# Opposition Brief — Knight v. Mingledorff

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386012_0509%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1994
- **Citation:** 513 U.S. 1001

## Text

(7) | E1LED
No. 94-548 ™ OCT 23 1994

BE CORE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1994

PHILLIP W. KNIGHT,
Petitioner, Q
vs.
GEORGE MINGLEDOREFF,
COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE FOR
THE STATE OF ALABAMA,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI |
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OF ALABAMA |

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT IN OPPO

SITION
TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIO

RAR]

JAMES H. EVANS
Attorney General, State of Alabama
RON BOWDEN, Chief Counsel
Department of Revenue and Assistant
Attorney General, State of Alabama
* J. WADE HOPE, Assistant Counsel
Department of Revenue and Assistant
Attorney General, State of Alabama
P. O. Box 320001
Montgomery, AL 36132-0001
Telephone: 242-9690

*Counsel of Record for Respondent

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QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether 16 U.S.C. §8311 pro-
hibits the imposition of the Alabama
Utility Gross Receipts Tax, §40-21-80,
et seq., ALA. CODE 1975, on the
Plaintiff's retail purchase of
electricity from the City of Decatur
when the electricity is purchased by the
city from the Tennessee Valley Authority.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ...++e+-ee-e-« i
Smee OR CONZENSS - «+ © «© we «wo ow se GS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........ iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....... . 1
pr ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee oe ee ee 3
Pee oe fy yn a a a a a a 3

II. THE DECISION OF THE ALABAMA
COURTS DOES NOT DECIDE A
FEDERAL QUESTION IN A WAY
THAT CONFLICTS WITH THE
DECISION OF ANOTHER STATE
COURT OF LAST RESORT NOR A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS. 5

III. THE DECISION OF THE ALABAMA
COURTS DOES NOT PRESENT A
FEDERAL QUESTION THAT WAS
INCORRECTLY DECIDED oe # @ « 7

eee ek ne ee ee a ee ee ee ee ee >

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES PAGE

Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,
468 U.S. 263, 104 $.Ct. 3049,
Sa &.8a.420 200 (1964) ..... 10, li

City of Birmingham v. Alabama Gas
Corp.,
564 So.2d 416, (Ala. 1990)... 8

Ex parte White,
477 So.2d 422, (Ala. 1985) » 4 8, 9

M'Culloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 4 L.Ed.
579 (1819) ee ae 9

Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA,
21 F.Supp. 947 (D.C.Tenn. 1938),
affirmed, 306 U.S. 118, 83 L.Ed.

pan, oe Boe. SOO £39a0n) -« - « - LI, 12
Town of North Courtland v. Town of
Courtland,

597 So.2d 1336 (Ala. 1992) . . . passim

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES:

a0 Gimet. Seek . . «' s - « Peesin
§40-21-80, Ala. Code 1975 .. . . passim
§40-21-83(1), Ala. Code 1975... a, 9
§40-21-85, Ala. Code 1975 .... 11
§40-21-86, Ala. Code 1975 .... ? s
§40-23-8, Ala. Code 1975 is Mes 11

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The City of Decatur, Alabama,
through its Utilities Board, distributes
electricity to retail consumers in its
geographic areas (North-Central Alabama)
pursuant to a contract with the
Tennessee Valley Authority, (TVA) which
is a federally chartered corporation
under 16 U.S.C. §831, et seq.

The Plaintiff, Phillip Knight, is a
retail purchaser of electric utility
services from the City of Decatur. Each
billing period there has been added to
the Plaintiff's bill for electric
services a charge of four percent (4%)
of the amount of the bill. This
additional charge represents the amount
of the Alabama Utility Gross Receipts
Tax, §40-21-80, et seq., Ala. Code
1975, which is passed on by the City of

Decatur to its customers as required by

§40-21-86.

The Plaintiff brought this action,
as a purported class action on behalf of
himself . and all others similarly
situated (i.e. retail consumers of TVA
supplied electricity) alleging that the
taxation of the activity of he City of
Decatur, in furnishing electricity under
contract with TVA violates the tax
exemption established in 16 U.S.C.
§831l. The Plaintiff contended
that 16 U.S.C. §8311 preempts
the State from imposing any kind of tax
on electricity generated. The Plaintiff
argued in the trial court that his
purchase of electricity from the City of
Decatur is excluded from the "gross
receipts" of the City of Decatur
pursuant to §40-18-83(1) and excluded

from the levy of tax. [This should be

§40-21-83(1)].

