# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Grahn v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Airline Division

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1993
- **Citation:** 508 U.S. 912

## Text

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No. —. ssid

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1992

VICTOR G. GRAHN; JAMES L. COOPER, JR.; RICHARD
DANIEL GALLAGHER; COURTNEY B.L. EDWARDS;
RONALD WAYNE DAGE, i..)...2.5eee ae PETITIONERS

versus

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS
AIRLINE DIVISION, LOCAL 608, affiliated with the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen, and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO; THE
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS,
CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN, AND HELPERS OF
AMERICA, AFL-CIO; UNITED PARCEL SERVICE CO.::
INDEPENDENT PILOTS ASSOCIATION, ....RESPONDENTS

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

HOLLIS L. SEARCY
Attorneys at Law

Republic Building, Suite 400
429 West Muhammad Ali Blvd
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
(502) 582-1100

Counsel for Petitioners

No.

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1992

VICTOR G. GRAHN; JAMES L. COOPER, JR.; RICHARD
DANIEL GALLAGHER; COURTNEY B.L. EDWARDS;
FPOTIREEE WEE TUE BPPURS ond ide ankncduisscanmecncas PETITIONERS

versus

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS
AIRLINE DIVISION, LOCAL 608, affiliated with the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen, and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO; THE
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS,
CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN, AND HELPERS OF
AMERICA, AFL-CIO; UNITED PARCEL SERVICE CO.:
INDEPENDENT PILOTS ASSOCIATION, ....RESPONDENTS

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Se

HOLLIS L. SEARCY
Attorneys at Law

Republic Building, Suite 400
429 West Muhammad Ali Blvd
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
(S02) 582-1100

Counsel for Petitioners

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

WHETHER THE LANGUAGE OF THE RAILWAY
LABOR ACT AT 45 U.S.C. § 152 SEVENTH AND 45
U.S.C. § 156 PROHIBITS DEFENDANTS FROM
CHANGING THE RATES OF PAY, RULES, OR
WORKING CONDITIONS OF THE PLAINTIFFS
CONTRARY TO AND IN VIOLATION OF THE
TERMS OF THE’ EXISTING COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT, AND CONTRARY TO,
AND IN VIOLATION OF THE RAILWAY LABOR
ACT, AND IF SO, WHETHER THE DECISION OF
THE DISTRICT COURT ENTERING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT
AGAINST DEFENDANT UNIONS FOR BREACH OF
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION, AND AGAINST
DEFENDANT UPS FOR BREACH OF THE
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT WAS
ARBITRARY AND IN ERROR AS A MATTER OF
LAW.

WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE COMPANY AND UNION
REPRESENTATIVES WERE AUTHORIZED TO
CREATE A SIDE AGREEMENT PURPORTING TO
INTERPRET A PROVISION OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL
AGREEMENT RESOLVED PREVIOUSLY BY A
SYSTEM ®80ARD OF ADJUSTMENT RULING,
WITHOUT ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF WHETHER
THE PROCEDURES ENGAGED IN TO EFFECT SUCH
CHANGES AND AMENDMENTS ULTIMATELY DID
OR DID NOT ABIDE BY THE TERMS OF THE
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, THE
PROVISIONS OF THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT, AND
A UNION’S DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION.

IIT.

Li

WHETHER THE SIXTH CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEALS FAILED TO APPLY THE CORRECT
STANDARD IN REVIEWING’ THE DISTRICT
COURT’S GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

1v
PARTIES

The Petitioners in this Court are Victor G. Grahn, James
L. Cooper, Jr., Richard Daniel Gallagher, Courtney B.L.
Edwards, Ronald Wayne Dabe, who were the Plaintiffs-Appellants
below.

The Respondents in this Court, who were the Defendants-
Appellees below, are International Brotherhood of Teamsters
Airline Division, Local 608, affiliated with the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and
Helpers of America, AFL-CIO; The International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of America,
AFL-CIO; United Parcel Service Co.; Independent Pilots
Association.

Vv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Questions Presented for Review......................... i, ii, ili
Pe aienucscharnncoca cat eacie cea iv
re ic cccsisdiceis ccs Vii
Official and Unofficial Reports of Opinions
Pe Ne Wi iuhasacccrtetvseonerecesieee ces Vili
a seiicniintinsitavined onslacs eromummaadeenins l
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and
Rules Involved in the Case.................... 2
Statement of the Case...............0 ccc ceceecec aces 3-11
PN i viksinanenseciatuacevene: iicukaesedeaabekebonseerin 11-26

I. The District Court Decision
Entering Summary Judgment
Dismissing Plaintiffs’ Complaint
Was Arbitrary And In Error As A
Matter Of Law Because It Failed
To Address The Issue Set Forth In
Plaintiffs’ Complaint And In The
Parties Motions For Summary
SIRS panckissucgeciccsunixscuenee, 11-14

Il]

Conclusio

Appendix

Dias hea

v1

Plaintiffs Have Presented Material
Facts Raising Genuine Issues As
To Defendant Teamsters Union's
Breach Of Its Duty of Fair

ROPTOSOMMATION, ......cccccccsevsceess

The District Court Did Not
Address The Issue Before It But
Instead Dismissed Plaintiffs’
Complaint Based On An Issue
Irrelevant To The
Case. PANEER CRA RO ATSS

15-22
22-26
26
la-23a

=

Vil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page
Cases:

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505,

91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) 10, 23, 24, 25
sranch 6000 v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 808.

