# Opposition Brief — District of Columbia v. Hansford > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386011_2339%3A3 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Opposition Brief - **Published:** January 1, 1993 - **Citation:** 509 U.S. 905 ## Text No. 92-1655 In The Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1992 ‘ DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Petitioner, THOMAS T. HANSFORD, SR. AND MARY DELL HANSFORD, Respondents. } Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The Maryland Court Of Appeals ¢ - RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPQSITION * Gary M. SIDELL 1717 Massachusetts Ave., N.W. Suite 100 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 783-0060 (Counsel of Record) Lesuie G. FEIN CHRISTOPHER G. HocE Crow.ey, Hoce & FEIN 1717 Massachusetts Ave., N.W. Suite 100 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 483-2900 Counsel for Respondents eee LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964 OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-283 “- QUESTION PRESENTED Whether a state’s courts may exercise in personam jurisdiction in a tort suit against the District of Columbia, a non-resident municipal corporation that maintains a full time presence on a Federal enclave within the geo- graphic boundaries of that State and that commits a tort on that enclave causing injury within the State? il TABLE OF CONTENTS Page RPUPece OUR OE OEE WEED bag 5 cccecvecasesdenuey ea nes i py ge ae tas, 8 3). ee rr ere re iii DEPRES MEMETE GAP EWE GAs osc cade le teectessues 1 REASONS WHY THE WRIT SHOULD BE DENIED... 5 A. A state may exercise its judicial jurisdiction by permitting its citizens to maintain a lawsuit in its own courts against a municipal corporation located on a federal enclave within that state’s boundaries without any unconstitutional inter- ference in that corporation’s activities ....... 7 B. “Exclusive jurisdiction” encompasses only exclusive legislative authority over a particular area and does not limit a state’s judicial juris- diction to provide its courts as a forum for the resolution of various local disputes which occur or involve parties located on federal eee Teer er rere rere rrr om a 14 C. The District of Columbia, by its operation of a prison in Maryland, is not operating as the federal government, nor carrying out any national purpose and, therefore, is not entitled to any immunity which may be applicable to tive federal COVETNMONE. .... 0.60055 cescecsess 18 RIE AINE BAAN Wd ead G eu snanens en elatciaerere. 20 lil TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page CASES Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962)............... 6 Biscoe v. Arlington County, 238 U.S. App. D.C. 206, 738 F.2d 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 I Sh Sean cass ceannsvcecccsess a, 22, 13 Cannon v. United States, 645 F.2d 1128, 207 U-S. OE aD |) ) 19 Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) ..... 6 District of Columbia v. Woodbury, 136 U.S. 450 cai vce sccccccccceces. 18 Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970)............. 9, 10 Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176................. 6 Fort Leavenworth K.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 RUC RGUR GR SUAS Sb eve sscscsssscccscces 8, 11 Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473 Nn c cau casncsseccccceccs 15, 16 Hansford v. District of Columbia, 329 Md. 112, 617 PU ME yk ccs cscs esses eseces 16, 19 Howard v. Commissioners of Sinking Fund of City of Louisville, 344 U.S. 624 (1953)................ 8, 9, 10 In re Air Crash Disaster at Gander, Newfoundland, 660 F. Supp. 1202 (W.D. KY. 1987) ................ 15 James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94 (1940) .... 19 Knott Corp. v. Furman, 163 F.2d 199 (4th Cir.), cert. EE > gr 8 Mainecki v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 658 P. 2d 422, cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 806 (1983)............ 13 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued Page Metropolitan R.R. v. District of Columbia, 132 U.S. 1 te ere er eres Pr re mae Peete ey 18 Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979)........ 7, 10, 12, 13 Ohio River Contract Co. v. Gordon, 244 U.S. 68 CRUE Pa xskoneo 1544400405007 s sake Rr eeCrEe ee 15 Peterson v. Texas, 635 P.2d 241 (Colo.App. 1981) ..12, 13 Phillips v. Baltimore, 110 Md. 431, 72 A. 902 (1909) ..... 3 Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) .............. 6 Wade v. District of Columbia, 310 A.2d 857 (D.C. Ee | een ire yt chal Medien Je ig Ale 19 STATUTES Constitution, Article I, § 8, Cl. 17......... 