# Reply Brief — Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995) (No. 94-511)

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386012_0472%3A4

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Reply Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1995

## Text

Bape Court, U.S
FILED
(4) JAN 6 1995
No. 94-511 Fide us (HE CLERK
4 .
In The

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1994

°
FLORIDA ROCK INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Petitioner,
v.
THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent.

+

Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Federal Circuit

+

PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF
+

Joun A. DeVautrt, III
Counsel of Record

C. WARREN TRIPP, JR.
Counsel

Jane A. LESTER
Counsel

Bepvett, Ditrmar, DeVautt &
Pirttans P.A.

The Bedell Building

101 East Adams Street

Jacksonville, Florida 32202

(904) 353-0211

For Petitioner

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

ARGUMENT

The government’s response fails to distinguish the
Court’s holding in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992), from that of the Federal Circuit
herein; and misconstrues the Federal Circuit’s new partial
taking doctrine, underscoring the need for immediate
review.

1. Contrary to Respondent’s assertion that the Fed-
eral Circuit “did not decide whether the facts of this case
constitute a taking,” (Resp. Br. 8), the Federal Circuit
indeed held that Petitioner Florida Rock did not suffer a
compensable “categorical taking” (App. 11, 32), because
of the possibility of sales to persons without knowledge
of the restrictions (App. 14 n.12), despite the fact that the
Army Corps of Engineers’ denial of a Clean Water Act
permit left Florida Rock with no “allowable and practica-
ble immediate use” of its property (App. 111).

The possibility of resale of oceanfront property in
Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2895 n. 8, did not defeat the categorical
taking determination where the court found the govern-
ment had deprived the owner of all economically benefi-
cial use by requiring the land to be left substantially in its
natural state. Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2824-95. Nor should the
possibility of the resale of Florida Rock’s wetlands, bur-
dened by federal regulations which require it be left in its
natural state, enable the government to avoid the pay-
ment of just compensation in the instant case.

2. The government suggests that “the court's refer-
ences to ‘partial takings’ are unfortunate,” and acknowl-
edges that the opinion “could create confusion.” (Resp.
Br. 10-11). Nevertheless, rather than cross-petitioning, the

government urges that because the Federal Circuit's
holding that partial compensation is required “whether
the taking is by physical occupation . . . or by regulatory
imposition to preserve the property as a wetland” (App.
22-23) is “wrong,” (Resp. Br. at 11), review by this court is
not required.

The government insists that any “misunderstanding
that might be generated by the [Federal Circuit’s] opin-
ion”! may likely later be resolved by lower court deci-
sions. (Resp. Br. at 11.) Clearly such a resolution has not
emerged during the period since publication of the opin-
ion. Thus far, contrary to the government’s view, the
courts and commentators discussing the Federal Circuit's
Florida Rock opinion, have consistently interpreted it as
permitting compensation under the Fifth Amendment for
a regulatory deprivation of less than all economic use.?

1 Pursuant to the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 149, the Federal
Circuit is, of course, the appellate court to hear all appeals
involving claims seeking “compensation for any taking that
may occur through the operation of a federal statute.” United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,128 (1985).

2 See Creppel v. United States, No. 94-5070, 1994 WL 647932,
at *3 (Fed.Cir. 1994); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28
F.3d 1171, 1180-82 (Fed.Cir. 1994); Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v.
United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1573-79 (Fed.Cir. 1994) (Nies, C.J.,
dissenting) (App. 32-50); Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed.Cl. 37, 45
(1994); John J. Delaney and Emily J. Vaias, American Law Insti-
tute, ALI-ABA Course of Study, “Land Use Institute: Planning,
Regulation, Litigation, Eminent Domain, and Compensation; A
Survey of Selected Recent Cases” (Aug. 17, 1994), available in
Westlaw, C930 ALI-ABA 23, 38-40; Michael M. Berger, American
Law Institute, ALI-ABA Course of Study, “Land Use Institute:
Planning, Regulation, Litigation, Eminent Domain, and Com-
pensation; Recent Takings and Eminent Domain Cases” (Aug.

¥

Such acknowledged confusion on a constitutional issue of
first impression demonstrates the necessity for this

court’s review.

Respectfully submitted,

JouHn A. DeVautt, III

Counsel of Record

C. WarrEN Tripp, JR.

JANE A. LESTER

Bepett, Dirrmar, DeVautt &
Pittans P.A.

The Bedell Building

101 East Adams Street

Jacksonville, Florida 32202

(904) 353-0211

17, 1994), available in, Westlaw, C930 ALI-ABA 221, 233-38; John
L. Horwich and Hertha L. Lund, Montana Supreme Court Unnec-
essarily Misconstrues Takings Law, 55 Mont.L.Rev. 455 (Summer,
1994); Ronald L. Weaver and Mark D. Solov, Emerging Property
Rights Protection, Fla.Bar J. (June, 1994), available in Westlaw, 68
Jun FLBJ 103.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386012_0472%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.
