# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Welliver v. United States

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386011_1891%3A1

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1993
- **Citation:** 507 U.S. 1004

## Text

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED

| DEC 29 192

No. OFFICE OF THE CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1992

0
©) cy ons * -) .
wy r oF fF @ } |
: ; aR. ~ the Court of Appeals held that if a
government entity had a contractual right of access to

5 In fact, at trial the FCIC never identified a single regula-
tion or rule promulgated by the FCIC relevant to Petitioner’s

case.

17

business records, a business owner could never challenge
the warrantless seizure of his records because he had no
reasonable expectation of privacy. Such a holding is
clearly invalid in light of this Court’s Fourth Amendment
cases.

Additionally, this is not a case where a corporate
officer is claiming a right of privacy in corporate records.
This case involves a sole proprietor who did not operate
his businesses as corporations. The distinction between
corporate and individual enterprise is one of the deepest
in our constitutional law. In Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43
(1906), the Court stated:

. we are of the opinion that there is a
clear distinction in this particular between an
individual and a corporation, and that the latter
has no right to refuse to submit its books and
papers for an examination at the suit of the
State. The individual may stand upon his constitu-
tional rights as a citizen. He is entitled to carry on
his private business in his own way. His power
to contract is unlimited. He owes no duty to the
State or to his neighbors to divulge his business,
or to open his doors to an investigation, so far as
it may tend to criminate him.

201 U.S. at 74-75. (Emphasis added).

Petitioner had an objectively reasonable expectation
of privacy in his business records so as to require a search
warrant or an administrative subpoena before allowing
his records to be seized by a government agent. As a sole
proprietor, Petitioner’s expectation of privacy in his busi-
ness records is precisely the type of right that society
recognizes as reasonable. See New York v. Burger, supra,

18

482 U.S. at 699. These records were not required by
statute to be kept nor were they subject to inspection by
statute. This case clearly does not fall within the excep-
tions recognized by this Court for warrantless searches
and seizures in highly regulated industries.

The Court of Appeals’ decision in this case also con-
flicts with the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in
United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592 (10th Cir. 1988). it is
also inconsistent with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
Mason v. Pulliam, 557 F.2d 426, 429 (Sth Cir. 1977). The
Court of Appeals’ premise in this case is that Petitioner
lacked the requisite expectation of privacy in his own
business records because the FCIC “had the right to
inspect any company records.” (A-11) (emphasis in origi-
nal). The implicit suggestion is that somehow any privacy
interest in the records was waived by the Petitioner or
that he consented to the seizure. The “expectation was
clearly unreasonable, as he was obligated to give the
FCIC ‘access to any operation of the company’ ‘for the
purpose of investigation, audit, or examination.’ ” (A-11).
The Court of Appeals ignored the district court’s finding
that the reinsurance agreement “doesn’t amount to or
need not amount to a consent,” and deleted this language
from its quote of the district court’s conclusion. (A-9, 10,
18). In addition, the Court of Appeals erroneously equa-
ted a contractual right of access with a right of seizure
without a warrant.

In United States v. Leary, supra, two officers of an
exporting company challenged a search warrant pursuant
to which 20 boxes of business records were seized. The
government argued that either the individuals waived
their Fourth Amendment rights or consented to the

19

search because they had adopted an “open door policy,”
inviting government agents to inspect their business
records. Id. at 597. The Court found that the company’s
“open door” policy did not negate the defendants’ expec-
tation of privacy. “There is a distinction of constitutional
significance between the company’s policy, which invited
government agents to ‘visit . . . and ask for any file or
information they want or need,’” and a seizure and
removal of 20 boxes of files. Id. The Court specifically
noted that the defendants invited the government agents
to inspect and copy records, not to seize them. Id. at 599.
The Court held that even if the defendants’ policy could
be characterized as an ongoing consent to government
searches, the government had exceeded the scope of that
consent by seizing the records. Id. at 599. Similarly, in
Mason v. Pulliam, supra, the Fifth Circuit held that when
the basis for a search or seizure is consent, the govern-
ment must conform to the limitations placed upon the
right granted to search, seize or retain the papers or
effects. 557 F.2d at 429.

Contrary to the above cases, in the instant case, the
Court of Appeals held that the Petitioner had no constitu-
tional right to challenge the warrantless seizure of his
records simply because he had contractually agreed to
provide access to those records. In the first place, it must
be noted that Petitioner was not a party to the contract in
question; it was a contract between the FCIC and the two
Mutual of Omaha companies for which the Petitioner was
just the managing general agent. The records that the
FCIC had the right of access to were Mutual of Omaha
records, not Petitioner’s. Secondly, even if the Court of
Appeals was correct in accepting the claim that Petitioner

20

was bound as a managing general agent by its principal’s
contractua! provision,® only access to records was agreed
to, not permission to seize them. Petitioner, at all times,
retained control over his premises and records and had
given instructions to keep them confidential. He clearly
had the authority to restrict the government’s access to
his business records, notwithstanding the contractual
obligation. In fact, the contract itself provided for arbitra-
tion or administrative appeals for disputes.

