# Respondents Brief — North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Respondents Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1995
- **Citation:** 515 U.S. 29

## Text

NORTH STAR STEEL COMPANY,
Petitioner,

Vv.

CHARLES A. THOMAS, et al.,
Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS

Paul Alan Levy
(Counsel of Record)
Alan B. Morrison

Public Citizen Litigation Group
Suite 700

2000 P Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 833-3000

Attorneys for Respondents
March 27, 1995

QUESTION PRESENTED

In actions brought under the Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification Act, should courts borrow the
limitations period from the National Labor Relations Act, as
opposed to state law or another federal statute, such as the
Fair Labor Standards Act?

iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Us ay 5 i

Deemee PAA www te eee Vv
EE Ee l
EE a ea
a 3
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................ 5
EEE 8

I. UNDER DELCOSTELLO AND ITS PROGENY,
THE GENERAL RULE, “IN LABOR LAW
AND ELSEWHERE,” REQUIRES THE BOR-
ROWING OF STATE LIMITATIONS PERIODS,
SUBJECT TO A “NARROW EXCEPTION”
WHEN A “COMPELLING” CASE CAN BE
MADE TO BORROW A FEDERAL PERIOD
EE Ea 8

II. NORTH STAR HAS NOT MADE THE ‘COM-
PELLING DEMONSTRATION” NEEDED TO
SUPPORT BORROWING A _ LIMITATIONS
PERIOD FROM FEDERAL RATHER THAN
EE 17

A. Petitioners’ Arguments Would Eviscerate
the Presumption in Favor.of Borrowing
Limitations Periods from State Law. ..... 18

B. The NLRA Is Not Analogous to WARN. .. 23

iV

1. Upepeoee Peers... 2 6 ee

a

2. Different Procedures ........... 27
3. Different Causes of Action. ....... 27
&. (Wooo Bete... ... 6c a cet ee ews 30
The Six-Month Limitations Period Is Not
Needed to Protect Federal Labor Policies,
and Its Adoption Could Easily Frustrate
WARN’s Own Policies. ............. 32
1. Section 10(b) Is Not Needed to Effec-
tuate Federal Policies. .......... 32

Adoption of Section 10(b) Would
Make It Difficult to Enforce WARN. . 36

III. THIS ACTION WOULD BE TIMELY BASED
ON ANY OF THE ANALOGOUS STATE OR
FEDERAL LIMITATIONS PERIODS. ...... 38

IV. THE COURT SHOULD NOT REVERSE 165
YEARS OF PRECEDENT BY CREATING A
PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF BORROWING
PRES EE. Goa ee ee ale eee 43

CONCLUSION

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page:
Adams v. Gould, Inc.,

739 F.2d 858 (3d Cir. 1984) ............. 15
Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc’s,

se On, | a passim
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,

WO Bie Os 5 oss hs ho vv eine eae 14
Allgood v. Elyria United Methodist Home,

904 F.2d 373,

reh. granted and app. dism. in part on other

grounds,

913 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1990) ............ 16

Aluminum Workers Local 674 v. A.P. Green Refractories,
895 F.2d 1053 (Sth Cir. 1990) ............ 16

Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Lines,
dei | 30

Bowdry v. United Air Lines,
956 F.2d 999 (10th Cir. 1992) ............ 16

Brenner v. Carpenters Local 514,
927 F.2d 1283 (3d Cir. 1991) ............ 16

Campbell v. City of Haverhill,
BoP Wats UM EUMD cw ec cc cace 8

Carpenters Dist. Cuuncil v. Dillard Dep’t Stores,
i> P.28 izro OO Cir. 19908) 2. kw wk 31

vi

Carruthers Ready-Mix v. Cement Masons Local 520,

TPS F.26 S20 Ge Gas se ws et ee 15
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,

404 U.S. Fir Go Cae a ee es 19
Clift v. UAW,

881 F.2d 408 (7th Cir. 1969) ............ 16

Connors v. Consolidation Coal Co.,
366 F.26 SOP Ce es ee ee eee oe 40

Cope v. Anderson,
331 U.S. QO) Glee oe en a ee ee ee 8

Corsicana Nat’l Bank v. Johnson,
251 U.S. GB Ce a se ks 40

Damron v. Rob Fork Mining Corp.,
945 F.2d 123 GUUS R Pee ha os ee ee we 37

Dantagnan v. ILA Local 1418,
496 F.2d 400 (Sth Cir. 1974) ............ 39

DelCostello v. Teamsters,
462 U.S. TSE GO 6 ace eeeea ewe passim

Doty v. Sewall,
TOA F.28 1 (ist Cae, Fi es ee we we a 30

Edwards v. Wilkes-Barre Pub. Co. Pension Trust,
757 F.28 S2 GOR GA, Ge eee ea ese es 15

Elevator Constructors v. Home Elevator Co.,
T98 F.2d 222 CFR BD sw ter ee wes 17

Vii

Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Add’n Cmnty. Org.,
Me PT 6 ge oc ke ke KS Ke ew 23

Felton v. Unisource Corp.,
940 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1991) .......005.. 15

First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB,
re 28

Florida-Texas Freight. Corp.,
203 N.L.R.B. 509 (1973),
enf’d mem., 489 F.2d 1275 (6th Cir. 1974) .... 31

Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne,
a 24

Frymire v. Ampex Corp.,
821 F. Supp. 651 (D. Colo. 1993) ...... 17, 39

Gar Wood-Detroit Truck Equipment,
EE 28

Gavalik v. Continental Can Co. .,
812 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1987) .......... 15, 42

Gonzalez v. Aloha Airlines,
940 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1991) ............ 16

Goodman vy. Lukens Steel Co..,
RO 14, 29

H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB,
eR A): | 23

Haggerty v. USAir,
woe women pee Cb Cir. 1992)... . we es 16

Vill

Halkias v. General Dynamics Corp.,
31 F.3d 224,
rehearing en banc granted,
3h Pie oe Ce Gas Fe nee 8 cs a eee 18

Held v. Manufacturers Hanover Leas. Corp.,
Sid Fide Teer CCM. Te gee eed wes 15

Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Ry. Comm.,
Dae Gls OPE Ee 8 ke hn 6 ee as eR 43

Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight,
ee | re re 10

Holmberg v. Ambrecht,
ar Shee ee vn i oe ee 8

Howard v. Roadway Express,
726 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1984) ........... 14

ILA Local 953 v. Cataneo, Inc.,
990 F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1993) ............ 16

Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
ie ef) a ere 8, 14

Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind v. Gilbertson,
Se rie Be NE ha ne 8 at ee ws 13, 21

Machinists Local 701 v. Santa Fe Terminal Serv. ,
8 IER Cases 897, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5859
ee es SN a ss 4 ae 2 ere a a ee 17

Machinists Lodge 702 v. Loudermilk,
444 F.26 719 (St) Cis. W971) www ce ee 27

ix

Marshall v. Brewers Local 6,
960 F.2d 1360 (8th Cir. 1992) ........., passim

McDonald v. Piedmont Airlines,
930 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1991) ............. 16

McDonald v. Thompson,
eS ae oe 39

McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co.,
Be U8. THO oo cn cc ve cen 42

M’Cluny v. Silliman,
@ Peters 270, 277 (199). wk ww ce 8

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts,
ee as Ss.) 23

Milwaukee Spring,
268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984),
enf’d sub nom. UAW Local 547 v. NLRB,
VOD F.20 175 CC. Cir. 1988) 2... LL. 28

Monarch Long Beach Corp. v. Teamsters Local 812,
762 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1985) ............. 15

North Carolina Coastal Motor Lines,
219 N.L.R.B. 1009 (1975),
enf’d, 542 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1976) ........ 30

O'Hare v. General Marine Transp. Corp.,
740 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1984) .........22.., 15

O'Sullivan v. Felix,
508 OB. OTe Cok 6 6 ok eee HAR 8

X

Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC,

ae St ee ee ee ee eS 9
Owens v. Okure,

eee i re CE % 2 ee ok ee ee eS 40
Paperworkers Local 340 v. Specialty Paperboard,

999 F.26 51 (20 Cir. 1999) . ww ees 17, 24, 39
Paperworkers Local 395 v. ITT Rayonier,

951 Fae Bae CE Ce. TPP) ck ie ee eh 17
Prater v. UMW,

793 F.2d 1201 (11th Cir. 1986) ........... 15
Pruitt v. Carpenters Local 225,

Os F208 1206 Gi Ut. TD 2k cg vt ce ee 16
Rawlings v. Ray,

Pee hs PE RN we oe eee ee eee 8
Reed v. UTU,

Cee a Pe Rte se kh eS a passim

Republic Steel v. Maddox,
FOP US SC oe 6 HELE ERS 9

Royal Norton Mfg. Co.,
ee Ce ee ITD 65-6 8S ee 30

Runyon v. McCrary,
Ge? 2). SNe 6 oe ea 3 8

SEIU Local 36 v. City Cleaning Co..,
962 F.20 89 (0 Cir. 1992) 2... oe ces 16, 40

4

Shell Oil Co. v. lowa Dep’t of Revenue,
a thes SUD oro 5 86S ose kee wee 26

Sisco v. Conrail,
732 F.2d 1188 (3d Cir. 1984) ............ 12

Smith v. Evening News Ass’n,
DA Wels SUMO ek ewe eee ev edeane 9

Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
ee Ps I iss 6 6 es bk ewe es 10

Steelworkers v. North Star Steel,
809 F. Supp. 5 (M.D. Pa. 1992),
aff'd, 5 F.3d 39 (3d Cir. 1993) ............, 2

Steelworkers v. North Star Steel Co..,
> F.3d 39 (Gd Cir. 1993) ..... ccc cece z, an

Stevens Pontiac-GMC,
295 N.L.R.B. 599 (1989) ............... 30

Teamsters Local 315 v. Great Western Chem. Co..,
781 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1986) ............, 17

Teamsters Local 63 v. Santa Fe Terminal Serv.,
8 IER Cases 778, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8923
ee yy Gb ws ee es we we 17

Teumer v. General Motors Corp..,
34 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 1994) .........0... 40

Thomas v. North Star Steel Co.,
32 F.3d 53 (3d Cir. 1994) ............, 4,17

XI
Times Herald Printing Co..,
315 N.L.R.B. No. 100, 147 L.R.R.M. 1281
SN is a eed soe 8 Ae ee 31

Transmarine Navig. Corp.,
EA? Se OF). re ee ee 3]

UAW vy. Hoosier Cardinal Corp..,
Pee Ces Se so 6 6 aS es 8, 16, 20

UMW vy. Peabody Coal Co.,
36 F308 GSO (Gta Cir. 1998) 0 wc ccc cc ees 18

UPS v. Mitchell,
ee ers CUED Go os wee ee see eee es 10

Vaca v. Sipes,
See es AE ED 66k 2 oe eee whe ees 10

Wallace v. Detroit Coke Corp..,
818 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. Mich. 1993) ........ 39

West v. Conrail,
ee Oe ee OE 6 ok oe ke ae ee 12

Wilson v. Garcia,

ee Ae 8. err a we passim
LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY MATERIALS
Federal Statutes

an EM i 0 6 6 6 eee eee es a 44

ee 6 i OG Tae eee ee 44, 45

EE db hk oe 6 0 oad eo 2 eek 35
Age Discrimination in Employment Act,

29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seg. «2.2... ee 27
Airline Deregulation Act,

CES: 16
Civil Rights Acts,

LE 6, 14, 29

42 U.S.C. § 1963.............. 5,6, 21, 29

Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e ........ 6, 14, 29

Davis-Bacon Act,
40 U.S.C. §§ 276a et seg. ........... 33, 42

Employee Retirement Income Security Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq.

