# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Patterson v. Matanuska Maid, Inc.

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386012_0913%3A1

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1995
- **Citation:** 513 U.S. 1127

## Text

Supreme Court, U.S.

oe FILED
‘) 94 O79ONOV . 8 1994
No. 94-
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1994

WILLIAM L. PATTERSON,
Petitioner,
v.

MATANUSKA MAID, INC., Individually and
Severally; and its agents JOHN SEAWELL,
RON WILDE, JOE VAN TREECK and STEVE
BEVINS, Individually and Severally,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE
OF ALASKA

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

A. Lee Petersen, Esq.
LAW OFFICES OF A. LEE
PETERSEN, P.C.

1115 West Fireweed
Suite 204

Anchorage, AK 99503
(907) 276-8330

Attorney for Petitioner

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The petitioner contends that the decision of

the Supreme Court for the State of Alaska
erroneously held his state tort claim to be pre-
emnpted by the Labor-Management Relations Act
(LMRA) and erroneously held his tort claim and
wrongful discharge claim to be time-barred, as
reflected in the following questions:

1. Did the Alaska Supreme Court deny due
process of law and equal protection of laws in
upholding dismissal of the petitioner's claim for
libel under state law on the basis that the claim
was pre-empted by the LMRA and publication of a
defamatory letter was absolutely privileged ina
labor controversy?

2. Did the Alaska Supreme Court err in
holding that petitioner's suits for defamation
and wrongful discharge were time-barred under the

LMRA?

OTHER PARTIES
The State of Alaska was named as a party in

the state court proceedings. Additional parties
were named in the proceeding in the trial court,
but no appeal was pursued as to them. Patterson
named the defendants "individually and severally"
when he was a pro se plaintiff. A related case
is still pending in the United States District
Court for the District of Alaska, Patterson v.

International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 959,

Case No. A94-147-CV (JKS).

: TABLE OF CONTENTS
ee ee ee ee ee ee ee
gs re © |
I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION. .........1
II. APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL AND

Samaveums PROVISIGNS. . . « « « © © © « « oh
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. .. ..-« «© © «© © e3

IV. ARGUMENT STATING REASONS FOR
Geueeaewe BOE WEE 6 6 « te et el lel ltl tlt ltl wt 12

A. Patterson's Defamation Claim Was
Not Pre-empted by the Labor
Management Relations Act .......12

B. Patterson's Claims Should Not Be
Time-Barred Under the Labor-
Management Relations Act ....... 18

1. Patterson's Complaint for
defamation was timely under
the applicable statute of
Dr ss w 6 % 0 « » « « « « 20

2. The limitation period on
Patterson's § 301 claims was
tolled. o * e - s* o . e ° . = — . aa 21

V ° CONCLUS ION e io e ° * 2 o o . e e o * e * 7 s 3

APPENDI ».4 * ad a e e e a e 2 e e + > e e a = . A 1

ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471
U.S. 202, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85
L.Ed.2d 206 (1985) J e * ” . it _ oe - ° . > > # 13

American Pipe and Construction v.
Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 94 S.Ct. 756,
oe ce Tee es we ow ee ee ee ee 2

Conley v. International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers Local 639, 810
F.2d 913 (Sth Cir. 1987)... . * « 26,5 B29, 2°9

Daniels v. Pipefitters Association
Local Union No. 571, 945 F.2d 906
Fen aes See fF ee oat we ee oe es OO,

DelCostello v. International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct.
2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) .... . aes Bay Oo

Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 880 F.2d
149 (Sth Cif. 3908) « © ss we He ee eH A 26

Galindo v. Stoody Co., 793 F.2d
1502 (9th Cir. 1986) ° e +. a a e 7 * o o - - * 19

Harris v. Alumax Mill Products, Inc.,
897 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1990). ...... 20, 26

International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machi Wo s cal 790

v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S.
229, 97 S.Ct. 441, 50 L.Ed.2d 427

(1976) a e a 3 e e e a aa « - e * * e ° . 26, 27

Jackson v. Hayakawa, 605 F.2d 1121

(9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U. S. 952 (1980) e e — = * 2 . * 2 7” e * . e 24

Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis &
Pettigrow v. Gilbertson, U.S. ,
Aas WeGlle Bete EROOEE 6 « 2 we 6 « « 23, 28, 29

Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic
Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 108 S.Ct.
1677, 100 L5BG.30 410 41986)... .. 2. se © 3

Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers
of America Local 114, 363 U.S. 53,

86 S.Ct. 657, 15 L.Ed.2d 582 (1986) ..... 18

Nelson v. International Paint Co.,
716 ¥.24 646 (9th Cir. 1983). ... . «sss 26

Retail Clerks Union Local 648, AFL-CIO

v. Hub Pharmacy, Inc., 707 F.2d 1030
(Pee Sees Bees) «+ « « ee et te te 28, 25, 29, 3

Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d
1529 (9th Cir. Bweees 6 6 @ * se « = « & 2

Tellez v. Pacific Gas & Electric
Co., Inc., 817 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1987)
Gore, Gemiee, 106 §.Ct. 251. « « « « « « 16, 17

United Steel Workers of America v.
Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 110 S.Ct. 1904,
AOS 2. BG.30 362 (1990). . 2. 2 2 2 0 eo ew 12

Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 629 F.2d
516 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,

SOG UiOs 20gn CERO ess eo we we te hl hl hl hl tl} 2

Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
43> Us8. Bes, 162 6.Ct. 1127, 71

OE ea eee |
co O D STATUTES

United States Constitution,
pO ES ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee

28 WeweGe 1257. * e ° * @ * os 7. 7 e * ” e a7 . me |

- oe ee ee a a i i oe ee a ey

29 U.S.C. 185(a), (b) and (c) ... 1, 2, 3, 10

Alaska Statutes 09.10.070 . ..... + +. «3, 21

1

I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The petitioner respectfully prays that a
writ of certiorari be issued to review Opinion
No. 4108, dated August 5, 1994 in Case No. s-
4125, _ P.2d _, of the Supreme Court of the
State of Alaska. See, Appendix at A2 to A34. A
timely petition for rehearing was denied on
September 2, 1994. See, Appendix at Al.

This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. 1257. This petition is timely filed in

accord with 28 U.S.C. 2101.

II. APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS

This case involves rights protected by
Amendment XIV, §1 to the United States
Constitution, which provides:

---nor shall any State deprive any person of

life, liberty, or property without due

process of law; nor deny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal protection

of the laws.

This case also involves the Labor-Management

Relations Act, which, in §301, makes provision

for suits by and against labor organizations, 29

2
U.S.C. 185(a), (b) and (c), which provide:
Venue, amount, and citizenship

(a) Suits for violation of contracts
between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an_ industry
affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any §such_ labor
organizations, may be brought in any
district court of the United States having
jurisdiction of the parties, without respect
to the amount in controversy or without
regard to the citizenship of the parties.

Responsibility for acts of agent; entity for
purposes of suit; enforcement of money
judgment

(b) Any labor organization which repre-
sents employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this chapter and any
employer whose activities affect commerce as
defined in this chapter shall be beund by
the acts of its agents. Any such labor
organization may sue or be sued as an entity
and in behalf of the employees whom it rep-
resents in courts of the United States. Any
money judgment against a labor organization
in a district court of the United States
shall be enforceable only against the
organization as an entity and against its
assets, and shall not be enforceable against
any individual member or his assets.

Jurisdiction

(c) For the purposes of actions and pro-
ceedings by or against labor organizations
in the district courts of the United States,
district courts shall be deemed to have
jurisdiction of a labor organization (1) in
the district in which such organization
maintains its principal office, or (2) in

3
any district in which its duly authorized
officers or agents are engaged in
representing or acting for employee members.
State and federal courts have concurrent

jurisdiction of §301 suits. Lingle v. Norge

Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 108

S.Ct. 1877, 1880 n. 2, 100 L.Ed.2da 410 (1988).
State as well as federal courts must apply
federal law in deciding these claims. Id.

Patterson contends that the statute of
limitations applicable to his defamation claim is
not the limitation for §301 actions, but rather
is the applicable state statute, AS 09.10.0709,
which provides:

Actions to be brought in two years. No
person may bring an action (1) for libel,
Slander, assault, battery, seduction, false
imprisonment, or for any injury to the
person or rights of another not arising on
contact and not’ specifically provided
otherwise; (2) upon a statute for forfeiture
or penalty to the state; or (3) upon a
liability created by statute, other than a
penaldy or forfeiture; unless commenced
within two years.

