# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Browning v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1993
- **Citation:** 507 U.S. 1052

## Text

99. J 562 Suoremea Court Us
EILEC

NO. MAR 16 1993

Q6EIOR OF THE CiiRK

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

RODNEY BROWNING PETITIONER
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RESPONDENT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
NINTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
? we Pe, re
a4 ae fi, — .
DEANNA L. DENNISON
Counsel for Petitioner
524 Greenup Street
Covington, Kentucky 41011
(606) 491-3700

a Ean it ad 2) w oti

:
e

re

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

ne

WHETHER THE TRIAL
COURT DENIED THE

DEFENDANT HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO COUNSEL IN

VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT BY FAILING
TO GRANT THE
PETITIONER’S MOTION TO
SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL.

AS

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nite td hu te
Sioa stil. hii limit

PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING

The parties to this proceeding are
those contained in the caption of the case
in this Court, namely:

RODNEY BROWNING. ° 2© © © e« « e PETITIONER
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA .. . RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions Presented for Review. .... i

Parties to the Proceeding ....... ii
Table of Contents .... Peete so «ee
Table of Authorities... a oe ee Fe |

Reference to Opinions in the
er ee ee ee ee ee

Statement of Jurisdictional
CPPCC CC eT. . es 5 5 » « 6 «© » « AV

Constitutional Provisions,
I RAO gl kl ltl tl tl tl tl tl tlCUWY

Statement of the Case and Basis

for Federal Jurisdiction ...... 1
Mies 6 6 s & 5 &© © © © © © «© «© 0 «© Lh
EE ee ee ©
To) a a 4 |

Dr owe se 5 6 6 6 + « & «© « «© « 29

li

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 83
inngeeee Gan, 205 §.Ct.- 830
i Cicero w eS ey | Ue

: McKinnon v. State, 526 P.2d, 18,
yy Be NE ES a} ee 21

Slappy v. Morris, 649, F.2d 718
; oem aes SOAR a x tk Uw es 88; 90,
4 23

| U.S. v. McClendon, 782 F.2d 785,
‘ 789 (9th Cir. 1986)
: Peet a a tk os se ele oe, 3S

U.S. v. Rogers, 769 F.2d 1418,
Gas Cwem Gals LUGS). «+ + «© « «+ « 26

U.S. v. Walker, 915 F.2d 480,
: 482 (9th Cir. 1990)
4 oe | a a

U.S. v. Williams, 594 F.2d 1258,
1260-61 (9th Cir. 1979) ..... 16

iii

OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

The opinion delivered in the Court
below, that is, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, affirmed
the Petitioner’s conviction on December
16, 1992 by Judgment and Order Number 91-
50317 which was not recommended for
publication. A copy of the Memorandum of
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
consisting of five pages is appended
hereto.

JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS

etP The Opinion of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals was rendered on
December 16, 1992.

eser No request was made for
rehearing and no extension was requested
for additional time to file this Petition.

CZ2a) The Supreme Court has
jurisdiction to grant Certiorari in this
case and the statutory provision believed

to confer jurisdiction on this Court to

iv

‘ —
‘ ; 3?

review the judgment in question by Writ of

Certiorari is 28 U.S.C. Section 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
AND RULES

The following Constitutional
Provisions\are involved:

The Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution states as
follows:

"In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime

cnt AA i a eee ek AR A eae ae ee

: shall have been committed, which
: district shall have been previously
| ascertained by law, and to _ be
: informed of the nature and

‘ cause of the accusation; to be

confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and
3 to have the assistance of counsel for
| his defense."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND BASIS FOR
FEDERAL JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit has jurisdiction over appeals from
final judgment under 28 U.S.C. Section
1254(1) and from final sentence under 18
U.S.C. Section 3742(a) (2).

On July 18, 1987 the United States of
America, in a multi-defendant, multi-count
indictment, as superseded by a fourth
Superseding indictment filed on December
3, 1987, as redacted by the United States
of America before trial, charged the
Defendant, RODNEY BROWNING, with one count
of conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C.
Section 846, and two counts of
distribution of a Schedule II controlled
substance in violation of 21 U.S.C.
Section 841(a)(1) (counts 15 and 23 of the
fourth superseding indictment).