The Plaintiff repeated his argument
and contentions on appeal to the Alabama
Court of Civil Appeals.

ARGUMENT
I. INTRODUCTION

The Petitioner, Phillip Knight,
alleges two separate grounds for review
of the decision rendered by the Alabama
courts. The Petitioner alleges first
that the decision in this case directly
conflicts with a prior decision of the
Alabama Supreme Court in construing 16
U.S.C. §8311 in Town of North
Courtland v. Town of Courtland, 597
So.2d 1336 (Ala. 1992). Second, the
Petitioner alleges that the question
raised involves an important federal
question, wrongly decided by the Alabama
court, which has not been, but should be
decided by this Court. An examination
of the alleged grounds for review

reveals that neither of the alleged

3

grounds warrant granting the Petition
for Writ of Certiorari.

The Town of North Courtland case,
surpra, does not address the question
raised by Plaintiff in the present
case. Although unreported federal
district court cases were cited in Town
of North Courtland as authority for not
allowing one municipality to impose a
tax. on another municipality operator, an
electric utility on a non-profit basis
pursuant to the TVA Act, there was no
discussion concerning whether the
utilities operated by the municipalities
were a "franchise" of TVA and thereby
exempt from all taxation pursuant to the
last sentence of the first paragraph in
16 U.S.C., §8311.

In addition, the Alabama Utility
Gross Receipts Tax does not impact the
revenues of the utilities, nor TVA,
because the tax is, like a sales tax,

4

required to be added to ae retail
purchaser's utility bill pursuant to
§40-21-86, Ala. Code 1975. The law in
Alabama is well established that the
utility gross receipts tax is a direct
tax levied on the consumer and not the
utility. Therefore, the present case
does not present a federal question
sufficiently important to invoke the
jurisdiction of this Court.

II. THE DECISION OF THE ALABAMA COURTS
DOES NOT DECIDE A FEDERAL QUESTION IN A
WAY THAT CONFLICTS WITH THE DECISION OF
ANOTHER STATE COURT OF LAST RESORT NOR A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS.

The Petitioner relies heavily upon
the Alabama Supreme Court's decision in
Town of North Courtland v. Town of
Courtland, supra, for the proposition
that the utility gross receipts tax
found at §40-21-80, et seq. can not be.
levied upon the Petitioner. The North

Courtland case and the decision of the

trial court in the present case do ane
conflict with each other. The North
Courtland case is distinguishable
because it involved the imposition of a
municipal privilege license tax upon the
gross receipts of a utility owned by the
town of Courtland. The tax was imposed
upon the furnishing of utility services
in the town of North Courtland. The
Alabama Supreme Court held that in
ruling on a Motion For Summary Judgment,
the trial court was justified in relying
upon a federal district court's
recognition that 16 U.S.C. §8311

prohibits a municipality from levying "

a
tax against another municipal
corporation which operates an electric
operation on a non-profit basis pursuant
to the TVA Act." 597 So.2d 1336, 1338.
However, the North Courtland case |
was remanded back to the trial court

because of the possible requirement that

6

the Town of Courtland may be required to
pay North Courtland a portion of
revenues retained from its’ electric
operations as being in lieu of taxes.
597 So.2d 1336, 1339-1340.

The present case does not involve
the imposition of a tax upon the
revenues of the utility. Therefore, the
issues raised in the North Courtland
case are not applicable to the facts of
the present case. Accordingly, the
Petition for Writ of Certiorari should
be denied.

III. THE DECISION OF THE ALABAMA
COURTS DOES NOT PRESENT A_ FEDERAL
QUESTION THAT WAS INCORRECTLY DECIDED.

The Petitioner alleges that the
question presented to the Alabama courts
involves an important federal question
which was incorrectly decided. The
Petitioner argues that the decision in
this case incorrectly determined that
the retail purchase of electricity by

7

the Petitioner was subject to the
utility gross receipts tax found at
§40-21-80, et. seq., Code of Alabama
1975.

With all due respect, the Order of
the Montgomery County Circuit Court
which was affirmed without opinion by
the Alabese Court of Civil Appeals took
into account prior decisions of the
Alabama Supreme Court Court when it
wrote at page 3 that:

The Alabama Supreme Court has
reaffirmed this principle
several times, stating that
aAhe—utitity gross receipts tax
is a direct tax levied on the
consumer and not the
utility. See City of
Birmingham Vv. Alabama Gas
Corp., 564 So.2d 416, 417
(Ala. 1990); Ex parte White,
477 So.2d 422, 423-24 fn.2
(Ala. 1985).