III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Patterson was employed as a delivery driver-

Salesman by Matanuska Maid, Inc. (Mat-Maid) from

4
1979 to 1986.(CR 402, 1100). Mat-Maid began as a
cooperative for processing, distributing and
marketing dairy products. Difficult financial

problems culminated in reorganization of the firm

under the Bankruptcy Code in 1984. The Bankruptcy
Court allowed the State of Alaska, the major
creditor, to take over management of the company
(CR 1099). John L. Seawell was appointed managing
agent for the state on November 15, 1984 (CR 87).
Seawell brought in a new management team, which
resulted in events leading to Patterson's
discharge on April 30, 1986 (CR 1100).
International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local
959 (Local 959) represented Mat-Maid's employees,
but there was no signed collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) in effect between Local 959 and
Mat-Maid from November 18, 1983 until a new two-
year CBA became effective April 1, 1986. During
the interim, the employer operated under what it
called an implemented last offer agreement, not

officially recognized by the union (CR 1099-

1100).

5

Patterson is a United States Army Veteran
who, after serving a tour of duty in Vietnam and
being honorably discharged, was diagnosed as
suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD) (Patterson Depo. at 38, 41, 72-75, 445).'
Despite the PTSD, Patterson's personnel file con-
tained no documented disciplinary incident prior
to June 3, 1985 and management witnesses acknow-
ledged in the arbitration hearing that Patterson
ordinarily demonstrated good work habits and was
considered a desirable employee (CR 1100, 1103).
Between June 3, 1985 and April 30, 1986,
Patterson's personnel file contains entries of
about a dozen deficiencies, including absent
reports, verbal reports regarding load sheets and
verbal reports regarding customer contacts, but
no formal disciplinary action (CR 1103).

On February 6, 1986, Steve Bevins,
Patterson's immediate supervisor, wrote a letter

to Robert J. Sinnett, Secretary-Treasurer of

‘Patterson's 215-page deposition with
exhibits is in the court file (CR 134-369).

6
Local 959, alleging misconduct by Patterson,
including alleged placing of six capsules of
Tranxene in Bevins' can of Coca-Cola; late
evening abusive telephone calls to Bevins' home
while under the influence of alcohol and/or
drugs, including name-calling and_ threats;
problems with the battery in Patterson's route
truck requiring four jump starts by Bevins in
four months, although the battery was new and
other drivers had no problems with it; obscene
calls at all hours of the day and night to
Bevins' home and the home of a _ non-union
employee, including alleged obscenities to
spouses, and obscene calls to one of the office
girls; customer complaints concerning Patterson's
alleged deliberate failure to follow instructions
and coverup attempts by Patterson (CR 84-85).
Patterson denied the allegations in a letter to
Seawell and requested an apology. Patterson also
obtained and supplied letters from customers

referred to in Bevins' letter, refuting Bevins'

allegations (CR 1115-1118), and a repair order

7

establishes that the truck in question had
serious problems with the electrical system (CR
1102, 1113). The office girl referred to in
Bevins' letter denied Bevins' allegations at the
arbitration hearing (CR 1102) and the company
could present only hearsay testimony about
alleged calls to Bevins' wife and the wife of the
non-union employee (CR 1101).

On April 30, 1986, at the beginning of
Patterson's work shift, he drove his company
truck to Local 959 headquarters hoping to see
Sinnett, the Secretary-Treasurer of Local 959,
to express his views about a provision of the
CBA, which was still under negotiation (Patterson
Depo. at 93, 94; CR 1104). While waiting to see
Sinnett, Patterson took a coffee break in the
restaurant on the premises and completed his
morning paperwork before making his deliveries.
After about 20 minutes, Patterson left without
seeing Sinnett. While he was stopped at a stop

sign at the parking lot exit, his truck was rear-

ended by a pickup truck. Patterson's truck

8

sustained no damage and the other driver was
cited for the accident. Shortly after Patterson
had completed his deliveries and returned to Mat-
Maid, he was given a termination notice by
Seawell, the general manager (Patterson Depo. 92,
93; CR 1104). The termination notice stated:

This is notice of termination of your

employment at Matanuska Maid effective

immediately.

Reasons for your discharge include:

Unauthorized use of company equipment for
personal use.

Gross disobedience.

Second accident within a year involving
property damage to others.

(CR 1081). Patterson had been involved in an
accident on May 27, 1985, which also was
attributable to the other driver (CR 1103).
Local 959 filed a grievance on Patterson's
behalf. On June 23, 1986, a hearing was held
before an arbitrator to determine if the termina-
tion of Patterson was for just cause and, if not,

what was the remedy? (CR 1099). On July 2, 1986,

the arbitrator made his Decision and Award that

ell

9

Mat-Maid had just cause to terminate Patterson's
employment, dismissing Patterson's grievance (CR
1112). The record does not establish when
Patterson was first informed of the arbitrator's
decision, but, because the decision is dated July
2, which was a Wednesday, and it was distributed
by mail, since Friday, July 4, was-a holiday, it
appears certain that Patterson did not become
aware of the decision until at least Monday, July
7, 1986, possibly later. See, Opinion of the
Alaska Supreme Court at Al17.

On January 6, 1987, Patterson filed a
Complaint for Discrimination in Employment with
the United States Department of Labor, Case No.
J870004, which was not finally determined until
March 11, 1993.

On February 5, 1988, Patterson, pro se,
filed a Complaint in the Superior Court for the
State of Alaska, Case No. 3AN-88-1093 Civil,
against Matanuska Maid, Inc., and its agents John

Seawell, Ron Wilde and Steve Bevins, alleging

that he had been maliciously defamed by the

10

publication of Bevins' February 6, 1986 letter to
Sinnett and the republication of that letter
during the arbitration proceeding (CR 27-32).

On May 2, 1988, Patterson, pro se, filed
another Complaint in the Superior Court for the
State of Alaska, Case No. 3AN-88-4692, naming the
same defendants and, in addition, Joe Van Treeck
of Matanuska and Local 959 as defendants (CR 1-
12). The Complaint includes allegations that Mat-
Maid wrongfully terminated Patterson and Local
959 breached its duty of fair representation. The
suit was stayed as to Local 959 because it was in
Chapter 11 Bankrutpcy »(CR 24-25). Upon motion of
Mat-Maid, the court ordered the two cases
consolidated on November 21, 1988 (CR 47-48).

On February 6, 1989, Patterson, still acting
pro se, added the State of Alaska as a defendant
(CR 982-985, 1004-1005).

On April 14, 1989, Mat-Maid filed a motion
for summary judgment asserting that Patterson's

claims were pre-empted by §301 of the Labor

Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 185,

i

11

and that all of Patterson's claims were time-
barred by the six-month limitation of action
applicable to §301 causes of action (CR 76-90).
The Superior Court granted Mat-Maid's motion for
summary judgment against all of Patterson's
claims on June 19, 1989 (CR 524-525) and entered
final judgment in favor of Mat-Maid and its
agents on August 10, 1989 (CR 562-563). The
Superior Court had granted summary judgment to
the state on May 1, 1989 (CR 1143-1144).

On November 4, 1992, the Alaska Supreme
Court granted Patterson the right to file a late
appeal (CR 1150-1152).

The Alaska Supreme Court issued its Opinion
affirming the Judgment on August 5, 1994
(Appendix at A2 to A34) and denied a timely
petition for rehearing on September 2, 1994

(Appendix at Al).

12

IV. SONS _ FO TING
THE WRIT

A. Patterson's Defamation Claim Was Not
Pre-empted by the Labor Management
Relations Act.

Patterson asserted his tort claim for defa-
mation based on the publications of the February
6, 1986 letter from Bevins to Sinnett in state
court under state law. Torts asserted pursuant
to state law are pre-empted by §301 of the LMRA
only when they conflict with federal law or would
frustrate the federal scheme, or when the court
discerns from the totality of the circumstances
that Congress sought to occupy the field to the
exclusion of the States. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v.
Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 209, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1910,
85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985). See, also, United Steel

Workers of America v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 369,

110 S.Ct. 1904, 1909, 109 L.Ed.2a 362 (1990);
Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1540-
41 (9th Cir. 1992). A state cause of action is

not pre-empted if it confers non-negotiable

state-law rights on an employee independent of

ale hie Nan ANS we tee. tm

13

any right established under ae CBA. is-

Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 213, 105 S.Ct. at 1912. If

evaluation of the tort claim is not inextricably
intertwined with consideration of the terms of a
labor contract, it is not pre-empted. Id. The na-
ture of the state tort is a matter of state law,
but the question of whether the tort is suffi-
ciently independent of federal contract interpre-
tation to avoid pre-emption is a question of
federal law. 4710U.S. at 214, 105 S.Ct. at 1912.

In Allis-Chalmers, the tort involved was
alleged bad faith in adjusting an insurance claim
which derived from the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in the CBA. Since the tort
was intrinsically related to the nature and
existence of the contract and rooted in the
expectations of the parties that must be
evaluated by federal contract law, it was held to
be preempted. 471 U.S. at 216-220, 105 S.Ct. at
1914-16.

The tort asserted by Patterson in his Con-

Plaint dated February 5, 1988, however, was en-

14

tirely independent of any CBA. It did not derive
from any rights or obligations established by the
contract, nor did it require interpretation or
application of any of the terms of the CBA.

