# Appendix — Felix v. United States

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386012_0961%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1995
- **Citation:** 513 U.S. 1113

## Text

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS

No. 93-0861
CMR No. 828476

UNITED STATES, APPELLEE,
V.

CHRISTOPHER A. FELIX, AIRMAN
U.S. AiR FORCE, APPELLANT.

Argued April 19, 1994.
Decided Sep. 16, 1994.

Counsel

For Appellant: Colonel Jay L. Cohen (argued); Captain
Robert I. Smith (on brief); Lieutenant Colonel Frank L.
Spinner.

For Appellee: Colonel Jeffery T. Infelise (argued); Cap-
tain Jules D. Silberberg (on brief); Major Barnard N.
Madsen.

Military Judge: Kenneth D. Randall

Opinion of the Court

Cox, Judge:

In the case at bar we are asked to decide the providence
of appellant’s guilty pleas to two specifications of escaping

(la)

2a

from correctional custody, and whether the Court of Mili-
tary Review erred in deciding to review that issue, en
banc.' We first consider the issue of en banc review.

Appellant was tried by special court-martial composed
of officer members. Pursuant to his conditional pleas, he
was convicted of failure to obey an order not to consume
alcohol, and of escaping from correctional custody (two
specifications), in violation of Articles 92 and 134, Uni-
form Code of Military Justice, 10 USC §§ 892 and 934,
respectively. He was sentenced to a bad-conduct dis-
charge, confinement for 5 months, and reduction to the
lowest enlisted pay grade. The convening authority ap-
proved the sentence.

On appeal, appellant’s case was originally heard by a
panel of three Court of Military Review judges (Senior
Judge Leonard and Judges James and Johnson), who
agreed to set aside all findings of guilty. 36 MJ 903, 913

' The granted issues are:
I

WHETHER THE PLEAS TO CHARGE II, BOTH SPECI-
FICATIONS, ARE IMPROVIDENT BECAUSE THE
FACTS INDICATE THE RESTRAINT IMPOSED ON
APPELLANT IN CORRECTIONAL CUSTODY WAS
MORAL, NOT PHYSICAL.

WHETHER THE AIR FORCE COURT OF MILITARY
REVIEW, A MAJORITY OF WHICH DISAGREED
WITH THE ORIGINAL PANEL’S DECISION, ERRED
BY DECIDING THE CASE AT BAR EN BANC, AP-
PARENTLY UNDER THE GUISE THAT THE PROVI-
DENCY OF APPELLANT’S PLEAS WAS A “QUESTION
OF EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE” WITHIN THE
MEANING OF RULE 17 OF THE COURTS OF MILI-
TARY REVIEW RULES OF PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE.

3a

n.11 (AFCMR 1993) (en banc) (James, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). During “off-panel” circula-
tion, a Court of Military Review judge who did not sit on
the panel suggested en banc consideration of appellant’s
case, and a majority of the court agreed. /d. The en banc
court heard appellant’s case and produced four opinions.?

2 The opinion of Judge James, with whom Senior Judge Leonard
and Judge Johnson joined, concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part,
attacks the propriety of en banc reconsideration of appellant’s case
following a hearing before a three-judge panel. Judge James opined:

Rule 17 of the Courts of Military Review Rules of Practice
and Procedure, 22 MJ CXXVII, CXXXIII, provides that
such reconsideration “ordinarily will not be ordered except
(1) when consideration by the full Court is necessary to
secure or maintain uniformity of decision, or (2) when the
proceedings involve a question of exceptional importance, or
(3) when a sentence being reviewed . . . extends to death.”
There was no conflict among decisions of different panels on
any issue in this case, and the punishment obviously does not
extend to death.

One might question whether such a subjective standard as
“exceptional importance” is so devoid of discernible criteria
as really to constitute mo rule. Were that the case, such a
judicial mugging as this one would be in violation of the
statute’s “in accordance with rules” clause. [Art. 66(a), Uni-
form Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 866(a).]... .

The decision of the majority to reconsider this case en
banc can be justified only on the basis that this is a case of
exceptional importance, and it demonstrates that the stand-
ard in the rules is interpreted by this Court as broad enough
to cover any situation where the majority disagrees with a
panel’s decision. The question of how to properly charge of-
fenses against correctional custody meets no plausible stand-
ard of “exceptional importance.” Surely this excursion into a
seldom visited back alley of military justice is not what the
Congress and the Judge Advocates General had in mind
when they gave us permission to shoot our toes off. . . .

Id. at 913 n.11.

da

The majority set aside the findings of guilty of failure to
obey a lawful order not to consume alcohol; affirmed the
remaining findings; and reassessed appellant’s sentence to
include a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 4
months, and reduction to the lowest enlisted level. 36 MJ
at 910-11.

Article 66(a), UCMJ, 10 USC § 866(a), provides that
“fajny decision of a panel may be reconsidered by the
court sitting as a whole in accordance with such rules” as
are prescribed by the Judge Advocates General. Rule 17(a)
of the Courts of Military Review Rules of Practice and
Procedure sets guidelines for en banc proceedings:

A majority of the judges present for duty may
order that any appeal or other proceeding be
considered or reconsidered, except as indicated
in section (c) below, by the Court sitting as a
whole. Such consideration or reconsideration or-
dinarily will not be ordered except (1) when con-
sideration by the full Court is necessary to secure
Or maintain uniformity of decision, or (2) when
the proceedings involve a question of exceptional
importance, or (3) when a sentence being re-
viewed pursuant to Article 66 extends to death.

22 MJ CXXXIII (emphasis added).

The first category of circumstances under which en banc
review is usually appropriate is where it is necessary for
uniformity. While en banc review is obviously helpful
where panels have reached inconsistent results, it might
also be deemed necessary by the courts where there is dis-
agreement among the judges and a panel might reach a
result that would make what is considered to be bad law or
law contrary to the majority view. In either case, review by —
the court sitting as a whole is entirely appropriate.

Sa

The second category where en banc consideration is
warranted is where a question of “exceptional importance”
is involved. What is of exceptional importance is a ques-
tion for the majority of the Court of Military Review to
determine. Deciding whether defining a crime, preventing
bad precedent, or preventing future inconsistencies is of
exceptional importance is within the court’s domain.

Additionally, we note that Rule 17 does not provide an
exclusive list of appropriate circumstances for en banc
review, but mereiy suggests when Courts of Military
Review should probably review cases en banc. The term
“ordinarily” precedes the list of circumstances where
review seems appropriate, and again, defining what is or-
dinary, out of the ordinary, or exceptional, is within the
province of the Court of Military Review. As we stated in
United States v. Flowers, 26 MJ 463, 465 (CMA 1988),
“we are confident that the court is cognizant of its own
rules and complies therewith.” We will not disturb the
court’s decision to reconsider appellant’s case en banc.

Next, we turn to the providence of appellant’s guilty
pleas. Appellant pleaded guilty to two specifications of
escaping correctional custody, but on appeal, he chal-
lenges the providence of those pleas, claiming he was
under moral, rather than physical, restraint. The offense
of escaping from correctional custody is “the act of a per-
son undergoing the punishment of correctional custody
pursuant to Article 15, [UCMJ, 10 USC § 815,] who,
before being set at liberty by proper authority, casts off
any physical restraint imposed by the custodian or by the

3 The issue as framed by appellant asks whether his case was one of
“exceptional importance” warranting en banc reconsideration. The
court’s rationale for reviewing appellant’s case en banc was never ar-
ticulated, and we will not limit our discussion of reconsideration en
banc to that on the basis of “exceptional importance.”

6a

place or conditions of custody.” Para. 70(c)(1), Part IV,
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984. The ele-
ments of that offense are as follows:

(a) That the accused was placed in correctional
custody by a person authorized to do so;

(b) That, while in such correctional custody, the
accused was under physical restraint;

(c) That the accused freed himself or herself
from the physical restraint of this correctional
custody before being released therefrom by prop-
er authority; and

(d) That, under the circumstances, the conduct
of the accused was to the prejudice of good order
and discipline in the armed forces or was of a
nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

Para. 70(b)(1).

Appellant was put into correctional custody by his
squadron commander who was authorized to place him in
custody [see Art. 15(b)(2)(H)(ii)], and appellant knew he
was not allowed to leave the correctional custody facility
without the permission of a Correctional Custody Monitor
unless he was assigned to a work detail outside the facility.
He admitted that on February 9, 1991, he “snuck out” of
the facility without proper authorization and went to the
Slots-of-Fun Casino where he had a couple of beers before
returning to the facility. He was the only one in correc-
tional custody, “was bored,” and “went out through the
back door.” Appellant stated there was “no security in that
place whatsoever.” He was gone approximateiy 3'2 to 4
hours. He left the facility again on February 13, 1991,
without authorization. He went out through the back door
while the monitor was in his office and went to an apart-

7a

ment to place a phone call to his girlfriend; he returned to
the facility after being gone about an hour.

The military judge explained the elements of the offense
to appellant twice. Appellant said he understood the ele-
ments and said, specifically, that he was “under physical
restraint” imposed by correctional custody. Following the
providence inquiry, United States v. Care, 18 USCMA
535, 40 CMR 247 (1969), appellant reaffirmed his desire to
plead guilty.

Article 15 describes correctional custody as “the physi-
cal restraint of a person during duty or nonduty hours and
may include extra duties, fatigue duties, or hard labor.”*
The Manual for Courts-Martial discusses two different of-
fenses against correctional custody: escape from correc-
tional custody and breach of correctional custody. Para.
70(b), Part IV.

Although there are two degrees of offenses described in
the Manual, by definition there is only one form of correc-
tional custody. “Correctional custody” equals physical re-
straint. If the conditions of a facility designated by the ser-

4 The Court of Military Review noted:

The President defines correctional custody as “the physical
restraint of a person during duty or non-duty hours, or both,
imposed as a punishment under Article 15... .” [PJara-
graph S(c)(4) [Part V, Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States, 1984]. This definition is taken almost verbatim from
the Senate Report explaining the 1962 amendment to Article
15. Prior to defining correctional custody, the Senate Armed
Services Committee stated as follows: “The bill contains a
form of physical restraint not authorized in existing law, and
termed ‘correctional custody.’” S.Rep.No. 1911, 87th
Cong., ist Sess. 7 (1962) (emphasis added).

