# Reply Brief — American Bankers Ass'n v. Kelley

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386012_0704%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Reply Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1995
- **Citation:** 513 U.S. 1110

## Text

ry Sita Court, U.S
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( EFILF®
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No. 94-752 DEC 7 194
| oo (ie wit DE]
IN THE eee

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1994

AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF REAL ESTATE LAWYERS,
AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE,
COMMERCIAL FINANCE ASSOCIATION,
EQUIPMENT LEASING ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA,

Petitioners,
v.
FRANK J. KELLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, ET AL.,
Respondents.

On Petition For Writ of Certiorari
To The United States Court of Appeals
For the District of Columbia Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS

JOHN J. GILL III EDWIN E. HUDDLESON, III*
THOMAS J. GRECO VOLPE, BOSKEY AND LYONS
MICHAEL F. CROTTY 918 16th Street, N.W.
AMERICAN BANKERS Washington, D.C. 20006
ASSOCIATION (202) 737-6580

1120 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 663-5026

Counsel for Petitioner Counsel for Petitioner
American Bankers Association Equipment Leasing Association
*Counsel of Record

{additional counsel listed on inside front cover]

ROGER D. SCHWENKE

CARLTON, FIELDS, WARD,
EMMANUEL, SMITH &
CUTLER

One Harbour Place

P.O. Box 3239

Tampa, Florida 33601

(813) 223-7000

Counsel for Petitioner
American College of Real
Estate Lawyers

MARGARET V. HATHAWAY
LAW OFFICES OF

MARGARET V. HATHAWAY
5322 Forty-first Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20015
(202) 244-8160

Counsel for Petitioner
American Council of Life
Insurance

PHILLIP E. STANO

ROBERT S. MCCONNAUGHEY

DAVID LEIFER

AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE
INSURANCE

1001 Pennylvania Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004
(202) 624-2183

Counsel for Petitioner
American Council of Life
Insurance

DAVID T. BUENTE, JR.
CARTER G. PHILLIPS
SIDLEY & AUSTIN

1722 Eye Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 736-8111

Counsel for Petitioner
Commercial Finance
Association

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Denice Net te,

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES:
Adams Fruit v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638 (1990)

American Hospital Association v. NLRB,
ee rs Lk kw da wee Os

Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
ee a ee COED kk ee ks eee a

Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979)

Citizens to Save Spenser County v. EPA,
600 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1979) .........

Dico v. Diamond, 35 F.3d 348 (8th Cir. 1994)

Linemaster Switch Corp. v. EPA, 938 F.2d 1299
we er re

Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc.,
ae Se DP RUTOE ne ek KS kee ee ten

Touche Ross & Co v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570
NE i Se es

United States v. Fleet Factors, 821 F. Supp. 707
I Ee ab 6 bw sw ak eas

United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co..,
eR re

ii

Page

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power v. NRDC,

ee es OE ea ean heehee eae 6
Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918

(D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1584

ka bed ewes be PER Ue ak Re ge es 8
STATUTES:
Oe Sen BED oak er eset ue bbnees 6
ie Shs EE Sa bo ee eRe RR eee 8
Oe Sa SO. 6 8 oe he Sais Ce eee ee 5
Ce Ain OEOEE b 0 8 vos KK SO ee ORAM 2, 8
Ce oe ll Ere Terr ee ee Pr 6
Ce Sc EE Oi ee ON ee owes os he ee 8
ADMINISTRATIVE MATERIAL:
37 Fed. Reg. 16,344 (April 29, 1992)... 0. ese 4
LEGISLATIVE MATERIAL:
126 Cong. Rec. 30,932 (1980) ... : a's Wek ae ees 7

H.R. Rep. 253(1), 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985) ..... 7

ili
Page
MISCELLANEOUS:

1 Davis & Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise
chapter 3 (3d ed. 1994) ........-..2---. 4,7,9

Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation,
99 Hlarv.L.Rev. 1456 (1I9GG) ww eet ce cece 7

Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, The D.C. Circuit,
and the Supreme Court, 1978 Supreme Court
EP re Se ar ren hare ee a 8

R. Stern, et al., Supreme Court Practice (7th ed.
Sa ne ae r er ear a eka tr ar ewe a a 2

Superfund Reform Unlikely Until 1998, EPA Official
Says, BNA Daily Tax Report (November 21, 1994) . 3

Supreme Court Rule 10.1(c) .... 2... eee eee eee 2

The Use of Legislative History: A Debate Between
Justice Scalia and Judge Breyer, 16 Admin.L.News
FE: Seen rae er ee ar et 8

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1994

No. 94-752

AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION,
AAMERICAN COLLEGE OF REAL ESTATE LAWYERS,
AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE,
COMMERCIAL FINANCE ASSOCIATION,
EQUIPMENT LEASING ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA,

Petitioners,
Vv.

