# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Schwager v. Texas Commerce Bank, N. A.

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386011_2030%3A1

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1993
- **Citation:** 507 U.S. 1030

## Text

upreme Court, U.S.
FILED

92- ] 26 F YAN 25 1993

qs t : RK

NO.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1992

BRUCE B. SCHWAGER, et al..,
Petitioners,

Vv.

TEXAS COMMERCE BANK, N.A., et al.,
Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

BRUCE B. SCHWAGER- BETTE R. SCHWAGER
2001 Holcombe, Apt. 806

Houston, Texas 77030

(713) 796-2540

Pro Se

NO.

IN THE

oe Court of the Hnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

BRUCE B. SCHWAGER, et al.,
Petitioners,

¥.

TEXAS COMMERCE BANK, N.A., et al.,
Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

BRUCE B. SCHWAGER BETTE R. SCHWAGER
2001 Holcombe, Apt. 806

Houston, Texas 77030

(713) 796-2540

Pro Se

_——————————— re

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Were Petitioners denied their right to Due Process and Equal
Protection of the law and access to the Court as required by the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and
the Texas Constitution art. I §§ 3, 13 and 19 due to the method
of electing judges along with the unlimited campaign contribu-
tions allowed? Is the Texas Election Code Section 251.003
constitutional? Did the hundreds of thousands of dollars in
campaign contributions made by attorneys for Baker & Botts,
Respondent’s law firm, to the trial judge Don Wittig, the Ist
Court of Appeals Judge Murray Cohen and successful candi-
dates to the Texas Supreme Court constitute lack of access to
the court and an obstruction of justice?

Nw

Was Petitioner Bette R. Schwager deprived of her rights and
property without Due Process and Equal Protection of the law
as required by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution and the Texas Constitution art. I §§ 3, 13, 14
and 19 when she was not allowed to prosecute her claims and
defend herself against the taking of her property?

3. Were Petitioners denied their constitutional right of Due
Process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States and the Open Courts Provi-
sion of the Texas Constitution art. I §§ 3, 13 and 19 by not
being afforded a fair opportunity to obtain a meaningful appeal
on the merits of the case when the court of appeals struck 43
of Appellants’ 44 points of error for procedural defects?

4. Were Petitioners denied their right to Due Process and Equal
Protection of the law as required by the U.S. Constitution Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments and the Texas Constitution art. I
§§ 3, 13 and 19 by the Courts of Texas not applying the law
equally to all citizens of the U.S. and the State of Texas? Were
Petitioners denied the benefit of the final judgment entered in
their favor on Oct. 14, 1986? (Appendix “W”) by Ist Court of
Appeals ruling on March 12, 1992 (Appendix “Y"’). Were

rt

Petitioners denied their constitutional rights by the Texas courts
assessing judgment against them without jurisdiction?

5. Were Petitioners denied their mght to Due Process and Equal
Protection of the law as required by the U.S. Constitution Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments and the Texas Constitution art. [
§§ 3, 13 and 19 by the courts of Texas’ use of false and
fraudulent facts to support their opinion along with the allowed
perjury by the trial court?

Note: Schwager v. Texas Commerce Bank, N.A., 813 S.W.2d 225
(Tex. App.—Houston 1991) (per curiam). This case was stated in
the U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Highlights November 1991, page
ix West Supreme Court Reporter Vol. 112 November 1, 1991
No. I.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Pursuant to the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, Petitioners
certify that the following is a complete list of the names of all
parties:

PETITIONERS:

Bruce Schwager, Bette Schwager,

B.B.M.M., Ltd., and B.M. Bayou Corporation
2001 Holcombe

Houston, Texas 77030

RESPONDENTS:

Dr. Malcolm Marcoe
6630 DeMoss Suite A
Houston, Texas

Dr. Harvey Resnick
201 Oak Drive
Lake Jackson, Texas

Fred Fallas
9306 Cliffwood
Houston, Texas

Texas Commerce Bank, N.A.
712 Main
Houston, Texas

Charles Best
3803 Lost Oak
Spring, Texas

iV

Meyer Fallas
9431 Denbury
Houston, Texas

William Cramer ,
9902 Balmforth
Houston, Texas

ATTORNEYS:

Bruce B. Schwager Bette R. Schwager Pro Se
2001 Holcombe, Apt. 806
Houston, Texas 77030

Mr. Robert Axelrad Texas Commerce Bank
1990 Post Oak Boulevard Charles Best
14th Floor

Houston, TX 77056-3814

Mr. Newton B. Schwartz Harvey Resnick
Schwartz, Berger & Valdez, P.C.

723 Main Street

Suite 325

Houston, TX 77002

Mr. John Zavitsanos Texas Commerce Bank
Baker & Bo*ts Charles Best

One Shell Plaza

910 Louisiana

Houston, TX 77002-4995

Ms. Cynthia G. Farris Texas Commerce Bank
Baker & Botts Charles Best

One Shell Plaza, 910 Louisiana
Houston, TX 77002-4995

——

Mr. Neil S. Levin Fred Fallas, Meyer Fallas,
Suite 710 Malcolm Marcoe,
4828 Loop Central Drive William Cramer

Houston, TX 77081-2212

.)