Mat-Maid contended that the publications of
the Bevins letter were absolutely privileged be-
cause it had been its regular custom and practice
to informally confer with the union on labor
issues to prevent them from becoming serious
labor disputes (CR 427). Mat-Maid asserted that
it was operating under an implemented last offer
agreement at the time of the initial publication
of the letter, but it never disclosed in the
record any of the terms of the alleged implemen-
ted agreement. At the time the letter was pub-
lished at the arbitration hearing, a new CBA was
in effect, and Mat-Maid asserted that the
preamble (Article 1.01) and Articles 9.01 and
9.02 provided for informal conferences and con-
ciliation and direct communication of complaints

by the employer to union representatives apart

from initiation of formal grievance proceedings

15

(CR 426). The pertinent portion of Article 1.01
states, "The purposes of this Agreement are to
provide for the settlement of labor disagreements
by conference..." (CR 92). Article 9.01 is merely
a general statement of the intent of the parties
to follow the procedures stated thereafter in the
orderly and peaceful resolution of disputes (CR
97). Article 9.02 states:

Any dispute that arises between the employee

and the employer or any complaint or

grievance on the part of both or one, said

grievance, complaint or dispute shall be

submitted to the Local Union within thirty

(30) days to be eligible to receive

assistance of the Local Union.
(CR 97). Articles 9.03 through 9.11 specify the
procedures for bringing a grievance, complaint or
dispute and the arbitration thereof, but there is
no provision for Mat-Maid to file a dispute,
complaint or grievance without seeking
arbitration (CR 97-98).

The Bevins letter did not seek arbitration,

nor did it give notice of any suspension or

termination. When Patterson was terminated on

April 30, 1986, the termination notice neither

16
referred to the February 6, 1986 letter nor

anything stated in that letter.
In Tellez v. Pacific Gas & Electric Company,

Inc., 817 F.2d 526, 538 (9th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S.Ct. 251, the court stated, "One can
sue for defamation regardless of employment
status or union membership." That case involved
a suspension letter which alleged that the
employee had been observed to purchase cocaine
from another employee. The Court of Appeals
stated further:

The agreement (the CBA) simply does not
govern Bain's allegedly defamatory conduct.
It neither requires management to _ send
written notice of suspension nor provides
guidelines in the event such notice is sent.
Thus, Bain could not have been acting under
the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement when he sent the _ suspension
letter. It follows that the resolution of
Tellez's defamation claim does not require
interpretation or consideration of the
agreement.

...We therefore conclude that permitting
Tellez's state defamation claim to proceed
does not impinge on the authority of the
arbitration process contemplated by the
parties' collective bargaining agreement.

|
i ‘ ¢ 4

17

(Footnotes omitted). 817 F.2d at 538. The Court
of Appeals then distinguished the Tellez case
from the cases cited by the Alaska Supreme Court
in support of its holding that the publication of
Bevins' letter was absolutely. privileged.
(Appendix, A32). The same distinguishing factors
apply to this case. In fact, this case is even
further removed from the labor contract than
Tellez because in that case the defamatory letter
was a "suspension letter," whereas here the
letter did nothing whatsoever to invoke or cause
the invocation of the CBA. Consequently there is
no basis for pre-emption of Patterson's
defamation claim and, likewise, there is no basis
for any privilege to attach to the defamatory
statements in the context of the LMRA.

Furthermore, Patterson asserted in his
Complaint that the defamatory statements were
made with malice and were either deliberately or
recklessly untruthful. Even in the labor

relations context, such statements enjoy no

constitutional protection and cannot be condoned.

18
inn v. Unit uard W fe) erica
Local 114, 363 U.S. 53, 63, 86 S.Ct. 657, 663, 15
L.Ed.2d 582 (1966). A cause of action based on
such libelous statements is not pre-empted. 383
U.S. at 64, 86 S.Ct at 663-664.

By holding that Patterson's state tort claim
for defamation was pre-empted by the LMRA and
that the publications of the Bevins letter were
privileged as though they were in the context of
a labor dispute, the Alaska Supreme Court
erroneously deprived Patterson of his day in
court and in reality denied him equal protection
of laws and also deprived him of his property
(his cause of action) without due process of law.
Patterson is entitled to litigate his claim and
have it decided by a jury of his peers.

B. Patterson's Claims Should Not Be Time-
Barred Under the Labor-Management

Relations Act.

In applying for summary judgment as to
Patterson's claims for defamation and wrongful
termination, after the two lawsuits were consoli-

dated, Mat-Maid took the position that all claims

Soci AL NaN RR eal PEN

ata aden Mia AN ei Se ev et

19

were étindupaseed in a hybrid §301/Fair Represen-
tation action, which is a dual action against the
union for breach of its duty of fair representa-
tion implied under the LMRA and against the
employer for breach of the CBA. See, DelCostello
v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462
U.S. 151, 164, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2290, 76 L.Ed.2da
476 (1983). A six-month limitation period is
applied to such claims. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at
169-170, 103 S.Ct. at 2293-94.

Assuming the six-month limitation is applic-
able, the record in this case is unclear as to
when it began to run. It is clearly established
that the limitation period does not begin to run
until the employee learns of the arbitrator's
decision. Galindo v. Stoody Co., 793 F.2d 1502,
1509 (9th Cir. 1986). Other court decisions
confirm that such a hybrid cause of action does
not accrue and the six-month statute of limita-
tions does not begin to run until the employee

discovers that the union will take no further

action on his grievance. Daniels v. Pipefitters

20
Association Local Union No. 571, 945 F.2d 906,
922 (7th Cir. 1991); Harris v. Alumax Mill
Products, Inc., 897 F.2d 400, 404 (9th Cir.
1990). In this case, the arbitrator's decision
is dated July 2, 1986 and it was mailed by the
arbitrator to the union representative. Since
July 2 in 1986 was a Wednesday, it appears that
Patterson could not have been informed before the
July 4th holiday on Friday, so the only fair
inference is that Patterson did not know about it
until at least Monday, July 7, 1986. Thus, the
record is sufficient to establish that the
limitation could not have begun to run before
that date, but it is insufficient to determine
exactly when Patterson was informed that the
union would take no further action on his
grievance. Moreover, Patterson has never conceded
that the six-month limitation applied to his
defamation claims.

1. Patterson's Complaint for defamation
was timely under the applicable statute
of limitations

As shown previously, Patterson's Complaint

21
for defamation is a tort under state law and it
should not have been pre-empted by the LMRA. The
applicable statute of limitations is two years as
provided by AS 09.10.070, quoted supra at 3-4.

2. The limitation period on Patterson's

§ 301 claims was tolled.
In DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 172, 103

S.Ct. at 2295, this court remanded for a deter-
mination as to whether the six-month limitation
period had been tolled, thereby recognizing that
tolling may be applicable in such cases.
Statutes of limitations are not jurisdictional,
so they are subject to waiver and tolling when

equity so requires. Zipes v. Trans World

Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398, 102 S.Ct.
1127, 1135, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982). In deciding
whether to toll a limitation period, "[t]he
ultimate question is one of the congressional

intent ‘whether tolling the limitation in the

given context is consonant with the legislative

scheme.'" Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d
516, 527 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 454 U.S.

22
1031 (1981), quoting, American Pipe and
Construction v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 558, 94 S.Ct.
756, 768, 38 L.Ed.2d 713 (1974).

Patterson's cause of action accrued sometime
after July 7, 1986, but the record does not
establish exactly when it accrued. Patterson
filed a complaint for wrongful termination with
the Department of Labor on January 6, 1987, which
appears certainly to have been within six months
of the accrual of his cause of action. Because
Patterson was without employment and,
consequently, representing himself, the record in
this case contains very little information about
the nature and progress of his complaint to the
Department of Labor, although he _ testified
briefly about it in his deposition (Patterson
Depo. at 46-47). Summary judgment was granted
against Patterson on the basis of a statute of
limitations without anything in the record
establishing when the limitation period began to

run and little information to indicate whether it

should have been tolled.

23
This court has consistently recognized that
time requirements in lawsuits are customarily
subject to equitable tolling. See case citations

in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petiaqrow v.

Gilbertson, — Meme . , £33 8.08. 2773, 2783
(1991).

At the time Patterson's hybrid §301 cause of
action accrued, the applicable law to be
considered, if Patterson as a prospective pro se
litigant was able to find and apply the law, was
that a six-month limitation period applied and it
could be tolled in a context consonant with the
legislative scheme. In Retail Clerks Union Local

648, AFL-CIO v. Hub Pharmacy, Inc., 707 F.2d

1030, 1033 (9th Cir. 1983), the court had

explained:

Equitable tolling should not be applied in
a manner that frustrates national labor-
management policy. We believe that policy is
fostered by the NLRB attempt to resolve an
issue before a party resorts to a §301
action. Thus, if tolling is appropriate in
this case, it would not be inconsistent with
the Constitution or with the applicable
federal labor laws.