(Emphasis original) a

The decision of the Circuit Court
cited City of Birmingham v. Alabama Gas |
Corp., supra, for support in holding

that the clear intent of the Alabama

Legislature was to impose the tax on the
customers of all utilities in Alabama.

The Circuit Court decision also
cited Ex parte White, supra, in
holding that §40-21-83(1) provides an
"exclusion" from tax which has been
characterized as exempting sortnin uses
of electricity from tax. The Court
concluded that the exclusion in
§40-21-83(1) excludes utility services
that are provided to the federal
government.

The Petitioner argues that the
decision of the Alabama Courts conflicts
with M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat) 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819) because
the utility gross receipts tax
unlawfully taxes the income of the
Tennessee Valley Authority, an agency of
the United States. (See Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, pages 4-5). As
previously stated herein, the trial

9

court held that the tax under
§40-21-80, et seq., is imposed on
customers of the utilities in Alabama,
and not the utility nor TVA. In fact,

the Court held that the furnishing of

utility services to the federal
government is excluded from tax.
Therefore, the income of TVA is not

subject to the tax as argued by the
Petitioner.

Although Plaintiff cites Bacchus
Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 104
S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200 (1984) as
support for his argument that’ the
Alabama Utility Gross Receipts Tax is
actually levied upon the utility, this
Court held that wholesalers had standing
to challenge the discriminatory tax
because it had an adverse competitive
impact on their business. The tax
discriminated on its face against

interstate commerce and clearly the

10

wholesalers had standing to challenge
the tax in this Court.

However, in the present case, the
utilities are not in the same position
as the wholesalers in Bacchus. The
utilities are not required to pay the
gross receipts tax if their retail
customer fails to pay the bill. Section
40-21-85 incorporates §40-23-8 into
the provisions of the Utility Gross
Receipts Tax which only requires the tax
to be paid on cash sales and credit
collections made during the month. The
utility is only liable if it fails to
add the tax to the sale price of the
utility services.

In Tennessee Electric Power
Company v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
306 U.S. 118, 59 S.Ct. 366 (1979) this
Court characterized the purchasers of
electricity from TVA as vendees of TVA
and not as franchisers or franchisees.

ll

nhl

This Court described the right conferred
upon TVA as a right to exist as a
corporation and to improve navigation
and control flood waters along the
Tennessee River by developing a series
of dams for flood control and to sell
the electrical power created from the
erection of the dams. It is submitted
that the right to do these things is the
"franchise" that was conferred upon TVA
by Congress and which is exempted from
tax in 16 U.S.C., §8311. |
Likewise, the State also has
authorized the incorporation of
nonprofit entities to exist as public
utilities and to contract with TVA to
purchase and resell electrical energy.
This is the type of franchise that has
been granted by the State to entities
such as the Defendants in the present
case. See Tennessee Electric Power

Company v. Tennessee Valley Authority,

12

306 U.S. at p. 139-141, 59 S‘Ct. at p.
370-371, discussing the term franchise
and certain Alabama Acts.

It is submitted that the trial
court and the Court of Civil Appeals
decision properly refused to
characterize the Decatur Utilities Board

as a franchise or franchisee of TVA.

CONCLUS ION

Phillip Knight has petitioned this
Court for Writ of Certiorari asserting
two grounds for review, neither of which
warrant the issuance of a Writ of
Certiorari. This case (and the statutes
involved) was correctly decided by the
Montgomery County Circuit Court and the
Court of Civil Appeals. In addition,
the prior decision cited by Petitioner,
as being in conflict with this case,
does not involve the same issues as are

present in this case. The Alabama gross

13

receipts tax is imposed upon the retail
customers (ultimate consumer ) of
utilities. It is not imposed upon the
utility that purchases electricity from
TVA nor TVA. Accordingly, the Petition
for Writ of Certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Udede_ . hae.

J. WADE HOPE, AssiStant Counsel
Department of Revenue and Assistant
Attorney Generali, State of Alabama
P.O. Box 320001

Montgomery, AL 36132-0001
Telephone: (205) 242-9690

COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR RESPONDENT

JWH:eb158

14

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386012_0509%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