Mr. Joseph D. Cheavens Texas Commerce Bank
Baker & Botts Charles Best

One Shell Plaza

910 Louisiana

Houston, TX 77002-4995

vl

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
eb gg 8G |). ) SE ee rrr ara i
PRUE 2O) Tits PURO oe eee ec ees ill
eS kT Oo ik se oe ee a oe x
I ans wa ke ke ves Se hee ara © eee We l
eo PR ee ee re ee era ee l
ee ee eS Se ee See Se ey Se a ee 2
PERTINENT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ......... 2
ge Ri pry.) aa 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS ............ 5
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ............. il

& Petitioners were denied their right to Due Process and
Equal Protection of the law and access to the Court as
required by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the U.S. Constitution and the Texas Constitution art.
I §§ 3, 13 and 19 due to the method of electing
judges along with the unlimited campaign contribu-
tions allowed. The Texas Election Code Section
251.003 is unconstitutional. The hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars in campaign contributions made by
attorneys for Baker & Botts, Respondent’s law firm,
to the trial judge Don Wittig, the Ist Court of Appeals
Judge Murray Cohen and successful candidates to the
Texas Supreme Court constituted a lack of access to
the court and an obstruction of justice ............ 11

Vil

Petitioner Bette R. Schwager was deprived of her
rights and property without Due Process and Equal
Protection of the law as required by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and
the Texas Constitution art. I §§ 3, 13, 14 and 19 as
she was not allowed to pro:ecute her claims and
defend herself against the taking of her property

Petitioners were denied their constitutional right of
Due Process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution of the United States and the
Open Courts Provision of the Texas Constitution art.
I §§ 3, 13 and 19 by not being afforded a fair oppor-
tunity to obtain a meaningful appeal on the merits of
the case as the court of appeals struck 43 of Appel-

lants’ 44 points of error for procedural defects .....

Petitioners were denied their nght to Due Process and
Equal Protection of the law as required by the U.S.
Constitution Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and
the Texas Constitution art. I §§ 3, 13 and 19 by the
Courts of Texas not applying the law equally to ail
citizens of the U.S. and the State of Texas. Petitioners
were denied the benefit of the final judgment entered
in their favor on Oct. 14, 1986. (Appendix “W”) by
Ist Court of Appeals ruling on March 12, 1992
(Appendix “Y”). Petitioners were denied their consti-
tutional rights by the Texas courts assessing judgment

against them without jurisdiction ..............

Petitioners were denied their nght to Due Process and
Equal Protection of the law as required by the U.S.
Constitution Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and
the Texas Constitution art. I §§ 3, 13 and 19 by the
courts of Texas’ use of false and fraudulent facts to

Page

.

Vill

Page
support their opinion along with the allowed perjury
Ot Se es OE oc cae eR eho ecb eee sc shares 26
CR 4 o:d6s OSCR ES us hore ee ox bok eks 28
APPENDIX “A”: Newspaper Articles -
Campaign Contributions
Legeaed Brmery 2... wees A-|
APPENDIX “B”: Ruling Texas Supreme Court, 9/9/92 .. B-|
APPENDIX “C”: Ruling Texas Supreme Court,
PEE 664-04 ue ea wk eek be C-|
APPENDIX “D”: Judgment Ist Court of Appeals,
rere eres D-|
APPENDIX “E”: Incorrect and Inconsistent Statements .. E-|
APPENDIX “F”: Documents Showing Finality of
86-07376 Judgment .............. F-]
APPENDIX “G”: S.F. Hearing, 5/26/67 ............. G-]
APPENDIX “H”: List of Authorities Submitted to
Texas Supreme Court ............. H-|
APPENDIX “I”: | Newspaper Article:
Texas Justice for Sale... ........55:, I-]
APPENDIX “J”: Newspaper Article:
Law Firm Top Donors to Justices ..... j-1
APPENDIX “K”™: Newspaper Article:
selecting Our Judges ... 2... 0.055, K-]

APPENDIX “L”:

APPENDIX

APPENDIX “

APPENDIX “

APPENDIX “P”:

APPENDIX “

APPENDIX °

“Mi”:
.

APPENDIX “S”

Answer to Action of Trial Court ..... L-1

Answer to Ist Court of Appeals
gt a ae ee ee M-1

Bette Schwager’s Detailed Argument .. N-1

Judgment Case #87-14551 ......... O-1
Respondents’ Trial Pleading ........ P-|
ye ae ae ee eee Q-1

Argument for Finality of 86-07376
SE a aaah eke 6s 0k 6x ee OO R-|

po Le ee S-1

APPENDIX “T”: Arguments for Conspiracy & Perjury .. T-1
APPENDIX “U”: Constitutions and Statutes .......... U-1
APPENDIX “V”": Order Striking 42 Points of Error

ARRAS a ere re V-1
APPENDIX “W”: Judgment Case #86-07396 ......... W-!
APPENDIX “X”: Campaign Contribution Report ...... X-1
APPENDIX “Y”: Opinion Affirming Judgment

APPENDIX “Z”:

Cause #87-14551, 3/12/92 ......... Y-|

Newspaper Article: There are better
ways to finance judicial races than
the way we do in Texas ........... Z-1

X

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page
FEDERAL CASES
Allen v. McCurry, 101 S. Ct. 411 (1980) ............. 25
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) ............ 21
Armstrong v. Manzo, 85 S. Ct. 1187 (1965) ......... 15, 28
Asher v. Swenson, Warden, 397 U.S. 436

eT eee, ie ae alate Geek hoe 26
Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381

Ree oe ay ee ere 18
Barber v. Connolly, 5 S. Ct. 357 (1885)... 2.6 eee 8, 27
Billington v. Undernood, 613 F.2d 91 (CA 5

a EE eee ee ee ee 12
Bounde v. Smith, 97 S. Ct. 1491 (1977) . 2.2... .....858. 15
Brinkerhoff-Farris Trust & Savings Co. v.

Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 50 S. Ct. 451 (1930) ........ 27
Brown v. Felsen, 99 S. Ct. 2205 (1979) .............. 26
Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 110

i es I ee eae See es cance eva es 24
Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Watkins,

ioe Bl ett fe 3 | ere 26

Craig v. Carson, 449 F. Supp. 385 (1979) ............ 17

Xl

Crest v. Lane, 745 F.2d 476 cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 2146, 471 U.S. 1068, 85 L. Ed. 2d

LCE EeT SEE eee ce eee eae

Dirt, Inc. v. Mobile County Com'n, 739 F.2d

cok. | eeererere es Tees eee ee

Douglas v. People of State of California, 83

Ea et || ECT E ee Tee TE eee

Drum vy. Nasuti, 648 F. Supp. 888 (E.D. Pa.

SRR ye eee
Estin v. Estin, 68 S. Ct. 1213 (1948) ...........
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985) ...........