Section 413, 29 U.S.C. § 1113 ........... 33
Section 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 ........... 4]

Fair Labor Standards Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 201 ef seq. ........... 7, 33, 42

Federal Employers’ Liability Act,
45 U.S.C. §§ 51 et seq.

mecmon 6, 45 U.3.C.956 ........ccece. 33
Jones Act,
ee.

Labor-Management Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 141 er seq.

Section 1(b), 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) .. 2.2.2.2... 23

XIV

Section 301, Z9 U.S.C. $15 2... ceca passim

sectton 305, 29 U.S.C. $167 2. ccc cans 14
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act,

Fo ie Some 8 gS 16, 27

Title I, 29 U.S.C. $§ 411 ef seg. 2... 2s. 13, 29

National Labor Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq.

a Or Oe kk we es ee 23
ee 8 oa >) 28
Section 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) ... 2... 29
Section 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) . . . . 27, 28,

29, 36
Section 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) ...... passim

Portal-to-Portal Pay Act
meee ©, oe US. OB 2oe ke et ws 33, 42

Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act,
18 U.S.C. §§ 1861 et seq. ..... ee ear 20, 42

Railway Labor Act,
45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq.

Section 3, First (r), 45 U.S.C. § 153,
I sees a a ho oe a 12, 33

Rules of Decision Act,
Es yy ks Od ee ee ee . 8

Walsh-Healey Act,
eS a Se 33, 42

XV

Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act,
29 U.S.C. 2101 et seq.

Section 2(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 2101(ay(1) .. 2... 36

Section 2(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(2) ... 24, 36
Section 2(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(3) ... 24, 36
Section 2(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(4) .. 2... 27
Section 2(a)(8), 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(8) ...... 36
Section 2(b), 29 U.S.C. §2101(b) ......... 36
Section 3(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a)(2) ...... 24
Section 3(b), 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b) ......... 37
Section 3(d), 29 U.S.C. § 2102(d) ......... 36
Section 4(1), 29 U.S.C. § 2103(1) ......... 37
Section 4(2), 29 U.S.C. § 2103(2) ......... 26
Section 5(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(1) .. 2... 31
Section 5(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(2) ... 31, 41
Section 5(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(3) ...... 24
Section 5(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(4) .. 2... 41
Section 5(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(5) .. 2... 24
Section 5(b), 29 U.S.C. § 2104(b) ......... 31
Section 6, 29 U.S.C. § 2105 ............. 30
Section 9, 29 U.S.C. § 2108 ............. 27

Legislative History

134 Congressional Record (1988) .......... 24, 26
136 Congressional Record (1990) ............. 44
1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 6870...... 45
H.R. Rep. 285, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 7) 26

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 100-576, 100th Cong., 2d
eB ae ae ee 31

S. 538, Section 333, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987) .. 26

XVi

Rules
7 CLR, 8 Pe on oe eh ese 35
pie St AE: rere a ey 23, 24

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
| a Amer 33, 37

State Statutes

42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524(5).......... 35, 40
42 Pa, Com. Diet: Age. & Fee) ss ewe ee een 39
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5525(4)............. 39
re, @> © © © Ss eee. 40, 41
43 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 260.9a(g).............. 7, 39
MISCELLANEOUS

Bureau of National Affairs, Proportion of Union Member-
ship Hits 15.8%,
142 Labor Relations Reporter 180 (February 15,
POU asic eks te tus ee eee 28

McHugh, Fair Warning or Foul? An Analysis of the
[WARN] Act in Practice,
14 Berkeley J. Emp. & Labor Law | (1993) ... 36

XVii

Siegel, Practice Commentary,
U.S.C.A., Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial
Procedure, §§ 1653 to 1960, Supplementary
ee ny 6 hee ee 8 es

In the

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term 1994

No. 94-834

NORTH STAR STEEL COMPAN , -
Petitioner,

V.

CHARLES A. THOMAS, et al.,
Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT
A. Facts

Until 1991, petitioner North Star Steel Corporation
(“North Star”) operated a production facility in Milton,
Pennsylvania, producing hot rolled steel bars and other steel
products. The production employees, who were paid by the
hour, were represented in collective bargaining by the United
Steelworkers of America (“USWA”). The respondents in
this case, by contrast, were salaried employees who were not
represented by any union. Joint Appendix (“JA”) 15.

2

On February 25, 1991, petitioner announced that all of
its employees would be laid off, effective immediately, for
an indefinite period. JA 15-16. None of the employees,
hourly or salaried, was given any advance notice of this
action. Appendix to the Petition (“Pet. App.”) 17a. Peti-
tioner refused to state how long the plant would be closed,
or even whether the closure was permanent. JA 16. Asa
consequence, it did not give respondents the accumulated
vacation and severance pay to which they would have been
entitled if their lay-offs were permanent. JA 16, 18-19.
Respondent Thomas, who was the purchasing manager at the
Milton plant, made numerous inquiries about petitioner’s
plans, but received only vague and inconclusive answers. /d.

The USWA did not accept petitioner’s claim that it was
unsure how long the layoff would last, and so, on September
9, 1991, it sued in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania, claiming that petitioner’s
failure to provide advance notice violated the Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (“WARN”).
USWA v. North Star Steel, 809 F. Supp. 5, 6 (M.D. Pa.
1992), aff'd, 5 F.3d 39 (3d Cir. 1993). Because USWA
only sued on behalf of its own members, it sought no relief
for respondents. Jd. at 7. Although that suit was filed more
than six months after the unannounced closing of the plant,
petitioner did not raise the statute of limitations as a defense.

Eventually, respondent Thomas began to put his
inquiries in writing. JA 16-17. Meanwhile, petitioner
conceded in the USWA suit that it had committed what it
called a “technical” violation of WARN, and on April 9,
1992, the district court granted summary judgment against
petitioner, and later determined the number of days for which
it was required to pay the USWA’s members. USWA vy.
North Star Steel Co., supra. By letter dated May 21, 1992,
petitioner promised respondent Thomas that it would make
the same payments to its non-union employees as the district
court decided had to be made to employees represented by
the USWA. JA 19. Although petitioner continued to make

3

such promises, JA 20, it ultimately provided the respondents
only with their accumulated vacation and severance pay. JA
13, 17. As late as August, 1992, petitioner was claiming
that it had originally anticipated that the lay-off would be
only temporary, and that only in that month had it decided to
make the-closure permanent. JA 13.

B. Proceedings Below.

Two months later, on October 23, 1992, respondents
filed this action against petitioner in the Middle District of
Pennsylvania, alleging that petitioner’s failure to notify them
violated WARN. Petitioner’s answer did not deny that it had
violated WARN, but did raise the statute of limitations as an
affirmative defense, arguing that the six-month period of
section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”)
should be borrowed. !

On April 1, 1993, respondents moved for summary
judgment on the merits, and petitioner cross-moved for
summary judgment based on its statute of limitations defense.
On May 25, 1993, the district court granted petitioner’s
motion for summary judgment. 838 F. Supp. 970. Respon-
dents appealed to the Third Circuit, which consolidated their
appeal with USWA v. Crown, Cork & Seal Corp., a case
presenting the same issue. Respondents argued that the court
should follow the normal rule of borrowing a limitations
period from state law, that the NLRA was not closely
analogous to WARN, and that federal policies and the
practicalities of litigation did not require a federal limitations
period for WARN any more than they do for most federal

' Respondents argued that petitioner’s misleading statements in
response to Thomas’ inquiries about its plans should estop peti-
tioner from raising a limitations defense. The district court re-
jected this argument, Pet. App. 24a, which was not pressed on
appeal.

4

Statutes. To the contrary, respondents pointed out, the argu-
ments advanced by petitioner for borrowing from federal law
would apply equally to most federal statutes, and so adopting
petitioner’s analysis would make borrowing from federal law
the normal rule, rather than the exception.

In arguing against the adoption of section 10(b),
respondents pointed to several more analogous limitations
periods, both state and federal, under which their claims
would have been timely. They argued, however, that it was
unnecessary for the court to pick one of these alternatives,
because the choice would not affect the outcome of the
appeal, and thus would be mere dictum.

The court of appeals reversed. 32 F.3d 53 (3d Cir.
1994). It began by noting this Court’s repeated holdings
that, if a federal statute contains no statute of limitations, the
normal rule is that courts should borrow the most closely
analogous state law limitations period. E.g., Reed v. UTU,
488 U.S. 319 (1989); DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S.
151 (1983). Aithough there is an exception for cases where
a federal limitations period “clearly provides a closer anal-
ogy” and the federal policies at stake make that rule “signif-
icantly more appropriate,” DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 172
(emphasis added), this exception is “closely circumscribed.”
Reed, 488 U.S. at 324, quoted Pet. App. 6a. The court also
noted this Court’s expression of distress in Reed that many
lower federal courts had failed “to take seriously our
admonition” that borrowing from state law is the norm, and
that using a federal statute is the rare exception, “in labor
law as elsewhere.” /d.

Based on that standard, the court found no sound
argument for borrowing from federal law. Although WARN
cases and NLRA claims have some features in common, the
purposes, procedures, rights and remedies of the two statutes
are quite different. /d. 7a-l1la. Nor were there serious
reasons to believe that the interest in uniform characterization
of federal statutes that encompass a broad variety of claims

5

and legal theories provided a basis for borrowing from
federal law, as in the case of RICO claims. Agency Holding
Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc’s, 483 U.S. 143 (1987). See
also Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) (borrowing the
same state period to govern all section 1983 claims). Pet.
App. 12a-13a. Finally, the court noted that an unduly short
limitations period might well frustrate the ability of affected
workers to bring claims. Jd. 14a-15a.

For all these reasons, the court of appeals held that a
state limitations period, rather than section 10(b), should be
borrowed, and accordingly it reversed the dismissal of
respondents’ claims. In rejecting petitioner’s contention that
section 10(b) ought to be borrowed to govern WARN, the
court of appeals declined to decide which limitations period
should be borrowed, because the actions would be timely
under any of the possibilities that had been brought to its
attention, and because petitioner had not identified any other
limitations period under which the action would be untimely.
Id. 15a.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

As a general rule, the limitations period for a federal
cause of action is borrowed from the most closely analogous
state law. In DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151
(1983), this Court applied what it characterized as a “narrow
exception” to this general rule for the federal “hybrid” action
to enforce rights under collective bargaining agreements
(“CBAs”) when a union violates its duty of fair representa-
tion (“DFR”), which is implied by the NLRA. The Court
decided that, because the prompt resolution of disputes invol-
ving CBAs helps maintain labor peace, a short limitations
period was required to allow the bargaining parties to be
certain that their resolutions of such disputes were, in fact,
final. Accordingly, it ruled that the six months allowed by
section 10(b) of the NLRA for filing unfair labor practice
(“ULP”) charges would be borrowed for DFR suits. The

6

Court emphasized, however, both in De/Costello and in later
cases, such as Reed v. UTU, 488 U.S. 319 (1989), that the
borrowing of state limitations period was to remain the norm,
for labor law as well as other federal claims.