36 MJ at 906-07. We do not consider ihe President's description of
correctional custody inclusive of all possible conditions of correc-
tional custody punishment. In other words, we do not consider correc-
tional custody, by definition, to include physical restraint.

8a

vicemember’s commander as the “correctional custody”
facility do not provide for physical restraint, then the
facility is something other than a “correctional custody”
facility. A servicemember ordered to such a facility simply
is not in “correctional custody”; rather, he or she is “re-
stricted.”° The majority opinion of the Court of Military
Review described it this way:

[I]n the absence of evidence to the contrary, a
correctee is under physical restraint whenever he
or she has been committed to a designated cor-
rectional custody setting (a centralized base
facility or designated area within a facility) under
the supervision of a monitor, and with knowl-
edge he or she is not to leave except under speci-
fied conditions.

36 MJ at 908.

In this case, appellant admitted to being in correctional
custody. The Government, by virtue of appellant’s admis-
sions, stipulations of fact, and pleas of guilty, was relieved
from proving this fact by actual testimony. In light of the
clear and unambiguous response by the accused, we will
not speculate as to the true condition of the correctional
custody facility at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. See
United States v. Prater, 32 MJ 433 (CMA 1991); United
States v. Harrison, 26 MJ 474 (CMA 1988).

Two other observations are called for in light of the
distinction made in the Manual for Courts-Martial be-
tween “breaches” of and “escapes” from correctional
custody. First, both offenses flow from the same fountain-
head—the lawful imposition of Article 15 nonjudicial
punishment. The lawful imposition of the punishment is
no more or less than a lawful order of the commanding

’ This is analogous to being “pregnant.” Either one is or one isn’t.

9a

officer requiring a servicemember to perform a lawfully
imposed duty. If a servicemember refuses to do that duty,
the offense could be punished under Article 90, UCMJ, 10
UCMJ § 890, as a willful disobedience offense. Thus, the
Article 134 offenses are in reality redundant and most like-
ly are there for sentencing considerations rather than to
create new offenses under the rubric of general disorders.
Why the President chose to treat breaches of correctional
custody as less serious offenses (for to some they appear
more serious than many other Article 90 offenses) than
other disobedience cases escapes us, but there they are.

The second observation is that breaches of correctional
custody and escapes are distinguishable only if there is cor-
rectional custody in the first instance. The question of
whether a particular facility or situation constitutes “cor-
rectional custody” is a question of fact and, as stated
earlier, there can be no correctional custody without
physical restraint. Once that fact is established, the next
question is whether the accused “escaped” or whether he
was lawfully free of the physical restraints (for example,
authorized to report for duty elsewhere during duty
hours), and “breached” the custody by not returning there-
to as duly required.

Notwithstanding these distinctions, in this case we are
convinced appellant knowingly and voluntarily admitted
guilt, gave up trial rights, and gave up defenses to the
charges. United States v. Penister, 25 MJ 148, 153 (CMA
1987) (Cox, J., concurring). While arguably appellant’s
unsworn statement casts some doubt on the effectiveness of
the physical restraints employed in this correctional custody
facility, they do not render appellant’s pleas improvident.°®

® Article 45(a), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 845(a),
States:

If an accused after arraignment makes an irregular pleading,
or after a plea of guilty sets up matter inconsistent with the

10a

At no time did he dispute the fact that he was duly re-
quired to be in the “designated correctional custody set-
ting.”

The decision of the United States Air Force Court of
Military Review is affirmed.

Chief Judge SULLIVAN and Judges CRAWFORD, GIERKE,
and Wiss concur.

plea, or if it appears that he has entered the plea of guilty im-
providently or through lack of understanding of its meaning
and effect, or if he fails or refuses to plead, a plea of not
guilty shall be entered in the record, and the court shall pro-
ceed as though he had pleaded not guilty.

See RCM 910(h)(2), Manual, supra.

lla

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE COURT
OF MILITARY REVIEW

ACM S828476
UNITED STATES
Vv.

AIRMAN CHRISTOPHER A. FELIX, FR566-11-8921
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

10 February 1993
paren) | Serene

Sentence adjudged 25 February 1991 by SPCM con-
vened at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. Military Judge;
Kenneth D. Randall.

Approved sentence: Bad-conduct discharge, confine-
ment for 5 months, and reduction to E-1.

Appellate Counsel for the Appellant: Colonel Jeffrey R.
Owens, Lieutenant Colonel Terry J. Woodhouse, Major
George P. Clark, Captain Michael D. Burt, and Captain
Rovert I. Smith.

Appellate Counsel for the United States: Major Paul H.
Blackwell, Jr., Major Jeffrey C. Lindquist, and Captain
James B. Wager, Jr.

l2a

En Banc

Dixon, O’HAIR, LEONARD, SNYDER, MCLAUTHLIN,
JAMES, GRUNICK, JOHNSON, and HEIMBURG Appellate
Military Judges.

Opinion of the Court
SNYDER, Judge:

Pursuant to conditional pleas of guilty,' appellant was
convicted by special court-martial of failure to obey a
lawful order, and two specifications of escape from cor-
rectional custody. He was sentenced to a bad-conduct
discharge, 5 months confinement, and reduction to E-1.
Appellant raises five assignments of error, of which three
merit extensive discussion. We granted partial relief on the
findings and sentence.

Appellant now claims his pleas to the specifications and
charge, Charge II, are improvident. The basis for his
assertion is that comments in his unsworn statement dur-
ing sentencing raised matter inconsistent with his plea.
Specifically, he suggests the restraint he breached was
moral, rather than physical.’ Because of the salient facts
of the instant case, for appellant’s contention to prevail,
we must accept the premise that a person placed in a
designated, supervised correctional custody facility is not
thereby under physical restraint. Indeed, appellant’s sup-
emental brief argues as much. We disagree. Absent some

' R.C.M. 910(a)(2). We continue to remind staff judge advocates
that, if the issue preserved by a cunditional guilty plea is not case
dispositive, it should not be accepted.

2 Articles 92 and 134, UCMJ (10 U.S. §§ 992, 934, (1988)).

> As is usually the case, this issue would have been avoided with a
more thorough providence inquiry, as well as a more comprehensive
stipulation of fact.

l3a

evidence contradicting appellant’s concession that he was
under physical restraint in a centralized, monitored correc-
tional custody facility, we decline to hold that his unsworn
statement raising the possibility that the physical restraint
was ineffective was a matter inconsistent with his pleas of
guilty to escape from correctional custody.

Absent evidence demonstrating appellant was being
controlled by moral restraint at the time of the offense, we
find provident, his pleas that he escaped by casting off the
restraint of a monitored, centralized correctional custody
facility, regardless of the means by which he did so.

I. FACTS

The following dialogue transpired between appellant
and the military judge:

MJ: And are you, were there in fact limits on where
you could go, within correctional custody,
without the permission of the correctional
custody monitor?

J ;
Acc: Was there an outline, you mean —

MJ: Yes.
Acc: —as far as I could go?
MJ: Um-hum.

Acc: I don’t remember seeing anything like that.
MJ: No, but I mean—

Ace: No, I —

MJ: —did you understand that you were under
physical restraint

Acc: —yes, sir.

MJ: —imposed by this correctional custody?

Acc: Yes, sir.
MJ: And that you would need the permission of the
correctional custody monitor in order to go

Acc:
MJ:

Acc:
MJ:

Acc:
MJ:

Acc:
MJ:
Acc:

MJ:
Acc:
MJ:
Acc:
MJ:

Acc:

l4a

out of the correctional custody facility unless
you were out on some kind of a work detail or
something like that?
Yes, sir.
And you knew of the limits, the limitations
placed on you with, in terms of physical
restraint, by this, —
Yes, sir.
—by your status of being in correctional
custody?
Yes, sir.
Okay. Now did you, on the 9th of February,
free yourself from the physical restraint that
had been imposed upon you?
Yes, sir.
What'd you do? Did you go downtown?
Went downtown, sir.

” + * * *
Now, on the 13th of February, was your status
still the same as it was on the 9th of
February, —
Yes, it was.
—as being in correctional custody?
Yes, sir.
And again, you were aware of that status, is
that correct?
Yes, sir.

*x * * * -

Okay. What did you do on the 13th of
February to escape from correctional custody?

1 needed to go use the phone, sir. . . and I left
through the back door.

lSa

MJ: And did you in fact surreptitiously leave the
correctional custody facility without permis-
sion from anyone who could give you permis-
sion to leave?

Acc: Yes, sir.

A stipulation of fact entered into by all parties at trial
reflects the appellant left the correctional custody facility
and went to a Las Vegas casino where he consumed beer.
While there, he remarked to a noncommissioned officer
working part-time at the casino that “I just snuck out of
CC.” Regarding the 13 February offense, the stipulation
of fact reflects the appellant departed the facility “out the
back door while the CC monitor was in his office.”

Il. CORRECTIONAL CUSTODY

Appellant argues that finding physical restraint on the
facts of the instant case renders paragraph 70, MCM,
redundant. His argument refers to the second element of
the offense, which requires tue correctee to be under
physical restraint while in correctional custody. MCM,
Part IV, paragraph 70(b)(1)(b) (1984). The essence of this
argument is that the trial judge should have inquired into
what extent, if any, the facility deterred or hampered ap-
pellant’s freedom of movement. This argument fails to ac-
count for the essence of correctional custody.

Correctional custody is an authorized nonjudicial
punishment pursuant to Article 15, UCMJ (10 U.S.C.
§ 815). The President defines correctional custody as “the
physical restraint of a person during duty or nonduty
hours, or both, imposed as a punishment under Article 15.