Fay v. Nota, 3 S. Ct. 822 (1903) 2... ce enes

Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 101

ee 2) a re eee
ee RG De ey Se ee

Fuentes v. Sherin, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972) ........

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct.

Rp ee oe ere

Haag v. Cuyahogu County, 619 F. Supp. 262

oe ee

Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 91 S.

Ct. 1778, 29 L. Ed. 2d 423 (1971) ........

‘6's 4 5

Page

——— ee

Xi

Page

Kremer v. Chemical Const. Corp., 102 S. Ct.

SP RU leg ie ce eee Sw eek eae 26
Leis v. Flyn, 439 U.S. 438, 99 S. Ct. 698

1 Peer rs Per Penne irr rege 23
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 102 S. Ct. 1148

CR oe hes ee ee Se ee ee 18, 22
Logan v. Zimmermann Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422

A) Pee eee hee ee ee eee 21
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 333, 96 S.

ay. Reg me Re ae ee er 18
McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894) ............ 21
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427

U.S. 539, 96 S. Ct. 279, 49 L. Ed. 2d 683

Ne ar eh er eae ea ee a aga aly 14
North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di Cheng, Inc.,

419 U.S. at 607, 95 S. Ct. at 722, 42 L.

& Ff 2. o Sie ee re ee ee rere eee 17
Okison vy. Tolley School Dist. No. 25 Renville

County State of N.D., 760 F.2d 864

IE. Fee SE PE hee a is ca ee ws eas 17
Patterson v. Coughlin, 761 F.2d 886 cert.

denied, 106 S. Ct. 879, 474 U.S. 1100,

3 ee FU ee eee ee eee ere 17

Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 92 S. Ct. 1778,
ak Se ee CD AN ea eee ewer 14

17

Xiil

Rinaldi v. Yeager, 86 S. Ct. 1497 (1966) ...........
Schweiker v. McClure, 102 S. Ct. 1665 (1982) .......

Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 94 S. Ct.
EE Vcr th cclah Senn anes ako Sak a ee

Sec. Cox v. State of Louisiana, 85 S. Ct. 476
SEE era iw en ward ak aia eae ware

Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 100 S.

i Se EE sk a 9 bo ae Rone Ss be bce Oo

Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 42 S. Ct.

+ 9). re rere eee a re ee ee ee

United States v. Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 568

SE a4 c ON GGAC Se RS GSe rede Oe eRe EA AAAS

Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458

(| ee ers aren ee eee ee eee

Williams v. Oklahoma City, 89 S. Ct. 1818

(BRE erererTerTer Ee rre Terre ere r ere ee

Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 95 S. Ct.

a eee 6 6h os. re

Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,
OE GP a Gas SUED Soe eae cee ewe nes

para

.

~_—a

24

79

am!

oy)

oll

XIV

Page
STATE CASES

Abbott Laboratories v. Gravis, 470 S.W.2d 639

0 A a re Se Se 9
Beard v. Graft, 801 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. App.San

Amomeo (FFU) 5 kos 4 dee eee eee 10
Citizens State Bank v. Caney Investments, 746

>. Wiae S77 Clem. VE) sc cena eee 8, 23
Crampton v. Dep't of State, 395 Mich. 347,

233 M.W.28 Son CIP Fa) . Vans eae eae anaes 14
Davis v. City of San Antonio, 752 S.W.2d 518

(Hon. 1908) .. k.vs cee een eee ee 19
Fergurson v. Fergurson, 338 S.W.2d 945 (Tex.

| I ira ey egy 5, 8
Gentry v. Credit Plan Corporation of Houston,

548 S.Wae S7i COUR. RR ree cc gwanecisesssenns 8
Houston-American Finance Corporation v.

Travis, 343 S.W.2d 323 (C.A. Tex.--Dallas

SGD) wee es hd eee ye ee ee ee 20
Hunt Production Co. v. Burrage, 104 S.W.2d 84

(CA. Tenement Bate cs. cakn ce ees 25
Inpetco, Inc. v. Texas American Bank, 729

3. Wie SO COR. ORT 5k dae ee ee eee ees 4,19

LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. 1986) ........ 21

XV

Page

Matthews Const. Co., Inc. v. Rosen, 796

er 9, 10
Murray v. Milner, 118 Mich. App. 352, 325

N.W.2d 422 (1982), rev'd, 419 Mich. 872,

ee a as da 6 ae 4 6 oe se 8 14
Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984) ........ 21
Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex.

ES EE rere ee 19
Salvaggio v. Brazos Cty. Water Control, 598

eae 18
Secrest v. Secrest, 649 S.W.2d 610 (Tex.

eee eb chsh evs cersseseues 26
Starnes v. Holloway, 779 S.W.2d 86 (Tex.

ee ee ae 16
Strong v. Pontiac Gen. Hosp., 419 Mich. 872,

| rr 14
Tarango v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 823

S.W.2d 717 (Tex. App.El Paso 1992) ........... 10
Trans-State Pavers, Inc. v. Haynes, 808

S.W.2d 727 (Tex. App.Beaumont 1991) ......... 16
Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State, 106 S.W. 326

ek ko po ev ka betes ss 23

Weaver v. Southwest National Bank, 813 S.W.2d
a con ck se eke eh ee 19

XVI

Page
Williams v. Khalaf, 802 S.W.2d 651 (Tex.
NN See aia hve he aoe A cee a ee ee 19
STATUTES
U.S. Const. amend. 5 ....... 2, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22, 26, 29
U.S. Const. amend. 14 2, 8, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22, 26, 29
ye USS. & Uses. oe UG. © ROE wv nc ss co eases 2
; Xe OM OURS OF eee eee eee ee 2 Vi. 13, 18, 22, 2
Wak, SE, I RS 1S a 5 so ee ces 2, 11, 15, 16, 18, 22, 26
, Re USE CU erry are rrrers area res ae
Th EE ORS EST 3 hs ok ek a. Be Pe ae oe
ek, Sa, GE 6 i'n a ks oss eee aka en 2, £2
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(1)
LN GE, SUD ke eA ew 6 aes Wad eee 4, 20