4, 6, 8, 9, 11 we 8 a re rere ae 11 tS ee Re eer Pere err Te Teer err er err err e 15 TO Ue I orc cc so hese 19 ee AEs. ee hg I is 5 ca ence n nate becistagasane 19 Oe Shei SP I As CR RR Cbs oh eeem eae eee eds eae Es 3 [aks SO Ee BPMN hanks kab cn kana msaee eee 18 Md. Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article Lee eh. rr rrr rey roe ee 4,5 Md. Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article Be GHG WE et baeeuy keane Milan amen eee ence Tees 16 Md. Code, State Government Article § 14-102(b) [RP ROO SL, IID oc cc kcceanceeeceeeseacs 4,5 RULE ek es ee eT eT ee rr re er err 6 aS REP EES SES ESR are eve wer ne Nn HR MERA: ecto Nee TET ORIN, To A OE No. 92-1655 ¢ In The Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1992 + DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Petitioner, VS. THOMAS T. HANSFORD, SR. AND MARY DELL HANSFORD, Respondents. e ia Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The Maryland Court Of Appeals ¢ RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION 4 STATEMENT OF THE CASE In June, 1987, Carl Sewanti Richardson (“Rich- ardson”) escaped for the second time from Oak Hill, the District of Columbia’s maximum security facility for its most violent and dangerous juvenile delinquents. The Oak Hill facility is located in Laurel, Maryland, on land that the petitioner alleges is a “Federal enclave”.! At the 1 Although petitioner contends that the land on which Oak Mill is located is, in fact, a federal enclave, there is no record support for its contention. Indeed, after the June 14, 1990, oral argument before the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, pheerill time of his June, 1987, escape, Richardson had demon- strated his violent propensities by his eleven (11) prior criminal adjudications, as well as his ability to escape previously from this same facility. On August 16, 1987, at 1:00 a.m., Thomas T. Hansford, Jr., the respondents’ 21- year-old child, was murdered in Prince George’s County, Maryland, by Richardson and another. The respondents resided with their son in Prince George’s County, at a location close to their son’s homicide. On August 3, 1988, Richardson was convicted of the felony murder of Thomas T. Hansford, Jr. in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. Pet. App. @ la.? On August 15, 1988, the respondents filed their law- suit in the Prince George’s County Circuit Court against Richardson, petitioner and petitioner’s employee, J.E. Neil Ollivierra (“Ollivierra”), who was, at the time of Richardson’s June, 1987 escape, in charge of the Oak Hill facility. Pet. App. @ 1a-2a. Although respondents allege a variety of different legal theories in their complaint, the essence of their claims is that petitioner and Ollivierra were negligent in their operation of the Laurel prison due to their failure to maintain custody and control of Rich- ardson, who they knew or should have known had a prior record of both violent crimes and a successful escape from this very location. Moreover, respondents petitioner’s motion to supplement the record by including a copy of the purported deed to the Oak Hill property was denied. 2 Respondents rely on the petitioner’s appendix as con- tained in its Petition and will refer to particular pages by “Pet. App @__”. contend that petitioner and Ollivierra were negligent for their failure to either recapture Richardson or to provide any warning of his escape and dangerous status to the surrounding Maryland communities. Furthermore, respondents contend that petitioner had a custom or pol- icy at the time of Richardson’s second escape as a result of which one of every three delinquents was permitted to be missing from the Oak Hill facility. Pet. App. @ 2a. On September 8, 1989, after petitioner filed its answer, a Prince George’s County Circuit Judge heard argument on, and granted in part, petitioner’s motion to dismiss the complaint. This ruling was limited only to the District of Columbia. The motion was denied as to Ollivierra. The principal basis for petitioner’s motion to dismiss in the trial court was that Maryland courts had no jurisdiction over a foreign municipal corporation. Peti- tioner relied exclusively on Phillips v. Baltimore, 110 Md. 431, 72 A. 902 (1909). The trial court based its dismissal of the petitioner solely on the Phillips case, which involved venue, not jurisdiction, principles and the construction of a venue statute. There was no consideration of, or ruling on, any federal or constitutional contention by the trial court since none had been raised by the petitioner. Peti- tioner also moved to dismiss on the grounds of insuffi- ciency of pleading, proximate cause and failure to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. All of these arguments were denied summarily by the trial judge. Pet. App. @ 4a. On appeal by respondents to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, petitioner for the first time raised