(D.C. Cir. 1979) 16
Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.,

424 U.S. 554 (1976) 18
Ratkosky v. United Transportation Union.

843 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1988) 1S, 17, 19
Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp.,

$23 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975) 1S, 17
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87

S. Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842

(1967) 1%

Statutes:

45 U.S.C. § 151 2
45 U.S.C. § 151, First 4
45 U.S.C. § 151, Fifth 3
45 U.S.C. § 152, Seventh 2. 81
45 U.S.C. § 156 2.9. t.. t2
Federal Rules Civil Procedu

56 (c) and }

Vill

OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF
OPINIONS IN THE CASE

Victor G. Grahn; James L. Cooper, Jr.; Richard Daniel
Gallagher; Courtney B.L. Edwards; Ronald Wayne Dabe
v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Airline
Division, Local 608, affiliated with the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen,
and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO; The International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen,
and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO; United Parcel Service
Co.; Independent Pilots Association, Civil Action No.
C89-0983-L(B) (W.D. Ky., 12/12/89).

Victor G. Grahn; James L. Cooper, Jr.; Richard Daniel
Gallagher; Courtney B.L. Edwards; Ronald Wayne Dabe
v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Airline
Division, Local 608, affiliated with the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen,
and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO; The International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen,
and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO; United Parcel Service
Co.; Independent Pilots Association, No. 92-5286 (6th
Cir. 1992).

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1992

VICTOR G. GRAHN; JAMES L. COOPER, JR.; RICHARD
DANIEL GALLAGHER; COURTNEY B.L. EDWARDS;
DASECPE ED WOON TE PERS BPPRIINS oicennuscaveasuccapamennonns PETITIONERS

Ws

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS
AIRLINE DIVISION, LOCAL 608, affiliated with the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
-Warehousemen, and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO; THE
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEANSTERS,
CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN, AND HELPERS OF
AMERICA, AFL-CIO; UNITED PARCEL SERVICE CO.;

INDEPENDENT PILOTS ASSOCIATION........ RESPONDENTS

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

JURISDICTION

The United States Court of Appeals issued its opinion on
January 5, 1993, affirming the decision of the United States

2

District Court. District Court jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331.

The jurisdiction of this Court to review this Petition for
Writ of Certiorari is invoked under Title 28, United States Code,
Sections 1254(1) and 2101(c), and Supreme Court Rules 13 and
14.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND
RULES INVOLVED IN THE CASE

This case involves the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §
151 et seq. ("RLA"), which provides at § 152, Seventh:

Seventh. Change in pay, rules or working conditions .
contrary to agreement or to section 156 forbidden. No
carrier, its officers or agents shall change the rates of pay,
rules, or working conditions of its employees, as a class as
embodied in agreements except in the manner prescribed
in such agreements or in section 6 of this Act [45 USCS
§ 156].

Which provides at § 156:

Procedure in changing rates of pay, rules, and working
conditions. Carriers and representatives of the employees
shall give at least thirty days’ written notice of an intended
change in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules, or
working conditions, and the time and place for the
beginning of conference between the representatives of the
parties interested in such intended changes shall be agreed
upon within ten days after the receipt of said notice, and
said time shall be within the thirty days provided in the
notice. In every case where such notice of intended
change has been given, or conferences are being held with
reference thereto, or the services of the Mediation Board
have been requested by either party, or said board has
proffered its services, rates of pay, rules, or working

3

conditions shall not be altered by the carrier until the
controversy has been finally acted upon as required by
section 5 of this Act [45 USCS § 155], by the Mediation
Board, unless a period of ten days has elapsed after
termination of conferences without request for or proffer
of the services of the Mediation Board.

This case also involves Fed.K.Civ.P. 56 which holds at
paragraphs (c) and (e) that if the adverse parties’ response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule (pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file) sets
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue as to any
material fact, summary judgment is not appropriate. (Appendix
22a)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiffs are employees as defined in 45 U.S.C. § 151
Fifth and seek injunctive relief, damages, declaratory judgment and
other appropriate relief pursuant to the Railway Labor Act, 45
U.S.C. § 151 et seq.

Plaintiffs’ underlying Complaint arises out of the
Teamsters Union’s' breach of its duty of fair representation and
the company’s breach of the collective bargaining agreement.
Defendants have changed the working conditions of the Plaintiffs
and have changed the language of the collective bargaining
agreement depriving Plaintiffs of their rightful seniority status.
Plaintiffs allege this was effected in violation of the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement, in violation of the provisions of
the RLA, and in breach of the unions’ duty of fair representation
regarding contract changes.