The Court of Appeals improperly transformed Peti-
tioner’s contractual obligation to provide access, which
he was free to breach, into a right of the government to
seize business records without a warrant. Certainly Peti-
tioner would have been entitled to expect that his records
would not be taken from him without the government
first requesting access. The reinsurance agreement relied
upon by the Court of Appeals, contained other provi-
sions, of which Petitioner was aware, which stated what
action the FCIC could take against a company not in
compliance with the provisions of the agreement. In addi-
tion to the usual remedies available to the FCIC for
breach of contract, the agreement provided that the FCIC
could rescind or deny liability for reinsurance, deny pay-
ment of a share of a premium or of an expense reimburse-
ment payable, or refuse to assume any further
reinsurance agreements. The agreement also allowed for

© The district court did not make this finding. This is an
example of how the Court of Appeals mischaracterized the facts
in a number of respects in its opinion ard drew faulty conclu-
sions as a result.

21

arbitration or administrative appeal of any misunder-
standing or dispute arising between the company and the
FCIC. Thus, the very agreement relied upon by the Court
of Appeals to destroy Petitioner’s expectation of privacy,
contains other provisions authorizing FCIC actions, none
of which included warrantless seizures or even adminis-
trative subpoenas.

Clearly, the Petitioner did not unequivocally consent
to the seizure of his business records, as a result of the
contract provision which arguably obligated him to pro-
vide access to his business records.” If Petitioner con-
sented to anything it was that the government could ask
and look at his records; he did not give them his permis-
sion to take his records. The decision in this case cannot
be squared with the decisions of the Tenth Circuit in Leary
and with the Fifth Circuit opinion in Mason. However, it
is arguable that the Court of Appeals’ decision in this
case is in line with the Second Circuit opinion in United
States v. Chuang, 897 F.2d 646 (2nd Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 77 (1991) (Bank president did not have a legiti-
mate expectation in privacy in bank documents examined
by the office of the Comptrolier of the Currency
(“OCC”)). Although the holding in Chuang is more defen-
sible because the defendant was a corporate officer of a
bank, which is a heavily regulated industry and the OCC
must conduct regular audits, its rationale is similar to the
Court of Appeals in this case. Significantly, these four
courts of appeals’ decisions evidence a split of authority

7 The district court found that the provision did not amount
to a consent. (A-17, 18).

22

in the important area of Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence that demonstrates a clear need for Supreme Court
consideration.

Il.

JUROR QUESTIONING IN CRIMINAL CASES IS
INHERENTLY PREJUDICIAL.

The question whether to permit jury questioning of
witnesses during criminal trials, and if so, under what
circumstances is an issue ripe for Supreme Court review.
Numerous circuits have grappled with this issue with
varying standards of review and results. For example, in
the instant case the Court of Appeals applied the “plain
error” standard of review and held that the district court
had not committed plain error in allowing oral jury ques-
tions in the absence of a contemporaneous objection.
(A-14). See also United States v. Land, 877 F.2d 17 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 894 (1989) (court held that, absent a
contemporaneous objection, jury questioning, though a
“somewhat troubling” procedure as implemented in that
jurors stated their questions, as here, from the box with-
out prior consideration by the coursi, could only be
reviewed for plain error which was absent in that case).
In United States v. Johnson, 892 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1989), the
majority opinion found no plain error. However, Chief
Judge Lay wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Judge
McMillian, addressing the serious constitutional ques-
tions arising from the practice of jury interrogation of
witnesses, particularly of the defendant in criminal cases.
Additionally, in United States v. Lewin, 900 F.2d 145 (8th
Cir. 1990), the court found no plain error per se in jury

23

interrogation and reviewed the jury questions for abuse
of discretion by the trial court.

Other circuits have considered the question and their
opinions evidence a lack of uniformity.® In United States v.
Polowichak, 783 F.2d 410, 413 (4th Cir. 1986) the Fourth
Circuit disapproved of the district court “inviting juror
questioning . . . as well as permitting a juror to state his
question within the hearing of the other jurors,” but
found no prejudice upon which to base a reversal. Id. at
413. Shortly before Polowichak was decided, the Fourth
Circuit considered the question in a civil case and
exhaustively described the dangers inherent in allowing
juror questions. DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
754 F.2d 512, 516 (4th Cir. 1985). The dangers in the
practice of allowing juror questions according to the
Fourth Circuit are as follows: (1) Judicial system is
founded upon the presence of a neutral fact finder to
discern the truth from the positions presented by adverse
parties. Only relevant and admissible evidence should be
put before the neutral fact finder. Jurors are not trained in
the law and do not know what is legally relevant and
what is legally admissible. Thus, there is a much greater
risk of improper or prejudicial questions from jurors. (2)
An oral question whether answered or unanswered may

8 The state courts have also addressed this issue with
inconsistent holdings. See State v. Zima, 237 Neb. 952, 468
N.W.2d 377 (Neb. 1991) (jury questioning prohibited); People v.
Heard, 388 Mich. 182, 200 N.W.2d 73 (1972) (juror questioning is
permitted within discretion of trial court); People v. McAlister,
167 Cal. App.3d 633, 213 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1985) (procedure
allowed for juror to submit written questions, subject to review
by the court and counsel).