This general rule, and not the narrow exception, applies
to WARN claims. To be sure, most labor law claims could
be said to have some connection to bargaining disputes. But
if the result in DelCostello is to remain an exception rather
than become the rule, the application of section 10(b) must
be confined to claims which carry the same direct and
immediate threat to the finality of bargaining compromises
that DFR claims do.

WARN claims are not analogous to the NLRA; they are
even less analogous to the NLRA than, say, claims under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 are to claims under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261
(1985). And WARN claims are just as analogous to state
law claims in contract, to Pennsylvania’s Wage Collection
Statute, or to its residual limitations period as are claims
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 to general personal
injury claims. Thus, WARN does not qualify for federal
borrowing under the first prong of the De/Costello test.

Nor do WARN claims threaten the finality of grievance
decisions, as do DFR claims, which are based on workers’
economic rights as members of a bargaining unit represented
by aunion. WARN claims, by contrast, are founded on em-
ployees’ statutory rights, independent of any contract, even
a CBA. Indeed, only 10% of all employees protected by
WARN are even represented by unions; most such employees
are unrepresented, as are respondents here. Moreover, the
adoption of a short statute of limitations threatens the
remedial objectives of WARN, and, given the tenuous
connection between WARN claims and bargaining compromi-
ses, there is no countervailing justification for endangering
the ability of workers to protect their rights, unlike the need
for finality in DFR actions.

7

Instead of trying to argue that WARN requires the
borrowing of a federal limitations period under the standard
set in DelCostello, Reed and elsewhere, petitioners ask for
the adoption of a different standard. Petitioner North Star
does this openly in the last section of its brief, but both
petitioners do so throughout their briefs by recasting the
DelCostello test as one that gives federal limitations periods
at least an equal status with state periods. Indeed, petitioners
place so much emphasis on the need for a limitations period
whose duration is the same in every state, that their test
covertly creates a strong presumption in favor of federal bor-
rowing. But the arguments that petitioners advance for
reversing 165 years of precedent favoring state law bor-
rowing are unconvincing, and adoption of their proposed test
would effectively reopen the question of the proper limita-
tions period for every federal statute. The litigation over this
question would produce the very unpredictability and
increased litigation costs that petitioners advance as the
reason for adopting their proposed rule.

Under the general rule of borrowing from state law,
either the three-year limitations period for enforcing claims
under Pennsylvania’s Wage Payment Collection Law, or the
four-year period for suing under either an express contract,
not in writing, or a contract implied in law, is the most
analogous state period. Even if the Court chooses to borrow
a federal limitations period, the two and three year limit-
ations period for filing wage claims under the Fair Labor
Standards Act provides a better balance between employers’
interest in repose and workers’ interest in protecting rights
that Congress has granted them. Indeed, if the Court is
persuaded by petitioner North Star’s appeal to the supposed
Congressional intent behind the new four-year residual
limitations period as a reason to abandon the traditional
preference for state law borrowing, it should borrow that
new limitations period to govern WARN.

8
ARGUMENT

I. UNDER DELCOSTELLO AND ITS PROGE-
NY, THE GENERAL RULE, “IN LABOR
LAW AND ELSEWHERE,” REQUIRES THE
BORROWING OF STATE LIMITATIONS

_ PERIODS, SUBJECT TO A “NARROW EX-
CEPTION” WHEN A “COMPELLING”
CASE CAN BE MADE TO BORROW A
FEDERAL PERIOD INSTEAD.

With some exceptions, federal statutes do not contain
their own limitations periods; rather, they must be borrowed
from other sources. At least since M’Cluny v. Silliman, 3
Peters 270, 277 (1830), this Court has repeatedly declared
that, as a general rule, courts should apply the most closely
analogous state statute of limitations. Some of the early
decisions indicated that this rule was compelled by the Rules
of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652. See id. at 277; see also
Campbell v. City of Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 615 (1895)
(Rules of Decision Act gives courts discretion to refuse to
apply state limitations periods that allow insufficient time to
sue). However, at least since Holmberg v. Ambrecht, 327
U.S. 392, 395 (1946), the Court has treated “the implied
absorption of State statutes of limitation within the interstices
of federal enactments [as] a phase of fashioning remedial
details where Congress has not spoken but left matters for

> Johnson vy. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 462
(1975); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 180 (1976), UAW v.
Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 701-705 (1966); Cope v.
-Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 463-464 (1947); Rawlings v. Ray, 312
U.S. 96, 97-98 (1941); O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 322
(1914); Campbell v. City of Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 619-620
(1895).

9

judicial determination within the general framework of
familiar legal principles.” .

The selection of which state statute of limitations to
borrow sometimes presents a difficult issue of characteriza-
tion, because federal statutes frequently create rights for
which there is no exact state parallel. The Court has made
clear, however, that mere difficulty of characterizing the
federal law is not a sufficient reason to abandon the effort.
DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 171 (1983); Wilson
v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 272 (1985).

There is a narrow exception to the general rule where
the use of analogous state statutes would frustrate the
implementation of national policies. Occidental Life Ins. Co.
v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977). As the Court held in
DelCostello, the “hybrid” action against a union and an
employer is one example. In order to place in context the
reasons why the Court found it necessary to make an
exception in such cases, it is important to explain the precise
role which “hybrid” actions play in federal labor law, and
then how they differ from WARN cases.

Individual employees, as well as their unions, may sue
under section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act
(“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185, to enforce rights conferred on
them by CBAs between their employers and their unions.
Smith v. Evening News Ass’n, 371 U.S. 195, 200 (1962).
But the Court has erected a significant procedural barrier to
prevent the courts from being inundated with suits to enforce
CBAs — the plaintiff must exhaust contractual grievance
procedures, including arbitration, before suit is filed.
Republic Steel v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965). It has also
erected a major substantive barrier to such suits — the courts

* Petitioner North Star thus errs in asserting that this analytic
development is “recent”, Br. at 10, citing DelCostello, and
implying that, because the change is so recent, it warrants further
changes in the governing standard. /d. 32-33.

10

will not overturn arbitral awards unless the award cannot be
justified as having drawn its essence from the CBA.
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960).

The Court has also recognized, however, that employ-
ees may be prevented from exhausting the contractual
procedures, or may be unable to obtain a fair hearing in
arbitration, if the union breaches its DFR either in deciding
not to pursue the contractual procedures or in the way it
conducts them. Accordingly, the Court has ruled that
individual employees seeking to enforce their rights under a
CBA will be excused from the exhaustion requirement, and
from the highly deferential standard of review under Enter-
prise Wheel, if, but only if, they can show that the union
breached its DFR in handling the grievance. Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171 (1967); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424
U.S. 554 (1976). A lawsuit in which employees seek to
enforce both the CBA against the employer, and the DFR
against the union, is known as a “hybrid” DFR action.

The issue of the proper limitation period for hybrid
actions first reached the Court in UPS v. Mitchell, 451 U.S.
56 (1981). In Mitchell, the narrow question on which
certiorari was granted was which state statute was the most
analogous for post-arbitration hybrid suits against employers
alone. /d. at 61-62. In choosing to borrow the limitations
period for suits to vacate arbitration awards, the Court relied
on the fact that, absent a fairly short limitations period, the
parties to the CBA could not be sure that an arbitrator’s
resolution of a dispute under the agreement was finai.
Therefore, the Court rejected state limitations periods for
enforcing contractual rights because they allowed too long a
period in which the arbitrator’s disposition of a grievance
was in question, and their use would frustrate federal policy
favoring prompt resolution of collective bargaining disputes.
Id. at 63-64.

1]

Two years later, in DelCostello, the issue was whether
to apply a federal limitations period, instead of any of the
State alternatives, in hybrid suits against both an employer
and a union. The Court reiterated its concern that several of
the analogous state limitations periods, such as actions for
tortious injury or for professional malpractice, were so
lengthy that employer-union disputes, and the compromises
by which they were resolved (including negotiated terms,
settled grievances, or even arbitral adjudications), could
remain in limbo for years, and thus could endanger stability
in labor relations and, in the long run, labor peace. 462
U.S. at 168-169. The other most analogous state statutes,
such as those governing actions to vacate arbitration awards,
were so short — generally three months — that aggrieved
employees would not have enough time to file suit. Jd. at
165-168 (undue brevity was “most serious objection” to
State-law borrowing). Moreover, the Court recognized that
the most analogous state statutes were different for the
employer and for the union, and if each were applied to their
respective defendant, the result would be the application of
different limitations periods to two parties to the same suit,
which would clearly have been undesirable. Jd. at 169 n.19.

Still, the Court said, “[t]hese objections to the resort to
State law might have to be tolerated if state law were the
only source reasonably available for borrowing, as it often
is.” Id. at 169. However, it found that section 10(b) of the
NLRA was significantly more appropriate than any of the
State analogies, both because Congress had designed it to
accommodate a “very similar balance of interests”, i.e.,
employee rights versus the stability of private adjustment of
labor disputes, and because the DFR cause of action was
itself implied from the NLRA. Jd. at 169-171.

The Court carefully emphasized the narrowness of its
holding, however, and admonished that courts should not
decline to adopt state limitation periods simply because state
law fails to provide a perfect analogy:

12

We stress that our holding today should not be
taken as a departure from prior practice in bor-
rowing limitations periods for federal causes of
action, in labor law or elsewhere. . . . [R]esort
to state law remains the norm for borrowing of
limitations periods [unless] a rule from elsewhere
in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy
than available state statutes, and . . . the federal
policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation
make the rule a significantly more appropriate
vehicle... ..

Id. at 171-172 (emphasis added).

As a result of these limits, the only other labor law
Suits to which lower courts consistently agree to extend
section 10(b) are DFR suits against unions and employers
who are covered by the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”) rather
than the NLRA. According to these courts, such cases are
so similar to NLRA hybrid actions that DelCostello’s
reasoning requires the borrowing of a federal limitations
period in such cases as well. E.g., Sisco v. Conrail, 732
F.2d 1188 (3d Cir. 1984).4

The predominant trend for non-DFR labor cases,
however, is illustrated by Reed v. UTU, 488 U.S. 319
(1989), where the Court borrowed state limitations periods
to govern claims under the Union Members’ Bill of Rights,

* This Court has not yet decided whether it is appropriate to
borrow a federal limitations period for hybrid suits under the RLA,
and, if so, whether the proper federal period for borrowing is the
NLRA’s six-month limitations period or the RLA’s own two-year
limitations period, 45 U.S.C. § 153, First (r). Contrary to the im-
plication in petitioner North Star’s brief, at 11, this Court did not
decide that question in West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35 (1987). Both
parties assumed the applicability of section 10(b), as did the
Question Presented, and this Court found it unnecessary to address
that issue. /d. at 38 n.2.