It also had been established that where a

24

plaintiff adopts a single course of action which
is dismissed or otherwise fails, courts generally
allow the plaintiff to pursue a second remedy
based on the same right or claim, tolling the
limitations period during the pendency of the
initial defective action. Nelson v. Internationa

Paint Company, 716 F.2d 640, 645 (9th Cir. 1983).
In order to establish that tolling should apply,
a plaintiff had to show that his pursuit of the
initial remedy gave notice to the defendant of
the existence of a legal claim against it, the
defendant must not be prejudiced in its ability
to gather evidence by the bringing of the second
claim, and the plaintiff must have acted in good
faith. Jackson v. Hayakawa, 605 F.2d 1121, 1127
(9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 952
(1980). Not until after Patterson had elected to
file his wrongful discharge claim with the
Department of Labor did the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals pronounce that the filing of an

optional NLRB action did not toll the limitation

for the filing of a §301 claim. Conley v.

ir rice land i! a

25

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,

Local 639, 810 F.2d 913, 916 (9th Cir. 1987). In

doing so, the court stated, "Allowing tolling in
this circumstance would frustrate the national
policy of prompt resolution of labor disputes,"
which was exactly the opposite of what the same
court had said in Hub Pharmacy, = supra.
Furthermore, in DelCostello, this court indicated
at least as much concern about a limitation
period being too short as too long. 462 U.S. at
167-6, 103 &.Ct. at 2292.

In Conley, the court made the illogical
pronouncement that, "Equitable tolling is most
appropriate when plaintiff is required to avail
himself of an alternate course of action as a
precondition to filing suit." 810 F.2d at 915.
But equitable tolling does not apply when an
alternate course of action is a precondition to
filing suit, because a cause of action does not
accrue until preconditions have been exhausted.

ni Vv. ipefitters Association Local Union

No. 597, 945 F.2d 906, 922 (7th Cir. 1991). In

26

Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 880 F.2d 149, 155 (9th
Cir. 1989), a different panel, without reference
to Conley, explained:

Equitable tolling applies when the plaintiff

seeks a different remedy for the same wrong.

However, equitable tolling is not applicable

when a plaintiff has pursued a remedy as to

only one of several distinct wrongs.
The first sentence of this pronouncement is
applicable in Patterson's case. The second
sentence was applicable in Harris v. Alumax Mill
Products, Inc., 897 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1990) in
which the court held that a §301 claim was not
tolled by the filing of a worker's compensation
claim. Without reference to Eichman, the Harris
court unnecessarily relied on the illogical
pronouncement in Conley. Harris, 897 F.2d at 404.

In Harris, the court also relied on this
court's decision in International Union of
Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, Local 790
v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 236-40,

97 S.Ct. 441, 446-49, 50 L.Ed.2d 427 (1976). In

that case, a majority of this court analyzed the

applicability of tolling the limitation period

27

for filing a Title VII claim under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 while pursuing a grievance of
a discharged employee under the applicable
collective bargaining agreement. The majority of
the court concluded that the Title VII time
limitation was not tolled. But that conclusion
appears to be limited to that specific legisla-
tion in which Congress emphasized the existence
and independence of the two remedies. 429 U.S. at
237, 97 S.Ct. at 447. There is no similar em-
phatic expression of congressional intent
applicable in this case. Even so, in Robbins &
Myers, four members of this court, as then
constituted, declined to join in that part of the
opinion, but concurred in the result on the basis
that Congress had lengthened the limitation
period after the cause of action had initially
accrued and the new limitation was applicable.

Although, as has been noted, all members of
this court appear consistently to have recognized
the desirability of the doctrine of equitable

tolling of limitation periods, how and under what

28
circumstances tolling and related concepts are to
be applied has resulted in many differences of

opinion among the members of this court. For

example, in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis &
Petigrow v. Gilbertson, supra, there are five
different opinions, with only four members of the
court joining in all of the main opinion. Justice
Stevens, in his opinion, recognized that the
traditional rule of borrowing from analogous
state limitations is often chaotic, but he said
it would still be preferable for Congress, rather
than the court, to legislate any change. 111
S.Ct. at 2784. But the pithy comments of Justice
O'Connor are more applicable to this case. She
wrote:
In holding that the respondents' suit is
time-barred under a limitation period that
did not exist before today, the Court
departs drastically from our established
practice and inflicts an injustice on the

respondents.

111 S.Ct. at 2785. Justice O'Connor continued:

Notwithstanding respondents' entirely proper
reliance on this limitations period, the
Court now holds that their suit must be
dismissed as untimely because respondents
did not comply with a federal limitations

29
period announced for the first time today--
four-and-one-half years after the suit was
filed. Quite simply, the Court shuts the
courthouse door on respondents because they
were unable to predict the future.
111 S.Ct. at 2786. Although the facts of this
case are somewhat different, the essential facts
are analogous. At the time Patterson, pro se,
elected to pursue his claim administratively with
the Department of Labor, the law appeared to be
clear that doing so would toll the limitations
period applicable to his §301 claims. But now,
*he state courts have shut the courthouse door on
Patterson because he was unable to predict the
future. As Justice Kennedy commented,
That (looking to limitations periods
Congress established under the Act) does not
relieve us, however, of our obligation to
reject a limitations rule that would
"frustrate or significantly interfere with
federal policies."
111 S.Ct. at 2788. Federal policies at the time
Patterson was determining his course of action

favored a party attempting to resolve an issue

administratively before resorting to a §301

action. i erks Union Local 648 v. Hub

30
Pharmacy, 707 F.2d at 1033.

V. CONCLUSION

Patterson has been denied due process of law
as to his state tort action by unwarranted pre-
emption of it into his §301 cause of action; and
he has been denied due process of law as to his
§301 cause of action by the application of
concepts of tolling the limitation period which
did not exist at the time Patterson's cause of
action accrued.

This court is urged to grant a writ of
certiorari so that this case may be considered on
the merits and then to determine that the
Judgment of the Alaska Supreme Court should be
reversed.

Respectfully submitted the LZ) day of
November, 1994.

LAW OFFICES OF A. LEE PETERSEN, P.C.
Attorneys for Petitioner

1115 West Fireweed Lane, Suite 204
Anchorage, Alaska 99503
(907) 276-8330

Al

F APPELLATE COURTS CLERK
R 303 K STREET

0 ANCHORAGE, AK 99501

M

Case Title: PATTERSON Vv MATANUSKA MAID INC
Suprem Court Case #: S4125

eeeKE OR DE R #kkkKe 09/01/94

IT IS ORDERED: THE PETITION FOR REHEARING FILED
ON AUGUST 15, 1994. IS DENIED. ENTERED AT THE
DIRECTION OF THE SUPREME COURT ON SEPTEMBER 1,
1994,

CC: JUSTICES, JUDGE HUNT, APPEALS DIVISION 3AN-
88-1093 CIVIL. PUBLISHERS (OP#4108. 8/5/94). TRW

Clerk of the Appellate Courts

A2

THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF ALASKA

WILLIAM J. PATTERSON, a.
)Supreme Court
Appellant, )No. S-4125
)
Vv. )Superior Court No.

) 3AN-88-1093 CI
STATE OF ALASKA, DEPARTMENT OF)
AGRICULTURE, Individually and ) OPINION

Severally; MATANUSKA MAID, )
INC., Individually and )[No. 4108 - August
Severally; and its agents ) 5, 1994]

JOHN SEAWELL, RON WILDE, )
STEVE BEVINS and JOE )
VAN TREECK, Individually )
and Severally, )
)
)

Appellees.

Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Karen L. Hunt, Judge.

Appearances: A. Lee Petersen, Law Offices of

A. Lee Ptersen, P.C., Anchorage, for
Appellant. Parry Grover, James H. Juliussen,
Davis Wright Tremaine, Anchorage, for

Appellees Matanuska Maid, John Seawell, Ron
Wilde, Steven Bevins, and Joe Van Treeck.
Kevin Saxby, Assistant Attorney General,
Anchorage, Charles E. Cole, Attorney
General, Juneau, for Appellee State of
Alaska.

Before: Moore, Chief Justice, Rabinowitz,
Matthews and Compton, Justices. ([Burke,
Justice, not participating. ]}

RABINOWITZ, Justice.

' Justice Burke participated in oral argument but
retired from the court before the opinion was
rendered.

I. INTRODUCTION

William Patterson initially sued Matanuska

Maid and its agents (Mat-Maid) for defamation.
Patterson then filed a second lawsuit against the
State of Aalska, Department of Agriculture
(State) and Mat-Maid for wrongful termination.
Patterson now appeals from the superior court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of the State
and Mat-Maid on both claims.

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Patterson had been employed by Mat-Maid for
seven and one-half years, during which time the
company came under new management. Mat-Maid had
experienced financial difficulties, and the
federal bankruptcy court ordered reorganization.
The bankruptcy court authorized the State to
Operate the company, and a new managing agent,
John Seawell, was appointed in November 1984.