Texas Election Code Title 15 Chapter 251 §
POC ee Oe ee Ue ena Seo ko eb 2, 11,

30

XVil

Page
MISCELLANEOUS

Anthony Champagne, Campaign Contributions in
Texas Supreme Court Races, 17 Crime, Law
& Socel Chamee 91,91 (IFFE) «ee eee 14

Banner, Disqualifying Elected Judges from
Cases Involving Campaign Contributors, 40
Stanford Law Review 449 ............220005- 14

Black’s Law Dictionary, Sth Edition,
| Et Le Tee PETE ee Te Te 11

Carlson, Mandatory Supersedeas Bond
Requirements: A Denial of Due Process
Rights?, 39 Baylor L. Rev. 29 (1987) ........... 21

Hill, The Texas Plan: Merit Selection of
Judges in Committee of 100, The Texas
Pian: Merit Selection of Judges (1986) ......... 14

Jackson & Riddesperger, Money and Politics in
Judicial Elections: The 1988 Election of
the Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme
Court, 74 Judicature 184 (1991) .............. 14

Schotland, Elective Judges’ Campaign
Financing: Are State Judges’ Robes the
Emperor’s Clothes of American Democracy,
2 Journal of Law and Policy 57 (1985) ......... 14

The Ultimate Injustice: When a Court
Misstates the Facts, 11 Cardoza Law
Se Cee CE © wwe da koe ken 6S ee eee 28

XViil

Page
EE OE raga bg eee a OW ee ee ew be ae 10
NS ci b's a CAR ee ee EERE TER TRE ES 20
O&A rr ae Cree retiree 20
| gt renner Farariare traci 4 19, 20
Pr 5-058 V be oe Ce eee ee ee 19, 20
Sh 6 5G) NKR RE CAE eae 9, 10, 20
1203S Texas Bar Journal, Dec. 1967 ........0 cc ceees 24
1207 Texas Bar Journal, Dec. 1987, footnote 47 ......... 21
32 South Texas Law Review 131-135 ............... 10

75 Corpus Juris Secundum 692 § 29 ..............-. 24

NO.

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1992

BRUCE B. SCHWAGER, et al.,
Petitioners,

v.

TEXAS COMMERCE BANK, N.A., et al.,
Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

PRAYER

Petitioners respectfully request that a Writ of Certiorari issue
to review the Orders of the Texas Supreme Court in this case.

OPINIONS/ORDERS BELOW

The Order of the Texas Supreme Court, upon Petitioners
Motion for Rehearing, was decided Oct. 28, 1992 (Appendix
“C”). The Order of the Texas Supreme Court upon Application
For Leave To File Application For Writ Of Error was entered
Sept. 9, 1992 (Writ Denied). (Appendix “B”). The Opinion of the

x,

Texas Court of Appeals was entered March 12, 1992. (Appendices
“D” & “Y”). The Opinion of the Ist Court of Appeals was entered
Feb. 24, 1992 (striking 42 of 44 Points of Error) (Appendix “V”).
The Judgment of the Harris County District Court was entered on
12-8-89. (Appendix “O”). The judgment in Case #86-07376 was
entered on Oct. 14, 1986 (Appendix ““W.”

JURISDICTION

The Order of the Texas Supreme Court overruling Petitioners’
motion for rehearing was entered on 10/28/92. This [Petition for
Certiorari is within 90 days of that date. The jurisdiction of this
Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257. 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b) may
be applicable. Issues presented in this petition have been previously
submitted to the Texas Ist Court of Appeals and/or the Texas
Supreme Court.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The 5th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, Art. |
§§ 3, 13, 14 & 19, and Article 5 § 8 of the Texas Constitution.
Texas Civil Practices & Remedy Code Ann. § 51.014(1) Vernon
Supp. 1992. (Appendix “U”’). Texas Election Code Title 15 Chapter
251 § 251.003. Appendix “S.”

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The Fourteenth Amendment speaks of “property” generally.
And, under our free-enterprise system, an individual's choices in
the marketplace are respected, however unwise they may seem to
someone else. It is not the business of a court adjudicating due
process rights to make its own critical evaluation of that choice and
protect only the ones that by its own lights are necessary. Fuentes
v. Sherin, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 1999 (1972).

Middle-class Americans who have been wrongfully denied their
constitutional right of liberty and property are just as entitled to
access to this Court as an habitual criminal. Middle-class Ameri-

cil

re.

cans of any color or creed who have been stripped of their dignity,
liberty or property and forever precluded from owning and enjoying
property are as devastated as a habitual criminal would be having
to spend time incarcerated. Neither case should be allowed to exist
Petitioners pray that the U.S. Supreme Court ar least review their
Petition for Writ of Certiorari and issue an opinion.

This Petition for Writ of Certiorari is made to correct the
MANIFEST INJUSTICE (Black’s Law Dictionary, Sth Edition,
pages 707 and 867) perpetrated on “Schwagers” by the courts of
the State of Texas. Aiso, the Petition gives the U.S. Supreme Court
the opportunity to show voters in Texas that it has the courage and
conscience to reverse an unjust ruling (Sept. 9, 1992). Recent
articles in the Houston Chronicle and Post have indicated that the
Texas Supreme Court can be purchased by large campaign
contributions from banks, insurance, and other large corporations.
(Appendices “I,” “J” & “K’’).

¢

U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has stated
that her home state of Arizona had changed from partisan selection
to an appointment/merit election and that the quality of the
judiciary had improved 100 percent. Justice O’Connor said that this
change also solved the need for campaign contributions from
attorneys. Appendix “K-3”.