FRANK J. KELLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, ET AL.,

Respondents.

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER

The oppositions to certiorari by the Chemical
Manufacturers Association (CMA) and the State of Michigan
(Michigan) warrant a brief response. We note that the
Solicitor General vigorously supports the EPA Rule and does
not oppose certiorari.

1. The validity of EPA’s “Lender Liability Rule” is
a matter of national public importance that should be
reviewed by this Court. There will never be a “square”
conflict in the circuits, since only the D.C. Circuit can

2

review EPA’s CERCLA rules. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(a).
Yet settled principles support this Court’s review of the
decision below, because of the vital importance of the EPA
Rule for commercial lending and borrowing. See, e.g., R.
Stern, et al., Supreme Court Practice § 4.13, pp.187-188
(7th ed. 1993) (importance of federal statutory and
regulatory issues, with or without conflict among lower
courts, frequently warrants review by this Court); Supreme
Court Rule 10.1(c).

The court of appeals’ decision, if left standing, will
cripple commercial lending for years. As both the court of
appeals and the Solicitor General recognized, this makes the
EPA Rule a matter of national public importance. What
matters is not the number of CERCLA suits brought against
lenders (see CMA Opp. 1, 7 & nn.10,11; Mich Opp. 15),
but the chilling effect on lending throughout the country that
results from unclear CERCLA liability rules threatening to
impose catastrophic liability on ordinary commercial lending
practices.' The impact of the decision below extends far
beyond commercial lenders and their "pecuniary interest"
(Mich Opp. 14). Without the EPA Rule, many borrowers
(including small businesses, inner city development projects,
and businesses needing funds for hazardous waste clean-up)
will suffer by being denied access to needed loans. The
slow case-by-case rulings of the lower courts on the status of

' Moreover, the court of appeals recognized that the
EPA Rule would be robbed of effect if it were viewed
simply as "policy guidance" for EPA enforcement proceed-
ings: “[L]enders would still face potentially staggering
liability because of the generality of the statutory language
and the prospect of private suits. That potential liability
would force lenders to behave cautiously even if EPA were
to adhere to the regulation as its policy." App. 15a.

3

secured lenders under CERCLA may never provide the
clear, uniform “safe harbor" rules that make the EPA Rule
effective. This is why EPA issued the Rule in the first
place.

Though both the Federal! Government and CMA
mention the possibility of Congressional relief (Gov’t Br.9;
CMA Opp. 5-6), such relief may be years away, if it ever
materializes. See Superfund Reform Unlikely Until 1998,
EPA Official Says, BNA Daily Tax Report at G6 (November
21, 1994) ("While not everyone is predicting that reform will
stall in the 104th Congress, nearly all sources involved in the
reform effort during the 103rd Congress predicted that the
chances are slimmer than before.") The issue of lender
liability under CERCLA has bounced through the Judicial,
Executive and Legislative branches for a decade, consuming
vast amounts of intellectual and financial resources. The
EPA Rule is a much-needed clarification of the law. It was
wrongly struck down by the court of appeals. This Court
should grant review.

2. Over-reading Adams Fruit v. Barrett, 494 U.S.
638 (1990), the court of appeals struck down the EPA Rule
on its face, finding that the availability of private suits under
CERCLA strips EPA of statutory rulemaking power on
"liability" issues and deprives the EPA Rule of the deference
on judicial review to which it is entitled under Chevron v.
NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).2 App.12a-13a. = This

? CMA’s complaints about the merits of particular parts
of the EPA Rule are not at issue before this Court.
Moreover, CMA misdescribes the EPA Rule. (1) Limited
post-foreclosure protection. Overlooked by CMA (CMA
Opp.4, 5 n.6) is the fact that the EPA Rule only protects
lenders when they act "consistent with accepted commercial

4

misreading of Adams Fruit converts it into an engine of
destruction of agency rulemaking powers.

One of the provisions that the court below nullified
is EPA’s statutory authority

to promulgate any regulations necessary to
carry out the provisions of this subchapter

42 U.S.C. § 9615. If this is not a statutory delegation of
agency rulemaking authority, supporting Chevron deference
to the EPA Rule, nothing is. See 1 Davis & Pierce,
Administrative Law Treatise § 6.3 p. 236 (3d ed. 1994)
(statutory delegation of agency rulemaking power is
"implicit" and triggers Chevron deference "if, for instance,
Congress used ambiguous language in the statute and
conferred upon the agency a general grant of power to
promulgate legislative rules to implement the statute.")