13

Title I of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959 (“LMRDA”). The Court refused to borrow the
six-month period of section 10(b), even though intra-union
disputes will sometimes affect collective bargaining disputes,
because the latter sort of disputes were often not involved at
all, and even when they were involved, LMRDA cases would
have

substantially less immediate and less significant an
impact on bargaining and private dispute settle-
ment than that which led us to apply the § 10(b)
Statute to hybrid § 301/fair representation claims,
which directly challenge both the employer’s
adherence to the collective bargaining agreement
and the union’s representation of the employee in
grievance-and-arbitration procedures.

Id. at 331.

Moreover, the Court noted, the LMRDA was enacted
because Congress was dissatisfied with the NLRA’s protec-
tion of the union member interests that the LMRDA was
intended to safeguard. And, most important, the lower court
in Reed had “fail{ed] to take seriously our admonition that
analogous state statutes of limitations are to be used unless
they frustrate or significantly interfere with federal policies,”
id. at 327, for which a “compelling demonstration” is re-
quired. Id. See also Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind v. Gilbertson,
501 U.S. 350, 356 (1991) (stressing that “state-borrowing
doctrine may not be lightly abandoned [and] federal borrow-
ing [i]s ‘a closely circumscribed exception’”). As the Court
further emphasized,

This is a narrow exception to the general rule.
As we made clear in De/lCostello, “in labor law
or elsewhere,” application of a federal statute will
be unusual, and “resort to state law remains the
norm for borrowing of limitations periods.”

14

Reed, 488 U.S. at 324, quoting DelCostello, 462
U.S. at 171.

Remarkably, even though Reed is this Court’s only decision
since DelCostello to address the propriety of borrowing
section 10(b) to govern a federal labor claim, and although
it is the only decision of this Court containing an extended
discussion of the meaning of DelCostello, neither petitioner
discusses Reed, nor even cites it for more than a general
proposition or for its narrow holding.

Moreover, the limitations periods in employment
discrimination cases have been borrowed from state law, |
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 462
(1975), despite the fact that such suits frequently call into
question matters which had been resolved between unions
and employers. Id.; Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36 (1974) (Title VII case). The lower courts continue
to apply state limitations periods in suits under 42 U.S.C. §
1981, even against unionized employers, relying on the
general rule discussed in DelCostello. E.g., Howard v.
Roadway Express, 726 F.2d 1529, 1531 (11th Cir. 1984);
see also Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 661-
662 (1987) (suit against union alleging discriminatory
grievance handling).

North Star asserts in its brief that section 10(b) “has
been applied to claims under other federal labor laws,” North
Star Br. 11, apparently seeking to convey the sense that
courts have generally abandoned the rule of borrowing from
State law in labor law cases. This proposition is supported
by a highly selective citation of precedent, because the vast
majority of appellate cases in the labor law area, particularly
since Reed, have continued to borrow limitations periods
from state law outside the DFR area.

For example, in suits to enforce the NLRA’s secondary
boycott provisions under section 303 of the LMRA, 29
U.S.C. § 187, no court of appeals applies the six-month
period of section 10(b). Instead, all apply longer state

15

limitations periods, even though labor-management relations
are directly affected by such suits, and a secondary boycott,
like a breach of the DFR, is a ULP that is governed by the
express six-month limitations period for filing charges with
the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”). Even though
the case for borrowing section 10(b) is far more compelling
for cases under section 303 than for WARN cases, these
courts conclude that the effect of such litigation on stable
labor-management relations, and consequently on labor
peace, is insufficient to warrant a departure from the normal
rule of borrowing analogous state limitations periods. °

Similarly, courts of appeals generally hold that claims
under ERISA are governed by state limitations periods, not
by section 10(b).° They apply this rule even when the claim
implicates collective-bargaining disputes.’ And suits to en-
force union constitutions under section 301 of the LMRA are
usually governed by state limitations periods, although courts
sometimes borrow section 10(b) if the claim is parallel to a

* Monarch Long Beach Corp. v. Teamsters Local 812, 762
F.2d 228, 231 (2d Cir. 1985); Carruthers Ready-Mix v. Cement
Masons Local 520, 779 F.2d 320, 325-328 (6th Cir. 1985); Prater
v. UMW, 793 F.2d 1201, 1209-1210 (11th Cir. 1986). ~

° E.g., Felton v. Unisource Corp., 940 F.2d 503, 510-513 (9th
Cir. 1991); Held v. Manufacturers Hanover Leas. Corp., 912 F.2d
1197, 1200-1202 (10th Cir. 1990).

” E.g., Adams v. Gould, Inc., 739 F.2d 858 (3d Cir. 1984)
(enforcing collectively bargained pension rights); O’Hare vy.
General Marine Transp. Corp., 740 F.2d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 1984)
(enforcing plan against employer that sought to withdraw from
multi-employer unit); Edwards v. Wilkes-Barre Pub. Co. Pension
Trust, 757 F.2d 52 (3d Cir. 1985) (seeking pension benefits for
strikers); Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834 (3d Cir.
1987) (claim that plant closing was intended to prevent union
members from exercising pension rights).

16

DFR claim.* Even LMRDA cases challenging the ratifica-
tion of CBAs, the one type of claim on which this Court
reserved judgment in Reed, 488 U.S. at 331-332 n.6, are
now held to be governed by state limitations periods.’
Indeed, even the two non-DFR examples chosen by petitioner
North Star to support its assertion that section 10(b) “has
been borrowed” do not represent the majority view of the
lower courts with respect to the statutes involved in those
cases. '°

* E.g., Brenner v. Carpenters Local 514, 927 F.2d 1283,
1292-1295 (3d Cir. 1991); Pruitt v. Carpenters Local 225, 893
F.2d 1216, 1219-1221 (11th Cir. 1990).

” Since Reed, the courts of appeals have unanimously applied
State limitations periods in that situation, even those that had held
to the contrary before Reed. Marshall v. Brewers Local 6, 960
F.2d 1360, 1366-1367 (8th Cir. 1992); Allgood v. Elyria United
Methodist Home, 904 F.2d 373, 377-378, reh. granted and app.
dism. in part on other grounds, 913 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1990)
(overruiing circuit precedent); Clift v. UAW, 881 F.2d 408, 412
(7th Cir. 1989) (overruling circuit precedent).

'° Thus, unlike Haggerty v. USAir, 952 F.2d 781 (3d Cir.
1992), most courts borrow state limitations periods to govern the
Employee Protection Program of the Airline Deregulation Act.
Bowdry vy. United Air Lines, 956 F.2d 999, 1005 (10th Cir. 1992);
Gonzalez v. Aloha Airlines, 940 F.2d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir. 1991);
McDonald v. Piedmont Airlines, 930 F.2d 220, 224-225 (2d Cir.
1991). And although Aluminum Workers Local 674 v. A.P. Green
Refractories, 895 F.2d 1053 (Sth Cir. 1990), applied section 10(b)
to a “pure” action under section 301 of the LMRA between a
union and an employer, this Court, in a pre-DelCostello decision,
borrowed state law to govern such an action in UAW v. Hoosier
Cardinal Corp. , 383 U.S. 696 (1966), as many lower courts have
done, especially in their post-Reed decisions. E.g., ILA Local 953
v. Cataneo, Inc. , 990 F.2d 794, 800 (4th Cir. 1993); SEJU Local

(continued...)

17

Thus, the lower courts continue to follow this Court’s
mandate, in labor law and elsewhere, by borrowing state
limitations periods to govern most claims, and federal
borrowing remains the rare exception.

Il. NORTH STAR HAS NOT MADE THE
“COMPELLING DEMONSTRATION” NEED-
ED TO SUPPORT BORROWING A LIMITA-
TIONS PERIOD FROM FEDERAL RATHER
THAN STATE LAW.

Petitioners contend that WARN warrants an exception
to the general rule because, they say, the NLRA is more
analogous to WARN than any state statute, and the failure to
adopt a uniform federal limitations period may harm
WARN’s policy objectives. Two courts of appeals, joined
by all district courts in circuits where the issue remains open,
have borrowed state law.'!' The Sixth Circuit adopted

'°(...continued)

36 v. City Cleaning Co., 982 F.2d 89, 95 (3d Cir. 1992):
Paperworkers Local 395 v. ITT Rayonier, 931 F.2d 832, 838 (11th
Cir. 1991); Elevator Constructors v. Home Elevator Co., 798 F.2d
222, 224-229 (7th Cir. 1986). Courts are more likely to apply
section 10(b) where the section 301 action is brought to compel
arbitration. E.g., Teamsters Local 315 v. Great Western Chem.
Co., 781 F.2d 764, 769 (9th Cir. 1986).

‘' Thomas v. North Star Steel Co., 32 F.3d 53 (3d Cir. 1994);
Paperworkers Local 340 v. Specialty Paperboard, 999 F.2d 51 (2d
Cir. 1993); Frymire v. Ampex Corp., 821 F. Supp. 651 (D. Colo.
1993); Machinists Local 701 v. Santa Fe Terminal Serv., 8 IER
Cases 897, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5859 (N.D. Ill. 1993);
Teamsters Local 63 v. Santa Fe Terminal Serv. , 8 IER Cases 778.
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8923 (C.D. Calif. 1993).

18

section 10(b), as did a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit,
which then, sua sponte, granted rehearing en banc.”

As we now show, the reasons given by petitioners do
not warrant a departure from the general rule of borrowing
from state law. Indeed, petitioners are able to argue for the
result they favor only by so distorting the test as to create a
preference for borrowing from federal law that would govern
virtually every federal statute.

A. Petitioners’ Arguments Would Eviscerate
the Presumption in Favor of Borrowing
Limitations Periods from State Law.

Petitioners can mount a superficially cohesive assault on
the decision below only by failing to take seriously this
Court’s admonitions in DelCostello and Reed that state law
borrowing remains the norm, and that federal borrowing is
the “closely circumscribed” exception, 488 U.S. at 324, that
must be justified by a “compelling demonstration” that
federal policies so require. Jd. at 627.

For example, on the first prong of the exception,
petitioners characterize state law borrowing as only a “fall-
back” position, and repeatedly assert that section 10(b)
provides a “closer” analogy than various state limitation
periods, or is “closest” or “most analogous.” North Star Br.
25, 26, see also caption 18; Crown, Cork Br. 5, 7, 11, 25,
see also captions 8, 11; Chamber Br. 8, 9, 12, see also
caption 6. Petitioners never try to show, as they must, that
the NLRA provides a claim that is “clearly” closer to the
WARN cause of action than any state law category of claims.
At most, they simply place all of the possible analogies in a
pot and try to show that none of the state analogies is perfect

'? UMW v. Peabody Coal Co., 38 F.3d 850 (6th Cir. 1994);
Halkias v. General Dynamics Corp., 31 F.3d 224, reh. granted,
31 F.3d 248 (Sth Cir. 1994).

19

and that the NLRA is closer than any alternative. Crown,
Cork Br. 21-25. But if this were the test, there would no
longer be any presumption in favor of borrowing from state
law, let alone the strong one established by this Court.'?

Similarly, in applying the second prong of the test,
petitioners’ arguments would, if accepted, obliterate the
general rule and require that limitations period always be
borrowed from federal law. For example, they argue that,
unless a single limitations period is used, employers that
operate in several different states could be inconvenienced in
making nationwide decisions that could lead to layoffs in
several different states. North Star Br. 15-18; Crown, Cork
Br. at 30-32; Chamber Br. 12-15. As North Star concedes,
Br. 13 n.4, this aspect of uniformity would require federal
borrowing in all but the most “limited circumstances”
because federal laws almost always apply to national entities
that operate in different states. The states regularly differ in
the amount of time they allow for bringing the same type of
claim, and yet state statutes of limitations are routinely
borrowed for federal claims against defendants that operate
in more than one jurisdiction.