As one of the largest banks in the State of Texas, “TCB” is a
respondent in this case and is represented by Baker & Botts, one
of the largest defense law firms in Texas. A once-in-a-lifetime
opportunity existed for the Texas Supreme Court to show the world
that there is equal protection under the law for a citizen of the State
of Texas regardless of their status.

in the letter from the Texas Supreme Court which was NOT
SIGNED by any of the sitting Judges of this Court or any Judge
for that matter, the notation was made “Writ Denied.” (Appendix
“B”). These two words destroyed the lives of two upright, long-
term citizens of the State of Texas. No opinion was issued by the
Texas Supreme Court to support its erroneous decision. The lack
of a Judge’s signature and an opinion to support “Writ Denied”
tends to support the accusations made about the Texas Supreme
Court’s refusal to equitably dispense justice. Appendix “I”.

i

It is evident from the actions of the Texas Supreme Court that
it did not issue an opinion to support its ruling as there was not a
just, fair, equitable and impartial argument to be made to support
“Writ Denied.” The court also violated its mandate to correct
rulings that if left standing would constitute a serious departure
from the established law or introduce a doctrine violative of
fundamenta! principles. 1203 Texas Bar Journal, Dec. 1987.

It is incredible that the Texas Supreme Court has ruled that the
lower courts have made errors but the “Schwagers” did not matter
enough to have the judgment against them reversed or that the
issues were not important to the jurisprudence of the State of
Texas. Certainly, JURISDICTION ic a FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLE.

The admission of error by the Texas Supreme Court, without
a special opinion, will only create the problems similar to those
created by the court’s ruling in /npetco. 32 STL 131-135 South
Texas Law Review. THE SANCTITY OF FINAL JUDGMENTS
MUST BE PRESERVED. Voters have the right to know if a
judgment in their favor or against them is final or not. The final
judgment issued in favor of “Schwagers” on Oct. 14, 1986, Case
#86-07376 (Appendix “W”, was ruled not final SIX (6) YEARS
LATER by Justice Murray Cohen, First Court of Appeals on
March 12, 1992. Appendix “‘Y-5”.

The Texas Supreme Court's ruling has only had the effect of
justifying trial court judge Don Wittig’s statement prior to trial that
he was not going to let the “Bank” lose the case. (Motion for Sanc-
tions and Gag Order Ist Court of Appeals 8-22-91). This judge
knowingly allowed perjury to be committed in his court, and
allowed other wrongful acts as demonstrated by documents
submitted in the First Court of Appeals and the Texas Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court of Texas has also confirmed the action
of Appellate Court Judge Murray Cohen who should have recused
himself “sua sponte” as he was a personal friend of one of the
parties to this action (H. Resnick). Further, Justice Cohen usurped
the authority of the Texas Supreme Court and the State Legislature
by deciding which Rules of Appellate Procedure are valid and
which should be disregarded so as to deny Appellants their

’

in

constitutional nght of appeal. (Ruling Feb. 24, 1992 and March 12,
1992). (Appendices “V” and “Y”). These rulings struck 43 of
Petitioners’ 44 points of error for procedural defects.

It was unconscionable for Judge Cohen to state in his opinion
(Appendix “Y-3") that breach of fiduciary duty was not tried in
Case #86-07376. The record clearly and irrefutably shows that
breach of fiduciary duty was tried. The trial judge Michael O’Brien
in Case #86-07376 stated that breach of fiduciary duty was tried.
At the trial of Cause #86-07376 on July 22, 1986 the trial judge,
Michael O’Brien, stated the following: S.F. 102 “Again I think
your argument here goes to that Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Argument.” S.F. 104. He’s alleging you breached your fiduciary
by the General Partner unilaterally changing the terms of the
lease that exists between the two entities. Whether you had the
power to do it is a legal interpretation for me based on the
evidence.” The Ist Court of Appeals was required to review the
pleadings and evidence in Case #86-07376 to determine if the
judgment was final. Fergurson v. Fergurson, 338 S.W.2d 945, 946,
947 (Tex. 1960). This duty was clearly shirked by the Ist Court of
Appeals and the Texas Supreme Court. '

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This lawsuit involves a conspiracy between TCB and the
Limited Partners of B.B.M.M., Ltd. to defraud the General Partner,
Bruce B. Schwager of his 50% interest in the Partnership. Appen-
dix “T.”

These claims were made against TCB and the Limiteds in the
TRO obtained on March 27, 1987 by Bruce B. Schwager. “Schwa-

gers” were the true Plaintiffs in the case before the trial court in
Case #87-14551 (consolidated case) as they were in Case #86-

‘Bruce Schwager was tned for breach of fiduciary duty allegedly committed
in January of 1986 at the trial of Case #86-07376 in July of 1986. After all issues
of law and fact were submitted, he was found mot guilty. He was retned for this
breach of fiduciary duty during the trial in November of 1989 (87-14551) and
found guilty.

’

a

07376. Schwager was not only unable to obtain a judgment against
TCB and the Limiteds, but sustained a judgment against them in
favor of TCB for approximately $775,000 and in favor of the
Limiteds for approximately $1,300,000. This was a reprehensible
outrage based on the facts and law of this case which were not
ruled on by the First Court of Appeals and the Texas Supreme
Court. TCB had no standing to sue Schwager after it breached the
contract by wrongfully accelerating the Promissory Note and the
Limiteds breached the Partnership Agreement by not making .
payments as required in January 1987. Appendices “L-3” & “E-3.”
At the hearing held on March 9, 1987, the Limited Partners’
attorney, Joseph Cohen, stated: “The investors, Limited Partners are
not in position financially to invest or contribute any additional
funds to the partnership at this time because of the uncertainty in
the economy and the lack of a prospective purchaser at the present
time for the partnership assets, and because of that they will not be
making any additional contributions to the partnership.” Note: No
claims of any wrongdoing by Bruce B. Schwager were made as
a reason for stopping contributions. This case tumed on the
alleged secret amendment to the lease, an issue that was thoroughly
litigated in Case #86-07376, a trial held in July of 1986 which
included the nghts of TCB on this issue. (S.F. Hearing July 14,
1986 Testimony of Steve Smith, pp. 70-73). These four pages of
testimony only pertained to the changes in the lease. See also
statements made by Judge O’Brien “P-6” this document. Once the
jury determined that Schwager committed wrong (breached contract
and fiduciary duty) in January 1986 (Jury Issue #22 Tr. 1243),
anything that happened after that point would be ruled against
Schwager. Breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty were the
grounds for the requested dissolution of the Partnership by the
Limiteds in the 1986 case. (Appendix “P”). The court stated in the
judgment in Case #86-07376 (Appendix “W”’) the following: “A
jury tnal having been waived and all issues of fact and law having
been submitted to the court and the court having considered the
evidence: issues the following judgment: 1. It is ordered that the
request of Defendants for a dissolution of B.B.M.M., Ltd. is
denied.”