The statutory delegation of rulemaking authority in 42
U.S.C. section 9615 gives EPA wide authority to "fill in the
gaps" and to clarify CERCLA’s statutory terms defining

lending practices in the post-foreclosure context." 57 Fed.
Reg. at 18,367 (April 29, 1992). Under the EPA Rule,
lenders can be held liable if they cause post-foreclosure
spills. See 57 Fed. Reg. at 18,357 (April 29, 1992); United
States v. Fleet Factors, 821 F. Supp. 707 (S.D.Ga. 1993).
(2) No "windfall." Contrary to CMA’s assertions (CMA
Opp.8), the EPA Rule states that "the United States will seek
to recover any windfall or excess amount by which a person
is unjustly enriched by means of a taxpayer-funded cleanup."
57 Fed. Reg. at 18,365. See 57 Fed. Reg. at 18,368
(Equitable Reimbursement of the Agency for Taxpayer-
Financed Cleanups).

5

liability. See, e.g., Mourning v. Family Publications
Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369-370 (1973) (Truth in
Lending Act disclosure requirements); Touche Ross & Co v.
SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 577-582 (2d Cir. 1979) (SEC liability
rules). As Chief Judge Mikva noted, in administering the
CERCLA sstatute EPA routinely interprets CERCLA’s
liability provisions including CERCLA’s “secured creditor
exception,” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A). See App.25a and
contrast Mich Opp. 19, 22-23.

There is nothing in the CERCLA statute that purports
to deprive EPA of rulemaking authority on "liability"
issues. Furthermore, CMA’s and Michigan’s claim that

> The cases cited by CMA and Michigan are inapposite.
See Citizens to Save Spenser County v. EPA, 600 F.2d 844
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (CMA Opp. 10) (court upholds the validity
of EPA Rules issued under the Clean Air Act’s general grant
of rulemaking authority); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S.
281, 301-308 (1979) (Mich Opp. 24) (statute authorizing
collection of information does not authorize public
disclosure); Linemaster Switch Corp. v. EPA, 938 F.2d
1299, 1303-1305 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Mich Opp.24) (court
upholds EPA’s authority to add waste sites to CERCLA’s
"National Priorities List" even after statutory deadline,
though court denies Chevron deference to EPA’s view as to
the consequences of its delay, finding no congressional intent
to delegate to EPA "the authority to devise a remedy for its
own untimeliness.")

* Nothing in CERCLA’s general civil liability provis-
ions, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), cited by CMA (CMA Opp. 9),
cuts back EPA’s rulemaking authority on CERCLA "“liabil-
ity” issues. Similarly, the obscure "structural" argument
made by CMA (CMA Opp.9 n.12) falls far short of limiting

6

EPA is powerless to issue a Rule clarifying CERCLA’s
"secured creditor exemption” (42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)) is
refuted by well-settled principles of administrative law’ and
"good sense” Citizens to Save Spenser County v. EPA, 600
F.2d 844, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Leventhal, J., concurring):
Though courts have jurisdiction to decide the final outcome
of CERCLA suits (see 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b), cited in Mich
Opp. 22,26), they should welcome the expert policy
guidance of the EPA Rule on the meaning of CERCLA’s
"secured creditor exemption" (42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)).

The sweeping oppositions of CMA and Michigan
underline the need for this Court to grant review to clarify
the relationship between Adams Fruit and Chevron.
Essentially, CMA and Michigan claim that the EPA Rule is
invalid because courts have jurisdiction to make the final

or "overruling" EPA's explicit statutory rulemaking authori-
ty.

* The court of appeals ruling bars EPA from utilizing
rulemaking (as opposed to case-by-case adjudication) to
establish the metes and bounds of CERCLA "liability." This
conflicts with well-settled principles of administrative law
recognizing wide agency discretion to choose between
rulemaking and adjudication. See, e.g., American Hospital
Association v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 611-614 (1991) ("even
if a statutory scheme requires individualized determinations,
the [agency] decisionmaker has the authority to rely on
rulemaking to resolve certain issues of general applicability
unless Congress clearly expresses an intent to withhold that
authority"); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power v. NRDC, 435
U.S. 519, 543-545 (1978); United States v. Storer
Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 201-205 (1956).

7

decision about CERCLA liability issues.° But the courts’
final authority to determine "the law" is in no way
inconsistent with Chevron deference to agency rules. See |
Davis & Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise Chapter 3,
especially § 3.3 (reconciling Marbury and Chevron).

Nor is there anything in the legislative history of
CERCLA that trumps Chevron deference to the EPA Rule.
The legislative history cited by CMA and Michigan (CMA
Opp. 9 & n.13; Mich Opp. 27-30) indicates only that courts
should look to common law principles to decide how to
apportion, or divide, the total amount of CERCLA clean-up
costs among liable defendants.’ See Developments in the
Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 Harv.L.Rev. 1458, 1524-
1539 (1986). The same point--that courts should determine
how joint-and-several CERCLA liability is to be allocated--is
reflected in 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f), cited by CMA (CMA Opp.
9).