The Defendant was not arraigned until
September 12, 1989, at which time he pled

not guilty to all the charges against him

and a public defender was appointed to
represent him. An initial trial date was
set for November 7, 1989; however, by

Stipulation of the parties, without

consulting the Defendant, the trial date

was vacated and an order was entered by
the court that a new trial date be set at
such time as the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals entered an opinion regarding the
district court’s ruling denying certain
co-defendants’ motions to suppress wiretap
evidence which was used at their trials.
The Defendant was not present at the
motion to suppress nor was the Defendant’s
public defender and therefore, no one was
present on behalf of the Defendant to
cross examine the Government’s witnesses
on the Defendant’s behalf.

After the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals entered its opinion in the appeals
which affirmed the denial by the district

court of their motions to suppress the

or a oY “=o

——

wiretap evidence at their trials, the
court reset the Defendant’s trial for
November 27, 1990.

On October 4, 1990, approximately
eight weeks’ before trial, a status
conference was held, with the Defendant
and his public defender being present.
The court had received a letter from the

Defendant in which he vehemently expressed

his dissatisfaction with defense counsel
on the following grounds: that his public
defender did not have the time to prepare
a defense because he was very involved in
another case which hadn’t allowed him to
work on the Defendant’s case, that his
public defender hadn’/t visited him
regarding his case, .hadn’t returned his
phone calls, hadn’t presented any motions
in his case, and hadn’t even advised him
whether he would even be going to trial.
In response, the Defendant’s' public

defender admitted that he hadn’t returned

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the Defendant’s phone calls and had
delegated the visitation time to his
"court-appointed investigator" who has
"run the ball substantially on that
particular issue." He acknowledged that
there had been "time constraints" (for
over a year?) and that "I delegated to the
extent that I did and felt the delegation
was as to tasks which I felt were
appropriate to delegate." The Defendant’s
public defender acknowledged to the court
that he was very involved in another case
and agreed that the Defendant was correct.

Upon further examination by the
court, the Defendant’s public defender

revealed that a dispute existed between

the Defendant and himself regarding a
"Stipulation" as to the authenticity of
certain tapes to be used at trial. He
claimed that if the Defendant did not

stipulate that his "task would be just a

bit harder" and that the Defendant should

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not hold that against his performance.

The court disagreed.

Court:

It is the Petitioner’s
absolute right not to

stipulate and that if it

takes a little longer to
present the case, then
sobeit. His right is
paramount. You may explain
to him what the pros and
cons are, but ultimately
that has to be his choice.

The court then asked the Defendant to

comment upon
concerning his

Defendant:

Court:

Defendant:

Court:

Defendant:

the letter he wrote
representation.

I had him for the last 12,
13 months and I just, I
have been sitting over in
the jail over there and I
haven’t seen nobody...I
haven’t seen him even at
the jail over 10 times.

Have you been seeing his
people from his office,
investigators?

No...I have seen Kristine
two times, two to three
times in the last six
months.

Have you been presented
with transcripts, digest
and things like that?

Back in April.

Court: But, those are the same
transcripts that we will
be dealing with in trial.

Defendant: Transcripts or digests.
Since June she came one
time.

Court: Have things been left with

you to look at?

Defendant: Back in April. I haven’t
had nothing else since
that.

The court recognized that the Defendant
had been in custody for 12 or 13 months
and made it known to the Defendant’s
public defender that he was concerned

about his lack of contact with his client.

Court: Now, Mr. Nicolaysen, from
now until November 27, is
almost eight weeks,
seven weeks, its plenty of
time. You have to make
more time to see Mr.
Browning. You have to make
more time to see Mr.
Browning...But, from here
on in you have got to at
the end of the day march
over there at 5:00 o’clock
and speak to Mr.

Browning and find a way to
communicate with him.