Ris : m :
Teamsters Union" when used, will refer to Teamsters International,
and Teamsters Local 608, collectively

4

Plaintiffs are employed as flight crewmembers by
Defendant United Parcel Service Co. (UPS Co.) a wholly owned
Subsidiary of United Parcel Service of America, Inc. (UPS
America), a holding and management company. UPS Co. is a
carrier within the meaning of the RLA 45 U.S.C. § 151, First.

Until August 24, 1987, when UPS? announced its decision
to assume operational control of its aircraft, UPS contracted with
four contract carriers to provide air crews and maintenance crews
for the planes owned by the company and leased to the contract
carriers.

Teamsters International, in conjunction with its affiliate,
Local 608, acted as representative for the flight crewmembers in
negotiating a Collective Bargaining Agreement between the flight
crewmembers and the company.’ Also negotiated at this time,
and incorporated in Article 4 of the Supplemental Agreement, was
the "Transition Letter of Agreement" to cover, among other issues,
special seniority issues during the transition period.‘

The Transition Letter of Agreement was negotiated to
"provide the addition of complete crews to the Crewmembers
Seniority List in an orderly manner during the return of aircraft
to the Company from contractors."

e+ UPS" when used, will refer to UPS America and its wholly owned

subsidiaries

5This contract is entitled "Flight Crewmember Supplemental Agreement
to the National Master UPS Collective Bargaining Agreement.”

“The “transition period” refers to the period from August 1987, when
UPS first began hiring flight crewmembers, through calendar year 1988

5

The Transition Letter of Agreement assures that employees
hired from the four contract carriers’ during the transition period
be given a preferential seniority status designated Group I.°
Paragraph A of the Transition Letter of Agreement states that:

Group I shall be former Company contractor
crewmembers who were flying for a Company
contractor on or after September 1, 1987, and also
crewmembers who are acquired as a result of a
merger with, or acquisition of, another carrier.

The seniority position of Group I flight crewmembers
relative to each other is also defined in paragraph A of the
Transition Letter of Agreement, as follows:

Group I crewmembers will be hired in position by
status and aircraft type. Group I contractor
crewmembers will be positioned on the
administrative list by those hired September 1,
1987 and earlier, arranged by date of birth
followed by those hired after September 1, 1987,
arranged by date of birth.

As defined by the terms and conditions of the Transition
Letter of Agreement, each of the Plaintiffs are Group I employees
hired by a contract carrier prior to September 1, 1987.

UPS hired its first crewmembers on January 18, 1988.
The first seniority list was developed and published in January,
1989. after the transition period had been completed. A thirty-day

>The four contract carriers referred to in the Transition Letter of
Agreement are: Evergreen Airlines, Inc.; Interstate Airlines, Inc.; Onon Air,
and, Ryan Aviation/PHH Air.

6
Group II crewmembers are employees hired from sources other than
the four contract carriers, and this category is not an issue in the present action.

6

period was allowed for employees to review and object to the
seniority list. According to a memo from William Ferchak, who
became Trustee of Teamsters Local 608 in late 1988’, some
eighteen grievances were filed within the thirty-day period alleging
violations of Article 4 (Seniority) of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement and alleging violations (Seniority) of the Transition
Letter of Agreement.

Although Plaintiffs were former contract _ flight
crewmembers with Orion Air, hired and flying for the contract
carrier before September 1, 1987, they were incorrectly positioned
on the seniority list with those employees hired by the contract
carriers after September 1, 1987.

Article 17 of the flight crewmembers Supplemental
Agreement states that:

In compliance with Section 204, Title II of the
Railway Labor Act, as amended, is hereby
established a System Board of Adjustment for the
purpose of adjusting and deciding disputes which
may arise under the terms of this Agreement and
any amendment or additions thereto and which are
properly submitted to it, which Board shall be
known as “United Parcel Service Crewmembers
System Board of Adjustment", herein referred to
as the "Board."

Pursuant to the terms of the contract, a System Adjustment
Board hearing was held in Louisville, Kentucky, in February, 1989
to hear the above-referenced grievances. The 4-0 decision of the
February System Adjustment Board interpreted the contract
language regarding seniority to mean that:

;
Dan Darrow, a Teamster International employee was Trustee prior to
Ferchak

a

7

All crewmembers hired by the Company in 1988
who were previously working for a company
contractor and who were hired by the contractor
prior to September 1, 1987, regardless of the date
of IOE compietion, shall be placed in Group I;
followed by all crewmembers hired by the
Company in 1988 who were previously working
for a company contractor and who were hired by
the contractor on or after September 1, 1987.
There shall be no retroactive compensation.

A UPS crewmember revised seniority list was issued
subsequent to the Board decision reflecting Plaintiffs’ correct
seniority position in Group I, which positions them before those
contract crewmembers hired by the contract carriers after
September 1, 1987.

