# Opposition Brief — Enterprise Consolidated School District v. Lauderdale County

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386012_0444%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1994
- **Citation:** 513 U.S. 988

## Text

No. 94-482 a

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1994

ENTERPRISE CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT
by and through Its Board of Trustees,
Petitioner,
V.

THE LAUDERDALE COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI SCHOOL DISTRICT,
by and through Its Board of Trustees, et al.,
and the
QUITMAN, MISSISSIPPI SCHOOL DISTRICT,

by and through Its Board of Trustees, et al.,
Respondent

Consolidated With
ENTERPRISE CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Petitioner,

¥.
QUITMAN CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Respondent.

On Petition For A Writ of Certiorari to the
Uni‘ ed States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

TALLY D. RIDDELL PERRY SANSING
P.O. Box 199 (Counsel of Record)
Quitman, MS 39355-0199 JAMES A. KEITH
BRUNINI, GRANTHAM, GROWER &
HEWES

Post Office Drawer 199
Jackson, Mississippi 39205

Counsel for Respondent
October 13, 1994

PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. 1-800-347-8208

PTOrcT AVAIL ARIE COPY Ee

ee ae se
a .

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether the Court of Appeals properly applied
Milliken vs. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), in reversing the
District Court’s decision to order interdistrict relief in the
absence of a finding by the District Court of an interdistrict
constitutional violation?

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding under
the clearly erroneous standard the District Court’s factual
finding that equitable estoppel barred a party from asserting a
position inconsisent with that party’s conduct and
representations over a 26-year period?

——

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........----++++-- i
STATEMENT OF PACTS «sc cccccsssecvsuss 2

REASONS WHY THE PETITION SHOULD BE
CONG ak 0 6 bk CERES ae eee 4
A. The Fifth Circuit’s decision regarding

estoppel is fact-sensitive and creates no

conflict with the decisions of this Court

or any court of appeals. In addition,

the Fifth Circuit relied on an alternative

holding to support its decision. ...... 4
B. The Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of

Milliken vs. Bradley does not create a

conflict with the decisions of any court

ff Serre rer ree eee 8

COMNCTAMIIGN 2c cin b curse ee enna 10

il

ee ee Me eee Me Les EE RE oe ea a Pe rt

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Anderson vs. City of Bessemer City,

Og ee ee ee ee

City of Richmond vs. United States,

ER)

Goldsboro City Bd. of Educ. vs.
Wayne County Bd. of Educ.,

745 F.2d 324 (4th Cir. 1984) .......

Goodman vs. Lukens Steel Co.,

482 U.S. 656 (1987) .............

Graver Mfg. vs. Linde Co,

re

Hoots vs. Pennsylvania,

672 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1982) .......

Jenkins vs. Missouri,

807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1987) .......

Lee vs. Lee County Bd. of Educ.,

639 F.2d 1243 (Sth Cir. 1981) .......

Lopez vs. Hale County,
797 F. Supp. 547 (N.D. Tex. 1992),

aff’d mem., it

ee

iil

f
2
oO

Milliken vs. Bradley,
418 U.S. 717 (1974) . 0. ee ee ees i, 8,9

NCAA vs. Board of Regents,
a eok | re ere ee ee 5

Shelley vs. Kraemer,
TEI es) | Bee ere eae 7

United States vs. Dallas County Comm’n,
548 F. Supp. 794 (S.D. Ala. 1982),

aff’d in part and rev’d in part on
other grounds, 739 F.2d 1529

4) 4° Ge ae ee 7
Williams vs. City of Dothan,
745 F.2d 1406 (1ith Cir. 1984) ........... 7
OTHER
Rat OO BF Oe oi ee Ce ee 8 8 y

Robert L. Stern, et al.,
Supreme Court Practice
§ 4.4 (Tth ed. 1993) .... 22 eee cere cece 6

iV

No. 94-482

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1994

ENTERPRISE CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT,
by and through It Board of Trustees,
Petitioner,
Vv.

THE LAUDERDALE COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI SCHOOL
DISTRICT, by and through Its Board of Trustees, et al.,
and the
QUITMAN, MISSISSIPPI SCHOOL DISTRICT,
by and through Its Board of Trustees, et ai.,

Respondents,

Consolidated with
ENTERPRISE CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Petitioner,
v.