After reviewing the Defendant’s

“ae

complaints in open court and the response
of the Defendant’s public defender, the
district court denied the Defendant’s
request for appointment of new counsel.
On November 13, 1990, seven days
before trial, the Defendant, in a panic,
sent another letter to the court
expressing his desire to substitute
counsel because of the public defender’s
continuing lack of communication with him
and their relationship as attorney and
client.
The Defendant’s public defender
responded by submitting to the lower court

a declaration under seal which the

Defendant and the United States had no

right to see or respond to. The Court on

its own reviewed the response of the

Defendant’s public defender and refused to

openly address the Petitioner’s fears and

concerns about his representation.

Court: I invited his response
and what I will do is

Court:

Nicolaysen:

Court:

Gordon:

Court:

Gordon:

Court:

study his response and
your letter. I don’t have
a chance right now. If
necessary, I will hold
another hearing or make
some appropriate order

as a result. In other
words, I have your

letter and I have his
response.

You filed your declaration
under seal.

I don’t want to serve the

Government with it or have

it be a part of public
record.

I will keep it under seal.
This has to doe with his
response to Mr. Browning’s
motion regarding some of
Mr. Browning’s concerns
about his representation.

I don’t see why that should

be filed under seal. I
assume the defendant is
trying to get Mr.
Nicolaysen excused or

substituted out.
Yes.

There is no basis for the
government not being able
to see the argument.

Shouldn’t that be only if I
find it to be meritorious?
In other words, if I am
able to rule on the papers
without further inquiry,

Gordon:

Gordon:

Court:

shouldn’t I protect the
confidence?

In other words, if I read
the papers and I find that
based upon my reading of
the papers that the motion
is without merit, then I
think I ought to keep the
declaration under seal.

If I believe that it
warrants further inquiry,
then I think that I ought
to consider unsealing it.
Shouldn’t it wait an
initial examination.

Here is the only reason I
think it may not. What if
the government has’ some
explanation for certain
things that may, in

fact, show the defendant’s
claim lacks merit? Your
Honor may not know it.
Defense counsel may not
have known st. The
government may say, No,
your Honor, Rodney
Browning’s argument on this
is insufficient because of
a oe 2

Assume your Honor goes
ahead and denies the
motion. Rodney Browning
would have an appeal down
the line for improperly
denying to substitute
counsel when we may be
able to circumvent that
argument.

Let’s just wait a reading
of the response. I haven’t

done that yet.
I just received it.

The court issued an Order stating
that the Defendant’s letter to the court
dated October 31, 1990 be considered a
motion to relieve court appointed counsel,
and that the court, having reviewed the
defendant’s motion and the declaration of
counsel Gregory Nicolaysen, filed under
seal, denied the Defendant’s motion
without a hearing and no further
discussion was permitted.

The Government began to try its case
on November 27, 1990. Upon closing their
case, the Defendant’s public defender
Simply stood up and declared that the
defense rested without presenting any
evidence or calling a single witness. As
the district court began to instruct the
jury, the Defendant, obviously ina fit of
frustration and anger over his’ public
defender’s refusal to present any defense

on his behalf, when he was facing life

10

without parole, literally attacked his
attorney in front of the jury.

The jury was excused after having
witnessed the altercation between the
Defendant and his attorney, only to return
twenty-five minutes later observing the
Defendant hand-cuffed and sitting with the
marshalls, while his attorney sat alone at
defense table.

The court allowed defense counsel an
hour and a half to compose himself and
present his closing argument while in
tattered clothes.

When proceedings resumed the
afternoon of November 29, 1990, counsel
announced that they had reached a plea
bargain agreement whereby the Defendant
would plead guilty to count 23 of the
redacted indictment, in return for which
the Government would drop the conspiracy
charge (count 1 of the indictment) as well

as count 15 of the redacted indictment.

11

7

2

The court refused to accept the plea
bargain agreement on the basis that the
trial had concluded and the government’s
case was strong (which is obvious when no
defense was presented).