4 Appellant completes his logical circle by concluding that, if so,
then that element would require the instructions to state, “while in
such correctional custody, the accused was in correctional custody.”

l6a

...” MCM, 1984, Part V, paragraph 5(c)(4) (1984). This
definition is taken almost verbatim from the Senate
Report explaining the 1962 amendment to Article 15.
Prior to defining correctional custody, the Senate Armed
Services Committee stated as follows: “The bill contains a
form of physical restraint not authorized in existing law,
and termed ‘correctional custody’.” S. Rep. No. 1991, 87th
Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1962) (emphasis added).

Although there is a paucity of decisions involving cor-
rectional custody, the few in existence do not contradict
the crystal clear intent of Congress and the President to
make correctional custody a form of physical restraint,
especially when the issue actually before the Court is
separated from the collateral aspects. In United States v.
Carson, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 407, 35 C.M.R. 379 (1965), atten-
tion might be diverted to the fact the correctee was locked
in a barracks room. The issue before the Court, however,
was whether the members had to find the correctional
custody was legally imposed as an element of the offense
of escape from correctional custody. The Court held that
was a question of law and not an element of the offense
for the factfinders. The decision placed no emphasis what-
soever on the fact the accused was actually locked up while
undergoing correctional custody. In fact, the instructed
elements required the members only to find the accused
was in correctional custody and he freed himself from the
restraint of that custody before proper release.

In United States v. Mackie, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 14, 36
C.M.R. 170 (1966), a case involving breach of correctional
custody, appellate defense counsel argued to the Court
that, because correctional custody and confinement dif-
fered only in semantics, correctional custody should be
imposed only by sentence of court-martial. 36 C.M.R. at
174. The Court disposed of the issue by emphasizing the
correctee’s right to demand trial by court-martial in lieu

17a

of Article 15 proceedings. There was no effort by the
Court to articulate a position that correctional custody is
not physical restraint.

This same issue was revisited during the United States
Court of Military Appeals’ decisions applying Argersinger
v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), to UCMJ practice.’ The
argument was, because of the absence of a real distinction
between correctional custody and confinement, Article 15
punishments which imposed correctional custody without
representation by counsel should be inadmissible in a
subsequent trial by court-martial as are summary courts-
martial convictions which impose confinement without the
accused being represented by counsel.® United States v.
Shamel, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 362, 47 C.M.R. 116 (1973). To
Judge Quinn, correctional custody resembled restriction
more than confinement, but only because of the dif-
ferences in treatment accorded correcteees vis a vis
prisoners, not on the absence of physical restraint. His
final comparison was to detention after school. 47 C.M.R.
at 117. Although they differed on the disposition of the
ultimate issue, the other two judges could not discern a
substantive difference between correctional custody and
confinement. Shamel, 47 C.M.R. at 118, 119 (dincan, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Alderman, 22 U.S.C.M.A.

’ Argersinger held that, even in misdemeanor actions, one cannot
be sentenced to confinement, unless represented by counsel. This deci-
sion impacted the manner by which the armed forces administer trials
by summary courts-martial. See Article 20, UCMJ (10 U.S.C. § 820
(1988)); R.C.M. 1301. Because Article 15 provides for correctional
custody as an authorized punishment, the issue spilled over to Article
15 actions.

6 Argensinger impacts admissibility under R.C.M. 1001(b)(3) for
aggravation purposes, and under R.C.M. 1003(d)(1) and (2) for
sentence enhancement purposes. It does not impact admissibility for
impeachment under Mil. R. Evid. 609.

18a

298, 46 C.M.R. 298, 308 at n.1 (1973) (Darden, C.J.,
dissenting).

In short, there is nothing in those decisions to indicate
correctional custody is not physical restraint.

Appellant’s resort to comparisons with the offense of
escape from confinement is persuasive, but in a manner
contrary to his position.’ Appellant mistakenly interprets
our decision in United States v. Hodge, 50 C.M.R. 445
(1975), to mean that more than a casting off of confine-
ment status must be shown to constitute an escape, and,
from that interpretation concludes the same holds for cor-
rectional custody. In fact, the part of Hodge appellant
relies upon provides that evidence which shows the pro-
cedural requirements for confinement were accomplished
is not proof, per se, that a person actually was placed in
confinement. We held that, although Hodge had not been
physically placed in the confinement facility, because the
procedural steps were properly completed, and he was
committed to the corrections supervisor who could not
refuse to accept him, he was in confinement. Hodge’s con-
finement status having attached, his flight from his guards
en route to the facility constituted an escape from confine-
ment, not an escape from custody. 50 C.M.R. at 448.

Any doubt in this regard should have been eliminated by
our decision in United States v. Cornell, 19 M.J. 735
(A.F.C.M.R. 1984), which reemphasized our holding in
United States v. Maslanich, 13 M.J. 611 (A.F.C.M.R.
1982). Once confinement status attaches, the throwing off
of that status by any means, whether by physically over-
powering a guard, picking a lock, or by simply walking
away, constitutes an escape. See United States v. Felty,

’ Although correctional custody is physical restraint, it is not con-
finement. Consequently, the comparison of decisions on the two be
read in that light.

19a

12 M.J. 438 (C.M.A. 1982). In Cornell we affirmed an

escape from confinement where a minimum custody

prisoner (who did not require an escort, etc.) left the in-

Stallation without permission, rather than going to his
stated destination.

The fact that correctional custody anticipates and man-
dates periods when the correctee is subject to moral
restraint does not cancel the inherent status of physical
restraint.’ This factor is reflected in the Secretary of the
Air Force’s (SAF) implementation of the correctional
custody provisions of Article 15. The Air Force concept
States, in part, “[T]he deprivation of liberty is a severe
punishment to be carefully considered and imposed only
when it is necessary to closely hold the offender in a treat-
ment setting.” Air Force Regulation 125-35, Correctional
Custody, para. 2 (4 September 1981). AFR 125-35 does
not reflect any intent on the part of SAF to prosecute cor-
rectional custody offenses solely by charging breach of
correctional custody, as the Secretary of the Army ap-
parently has done. See United States v. Kellner, 16 M.J.
524 (A.C.M.R. 1983). We note this is a policy decision by
the Army which has no effect upon the essence of a cor- .
rectee’s status while in custody.

Comprehensive analysis of correctional custody reveals
that moral restraint is present when the correctee is outside
or beyond the designated, monitored correctional

® To help the factfinders focus on whether a correctee has actualiy
committed a breach of correctional custody as opposed to an escape,
the instruction on breach cautions as follows:
Although a person in correctional custody is a/ways under
physical restraint, this offense involves the breach of other
specific limitations upon a person’s freedom of movement while
under the physical restraint (emphasis added).

Department of The Army Pamphlet 27-9, Military Judges’
Benchbook, Change 1, para. 3-136 (18 February 1985).

ne

20a

custody setting, e.g., when performing one’s normal duties
or when on unsupervised details, and when following
designated routes to and from the correctional custody
facility. When this standard is applied, the language of
MCM, Part IV, para. 70(b)(1)(b)(1984) is not redundant.

Therefore, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a
correctee is under physical restraint whenever he or she has
been committed to a designated correctional custody set-
ting (a centralized base facility or designated area within a
facility or designated area within a facility) under supervi-
sion of a monitor, and with knowledge he or she is not to
leave except under specified circumstances.

Il. PROVIDENCY OF PLEAS

A. Pleas to Escape From Correctional Custody

With these salient legal principles in mind, we now turn
to appellant’s pleas. Although appellant pleaded guilty, it
is axiomatic that if he set up matters inconsistent with that
plea at trial, or pleaded improvidently, his guilty pleas
cannot stand. Article 45(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 845(a).
More than a possible ingenious conflict is required. There
must be evidence of a substantial conflict with the
accused’s plea. United States v. Logan, 22 U.S.C.M.A.
349, 47 C.N.R. 1 (1973). However, we also must bear in
mind appelant’s pleas precluded the Government from
putting on a more detailed case and developing the facts.
United States v. Burnette, 35 M.J. 58 (C.M.A. 1992). Ac-
cordingly, for us to set aside appellant’s pleas, the record
must show a substantive basis in law and fact for question-
ing his guilty pleas. United States v. Prater, 32M.J. 433
(1991). Further, an inconsistency is not generated by the
absence of evidence from the record, but from the record’s
entirety. The same holds true for providency. Although
additional evidence may be desirable, if the record in its

2la

entirety reflects appellant knew the elements of the offense
to which he pleaded guilty and admitted freely, even if the
trial judge did not fully explain them, and there is a factual
basis for his pleas, the pleas will stand. United States vy.
Jones, 34 M.J. 270 (C.M.A. 1992).

The Stipulation of Fact reflects appellant was commit-
ted to Nellis AFB’s Correctional Custody Facility. As in-
dicated above, appellant admitted he knew he was under
physical restraint by virtue of his status of being in correc-
tional custody and that he could not leave the facility
without permission. Nowhere in the record is there an in-
dication the facility was viewed as moral restraint during
evening hours. In fact, appellant avoided a monitor to
depart on the second occasion. We may reasonably infer
the monitor also was on duty during his first departure.
During the providency inquiry into the second escape, the
trial judge specifically referred appellant back to his
responses on the first escape to ensure appellant was
following him.

The MCM defines escape from correctional custody as:

The act of a person undergoing the punishment of
correctional custody pursuant to Article 15, who.
before being set at liberty by proper authority, casts
off any physical restraint imposed b y the custodian or
by the place or conditions of custody (emphasis
added).

MCM, Part IV, paragraph 70c(1) (1984). Appellant’s
responses to the trial judge clearly reflect acts which fall
within that definition. His leaving without permission cast
off a restraint imposed by the custodian, in the form of the
monitor, as well as the place of his custody, the designated
facility. It was not essential for the trial judge to ascertain
how appellant cast off the physical restraint and his status
imposed upon him. Appellant’s status while in the moni-

22a

tored facility transcended whether the back door was
locked, or whether the facility even had locks and bars.
Appellant knowingly and freely admitted to his status of
physical restraint by being in correctional custody and
escaping thereform. His pleas were provident. United
States v. Burnetter, 35 M.J. 58 (C.M.A. 1992); United
States v. Jones, 34 M.J. 270 (C.M.A. 1992); United States
v. Prater, 32 M.J. 433 (C.M.A. 1991).