24

influence the perceptions of the other jurors. (3) Even if
the court takes remedial steps after an improper question
is asked, the questioning juror may feel his or her pursuit
of the truth has been thwarted. (4) Since questions are
from one or more jurors, the possibility that the jury will
attach more significance to the answers to these jury
questions is great. DeBenedetto, supra, 754 F.2d at 517.
Notwithstanding these dangers the Fourth Circuit did not
reverse because it found no prejudice. Id.

In United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078, 1086 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 826 (1979), the trial court
allowed one written jury question to be asked. The defen-
dant appealed and the court of appeals said “proper
handing of juror questions [was] a matter within the
discretion of the trial judge.” (Citations omitted). The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that there was no
error committed in allowing the one question to be asked
and that the procedure employed of requiring jurors to
put their questions in writing and clear their relevancy
first with the court was not an abuse of the court’s
discretion. Id.

Yet, in United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110, 1123 (1st
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1005 (1990), the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit held that it was within the
trial court’s discretion to deny the defendant’s request to
allow jury interrogation, but generally disparaged the
practice. “It seems foolhardy to suggest that a judge ina
multiple defendant criminal case must freely allow jurors
to question a witness... . ” Id.

In United States v. Witt, 215 F.2d 580 (2nd Cir.), cert.
denied sub. nom. Talanker v. United States, 348 U.S. 887

25

(1954), some jurors put questions to witnesses and
received answers. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the matter was within the judge’s discretion,
like witness-questioning by the judge himself. Id. at 584.
However, the Witt opinion failed to discuss Pacific
Improvement Co. v. Weidenfeld, 277 F. 224 (2nd Cir. 1921), in
which the court stated that “a jury should listen to evi-
dence, counsel should elicit, and the court should dis-
courage, and, if necessary, suppress, such idly curious
jurors as this record displays.” Id. at 227.

Thus, the courts of appeals that have considered the
question are not in accord. Some courts discourage juror
questioning but allow the practice within the discretion
of the trial court, and only review for prejudice. Some
courts review only for plain error. One court did not
allow any juror questioning. In contrast, some courts
allow the jurors to submit written questions to the court,
subject to review by the court and counsel.

Oral juror questioning is inherently prejudicial and
the technique suggested by those jurisdictions that permit
written questions, does not cure the problem because it
does not deal with the fundamental question of what
effect juror questioning may have, or may appear to have
on juror impartiality. “The fundamental problem with
juror questions lies in the gross distortion of the adver-
sary system and the misconception of the role of the jury
as a neutral fact finder in the adversary process.” United
States v. Johnson, 892 F.2d at 713 (Lay, C.J., concurring).

Due process requires a fair trial before a fair and
impartial jury. Criminal convictions should be based on
evidence elicited by counsel which is heard, evaluated

26

and acted upon by jurors who have no investment in
obtaining answers to questions they have posed. Permit-
ting juror questions puts the jury in the adversary process
and disrupts neutrality. Our system of justice depends on
a neutral jury. As Chief Judge Lay said in his concurring
opinion in Johnson, supra, 892 F.2d at 715, “when the jury
becomes an advocate or inquisitor in the process it for-
sakes its role of arbiter between the government and its
citizens.” Similarly, this Court has noted:

The framers of the constitutions strove to
create an independent judiciary but insisted
upon further protection against arbitrary action
[of government]. Providing an accused with the
right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him
an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or
overzealous prosecutor and against the compli-
ant, bias, or eccentric judge. If the defendant
preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury
to the more tutored but perhaps less sympa-
thetic reaction of the single judge, he was to
have it.

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).

The issue of whether juror interrogation is proper
reaches constitutional dimensions in a criminal case. A
criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to due pro-
cess under the Fifth Amendment and to a trial by a fair
and impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment. Jury
questioning is inherently prejudicial and infringes upon
the defendant’s constitutional right of due process and
right to an impartial jury.

As a matter of law, jurors should not be permitted to
become participants in the trial at which they are the sole

27

judge of the facts. A defendant is prejudiced by allowing
jurors to ask questions, because such conduct unfairly
benefits the government by reopening direct examination
and augmenting the government’s case-in-chief. Jurors
should not be allowed to assist the government in satisfy-
ing its burden of proof by adducing additional evidence
through their questions which produce answers admissi-
ble against a defendant. The opportunity given the jury to
ask questions creates a very great risk that inadmissible
evidence may be adduced against the defendant. To the
detriment of a defendant, jurors who are allowed to ask
questions have a tendency to begin making up their mind
before they have retired to the jury room and before they
have begun discussing the evidence with the other jurors.
As a direct result of the district court inviting jury ques-
tions, a defendant is prejudiced by being forced to risk
alienating jurors by having to object to preserve the
record or to allow the questioning to proceed. Lastly, the
Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure and the
Federal Rules of Evidence restrict the interrogation of
witnesses to the parties and to the Court. The Court of
Appeals in this case simply ignores the constitutional
aspects of this prejudicial practice of allowing jurors to
ask questions.

CONCLUSION

The Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to
grant certiorari to address the important Fourth Amend-
ment issue raised in the Petition. The decision of the

28

Court of Appeals creates a new exception to the require-
ment of a warrant for government seizures in the com-
mercial setting that is in conflict with this Court’s prior
holdings and will continue to cause confusion in the
circuits.