’ ae

se

The judgment against “Schwagers” was the direct result of the
violation of law allowed by the trial court judge and is void for
lack of jurisdiction. The following are the errors committed by the
trial judge, Don Wittig.

1. Trial judge erred by consolidating Case #86-07376 with Case
#87-14551 and retrying Case #86-07376.
2. Trial judge erred by holding a materially unfair trial.

3. Trial judge erred by allowing jury issue on fraudulent induce-
ment.

4. Trial judge erred by refusing to submit jury issues on good
faith, wrongful acceleration, forgery, conspiracy, breach of
contract. (Jury could only conclude Bruce Schwager was

lying).

5. Trial judge erred by denying that, as a matter of law, TCB had
committed usury.

6. Trial judge erred by refusing to admit documentary evidence of
fraud and conspiracy. Perjury was thus committed.

7. Trial judge erred by allowing a “Judge” to testify for TCB and
Limiteds while refusing to allow a “Judge” to testify for
Schwagers.

8. Trial judge held impermissible bias and prejudice.
9. Trial judge entered improper judgment.

10. Trial judge etred by denying Schwager’s constitutional right to
jury trial on contempt.

11. Trial judge erred by denying Schwager’s directed verdict on no
evidence and insufficient evidence.

12. Trial judge erred by ruling that Bruce B. Schwager was guilty
of conversion.

Note: The above Points were contained in Appellants’ Opening
Brief 6/17/91 filed in the Ist Court of Appeals.

The Texas Supreme Court had an inescapable duty to make an
independent evaluation of Petitioners’ Application for Writ of

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Error. Encompassed in this evaluation is a review of the entire
record which includes the Petitioners’ Application for Writ of Error
and Petitioners’ Reply Brief. “It is mandatory that the Court review
the pleadings and evidence in determining the finality of the judg-
ment.” Ferguson v. Ferguson, 338 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. 1960).
See also Gentry v. Credit Plan Corporation of Houston, 528
S.W.2d 571, 576 (Tex. 1975).

It is evident from the initial ruling made by the Texas Supreme
Court that it did not fulfill its mandate but just paraphrased
BAKER & BOTTS’ opinion made on page 44 of its Response
Brief filed 7/20/92 which states the following:

“Therefore this Application for Writ of Error presents no important
legal issue that deserves the consideration of this Court.” Why did
“TCB” expend in excess of $1,000,000 in attorneys’ fees if this
statement was true? (Motion for Sanctions and Gag Order | st Court
of Appeals 8-22-91). Clearly, this case is important to the citizens
of Texas and “Petitioners.” All persons should be equally entitled
to pursue their happiness and acquire property and enjoy property;
that they should have like access to the courts of the country for
the protection of their persons and property, the prevention and
protection of property redress of wrongs and the enforcement of
contracts; that no impediment should be interposed to the pursuit
by others under like circumstances; that no greater burden should
be laid upon one than are laid upon others. Barber v. Connolly, 5
S. Ct. 357 (1885).

When the “BANK” in Citizens State Bank v. Caney Invest-
ments, 746 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. 1988), complained about the rulings
of district and appeals courts that the appointment of a receiver
gave the trial court continuing jurisdiction over a case in which a
judgment was rendered after a conventional trial on the merits.
THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT RULED THAT THE
JUDGMENT WAS FINAL AND THE TRIAL COURT DID
NOT HAVE JURISDICTION.

HOWEVER, WHEN PRIVATE CITIZENS OF THE
STATE DEMAND EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE
SAME LAW, THEY ARE DENIED THEIR CONSTITUTION-
AL RIGHTS. Tex. Const. art. I § 3. U.S. Const. amend. 14.

eT |

x

The SANCTITY OF FINAL JUDGMENTS IS TO BE
PRESERVED, NOT PERVERTED. Matthews Const. Co., Inc. v.
Rosen, 796 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. 1990).

In order to properly address the disagreement with the Texas
Supreme Court on the nature of the case, the following quote from
TRAP 133(a) is made: “In all cases where the Supreme Court is
not satisfied that the opinion of the Court of Appeals in all respects
has correctly declared law, but is of the opinion that the application
presents no error which requires reversal, or which is of such
importance to the jurisprudence of the state as to require correction,
the Court will deny the application with the notation “Writ
Denied.”

It is incredible that the Texas Supreme Court did not perceive
the following issues as important.

1. Jurisdiction

to

Fundamental Error
Sanctity of Final Judgment

3
4. Due Process - (Bette Schwager denied her nght to prosecute
her personal claims)

5. Jury Issues
6. Right to Have Appeal Reviewed for Merit

7. Res Judicata - (Bruce Schwager tried twice for breach of
fiduciary duty)

The Latin phrase “res judicata means that the matter has been
adjudged; a thing judicially determined; or a matter settled by
judgment. THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA IS AN
OLD ONE FOUNDED UPON PUBLIC POLICY. Abbot:
Laboratories v. Gravis, 470 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. 1971).

Under res judicata a final judgment on the merits bans
further claims by parties or their privets on the same cause of
action. United States v. Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 568, 571 (1984).

8. Enforcement of Final Judgment

.-.