We also find appellant’s pleas were consistent
throughout the entire trial. During appellant’s unsworn
statement, defense counsel asked, “how’d you actually get
out?” Appellant responded, “there’s no security in that
place whatsoever. It’s just, | went out through the back
door.” We do not view this remark as matter inconsistent
with an admission of escape, but mere rationalization by
appellant to justify his behavior.’ United States v.
Penister, 25 M.J. 148 (C.M.A. 1987). To state, in essence,
had he been chained to his bed, or locked in his room, he
would not have left, is to state the obvious. The absence of
security devices does not convert appellant’s restraint to
moral restraint. Neither does his rationalization render his
comment substantively inconsistent with his plea.
Penister, 25 M.J. at 153 (Cox, J., concurring).

B. Plea to Failure To Obey An Order

As a result of appellant taking the pleasure of a beer
during his first sojourn from correctional custody, he was
charged with failure to obey a lawful order. The act was
alleged as a violation of Correctional Custody Operating

* Unlike our dissenting brethren, we do not believe it necessary to
look beyond appellant’s pleas to ascertain “how much” physical
restraint was imposed upon him while in the facility. Appellant’s quip
while at the casino reflects his knowledge he had to bypass more than
his personal moral recognizance to leave the facility.

23a

Instruction 39-6, para. 2e. Its specific title, “Correctee
Honor System.”

We find this “order” to be so broad and vague that it
amounts to no order at all. Although the Instruction cau-
tions the reader that, “Violations of the honor system...
may be cause for disciplinary action,” it falls short of be-
ing sufficiently clear and definite to place one on notice of
the prohibited conduct. See generally United States y.
Benway, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 345, 41 C.M.R. 345 (1970);
United States v. Baker, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 504, 40 C.M.R.
216 (1969); United States v. Hogsett, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 681,
25 C.M.R. 185 (1958). For example, the provision sup-
posedly forbidding the consumption of alcohol is under
the heading of: “The following will not be condoned: .. .
consumption of alcohol.” Also not to be condoned are:
quibbling and evasiveness, profanity (not defined), at-
titudes (non-specified), alterations, infringements upon
privacy, and the refusal to render assistance to those in
need. On balance, the Instruction reads more like a civics
lesson than a militry order. Consequently, the Instruction,
as a whole, fails to state a military order enforceable under
Article 92, UCMJ. United States v. Scott, 22 U.S.C.M.A.
25, 46 C.M.R. 25 (1972).

There remains the issue of our possibly approving a
finding of the lesser offense of dereliction of duty. Where
a providence inquiry fully aprises an accused of the
elements of an included offense as part of the elements of
the charged offense, and an accused’s responses knowingly
and clearly admits the included offense, we may approve
an included offense on appeal. See United States y.
Sassaman, 32 M.J. 687 (A.F.C.M.R. 1991); Cf. United
States v. Brown, 18 M.J. 360 (C.M.A. 1984).

During his providency inquiry, appellant admitted he
had a duty to obey the Correctional Custody Instruction,
and he knowingly consumed alcohol contrary to the

24a

Instruction. On their face, these admissions appear to con-
stitute the offense of dereliction of duty.'® The Instruc-
tion’s inherent deficiencies, however, constrain us to
decline to approve a conviction of the lesser offense of
dereliction of duty, appellant’s admissions, notwith-
standing.

In addition to the Instruction’s broad hortatory provi-
sions noted above, the Instruction essentially incorporates
all the UCM/J’s punitive articles (Articles 77 through 134)
under items which are not condoned. Obviously, this In-
struction is not needed to prevent thefts or assaults, for
Articles 121 and 128 prohibit such misconduct. This in-
struction, in essence, merely encourages Nellis AFB Cor-
rectional Custody correctees to be good citizens and obey
the law, a duty to which they are subject at all times
without the help of the Instruction. Therefore, we disap-
prove entirely on Charge I and its specification.

IV. IMPROPER POST-TRIAL PROCESSING

The final assignment of error we discuss in detail is the
improper preparation of the Staff Judge Advocate’s
Recommendations to the convening authority (SJA
Recommendations) by the assistant trial counsei, Major
D. This was contrary to Article 6(c) and R.C.M. 1106(b).
Under the circumstances of the instant case, we find this
statutory violation to have been waived, and we find no
plain error.

The allied papers of the record of trial reflect the SJA
Recommendations were duly served on trial defense
counsel as required. R.C.M. 1106(f). In the post-trial sub-
missions, trial defense counsel did not assert the existence
of any errors in the SJA Recommendations. He limited

'© See Article 92(3), UMCJ (10 U.S.C. § 992 (3) (1988).

25a

his submissions to a clemency request on behalf of ap-
pellant. Failure to specifically note patent errors in the
SJA Recommendations constitutes a waiver of those er-
rors. R.C.M. 1106(f)(6). R.C.M. 1106(f)(6) does not ex-
empt any particular errors from its waiver provision.

Although the post-trial processing with which we are in-
volved is deemed part of an accused’s military due process
rights, such rights are not immune to waiver. We previous-
ly have held that constitutional rights may be waived just
as statutory rights and other benefits. United States y.
Lucas, 19 M.J. 773 (A.F.C.M.R. 1984), aff'd. 25 M.J.9
(C.M.A. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1027 (1988) (failure
to object at trial to improper use of immunized testimony
held waived on appeal).

Having deemed the error waived, we test for plain error
and find none. First, Major D’s handiwork did not go
directly to the convening authority. The staff judge ad-
vocate also signed the SJA Reccommendations and cer-
tified he had reviewed the record of trial and recommenda-
tion, and concurred. See United States v. Grinder, 28 M.J.
840, 843 (A.F.C.M.R. 1989). Second, the SJA personally
prepared and signed the Addendum to the SJA Recom-
mendations, which was the response to trial defense
counsel’s R.C.M. 1106(f) response. Thus, we conclude the
interests of justice do not require a new SJA Recommen-
dation and convening authority action.

it begs the issue to state these type errors are very easily
avoided. No one should be more aware of a statutory dis-
qualification than the disqualified person him or herself.
In the instant case, Major D should have been aware of
and voiced his disqualification when asked to prepare the
SJA Recommendations. Failure to detect and avoid such
rudimentary errors contributes to the many instances of
the Courts of Military Review having to remand otherwise
valid convictions.

26a

V. REMAINING ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

We have considered the other assignments of error and
resolved them adversely to appellant. McNeil v. Wiscon-
sin, ___. U.S. ____, 111 S. Ct 2204 (1991); United States
v. Lewis, 33 M.J. 758 (A.C.M.R. 1991); R.C.M.
1001(a)(1)(a); Mil. R. Evid. 103(a)(1); United States v.
Martin, M.J. ___A.F.C.M.R. 1993).

VI. CORRECTIVE ACTION

In view of Part IV-B, ante, we must determine whether
remand for a rehearing on sentence only, or sentence
reassessment is appropriate. Our review of the record con-
vinces us that we can reassess the sentence to reflect what
sentence appellant would have received had he not been
charged with the failure to obey a lawful order not to con-
sume alcohol. United Siates v. Peoples, 29 M.J. 426
(C.M.A. 1990). We believe the members viewed the two
escapes from correctional custody as the gravamen of ap-
pellant’s misconduct. Reassessing on that basis, we find
appropriate only so much of the sentence as provides for a
bad-conduct discharge, 4 months confinement, and reduc-
tion to E-1.

VII. DECRETAL

The findings on Charge I and its specification are disap-
proved, and Charge I and its specification are dismissed.
The findings and sentence, as modified, are correct in law
and fact, Article 66(c), UCMJ, and are hereby,

AFFIRMED

Chief Judge Dixon, Senior Judges O’HAIR and
McLAUTHLIN, and Judges GRUNICK and HEIMBURG con-

cur.

27a

HEIMBURG, Judge (concurring):

I concur in the opinion of Judge Snyder, and write
separately only because I believe it necessary to mark out
more clearly the boundary between the majority and the
dissent concerning Charge II.

The opinions in this case have revealed Significant differ-
ences of opinion on the nature of “physical restraint” in
correctional custody. Without minimizing these differ-
ences, it is important to note that the Court’s decision does
not require adoption of one of the conflicting views. The
Court does not today decide whether correctional custody
automatically includes physical restraint or authorizes
physical restraint to be imposed by competent authority.
Nor does it define what physical restraint may be required
if not automatically included — whether it requires some
physical means of restricting the correctee’s movements or
may be assumed to exist when proper limits are defined in a
designated building or other facility. Mos: importantly, this
case does not decide that the status of being in correctional
custody equates to the fact of being under physical
restraint.

The issue we addressed was whether a guilty plea was
provident. What most divides the majority and minority on
that issue are the assumptions each brings to a review of the
providency of a guilty plea to escape from correctional
custody. One of the “assumptions” of which | speak con-
cerns the meaning of the term “correctional custody.” Each
of us carries mental images which color and give meaning
to the words we see when we read a record of trial. If ap-
pellent had been confined rather than in correctional
custody, his offhand -or flippant remarks to the court,
“there’s no security in that place whatsoever. . . . | went
out through the back door” would not kave been viewed as
contradicting his plea of guilty. It is because judges know
of Air Force correctional Custody facilities which have
“no security . .. whatsoever” that these words immedi-

28a

ately raise questions: What kind of facility was he talking
about? Was there any real security? Having such questions
does not equate to “matters inconsistent” with a guilty
plea. Unless something an accused says raises a defense or
undercuts an element of the offense, we should not con-
sider the plea improvement just because we would like to
know more facts which, were the case litigated, would be
necessary to proof. United States v. Logan, 22
U.S.C.M.A. 349, 47 C.M.R. 1 (1973); United States v.
Berinette, 35 M.J. 58 (C.M.A. 1992); United States v.
Prater, 32 M.J. 433 (C.M.A. 1991). Otherwise, we will be
in danger of nullifying the stern warning each trial judge
gives a person about to plead guilty:

A plea of guilty is equivalent to a conviction and is the
strongest form of proof known to the law. On the
basis of your plea alone, and without receiving any
evidence, this court could find you guilty of the of-
fense(s) to which you plead guilty.

Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-9, para. 2-9. See
also, Article 45, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 845.

An objective look at what appellant told the court about
the escape shows the providency of his pleas. He first
acknowledged that he understood the elements, including
the element that, “while in correctional custody, you were
under physical restraint.” Appellant told the court there
was a “monitor” in the correctional custody facility whose
permission he needed to leave. The presence of a monitor
who has the duty and means to prevent departure can
equate to physical restraint, for the monitor equates to the
“custodian.” Manual for Courts-Martial, 1984, Part IV,
para. 70c({1). Appellant told the military judge he left the
correctional custody facility on both occasions without
obtaining permission to do so: the first time he “snuck
out” and the second time he “left through the back door”
while the monitor was otherwise occupied.

29a

At that point, appellant had given the court sufficient
information to support his guilty pleas, but my dissenting
brothers find inconsistency in subsequent statements he
made during his unsworn statement. Let’s examine them,
also. In a colloquy with his defense counsel, appellant was
explaining his actions in escaping from correctional
custody. Concerning the first incident, appellant explained
that it was “bad, being in there” all alone, and he was
bored, he “needed just to, to explode.” How did he get
out? “—[T]here’s no, there’s no security in that place
whatsoever. It’s just, I went out through the back door.”
He came back several hours later, and “nobody knew
anything about it.” This is the same incident in which, ac-
cording to the stipulation of fact appellant agreed to, ap-
pellant told a NCO he saw at a casino downtown, “be-
tween me and you I just snuck out of CC.”

Apart from one’s assumptions regarding what sort of
correctional custody facility this must have been, ap-
pellant’s comments during his unsworn statement raised
no inconsistency whatever with his guilty plea. Sneaking
away from a guard, custodian, or “monitor” is not incon-
sistent with the presence of physical restraint; indeed, were
there no physical restraint sneaking would be unnecessary.

Another assumption that divides this Court is the weight
to give to an accused person’s assent to the terms used by
the military judge to explain the elements of the offense. |
am prepared to assume that appellant understood the term
“physical restraint;” this term is not a legal term of art re-
quiring advanced education to understand. Thus, despite
the conclusory nature of the military judge’s inquiry, it
established a factual basis for appellant’s plea. See,
R.C.M. 910(e); United States v. Care, 18 U.S.C.M.A.
535, 40 C.M.R. 247 (1969).

By his pleas, agreement to a Stipulation of fact, and
response to questions by the military judge, appellant

30a

gave this Court an adequate basis for upholding his con-
viction of escape from correctional custody. We should
not require proof of facts in a guilty plea case when no fac-
tual dispute exists. Believing appellant’s pleas to Charge II
provident, I join the majority in upholding his conviction
and sentence.

Judge JAMES, with whom Senior Judge LEONARD and
Judge JOHNSON join (concurring in part and dissenting in
part):

We dissent from the majority’s disposition of the con-
viction for escape from correctional custody.''

'! This case was originally decided by panel 3 of this Court, con-
sisting of Senior Judge Leonard, Judge Johnson, and me. The panel
voted and agreed on an opinion that set aside all the findings of guilty.
During “off panel” circulation, an “off panel” judge suggested en banc
consideration. The majority of the Court agreed, and the Court en
banc the formed a majority for the current disposition.

There was a time when a panel’s decision in an individual case could
not legally be overturned by the Court sitting en banc. United States v.
Chilcotte, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 283, 43 C.M.R. 123 (1971); see, e.g., Cole-
man v. United States, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 171, 44 C.M.R. 225 (1971);
Maze v. Army Court of Military review, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 599, 44
C.M.R. 29 (1971); United States v. Wheeler, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 595, 44
C.M.R. 25 (1971). This result, based on statutory construction, was
changed by the Military Justice Act of 1983, 97 Stat. 1402, which
amended Article 66 (a) to provide for en banc reconsideration of any
panel decision in accordance with the Court’s rules. S. Rep. No. 53,
98th Cong. Ist Sess. 28 (1983), as quoted at United States v. Flowers,
26 M.J. 463, 465 (C.M.A. 1988) (q.v.).

Rule 17 of the Courts of Military Review Rules of Practice and Pro-
cedure, 22 M.J. CXXVIII, provides _that such reconsideration “or-
dinarily will not be ordered except (1) when consideration by the full
Court is Necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of decision, or (2)
when the proceedings involve a question of exceptional importance, or
(3)_when a sentence being reviewed . . . extends to death.” There was
no conflict among decisions of different panels on any issue in this
case, and the punishment obviously does not extend to death.

3la

The Court divides on the requirement for “physical
restraint” to sustain a conviction for escape frm correc-
tional custody. The majority’s lexicographical highjinks
assume away an element of proof. The majority is willing
to infer the presence of physical restraint simple from the
Status of custody. Its theory for its disposition avoids any
analysis of the extent to which there were replies given by
Airman Felix during the “providency inquiry” that were
inconsistent with his concession that he was unde:
“physical restraint.” The majority lives in an Aristotelian
world of pure, symbolic logic in which it assumes a state of
the legal universe without bothering to look out the win-
dow to see whether its belief has any real connection with
reality.

Now it is, regrettably, our job to throw bricks through
its window. To establish our view, we first review the re-
quirement that a military judge inquire into matters incon-

One might question whether such a subjective standard as “excep-
tional importance” is so devoid of discernible criteria as really to con-
Stitute no rule. Were that the case, such a judicial mugging as this one
would be in violation of the statute’s “in accordance with rules” clause.
Presumably the Chilcotte result would follow necessarily.

The decision of the majority to reconsider this case en banc can be
justified only on the basis that this is a case of exceptional importance,
and it demonstrates that the standard in the rules is interpreted by this
Court as broad enough to cover any situation where the majority
disagrees with a panel’s decision. The question of how to properly
charge offenses against correctional custody meets no plausible stand-
ard of “exceptional importance.”

Surely this excursion into a seldom visited back alley of military
justice is not what the Congress and the Judge Advocates General had
in mind when they gave us permission to shoot our toes off. The Court
of Military Appeals indicated in Flowers that it was concerned with
proper compliance by the Courts of Military Review with Rule 17. The
extent to which such concern may be the basis for relief to an ap-
peilant remains an open question.

32a

sistent with a plea of guilty, for that is the legal turning
point in this case. Next we note the diversity in the use of
correctional custody, for it accounts for much of the
dispute. Then we look at the elements of the offense to
highlight the pivotal difference between infractions
against moral restraint and infractions against physical
restraint. Finally, we review very briefly the law relating to
escapes from confinement, for it explains how the majori-
ty could possibly come to such a result.

I. MATTERS INCONSISTENT WITH PLEA OF GUILTY

Whenever a plea of guilty is offered, the military judge
must “inform the accused of ... the nature of the
offense.” R.C.M. 910(c)(1). The elements of that offense
should be described. /d., Discussion. The military judge
must then determine the accuracy of the plea by inquiring
into the underlying facts. R.C.M. 910(e). When the ac-
cused makes statements inconsistent with the offered plea
of guilty, the military judge must resolve the inconsistency
or enter a plea of not guilty for the accused. Article 45(a),
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 845(a) (1988); R.C.M. 910(h){2); see
generally United States v. Logan, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 349, 47
C.M.R. 1 (1973). Logan corrects the mistaken view in
some prior decisions that a “mere possibility” of incon-
sistency required that the plea be rejected and substitutes
the “substantial conflict” test which now prevails. See,
e.q., United States v. Prater, 32 M.J. 433 (C.M.A. 1991).
Nonetheless, we emphasize that the “inconsistency” rule is
statutory, not something cooked up in the wild imagina-
tion of soft-hearted appellate judges. It deserves to be ap-
plied as it was intended to be applied, not subverted.
Momentarily we conclude that such a substantial conflict
occurred in this case, but first we address the nature of of-
fenses against correctional custody so that the occurrence
of the conflict can be understood in its context.

el

33a

il. WHAT DOES CORRECTIONAL CUSTODY LOOK LIKE?

The central disagreement in this Case arises because the
majority views correctional custody as necessarily in-
cluding physical restraint. Just as the majority says, cor-
rectional custody is defined by the President as “physical
restraint of a person.” Manual For Courts-Martial, United
States, 1984 (MCM), Part V, paragraph Sc(4). The majori-
ty stops there—thus it is defined and thus it must have
been —and lets its dictionary of common military justice
terms govern reality. Conversely, we take notice that the
implementing practices vary.

Thus, Judge Quinn once remarked, “As I assess correc-
tional custody it resembles restriction so much more than
confinement that it . . . does not . . . fall within Argen-
singer’ '? prescription of the right to appointed counsel.”
United States y. Shamel, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 361, 362, 47
C.M.R. 116, 117 (1973). He compared it “to the practice
of ‘detention’ after school.” Jd.. In the 1960s our Army
brethren imposed correctional custody on a particularly
slippery soldier:

Various moderate restraints of the accused’s freedom
of movement were ineffectual and, eventually, he was
placed in a locked room on the third floor of the com-
pany barracks. He escaped.

United States v. Carson, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 407, 35 C.M.R.
379, 380 (1965) (emphasis). What is notable is not that the
miscreant was eventually locked up in correctional custody
but is instead that he was not locked up until less severe
restraints failed successively. More recently, at least, the
Army’s regulation “mandate[d] the use of moral, rather
than physical, restraint in correctional custody facilities.”

'? Argesinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (right to counsel when
confinement results).

34a

United States v. Kellner, 16 M.J. 524, 525 (A.C.M.R.
1983). Cf. United States v. Shamel, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 361,
47 C.M.R. 116 (1973).

The Air Force implementing regulation does not state
the required circumstances of correctional custody, but it
provides, “Normal troop housing may be adapted to cor-
rectional custody use by physically defining an area for
such custody.” Air Force Regulation 125-35, Correctional
Custody, paragraph 4a (4 Septembet 1981). Of course, the
physical definition could be a line painted on the floor.
The same provision also contemplates use of jails, but we
take notice that there are Air Force correctional custody
programs which do not feature the jail-like setting that the
Manual’s definition implies.