The Petition for Certiorari should be granted on the
issue of juror questioning because numerous courts, both
federal and state, have considered the question with con-
flicting results. In the criminal case, this practice takes on
constitutional dimensions and is inherently prejudicial.
The lower courts need guidance on this important ques-
tion and Petitioner respectfully urges the Court to grant
his Petition.

Dated: December 24 1992.
Respectfully submitted,

LigBeN, DAHLK, WHITTED,

HOUGHTON, SLOWIACZEK & JAHN, P.C.
SANDRA L. DoucGHERTy* (16823)

100 Scoular Building

2027 Dodge Street

Omaha, Nebraska 68102

(402) 344-4000

Attorney for Petitioner
“Counsel of Record

A-1

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 91-3794

United States of America, Appeal from the

a United States
Plaintiff — Appellee, ‘ District Court

v. , for the

Dennis Welliver District of Nebraska.

Defendant - Appellant.

Submitted: May 15, 1992
Filed: October 1, 1992

Before MCMILLIAN, JOHN R. GIBSON, and BEAM, Cir-
cuit Judges.

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.

Dennis Welliver was charged with a multi-count
indictment in connection with the filing of certain
accounting reports with the Federal Crop Insurance Cor-
poration (FCIC). A jury convicted him of two counts of
mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West Supp.
1992), two counts of making false statements to the FCIC,
in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1014 (West Supp. 1992), two
counts of theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1988), and
three counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A.

A-2

§ 1343 (West Supp. 1992). Welliver appeals, claiming that:
(1) the district court erroneously allowed illegally
obtained evidence; (2) the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction; (3) the district court should not
have allowed the jurors to question witnesses; and (4) he
was the victim of selective prosecution. We affirm the
judgment of the district court.!

The FCIC, an agency of the United States Department
of Agriculture, provides farmers with multiple peril crop
insurance through reinsurance agreements with private
insurance companies. The private companies sell and ser-
vice the crop insurance policies, collect premiums, and
settle claims. The FCIC reimburses the companies for
their administrative expenses and for losses paid out to
farmers. Reimbursements are based on monthly reports
the private insurance companies are required to compile,
certify as “complete and correct,” and send to Crop Hail
Insurance Actuarial Association. Crop Hail processes the
reports for the FCIC, edits them for accuracy, and notifies
the company of any errors. Crop Hail creates a monthly
accounting report, and sends it to the company, which in
turn sends it to the FCIC to receive payment.

Omaha Indemnity Company and Omaha Property
and Casualty Company entered into standard reinsurance
agreements with the FCIC. Welliver, the sole proprietor of
Omaha All Risk Insurance Services in Lexington,
Nebraska, was the managing general agent for these com-
panies, and was responsible for conducting all daily

1 The Honorable Warren K. Urbom, Senior United States
District Judge for the District of Nebraska.

A-3

transactions with the insureds and the FCIC. Managing
general agents are bound by all the FCIC rules and regu-
lations applicable to the reinsured companies themselves.

Welliver was also the sole proprietor of Nebraska
Computer and Financial Services, a company that did the
accounting and computer work for Omaha All Risk. Terry
Anderson was Welliver’s director of computer opera-
tions. Evelyn Tuma, a computer programmer for
Nebraska Computer and Financial Services, created,
maintained, and tested computer programs and assisted
with various computer operations and Crop Hail trans-
missions.

In May 1987, Welliver met with Tuma and Anderson
to discuss the delayed entry of Omaha All Risk’s 1987
premium information into their computer system, which
delayed reporting to the FCIC and held up reimburse-
ment. Welliver asked them to “roll over” 1986 premium
information and submit it to Crop Hail as current 1987
information. Welliver asked Anderson to maintain a list-
ing of the rolled over policies. Tuma wrote a program and
rolled over the policies as Welliver had instructed.

In March 1988, Welliver again met with Tuma and
Anderson and discussed “doubling” approximately
$80,000 of losses on Crop Hail reports by changing the
“seed code.” This could be done by running an existing
reported loss that had cleared the Crop Hail edits
through the system a second time under a different code
to report it as a senarate, additional loss. Anderson dou-
bled a loss from a California insurance policy, and Tuma
also doubled losses at Welliver’s direction, including two
from Colorado and California policies in April 1988.

A-4

In 1988, Gary Diers, a special agent for the Office of
the Inspector General of the United States Department of
Agriculture, began investigating Omaha All Risk regard-
ing a matter unrelated to this case. He contacted Evelyn
Tuma and met with her on May 26, 1988. Diers showed
Tuma his badge and a piece of paper listing the penalties
for aiding and abetting. He told her she was not in any
trouble, she did not need a lawyer, and he simply wanted
to ask her some questions about Omaha All Risk. Tuma
eventually told Diers about the rollovers and described
certain documents at Omaha All Risk that would consti-
tute evidence of the practice. Diers asked Tuma to
retrieve these documents for him, but Tuma had reserva-
tions. Diers assured her that as long as the documents
were not under “lock and key” and were not “something
[she] shouldn’t be looking at any way,” she had a right to
obtain them.