its claim that Maryland courts could not exercise in personam jurisdiction over it due to Maryland’s cession of the Oak Hill land to the United States before 1943. Pet. App. @ 5a. As support for this contention, petitioner relied on § 14-102(b) of the State Government Article of the Mary- land Code (1984, 1992 Cum. Supp.) (Maryland legislative jurisdiction over previously ceded land to United States), not on Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the United States Constitution. Pet. App. @ 6a; 6b-7b. In upholding the trial court’s dismissal of the claims against petitioner, the Court of Special Appeals ruled that there was a conflict between two (2) Maryland statutes (State Government Article § 14-102(b) and Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article § 6-101, et seq., the Maryland “Long-Arm” stat- ute) and that as a result, Maryland courts could not exercise jurisdiction over the District of Columbia where its negligence occurred on an enclave located in Mary- land that was ceded before 1943. Pet. App. @ 7b. As in the trial court, the Federal Constitutional claim now raised by petitioner was neither pursued before, nor ruled upon by, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals. The respondents’ petition for a writ of certiorari to the Maryland Court of Appeals was granted. 321 Md. 709, 584 A.2d 708 (1991). The writ was issued to review the following relevant issues: 1) whether the trial court erred in holding that the District, as a municipal corporation, could not be sued outside of the jurisdiction in which it is located; and 2) whether the Court of Special Appeals erroneously affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint against the District on the ground that the trial court could not exercise jurisdiction where the District’s alleged tortious conduct occurred on a federal enclave ceded prior to 1943. Pet. App. @ 6a. The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the Court of Special Appeals by ruling that there was, in fact, no actual conflict between the state’s legislative jurisdiction statute, as detailed in the State Government Article § 14-102(b), and its “Long-Arm” jurisdiction statute, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article § 6-101, et seq. when considering the issue of in personam jurisdiction over petitioner. Pet. App. @ 13a-14a. After holding that the two (2) state statutes can be construed harmoniously, the Court ruled that respondents may pursue their tort claims against petitioner in Maryland State Courts. The Court reasoned that in personam jurisdiction over peti- tioner exists due to petitioner’s conduct of business in Maryland, its use of real property in Maryland and, arguably, its tortious causation of injury in Maryland. Pet. App. @ 14a-15a, n.7. The Court did not rule that either Maryland statute was in conflict with any constitutional right, title or interest the protection of which petitioner attempted to seek. Pet. App. @ 20a-22a. ¢ REASONS WHY THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED It has long been settled that a state’s courts may exercise their judicial jurisdiction over all manner of activities occurring within the state’s boundaries, regard- less of whether those activities occur on federal enclaves or whether they involve out-of-state municipalities, coun- ties or, indeed, other states. The District of Columbia asks this Court to create an exception to this universal rule just for itself, on the sole basis that it is, in effect, the same as the federal government. Moreover, the District of Colum- bia claims that, without such a unique exception, a state’s exercise of jurisdiction over it would interfere imper- missibly with the activities of the federal government to a constitutionally significant degree. The District’s fanciful argument has no basis in the decisions of any court. This case presents mo constitutional issue that was pressed by petitioner and passed upon by the trial court or the intermediate Maryland appellate court.° See, Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 181, n. 3 (1983); Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 549-550 (1962); but see, Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969). Although petitioner raised its Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 claim before the Mary- land Court of Appeals, it was not passed upon by that court. As such, the advisory opinion sought by petitioner from this Court is unwarranted. Rather, the decision from which petitioner now seeks review involved the Mary- land Court of Appeal’s harmonious construction of two (2) state statutes. Moreover, the decision below does not conflict with any decision by any other court requiring reconciliation by Supreme Court review. Furthermore, this case does not involve an issue