Article 17 of the flight crewmembers Supplemental
Agreement clearly states that:

The Board shall have jurisdiction over all disputes
growing out of grievances or Out of the
interpretation or application of any of the terms of
this Agreement... The Board shall be competent to
hear the disputes properly submitted to it and
decide said disputes by a majority vote of all
members of the Board. Decision of the Board
shall be final and binding upon the parties hereto.
(Emphasis added)

The February decision of the System Adjustment Board
was grieved by employees alleging their seniority was affected by
the Board’s decision. Although the Board was bound by the terms
of the CBA.to deny these grievances as without merit, since the
February Board decision which interpreted the contract language
regarding seniority was final and binding on all parties, a special
unannounced June System Board was called by William Ferchak,

8

Teamster Trustee of Local 608, and by Neil Konietzko, Air
Region Labor Relations Manager for UPS, to specifically hear
those grievances.* After hearing the grievances of those whose
seniority was allegedly negatively affected by the February Board
decision, the June System Board issued a communication dated
June 21, 1989, stating that:

This case is referred back to a joint company-
union committee for resolution.

On August 2, 1989, without affording Plaintiffs any
hearing, or opportunity to be heard, the company and the union
issued an “Agreement” signed by William Ferchak and Neil
Konietzko attempting to add new contract terms, and language
altering the Collective Bargaining Agreement. As the result of this
invalid decision, Plaintiffs were demoted to a new seniority
classification arbitrarily entitled "Group I-A," a classification not
authorized by the contract or the Transition Letter of Agreement.
UPS issued a revised crewmember seniority list on August 2,
1989, simultaneous with the so called "August Agreement",
reflecting this confusing, improper and invalid decision.

Subsequent to the “August Agreement”, Plaintiffs filed
grievances requesting that the Collective Bargaining
Agreement/Transition Letter of Agreement, as interpreted by the
February System Board, be adhered to and that the arbitrary and
invalid “August Agreement" be voided. Plaintiff Grahn’s
grievance was denied by the company with the curt statement that
there was "no contract violation." The union’s response to
Grahn’s grievance was that the grievance was "settled." The union
has refused Plaintiff Grahn any meaningful appeal. Further, the

Sr erchak (Teamsters Local 608) and Konietzko (representing UPS) were
two of the four System Board members who rendered the unanimous February
Board decision which definitively interpreted the contract language regarding
seniority. The other two were Lee Wallace, UPS Flight Operations Manager,
and Robert Miller, union steward.

ee

9

union has refused to process the grievances filed by the other
Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have thus exhausted all administrative
remedies. Since the union has indicated that its decision is fixed,
any administrative remedies would be futile and are not required.

The Memorandum and Order of the District Court, dated
June 18, 1991,states at page 18a of the Appendix:

The record shows that the final disposition of the
grievance heard in June by the Board was not
accomplished by a Board decision in the manner
contemplated in Article 17(E) of the Supplemental
Agreement. There is no record that the committee ever
returned to the board to argue or to support its
recommendation, but rather the evidence suggests that the
committee submitted the recommeidation directly to the
union and the company.“™?” It does not appear that any
formal request to negotiate such an agreement was made
by either signatory or that the procedures mandated by the
Railway Labor Act, Section 156 for changing collective
bargaining agreements were followed in its adoption.

€\12 There is no written record of the Board's
consideration of the recommendation as required
in Article 17(M) of the Supplemental Agreement.

The June 18, 1991, District Court Memorandum and Order
further states:

It is undisputed that the proceedings and decision
of the February Board conformed with Article 16
and therefore the Board which convened in June
did not have the authority to settle the dispute
before it. (at 19a)

Although the District Court found that “the Board which
convened in June did not have the authority to settle the dispute

a

10

before it," the Court held the motions of the parties for summary
judgment in abeyance. Further, the District Court granted
Defendant Local 608, or any other Defendant sixty days in which
to brief and submit to the Court any memoranda or evidence
regarding apparent authority as to "whether the company and union
representatives were authorized to create a ‘side agreement’
purporting to interpret a provision of the Supplemental Agreement
resolved previously by a Board ruling."

Detendants Teamsters International Union, Teamsters
Local 608, and UPS, filed supplemental memoranda on August 19,
1991. Plaintiffs filed their motion for leave to respond to
Defendants’ supplemental memoranda, and duly filed their
responses thereto.

On January 24, 1992, the Court entered its Memorandum
and Order that the motion of the Plaintiffs for summary judgment
against the Defendants be and is hereby denied: and further that
the motion of the Defendants for summary judgment on the claims
of the Plaintiffs against them be granted and Plaintiffs’ claims be
dismissed with prejudice. (Appendix 4a)

The District Court held that:

The afiiants attest to the local union officers’
authority to negotiate binding amendments to the
Flight Crewmember Supplemental Agreement to
the CBA. Plaintiffs do not controvert the
affidavits, but argue instead that even if the local
union had authority to enter into binding side
agreements, the members of the "joint company-
union committee" who recommended the change
in the contractual provision were "self-serving."
Plaintiffs allegations’ are not sufficient to
withstand the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

il

U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202
(1986). (Appendix 7a)

The District Court did not address, nor give weight to the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions
on file which clearly controverted Defendants’ affidavits, which
clearly showed that Plaintiffs’ legal argument and the facts
presented supported Plaintiffs’ allegations that the union acted
arbitrarily, discriminatorily, and in bad faith.