Patterson was involved in an accident with
a company truck in June 1985. He was reprimanded,
and a corrective action report was placed in his

file. This incident, coupled with the change in

A4
management and Patterson's problems associated

with post-traumatic stress disorder,’

appear to
have triggered a series of absences from work,
customer complaints about Patterson, and
reprimands regarding his performance of routine
duties. Mat-Maid took no formal disciplinary
action against Patterson for any of these
reported incidents.

Starting in April 1986, a collective
bargaining agreement between Mat-Maid and
Teamsters Local 959 controlled Patterson's terms

of employment.° The agreement required "just

cause" for termination of employment and also

‘Patterson is a Vietnam veteran who has been
diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress
disorder. His psychotherapist states that as a
result of his war experiences Patterson has
"experienced a great deal of problems in his
relationships with supervisors in his work over
the years." It appears that after the change in
management "the relationship between Mr.
Patterson and his supervisors became very
adversarial."

*Before the collective bargaining agreement
went into effect, Mat-Maid looked to an employer-
implemented last offer agreement, which Local 959
had never endorsed, to govern relations with
employees.

A5
contained mandatory grievance and arbitration
procedures.?

On February 6, 1986, Steve Bevins,
Patterson's immediate supervisor, wrote a letter
to the secretary-treasurer of Local 959, Robert
J. Sinnett, asserting misconduct by Patterson.
Bevins alleged that Patterson tried to poison him
and that Patterson was calling his home making
obscene remarks to his spouse. The letter also
said that Patterson made obscene calls to other
employees, and that Bevins was concerned about
Patterson's stability and performance. Essen-
tially, the letter asked Local 959 to intervene
and attempt to straighten out the situation, and
stated that if problems with Patterson's behavior
continued, he would be fired.

Patterson was subsequently involved in a
second automobile accident on April 30, 1986. At

the time of the accident Patterson had detoured

‘The agreement specified that the procedures
therein would be "the sole means of resolving
disputes, complaints, or grievances." Under these
procedures, arbitration would be a last resort.

ill

A6

without permission from his delivery route. He
drove to the Teamsters Building in an attempt to
gain Sinnett's permission to attend a meeting
between Local 959 and Mat-Maid. As he left the
parking lot a pick-up truck collided with the
rear of his delivery truck. Patterson was
terminated for cause that same day.

Patterson subsequently filed a termination
grievance, which Local 959 took to arbitration on
his behalf. An arbitration hearing was held and
on July 2, 1986, the arbitrator rendered a
decision and award in favor of Mat-Maid. Neither
Patterson nor Local 959 appealed from the
arbitration decision.

On February 5, 1988, Patterson file a pro se
tort action for defamation against Mat-Maid. On
May 2, 1988, Patterson filed a second lawsuit for
wrongful termination against Mat-Maid, Local 959
aud its officers, and the arbitrator. Both
actions were based on the conduct of Mat-Maid and
Local 959 during Patterson's employment and the

subsequent grievance proceedings. According to

| A7
Patterson's complaint, the arbitrator "admitt[ed]
unsubstantiated, irrelevant, and grossly hearsay
evidence," sustained Patterson's termination on
grounds other than those charged, "overstepp[ed]
his bounds," and "ignor[ed) his duty as an
impartial judge." The two cases were subsequently
consolidated by superior court order. on February
6, 1989, Patterson filed a document titled
"Addition to Plaintiff's List of Defendants in
Above Mentioned Cases," in which for the first
time he named the State as a defendant in the now
consolidated lawsuits. The State and Mat-Maid
thereafter filed separate summary judgment
motions.

The superior court granted summary judgment
in favor of the State in May 1989, on the grounds
that Patterson had not named the State as a party
until after the statute of limitations for
wrongful discharge and defamation had run. The
Superior court also held that Patterson's claim
against the State did not relate back to the date

of his original complaints, see Alaska R. Civ. P.

A8
15(c), because he was not mistaken as to the
identity of the proper party.*

Without comment, the superior court granted
summary judgment in favor of Mat-Maid in June
1989. The court entered final judgment in favor
of Mat-Maid on August 10, 1989. Now represented
by counsel, Patterson appeals from the grants of

summary judgment to the State and Mat-Maid.°

“All claims against Local 959's officers
were dismissed by superior court order in August
1988. The superior court on that date also
ordered a stay of proceedings against Local 959
pursuant to the United States Bankruptcy Code, 11
U.S.C. § 362. In September, the superior court
additionally dismissed all claims against the
arbitrator.

>In Patterson v. State, Mem. Op. & J. No.
0642 (Alaska Nov. 4, 1992), this court granted

Patterson leave to file a late appeal from the
superior court's final judgment of August 10,
1989. The State now contends that because
Patterson did not explicitly appeal the superior
court's May 1, 1989 grant of summary judgment to
the State, he cannot challenge that judgment
here. The superior court's judgment was titled
"Order Granting Final Summary Judgment," and the
State now characterizes this determination as a
proper final judgment.

The State is mistaken. If an action involves
multiple claims or multiple parties, and some
claims are adjudicated before others, then no
appeal may be taken until the court has disposed
of the entire case on all substantive issues,

A9

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

"When reviewing an appeal from summary
judgment, we determine whether there was a
genuine issue of material fact before the trial
court, and whether the moving party was entitled
to judgment on the law applicable to the

established facts." Crissey v. Alaska USA Fed.

Credit Union, 811 P.2a 1057, 1059 (Alaska 1991).

except as provided under Alaska Civil Rule 54(b).
See Johnson vy. State, 577 P.2d 706, 709-10
(Alaska 1978). Rule 54(b) allows the entry of
final judgment "as to one Or more but fewer than
all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination that there is no just reason for
delay and upon an express direction for the entry
of judgment." The Superior court's order of May
1, 1989 contained no such explicit findings.

Therefore, no appeals could occur until
final disposition of the action on August 10,
1989, with the entry of final judgment as to Mat-
Maid. The time for filing an appeal on any of
Patterson's claims started at that time. Under
these circumstances, we read our grant of
permission to file a late appeal as an extension
of the time to appeal all claims. Whether
Patterson mentioned the judgment of May 1, 1989
in his motion to file a late appeal is not a
relevant consideration.

and the Applicable _ Period ___of
Limitations

An arbitrator's decision can only be
challenged in two ways: (1) collaterally in an
action alleging breach of contract against an
employer and breach of the duty of fair
representation against a union; or (2) directly
through an action to vacate the award. Hines v.
Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 570
(1976); see also Sine v. Local No. 992 Int'l Bhd.
of Teamsters, 644 F.2d 997 (4th Cir.) (addressing
and analyzing both employee's direct challenge to
arbitrator's decision and employee's claim for
union's breach of duty), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
965 (1981). We turn first to the issues
pertaining to Patterson's collateral attack on

the arbitrator's decision.

1. The Applicable Limitations Period
fo 3 brid Claims

Patterson attempts to characterize his May

2, 1988 wrongful termination suit as a hybrid

action that federal law authorizes when a labor

All
union breaches its duty to fairly represent an
employee in arbitration proceedings. See
DelCostello vy. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
462 U.S. 151, 164-65 (1983). Brought under § 301
of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 185,° this action is both a suit against the
employer for breach of a collective bargaining
agreement, and a suit against the union for
breach of the duty of fair representation.

DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 164-65; see also Vaca v.

Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186-87 (1967). State courts
have concurrent jurisdiction to hear a collective
bargaining suit presenting § 301 hybrid clains.

Vaca, 386 U.S. at 186-87. See generally John P.

‘This statute states in part:

Suits for violation of contracts
between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry
affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor
Organizations, may be brought in any
district court of the United States having
jurisdiction of the parties, without respect
to the amount in controversy or without
regard to the citizenship of the parties.

29 U.S.C. § 185(a).

Al2
Ludington, Annotation, State Court Jurisdiction
as Pre-e b bo tions Act as
Amended U.S.C.S. 141 et seq.)--Supreme
Court Cases, 75 L.Ed.2d 988, 1012-13 (1985)
(discussing lack of pre-emption in § 301 cases).
However, state courts must apply federal

substantive law in adjudicating § 301 actions.’

"The U.S. Supreme Court requires application
of federal law alone in order to ensure uniform
interpretation of collective bargaining
agreements and to promote the peaceful and
consistent resolution of disputes between labor
and management:

The dimensions of § 301 require the conclu-
sions that substantive principles of federal
labor law must be paramount in the area
covered by the statute. Comprehensiveness is
inherent in the process by which the law is
to be formulated ... requiring issues raised
in suits of a kind covered by § 301 to be
decided according to the precepts of federal
labor policy.