Only federal limitations periods can ensure that claims
under a particular federal statute always expire in the same
amount of time regardless of the jurisdiction in which the
violation was committed or in which the parties live. But
such a strong presumption in the direction of borrowing from
federal law would stand on its head the repeated statements
by this Court, in labor law as in other areas of the law, that
borrowing from state law is the norm, and borrowing from
federal law the rare exception. See Chevron Oil Co. v.
Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 104 (1971) (federal limitations period
justified “only when the need for uniformity is particularly

' Petitioner North Star’s brief does not even bother to analyze
State law alternatives; it simply states that their lack of appropriate-
ness is “self-evident.” Br. 26.

20

great”). Petitioners’ “uniformity” argument does not serve
to distinguish the WARN cause of action from most federal
causes of action, or to show why this case warrants the
application of the exception rather than the general rule. It
is, at best, an argument for changing the presumption, which
should be presented to Congress. See also pages 43 to 46,
infra (replying to argument that Court should overrule
presumption).

In addition, the statutes at issue in Reed and Hoosier
Cardinal — the LMRDA and section 301 of the LMRA —
applied to many defendants that operated in more than one
State, but that did not prevent the Court from following the
normal federal rule by borrowing from state law. In this day
and age, large companies that operate in multiple locations
have learned to adapt to the different substantive and proce-
dural requirements of the jurisdictions in which they do
business.

To the extent that some companies regulated by WARN
may have to take different limitations periods into account in
assessing their contingent liabilities and deciding how long to
keep their records, it is hard to imagine that the application
of the normal rule of borrowing state limitations periods will
have any significant impact on those companies’ operations,
especially because plant closings are not a daily occurrence
in any business.

To support their argument that “uniformity” is a central
consideration in borrowing decisions, petitioners rely largely
on the majority opinion in Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-
Duff & Assoc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987). But the “uniformity”
with which the Court was concerned there was not uniformi-
ty in length of time, but uniformity in characterization of the
cause of action. Thus, in Malley-Duff, the Court was
impelled to use a federal limitations period for RICO because
RICO “encompass[es] numerous and diverse topics and
subtopics,” which, depending on the precise claim, might be
analogous to at least nine different state causes of action. /d.

21

at 149. In that situation, so much time and energy might be
spent litigating limitations questions, with the Court unable
to answer such questions for all RICO cases with a single
ruling, that the practicalities of litigation required the
adoption of a single federal period to govern all possible
actions under that statute. Jd. at 150. Accord, Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 272 (1985) (choosing a uniform
characterization under state law, but not a uniform amount of
time, for section 1983 claims). That argument does not
apply to WARN because it contains only one type of claim
— for damages for failure to provide sufficient notification.

Petitioners also cite Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind v.
Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991), to support their argument
giving primacy to borrowing statutes that make the amount
of time in which to sue the same in every state. But the part
of the Lampf opinion containing such language, 501 U.S. at
357, drew the support of only a minority of the Court."
Lampf s holding is that, when a cause of action is inferred
from a federal statute that also contains an express cause of
action and an express limitations period, the courts must look
first to that statute and, indeed, the inquiry should normally
end there. Id. at 359. Because this is the part of Lampf that
was joined by a majority of the Court, because this analysis
would explain DelCostello as well (the DFR having been
inferred from the NLRA), and because under petitioners’
reading Lampf would sub silentio have overruled 165 years
of precedent making state statutes the primary source for
borrowing, Lampf should be read as limited to statutes, like
the securities laws and the NLRA, that create both inferred
and express causes of action.

In addition, petitioners’ “practicalities of litigation”
argument is replete with lamentations about the possibility

~ 4 Contrary to North Star’s brief, at 12, the dissenting opinions
of Justices O’Connor and Kennedy do not suggest that they agreed
with this part of the opinion. —

22

that, under a two or three year statute of limitations, evi-
dence may disappear, potential plaintiffs may be harder to
find to pay them their damages, parties may be harder to
serve, and the like. Again, even assuming that this is a
serious problem — and we explain below why it is not — it
affects most federal causes of action to which the De/Costello
presumption nevertheless applies. No doubt, all defendants
would like to have the benefit of a six-month limitations pe-
_ riod because it protects them sooner against allegations of un-
lawful conduct and reduces their record-keeping needs, but
invocation of this concern does not help distinguish between
those federal causes of action that ought to follow the normal
rule of borrowing from state law, and those which ought to
be brought within the exception.

Indeed, only two “practicalities” have been held by this
Court to warrant departure from the normal rule of bor-
rowing from state law — the prospect of lengthy wrangling
over the proper limitations periods for federal statutes that in-
clude a wide variety of causes of action (as in the case of
RICO), and the danger of interference with the administra-
tion of CBAs (as in the case of hybrid DFR actions).
Because petitioners do not, and cannot, contend that either
danger is present here, that is sufficient to warrant rejection
of their arguments for borrowing from federal law.

Finally, petitioners suggest that the Court should
borrow the six-month limitations period because some federal
labor statutes have express six-month periods. North Star
Br. 27-28; Crown Cork Br. 27-28. See also Chamber Br.
16. As we explain infra at 32-33, this argument is predicat-
ed on a highly selective and unrepresentative citation of
express limitations periods among federal employment
Statutes. But the biggest flaw in the argument is that it ig-
nores this Court’s admonition that the principle of borrowing
from state law remains the norm, “in-labor law as else-
where.” If petitioners desire a uniform six-month statute of
limitations for labor cases, they must ask Congress, not this
Court, to create one.

23
B. The NLRA Is Not Analogous to WARN.

1. Different Purposes. Petitioners contend that
WARN ’s purpose is comparable to that of the NLRA, thus
warranting the borrowing of the NLRA’s six-month limita-
tions period. In fact, the purposes of the two laws are quite
different. The purposes of the NLRA are well-described in
its preamble: to achieve long-term industrial peace, and
prevent disputes between labor and management from be-
coming so serious as to cause constant industrial warfare, by
encouraging workers to choose unions to represent them in
collective bargaining, and by requiring employers to bargain
in good faith with the workers’ chosen representative. 29
U.S.C. §§ 141(b), 151. The method chosen by Congress
was not to set minimum employment standards, Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 753-756
(1985); indeed, the NLRB is forbidden to require the parties
to agree to any particular set of terms and conditions of
employment. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99
(1970). Instead, Congress’ strategy in the NLRA was to
encourage the practice of collective bargaining, id., and to
prevent all parties from acting in ways that are inconsistent
with such bargaining. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western
Add’n Cmnty. Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975).

WARN, by contrast, promulgates a substantive standard
of conduct for employers, and grants rights to all employees,
regardless of whether they join a union or engage in collec-
tive bargaining. Under the Act, before employees suffer an
employment loss from the closing of an entire plant, or the
layoff of a substantial number of workers at a plant, they are
entitled to notice of the proposed action. As explained in the
Labor Department’s implementing regulations, WARN

provides protection to workers, their families and
communities by requiring employers to provide
notification 60 calendar days in advance of plant
closing and mass layoffs.

24

20 C.F.R. § 639.1 (1993).

Because it is a minimum labor standard, rather than a pro-
collective bargaining statute, it makes no sense to borrow a
limitations period that was intended to govern claims relating
to the bargaining process and labor relations.

This Court has specifically invoked that difference in
recognizing the distinction between the purposes of plant
closing statutes and of the NLRA. In Fort Halifax Packing
Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987), the issue was whether the
NLRA preempted a Maine statute, comparable to WARN,
that required employers to give prior notice of plant closings.
The Court ruled that “the NLRA is concerned with ensuring
an equitable bargaining process, not with the substantive
terms that may emerge from such bargaining,” id. at 20, and
thus held that the NLRA, being directed at a different pur-
pose than the state law, did not preempt the Maine statute.

Moreover, as the court pointed out in Paperworkers
Local 340 v. Specialty Paperboard, 999 F.2d 51 (2d Cir.
1993), far from being solely a labor statute, as the NLRA is,
WARN protects communities as well as workers. As the
Act’s sponsors recognized, both communities and workers
pay a heavy price for the dislocation that follows a surprise
plant closing, as taxpayer expenses for unemployment
compensation and welfare mount, and workers lose their
ability to spend money at community businesses and to pay
their mortgages to community financial institutions. See 134
Cong. Rec. 15514 (Sen. Byrd), 16690-16691 (Sen. Warner).
That is why WARN requires employers to give notice to the
chief officer of the affected unit of local government, as well
as to the state’s dislocated worker agency, 29 U.S.C. §
2102(a)(2), and gives local governments a right to receive
$500 for each day that notice is withheld. 29 U.S.C. §
2104(a)(3). Indeed, the statutory provision under which
respondents sued here is the very one that entitles local
governments to sue, 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(5). It is evident
that the cause of action for local governments bears no

25

resemblance to the NLRA, so that there would be no
justification for making them sue within six months. Nor is
it likely that Congress intended the same cause of action to
have one limitations period borrowed from federal law, and
another from state law, depending on whether the plaintiff
was a worker or a municipality. Cf DelCostello v. Team-
sters, 462 U.S. 151, 169 n.19 (1983) (refusing to use
analogies that would result in different limitations periods
against different defendants). For this reason as well, the
NLRA is not an analogous statute from which the statute of
limitations should be borrowed."®

Petitioner Crown, Cork also quotes from committee
reports to support its argument that WARN’s notification
requirement was intended to affect collective bargaining over
plant closings. Br. 17. This legislative history analysis is
highly distorted. As Crown, Cork acknowledges, a bargain-
ing requirement was included in an early bill, but was
deleted in order to secure passage. When the House Report
was written, the bill still required employers both to bargain
with unions over plant-closings and to provide unions with
detailed information about the reasons for the closing (which,
in turn, the union might have used to bargain for alternatives

'S In arguing that WARN and the NLRA have the same
purpose, petitioners invoke a reference in the NLRA’s preamble
to benefits that the community receives from the proscription of
certain managerial practices. E.g., North Star Br. at 19. We do
not doubt that every labor statute is intended by Congress to
benefit the community as a whole, but to compare purposes at that
level of generality is simply to trivialize this aspect of the test.
Similarly, North Star’s assertion, Br. at 22-23, that the purposes
of the statutes are similar in that both affect labor-management
relations, shows only that both are labor laws. This argument does
not serve to distinguish WARN from most federal labor laws (such
as those in Reed), and so is inconsistent with this Court’s insis-
tence that state law borrowing is the norm “in labor law as
elsewhere.”

26

to the closing). Crown, Cork’s blocked quotation, supposed-
ly about the purpose of “prenotification,” actually begins the
section of the House Report captioned “THE DUTY TO
CONSULT,” H.R. Rep. 285, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 32
(1987), which, as noted, was never enacted.