The District Court also failed to address the issue before
it, that even if company and union representatives were authorized
to create a Side agreement purporting to interpret a provision of the
Supplemental Agreement resolved previously by a System Board
of Adjustment ruling, the procedures Defendants engaged in did
not abide by the terms of the CBA, the provisions of the RLA, or
the Union’s duty of fair representation.

Plaintiffs appealed the decision of the District Court. The
Sixth Circuit affirmed on January 5, 1993, holding that it found
"no errors warranting reversal." (Appendix 1a)

I. THE DISTRICT COURT DECISION ENTERING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS
COMPLAINT WAS ARBITRARY AND IN ERROR
AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE IT FAILED TO
ADDRESS THE ISSUE SET FORTH IN PLAINTIFFS’
COMPLAINT AND IN THE PARTIES’ MOTIONS
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

The Railway Labor Act forbids changes in pay, rules or
working conditions contrary to the collective bargaining agreement
and contrary to 45 U.S.C. § 156. (45 U.S.C. § 152, Seventh)

i2
Article 2, Section | of the Master Agreement’ states:

No new Supplements, Riders or Addenda to this
Agreement shall be negotiated by any of the
parties hereto, unless otherwise agreed to by the
Employer and the Nationai Negotiating
Commitiee. Any Supplement, Rider or Addendum
not agreed to by the National Negotiating
Committee will be null and void. (Emphasis
added)

The “August Agreement” changing the terms of the
Transition Letter of Agreement, clearly, was not ratified nor
agreed to by the National Negotiating Committee and is not only
null and void, it is in violation of the CBA which does not provide
for a committee, of any number, or any make-up, to negotiate a
change in contract language regarding pay, rules or working
conditions.

Defendant Teamsters Union has stated that the August
document was not an "Agreement", but was merely an
investigation of all the “evidence compiled." (Deposition of
William Ferchak, pp. 66, 68-69). UPS contends that the "August
Agreement" was negotiated by the company and the union.
(Deposition of Lee A. Wallace, p. 140). Regardless of how it is
characterized, the "August Agreement" is invalid. The Collective
Bargaining Agreement does not provide for a "joint company-
union committee" to unilaterally and arbitrarily create new contract
language, nor does it allow for secret company-union negotiations
to change contract language.

Section 156 of the RLA sets forth certain procedures in
changing rates of pay, rules and working conditions. These

*The Flight Crewmembers Supplemental Agreement does not address
the issue of mders or addenda to the contract

—— ————“‘<sirWt:;~*~*~t~t~—~”

13

include written notice of the intended change, and agreement
between the representatives of the parties interested in such change
as to the time and place for conferencing as to the intended
change. Defendants neither complied with the terms of the CBA,
nor the provisions of the RLA. instead, they arbitrarily,
discriminatorily and in bad faith, changed Plaintiffs’ working
conditions with the publication of the document entitled "August
Agreement.”

The issue that was placed before the District Court is
whether the Union breached its duty of fair representation:

a) when it reconsidered the final and binding decision
of the February System Board of Adjustment
which definitively interpreted the contract language
regarding seniority,

b) by calling a special June System Board to hear
meritless and untimely grievances regarding a
System Board Decision which was final and
binding on all parties;

9) by referring those “new grievances” to a “joint
company-union committee” of four crewmembers
for resolution; "°

d) by approving and signing the “recommendation”
of the invalid “committee” as an agreement
between the Company and the Union, which

ba “joint company-union committee” is not an alternative provided for
in the CBA, nor can it be found in the Railway Labor Act When the Board
cannot reach a decision by majority vote, it 1s bound by the terms of the contract
to appoint an independent arbitrator Decisions of the Board with the arbitrator
are also final and binding on the parties. CBA Supplemental, Article 17, Section
E

————————

14

"Agreement" arbitrarily and discriminatorily
changed Plaintiffs’ working conditions.

Plaintiffs have alleged and shown, and the District Court
ruled, that the Board did reconsider its decision without having the
power to do so. This lower court ruling gives rise to at least a
triable issue of material fact as to the arbitrariness of that decision
Nonetheless, the court below erroneously held that the real issue
was, "Whether company and union representatives were authorized
to create a ‘side agreement’ purporting to interpret a provision of
the Supplemental Agreement resolved previously by a Board
ruling.” As Plaintiffs have argued, neither party could
“reinterpret” the provision resolved by the February Board, that
decision being final and binding on both parties. The only means
by which the provision could be found to have another meaning
was to change that provision! Defendants have admitted the
language of the Transition Letter of Agreement was changed by the
August Agreement. (Deposition of Neil Konietzko, p. 80)

The determination as to whether the company and union
were cloaked with actual or apparent authority to change by “side
agreement” the working condition provisions of the CBA,
Supplement, or Transition Letter, is absolutely immaterial to the
decision required of the District Court.

Even assuming, arguendo, that they were so authorized,
the real question remains whether the procedure engaged in to
effect those changes and amendments ultimately did or did not
abide by the terms of the CBA, the provisions of the Railway
Labor Act, and the unions’ duty of fair representation to the
Plaintifts

This issue, which 1s the basis of Plaintitts’ Complaint, was
not addressed by the District Court.