This is a far cry from the court of appeals’ ruling that

* The opposition submitted by Michigan--which consis-
tently overreads Adams Fruit (Mich Opp. 19-22)--at one
point challenges the validity of all agency rules on "liability"
by claiming that “civil and criminal statutes are not
‘administered by any agency but by the courts’" (Mich Opp.
30-31).

? See H.R. Rep. 253(1), 99th Cong., ist Sess. at 74
(1985) ("Explicit mention of joint and several liability was
deleted from CERCLA in 1980 to allow courts to establish
the scope of liability through a case-by-case application of
‘traditional and evolving principles of common law’ and pre-
existing statutory law."); 126 Cong. Rec. 30,932 (1980)
(statement of Senator Rardolph).

8

Congress intended that only the courts (not EPA) would
determine all CERCLA “liability” issues de novo. Whatever
one thinks of “textualism" (see The Use of Legislative
History: A Debate Between Justice Scalia and Judge Breyer,
16 Admin.L.News No. 4 (Summer 1991)), these snippets
from CERCLA’s legislative history provide no basis for
nullifying the plain statutory text of CERCLA giving EPA
wide rulemaking authority that is binding on private parties.
42 U.S.C. §§ 9615, 9605, 9613(a).

3. This case presents important and recurring
questions about administrative law, and the EPA’s powers
under CERCLA, that warrant this Court’s review.
Understandably, the Federal Government hopes that the
lower courts will ignore (or sharply limit) the court of
appeals’ decision misinterpreting Adams Fruit to undercut
EPA’s administrative powers. See Gov’t Br.9-11 & nn.
6,7,8. But the rulings of the D.C.Circuit carry special
weight on administrative law issues. See Scalia, Vermont
Yankee: The APA, The D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court,
1978 Supreme Court Review 345, 371-375. And the lower
courts are in fact in conflict on the meaning of Adams Fruit
and the scope of EPA’s administrative powers under
CERCLA. See Dico v. Diamond, 35 F.3d 348 (8th Cir.
1994) (relying on court of appeals’ decision in Kelley to cut
back EPA authority under CERCLA section 106(b), creating
an explicit conflict in the circuits between Dico and Wagner
Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1584 (1992)).

The court of appeals’ reliance on Adams Fruit to
“overrule” the plain text of several CERCLA. statutory
provisions (42 U.S.C. § 9615, § 9605, § 9613(a), all relied
upon by EPA in issuing the Rule, 57 Fed. Reg. at 18,368-
18,369) makes it clear that this Court “should restate step

9

one of Chevron in simple, common sense terms” that explain
the scope of Adams Fruit and clarify what does (and does
not) trump Chevron deference to an agency’s views. 1
Davis & Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise § 3.6 at p.130
(3d ed. 1994).

The validity of EPA’s "Lender Liability Rule” is an
issue of vital national importance that should be reviewed by
this Court. This case also vividly illustrates the recurring
confusion and conflict in the lower courts on Chevron "step
one" and the proper interrelationship between Adams Fruit
and Chevron. Review by this Court is imperative.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and the reasons stated in
our petition, certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

EDWIN E. HUDDLESON, III *
VOLPE, BOSKEY AND LYONS
918 16th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 737-6580

Counsel for Petitioner
Equipment Leasing Association

* Counsel of Record

10

JOHN J. GILL III ROGER D. SCHWENKE
THOMAS J. GRECO CARLTON, FIELDS, WARD,
MICHAEL F. CROTTY EMMANUEL, SMITH &
AMERICAN BANKERS Cutler

ASSOCIATION One Harbour Place

1120 Connecticut Ave., N.W. P.O. Box 3239
Washington, D.C. 20036 Tampa, Florida 33601

(202) 663-5026 (813) 223-7000

Counsel for Petitioner Counsel for Petitioner

American Bankers American College of Real
Association Estate Lawyers

MARGARET V. HATHAWAY DAVID T. BUENTE, JR.

LAW OFFICES OF CARTER G. PHILLIPS
MARGARET V. HATHAWAY SIDLEY & AUSTIN

5322 Forty-first Street, N.W. 1722 Eye Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20015 Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 244-8160 (202) 736-8111

Counsel for Petitioner Counsel for Petitioner

American Council Commercial Finance
of Life Insurance Association

PHILLIP E. STANO
ROBERT S. MCCONNAUGHEY
DAVID LEIFER
AMERICAN COUNCIL OF
LIFE INSURANCE
1001 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004
(202) 624-2183
Counsel for Petitioner
American Council
of Life Insurance

December 1994.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386012_0704%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