Similarly, the Senate Report quoted by Crown, Cork
supported a version of the bill from which the duty to consult
had been eliminated, but which still contained the duty to
provide information to the union. S. 538, Section 333, 100th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1987). But this section was also deleted
from the bill in order to secure passage, and the Act that
remained had neither of the provisions to which these reports
referred as encouraging bargaining.'®

In further support of its argument that WARN is analo-
gous to the NLRA, petitioners rely on the fact that some
WARN provisions make express reference to the NLRA.
But many of the provisions they cite simply confirm how
disparate the two laws are, because they show the lengths to
which Congress went to keep WARN from having any
impact on the collective bargaining process that the NLRA is
intended to foster. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 2103(2) (WARN does
not cover economic action protected by NLRA); 29 U.S.C.

'© Petitioner North Star cites Senator Hatch’s assertion that
WARN was, in effect, an amendment to the NLRA, to show that
WARN is analogous to the NLRA. Br. at 21, citing 134 Cong.
Rec. 15923, 15924 (1988). North Star neglects to mention that
Senator Hatch voted against WARN, see 134 Cong. Rec. 16691
(1988), and that the speech that North Star quotes was given in
support of the unsuccessful Kassebaum amendment, which would
have eliminated its application to layoffs. 134 Cong. Rec. 16020-
16021. The theme that WARN amended the NLRA was a constant
one in Senator Hatch’s arguments against the bill, see 134 Cong.
Rec. 15763, 15764 (1988), but he failed to persuade a majority of
the Senate of this point. It is a cardinal rule of statutory construc-
tion that statements by a bill’s opponents are accorded little weight.
Shell Oil Co. v. lowa Dep’t of Revenue, 488 U.S. 19, 29 (1988).

27

§ 2108 (giving notice under WARN cannot violate NLRA).
Other provisions simply incorporate into WARN the defini-
tions used by the NLRA for basic terms. E.g., 29 U.S.C.
§ 2101(a)(4).

Moreover, as amicus Chamber of Commerce concedes,
Br. 9-10 n.8, many labor statutes, including the LMRDA and
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, incorporate
NLRA definitions and are to some extent interpreted in pari
materia with it. E.g., Machinists Lodge 702 v. Loudermilk,
444 F.2d 719, 722 (Sth Cir. 1971) (invoking NLRB prece-
dents to decide whether LMRDA lets union impose fines for
dual unionism). And yet in Reed, the Court applied the nor-
mal rule of borrowing from state law to the LMRDA,
expressly rejecting borrowing from the NLRA. Thus, the
fact that some WARN provisions refer to the NLRA does not
support the conclusion that the NLRA is clearly more
analogous to WARN than any state cause of action.

2. Different Procedures. In Malley-Duff, the Court
relied in part on the strong similarity between the enforce-
ment procedures of RICO and the Clayton Act in ruling that
the two were closely analogous. WARN, of course, must be
enforced by a private lawsuit in district court, unlike the
NLRA where a private party need only file a charge form,
in very general language, asking the NLRB’s General
Counsel to pursue an administrative complaint on his behalf.
Although this difference was not enough to preclude borrow-
ing section 10(b) in DelCostello, where ‘he other reasons for
borrowing federal law were so compelling, this difference in
procedures surely militates against the conclusion that the
two claims are so analogous that Congress must have
intended that the Court depart from the normal rule of
borrowing state law.

3. Different Causes of Action. Petitioners argue that
WARN is analogous to section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, which
requires employers to bargain in good faith with the union
representing its employees. Although WARN does not

28

include any duty to bargain, petitioners seize on the fact that
one item about which employers must sometimes bargain is
the effects of a plant closure (or, depending on the text of the
collective bargaining agreement, over the closure decision
itself). First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452
U.S. 666, 681 (1981); Milwaukee Spring, 268 NLRB 601
(1984), enf’d sub nom. UAW Local 547 v. NLRB, 765 F.2d
175 (D.C. Cir. 1985). This duty, in turn, requires the
employer to inform the union of its plans in sufficient time
to permit meaningful bargaining. Gar Wood-Detroit Truck
Equipment, 274 NLRB 113 (1985).

What this argument ignores — apart from the major dif-
ferences between the NLRA duty and WARN’s requirements
— is that such a duty exists only when the workers are
represented by a union and the duty has not been waived by
the union. The reason for this limitation is that the duty to
bargain is owed only to a union, and not to ind vidual
employees. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). But only 11.5% of all
private sector employees are union members. Bureau of
National Affairs, Proportion of Union Membership Hits
15.8% [including public employees], 142 Labor Relations
Reporter 180, 181 (February 15, 1993). Thus, if the NLRA
is analogous to WARN for limitations purposes, just because
a small fraction of all possible WARN employee-plaintiffs
(not including respondents here) enjoy limited protection
under the NLRA, then the tail would indeed be wagging the
dog.

Petitioners attempt to rebut this point by asserting that
the NLRA protects both represented and unrepresented
employees. Crown, Cork Br. 19-21; North Star Br. 24-25.
In fact, however, the vast bulk of the NLRA is concerned
solely with the certification of union representatives for
bargaining units and the supervision of the process of
collective bargaining. In practical terms, only one aspect of
the NLRA applies to union and non-union employees alike —
the section 7 right to engage in “concerted activities . . . for
mutual aid and protection,” retaliation for which is a ULP

29

under section 8(a)(1). For this reason, it is not surprising
that every one of the cases cited by petitioners for the
proposition that the NLRA applies whether or not there is a
union involves this particular ULP.

Significantly, petitioners do not contend that WARN
bears any resemblance to section 8(a)(1)’s protection of
concerted action, the only ULP that they cite as applying to
union and non-union employees alike. Rather, they draw an
analogy only with section 8(a)(5)’s duty to bargain with the
union. Petitioners do not pretend that this ULP applies to
nonunion employees, and we know of no precedent that so
holds. Accordingly, our argument that the section 8(a)(5)
ULP not only fails to resemble the WARN cause of action,
but also applies to only a small fraction of all WARN plain-
tiffs, stands unrefuted.

The argument that this one limited parallel with the
NLRA suffices to make the two statutes “closely analogous”
for borrowing purposes is completely inconsistent with this
Court’s precedents. For example, in Reed, the Court
acknowledged that one small class of suits under Title I of
the LMRDA might directly implicate challenges to collective
bargaining agreements, and thus closely resemble DFR
actions; but that was not sufficient reason to extend the
application of section 10(b) to actions under the LMRDA
generally. 488 U.S. at 331-332 n.6. Similarly, when this
Court decided Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), and
Goodman vy. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987), one
small fraction of the claims that could be brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and a larger fragment of claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1981, could be brought under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Yet that was no reason for this Court
to borrow Title VII’s 180-day limitations period to govern
claims under these civil rights statutes. So, too, the fact that
some WARN plaintiffs may have NLRA protection should
not affect the selection of the limitations period.

There is another respect in which North Star’s NLRA
analogy is inconsistent with precedent: this Court has held

30

that a mere “family resemblance” between a federal statutory
claim and some aspect of the NLRA is insufficient to warrant
adoption of section 10(b). Rather, there is sufficient similari-
ty between the NLRA and the federal claim only when the
claim directly challenges the private resolution of a dispute
between a union and an employer, and thus implicates the
long-term bargaining relationship between the two. Reed v.
UTU, 488 U.S. 319, 331 and n.6 (1989); Doty v. Sewall,
784 F.2d 1, 9, 10 (1st Cir. 1986).

As we more fully discuss below, that is surely not the
case here. Not only does WARN apply regardless of
whether there is a union involved, and regardless of whether
the union and employer have tried to resolve any dispute
about the plant closing, but any rights that even union
members may enjoy under the NLRA are in addition to their
WARN rights, as WARN expressly provides. 29 U.S.C. §
2105. Consequently, even if a union and employer reach an
agreement about the closing, and employees nevertheless
mount an attack on the employer’s compliance with WARN,
they are enforcing independent rights, not attacking the
dispute resolution itself. Cf Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight Lines, 450 U.S. 728 (1981).

4. Different Relief. Not only the purposes, proce-
dures, and cause of action, but also the relief available under
the NLRA, is very different from WARN. If the NLRA is
violated in connection with a plant closing or layoff, the
NLRB may issue an order requiring the company to bargain
with the union. Stevens Pontiac-GMC, 295 NLRB 599, 603
(1989). Employees who have been laid off may be entitled
to reinstatement to their positions. North Carolina Coastal
Motor Lines, 219 NLRB 1009, 1009-1010, 1015 (1975),
enf’d, 542 F.2d 637, 638 (4th Cir. 1976). The NLRB may
require the employer to offer the affected workers positions
at other plants, Royal Norton Mfg. Co., 189 NLRB 489,
489, 495 (1971), or even, in some cases, to reopen an opera-
tion pending the completion of the required bargaining with
the union. Florida-Texas Freight. Corp., 203 NLRB 509,

31

511 (1973), enf’d mem., 489 F.2d 1275 (6th Cir. 1974). In
theory, preliminary relief may be granted under section 10(),
ordering an employer not to close the plant in the first place.
The employees are also awarded back pay, but not from the
date of the closing; rather, a formula has been developed that
is intended to encourage an employer to bargain in good faith
once the Board has ruled, although interim earnings and
various other sums may be deducted. Transmarine Navig.
Corp., 170 NLRB 389 (1968).

WARN relief is quite different. First, WARN express-
ly forbids injunctions against a plant closing or layoff, 29
U.S.C. § 2104(b), a bar which, a fortiori, prevents an order
that a plant be reopened. There is no role for collective
bargaining of WARN rights, and so that relief, as well as
reinstatement to employment, is unavailable. The only relief
for employees is an award of damages, which are calculated
very differently than under the NLRA. Thus, although the
employees’ wages and benefits provide the measure of the
damages for each day on which required notice was not
given, 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(1), there are no offsets for
unemployment compensation, wages from other employers,
or payments otherwise owing to employees at the time of
shutdown. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(2); H.R. Conf. Rep. No.
100-576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1053 (1988). The NLRB
has unanimously distinguished WARN payments from the
backpay obligations that an employer may owe under its
Transmarine doctrine, precisely because the two kinds of
payments have such different purposes under the statute.
Times Herald Printing Co. , 315 NLRB No. 100, 147 LRRM
1281, 1283-1284 (1994). There is also authority that
employees need not show on which days during the period of
withheld notice they would in fact have worked, as the
NLRA would require. USWA v. North Star Steel Co., 5
F.3d 39 (3d Cir. 1993). Contra, Carpenters Dist. Council
v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, 15 F.3d 1275, 1286 (Sth Cir. 1994).

32

C. The Six-Month Limitations Period Is Not
Needed to Protect Federal Labor Policies,
and Its Adoption Could Easily Frustrate
WARN’s Own Policies.

Petitioners’ argument also fails because they cannot
show that “the federal policies at stake and the practicalities
of litigation make [section 10(b)] a significantly more
appropriate vehicle.” De/Costello, supra, 462 U.S. at
171-172 (emphasis added).

1. Section 10(b) Is Not Needed to Effec-
tuate Federai Policies.

Petitioners invoke two federal policies which, they say,
are imperiled unless a federal limitations period is borrowed.
The first is the interest in avoiding the forum-shopping and
needless litigation which, they assert, would necessarily
result from borrowing state limitations periods. However, as
Part II(A) of this brief explains, this argument, if accepted,
would always forbid the borrowing of state limitations
periods. Rather than distinguishing WARN from most other
federal statutes, it emphasizes what most federal laws have
in common — they apply to defendants that operate in many
different states, each of which has its own limitations
periods. The argument thus amounts to a request that the
presumption in favor of state borrowing be overruled. See
infra 43 to 46.