QUITMAN CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Respondent Quitman School District respectfully
requests that this Court deny the petition for writ of certiorari,
which seeks review of the Fifth Circuit’s opinion reported at
24 F.3d 671.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Enterprise mischaracterizes the Fifth Circuit’s holding
and misstates the record in several instances.

1. Enterprise states that "in 1962, Enterprise and
Quitman entered into a twenty-five (25) year contract ceding
[the Stonewall area] from Enterprise to Quitman in return for
Enterprise’s agreeing to educate all black school age children
continuing to reside in Stonewall." Pet. at 3. Throughout this
litigation, Enterprise has attempted to link the validity of the
annexation to the student-transfer contract, which all agree is
unconstitutional. Both the District Court and the Court of
Appeals rejected Enterprise's position. As the District Court
found, the annexation, which was not limited in duration, and
the 25-year student-transfer contract were separate parts of a
larger compromise that settled the dispute over ownership of
Stonewall. App. 6-7, 55. The Fifth Circuit affirmed this
factual finding under the clearly erroneous standard of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 52(a). "The annexation should be viewed separately
from the rest of the agreement. By itself, the annexation is
constitutional." App. 50. The Fifth Circuit also held that
"even assuming that the Stonewall annexation and [the 1962]
transfer agreement are linked, the annexation is not void."
App. 55. The annexation, which was accomplished by a
statutory procedure separate and distinct from the 25-year
student-transfer contract, did not promote segregation. App.
55-57.

2. Enterprise states that it was estopped from "raising
the constitutionality of the contract" and that the Fifth Circuit
“affirmed the District Court by upholding the contract between
Enterprise and [Quitman]." Pet. at 6; see also id. at 10. The
Fifth Circuit upheld the validity of the annexation and
affirmed the District Court’s holding that equitable estoppel
prevented Enterprise from challenging the annexation. The
validity of the student-transfer contract was not in issue. All
parties, including Enterprise, acknowledged the
unconstitutionality of that contract. App. 62. In fact,
Quitman stopped performing under the student-transfer
contract in 1969, and repudiated it in 1977 because it
discriminated against blacks. App. 12. — Enterprise’s
suggestion that the District Court or Fifth Circuit upheld the
student-transfer contract is simply wrong.

3. Enterprise’s reference to "(t]he insulation of the
town of Stonewall in its whiteness" suggests that Quitman’s
annexation was racially motivated. Pet. at 11. The impetus
for the annexation, however, was not race but Enterprise’s
decision to close the Stonewall High School. Parents of the
high school students actually initiated the process resulting in
the annexation. App. 42-43. Moreover, the territory annexed
was clearly defined, and not a "white only" area. Prior to
1962, the area annexed was the "Stonewall Attendance Area"
of the Enterprise district and, before then, had comprised the
boundaries of a separate school district. Neither the District
Court nor the Court of Appeals held that a racial animus
motivated the annexation. App. 57.

REASONS WHY THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED

A. The Fifth Circuit’s decision regarding estoppel
is fact-sensitive and creates no conflict with the decisions of
this Court or any court of appeals. In addition, the Fifth
Circuit relied on an alternative holding to support its
decision.

1. The Fifth Circuit’s holding that Quitman validly
annexed the Stonewall area is based on alternative holdings.
The Court of Appeals held that equitable estoppel precluded
Enterprise from challenging the annexation and that Quitman’s
ownership and control over Stonewall is consistent with the
final order in the desegregation litigation. App. 41-42, 50.
The basis for each holding is briefly reviewed.

During the desegregation litigation in the 1960s,
Enterprise admitted in its pleadings, testimony and exhibits
that the Stonewall area was a part of Quitman. App. 50-51.
After entry of the final desegregation order in 1969,
Enterprise continued to recognize that Stonewall had been
lawfully annexed by Quitman. "For over twenty-six years,
from June 1962 until June 17, 1988, when suit was filed,
Enterprise did nothing to indicate that the Stonewall area had
not lawfully been annexed to Quitman." App. 51 Asa result,
"Quitman was unaware that Enterprise would suddenly
challenge the annexation after decades of acquiescence." App.
51-52.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s factual
finding that Quitman relied to its detriment on Enterprise’s
representations. App. 50. The evidence before the District
Court showed that "Quitman planned, budgeted, forecasted,
funded, hired teachers and staff members, paid taxes, and
maintained school property since [the 1962 annexation] under

the assumption that the Stonewall territory was properly
annexed." App. 53. Based on this evidence, the District
Court found that equitable estoppel applied. App. 50.
Consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), the Fifth Circuit
upheld the finding. See Anderson vs. City of Bessemer City,
470 U.S. 564, 573-76 (1985).