Consequently, the jury returned a
verdict of guilty on all counts. The
Defendant was ultimately sentenced to life
on Count I and received thirty (30) years
each on Counts 15 and 23.

ARGUMENT FOR GRANTING WRIT

THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
NINTH CIRCUIT HAS SO FAR
DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND
USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS, OR sO FAR
SANCTIONED SUCH A DEPARTURE BY A
LOWER COURT, AS TO CALL FOR AN
EXERCISE OF THE SUPREME COURT’S
POWER OF SUPERVISION.

The Defendant was clearly denied his
right to counsel granted to him under the
Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. The Defendant was an
indigent black person who was facing a

sentence of life in prison. Counsel had

12

been appointed to represent him due to his
indigency and the Defendant’ clearly
extremely concerned about his
representation due to the fact that his
attorney had not come to see him for over
twelve to thirteen months and he sent a
letter to the court requesting the court
to substitute counsel. The court
chastised his public defender and
requested that the public defender do a
better job of communicating with the
Defendant. Defendant’s counsel admitted
not having enough time to handle this case
because he was handling another case.
Upon the court’s direction regarding any
other concerns that he may have the
Defendant again wrote a letter to the
court again prior to trial continuing to
address the same concerns he had addressed
approximately eight weeks ago regarding
his representation. The court refused to

openly address the issues that were

13

troubling the Defendant and permitted the
public defender to respond to the
Defendant’s letter under seal. Both the
United States and the Defendant were not
permitted to witness the response of the
Defendant. He made a decision, the
substance of which could not be reviewed
by anyone and denied the Defendant’s
ultimate Motion. The Defendant’s fears
were obviously confirmed when at trial his
attorney, after the Government closed his
case, his attorney failed to present a
defense and rested without putting on any
witnesses. The Defendant was frustrated

and popped his attorney.

Under the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, a
person accused of a crime has the right to
have assistance of counsel for his or her
defense. The right to counsel means more

however, than the right merely to have

some attorney physically present with the
accused during a criminal proceeding. The
right to counsel is regarded as implying a
right to effective assistance by competent
defense counsel and if counsel’s
performance at a given proceeding does not
meet reasonable professional standards or
if the judge, prosecutor, or others so
interfere with the defense that counsel is
unable to properly defend the accused’s
interests, then the accused may have
grounds for relief of his conviction,
sentence | or other adverse decision

resulting from the proceeding, Evitts v.

Lucey, 469 U.S.387, 821, 105 S.Ct. 830
(1985).

The following factors are considered
when reviewing a denial of a motion to
substitute counsel by an indigent
Defendant: (1) the timeliness of the
defendant’s motion; (2) the adequacy of

the court’s inquiry into the defendant’s

15

CO PRE ae

complaint; and (3) whether the conflict
between the defendant and his attorney was
so great that it resulted in a total lack
of communication preventing an adequate

defense. U.S. v. Rogers, 769 F.2d 1418

1423 (9th Cir. 1985). U.S. v. Walker, 915

F.2d 480, 482 (9th Cir. 1990).

First, in nearly all cases which
address the issue of substitution of
counsel by an indigent Defendant made the
motion literally on the eve of trial.

U.S. v. McClendon, 782 F.2d 785, 789 (9th

Cir. 1986). U.S. v. Williams, 594 F.2d

1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1979).

Secondly, the Court must focus its
inquiry into the nature and extent of the
conflict etveen defendant and counsel and
not just to the competency of counsel.

U.S. v. Walker, 915 F.2d 480 (9th Cir.

1990). In the instant case, at the
hearing on October 4, 1990, the court

merely identified that the Defendant was

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counsel more than eight weeks _ before

trial, and was directed by the court to

relate any further concerns he had to his
attention. The Defendant attempted to
inform the court again in a second letter
of his concerns regarding his
representation which was addressed by the
Court seven (7) days prior to trial.
Secondly, the Court must focus its
inquiry into the nature and extent of the
conflict between defendant and counsel and
not just to the competency of counsel.