15

iI. PLAINTIFFS HAVE PRESENTED MATERIAL
FACTS RAISING GENUINE ISSUES AS TO
DEFENDANT TEAMSTERS UNION’S BREACH OF
ITS DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION,

On January 18, 1991, each of the four Defendants filed its
Motion for Summary Judgment.

A Defendant Teamsters International.

In its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, Defendant Teamsters International stated at page 22
that

The standard by which the Union shall be judged
is whether it acted “arbitrarily, discriminatorily or
in bad faith.” Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp.,
523 F.2d 306, 309 (6th Cir. 1975), reh’g denied,
528 F.2d 912 (1975); Ratkosky v. United
Transportation Union, 843 F.2d 869, 876 (6th
Cir. 1988).

Teamsters International further stated, at page 21, that:

The Union did not participate in the committee's
deliberations nor did the Union have any input
into the criteria utilized which formed the basis for
the recommendation. No record evidence exists to
the contrary. As a result, Plaintiffs cannot meet
their burden of showing that their allegation
regarding the joint committee was “arbitrarily
discriminatory or self-serving.” More
importantly, however, the Plaintiffs fail to show a
connection to the Union which can even arguably
rise to the level of unlawful conduct on the

Union's part.

16

Clearly, this is an admission of the Union's abnegation of
its responsibility but it does not relieve the Union of its duty to
Plaintiffs. When a union’s conduct is an abdication of the
representative function that violates the duty of fair representation,
it constitutes an unfair labor practice under the Act. Branch 6000
v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 808, 816 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

Although Defendant Union erroneously states at page 18,
that neither the System Board of Adjustment nor the arbitrarily
established joint “committee” “owe the Plaintiffs a duty of fair
representation within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act as
interpreted,"

The union has_ responsibility as exclusive
bargaining agent to formulate the employees’
position on terms and conditions of employment.
This responsibility may be delegated by the union
membership...However, the delegatee, once
Selected, must in turn function as a representative
for all the employees in the bargaining unit. If a
representative's negotiating decisions are motivated
solely by self-interest, then there is a breach of the
duty of fair representation. The same result
attains when the decisionmaking function is
delegated to a group of employees with the
understanding that their actions will be motivated
solely by their own personal considerations. Id at
811-812.

Defendant Teamsters International concluded that “absent
any showing...that the Union here acted on the basis of arbitrary
factors such as race, personal animosity or sheer numbers of
employees in a given group, it cannot be found to have breached
its duty of fair representation." (At pages 26 and 27).

However, Plaintiffs have shown that precisely because of
such political pressure from another, larger group of flight

‘eee eee

17

crewmembers, the Union called a special June System Board of
Adjustment meeting to hear these new grievances, referred the
grievances to a special committee of four crewmembers, and
accepted the "recommendation" of this committee of four
crewmembers as the Union’s own “negotiation” with the company
regarding the issue of seniority. The rule announced in Vaca v
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S. Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967), that
4 union breaches its duty of fair representation if its actions are
either arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith, applies to all union
activity, including contract negotiation. By its conduct, the union
clearly breached its duty to Plaintiffs, and violated the standards as
set out in the 6th Circuit decisions in Ruzicka, and Ratkosky and
the Supreme Court decision in Vaca vy, Sipes, 386 U.S. 171
(1967).

B. Defendant Teamsters Local 608.

In its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, Defendant Teamsters Local 608 stated at page 19 that:

It is well established that a claim of unfair
representation requires a showing of bad faith,
discrimination, or arbitrary conduct on the part of
the Union. Ratkosky v. United Transportation
Union, 843 F.2d 869, 876 (6th Cir. 1988), citing
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).

At page 24 of its Memorandum, Defendant Teamsters
Local 608 stated that:

After the February-March system board issued its
decision, over 150 pilots signed a petition
protesting the decision which was presented to the
Union.

At page 25 of its Memorandum, Defendant Teamsters
Local 608 stated that:

18

Not only did representatives of those
crewmembers who grieved the March decision
appear and make lengthy presentations at the June
hearing, but, at the Union’s invitation, two
crewmembers who made major presentations at the
February-March hearing appeared and reiterated
their presentations at the June hearing."

Admitting, at page 31 of its Memorandum, that,
"Employees have ‘no absolute right to have [their] grievances
taken to arbitration’ by their Union Representatives, Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967); see also Hines v. Anchor Motor
Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 567 (1976)," the union, nonetheless,
acquiesced to a majority group and heard the new grievances at a
special June System Board of Adjustment.

Admitting at page 27 that, "the Union and UPS
incorporated the Committee’s recommendation into what ultimately
became the August Agreement,” Teamsters Local 608 went on to
categorize this action by the Union as a "reasonable and logical
approach to the dispute." Nothing can be more unreasonable or
illogical than the union’s arbitrary and discriminatory conduct.