Tuma, still unsure about the propriety of taking the
documents out of the office, contacted the local county
sheriff, who told her that he thought it was within her
rights to take the documents. Tuma went to Omaha All
Risk and retrieved a number of documents from Terry
Anderson’s desk drawer, which both she and Anderson
used. Tuma also later gave additional documents to
Diers. These documents were used to prepare search
warrants for Omaha All Risk’s Nebraska and Texas
offices, which were executed October 25, 1988.

A grand jury charged Welliver and Paul Buchanan jr.,
Omaha All Risk’s Texas branch manager, with various
counts of mail fraud, wire fraud, false statements, theft,
and conspiracy in connection with their dealings with the
FCIC. At trial, Welliver moved to suppress the records

A-5

Tuma turned over to Agent Diers. The district court
denied the motion, concluding that Tuma was not an
agent of the government and Welliver had no expectation
of privacy in the documents. The jury acquitted
Buchanan, but could not reach a unanimous verdict
against Welliver. The district court dismissed the conspir-
acy count against Welliver and declared a mistrial on the
remaining counts.

At his second trial, Welliver again moved to suppress
the documents Tuma had taken, and the district court
denied the motion. The jury convicted Welliver on all
counts. The district judge sentenced Welliver to three
years probation and six months of home confinement. He
ordered Welliver to perform 600 hours of community
service, pay a fine of $23,174.61, and make restitution in
the amount of $7,724.87. Welliver filed this appeal.

I.

Welliver argues that the district court erred in deny-
ing his motion to suppress the business records? Tuma
seized and all the testimony concerning the records
because the seizures violated his Fourth Amendment

? The records at issue are as follows: An internal Omaha All
Risk computer print-out which Anderson created and used to
change the seed code for doubling losses; Tuma’s handwritten
notes on the policies she used to double losses; a computer
print-out Tuma created of the raw data pertaining to doubling; a
print-out of the program Tuma created to roll over 1986 policies
into the 1987 year; computer print-outs of policies that Tuma
rolled over and sent to Crop Hail Insurance; and a computer
print-out containing a comprehensive listing of the policies
Omaha All Risk rolled over.

A-6

rights. One claiming a Fourth Amendment violation must
show that: (1) he had a legitimate expectation of privacy,
and (2) that expectation was invaded by government
action. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).

We first consider whether Welliver had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the records Tuma seized. This is
a two-part inquiry: (1) whether Welliver asserted a sub-
jective expectation of privacy, a question of fact; and (2)
whether Welliver’s subjective expectation is objectively
reasonable, a question of law. United States v. Kiser, 948
F.2d 418, 423 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1666
(1992) (relying on Smith, 442 U.S. at 740, and California v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986)). The Supreme Court first
enunciated this test in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
351, 353 (1967).

Under Katz, the first question involves determining
whether the person, by her conduct, has demonstrated an
actual expectation of privacy, id. at 361 (Harlan, J., con-
curring), or sought to preserve something as private. Id.
at 351-52. The second question involves deciding whether
the individual’s asserted privacy interest is legitimate,
i.e., “one that society is willing to recognize as ‘reason-
able.’ ” Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). In United States
v. Hendrickson, 940 F.2d 320 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 610 (1991), we stated that “[t]he test for legitimacy is
not whether an individual chooses to conceal his or her
activity, but instead ‘whether the government's intrusion
infringes upon the personal and societal values protected
by the Fourth Amendment.’ ” Id. at 322 (quoting Ciraolo,
476 U.S. at 212). We concluded that this “ultimate ques-
tion under Katz ‘is a value judgment.’” Id. (citations
omitted).

A-7

The district court relied on two cases involving
employees who have turned their immediate employer's
business records over to the government: United States v.
Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1031 (1980), and United States v. Miller, 800 F.2d 129 (7th Cir.
1986). In Ziperstein, the defendant owned medical clinics that
received Medicare and Medicaid funding and two com-
panies that handled the Medicare and Medicaid billing. 601
F.2d at 284. He argued that the district court erred in failing
to suppress certain records he claimed one of his employees,
a pharmacist, had “stolen” and turned over to the govern-
ment.? Id. at 288. The Seventh Circuit heid that the defendant
had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the documents.
Id. at 289. The court relied on Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436
U.S. 307 (1978), which states that “[{w]hat [employees]
observe in their daily functions is undoubtedly beyond the
employer’s reasonable expectation of privacy.” Ziperstein, 601
F.2d at 315. The court in Ziperstein reasoned that phar-
maceutical prescriptions came within the pharmacist’s daily
observations, and accordingly, there was no impropriety in
his “obtaining control over the records which serve[d] as the
basis of his daily activities.” Id. at 289.

° The defendant also claimed that the pharmacist was act-
ing as an agent of the government in obtaining these records.
601 F.2d at 288. The Seventh Circuit rejected this theory because
the employee initiated contact with the government to report
evidence of wrongdoing in one of defendant's clinics, obtained
the documents legitimately, and gave the documents to the FBI
on his own volition. Id. at 289. Our disposition of Welliver’s case
on the grounds of legitimate expectation of privacy, see infra at
10 [A-11], makes it unnecessary to discuss the government
agent issue.