More important, the subject matter of
§ 301(a) “is peculiarly one that calls for
uniform law." The possibility that indivi-
dual contract terms might have different
meanings under state and federal law would
inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon
both the negotiation and administration of
collective agreements .... Indeed, the
existence of possibly conclicting legal
concepts might substantially impede the
parties' willngness to agree to contract
terms providing for final arbitral or

Al3
Patterson's action is a § 301 action even though
he seeks to vindicate "uniquely personal" rights
related to his claim for wrongful discharge. See
Hines, 424 U.S. at 562.
As a threshold issue, both Mat-Maid and the
State contend that Patterson raises § 301 claims

for the first time on appeal and that this court

existence of possibly conclicting legal
concepts might substantially impede the
parties' willngness to agree to contract
terms providing for final arbitral or
judicial resolution of disputes.

--- The ordering and adjusting of com-
peting interests through a process of free
and voluntary collective bargaining is the
keystone of the federal scheme to promote
industrial peace. State law which frustrates
the effort of Congress to stimulate the
smooth functioning of that process thus
strikes at the very core of federal labor
policy.... [W]Je cannot but conclude that in
enacting § 301 Congress intended doctrines
of federal labor law uniformly to prevail
over inconsistent local rules.

Local 174, Teamsters of Amer. v. Lucas Flour -

369 U.S. 95, 103-04 (1962) (citations omitted) ;
accord Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc.,

486 U.S. 399, 403 & n. 2 (1988). See generally 2
Vv j w 1556-59 (Charles J.

Morris ed., 2d ed. 1988) (discussing applicability
of preemption doctrine to fair representation
cases under § 301).

Al14

record indicates that Patterson indeed failed to
make a § 301 argument to the superior court.

The State and Mat-Maid presented separate
defenses before the superior court, and do not
present a common defenses on appeal. In the
proceedings below, the State responded to
Patterson's wrongful discharge and defamation
claims without discussing any aspect of federal
labor law. However, in its memorandum in support
of its summary judgment motion, Mat-Maid raised
several arguments concerning the applicability of
§ 301 to Patterson's claims. Thus, § 301 issues
were before the superior court.®

The statute of limitations for hybrid § 301
claims is six months. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at

170-72." However, the statute of limitations

Spatterson's § 301 claim against the State
is meritless. As used in the Labor Management
Relations Act, the term "employer" does not
include states or their political subdivisions.
29 U.S.C. § 152(7).

*DelCostello borrowed the statute of limita-
tions for making charges of unfair labor prac~-
tices to the National Labor Relations Board. See
29 U.S.C. § 160(b); DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 169.

A15

pegine to run not on the date of the arbitrator's
decision but on the date that the employee learns
of the arbitrator's decision. Galindo v. Stoody
Co., 793 F.2d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1986).'°
Patterson contends that Mat-Maid never
established in the record the exact date on which
he became aware of the decision, and that thus a
genuine issue of material fact exists that
precludes summary judgment.

Patterson, however, does not produce
evidence that establishes a specific date from

which the limitation period should run.”

"The Galindo court said that "in a duty of
fair representation case, the six-month period
generally beings to run when an employee knows or
Should know of the alleged breach of duty of fair
representation by a union." Id.

Similarly, where a duty of fair representa-
tion suit seeks to overturn an unfavorable
arbitration award on the ground that the
union committed errors in the arbitration
proceedings, the claim accrues when the
employee learns of the arbitrator's award.

Id.

"see Bauman v. State, Div. of Family & Youth
Servs., 768 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Alaska 1989) ("Once
the movant has met that initial burden [estab-
lishing the absence of genuine issues of material

A16

Moreover, contrary to Patterson's allegations,
Mat-Maid in fact specified a date when the
limitations period started to run. In its
memorandum in support of its summary judgment
motion, Mat-Maid contended that the statute of
limitations started to run no later than July 2,
1986, the date of the arbitrator's decision.
Further, the record indicates that Patterson
knew or should have known of the arbitrator's
decision no later than July 21, 1986. On July 21,
1986, Mat-Maid appealed a decision by an
Employment Security Division hearing officer that
Patterson was entitled to unemployment compensa~
tion from May 4, 1986. The Commission of Labor
based his decision only on the evidence presented
to the hearing officer. That evidence included

the arbitrator's award upholding Patterson's

fact], 'the non-movant is required, in order to
prevent summary judgment, to set forth specific
facts showing that he could produce evidence
reasonably tending to dispute or contradict the
movant's evidence and thus demonstrate that a
material issue of fact exists.'") (quoting State,
Dep't of Highways v. Green, 586 P.2d 595, 606
n.32 (Alaska 1978)).

A17

discharge. Because Patterson participated in that
unemployment compensation proceeding, he must
have known of the arbitrator's decision by the
time of Mat-Maid's appeal on July 21, 1986.
Furthermore, Patterson's counsel "assumes" that
Patterson may have learned of the arbitrator's
decision on or about July 7, 1986.

Patterson filed his complaint for defamation
on February 5, 1988 and his wrongful termination
claim May 2, 1988, both over one and one-half
years after the July 2, 1986 arbitration award.
We therefore conclude that Patterson's § 301 suit
for wrongful termination is time barred, since it
was not brought within six months of the time
Patterson knew or should have learned of the
arbitrator's July 2, 1986 decision.

Patterson also claims that the applicable
limitation period should have been equitably
tolled while he pursued quasi-judicial relief.
Patterson filed a complaint with the U.S.
Department of Labor on January 16, 1987.

Patterson contends that if he learned of the

A18

arbitrator's decision on or around July 7, 1986
and then filed his complaint with the Department
of Labor within six months of that date, then a
genuine issue of fact exists as to whether the
applicable limitaitons period was tolled.

In countering Patterson's argument, Mat-Maid
relies on Harris v. Alumax Mi ducts nc.,
897 F.2d 400, 404 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 835 (1990), where the court cited authority
to the effect that an employee's § 301 claim is
not tolled by virtue of the filing of a worker's
compensation claim. The Ninth Circuit concluded
"that to allow tolling when the filing of an NLRB
claim was merely optional would 'frustrate the
national policy of prompt resolution of labor
disputes.'" Id. (quoting Conley v. International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 810 F.2d 913, 916 (9th
Cir. 1987)).

The Harris court stated that "'[e]quitable
tolling is most appropriate when the plaintiff is
required to avail himself of an alternate course

of action as a precondition to filing suit.'" Id.

TE"

A19
(quoting Conley, 810 F.2d at 916). Additionally,
Harris relies on the reasoning of the U.S.
Supreme Court regarding the tolling of a statute
of limitations by the filing of an optional
Claim, stating that "(tjhe Court has made it
Clear that it is reluctant to invoke tolling

where a plaintiff is tardy in pursuing a parallel
avenue of relief." Id. (citing International

Union of Elec., Radio, & Mach. Workers, Local 790
v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 236-40

(1976)). We conclude that Patterson's filing of

a claim with the U.s. Department of Labor was not
a precondition to the filing of his § 301 suit
against Mat-Maid, and that the applicable six-
month limitation period was not tolled by the

filing of that clain.”

Noting that Local 959 has filed for
bankruptcy and had obtained a stay of Patterson's
suit against it during that time, Patterson also
contends that Local 959 was an indispensable
party, and that the limitations period thus was
tolled for the duration of the stay. He is
mistaken. Except in unusual circumstances, an
automatic bankruptcy stay under 11 U.S.c. §
362(a) applies to the debtor alone and not to

non-bankruptcy co-defendants. E.g., Cushman &
Wakefield, Inc. v. Backos, 129 B.R. 35, 36 (E.D.

A20

Pa. 1991). Therefore, severance of the bankruptcy
defendant from non-bankrupt co-defendants is
allowable unless the bankrupt defendant is
indispensable to the action. Id. Patterson
acknowledges this rule. He also acknowledges that
in a hybrid § 301 action, neither the employer
nor the union is typically an indispensable party
in an action against the other, because generally
the suit against the employer is for breach of
the collective bargaining agreement, whereas the
suit against the union for breach of the duty of
fair representation. See Kaiser v. Local No. 83,
577 F.2d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 1977).

Nonetheless, Patterson contends that Local
959 is an indispensable party, because his claim
against Mat-Maid is not only for breach of the
collective bargaining agreement, but also for
conspiring with the union agaiinst Patterson.
Patterson does not discuss why the union might be
an indispensable party under Alaska Civil Rule 19
or the parallel federal rule. The sole authority
on which Patterson relies is an unsupported dic-
tum from Kaiser that an employer is not a parti-
cipant in the union's breach of duty "unless, of
course, the employee alleges that his union and
his employer conspired against him." Id.

Patterson's arguments must fail. In order
for one member of a civil conspiracy to be
liable, not all members of the conspiracy need be
named defendants or be joined as defendants.

E.g., U.S, dus. . Vo u , 854
F.2d 1233, 1251 (10th Cir. 1988); Walker Distrib.
Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1, 8

(9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 976
(1966); Non-Ferrous Metals, Inc. v. Saramar

Aluminum Co., 25 F.R.D. 102, 104 (N.D. Ohio
1960); 16 Am.Jur.2d Conspiracy § 66 (1979).