9. Receiverships - (No receivership appointment can now be made
without making judgment interlocutory)

10. Right to Present Case First - Tex. R. Civ. P. 266 (Ist Court of
Appeals did not rule on this issue as presented by Petitioners.
Supreme Court has also failed to rule on this issue)

The Texas Supreme Court was shown in Tarango v. Liberty
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 823 S.W.2d 717, 718 (Tex. App.—El Paso
1992), different appeals courts disagree with the interpretation of -«
the ruling “Writ Denied.” Also, this case shows that if the appeals
court feels that the matter “is of such importance to the jurispru-
dence of the state, that we interpret the Supreme Court's refusal to
grant a writ in that case to be tacit pronouncement that the general
rule will apply.” (Emphasis added). The conflict of opinion
between appeals courts, 32 STL 131-135 South Texas Law Review,
and the conflict between Supreme Court rulings require this Court
io issue a detailed opinion. See also Beard v. Graft, 801 S.W.2d
158, 173 (Tex. App.-—San Antonio 1990).

Thus, utter chaos will follow in Texas in relation to cases
involving issues on receiverships, res judicata, final judgment, etc.
was shown in Petitioners’ Application for Writ of Error, filed in the
Texas Supreme Court.

To further compound the problem, the Texas Supreme Court
stated in Mathews Const. Co., Inc. v. Rosen, 796 S.W.2d 692, 694
(Tex. 1990), that “[iJn any event our denial of the writ is NO
INDICATION that this court approved the opinion of the court of
appeals. See Tex. R. App. P. 133(a).” The preceding statement
irrefutably demonstrates that the Texas Supreme Court does not
want to be associated with the appeals court ruling. However, the
importance of the issues of this case makes this attitude irrational.
The language used in Mathews, 796 S.W.2d at 694, is much
stronger than that of Tex. R. App. Proc. 133(a).

The refusal of the Texas Supreme Court to abide by its
previous ruling has made a MOCKERY OF STARE DECISIS (to

|

i

abide by or adhere to decided cases. Black's Law Dictionary, Sth
Edition, page 1261).’

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. Petitioners were denied their right to Due Process and
Equal Protection of the law and access to the Court as
required by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution and the Texas Constitution art. I §§ 3, 13
and 19 due to the method of electing judges along with the
unlimited campaign contributions allowed. The Texas
Election Code Section 251.003 is unconstitutional. The
hundreds of thousands of dollars in campaign contributions
made by attorneys for Baker & Botts, Respondent’s law
firm, to the trial judge Don Wittig, the Ist Court of Appeals
Judge Murray Cohen and successful candidates to the
Texas Supreme Court constituted a lack of access to the
court and an obstruction of justice.

Campaign contributions are legalized bribery. (Appendix “A,
A-2”).

The issues of denial of due process and equal protection under
the law are included due to Judge Don Wittig, 125th District Court,
Judge Murray Cohen, Ist Court of Appeals and the Texas Supreme
Court Justices’ failure to disqualify themselves due to conflicts are
grounds for such a petition on United States constitutional grounds
enumerated herein.

The bias and prejudice of Judge Wittig, Judge Cohen and the
Texas Supreme Court and lack of access to a meaningful hearing
on their complaints violated Petitioners’ due process rights under

Doctrine of stare decisis imposes a severe burden on the litigant who asks
the supreme court to disavow one of its precedents, for that doctrine not only
plays an important rule in orderly adjudication, but also serves the broader societal
interests in evenhanded consistent and predictable application of legal rules. (Per
Mr. Justice Stevens with three Justices joining and three justices concurring in the
judgment). Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 100 S. Ct. 2647, 2648, 2658
(1980).

ee

=

JUDICATA* - (Appellants’ Point of Error #2). These claims were
wrongfully stricken by the Ist Court of Appeals Judge Murray
Cohen. Appendix “V-3” and Appendix “M-1.”

Even if the judgment in Case #86-07376 was not final as
Justice Cohen suggests, RES JUDICATA WOULD STILL BE
APPLICABLE. Final judgment settles not only issues actually
litigated, but also any issues that could have been litigated; that
judgment may have been wrong or premised on legal principle
subsequently overruled does not affect application of res judicata.
Secrest v. Secrest, 649 S.W.2d 610, 612 (Tex. 1983). Doctrine of
res judicata bans re-litigation of same cause of action between same
parties or their successors in interest.’ All respondents in the action
claimed res judicata and collateral estoppel. (Appendix ‘‘P”’).

Appointment of a receiver to enforce a final judgment does not
affect the finality of the judgment.’

5. Petitioners were denied their right to Due Process and
Equal Protection of the law as required by the U.S. Consti-
tution Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Texas
Constitution art. I §§ 3, 13 and 19 by the courts of Texas’
use of false and fraudulent facts to support their opinion
along with the allowed perjury by the trial court.

The Appeals Court did not correctly state the nature of the
case. The First Court of Appeals adopted the false and misleading
statements made by TCB in its reply brief (filed July 29, 1991).

411, 414, 415 (1980); also Asher v. Swenson, Warden, 397 U.S. 436, 464 (1970).

‘There is little to be added to the doctrine of res judicata as developed in
the case law of this Court. A final judgment on the merits of an action precludes
the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been
raised in that action.” Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 101 S. Ct. 2424,
2428 (1981); Brown v. Felsen, 99 S. Ct. 2205, 2209 (1979).

*Kremer v. Chemical Const. Corp., 102 S. Ct. 1883, 1890 (1982).

‘District Court that has in personam jurisdiction over defendant may appoint
receiver to enforce judgment. Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Watkins, 934
F.2d 1180, 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 1991); Fink v. O'Neil, 106 U.S. 272.

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Schwagers dedicated pages 1-9 of their Response Brief (Suppie-
mental filed on Feb. 13, 1992) to point out the incorrect and
misleading statements made by TCB in its opening statement of its
Reply Brief. Other false and misleading statements were shown by
Schwager in specific Response Points of their Brief (Feb. 13,
1992).

Additionally, Appellants set out in their Motion for En Banc
Rehearing (Mar. 27, 1992) the incorrect and inconsistent statements
made by the First Court of Appeals in their opinion of March 12,
1992, pages 1-5. (For details of incorrect and inconsistent
statements see Appendix “E”’).