An earlier example of such an Air Force facility was
described in United States v. Blosser, 35 C.M.R. 902
(A.F.B.R. 1965):

When accused was first placed in the . . . correctional
custody facility he was informed by the NCOIC
thereof he must not leave the building without per-
mission, and whenever he did leave he was to “sign
out” in the logbook on the first sergeant’s desk, and
when he returned he was to “sign in.” He received and
acknowledged reading and understanding a copy of
the “Correctional Custody Rules & Regulations”
which, among other things, purported to require him
to sign out or in whenever he departed or entered the
building (confinement facility) and to prohibit his
consumption of alcoholic beverages.

Id. at 906. Blosser left the facility with permission to serve
as a firewatch and failed to return. Instead, like Airman
Felix, he went into town to drink. Blosser was correctly
charged with and convicted of breach, not escape. Though
his departure is different from that of Airman Felix, we

eee

35a

do not know how the majority would avoid calling the
Blosser episode an escape, relying as it does on literal ap-
plication of the President’s definition, and yet it is clear
that no physical impediment governed Blosser’s
movements after he left the facility.

In such facilities, the offender may still be obliged to
Stay unless permitted to leave, but the obligation is im-
posed by an order, and it is a moral obligation, not a
physical restraint. See, e.g., Kellner, 16 M.J. at 525."3
Physical restraint is required to constitute escape, as we
see below.

iil. ELEMENTS

The Manual describes two approaches to pleading the
offense involved in unauthorized flight from correctional
custody.'* One not acquainted with variations in the con-
ditions of correctional custody might overlook the distinc-
tion between physical and moral restraint and select the
wrong approach. One is escape from physical restraint,
appropriate for instances like that in Carson, and the
other is breach of any other form of restraint, e.g., the
moral duty to remain in custody unless released.'5 MCM,
Part IV, paragraph 70b, c (1984).

'? Neither stone walls nor iron bars are required to make a correc-
tional custody facility, though they are not inconsistent with the idea.
However, their functional equivalents are required to make an escape
possible. Cf. United States v. Ellsey, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 455,37 C.M.R.
75, 79 (1966) (prisoner ordered into confinement escaped from escort
while in route to facility did not escape from confinement but
breached custody).

'* See generally United States v. Riedel, 37 C.M.R. 801 (A.F.B.R.
1966).

'S See, e.g., Mackie, 36 C.M.R. 171-72; United States v. Blosser, 35
C.M.R. 902, 906 (A.F.B.R. 1965); United States v. Baker, 35 C.M.R.
916 (A.F.B.R. 1965).

36a

Breach and escape are different. Each includes as an ele-
ment of proof the nature of the restraint imposed and
violated. Jd. The maximum confinement which may be ad-
judged for an escape is double that which may be imposed
for a breach. 7d. at 70e. Perhaps for that reason the
elements of proof of an escape require the prosecution to
prove that “while in such correctional custody, the accused
was under physical restraint” and that “the accused freed
himself. . . from the physical restraint.” Jd. at 70(1)(b)-(c)
(emphasis added). In contrast, the elements of a breach
are satisfied simply by proof of “a certain restraint.” Jd. at
70b(2)(b). We are happy that we are not obliged to ac-
count for the mysterious presence of the breach specifica-
tion if, as the majority contends, one who is put into the |
status of correctional custody is necessarily, ipso facto,
thereafter under physical restraint. There is no explana-
tion. If one follows the majority’s definitional logic, cor-
rectional custody always entails physical restraint, and the
breach specification has no use.

We would have thought that the Manual’s statement of
the elements would have been enough to dispose of this
case: Some proof is required that there was physical
restraint, and, in a guilty plea case, some inquiry is re-
quired when the accused gives replies inconsistent with the
existence of physical restraint. Moral suasion is not
enough to prove an escape, though it is satisfactory for
proof of a breach.

Given the diversity in implementing correctional
custody, the President’s definition (correctional custody is
physical restraint) does not substitute for facts. After all,
it is perfectly possible that his subordinates deviated from
his expectations when they implemented the authority to
impose correctional custody. That is not in the least a sur-
prise, for one must be careful about confining citizens

TORE ee ee

37a

without trials. While the constitutional and military due
process aspects were touched in United States v. Mackie,
16 U.S.C.M.A. 14, 36 C.M.R. 170 (1966) and United
States v. Shamel, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 361, 47 C.M.R. 116
(1973), there is always the threat of legislative responses if
correctional custody is too often too strenuous. Thus, it is
easily understood and perhaps commendable that the
President’s subordinates have not uniformily instituted
correctional custody with all the rigor that he seems to
have believed lawful. With Congress ever watchful,
sometimes authority lawfully had is best not exercised to
its limits, lest perceptions of abuse result in the authority
being taken away.

Despite our discussion of what we believe to be a differ-
ing perception of the world of correctional custody, the
majority assumes that physical restraint follows in proof
by logical tautology. In contrast, we would hold that
assumptions are not good enough to satisfy an element of
proof that doubles the maximum punishment. Not all cor-
rectional custody necessarily involves physical restraint, :
regardless of the Manual’s definition. Where the offender
is not shown to have been behind locked doors or similar
physical restraint, as is sometimes the case in Air Force
facilities, there may still be an offense committed when the
offender leaves the facility, but the offense is breach, not
escape.

IV. THE ESCAPE PRECEDENTS

One must ask how the majority—reasonable judges
all—could possibly get this so wrong as we in the minority
contend. We should avoid speculation about the major-
ity’s thought process, but in this case it has been fairly
overt. The majority analogizes from some of the cases in-
volving escapes from confinement under Article 95,

38a

UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 895 (1988). We think that is unwise,
for those cases are treacherous, too, badly in need of
careful reconsideration. When the touchstone for an
analogy is faulty, one should do without.

There is an oft-repeated doctrine that a prisoner remains
in “physical restraint” even when outside the jail if accom-
panied by an escort who—even unarmed — has the means
and duty to oppose flight. See, e.g., United Stares v.
Hodge, 50 C.M.R. 445 (A.F.C.M.R. 1975). We have no
fight to pick with the general idea that an escort can supply
the physical restraint that is otherwise lacking outside a
jailhouse, but, as one might expect, prior cases have of-
fered many an opportunity to find the limits of that doc-
trine. For example, in United States vy. Cornell, 19 M.J.
735 (A.F.C.M.R. 1984), our predeccesors affirmed a con-
viction of escape from confinement where the
prisoner --in minimum custody — was permitted to go out
of the jail unescorted to a gym, from whence he fled
without authority. Cornell was based on United States v.
Maslanich, 13 M.J. 611 (A.F.C.M.R. 1982), pet. denied,
14 M.J. 236 (C.M.A. 1982), in which a panel of this Court
explicitly overruled with only momentary analysis the
precedent inconsistent with its view of the law relative to
“physical restraint.”

One might well criticize Cornell and Maslanich as con-
fusing the status of confinement with the fact of physical
restraint, both of which appear to be required in an escape
from confinement. That is exactly the flaw in the
majority’s approach in this case, explicitly stated in its
opening. As the clarity of the distinction between the two
has been reduced, we seem in Cornell to have gotten to the
point that proof of one element (physical restraint) may be
inferred from proof of the other (status of confinement),
regardless whether the facts of the prisoner’s life were con-
gruent with that inference. To put it even more bluntly,

39a

Cornell and Maslanich lure one seductively into assuming
away a distinct requirement for proof of “physical
restraint.” Such a flawed approach warrants reconsidera-
tion.

Regrettably, neither Cornel// nor Maslanich make a per-
suasive brief for such a position.'® Lacking sound

'© Maslanich joined the assessment of some sister-service decisions
that the precedents are not consistent. 13 M.J. at 613 n.1, 614 n.3. It is
certainly true that the prior decisions offered an interesting variety of
outcomes, but ii seems something of an exagerration to view them as
too hopelessiy splintered ever to be reconciled. See generally United
States v. Hodge, 50 C.M.R. 445 (A.F.C.M.R. 1975) (physical
restraint Outside the facility depends on a guard who has the “means
and the duty ... to oppose” escape); United States v. Seelke, 45
C.M.R. 631 (A.C.M.R. 1972), pet. denied, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 648, 45
C.M.R. 929 (1972) (record silent about instructions to unarmed
escort, instructions to call “halt” are not enough); United States v.
Dees, 45 C.M.R. 891 (N.C.M.R. 1972) (proof of physical restraint
adequate where guard had a duty to oppose escape, but left priscners
unsupervised momemtarily); United States \. Roberts, 43 C.M.R. 998
(A.F.C.M.R. 1971) (plea to escape not improvident where prisoner on
work detail hopped off truck); United States v. Hahn, 42 C.M.R. 623
(A.C.M.R. 1970) (no escape where no evidence that guard has means
or duty to do more than cry “halt”); United States v. Hamilton, 41
C.M.R. 724 (A.C.M.R. 1970) (mere requirement that a guard cry
“halt” does not constitute physical restraint); United States v. Faist, 41
C.M.R. 720 (A.C.M.R. 1970) (escape set aside where parolee on work
detail given permission to go unsupervised to a latrine, the left);
United States vy. Connor, 40 C.M.R. 614 (A.C.M.R. 1969) (physical
restraint adequately shown where jumped out a window while
momentarily out of sight of a guard who had orders to shoot); United
States v. Laurie, 37 C.M.R. 663 (A.B.R. 1967) (guilty plea to escape
set aside where prisoner was released without supervision for detail);
United States v. Silk, 37 C.M.R. 523 (A.B.R. 1966) (physical restraint
continues outside prison if guard has means and duty: no restraint
where prisoners at work in dining hall could not all be watched at
once); United States v. Sines, 34 C.M.R. 716 (N.B.R. 1964), pet.
denied, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 697, _.. C.M.R. ____. (1964) (unarmed
guard with instructions to refrain from chasing was not “physical