A21

2. Applicable Limitations Period for a
Direct Attack on the Arbitrator's

u 986 Award
Because his suit concerns the alleged
violation of a contract between an employer and
a labor organization, Patterson's direct
challenge to the arbitrator's decision, like his
Claims against Mat-Maid and Local 959, falls
under § 301, and state courts thus must apply

federal law. See United Steelworkers of Amer. v.

Northwest Steel Rolling Mills, Inc., 324 F.2qa

469, 481 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1963) (addressing action

to enforce arbitration award); Safeway Stores v.

Brotherhood of Teamsters Local No. 70, 147 Cal.

Rptr. 835, 838 (Cal. App. 1978) (addressing
action to vacate arbitration award). Thus as a
threshold issue we must address the limitations
period that applies to such a direct attack.

If Congress does not Supply an express
Statute of limitations regarding enforcement of

a federal cause of action, courts must first look

to state law for an analogous rule of timeliness.

Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 323

A22
(1989); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs., Inc. v.
sociaci ° ,
873 F.2d 479, 480 (1st Cir. 1989). However, a
narrow exception to this rule exists where
adoption of state statute of limitations would
frustrate or hinder the carrying out of federal
policy. Reed, 488 U.S. at 324; Posadas, 873 F.2d
at 480. DelCostello gives a two-factor test for
determining when the exception applies:
[Wjhen a rule from elsewhere in federal law
clearly provides a closer analogy than
available state statutes, and when the
federal policies at stake and the
practicalities of litigation make that rule
a significantly more appropriate vehicle for
interstitial lawmaking, we have not
hesitated to turn away from state law.
462 U.S. at 172; accord Reed, 488 U.S. at 324.
Applying such an analysis, the DelCostello

court concluded that a six-month limitations per-

iod would be appropriate as to both union and en-

ployer in hybrid § 301 actions involving a un-

ion's breach of the duty of fair representation."

4 Ordinarily, the federal statute of limita-
tions for a motion to vacate, modify, or correct
an arbitration award is three months after the
filing or delivery of the award. 9 U.S.C. § 12.

A23
462 U.S. at 155, 169-70. The Court contrasted the
employee's claim with an action to vacate an
arbitration award in a commercial context:

The main difference is that a party to
commercial arbitration will Ordinarily be
represented by counsel or, at least, will
have some experience in matters of
commercial dealings and contract
negotiation. Moreover, an action to vacate
an commercial arbitral award will rarely
raise any issues not already presented and
contested in the arbitration proceeding
itself. In the labor setting, by contrast,
the employee will often be unsophisticated
in collective-bargaining matters, and he
will almost always be represented solely by
the union. He is called upon, within the
limitations period, to evaluate the adequacy
of the union's representation, to retain
counsel, to investigate substantial
mattersthat were not at issue in the
arbitration proceeding, and to frame his
suit. Yet state arbitation statutes
typically provide very short times in which
to sue for vacation of arbitration awards.

However, the federal arbitration statutes do not
apply to contracts of employment, such as collec-
tive bargaining agreements, see id. § 1; United
e ‘1 Union v. Misco Inc., 484 U.S.
29, 40 n.9 (1987), and most of the federal cir-
cuits, including the Ninth Circuit, reject the
limitations period found in 9 U.S.C. § 12. See
in > V. Graphic Communi-

. » 912 F.2d 608,

612-13 (2d Cir. 1990) (summarizing case author-
ity); i i il of Carpen-
e 683. ¥.2d.- 1137, 1141 (9th Cir.

1982).

A24
Id. at 165-66."
However, Patterson's case presents a situa-
tion unanticipated in DelCostello, because here
the state limitations period for challenging the

arbitrator's award is potentially far longer than

the six-month period borrowed in DelCostello.

"tn contrast, if a union raises a suit
directly challenging the aribtrator's award, so
that no issue arises regarding the duty of fair
reprsentation, then the concerns raised in
DelCostello are largely absent. Though the
circuits are split as to what limitations period
is applicable, see Posadas, 873 F.2d at 482-84
(surveying the case law), the Ninth Circuit
employs the state statute of limiations for
challenges to arbitrators' decisions when unions
seek to vacate them:

The factors that led to the result in
DelCostello have no parallel in the present
case. [The union] does not claim that the
arbitral process itself was flawed or
distored by the commission of an unfair
labor practice. It does not seek relief that
could not have been obtained in the
arbitration proceedings themselves. It has
been represented by counsel from the
beginning, and does not question the quality
of the representation.

United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners Local 1020 v.
FMC Corp., 724 F.2d 815, 815 (9th Cir. 1984). At
the same time, applying the state limitations
period promotes the speedy adjudication of
workplace grievances. Posadas, 873 F.2d at 483.

A25
Alaska statutory law applies a ninety-day limita-
tions period for a party to apply to the superior
court to vacate an arbitration award. See AS
09.43.120(c). However, AS 09.43.010-.180 will not
apply to a labor-management contract unless the
contract expressly incorporates these provisions
or another statute provides for their applica-
tion. AS 09.43.010. Because the contract between
Mat-Maid and Local 959 contains no provision
directing the application of AS 09.43.010-.180,
a ninety-day limitations period is inapplicable.

See, €.g., IBEW, Local Union 1547 v. City of

Ketchikan, 805 P.2q 340, 342 (Alaska 1991); State

Vv. Public Safety Emplovees Ass'n, 798 P.2d 1281,

1284-85 (Alaska 1990). We have consistently urged
legislative action on this matter, because no
time limit exists at common law for challenges to

an arbitration award. See IBEW, Local Union 1547,

805 P.2d at 342 n.5; Public Safety Employees

Ass'n, 798 P.2d at sa0n 8.7 < However, the

legislature has not yet responded.

Patterson's appeal presents a less difficult

A26
question. We must decide not the appropriate
state limitations period for his action, but
rather whether to apply a state limtations period
or a federal one. Our determination turns upon
our long-standing view that "the parties to an
agreement reached through arbitration should be
able to proceed to implement the agreement
without worry that it is subject to challenge
months or years in the future.," and that
"(fjinality is an important consideration" in
review of an arbitrator's decision. Public Safety
Employees Ass'n, 798 P.2d at 1285 n.7; cf. City
of Fairbanks Mun. Util. Sys. v. Lees, 705 P.2d

457, 459-60 (Alaska 1985) (holding that courts do
not review the merits of an issue submitted to
arbitration, because "arbitration should be a
final and binding means of dispute resolution,
not a mere prelude to litigation"). We also note
that where an employee's § 301 challenge to an
arbitrator's decision required a choice between
a state's ninety-day limitations period for

challenges to arbitrator's decisions and the same

A27
state's Six-year period for contract claims, the
U.S. Supreme Court selected the shorter period,
in part on the grounds that the system of
industrial self-government, "with its heavy
emphasis on grievance arbitration, and the ‘law
of the shop,' could easily become unworkable if
a decision ... could Suddenly be called into
question as much as six years later." United

Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 58-

59, 64 (1981)."%

Taking the DelCostello and Mitchell

decisions together, we hold that the statute of
limitations for directly attacking the
arbitrator's decision is the six-months period
under federal law for hybrid § 301 claims.
Patterson did not file his suit against the
arbitrator's July 1986 award until 1988, well in

excess of the six-months limitations period. We

“The Mitchell court declined to reach the
issue of whether to borrow a federal statute of
limitations, because neither party raised the

matter on appeal. id. at 451 & n.2; see also
DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 154 & n.2.

A28

therefore conclude that Patterson failed to make
timely his direct attack on the award.

B. at son' e tio

Patterson argues that there are genuine
issues of material fact regarding an agreement
not to re-publish Bevins' February 6, 1986 letter
to Sinnett. Mat-Maid responds that the
publication of the allegedly defamatory letter
was privileged and that the privilege constitutes
a complete defense. ®

The Ninth Circuit has held that statements
made by parties during the course of grievance
proceedings conducted pursuant to the provisions
of a collective bargaining agreement that is
subject to the Labor Management Relations Act are
absolutely privileged, as long as the statements
are not published to individuals’ lacking
legitimate interests in them:

Federal labor policy promotes’ the

collective bargaining process as a means of
stabilizing the relationship between

"’conceding that the State is immune from
suit on the defamation claims, [At. R. Br. 6]
Patterson pursues them against Mat-Maid alone.

A29

employers and employees. It is "an effort to
erect a system of industrial self-

government." j s ica
Vv. i i i , 363 U.S.
574, 580, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1351, 4 L.Ed.2d
1409 (1960). Grievance procedures

very heart of the System of industrial self-
government.... the Processing of disputes
through [that] Machinery is actually a
vehicle by which meaning and content are
given to the collective bargaining
agreement." Id. at 581, 80 S.Ct. at 1352.

To allow state defamation Claims based
on statements made in grievance proceedings
would weaken the grievance system as a means
of industrial self-government.

Hyles v. Mensing, 849 F.24q 1213, 1217 (9th Cir.