U.S. v. Walker, 915 F.2d 480 (9th Cir.

1990). In the instant case, at a hearing
held on October 4, 1990, the court simply
let the attorney Know that the Defendant
was concerned about his lack of personal
contact with him throughout the previous
thirteen (13) months and that the
Defendant feared that he was not devoting

enough time to his case to be adequately

prepared for trial. The court’s inquiry

did not attempt to determine; however, how
the Defendant’s concerns and his
attorney’s lack of contact might have
already affected the attorney’s ability to
prepare the case. In other words, given
the lack of contact, had any meaningful
attorney/client relationship really been
established? Furthermore, it becane
apparent to the court that the Defendant
and his attorney were fighting about his
attorney stipulating, without his
approval, to the authenticity of certain
tapes to be used at trial. The Court
instructed the attorney to make more time
to see his client in order tc prepare for
trial and to respect his client’s thoughts
about the stipulation.

Apparently, the Defendant ina panic,
sent another letter to the court which
reemphasized his concern about his

representation. The court acknowledged

its receipt and treated the letter as a

motion to substitute counsel. Instead of
inquiring into the matter further in open
court, the court permitted the Defendant’s
public defender to submit a response to be

reviewed by the court under seal, over the

Government’s objection.

No further inquiry was made, no
hearing was held and no discussion took
place ragandine this issue. The court
Simply denied the Defendant’s motion based
upon information that was not put in the
record.

In Slappy v. Morris, 649 F.2d 718

(9th Cir. 1981) the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held because of the importance of
the attorney/client relationship to the
substance of the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, the Sixth
Amendment encompasses the right to have
the trial court accord weight to that
relationship in determining whether to

grant a continuance founded on the

19

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temporary unavailability of the
defendant’s attorney. In Slappy the
defendant’s public defender prepared his
case for trial but became ill with
appendicitis and could not appear on his
behalf. Without consulting the defendant,
another public defender took his place one
week before trial. On the day of trial
the defendant complained to the court
about the new attorney’s lack of time to
prepare and insisted the case be continued
until his original attorney could return
to try it. The court overruled his motion
for a iphininos and forced the defendant
to proceed with the attorney who was not
prepared. Throughout the trial the
defendant complained that the case should
be continued because the new attorney was
not adequately prepared and that his right
to counsel was being infringed.
Eventually his new counsel asked to be

removed because he felt he could not

20

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render effective assistance in the face of
such conflict. After a conference in
chambers, however, he withdrew his motion.
The defendant was eventually convicted.
On appeal, the court held the refusal
under the circumstances, to grant a
continuance, constituted a violation of
the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. On appeal the Ninth Circuit held
the right to counsel includes more than
just the right to representation by
competent counsel at trial. It concluded
that the right would be without substance
if it did not also include a right to a

meaningful attorney/client relationship.

The special nature of the relationship was
explained by the Alaska Supreme Court in

McKinnon v. State, 526 P.2d 18, 22 (Alaska

1974) (footnotes omitted) in pertinent
part as follows:
The attorney/client relationship
involves an intimate process of

consultation and planning which
culminates in a state of trust

21

and confidence between the
client and his attorneys.
Often, the outcome of a criminal
trial may hinge upon the extent
to which the defendant is able
to communicate to his attorney
the most intimate and
embarrassing details of his
personal Jife. Complete candor
in attorney/client consultations
may disclose defenses or
mitigating circumstances’ that
defense counsel would not
otherwise have uncovered. At
the very least, an open exchange
between attorney and client will
often foreclose the possibilit:
of surprise at trial.

"Representation at trial is without
Substance if the defendant does not have
confidence in his attorney’s ability to
represent the defendant’s best interest.
It is unlikely that a criminal defendant
will have a legal education. He
therefore, will have to rely on _ the
attorney’s advice for the most basic
decisions in a criminal trial -- whether
to plead guilty, whether to testify,
whether to present a defense, and which
witnesses to call. If the defendant does

not trust his attorney, he may be

22

unwilling to follow his attorney’s advice

in these most important areas." Slappy,
649 F.2d 718, 720, 721 (1981).