At page 26 of its Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, Local 608 stated that the dispute was
"irreconcilable." In reality, the dispute had been reconciled by the
February System Board. The Board’s decision was consistent with
the language of the collective bargaining agreement and was final
and binding on all parties. Also, on page 26 of its Memorandum,
Local 608 characterized the August 2, 1989, agreement, as a
"compromise." The August agreement can hardly be considered
a compromise, when all members of the “joint company union

11 .
These two. union-invited crewmembers are the same_ two

crewmembers the union appointed as “committee” members

19

committee" benefitted from their "recommendation" at the expense
of Plaintiffs.

The acceptance and implementation of such a biased
agreement by Local 608 is clearly an arbitrary and discriminatory

action made in bad faith.

ce. Defendant UPS.

In its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, Defendant UPS stated at page 23 that:

The standard by which Local 608’s conduct is to
be measured has been set forth by the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Ratkosky v. United
Transportation Union, supra. In order to establish
a breach of the duty of fair representation,
Plaintiffs must make "a showing of bad faith,
discrimination, or arbitrary conduct on the part of
the union.”

Defendant UPS further stated at page 25 that:

Over one hundred and fifty crewmembers who had
heen moved down on the seniority lists filed a
petition protesting the March 9, 1989 System
Board decision as being contrary to the contract
and to what they had been told when hired.

Neil Konietzko and William Ferchak decided to

call a special System Board of Adjustment to hear
the grievances which protested the March 9, 1989
System Board decision. (Konietzko, page 31.)

20
D. Defendant Independent Pilots Association,

In its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, Defendant Independent Pilots Association stated at
pages 4 and S that:

Initially, a four member System Board composed
of Company and Union members agreed with this
interpretation and sustained the grievances. UPS
Exh. 10.

The decision required reconfiguration of seniority
placement and, naturally, provoked grievances
from adversely affected pilots. Indeed, over one
hundred grievances were filed against the System
Board’s decision. Grahn Dep. 68.

Although admitting that a decision of the February System
Board regarding seniority would “naturally provoke grievances
from adversely affected pilots," the fact that over 100 grievances
were filed, is suggested by Defendant IPA to be the significant
factor as to why the Union breached its duty of good faith toward
Plaintiffs and arbitrarily and discriminatorily changed the contract
language.

Union Trustee William Ferchak, when asked in his
deposition what evidence he relied on in adopting the August
Agreement, replied that he relied on the letters from the four
contract negotiators’? and the recommendations of the committee.
(Ferchak deposition, pages 47-49.) Ferchak also testified at pages
43-45 of his deposition that he considered Greene’s letter as
improper evidence, doubted the credibility of Landsman’s

"The four contract negotiators were Richard Greene, Peter Landsman,
Bill Reid and Bill Mann (former IPX employees, who held the first 25 seniority
numbers.

21

testimony, and felt that Mann “at that particular time was under a
lot of duress because the rank and file was getting on him for the
contract and some other things that he had done, so I couldn't put
too much stock into any of them, to be very truthful." Yet, in
spite of this improper evidence and non-credible testimony, the
Union Trustee, William Ferchak, issued the August Agreement in
conjunction with the employer, UPS, which, (as admitted by the
Defendant UPS) changed the contract language and the working
conditions of the Plaintiffs. To allow four crewmembers, not
authorized by the contract, and with self-serving interests to
"weigh" the decision of the February System Board was an
abdication of the Union's representative function and clearly
violated the duty of fair representation. This constitutes an unfair
labor practice.

Although both Plaintiffs’ Complaint and the Defendants’
Motions for Summary Judgment all dealt with the issue as to
whether the Union breached its duty of fair representation and
whether the Company breached the collective bargaining
agreement, the District Court in its Memorandum and Order of
June 18, 1991, granted Defendant Local 608, or any other
Defendant sixty days in which to brief and submit to the Court any
memoranda or evidence regarding an entirely different issue, the
apparent authority as to “whether the company and union
representatives were authorized to create a side agreement
purporting to interpret a provision of the supplemental agreement
resolved previously by a Board ruling.” All Defendants responded
to the invitation of the District Court. Plaintiffs filed a motion for
leave to respond to the submitted memoranda.

This side issue, newly presented by the District Court, in
no way supersedes the issues in Plaintiffs’ Complaint and the
issues before the Court; breach of duty of fair representation,
breach of the CBA. However, in its Order of January 24, 1992,
granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment against the
Plaintiffs and denying Plaintiffs’ summary judgment against the
Defendants, the District Court disregarded the pleadings,

22

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file
regarding the issues of bad faith and breach of contract. The
Court held that Plaintiffs did not controvert Defendants’ affidavits
regarding the extraneous issue of the Union’s authority to create
a side agreement purporting to interpret a provision of the
supplemental agreement resolved previously by a System Board of
Adjustment ruling.

The District Court did not address the issue of whether the
procedures the Defendants engaged to effect such changes, if
indeed they were authorized to make them, did or did not abide by
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, the provisions of
the Railway Labor Act, and a union’s duty of fair representation,

il. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ADDRESS THE
ISSUE BEFORE IT BUT INSTEAD DISMISSED
PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT BASED ON AN ISSUE
IRRELEVANT TO THE CASE.