1988).
Patterson asserted in his complaints that
Bevins'! February 6, 1986 letter was published on
three occasions: (1) on February 6, 1986, when
Bevins sent the letter to Sinnett; (2) on June
23, 1986, when Mat-Maid introduced the letter
into evidence at the arbitration proceeding; and
(3) on certain unspecified dates and to
unspecified recipients when "the contents of the

letter (were) used when other employer[]s

A30

requested information regarding Mr. Patterson."
On appeal, Patterson failed to provide briefing
about the third occasion; thus we consider this
point waived. See Miles v. Miles, 816 P.2d 129,
133 (Alaska 1991). On the second occasion,
publication clearly was privileged under Hyles.
See 849 F.2d at 1217. However, the first occasion
presents a more complex issue. The collective
bargaining agreement on which Mat-Maid relies did
not go into effect until April 1986, after Bevins
sent Sinnett the letter. The agreement was in
effect at the time of Patterson's termination and
at the arbitration hearing. Patterson thus
contends that the grant of summary judgment on
the absolute privilege issue was improper because
"Mat-Maid has failed to establish that any
[agreement] was in effect at the time of the
initial publication by Bevins to Sinnett."

Mat-Maid's summary judgment motion relied
solely on the April 1986 collective bargaining
agreement. However, the arbitrator's decision

states that before the collective bargaining

A31

agreement went into effect, Mat-Maid abided by an
"employer implemented last offer agreement,"
which was dated November 18, 1983, and which
Local 959 had never endorsed. Patterson did not
address Mat-Maid's arguments at the summary
judgment stage.

This evidence is sufficient for the summary
judgment in favor of Mat-Maid to survive
Patterson's appeal. If no union-management
grievance resolution mechanism were in effect at
all, then no need would have existed for Bevins'
February letter to Local 959's representative.
The implemented agreement Clearly was a
substitute for a collective bargaining agreement.
The letter would constitute a type of informal
grievance resolution, related to whatever
agreement would be in force at the time of the
actual termination and _ formal arbitration
proceeding. Even though the letter from Bevins to
Sinnett falls outside of formal grievance
proceedings, its relationship with the grievance

resolution process brings it within the scope of

A32
the privilege. See General Motors Corp. v.
Meridicki, 367 F.2d 66, 70-. (10th Cir. 1966)
(holding that absolute privilege extends to
statements made in informal but customary
conference, which occurred before formal hearing

on the grievance, and which the bargaining

agreement did not mandate); accord Hasten v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 640 F.2d 274, 276-77
(10th Cir. 1981); see also Green v. Hughes
Aircraft Co., 630 F.Supp. 423, 427 (S.D. Cal.
1985) (allowing an absolute privilege for
statements made to union representatives in a
meeting prior to the initiation of disciplinary
action). See e Gary J. Spivey,
Annotation, Libel and Slander: Privileged Nature
of Communication to Other Employees or Employees'
Union of Reasons tiff's Di , 60
A.L.R.3d 1081 (1974); Gary J. Spivey, Annotation,
ib a :

Communications Made in Course of Grievance or
Arbitrati p p ided for by Collecti

—_—_ ET

A33

Bargaining Agreement, 60 A.L.R.3d 1041 (1974) .17
IV. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the Superior court's grant of

summary judgment to Mat-Maid and the State on
Patterson's wrongful termination claims. As for
Patterson's § 301 collateral attack on the
arbitrator's award, we conclude that it is barred
by the applicable six-month period of
limitations. Similarly, we conclude that
Patterson's direct attack on the arbitrator's

award was untimely and thus was barred.

“in regard to Bevins' sending the February
6, 1986 letter to Sinnett in his capacity as an
officer of Local 959, the collective bargaining
agreement provides:

Any dispute that arises between teh employee
and the Employer or any complaint or
grievance on the part of both or one, said
grievance, complaint, or dispute shall be
Submitted to the Local Union within thirty
(30) days to be eligible to receive the
assistance of the Local Union.

Given this provision, Bevins' letter to Sinnett
can fairly be viewed as a publication in
connection with "'the entire proceeding
contemplated by the provisions of the agreement
for the grievance machinery,'" Green, 630 F.Supp.
at 427 (quoting Hasten, 640 F.2d at 277), and
thus is absolutely privileged.

A34
We AFFIRM the superior court's grant of
summary judgment to Mat-Maid on Patterson's
defamation claims, since on the two occasions
when Bevins' February 6, 1986 letter was
published, such publication was absolutely

privileged.

AFFIRMED.

A35
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF ALASKA

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT AT ANCHORAGE

WILLIAM L. PATTERSON, )
) CaseNo. 3AN-
Plaintiff, )88-1093 Civil

vs. )

STATE OF ALASKA, DEPT. OF AGRICUL- )
TURE, Individually and Severally; )
MATANUSKA MAID, INC., Individually )
and Severally; and its agents JOHN )
SEAWELL, RON WILDE, and STEVE )
BEVINS, Individually and Severally, )

)

Defendants. )

WILLIAM L. PATTERSON, )
) CaseNo. 3AN-
Plaintiff, )88-4692 Civil

vs.

)
)
STATE OF ALASKA, DEPT. OF AGRICUL- )
TURE, Individually and Severally; )
MATANUSKA MAID, INC., Individually )
and Severally, and its agents JOHN )
SEAWELL, RON WILDE, STEVE BEVINS )
and JOE VAN TREECK, Individually )
and Severally; and the INTERNA- )
TIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, )
CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND )
HELPERS OF AMERICA, Individually )
)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

and Severally; and THE INTERNA-
TIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS
LOCAL 959, Individually and Sever-
ally, and its agents ROBERT J.
SINNETT and EDWARD R. CONYERS, In-
dividually and Severally, and JERRY
THORN dba JERRY THORN, Arbitrator,
Individually and Severally,

Defendants.

A36

THIS MATTER having come on before the above-
entitled Court on defendants Matanuska Maid,
Inc., John Seawell, Steve Bevins, Ron Wilde, and
Joe Van Treeck's Motion for Final Judgment the
Court having entered an Order Granting Motion for
Summary Judgment on June 19, 1989, and being
otherwise fully advised of the premises; NOW,
THEREFORE,

IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED AND ORDERED:

1. Summary Judgment is entered in favor of
Matanuska Maid, Inc., John Seawell, Ron wilde,
Steve Bevins, and Joe Van Treeck, dismissing all
claims against them in the above-captioned
consolidated matters;

2. Matanuska Maid, Inc., John Seawell, Ron
Wilde, Steve Bevins, and Joe Van Treeck are
awarded judgment against plaitniff William L.
Patterson for attorneys' fees in the amount of

$ and costs in the amount of $ -

3. This judgment shall bear interst at the

rate of 10.5 percent per annum from the date

entered until paid in full.

A37

DONE this 10th day of August, 1989, at
Anchorage, Alaska.

K. _L. HUNT

The Honorable Karen Hunt
Judge of the Superior Court

A38

Parry Grover

Gina M. Zadra

DAVIS WRIGHT & JONES
550 W. 7th Avenue, Suite 1450
Anchorage, AK 99501

(907) 276-4488

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF ALASKA

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTR{CT AT ANCHORAGE

WILLIAM L. PATTERSON,

Plaintiff,
vs.

MATANUSKA MAID, INC.
Individually and Severally
and its agents JOHN SEAWELL,
RON WILDE, and STEVE BEVINS,
Individually and Severally,

Defendants.

CaseNo. 3AN-

)88-1093 Civil

WILLIAM L. PATTERSON,

Plaintiff,
vs.

MATANUSKA MAID, INC.,
Individually and Severally, and
its agents JOHN SEAWELL,

RON WILDE, STEVEN BEVINS and
JOE VAN TREECK, Individually and
Severally and THE INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS,

LOCAL 959, Individually and
Severally, and its agents
ROBERT J. SINNETT and EDWARD R.
CONYERS, Individually and
Severally, and JERRY THORN dba
JERRY THORN, Arbitrator,
Individually and Severally,

) CaseNo. 3AN-
)88-4692 Civil

ee ee ee ee See Se ee See ee See See ee See See See See” =,
.
ve)

A39

)
Defendants. )

THIS MATTER having come on before the above-

entitled Court on defendants Matanuska Maid, John
Seawell, Ron Wilde, Steve Bevins and Joe Van
Treeck's Motion for Summary Judgment; the Court
having reviewed defendants’ Motion and Memorandum
in of Support Motion for Summary Judgment, the
Affidavit of Gina M. Zadra, the Affidavit of
Steve Bevins, the Affidavit of John Seawell, and
the Affidavit of Robert J. Sinnett, and the
pleadings and record herein, and being otherwise
fully advised of the premises; NOW THEREFORE

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Summary Judgment
is granted in favor of Matanuska Maid, Joe Van
Treeck, Ron Wilde, Steve Bevins and John Seawell.

Done this 19 day of June, 1989.

K. L. HUNT

The Honorable Karen Hunt
Judge of the Superior Court

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386012_0913%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.