The court in the Defendant’s case did
not inquire inke the extent of damage to
the attorney/client relationship caused by
the attorney’s lack of communication with
his client. The court seemed to assume
that more communication between them would
solve any concerns the defendant might
have. The events that followed clearly
indicate that irreconcilable differences
had developed between the Defendant and
his attorney which resulted in a total
lack of communication between them. The
Defendant, one week before trial and upon
the court’s specific direction, attempted
once again to inform the court regarding
his ongoing concerns about his

representation and relationship with his

attorney. Instead of investigating
further, the court accepted ae sealed
23

ae

statement from defense counsel and without

a hearing overruled the Defendant’s motion
to have new counsel appointed.

At trial, the inadequacy of the
court’s inquiry appeared immediately when,
after thirteen (13) months of alleged
trial preparation, the Defendant’s
attorney presented no defense on his
behalf. Although some may argue such a
tactic to be legitimate trial strategy,
such an explanation is weak in the face of
the attorney’s insistence that he had at
all times been doing his best to prepare
the Defendant’s case and is consistent
with the Defendant’s continuous claim that
his attorney had not been working on his
case.

When the Petitioner attacked his
attorney in front of the jury, it should
have been clear that the mistrust and
animosity the Petitioner felt toward his

attorney was too great to have allowed any

24

meaningful attorney/client relationship to

have ever developed between them. Instead
of attempting to discern whether the
Defendant’s actions were truly a
manifestation of legitimate frustration or
simply a desperate attempt to
intentionally prevent a mistrial, the
court continued on. The court made a snap
judgment, without any further inquiry,
that the Defendant’s actions were merely
an intentional ploy to derail the trial.
In addition, he further prejudiced the
Defendant by demanding that the trial
continue, forcing the Defendant’s attorney
to give a closing argument in torn
clothing, and by making the defendant sit
in handcuffs with the bailiffs in clear
view of the jury while his attorney sat
alone at counsel table.

The Defendant felt more than mere

frustration because obviously no

attorney/client relationship ever existed.

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He was facing a life sentence. He had
extremely serious concerns’ about his
representation which were swept under the
rug as if they were of little consequence.
And then, his attorney put on no proof on
his behalf. He simply stood up and
rested.

Clearly, the court’s inquiry into the
extent of conflict between the Defendant
and his attorney had been deficient. The
defense attorney’s lack of pretrial
communication with his client, his failure
to present a defense on behalf of his
client as well as the Defendant’s behavior
at trial clearly indicated that
irreconcilable differences had developed
between them resulting in a total lack of
communication, and that no meaningful
attorney/client relationship had ever been
established.

This Court should grant Certiorari

because the Court of Appeals for the Ninth

26

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Circuit has so far sanctioned the lower
court’s departure from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings as it
relates to the trial court’s sealing and

withholding of evidence critical to the

determination of the Defendant’s right to
counsel guaranteed to him under the United
States Constitution, as to call for an
exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of

supervision.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Counsel
for the Petitioner respectfully urges that

this Petition be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

DENNISON & ASSOCIATES

4

DEANNA L. DENNISON
Attorney for Petitioner
524 Greenup Street
Covington, Kentucky 41011
(606) 491-3700

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WM nts RO Fe TN MIE We SUP HES tee

Re oe Sees De Pep ek = aor eT ae

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have this

Lo day of March, 1993 mailed a copy of
the foregoing Petition for Writ of
Certiorari by first class postage prepaid
to the Solicitor General of the United
States, Department of Justice, Washington,
D.C. 20530; Cathy A. Catterson, Clerk of
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, Two Rincon Center, 121
Spear Street, San Francisco, California
94105, and three copies to the Assistant
United States Attorney, John S. Gordon and
Assistant United States Attorney, Lisa B.
Lench, 1400 United States Courthouse, 312
North Spring Street, Los Angeles,
California 90012. .

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- DEANNA L. DENNISON

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386011_2252%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.