of widespread impor- tance or application which will, if unreviewed here, open the floodgates of litigation against petitioner. As peti- tioner noted, this case presents the first occasion in sev- enty years where private claims involving Oak Hill have been pursued against the District of Columbia in Mary- land state courts. Pet. @ 7. If petitioner’s “floodgate” claim had any merit, the issues involved here would have > Contrary to the provisions of Supreme Court Rule 29.4(c), petitioner has not recited in its initial pleading that it has served notice on the attorney general of Maryland of its claim challeng- ing the constitutionality of the applicable Maryland statutes. been pressed repeatedly by others, and resolved, before now. Finally, but most importantly, the decision below was a correct one, construing as it did the application of the Maryland “long-arm” jurisdiction statute and the avail- ability of a state’s judicial, rather than its legislative, jurisdiction over wrongful death and related claims. Indeed, the ability of one state’s judiciary to provide a forum for civil claims against another state has been previously upheld. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979). Petitioner fails to offer any reason why, as a municipal! corporation, it is entitled to receive greater immunity than that afforded to a state. Contrary to the contention of petitioner that the maintenance of respondents’ lawsuit will interfere with its governmental functions, no inter- ference at all will result from the orderly use of a judicial forum where respondents present evidence to prove peti- tioner’s liability. Petitioner then has all the rights of any other litigant, whether individual or governmental. A. A STATE MAY EXERCISE ITS JUDICIAL JURIS- DICTION BY PERMITTING ITS CITIZENS TO MAINTAIN A LAWSUIT IN ITS OWN COURTS AGAINST A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LOCATED ON A FEDERAL ENCLAVE WITHIN THAT STATE’S BOUNDARIES WITHOUT ANY UNCONSTITUTIONAL INTERFERENCE IN THAT CORPORATION’S ACTIVITIES. The issue of whether a state may exercise its jurisdic- tion over activities that occur on, and people who reside on, federal enclaves within the state has been raised and resolved by this Court and others in a number of different contexts. For instance, more than 100 years ago this Court ruled that a state-imposed tax on property located on a federal enclave was not invalid since there was no inter- ference by imposition and collection of that tax with the operations of the federal government, even though acqui- sition of the enclave, the situs of the tax imposed, had been obtained under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitu- tion. Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885). By its express terms, this constitutional provision gives Congress authority to exercise “exclusive legislation” over such land. Nevertheless, the state in which an enclave was physically located was not deprived of its non-legislative jurisdiction over that same land unless it attempted to interfere with federal operations thereon. Id., at 533-534. Similarly, a foreign private corporation doing com- mercial business on a federal enclave is subject to a state court’s jurisdiction for injuries occurring in the course of its business on that enclave despite its claims that it is not “doing business” within the judicial jurisdiction of the state. Knott Corp. v. Furman, 163 F.2d 199, 206 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 809 (1947). Maintaining such a per- sonal injury lawsuit in the state’s courts in no way uncon- Stitutionally “interferes” with the operation of the Federal government on that enclave. Additionally, a city may enact legislation imposing a tax on income for work performed on a federal enclave, even though the United States had acquired “exclusive jurisdiction” of the area, so long as the tax does not interfere with the enclave’s activities. Howard v. Commis- sioners of Sinking Fund of City of Louisville, 344 U.S. 624, 626 (1953). Certainly, the imposition of a tax, by either local or state government, is burdensome conduct as to those who must pay it. By contrast, use of a state’s court system by private parties can impose no greater burden than imposition of a tax and, indeed, respondents sug- gest, a far lesser burden is imposed by the exercise of judicial jurisdiction. Enclave residents are part of the state community. They do not lose their state-created rights as citizens of the state in which the enclave is located simply because of where they live. Thus, this Court invalidated a Mary- land statute prohibiting enclave residents from voting in Maryland elections as a denial of their equal protection rights. Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970). Residents at the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) had been denied the right to vote in Maryland elections since they were considered not to be residents of Maryland while living on an enclave created under the authority of Arti- cle I, Section 8, Clause 17, and Congress possessed “exclusive federal jurisdiction” over such enclaves. How- ever, this Court noted that enclave residents live within the geographical boundaries of the State of Maryland. ...” since enclaves even after creation remain part of their surrounding state, relying on its previous rejection of the “fiction of a state within a state”. /d. at 421-422, citing Howard v. Commissioners of Louisville, supra, at 627. Clearly, if an enclave resident is a state resident such that he or she may vote in state elections, is obli- gated to pay state taxes, is entitled to use the state's educational system and is subject to state process and the jurisdiction of state courts, that state’s courts must have personal jurisdiction over persons and activities on an enclave. This is precisely the ruling of the Maryland 4é . Clearly 10 Court of Appeals in this case, and is consistent with Evans, supra, and Howard, supra. Pet. App. @ 17a-20a. In order for petitioner to prevail here, this Court’s long standing prior decisions concerning the rights and responsibilities of enclave residents would need to be overruled as wrongly decided. Respondents submit they were not. In a case not involving a Federal enclave, this Court has held that a state’s constitutional claim of sovereign immunity from suit in its own courts presents no bar to suit in the courts of other states. Consistent with due process considerations, a state not only has judicial juris- diction over individuals and businesses operating within its geographic borders, but also has the constitutional ability to exercise in personam jurisdiction over another sovereign state. In Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), plaintiffs, California residents, sustained personal injuries in the State of California due to the negligent operation of a vehicle by a Nevada state employee. Nevada, when sued in California, claimed that it was immune from liability in California’s courts, that its own immunity under Nevada law was entitled to full faith and credit by the California courts and that, in any event, as a matter of comity, Nevada should be able to avoid liability for the plaintiffs’ injuries in California. This Court ruled against Nevada on all issues and upheld a significant plaintiffs’ verdict. Id., at 426-427. It is without question that, if one strte is not constitu- tionally required to accept a sister state’s claim of sover- eign immunity, a municipal corporation, even the District of Columbia, is not entitled to any greater consideration. Indeed, petitioner fails to provide any basis why it alone eee 11 should receive such unique immunity, despite its reliance on Article I, Section 8, Clause 17. This Constitutional provision, by its terms and as construed, permitted acqui- sition of ten (10) square miles of land to create a separate District of Columbia as a location where the nascent Federal Government would be physically protected from outside interference, particularly if host or neighboring states were incapable of guaranteeing the Government's safety. Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, supra, @ 529-531. To rely on this same constitutional provision as a bar to the maintenance of a personal injury lawsuit in Maryland - courts based upon the District’s negligent operation of its Maryland-based prison for juvenile delinquents is simply to ignore what the provision says, what it has been con- strued to mean and why it was deemed necessary in the first instance more than 200 years ago. The orderly use of a state’s courts to litigate claims against the District in no way unconstitutionally “interferes” with the District's function as the seat of the national government or with its own municipal prison functions. In light of a more recent case on the question of sovereign immunity, and specifically involving the metro- politan area jurisdictions of Virginia and the District of Columbia, Biscoe v. Arlington County, 238 U.S. App. D.C. 206, 738 F.2d 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1159 (1985), the petitioner’s contentions are further weak- ened. The applicability of sovereign immunity was rejected when a Virginia county was sued for personal injuries in the District of Columbia. Arlington County, Virginia, the defendant, claimed that sovereign immunity barred liability in the District of Columbia courts, that the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. Constitution, Article IV, 12 Section 1, compelled application of Virginia’s immunity law, and that comity principles required the District of Columbia to recognize Virginia’s immunity. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected all of these contentions, partly on the basis of Nevada v. Hall, supra. In evaluating the comity issue, the Circuit Court commented on the District’s greater policy interest of not limiting compensation to injured persons, as would be the case if Virginia’s immu- nity were invoked, by recognizing “ . . . the special and largely unique interests of the District in protecting persons who live in the surrounding suburbs and work in the District. ...” Id., 738 F.2d at 1361, (emphasis added). Indeed, the Biscoe court noted the inequity of limiting a compensatory policy to the physical confines of the Dis- trict itself by stating, [T]o confine the benefits of the ... rule to the territory ceded by the States of Maryland and Virginia to form the Nation’s Capital would be to shun the present reality of the economically and socially integrated greater Metropolitan area. It is commonplace that residents of Mary- land are part of the Washington Metropolitan trading area, and that District residents and businesses have an interest in the well-being of these citizens of the Free State. Id. Similarly, other jurisdictions have permitted civil liti- gation similar to this case where parties were injured as a result of another sovereign’s negligence with regard to criminals. In Peterson v. Texas, 635 P.2d 241 (Colo.App. 1981), a Colorado State motor vehicle owner sued the 13 State of Texas for negligence in its supervision of juve- niles who were participating in a Texas sponsored reha- bilitation program located in Colorado. Colorado’s highest court did not recognize Texas’ claims of sovereign immunity in a civil damage action brought in Colorado courts for a car stolen by a Texas juvenile while he was in the Colorado rehabilitation program, relying on Nevada v. Hall, supra. To the same effect was a case where Nevada refused to honor Wisconsin’s claim of sovereign immunity in Mainecki v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 658 P. 2d 422, cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 806 (1983). A Wisconsin sex offender, while on probation, relocated to Nevada with his proba- tion officer’s permission. The sex offender moved in with the plaintiffs, a family with a minor son. Wisconsin authorities failed to warn the plaintiffs about the sex offender who ultimately victimized the minor son. The plaintiffs sued both Wisconsin and the probation officer for their failure to warn them about the sex offender and their failure to properly maintain and supervise his activ- ities. In the face of challenges similar to those raised in Nevada v. Hall, supra, and Biscoe v. Arlington County, supra, Nevada refused to recognize any form of immunity claimed by its sister state, but proceeded to exercise its jurisdiction over another sovereign. Petitioner’s position here is one which completely ignores the rationale for protection of Maryland residents as stated in Biscoe, as well as the factors analyzed in Peterson, supra, and Mainecki, supra, in addition to those cases decided by this Court. In sum, whether a civil claim in a state court is based on its own legislative enactments, such as its taxing power, or on its judicial ability to 14 provide a forum for private parties to resolve private disputes, states may exercise jurisdiction over persons and activities on federal enclaves so long as that jurisdic- tion does not impair the federal government's preroga- tives. B. “EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION” ENCOMPASSES ONLY EXCLUSIVE LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY OVER A PARTICULAR AREA AND DOES NOT LIMIT A STATE’S JUDICIAL JURISDICTION TO PROVIDE ITS COURTS AS A FORUM FOR THE RESOLUTION OF VARIOUS LOCAL DISPUTES WHICH OCCUR OR INVOLVE PARTIES LOCATED ON FEDERAL ENCLAVES. Despite petitioner’s attempts to generalize that its oft-repeated phrase of “exclusive jurisdiction” means exclusive political, legislation and judicial jurisdiction belonging to the federal government over the Oak Hill enclave, and thus barring this litigation, a state may constitutionally still maintain its judicial jurisdiction over federal property. This Court has previously ruled, albeit in the context of subject matter, rather than personal, jurisdiction, that traditional cases involving state law, even arising from activities on federal enclaves, should be decided by state courts: The factors generally recommending exclusive federal-court jurisdiction over an area of federal law include the desirability of uniform interpre- tation, the expertise of federal judges in federal law, and the assumed greater hospitality of fed- eral courts to peculiarly federal claims. These 15 factors cannot support exclusive federal juris- diction over claims whose government rules are borrowed from state law. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 482 (1981). See also, 16 U.S.C. § 457, which provides that [i]Jn the case of the death of any person by the neglect or wrongful act of another within a national park or other place subject to the exclu- sive jurisdiction of the United States, within the exterior boundaries of any State, such right of action shall exist as though the place were under the jurisdiction of the State within whose exte- rior boundaries such place may be;... . “ ‘Nothing inherent in exclusive federal sovereignty over a territory precludes a State Court from entertaining a personal injury suit concerning events occurring in the territory and governed by the federal government.’ ” In re Air Crash Disaster at Gander, Newfoundland, 660 F. Supp. 1202, 1207 (W.D. KY. 1987), quoting Gulf Offshore Co., supra, @ 482. See also, Ohio River Contract Co. v. Gordon, 244 U.S. 68 (1917) (an action for personal injury suffered on a reservation under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States may be maintained in a state court which has personal jurisdiction over the defendant). As this Court noted in Gulf Offshore Co., supra, @ 483, petitioner’s argument ” . . . confuse[d] the political jurisdiction of a State with its judicial jurisdiction.” (emphasis added). The Maryland Legislature, consistent with this Court’s prior rulings, and unlike petitioner, did not con- fuse its political and judicial functions when it enacted its “Long-Arm” statute. By express statutory terms, Mary- land has designed its “Long-Arm” in personam, judicial 16 jurisdiction to include federal enclaves and the statute is intended to “ . extend the personal jurisdiction and venue of courts of the State and the power to serve process of those courts to any person on federal enclaves, reservations or lands within the State to the fullest extent permitted by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Maryland Code (1989) Courts and Judicial Pro- ceedings Article § 6-102(e). In its ruling below, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that there was no “conflict” between two (2) state statutes, one of which deals with the legislative authority of Maryland over federal enclaves and the other of which confers “Long-Arm” jurisdiction. Moreover, the ruling determined that there was no limitation of in personam jurisdiction of Maryland courts over parties regardless of the situs of the dispute. The Court of Appeals decision recognized the clear dichotomy between a state’s execu- tive or legislative jurisdiction on one hand and its judicial jurisdiction on the other. Hansford v. District of Columbia, 329 Md. 112, 120, 617 A.2d 1057, 1065 (Md. 1993); Pet. App. @ 15a-l6a. As the Court stated, “[t]he District’s argument, and the position of the Court of Special Appeais, ‘confuses the political jurisdiction of a States with its judicial jurisdiction.’ Gulf Offshore v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 482 (1981).” Respondents submit that it is now time for recognition of that distinction by peti- tioner. Petitioner claims that permitting respondents’ case to go to trial will, somehow, interfere with “its discretionary actions in rehabilitating children and youths. ...” Pet. @ 8. Moreover, petitioner tries to bootstrap its position by raising the specter of more horrible “interference” in its 17 Virginia prison operations, which are larger than those in Maryland. Pet. @ 9. In light of all prior judicial decisions involving the scope of permissible state or local governmental acts on and over federal enclaves, petitioner necessarily must claim some type of “interference” with its activities in order to create a “constitutional” issue in this case. As even a cursory reading of the decision by the Maryland Court of Appeals discloses, none of petitioner’s constitu- tional interests has been deprived by the maintenance of this lawsuit. Moreover, the facts of this case belie all such claimed “interference” unless a basic fallacy in peti- tioner’s argument is accepted. That fallacy is simple: it must be assumed that a juvenile delinquent, who has been sent to the Oak Hill facility, is at some time permitted to escape from that facility by its professional staff as part of a considered and discretionary rehabilitative program for that person. Such a proposition is self-evidently absurd. If such an escape is not assumed to be part of an inmate’s rehabilitation program, allowing the mainte- nance of this lawsuit based on the District’s negligence in failing to maintain custody of Richardson and further failing to regain custody of him after his successful escape, in no way “interferes” with the District’s reha- bilitation of juveniles at Oak Hill. Liability attaches, and the District is subject to defend itself, only when its negligence in not maintaining absolute custody and con- trol of a dangerous person produces a legally cognizable injury. Unless there is unconstitutional “interference”, Maryland courts may exercise jurisdiction over the Dis- trict based on its Oak Hill operations, even though on a federal enclave, because there is no conflict between the 18 state’s acts and those District of Columbia activities occurring on the enclave. Hence, absent petitioner’s “interference” contention, there can be no conflict here sufficient to preclude Maryland courts from providing a forum for respondents to present their tort claims. Thus, there is no constitutional issue to warrant granting the petition. C. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, BY ITS OPERA- TION OF A PRISON IN MARYLAND, IS NOT OPERATING AS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, NOR CARRYING OUT ANY NATIONAL PUR- POSE AND, THEREFORE, IS NOT ENTITLED TO ANY IMMUNITY WHICH MAY BE APPLICABLE TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. The District of Columbia contends in its petition that, due to its operation of the Oak Hill prison, it is entitled to the same immunity as if it were the federal government and, therefore, is not subject to tort claims in Maryland’s courts. Pet. @ 12-17. Indeed, as noted, supra, the District here claims greater protection from tort claims in Mary- land courts than has been accorded when raised by states. Contrary to its claims here, the District of Columbia as a municipal corporation, D.C. Code § 1-102(a), does not possess immunity greater than a city. Rather, it may sue “...and be sued... .” just as any other entity and is subject to the same rules that govern procedures between private parties. Id; Metropo’.tan R.R. v. District of Columbia, 132 U.S. 1 (1889). Indeed, the District, as a municipal corporation, is responsible for the negligence of its offi- cers having the care of its streets and sidewalks. District of Columbia v. Woodbury, 136 U.S. 450 (1890). Additionally, 19 the District is liable for the intentional torts of its employees since its immunity is based on the common law immunity for municipal governments, not on any sovereignty of the United States government nor upon limits co-extensive with the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 1J.S.C. § 2671, et seq. Wade v. District of Columbia, 310 A.2d 857, 861 (D.C. 1973) (“When a tort is made possible only through the abuse of power granted by the government, then the government should be held accountable for the abuse, whether it is negligent or intentional in charac- ter.”); Cannon v. United States, 645 F.2d 1128, 207 US. App. D.C. 203 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Lorton Reformatory of the District of Columbia, located in Virginia, is not subject to any greater control by the federal government than any other District facility or agency and, therefore, is not a federal agency for purposes of Federal Tort Claims Act or 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)). While administration of a state law may not interfere with the execution of a national purpose, difficulty occurs only where there is a precise conflict between state and federal rights. In such instances, the supremacy of federal rights supersedes conflicting state rights. James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 103-104 (1940). However, without any actual conflict, or as the District character- izes it, “interference”, there is no bar to enforcement of the state’s rights. Here, the District, by its operation of a prison, is not the United States, Cannon v. United States, supra, and is carrying out no national purpose. As recog- nized by the Maryland Court of Appeals below, the Dis- trict is not entitled to immunity here on the basis of the Supremacy Clause or cases interpreting it. Hansford v. District of Columbia, supra, @ 1067-1068; Pet. App. @ 20 20a-21a. Therefore, this last contention provides no better basis for granting the petition than do those addressed above. CONCLUSION Because the Maryland Court of Appeals ruling cor- rectly construed two (2) state statutes concerning the “Long-Arm” in personam jurisdiction of its own courts, petitioner was deprived of no constitutional interest and this Court should deny the Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Respectfully submitted, Gary M. SIDELL 1717 Massachusetts Ave., N.W. Suite 100 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 783-0060 (Counsel of Record) Lesue G. Fein CHRISTOPHER G. HocE CROwLEY, Hoce & FEIN 1717 Massachusetts Ave., N.W. Suite 100 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 483-2900 Counsel for Respondents --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386011_2339%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.