A-8

Seven years later, the Seventh Circuit faced a similar
issue in Miller. An employee, refusing his employer’s
request that he hide business records at his home, con-
tacted the authorities and suggested that they imme-
diately come to the clinic, ask for the records, and have a
subpoena. Miller, 800 F.2d at 131-32. The authorities did
so. Id. at 132-33. The district court in Miller found that all
the clinic employees had access to the records and none
of the records were kept in restricted or private areas. Id.
at 131. Further, the employee had access to the
employer’s premises, permission to use all the records
there, and did, in fact, use many of them on a regular
basis. Id. at 131-32. The district court denied the defen-
dant’s motion to suppress. Id. at 133.

In its Fourth Amendment inquiry, the Seventh Circuit
focused on whether the employee was the custodian of
the records. Id. Discussing agency principles of actual and
apparent authority, the court cited Marshall regarding
“what ‘employees observe in their daily functions.’ ” Id.
at 134 (quoting Marshall, 436 U.S. at 315). The court held
that the district court’s findings of fact indicated that the
employee had actual authority to turn over the records.
Id. The court pointed out, however, that the employer’s
order to hide the records expressly limited the
employee’s authority. Id. at 134-35. It acknowledged that
the employer asserted a subjective expectation of privacy
in the documents, but held that his order to the employee
constituted an unacceptable request to obstruct justice. Id.
at 135. The court upheld the district court’s denial of the
motion to suppress, concluding that the employee’s
authority to dispose of the records defeated the
employer’s Fourth Amendment claim. Id.

A-9

Although both Ziperstein and Miller relied on Mar-
shall, we are not convinced it is dispositive of the issue
before us. Certainly, Marshall mentions that the observa-
tions of employees in their daily functions are beyond an
employer’s reasonable expectation of privacy, 436 US. at
315, but it does not treat this issue in detail. It is also true
that neither Ziperstein nor Miller analyzed the facts under
the two part subjective and objective expectation of pri-
vacy Katz test.

The district court in this case did not specifically
discuss Welliver’s subjective expectation of privacy. This,
however, is similar to California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211,
in which the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to
address the subjective expectation of privacy question
because the finding on that issue had not been chal-
lenged. Likewise, although the district court made no
finding on this issue and seems to have assumed it, the
government has not challenged Welliver’s subjective
expectation, and there is evidence in the record to sup-
port a subjective expectation of privacy finding.

The determinative issue, however, is whether the
subjective expectation of privacy was reasonable, and in
this respect, the district court concluded:

I think it’s true that there was no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the information con-
tained in these documents. It was expected that
the information contained in these documents,
or much of it, would be sent to [Crop Hail]. . . .

The fact that not all of the information
would likely go any place doesn’t retain for the
whole the expectation of privacy. As far as I can
tell it’s probably true that the only information

A-10

on the documents that would not be revealed to
some outside person or company or agency was
the fact that this really was 1986 information
rather than 1987. . . . But the rest of it was
expected to go some place, whether in detailed
form or in summary form. I think that ruins the
claim of a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The presence of the reinsurance agreement
is not irrelevant. .. . [I]t has to do with whether
there was a reasonable expectation that these
documents, information in the documents
would be kept private. And it militates in the
direction of nonprivacy.

Suppression Hearing Transcript at 123-24. We are con-
vinced that the district court did not err in ruling that
Welliver had no objectively reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the documents. Therefore, under Ciraolo, which
accepted and assumed a subjective expectation of privacy
but found that it was not objectively reasonable, 476 U.S.
at 212-15, we must reject Welliver’s argument that the
evidence should have been suppressed.

Much testimony at the suppression hearing focused
on whether the documents were for internal purposes
only or whether they would be sent to Crop Hail and the
FCIC. The reinsurance agreement resolves the issue. A
provision of the agreement states:

Access to Records and Operations

The Company must provide FCIC, USDA, and
the Comptroller General of the United States
and their authorized representatives, for the
purpose of investigation, audit, or examination,
access to any record or operation of the Com-
pany. The Company must keep records that

A-11

fully disclose all matters pertaining to this
Agreement, including premiums and claims
paid or payable under this Agreement. Records
relating to premiums must be retained and
available for three (3) years after final adjust-
ment of such premiums, and records relating to
reinsurance claims shall be retained and avail-
able for three (3) years after final adjustment of
such claims.

Under this provision, the FCIC and other federal govern-
ment entities had the right to inspect any company
records. Although Welliver argues that his company, as
merely a managing general agent, was not a party to the
reinsurance agreement with the FCIC, Timothy Hoffman,
the FCIC’s director of the Kansas City, Missouri compli-
ance office, testified that managing general agencies are
bound by the same rules and regulations as the reinsured
companies. Even if Welliver subjectively asserted his
expectation of privacy in the documents at issue, that
expectation was clearly unreasonable, as he was obli-
gated to give the FCIC “access to any record or operation
of the Company” “for the purpose of investigation, audit,
or examination.” Because of this holding, we need not
determine whether Tuma was an agent of the government
when she procured the records for Agent Diers. We con-
clude that the district court did not err in denying Well-
iver’s motion to suppress.

Il.

Welliver argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction. Although he admits that he “does
not challenge the fact that the government evidence.

A-12

established that the ‘doubling’ and ‘rollover’ did occur,”
he contends that there was insufficient evidence of his
criminal intent.