Enterprise’s Petition is simply an effort to have this
Court review the same record in the hope that a different
outcome might be reached. Therefore, this issue does not
merit review by this Court. See Goodman vs. Lukens Steel
Co., 482 U.S. 656, 665 (1987) ("[BJoth courts below having
agreed on the facts, we are not inclined to examine the record
for ourselves absent some extraordinary reason for
undertaking this task. Nothing the [Petitioners] have
submitted indicates that we should do so."); NCAA vs. Board
of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98 n.15 (1984) ("In-accord with our
usual practice, we must now accord great weight to a finding ~
of fact which has been approved by a court of appeals.");
Graver Mfg. vs. Linde Co, 336 U.S. 271, 275 (1949) (Court
should not "undertake to review concurrent findings of fact by
two courts below in the absence of a very obvious and
exceptional show of error").

2. Apart from the estoppel issue, the Fifth Circuit also
held that "Quitman’s control over Stonewall would comport
with" the Fifth Circuit’s 1969 desegregation order. App. 42.
The final order in that litigation was "based upon interdistrict
boundaries that assumed the validity of the annexation of
Stonewall by Quitman." App. 54. Although no Court ruled
specifically on the validity of the annexation, "they did not
have cause to do so. All parties, including Enterprise,
represented to the court that the annexation was valid." Id.
Enterprise neither acknowledges nor challenges this alternative
holding by the Fifth Circuit. The presence of an alternative

basis to uphold the annexation militates against granting the
Petition. See generally R. Stern, et al., Supreme Court
Practice § 4.4, at pp. 172-73 (7th ed. 1993) (conflict in
decisions may not merit grant of certiorari if Court can decide
case on another ground and thereby avoid reaching issue upon
which there is a conflict).

3. Enterprise contends that equitable estoppel cannot
be applied to preclude it "from changing its earlier position,
even if that position is wrong, ... to comport with newly
developed law." Pet. at 8. The underlying premise for
Enterprise’s argument is incorrect. Enterprise did challenge
the constitutionality of the annexation, and the Fifth Circuit
rejected Enterprise’s argument. App. 57-58. Enterprise has
not been prevented from changing its position based on a
change in the applicable law. Rather, Enterprise was estopped
from challenging the annexation of Stonewall after almost
three decades of acquiescence and after representing to the
District Court and the Court of Appeals in the desegregation
litigation that the Stonewall territory properly belonged in the
Quitman district.

No court has prevented Enterprise from acknowledging
that the student-transfer contract is unconstitutional. In fact,
Enterprise took that position in the Fifth Circuit, App. 62, and
again in this Court, Pet. at 10-11.

4. Enterprise fails to cite any authority to support its
argument that equitable estoppel cannot bar assertion of a
constitutional claim. As the Fifth Circuit pointed out, "[t}he
admittedly sparse authority on applicability of equitable
estoppel indicates the opposite." App. 52. Two district
courts have held that parties could be equitably estopped from
arguing constitutional violations, and this Court recently
affirmed a three-judge district court’s decision that laches, a

doctrine similar to equitable estoppel, could prevent a plaintiff
from enjoining unprecleared election changes. Id.'

5. Enterprise contends that the "illicit racial
motivation" for the 1962 student-transfer contract "should void
the entire" compromise agreement, including the annexation,
reached between Enterprise and Quitman. Pet. 11. The Fifth
Circuit rejected "the idea that an unconstitutional clause in a
contract automatically voids the entire contract." App. 57
n.38 (citing Shelley vs. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)).

Furthermore, the annexation did not contribute to
segregation in 1962 and does not today. "The Stonewall
annexation was no more promotive of segregation than was
any of the other pre-desegregation boundary changes among
Mississippi’s school districts." App. 57. Thus, Enterprise’s
reliance on City of Richmond vs. United States, 422 U.S. 358
(1975), is misplaced. The annexation of Stonewall was not
"taken for the purpose of discriminating against" blacks. Id.
at 378.