Petitioners also argue that borrowing state limitations
periods would harm a supposed federal policy favoring
prompt resolution of employment-related disputes. To the
extent that this supposed policy applies to all federal labor
statutes, it cannot support borrowing from federal law
because it proves too much — it always requires borrowing
section 10(b). See pages 19 to 22, supra.

But petitioners also err in asserting that Congress has
generally imposed extremely short limitations periods in

wT -

ee eee ne te ee

33

labor cases. In this regard, their citation of the limitations
periods for employment discrimination and federal employee
claims scarcely exhausts the express limitations periods that
Congress has enacted to govern claims by employees against
their employers. Indeed, other federal employment statutes
have substantially longer express limitations periods. For
example, the Portal-to-Portal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 255,
provides a two-year limitations period for seeking unpaid
wages under the Fair Labor Standards, Walsh-Healey, or
Davis-Bacon Acts (or three years for willful violations).
Similarly, the Railway Labor Act allows two years for suits
to vacate NRAB awards, section 3, First (r), 45 U.S.C. §
153, First (r), and six years are allowed to sue fiduciaries
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29
U.S.C. § 1113. Moreover, railroad and maritime workers
are given three years to sue their employers over on-the-job
injuries, 45 U.S.C. § 56; 46 U.S.C. § 688.

The one thing that all federal six-month limitations
periods have in common is that they define the time in which
an employee must file a charge with an agency, which the
agency then investigates on the employee’s behalf. The
longer statutes set forth the time in which an employee must
find a lawyer, do the necessary investigation to satisfy Rule
11, and file suit in court.’’

Nor, indeed, do this Court’s precedents support the
proposition that six-month limitations periods are generally
desirable for cases involving the rights of employees, or even
generally for cases that may have an effect on the collective
bargaining process. After all, it was not mere interference
with collective bargaining in some general sense that motivat-

'’ Similarly, almost every one of the short state limitations
periods for employment discrimination claims cited in Crown,
Cork’s brief at 28 n.13, sets the time for filing a charge with a
State agency, not for filing suit.

34

ed the Court in De/Costello, but rather the overturning of
union-employer dispute resolutions:

the grievance and arbitration procedure often
processes disputes involving interpretation of
critical terms in the collective-bargaining agree-
ment affecting the entire relationship between
company and union... This system, with its
heavy emphasis on grievance, arbitration, and the
“law of the shop,” could easily become unwork-
able if a decision which has given “meaning and
content” to the terms of an agreement, and even
affected subsequent modifications of the agree-
ment, could suddenly be called into question as
much as [three] years later.

462 U.S. at 169, quoting UPS v. Mitchell, 451
U.S. 56, 63-64 (1981).

But, as shown in the previous section of this brief, WARN
claims do not attack arbitral awards nor otherwise challenge
union-employer agreements, and hence this rationale is
inapplicable.

Petitioners also assert that WARN itself expresses a
policy in favor of rapid enforcement, primarily in a provision
that exempts employers from paying the $500 per day
penalty to local government units if they make their WARN
payments within three weeks of a plant closing. We certain-
ly agree that it is better if employers meet their obligations
promptly after failing to give notice, and we assume both
that Congress wanted employers to do so and that, in most
cases, employees will promptly sue as soon as it is clear that
a WARN violation occurred.

But the statute of limitations does not determine the
time within which employers will give notice of a plant
closing; it only determines, once an employer has failed to
meet its obligations in a timely manner, the amount of time
its employees have to sue for redress. Once an employer has

35

failed to honor its obligations under WARN, there is nothing
in the statute or in the underlying policies that favors the
speedy resolution of disputes that is at all comparable to the
need for industrial peace on which DelCostello relied.
Indeed, an unduly short limitations period would make it far
more difficult for employees, especially unrepresented
employees who do not have a union with experienced officers
and counsel looking out for their interests, to secure en-
forcement of the duties that WARN imposes on employers.
The ultimate result will be less compliance with WARN, not
more timely compliance.

Finally, petitioners contend that, because WARN may
involve companies that are going out of business, there is a
particular danger that records and witnesses may disappear
if suit has not been brought within six months. However,
the evidence that will be needed to defend a case will largely
be records that are in the company’s possession already, and
it is not every company that closes a plant or lays off many
employees that must keep records for WARN purposes —
only those that fail to give notice at least sixty days before-
hand must do so. Moreover, companies must still maintain
their financial records at least for the limitations period of
the tax laws and, probably, the securities laws, inasmuch as
a company in financial difficulty causing plant closures may
have exposure to suits under Rule 10b-5. And, as North Star
concedes, federal wage and equal employment laws require
employers to keep detailed payroll records for at least three
years. Br. 32 n.15.

What is more, even if the NLRA’s six-month limita-
tions period were borrowed to govern claims by employees,
it is inconceivable that the same period would be held most
analogous to claims brought by local governments to collect
the statutory $500 per day civil penalty. The claim may well
be governed by the express five-year limitations period for
civil penalties under 28 U.S.C. § 2462; it is also closely
analogous to Pennsylvania’s two-year limitations period for
actions under a civil penalty statute. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.

36

§ 5524(5). In either case, employers would have to retain
their relevant records for well over six months, and thus pe-
titioners’ final argument fails to justify a six-month limita-
tions period for WARN actions by employees.

2. Adoption of Section 10(b) Would
Make It Difficult to Enforce WARN.

Far from being needed to effectuate federal policy, the
use of section 10(b) would harm the policies underlying
WARN, because a six-month limitations period is too short
to permit many WARN claims to be brought. There are two
reasons for such concern.

First, workers, unions and communities that consider
bringing a WARN action must confront a number of issues.
See generally McHugh, Fair Warning or Foul? An Analysis
of the [WARN] Act in Practice, 14 Berkeley J. Emp. &
Labor Law 1 (1993). If an entire plant has been permanently
closed, their task is relativeiy simple: they must only
ascertain the original number of employees, 29 U.S.C. §§
2101(a)(1) and (2), with due regard for the number of hours
worked by part-time employees, § 2101(a)(8). But if the
plant continues in operation, potential plaintiffs also must
assess the number and percentage of employees laid off over
any thirty or ninety day period, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101(a)(3),
2102(d), taking into account the number of employees who
have been offered transfers to other locations. 29 U.S.C. §
2101(b). Even assuming that a union could use its rights
under section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA to obtain such information
soon enough to decide within six months whether a suit is
warranted, unrepresented employees are unlikely to have any
access to it. Moreover, WARN affords a variety of defenses
related to considerations of reasonable business and legal

- judgment, as well as, in the case of partial closures, the

employer's foresight about the likelihood of future layoffs at
the time an initial layoff is imposed, as well as concerning

37

the likely duration of the initial layoff. E.g., 29 U.S.C. §§
2102(b), 2103(1).

Second, if the employer does not announce at the outset
that the layoff or closing is permanent, prospective plaintiffs
must make the judgment whether the layoff is likely to last
more than six months. Moreover, workers who are hopeful
that, if the plant does reopen, they will be among the group
selected to go back to work, may be leery of suing their
employer until they are sure that their jobs have, in fact,
been eliminated. In this case, for example, North Star
initially took the position that its layoff was indefinite, and
hopefully temporary, and it steadfastly refused to clarify the
matter despite repeated inquiries from respondent Thomas.
Employees put in this position should not be required to be
mind-readers in deciding whether to rush into court before
the expiration of six months after the layoff began. The
borrowing of section i10(b) would require the employees and
their counsel to obtain the necessary information, make such
calculations, and file a complaint in compliance with Rule |!
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure within a mere six
months.

Petitioners make light of this issue, North Star Br. 29,
arguing that a number of plaintiffs have been able to sue
within six months, and that the only questions are whether
there was a lay-off, when notice was given, and how many
employees were involved. But there are also a large number
of cases in which plaintiffs have not sued that soon, because,
as we showed above, there are a number of questions that
may not be as easy for individual employees to answer as it
presumably is for sophisticated labor counsel retained by
larger employers. Even petitioners’ own briefs make clear
that far more may be involved. For example, they are at
pains to show that WARN courts have adopted NLRB stan-
dards, applied in election eligibility cases, for deciding
whether particular employees have a reasonable expectation
of recall and therefore are on only temporary layoff. North
Star Br. 21, citing Damron v. Rob Fork Mining Corp. , 945

38

F.2d 121, 124 (6th Cir. 1991). As this case makes clear,
that determination turns on a variety of criteria that them-
selves depend on data to which individual employees are not
likely to have access. There is a real danger that adoption of
a-six-month limitations period within which workers would
have to ascertain such information, find counsel, and file suit
could cripple enforcement of WARN, which provides yet

another reason why the judgment below should be affirmed.
* * x

In DelCostello, the Court was troubled that a limitations
period of a few months might be too short a time to bring
suit. However, impelled to choose between time periods
even shorter than six months that would endanger the
enforceability of the DFR, or lengthy periods that might
seriously threaten federal labor policies favoring the finality
of grievance settlements, it opted for section 10(b) because
the analogy between the NLRA and the DFR was so close.
462 U.S. at 169. Here, by contrast, as we showed supra at
23 to 31, the analogy to the NLRA is tenuous at best, and as
we showed supra at 32 to 36, federal labor policies will not
be endangered by a limitations period measured in years
rather than months, but adoption of a six-month period would
endanger WARN’s own policies. Supra 36 to 38. Accord-
ingly, the “exceptional” case for borrowing federal rather
than state law simply has not been made. Indeed, even if
there were no strong presumption, the analogies and equities
still favor borrowing from state law.

Iii. THIS ACTION WOULD BE TIMELY BASED
ON ANY OF THE ANALOGOUS STATE OR
FEDERAL LIMITATIONS PERIODS.

If the Court chooses to decide in this case what the
proper state limitations period for WARN actions, despite the
fact that petitioners deliberately did not present that question,
just as they avoided that question below, the best choice
among state limitations periods is the one chosen by a

39

number of federal courts for WARN — state law statutes
governing actions on contract." In Pennsylvania, this
would allow four years if the contract is deemed either
implied in law or based on an agreement not in writing. See
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5525(3) or (4).

The reason for borrowing a contract limitations period
is not that WARN arises from an actual agreement between
the parties; petitioners are clearly correct that the duty is
imposed by statute. Nevertheless, employees and employers
have a contractual relationship, whether under a CBA
governed by federal law or by the state’s common law, and
WARN imposes a additional duty on the parties’ contractual
relationship. Cf. McDonald v. Thompson, 184 U.S. 71, 74
(1902) (liability imposed on contractual relationship by
federal law should be characterized as either implied contract
or obligation imposed by statute).

Courts have sometimes borrowed contractual limitations
periods to govern other federal statutes that govern a contrac-
tual relationship. E.g., Dantagnan v. ILA Local 1418, 496
F.2d 400 (Sth Cir. 1974). Moreover, the statutory remedy
limits the employees to damages measured by the contractual
wage rate, and excludes the sort of damages that are com-
monly available in tort, such as emotional or punitive
damages.

