidence undertaken for
the purpose of depriving a party to litigation of the use of that
evidence, whether or not the content of the communication is
the subject of a subsequent publication or broadcast which is
privileged pursuant to this section. As used in this paragraph,
"physical evidence" means evidence specified in Section 250
of the Evidence Code or evidence that is property of any type
specified in Section 2031 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(3) This subdivision does not make privileged any
communication made in a judicial proceeding knowingly
concealing to existence of an insurance policy or policies.

(4) A recorded lis pendens is not a privileged
publication unless it identifies an action previously filed with a
court of competent jurisdiction which affects the title or right
of possession of real property, as authorized or required by
law

(c) In a communication, without malice, to a

person interested therein, (1) by one who is also interested, or
(2) by one who stands in such a relation to the person
interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the
motive for the communication to be innocent, or (3) who is
requested by the person interested to give the information.

-27a 3-
(d) By a fair and true report in a public journal, of
(1) a judicial, (2) legislative, or (3) other public official
proceeding, or (4) of anything said in the course thereof. or
(5) or a verified charge or complaint made by any person to a
public official, upon which complaint a warrant has been
issued.

(e) By a fair and true report of (1) the proceedings
of a public meeting, if the meeting was lawfully convened for a
lawful purpose and open to the public, or (2) the publication
of the matter complained of was for the public benefit.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386012_1648%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