Throughout its Petition, Enterprise refers or alludes to
current segregative effects of the annexation or the student-
transfer contract, or both. Pet. at i ("ongoing racially
gerrymandered district lines"); id. at 13 (interdistrict
constitutional violation in Pennsylvania case "similar to the
resulting segregative effects in the Mississippi school districts

1 The Fifth Circuit cited Williams vs. City of Dothan,
745 F.2d 1406 (11th Cir. 1984), United States vs. Dallas
County Comm’n, 548 F. Supp. 794 (S.D. Ala. 1982), aff'd
in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 739 F.2d 1529

(11th Cir. 1984), and Lopez vs. Hale County, 797 F. Supp.
547 (N.D. Tex. 1992), aff'd mem., Um. , tee kL.

Ed 2d 112 (1993).

iT.
A

here described"); id. at 15 (Fifth Circuit upheld "the
annexation of [Stonewall] to a school district and enforced
student transfers which perpetuated segregation"). The Fifth
Circuit ruled, however, that neither the annexation nor the
student-transfer contract could support interdistrict relief
because these events do not have current segregative effects.
App. 59.

B. The Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of Milliken vs.
Bradley does not create a conflict with the decisions of any
court of appeals.

Enterprise purports to find a conflict among the courts
of appeals concerning the application of Milliken vs. Bradley,
418 U.S. 717 (1974), which holds that interdistrict relief can
be imposed in a desegregation case only if "there has been a
constitutional violation within one district that produces a
significant segregative effect in another district." Id. at 744.
Thus, “without an interdistrict violation and interdistrict
effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for an
interdistrict remedy." Id. at 745. A review of the cases cited
by Enterprise on pages 12 and 13 of its Petition reveals no
conflict on this issue. The differences among these cases arise
solely from the evidence in each case, not from their
application of Milliken.

Here, the Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court’s
interdistrict remedy because no school district committed a
constitutional violation that had current segregative effects in
another district. App. 58-59. The court relied on Milliken

and Lee vs. Lee County Bd. of Educ., 639 F.2d 1243 (Sth
Cir. 1981), which interpreted Milliken to permit an
interdistrict remedy only “when there is proof of
unconstitutional governmental action that has been a
‘substantial cause’ of a ‘significant’ interdistrict segregative

effect, and where an interdistrict desegregation plan is
necessary in order to remedy segregation ‘directly’ caused by
this constitutionaily impermissible conduct." Id. at 1256.
The Fifth Circuit’s holding does not create a conflict. In fact,
Lee’s interpretation of Milliken has been followed in two of
the cases cited by Enterprise. See Jenkins vs. Missouri, 807
F.2d 657, 666 (8th Cir. 1987); Goldsboro City Bd. of Educ.

vs. Wayne County Bd. of Educ., 745 F.2d 324, 330-31 (4th
Cir. 1984). ;

In the context of the Milliken standard, the facts of
each case will determine whether an interdistrict remedy is
proper. For example, in Goldsboro, the Fourth Circuit stated
that the "present case differs from those cases where the
courts have found an interdistrict remedy to be appropriate."
745 F. 2d at 330. In both Lee and Goldsboro, the appellate
courts summarized the cases cited by Enterprise, pointing out
that some presented evidence to support interdistrict relief and
others did not.’

Rather than reveal a conflict, the cases cited by
Enterprise demonstrate quite clearly that the facts of each case
will determine the propriety of interdistrict relief under the
Milliken standard. In the absence of an actual conflict, the
fact-based issue raised by Enterprise is not the type that merits

2 The two cases not discussed in Goldshoro or Lee do
not aid Enterprise’s efforts to create a conflict. In Hoots vs.
Pennsylvania, 672 F.2d 1107, 1120 (3d Cir. 1982), the court
applied Milliken and noted that the interdistrict remedy "was
appropriate in this case because [the district court] concluded
that the violation itself was interdistrict in nature." In Jenkins
vs. Missouri, 807 F.2d at 666, the court, as noted, relied on
Goldsboro and Lee and held that the absence of a
constitutional violation precluded interdistrict relief.

9

review by this Court.

CONCLUSION

Respondent Quitman School District respectfully
requests that the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari be denied.

Dated: October 13, 1994

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

PERRY SANSING

(Counsel of Record)

JAMES A. KEITH
BRUNINI, GRANTHAM,
GROWER & HEWES

1400 Trustmark Building

Post Office Drawer 119
Jackson, Mississippi 39205
Telephone: (601)948-3101

TALLY D. RIDDELL

P.O. Box 199
Quitman, MS 39355-0199

10

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386012_0444%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.