In reviewing the denial of a motion for acquittal, we
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government, giving it the benefit of all reasonable infer-
ences from that evidence. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60, 80 (1942); United States v. Long, 952 F.2d 1520, 1524-25
(8th Cir. 1991). We will reverse only if the jury must have
entertained reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.
United States v. Jones, 880 F.2d 55, 64 (8th Cir. 1989).

Welliver’s argument hinges on witness credibility
and slight inconsistencies in the testimony of Evelyn
Tuma and Terry Anderson. Our review of the record
shows that there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate
Welliver’s intent to commit the rollovers and doubling.
Both Tuma and Anderson testified that in May 1987 they
met behind closed doors with Welliver, who asked them
to roll over the 1986 premium information and submit it
to Crop Hail as current 1987 information. Both of them
recalled that Welliver had gotten the idea from other
companies that were employing the process. They said
that Welliver wanted to get premium information
reported sooner so “we could get our commission, our
money back sooner.” Tuma wrote the program and used
it to roll over policies at “Dennis’s instructions.”

Although Welliver argues that problems getting
information to pass through Crop Hail’s edits motivated
the rollovers, both Tuma and Anderson testified that the
situation was created by Omaha All Risk’s own inability
to process information so it could be reported to Crop

A-13

Hail. Tuma testified that Welliver had stated that he did
not believe the rollover process was “quite Kosher.”
When the rollover process created a large error list, Well-
iver commented to Anderson and Tuma that they
“couldn’t even cheat right.”

Anderson testified that in March 1988 Welliver met
with him and Tuma and discussed how to double certain
losses on Crop Hail reports by changing the seed code.
Welliver specifically told them that he wanted to double
approximately $80,000 of losses. Although Tuma could
not specifically recall a meeting taking place in March
1988, she remembered a number of meetings regarding
doubling. She doubled losses several times after discus-
sions with Welliver and specifically recalled doubling
certain Colorado and California losses in April 1988 at his
direction.

Even if Welliver properly blames the Crop Hail edit
system for his resort to doubling losses, his argument is
premised on the assumption that he was entitled to sub-
mit false information to FCIC through Crop Hail to com-
pensate for processing problems. The reinsurance
agreement, which Welliver was bound by, clearly forbade
such a practice, as it required that all reports submitted to
the FCIC be “complete and correct.”

Regardless of Welliver’s stated motivations, there
was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that he
intentionally directed his employees to submit false infor-
mation to Crop Hail and the FCIC and, therefore, suffi-
cient evidence to support his conviction.

A-14

IIl.

Welliver also argues that the district court erred in
allowing the jurors to question the witnesses at trial.
Welliver, however, failed to make a single objection dur-
ing the jury questioning. Accordingly, we review only for
plain error. United States v. Land, 877 F.2d 17, 19 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 894 (1989).

Welliver makes lengthy policy arguments against
allowing the practice of jury questioning. His specific
complaints, however, involve the court’s refusal to allow
witnesses to answer two questions that Welliver claims
were favorable to his defense. The district court rejected
both of these questions on relevancy grounds. We must
therefore conclude that the district court did not plainly
err in allowing juror interrogation of witnesses.

Nevertheless, we state once again that we have
strong concerns about juror questioning of witnesses. In
this case, the potential for error was magnified as the
questions were propounded before other jury members.
In at least three cases, members of this court have voiced
strong objections to this practice. United States v. Gray,
897 F.2d 1428, 1429-30 n.1 (8th Cir. 1990) (Judges Bow-
man, Beam, and Henley); United States v. Johnson, 892 F.2d
707, 711-15 (8th Cir. 1989) (Judges Lay and McMillian
concurring and stating that juror questioning is “inher-
ently prejudicial and should not be condoned”); United
States v. Land, 877 F.2d at 19 (Judges Arnold, Bowman,
and Magill). These decisions in which seven, now eight,
of the judges of this court have joined make evident that
juror interrogation of witnesses presents substantial risk
of reversal and retrial. Where a record is properly made

A-15

and the record permits a conclusion that prejudice
occurred, this will be the inevitable result.

IV.

Finally, Welliver claims the district court erred in
failing to grant him a hearing on his motion to dismiss on
the ground of selective prosecution. A defendant has a
heavy burden in proving a selective prosecution claim,
United States v. Eklund, 733 F.2d 1287, 1290 (8th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985), and must meet a two-
part test for a prima facie claim. Id. The defendant must
first show that the government has singled him out for
prosecution, while failing to prosecute others similarly
situated who engaged in similar conduct. Id. Second, he
must show that the government based its discriminatory
selection on an impermissible ground such as religion,
race, or exercising the right of free speech. Id.

A district court should grant a hearing on a defen-
dant’s selective prosecution claim if the defendant alleges
“sufficient facts to take the question past the frivolous
state,” United States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d 864, 866 (8th Cir.
1978), and raises a reasonable doubt about the prosecu-
tor’s purpose. Id. Without these showings, it is presumed
that the government prosecuted the case in good faith
and in a nondiscriminatory way pursuant to its duty to
bring offenders to justice. Eklund, 733 F.2d at 1291.