The issue before the Court was whether Defendant Union
breached its duty of fair representation and whether Defendant
UPS breached the collective bargaining agreement.

Clearly, the Court misunderstood or misinterpreted the
issues. The Complaint alleges and the parties’ Motions for
Summary Judgment argue the issue of whether the Union breached
its duty of fair representation and whether the company breached
the collective bargaining agreement. The new “issue” presented
by the District Court is irrelevant to the Complaint and to the
Motions for Summary Judgment before it.

Plaintiffs maintain that even if the Union had the authority
to reconsider a final and binding decision, or whether the company
and the union representatives were authorized to create a side
agreement purporting to interpret a provision of the supplemental
agreement resolved previously by a Board ruling, the issue placed
before the Court is whether the procedures engaged in by the

'

23

Defendants to effect such changes and amendments ultimately did

or did not abide by the terms of the collective bargaining |
agreement, the provisions of the Railway Labor Act, and a union’s

duty of fair representation regarding contract changes.

Citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), the District Court held
that Plaintiffs’ allegations are not sufficient to withstand the
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. However, the Court
does not identify to which allegations it refers. The allegations in
the Complaint, the allegations in Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary
Judgment, the allegations in Plaintiffs’ Response and Objection to
Defendants’ Motions for Summ.» Judgment, or Plaintiffs’
Response to Defendants’ Supplemental Memoranda and Evidence
regarding the issue of apparent union authority to enter into
binding side agreements.

In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at page 248,
regarding the issue as to materiality, the court held that:

As to materiality, the substantive law will identify
which facts are material. Only disputes over facts
that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment. Factual disputes that are
irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted. See
generally 1OA C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure, Section 2725, pp
93-95 (1983).

...More important for present purposes, summary
judgment will not lie if the dispute about a
material fact is "genuine," that is, if the evidence
is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.

24

In the present action, Plaintiffs allege that the Union
breached its duty of fair representation and the company breached
the collective bargaining agreement. Defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment arguing that the Union’s action was not
arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. As nonmoving or
adverse parties, Plaintiffs responded, based on the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
showing that there is indeed a genuine issue as to material fact and
that the moving parties, Defendants Union and company, are not
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

In Anderson, the Supreme Court held that, “at the
summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not himself to
weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to
determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial."

The court in Anderson further stated at page 255 that:

Our holding that the clear and convincing standard
of proof should be taken into account in ruling on
summary judgment motions does not denigrate the
role of the jury. It by no means authorizes trial
on affidavits. Credibility determinations, the
weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of
legitimate inferences from the facts are jury
functions, not those of a judge, whether he is
ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for
a directed verdict. The evidence of the nonmovant
is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are
to be drawn in his favor. Adickes, 398 U.S., at
158-159, 26 L.Ed.2d 142, 90 S. Ct. 1598.
Neither do we suggest that the trial court should
act other than with caution in granting summary
judgment or that the trial court may not deny
Summary judgment in a case where there is reason
to believe that the better course would be to
proceed to a full trial. Kennedy v. Silas Mason

25

Co., 334 U.S. 249, 92 L.Ed. 1347, 68 S. Ct.
1031 (1948).

The Court of Appeals issued its affirming decision on
January 5, 1993, stating only that, "having carefully reviewed the
record and the issues presented in the appellate briefs and the
arguments of counsel, we find no error warranting reversal."

In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., a libel action brought
by a public figure, Plaintiff was required under the first
amendment to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant acted with actual malice. The court held that:

...{A] court ruling on a motion for summary
judgment must be guided by the New York Times
"clear and convincing" evidentiary standard in
determining whether a genuine issue of actual
malice exists - that is, whether the evidence
presented is such that a reasonable jury might find
that actual malice had been shown with convincing
clarity. Because the Court of Appeals did not
apply the correct standard in reviewing the District
Court’s grant of summary judgment, we vacate its
decision and remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In the present action, Plaintitts allege that the Defendant
union breached its duty of fair representation and the Defendant
employer breached the collective bargaining agreement. The
evidentiary standard in determining whether a genuine issue of
breach of duty and breach of contract exists is whether the union
acted arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith and whether the
Company’s actions were contrary to the terms of the CBA.

The District Court did not address the issue before it, but
instead, ruled on an “issue” irrelevant to the case, and dismissed

26

Plaintiffs’ Complaint based on that erroneous ruling. Plaintiffs
appealed the decision of the District Court.

The issue before the Court now is whether the Court of
Appeals, in affirming the District Court decision, did or did not
apply the correct standard in reviewing the District Court’s grant
of summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
should therefore be granted, and this Court should vacate the
decision below, and remand the case for further proceedings in
light of the stated issues before the District Court.

Respectfully submitted,

Hollis L. Searcy

Attorneys at Law

Republic Building, Suite 400
429 West Muhammad Ali Blvd.
Louisville, Kentucky 40202

(502) 582-1100

COUNSEL FOR PETITIONERS

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386011_2262%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