40a

restraint”); United States v. Morrison, 33 C.M.R. 899 (A.F.B.R.
1963), pet. denied, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 681, 33 C.M.R. 436 (1963) (escape
affirmed where guard had means and duty; ineffectiveness im-
material); United States v. Ramsey, 33 C.M.R. 566 (A.B.R. 1963) (no
escape where minimum custody prisoner walks away with permission
of KP supervisor but does not return, supervisor has no duty to do
more than "try to talk him out of it” and trail); United States v.
Morgan, 32 C.M.R. 665 (A.B.R. 1963 (escape affirmed where
prisoner under loose supervision of cook went outside to clean grease
racks, the left unimpeded, because cook had means and duty, even
though ineffective); United States v. Vincent, 24 C.M.R. 506
(N.M.B.R. 1957) (escape affirmed, physical restraint continued where
prisoners taken outside prison were left unsupervised in a lounge first
for 30 minutes, then a few more); United States v. Block, 18 C.M.R.
458 (C.G.B.R. 1955) (escape affirmed, physical restraint found where
prisoners detailed to boiler room of brig were not always in sight of
unarmed supervisor who has means and duty, because relaxed
vigilance was still enough given that the site was on a base); United
States v. Hunker, 18 C.M.R. 703 (A.F.B.R. 1954) (custody & confine-
ment distinguished: where commander ordered accused into confine-
ment, accused escaped while en route, held to be an escape from con-
finement!); United States v. Stewart, 17 C.M.R. 805 (A.F.B.R. 1954)
(escape affirmed, physical restraint found where unarmed guard
escorted prisoners to chapel, left them outside to look in, whereupon
they ran away) (some physical restraint is required, but how much is
immaterial); United States v. English, 17 C.M.R. 693 (A.F.B.R. 1954)
(escape affirmed, physical restraint found where unarmed escort
believed he was responsible for prisoners, searched inunediately;
Holcomb distinguished); United States v. Holcomb, 16 C.M.R. 537
(A.F.B.R. 1954) (no escape, no physical restraint where unarmed
escort had been ordered to touch prisoners, only to call halt: “Moral
restraint will not suffice. .. .” at 541); United States v. Wolfrey, 15
C.M.R. 768 (A.F.B.R. 1954) escape affirmed where prisoner on detail
was left behind when supervisor drove away, but record does not show
how far, etc.) (B.R. deferred to trial court’s view of the evidence);
United States v. Freeman, 15 C.M.R. 639 (A.F.B.R. 1954), pet.
denied, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 734, 16 C.M.R. 292 (1954) (escape affirmed
where escorted prisoner was allowed to go unescorted to water foun-
tain, then left: momentary laxity of the guard is a matter of ineffec-

4la

tiveness); United States v. Lorey, 14 C.M.R. 393 (A.B.R. 1954)
(escape affirmed, physical restraint found where guard armed with
shotgun went to sleep: inattentiveness was a matter of ineffectiveness);
United States v. Travis, 13 C.M.R. 780 (A.F.B.R. 1953) (escape set
aside where prisoner given permission to go unsupervised to a latrine
the kept going); United States v. Haddox, 12 C.M.R. 675 (A.F.B.R.
1953), pet. denied, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 838, 13 C.M.R. 142 (1953) (escape
affirmed where prisoner was under armed guard but escort was
distracted by conversation with hostess); United States v. Fritts, 12
C.M.R. 232 (A.B.R. 1953), Pet. denied, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 835, 12
C.M.R. 204 (1953) (no fatal variance where accused charged with
escape from custody, but evidence showed escape from confinement:
accused had been apprehended, then confined, and proof of the con-
finement included proof of the custody); United States v. Wesson, 9
C.M.R. 839 (A.F.B.R. 1953) (no escape where prisoner was left un-
supervised to wash car, stole it and drove away: last of the physical
restraint abated when car wash supervisor went away for rags); United
States v. Farley, 9 C.M.R. 753 (A.F.B.R. 1953) (escape set aside
where escorted prisoner was told to go alone to x-ray room because
escort had too many prisoners, prisoner was the under no physical
restraint when he left x-ray room); United States v. Conner, 7 C.M.R.
477, 481-82, 482 n.1 (A.F.B.R. 1952) (how restraint continues even
where lax so long as not permitted freedom by one with authority);
United States v. Garner, 7 C.M.R. 446 (N.B.R. 1952) (guilty plea to
escape from confinement provident where accused left when working
outside supervision of escort outside jail); United States v. Urquhart,
6 C.M.R. 445 (A..B.R. 1952) (no physical restraint, therefore no
escape where parolee left jail on “trusty pass,” went on errand, then
fled: only moral resiraint involved); United States v. Wildman, €
C.M.R. 406 (A.B.R. 1952) (escape from confinement affirmed where
prisoner escaped from armed escort en route to jail after approval of
adjudged confinement) (“at most an immaterial variance” anyway);
United States v. Fabrizzio, 6 C.M.R. 623 (A.F.B.R. 1952) (no
restraint and no escape where minimum security prisoner signed out,
left with permission but without supervision, did not return); United
States v. Owens, 6 C.M.R. 515 (A.F.B.R. 1952) (minimum custody
prisoner left place of work where he was unsupervised: no “physical
restraint”); United States v. Sanches, 2 C.M.R. 278 (A.B.R. 1951)
(physical restraint continued where prisoner on detail outside jail was
under guard’s supervision); United States v. Trimble, 2 C.M.R. 718

42a

arguments, we find it wiser to insist on proof of the ele-
ment as the law requires than to infer it by such flimsy
logic.

(A.F.B.R. 1951) (cannot “suffer escape” when the prisoner has been
permitted—even without authority—to go about without guard);
United States v. Noeil, 79 B.R. 117 (1948) (no restraint and no escape
where parolee allowed to sign out from jail to duty did so, did not
return: moral suasion not equivalent to physical restraint); United
States v. Van Breeman, 8 B.R. (E.T.O.) 405 (A.B.R. 1944) (escape af-
firmed where lenient escort let prisoner go to bathroom unescorted:
temporary relaxation of vigilance was no “abrogation of status as a
retrainer”); United States v. Humphrey, 28 B.R. 327 (1943) (moral not
substitute for physical) (fence around installation enclosed 28 square
miles, was not eqivalent to physical confinement); United States v.
Medlock, 14 B.R. 69 (1942) (no escape where prisoner was sent out of
jail unescorted and unobserved to wash pails in lake, did not return);
United States v. Lowry, 12 B.R. 309, 311 (1942) (requirement for
physical restraint is intended to exclude conviction for escape of
prisoner who is paroled to work, does not return) (prisoner in hospital
was, according to “very common understanding,” not supposed to
leave. Not good enough.); United States v. Smith, § B.R. 155 (1934)
(no escape where prisoner did not return when detailed to work out-
side the jail without supervision) (no “break away from any physical
restraint”): United States v. Gilchrest, 1 B.R. 297 (A.B.R. 1930) (no
“breaking away from physical restraint” where prisoner was sent
unescorted outside the jail to fetch ice, did not return). Maslanich
threw out the baby with the batch of water. It simply assumed away
the proof requirement as to physical custody because it found it too
difficult to follow the precedent about prisoners who were outside the
jail. It would have been better simply to require proof. Instead, the
Maslanich court changed the doctrine to conform to its taste for
simplicity and streamlined orderliness. That is exactly where we are in
Airman Felix’ case. The Court of Military Appeals has not visited the
extremes to which the law of escape have been taken, but the present
majority’s insistence on taking the same view of escape from correc-
tional custody gives it another chance.

= a ae ahh leads e, a5) de

43a

V. THE RECORD

We now turn to the colloquy during the inquiry into the
providence of the pleas of guilty. Before we begin, we
must set aside what is not relevant: It is not relevant that
Airman Felix knew of the local regulation or that it im-
posed limits on his liberty. The regulation and _ his
knowledge of it tend to prove only that he was in custody
imposed by the moral suasion resulting from a duty to
obey. The fact that Airman Felix was induced to agree
with the military judge’s characterization of his state as
“physical restraint” only helps keep this controversy in the
majority’s Aristotelian world. While this element can be
confessed away, the central need in the providency inquiry
is to assure that the accused knows what he’s talking about
when he does so. The inconsistent replies suggest that he
didn’t, and the military judge should have inquired fur-
ther."

The inquiries in this case focused on escape because that
is what was alleged. However, the record does not make
clear the circumstances of the correctional custody from
which Airman Felix departed. We might not have ques-
tioned it, had Airman Felix not made these statements sug-
gesting that the required “physical restraint” in that facility

'? This teapot-sized temptest is a superb example of the ripple ef-
fects of a trial judge’s use during the providency inquiry of leading
questions in which legal conclusions were embedded, calling upon the
accused to subscribe to each. That style makes for a fast inquiry and a
thin record, but it also seduces the participants into an assuredly false
and obviously dangerous sense of security. If we may be excused a lit-
tle speculation, we think it likely that if this trial judge had simply had
a brief conversation with Airman Felix about life in this facility, we
would never have had any cause to become so embroiled in such an
unproductive controversy as such a great expense. Either the incon-
sistency would have been dispelled or, at the very worst, the prosecu-
tion would have been put to the test.

44a

might have been absent. At one fleeting passage as to one
of his two absences, he explains that he went out the facili-
ty’s back door. There is no hint that any force or deception
or a locksmith’s skill was required, and so we cannot infer
that Airman Felix was then under physical restraint. There
is nothing to explain how he got out on the other occasion
or the circumstances of the custody on that occasion.
While Airman Felix gave the needed “yes, sir” responses to
the military judge’s questions, it is clear that neither the
military judge nor Airman Felix were discriminating be-
tween physical and moral restraint. Yet, in the one brief
reference to the conditions of custody, Airman Felix said
that he just walked out the door. Later, during sentencing,
he told us that there was no security in the facility at all.
Those replies are inconsistent with his agreement that he
was under physical restraint. Such an inconsistency left
unclarified causes a substantial conflict between the plea
(guilty of escape from physical restraint) and Airman
Felix’ description of the circumstances of the correctional
custody in his case (just walked out the door).

The participants at trial did not notice the distinctions
between offenses against correctional custody and,
naturally, did not notice the inconsistency and therefore
did not resolve it. The plea was not shown to have been
provident. The findings under Charge II should have been
set aside.'® Article 45(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 845(a)
(1988).