The district court determined that Welliver met the
first part of the prima facie test, but failed the second.
Specifically, Welliver’s claims that the government pros-
ecuted him because he criticized the FCIC were unsup-
ported by factual allegations sufficient to raise a

A-16

reasonable doubt as to the government’s motives. The
record demonstrates that the district court did not err in
so holding, and we affirm its denial of Welliver’s motion
to hold a hearing on this matter.

We affirm the district court’s judgment.

A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

takeing

A-17

DISTRICT COURT’S ORAL RULINGS

THE COURT: It is a very interesting subject
and I wish I had more time to work on it. But I have to do
the best I can with our limited amount of time.

Of course, we’re governed by the Fourth Amendment
and, which is to say that no unreasonable searches or
seizures will be made. And there’s a number of questions
arise under that constitutional amendment as to the (sic)
whether there was a seizure, whether there’s a search,
whether whatever was done was unreasonable if there
was a search or a seizure.

The only two cases that I’ve been able to find that
have similarity are United States versus Miller, M-i-l-l-e-r,
800 Federal 2nd 129, Seventh Circuit, 1986, and United
States versus Ziperstein, Z-i-p-e-r-s-t-e-i-n, 601 Federal
2nd 1281, 1979.

First, with respect to Mr. Naylor’s argument that you
can’t say Mr. Welliver gave a consent, I think consent is
not the issue. Question under constitutional analysis is
rather in this situation whether there was an expectation
of privacy. A reasonable expectation of privacy, which is
different from consent. And, related, but they’re different.
And, of course, consent would end the inquiry. But there
also is the issue of reasonable expectation of privacy.

I don’t think I can say there was consent in ihe sense
that Mr. Welliver knew that these documents, these par-
ticular exhibits were going to be sent to somebody. That
would be unrealistic.

A-18

On the other hand, | think it’s true that there was no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information con-
tained in these documents. It was expected that the infor-
mation contained in these documents, or much of it,
would be sent to CHIAA. CHIAA would send it back and
then at least a recap of it would be sent to FCIC.

The fact that not all the information would likely go
any place doesn’t retain for the whole the expectation of
privacy. As far as I can tell it’s probably true that the only
information on the documents that would not be revealed
to some outside person or company or agency was the
fact that this really was 1986 information rather than
1987. That’s true, I think. Not expected to go any place.
But the rest of it was expected to go some place, whether
in detailed form or in summary form. | think that ruins
the claim of a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The presence of the reinsurance agreement is not
irrelevant. [sic] Doesn’t amount to or need not amount to
a consent. But I don’t think it’s irrelevant either. | think
you, again, it has to do with whether there was a reason-
able expectation that these documents, information in the
documents would be kept private. And it militates in the
direction of nonprivacy.

If there was no reasonable expectation of privacy
then it doesn’t matter whether Miss Tuma was an agent
of the government or whether she was her own private
person and an employee of Mr. Welliver’s company only.
I don’t think she was an agent of the government.

I think it’s true that she was, she was impelled by
two separate considerations, connected but separate, in

A-19

that either could operate independently, but they both
operated at once in her instance.

One was that she expected that something was afoul
and thought it was the right thing to do to turn the
records over to an investigator. And second, that she
thought that she might be accused or suspected or
charged with some impropriety herself and that this
would be for her own good interest to turn these things
over and help her side.

And I think both those interests impelled her. I don’t
know which one was predominant. I think they worked
together.

Does that make her an agent of the government? |
don’t think so. I don’t think someone who cooperates
with the government in the sense of turning over infor-
mation thereby becomes an agent of the government.

It’s true that she did not turn over the information on
her own. I mean without any participation in that deci-
sion by the government agent. Indeed, she received some
encouragement from him. He requested that she return,
turn this information over to him. And she did so accord-
ingly. But I don’t think that makes her an agent of the
government.

The result of that, as I see it, is that there was no
seizure or search by the government. I think I shall stop
there.

It seems to me I don’t need to make any further
findings or declarations. Wonderfully interesting ques-
tion. But I shall, I’m comfortable with the decision and |
shall stand by it. The motion to suppress is denied.

A-20

-

Oh, I might, so that you don’t think I overlooked it,
Exhibit 77 may be different. And that’s true, it may be
different. I mean by that there was less expectation of
dissemination of it. Let me think about that a moment.

Mr. Welliver’s testimony was that he thought that
kind of information, not that very document, would be
transmitted to CHIAA. I think the document itself was
kept, as Mr. Naylor pointed out, for internal use. That’s
what actually happened to it. And it was particularly for
Ms. Tuma’s use.

There is in one of these cases cited a discussion of the
matter of telling an employee not to turn over, not to take
out, or I think in that instance it was just the opposite, do
take out these documents so that the authorities don’t get
them.

And the Seventh Circuit said that won’t fly as an
exception to the idea that the employer can limit the
authority of the employee to turn over records. And
under that kind of a declaration by the employer, the
employee, employee’s turning over the records was per-
fectly justifiable.

Which I suppose has to do with if the reason you are
seeking nondissemination is that you want this to be a
covering of impropriety then you’re going to be unsuc-
cessful in your Fourth Amendment argument. And this
may be said to be akin to that.

Exhibit 77 is a tougher one all right. But | think I shall
stand by my ruling that the documents are admissible.
And the motion is denied.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386011_1891%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