Another possible choice is the three years allowed by
43 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 260.9a(g) for suing under the Penns} lva-
nia Wage Payment and Collection Law (“WPCL”). Because
employees’ wage rates provide the measure of damages for
claims under WARN, the WPCL provides a sound analogy
to the WARN cause of action. The Third Circuit has
previously adopted that limitations period for the enforcement

'* Paperworkers Local 340 v. Specialty Paperboard, 999 F.2d
51, 57 (2d Cir. 1993); Frymire v. Ampex Corp., 821 F. Supp.
651, 655 (D. Colo. 1993); Wallace v. Detroit Coke Corp., 818 F.
Supp. 192, 196-197 (E.D. Mich. 1993).

40

of claims for unpaid pension contributions under a CBA.
Connors v. Consolidation Coal Co. , 866 F.2d 599, 603-604
(1989).

A third alternative is the six-year period aliowed by the
Pennsylvania residual statute of limitations, which applies “to
any civil action or proceeding which is [not] subject to anoth-
er limitation specified in this subchapter.” 42 Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann. § 5527. Crown, Cork argues that Agency Holding
Corp. bars the borrowing of such a limitations period, but
given Congress’ subsequent enactment of a four-year residual
limitations period for federal statutes, it is hard to understand
why there should be any presumption that Congress disfavors
residual state limitations periods. Moreover, this Court has
borrowed such statutes in other cases, Corsicana Nat’l Bank
v. Johnson, 251 U.S. 68, 85-86 (1919), including, most
recently, in Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989). And the
lower courts have continued to borrow residual limitations
periods when other state analogies have been inappropriate.
E.g., Teumer v. General Motors Corp., 34 F.3d 542, 548
(7th Cir. 1994); SEIU v. City Cleaning Co. , 982 F.2d 89, 95
(3d Cir. 1992) (“it encompasses any cause of action — either
federal or state — for which a limitation has not been
expressly created by the legislature or by Congress”). Thus,
if no other state limitations period will do, the Court should
borrow section 5527.

A final possible state analogy is with Pennsylvania’s
two-year limitations period for enforcing civil penalties. 42
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524(5). WARN damages operate,
at least in part, as a civil penalty. This is especially true for
communities, which are entitled to $500 per day regardless
of the amount of wages involved; indeed, the most analogous
limitations period for this cause of action is either the state
or the federal limitations period for civil penalties. But the
employees’ cause of action also has an aspect of both
deterrence and punishment of employers who fail to provide
60 days’ notice of a shut-down. Thus, although WARN
damages have a compensatory aspect, they are not entirely

41

compensatory, because Congress made a considered decision
not to impose any duty to mitigate on employees, or to
reduce their recovery according to whether and to what
extent they sustained “actual damages” because they might
not have worked on some of the sixty days in question, or
because they actually found employment for part of the sixty
days. Instead, the only way for employers to limit their
exposure to WARN damages is through a demonstration of
good faith, either in the commission of the violation itself, or
the provision of unconditional and voluntary benefits to
employees denied notice. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2104(a)(2) and (4).
These factors are related more to deterrence than to compen-
sation of employees for actual harm.

The fact that none of these possible limitations periods
may provide a perfect analogy is not surprising, because
states rarely enact their limitations periods with federal
statutes in mind. As the Third Circuit said in explaining its
decision to borrow the six-year residuai limitations period in
section 5527(6) to govern retaliation claims under section 510
of ERISA,

the DelCostello Court emphasized that “federal
courts should [not] eschew use of state limitations
periods anytime state law fails to provide a per-
fect analogy.” 462 U.S. at 171 (emphasis add-
ed). The Court recognized that “there is not
always an obvious state-law choice for application
to a given federal cause of action.” Jd. Nev-
ertheless, the Court concluded that “resort to state
law remains the norm for borrowing of limitations
periods.” Jd. Thus, only if “a rule from else-
where in federal law clearly provides a closer
anabgy,” id. at 172 (emphasis added), may we
“tum away from state law.” Jd.

42

Gavalik v. Continental Can Co. , 812 F.2d 834, 847 (3d

Cir. 1987) (emphasis in original; parallel citations

deleted).

However, if the Court finds that none of the available
State law analogies is adequate, there remain federal limita-
tions periods that are far more appropriate for borrowing
than section 10(b). The best alternative is section 6 of the
Portal-to-Portal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 255, that allows two
years to seek unpaid wages under the Fair Labor Standards,
Walsh-Healey, and Davis-Bacon Acts.

Like the WARN Act, the statutes governed by section
255 provide minimum labor standards, rather than being
directed to the encouragement of collective bargaining. Like
WARN, the FLSA and other statutes provide almost exclu-
sively for monetary relief (the FLSA does prohibit retaliation
against employees who enforce their FLSA rights, but that
aspect of the statute is clearly ancillary to the main subject of
the law). Like WARN, the overtime provisions of the FLSA
impose monetary obligations measured by whatever wage
rates are agreed between the employer and its employees
(i.e., 150% of the wage rate for the first 40 hours worked in
each week), even though the statute requires payments that
are excused by the contractual relationship itself. Like
WARN, section 255 provides reduced financial exposure —
a two-year limitations period, rather than three years — for
employers whose mental state is less culpable. See
McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co. , 486 U.S. 128 (1986). As
in Agency Holding Corp., where similarities in the remedial
structure of RICO and the antitrust laws provided a reason to
borrow the Clayton Act’s limitation period to govern RICO,
these remedial similarities support borrowing section 6 to
govern WARN, if any federal limitations period is borrowed.

Perhaps most important, section 6, like WARN, was
designed as an appropriate time for employees to find a
lawyer and file a complaint in federal court, not just to file
a simple charge form with a federal agency whose employees

APTOS Vi i Tate I OS

43

are charged with helping employees and investigating their
charges for them. Although this Court found it appropriate
in DelCostello to borrow section 10(b) where there was no
other federal law alternative, and where its six-month period
actually represented a longer time than the existing state law
analogue, that does not make section 10(b) the best choice
when other state and federal limitations periods are available.

IV. THE COURT SHOULD NOT REVERSE 165
YEARS OF PRECEDENT BY CREATING A
PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF BORROW-
ING FEDERAL LAW.

Presumably because it recognizes that the case cannot
be made for borrowing section 10(b) under prevailing
standards, petitioner North Star asks the Court to overturn
those precedents. It asserts that Congress has expressed its
desire to abandon state law borrowing, and that such borrow-
ing both foments litigation over possible state limitations
periods, and creates uncertainty among potential litigants who
may be sued in different forums. However, “[t]ime and
again this Court has recognized that ‘the doctrine of stare
decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of law,’”
Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Ry. Comm., 502 U.S. 197,
202 (1991), which has “special force in the area of statutory
interpretation,” id., Neither of petitioner's arguments
provides the “compelling justification” that is needed to
reverse such longstanding precedent. Jd.

We acknowledge that a presumption in favor of
borrowing from federal law does have the advantage of
creating uniform limitations periods for suits filed in every
state under any given federal statute. On the other hand,
because many federal claims have state law analogues, a
given litigant may have parallel claims under both state and
federal law, and it is desirable for both sets of claims to
expire at the same time. Under North Star’s proposal, that
result would not occur, thereby causing a problem of

44

increased significance given Congress recent enactment of the
supplemental jurisdiction provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Even if North Star’s arguments might have force if the Court
were writing on a Clean slate, that is not the situation.

Thus, when WARN was enacted in 1988, the Court had
held for almost 160 years that borrowing from state law is
the rule, and choosing a federal limitations period the very
narrow exception. The Court had also said, as recently as
1987, that it was fair to assume that Congress intended by its
silence to have the Court borrow from state law. Agency
Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff Assoc., 483 U.S. at 147.
Against this background, it is fair to assume that Congress
intended the limitation period for WARN to be developed
according to the same standard.

Nor is there any merit in North Star’s argument that
Congress’ intent in enacting a four-year residual limitations
period for statutes taking effect after 1990, 28 U.S.C. §
1658, frees the Court to rewrite 165 years of precedent and
apply a six-month limitations period to WARN. North Star
relies on an analysis that was placed in the Congressional
Record by Senator Grassley, 136 Cong. Rec. 17581 (1990),
which explained that, under existing doctrine, “federal courts
‘borrow’ the most analogous state law limitations period”;
according to the analysis, this rule has the disadvantage of
obligating courts to determine the applicable period, produc-
ing disagreements among the federal courts, and leaving
litigants uncertain until consensus is reached. This excerpt
not only shows Congress’ belief that it was state law periods
that were being borrowed, but Congress’ failure to alter this
approval shows that it recognized and was willing to accept
the fact that it is state law that is being borrowed. It is the
very need to borrow that Congress wanted to fix, and then
only for newly created causes of action.

In this regard, there is a great irony in North Star’s
proposal that the Court rewrite precedent based on the intent
underlying 28 U.S.C. § 1658. Normally, courts consider
legislative history in trying to construe the statute that was

45

being discussed, although there is controversy within the
Court about the extent to which such materials should be
considered. But North Star has no interest in having section
1658’s four-year limitations period applied to WARN.

Even more important, North Star ignores the reason
why Congress decided not to apply the law that was the
product of this analysis to existing statutes. According to the
House Report No. 101-734, the limitations periods for many
statutes had already been resolved by the Courts, and
imposing a new limitations period for all these laws “would
threaten to disrupt the settled expectations of a great many
parties.” 1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 6870. If
this Court overturned the many years of precedent on which
lower courts and parties have relied in reaching the general
consensus that prevails with respect to the limitations periods
for most federal statutes, the result would be to produce the
very disruption that Congress sought to avoid.

To be sure, there are some federal causes of action —
WARN among them — on which this Court has not pro-
nounced judgment and for which no consensus has yet
emerged among the lower courts. But the minor benefits that
would allegedly be produced in reducing the amount of
limitations litigation under those statutes by the adoption of
a federal borrowing presumption is far outweighed by the
strife that would be caused under the great majority of pre-
1991 laws whose limitations periods are now generally
accepted.

Indeed, if section 1658 is relevant at all, it shows that
the speedy resolution of controversies on which petitioners
seek to rely was obviously much less significant than they
have suggested, and that Congress is not disturbed by the
application of a limitations period four years in length. 28
U.S.C. § 1658. Although this statute applies only to laws
enacted without an express statute of limitations after
December 1, 1990, it has been argued that this four-year
period may be borrowed by analogy. Siegel, Practice Com-
mentary, United States Code Annotated, Title 28, Judiciary

46

and Judicial Procedure, §§ 1653 to 1960 at 243 (1994).
Indeed, if petitioner North Star is serious in urging the
enactment of section 1658 as a reason to apply federal law,
then it surely makes sense to adopt the four-year limitations
period adopted by Congress in section 1658 in choosing
among federal law alternatives.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be af-
firmed.

Respectfully submitted,

Paul Alan Levy
(Counsel of Record)
Alan B. Morrison

Public Citizen Litigation Group
Suite 700

2000 P Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 833-3000

Attorneys for Respondents
March 27, 1995

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386012_0779%3A05. Public record. Not legal advice.