'® We have no opportunity to rescue this charge by approving a
finding of guilty to a breach as if it were a lesser included offense, even
though it is fairly apparent that, had breach been pleaded, the plea
would likely have been provident. While moral suasion is less onerous
than physical imprisonment, a breach of custody is not necessarily a
lesser included offense of an escape. United States v. Greene, 42
C.M.R. 953, 959 (A.F.C.M.R. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 20
U.S.C.M.A. 232, 43 C.M.R. 72 (1970). But cf. Kellner, 16 M.J. 524)

a

45a

VI. THE MAJORITY’S REMEDY

Even if we were somehow disposed to accept the majori-
ty’s view of escapes from correctional custody, we could
not join its disingenuous disposition of this case. Airman
Felix, though hardly a model airman, was convicted only
of the escape which the majority now affirms and the
disobedience of the local correctional custody regulation,
which we all agree must be set aside. For those two convic-
tions he was sentenced to a bad-conduct discharge, con-
finement for 5 months, and reduction to E-1 from E-2. To
remedy a wrongful conviction of half the charges in this
case, the majority proposes now to reduce the confine-
ment 20 percent to 4 months.

Holding as we do the view that the other conviction
must also be aside, we are not obliged to set down our view
of what would constitute an appropriate remedy for the
majority to decree, for we would necessarily set aside the
whole sentence. Still, we can record the dire straits in
which the majority finds itself. It can’t bring itself to give
meaningful relief for what all agree was a wrongful con-
viction. It ran out of remedial options that it finds accep-
table.

Restoring the reduction would result in back pay, yet we
cannot calculate the money value of such relief because we
have no idea how long such a poorly disciplined airman
might have remained in pay status on active duty. See

(plea to escape found improvident in breach situation, breach af-
firmed where military judge’s inquiry included breach); United States
v. Whitmire, 13 M.J. 587 (N.M.C.M.R. 1982) (specification of escape
amended at trial to allege breach). The two elements are different, not
inclusive of one another. Unlike the military judge in Kel/ner, the
military judge in this case did not advise Airman Felix about the
elements of breach except superficially and did not inquire into facts
about breach. Thus, the inquiry requirement would remain unsatisfied
in either case.

46a

Article 76a, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 876a (1988) (required
leave). In short, we can’t tell how much relief would result
from setting aside the reduction. Furthermore, reduction
in grade is an appealing and somehow just punishment for
the irresponsibility shown in this case, if like the majority
one can find a sound conviction resulting from it. Setting
aside the punitive discharge would certainly be adequate
(perhaps even excessive) compensation for the error and
for whatever loss of liberty was attributable to it, but the
majority has, for whatever reason, found that to be inap-
propriate.

Most trying in the whole process is the mandate of the
Court of Military Appeals that, when reassessing a
sentence to correct an error, we must first determine
whether we can determine what the trial court “would
probably have adjudged’ had the error not occurred.
United States v. Peoples, 29 M.J. 426, 427 (C.M.A. 1990).
See also United States v. Sales, 22 M.J. 305, 307-308
(C.M.A. 1986); United States v. Suzuki, 20 M.J. 248, 249
(C.M.A. 1985). See Generally, United States v. Waits, 32
M.J. 274, 276-77 (C.M.A. 1991). When we can’t tell, we
are not supposed to guess, as we think the majority does.
We are supposed to remand.

That is a tricky bit of mind-reading in any case, but in
some it is sound logic than speculation. For example, we
know that an officer-accused stands a very good chance of
being dismissed from the service upon conviction of any
substantial crime, and we are not surprised when we see
dismissal alone adjudged and then approved even when
only one of several convictions can be sustained on appeal.
When we must reassess in such a case, we can often con-
clude, to the satisfaction of our conscience, that the
dismissal was inevitable even had the affected specifica-
tions never been referred. In other cases a particular com-
ponent of the sentence can be directly tied to a specifica-

ee

—s

47a

tion, as when the court-martial adjudges a fine in exactly
the amount the accused was convicted of stealing. If the
larceny conviction must be disapproved but others remain,
we can tell at least that the fine should go.

This is not such a case. One cannot say reliably enough
to satisfy my conscience that the escape alone produced
the punitive discharge, the reduction, and 4 of the 5 mon-
ths of confinement. The majority is simply guessing, and,
to make it much worse, their guesswork is deplorably par-
simonious.

The majority’s remedy is neither adequate nor effective,
because the appellant served all the confinement long ago
and has presumably been released. The sentence was ad-
judged on 25 February 1991, now nearly 2 years ago, and
only truly extraordinary circumstances would have
prevented the confinement from being served. None of it
should remain to be abated by the majority’s ungenerous
treatment. Thus, our appellate inefficiency gave the ma-
jority a Hobson’s choice, and it chose nothing.

One might argue that there are collateral consequences
to disapproving confinement already served, but we are
unacquainted with them, they are not in the record, and
we can only speculate what they might be and how reliable
the government might be in delivering them up to the ap-
pellant. Ignoring them as we must, we can only conclude
that the majority has tried to give back the one thing that
can never be given back in a non-capital case: liberty
deprived. It is a futile and tight-fisted gesture, inadequate
to the purpose, and born of speculation. This case should
be remanded for a rehearing on the sentence, even if one
agrees with the majority’s disposition of the convictions. !®

'? We refrain from detailing our disagreement with the majority’s
treatment of the identity of the staff judge advocate’s ghostwriter. In
our view, all that should matter is that the staff judge advocate signed

48a

JOHNSON, Judge, with whom Judge JAMEs joins (concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part):

I concur with the majority’s decision to set aside appel-
lant’s conviction for failure to obey a lawful order. I join
Judge James in dissenting from the majority’s decision to
affirm appellant’s convictions for escape from correc-
tional custody, and from the majority’s remedial action.?°

Correctional custody is listed in Article 15(b)(2), UC-
MJ, as an authorized punishment for nonjudicial punish-
ment actions, and it is there defined as “the physical re-
straint of a person during duty or nonduty hours... .”
This language can either be interpreted as meaning that a
person ordered into correctional custody is therefore auto-
matically under physical restraint, at least when he is in a
designated correctional custody facility, or it can be read
as an authorization for physical restraint to be imposed by
competent authority. The majority has apparently taken
the former view, with which I disagree.

Further, the term “physical restraint” may be taken to
mean either physical means limiting one’s movements
(such as locked doors, fences, or the presence of an escort
or monitor with the duty and means of limiting one’s liber-
ty), or it may be taken to mean the declaration of limits
beyond which one may not go. The majority in this case
seems to have adopted the latter view, with which I dis-
agree.

the post-trial recommendations in such a way as to make clear that
they were his own advice to the convening authority. Who served as
scrivener or draftsman should be of no real significance.

2° | also agree that this was not an appropriate case for considera-
tion en banc by this Court. Now that the majority of the Court has
voted to consider appellant’s case en banc, however, the merits of that
question are not dispositive of our action on the findings and sentence
in appellant’s case.

Pe ee ee

Ms be —_—
ee 3,

re. ee

wp

49a

The explanation of the offense of escape from correc-
tional custody in MCM, Part IV, paragraph 70c(1) (1984)
defines it as the casting off of “any physical restraint im-
posed by the custodian or by the place or conditions of
custody.” The words “conditions of custody” can be inter-
preted either as physical barriers to movement, or as
orders not to depart from certain limits. The majority in
this case seems to have adopted the latter view. I disagree.

In MCM, Part V, paragraph 5(c)(4) (1984), the Presi-
dent has authorized the Secretaries of the service depart-
ments to prescribe the conditions under which correctional
custody is to be administered in each service. The Secre-
tary of the Air Force, in Air Force Regulation 125-35,
Correctional Custody (4 September 1981), has given major
commands and installation commanders wide discretion in
establishing and operating correctional custody programs.
Some Air Force installations have no correctional custody
program, or send participants to other installations for
correctional custody. Those installations that do have cor-
rectional custody programs vary considerably in the way
they conduct their programs. Some have correctional
custody facilities in separate buildings with locked doors,
security fences, and monitors on duty around the clock.
Others are simply portions of normal barracks marked off
with tape or signs. The result is that some persons serving
correctional custody have physical barriers to their free-
dom of movement, while others do not.

MCM, Part IV, paragraph 70b (1984), provides for two
separate offenses against correctional custody. Escape
from correctional custody anplies when the offender has
cast off physical restraint. Breach of correctional custody
applies when an offender “went beyond the limits of the
restraint imposed” without casting off a physical restraint.
Escape carries a much heavier maximum punishment (dis-
honorable discharge, total forfeitures, and confinement

50a

for 1 year) than does breach of correction custody (bad-
conduct discharge, total forfeitures, and confinement for
6 months).

The majority has decided that any offender who leaves a
correctional custody facility without authority can be con-
victed of escape, even when the evidence indicates there
was no phyiscal barrier to movement. I believe this conclu-
sion is contrary to law. If an accused has breached a moral
restraint imposed by his placement into correctional
custody, he can be convicted of breach of correctional
custody. Before he can be convicted of the more serious
offense of escape from correctional custody, he must have
cast off some physical limit on his movement. If the
government charges the more serious offense, it should
plead and prove the aggravating facts. When a military
judge conducts a providency inquiry for a proposed plea
of guilty to escape from correctional custody, he should
inquire into the factual basis for the conclusion that
physical restraint was present. When an accused says there
was no security at all in the correctional custody facility,
and that he just walked out the back door, as in this case,
the military judge should recognize that the accused has
raised matters inconsistent with a plea of guilty to escape.
No amount of leading and conclusory questions will sub-
stitute for putting the facts on the record.

I would set aside all the findings of guilty in this case
and authorize a rehearing on the two specifications of
escape from correctional custody.

[SEAL OMITTED]

OFFICIAL

/s/ Naomi D. Allen
Naomi D. AALLEN
TSgt, USAF
Chief Court Administrator, AFCMR

* US. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1994-— 384-508/24006

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386012_0961%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