The refusal of the Supreme Court of Texas to grant to Schwa-
gers the same relief it grants to others in similar circumstances
within its jurisdiction denies Petitioners Schwagers the equal
protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Barbier v. Con-
nolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31, 5 S. Ct. 357, 359 (1984) and Truax v.
Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 334, 42 S. Ct. 124, 130 (1921).

The Supreme Court of Texas ignored complaints of fraud and
perjury made by Petitioners in the Ist Court of Appeals (Appendi-
ces “E” & “H”), disregarded the substantive and procedural law of
the state and prior controlling decisions of this Court, and dis-
missed the action. Nevertheless, the court obstinately refused to
reconsider an order by the Ist Court of Appeals based on fraud and
perjury. It also refused to recognize the district court’s failure to
prevent the perjured testimony used by Respondent during the trial
of Nov. 1989 (Appendix “T”). The Texas Supreme Court denied
Petitioners’ Writ of Error without addressing either the false
Statements of the record or any federal constitutional questions
raised by the Application for Writ of Error or the Motion for
Rehearing. See Brinkerhoff-Farris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281
U.S. 673, 679, 50 S. Ct. 451, 453 (1930).

The use of false information to support the opinion of the Ist
Court of Appeals—Judge Cohen deprived Petitioners of their
constitutional right of due process. Appendix “E.” The fundamental
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard: it 1s an
Opportunity which must be granted at a meaningful time in a

_ =

meaningful manner. Armstrong v. Manzo, 85 S. Ct. 1187, 1191
(1965).

Professor Anthony D’Amato addressed judicial fraud as
diabolically evil in The Ultimate Injustice: When a Court Misstates
the Facts, 11 Cardoza Law Review 1313 (1990). He states: “If we
take the most elementary interpretation of the last term justice . . .
we must acknowledge that justice, in any situation, depends upon
a full and fair accounting of the facts of that situation. If, instead
of facts, fictions are introduced that are contrary to the facts, then
any claimed just solution based on such fictions cannot achieve
justice in the real world. The proposition is so elementary that it
usually goes without saying.” Professor D’Amato further states:
“We should ask ourselves what kind of judiciary system this
society has produced where judges can misstate the facts of a case
and then proceed to apply law to those fictitious facts.”

CONCLUSION

Petitioner Bruce B. Schwager swore to briefs filed in the Ist
Court of Appeals and the Texas Supreme Court. It is clear that the
truth in this matter is a major point of contention. Someone in this
action is committing fraud and perjury and should be punished for
same. Ruling against Bruce B. Schwager is inferring that he has
committed perjury. Therefore, the Texas Supreme Court should
have filed charges against him. This document has been verified.

Appendix “Q.”

A complete reading of the Texas Bar Journal article, December
1987, pages 1201-1207 would show that the Texas Supreme Court
has seriously departed from existing law and principles in all
aspects of the case before the Supreme Court of Texas by not
reversing the judgment and dismissing the case or in the alternative
remanding the case for a new trial. “Schwagers” sought appellate
review of a substantial monetary judgment entered against them in
error. The court of appeals failed to consider the judgment entered
in Case #86-07376 as final. The trial court did not have jurisdiction
to consider Cases #86-07376 and #87-14551 and retry Case #86-
07376 as a consolidated case. This judgment should have been

on

» 20 «

reversed and dismissed by the Texas Supreme Court. There are
certain fundamental substantive rights which although not expressly
defined in the Constitution or its Amendments have been given
Status of constitutional rights; examples of such rights are the right
to travel, and freedom to choose and pursue a career. A “liberty”
right under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments means more than
freedom from personal restraints, and a “property” nmght is more
than ownership and possession of real and personal property. Const.
amends. 5, 14. “Procedural due process” means the procedure used
in effecting or denying one’s fundamental or constitutional rights.
U.S.C.A. Amends. 5, 14. Haag v. Cuyahogu County, 619 F. Supp.
262, 275, 276 (D.C. Ohio 1985).

Petitioners suffered an erroneous adverse judgment and the
denial of appellate review. Petitioners respectfully request this
Honorable Court's intervention so that justice may be done.
Meaningful appellate review should not be denied in this case.
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES STATED IN PETI-
TIONERS’ WRIT OF CERTIORARI AND THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED REQUIRE THAT THIS
COURT OVERTURN THE RULING BY THE TEXAS
SUPREME COURT WHICH STATED “WRIT DENIED.” Peti-
tioners have been raped by the legal system of Texas. “TCB,”
through its attorney “Baker & Botts,” has gone on unbridled
making “false” and misleading statements, in the First Court of
Appeals and the Texas Supreme Court and probably this Court to
deprive Bruce and Bette Schwager of their mghts and property,
including an attempt to deprive Bruce Schwager of his freedom.
Based on the ruling of the Texas Supreme Court, “Baker & Botts”
has been successful using the rule THAT IF A LIE IS REPEAT-
ED ENOUGH TIMES, IT WILL BECOME THE TRUTH.

Attorneys with Baker & Botts, a defense firm, contributed more
money ($197,000) to successful Texas Supreme Court candidates
than any other single group of lawyers in the state. (Appendix
*X"). It should not go unnoted that the Chief Justice of the Texas
Supreme Court Tom Phillips is a former member and/or partner in
the Baker & Botts law firm.

- 30 - 4

It is believed that this Court should dismiss the judgment
against Petitioners as they were denied their constitutional rights
and the fact that the Texas Election Code Section 251.003 is
unconstitutional; in the alternative, it is believed that the Federal
Constitution requires that the Texas Supreme Court be ordered to
remand this case to the district court for a new trial or remand this
case to the Texas Ist Court of Appeals for reconsideration of the
appeal on its merits. For these foregoing reasons, it is respectfully
requested that this Court grant the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. «
Petitioners further pray for other relief in law or in equity for
which they may be entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

- pate BS

BRUCE B. SCHWAGBR BETTE R. SCHWAGER
2001 Holcombe, Apt. 806
Housion, Texas 77030

Pro Se

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386011_2030%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.