# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Great Dane Trailers, Inc. v. Ruffin

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1993
- **Citation:** 507 U.S. 910

## Text

Bupreme Court, U.S
FILED

NOV 12 1968
GE TH& CLERM

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

GREAT DANE TRAILERS, INC.
Petitioner,
versus
RONALD RUFFIN,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

James B. Spears, Jr.

Counsel of Record
HAYNSWORTH, BALDWIN.
JOHNSON & GREAVES, P.A.
901 West Trade Street

Suite 1050

Charlotte, NC 28202

(704) 342-2588

October 1992

N

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Where a trial court orders only a very limited
injunction after a Title VII trial in which a plaintiff
sought across-the-board injunctive and monetary
relief for numerous claims of employment
discrimination, is the plaintiff a "prevailing party”
within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and this
Court's decision in Garland?*

Where only a very limited injunction has been
ordered, does the fact that it may later be enforced
in a contempt proceeding satisfy this Court's
requirement for a “material alteration" of the
litigants’ legal relationship within the meaning of
this Court's decision in Garland?

Is an employer's failure to appeal a trial court's
limited injunction, its findings of fact or legal
conclusions an appropriate factor for reversing a
trial court's decision to deny an attorneys’ fee
award?

“Texas State Teachers Ass'n v, Garland. 489 US. 782

(1989)

OPINIONS BELOW

JURISDICTION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
REASONS FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI:

a

tN

ww

CONCLUSION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Appeals Court Failed
To Apply The Standards Set
Forth In Garland,

SGP US. 762 (1969) .................

The Eleventh Circuit's
Application of Garland
Conflicts With Other Appeals

Courts Decisioms ...................

This Court's Decision To

Grant Certiorari In Estate

of Farrar v. Hobbey,

941 F.2d 1311 (Sth Cir. 1991),
cert. granted, US. _,
112 S. Ct. 1159 (1992), Confirms
The Importance Of Resolving
This Case Under A Proper

Interpretation Of Garland ............

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20

24

APPENDICES:

l.

5

Plaintiffs Complaint ................. A-1

District Court's Findings
of Facts and Conclusions of

MN <5 ERRS aan eee eee oe ee A-8
District Court's Judgment .............. A-35
Eleventh Circuit's Opinion ............. A-37
Statutory Provisions .................. A-59

- ill -

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

-ASE PAGE(S)

Christopher P. v. Marcus,
915 F.2d 794 (2nd Cir. 1990),

cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1081

5 Se a oa ee

Estate of Farrar v. Cain,
941 F.2d 1311 (Sth Cir. 1991),

cert. granted, uo.

Se oe Ef).

Hanrahan v. Hampton,

446 U.S. 754 (1980) .....................

Hensley v, Eckerhart,

461 U.S. 424 (1983) .......-...... 12, 15,

Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755

19,

(ROID oko ees kk ad dckccces 13, 14, 16, 19, 23,

Langton v. Johnston, 928 F.2d

ome (ist Cir, 1991) 2... ccc.

Lewis v. Kendrick, 944 F.2d

949 (Ist Cir. 1991) .................. Sere

Nadeau v. Helgemoe,

581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978) ...............

21

24

YB 5

| ie
ao

21

~

13

CASES

New York City Unemployed &

Welfare Council v. Brezenoff,

677 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1982) ...

New York Ci nemploye

Welfare Council v. Brezenoff,

742 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1984) ...

Northbrook Excess & Surplus
Ins. Co. v. Proctor &
Gamble Co,, 924 F.2d 633

(7th Cir. 1991) .............

Rhodes v. Stewart,

CST. ae

Slade v. United States Postal
Service, 952 F.2d 357

(10th Cir. 1991) ............

Tex tate Teacher 'n
Vv land In ndent

School Dist., 489 U.S. 782

|, Dep ete

PAGE(S)

STATUTES PAGE(S)

Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. ;

FP eas coc dea ee deel. 2

Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
I ooo eee 2

Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976,
Pe a ES rs, 2 ae ee ee ee 2

oe

OPINIONS BELOW

Ronald Ruffin sued his employer claiming
numerous instances of race discrimination in_ his
employment. (Pet. App. A-1 - A-7). Finding only a very
limited entitlement to relief, the Trial Court denied an
attorneys’ fee award. (Pet. App. A-33 - A-34). Ruffin
appealed only the denial of attorneys’ fees. (Pet. App.
A-38). The Eleventh Circuit reversed the Trial Court's
denial of attorneys’ fees and rejected Petitioner's argument
that the Trial Court's nominal injunctive relief was only a
technical or de minimis victory. (Pet. App. A-37 - A-58).
The Appeals Court's theory was that any court-ordered

relief that could subsequently be enforced through a

contempt proceeding constitutes the necessary material

alteration mandated by this Court in Texas State Teachers

Ass'n v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 489 U.S. 782 (1989).

There, the Supreme Court made clear that a party must

achieve more than merely a technical or de minimis

victory before an attorneys’ fee is Statutorily authorized.

eT

The Appeals Court concluded Ruffin met the Statutory

requirements for a fee award.

JURISDICTION

The opinion and judgment of the Court of Appeals
was entered on August 20, 1992. (Pet. App. A-37 - A-58).
This petition for certiorari was filed in less than 90 days
and is timely. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

This case arises under the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5k and the Civil Rights
Attorneys Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Pet.

App. A-59 - A-61).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

At the time of trial, Ruffin was a mechanic in

Petitioner's tractor trailer repair shop. In his Title VII

bho

Complaint he alleged that he had been repeatedly
discriminated against because of his race, black. by
management's failure to grant him various promotions,
several wage increases, and more desirable job
assignments. He also claimed he had suffered numerous
instances of discriminatory discipline and racial
harassment from coworkers "without any corrective action
being taken [by management]" (emphasis added). (Pet.
App. A-3 - A-S). Ruffin's claims covered the years 1987,
1988, 1989, 1990 and 1991.

Following a two-day trial, the Honorable Sam C.
Pointer, Jr. ruled in favor of Defendant on all of Plaintiff's
claims for discriminatory promotions, wage increases,
discipline and job assignments. The Trial Court awarded
no monetary damages; it did not require the employer to
promote him, change his job classification, alter his job
assignments, give him additional seniority, increase his

pay, benefits, pension, or, remove or modify any discipline

ce a

against him.' Similarly, the court did not grant the

additional across-the-boara injunction sought in Ruffin's

Complaint. (Pet. App. A-6, Prayer for Relief, paragraph
2).

The Court expressed concern about an isolated
coworker harassment incident "back during that period of
time [1987]." (Pet. App. A-26). The Trial Court's
description of the 1987 incident reveals the isolated nature
of this incident:

There is an incident that occurred in

or around the close of the year 1987

certainly as to which this Court would be
concerned and is concerned. An incident in

‘Plaintiffs Complaint sought numerous injunctive and
monetary remedies including a court order:

requiring the defendant to make the
plaintiff whole by awarding him the position
he would have [sic] occupied in the absence
of race discrimination, back pay (plus
interest), compensatory damages, lost
seniority, benefits and loss of pension.

Pet. App. A-6.

which a noose was prepared using heavy
rope by white mechanics and ultimately the
noose was put around Mr. Ruffin's neck by
one of these white mechanics. These are
coworkers and not supervisors.

Mr. Ruffin made a complaint to
management about what had occurred and
management did immediately make an
inquiry investigation into it. Management
got conflicting stories with the whites who
were involved having indicated that, number
one, it had not originally been prepared in
any way as something directed to Mr. Ruffin
and that in any event it was a matter simply
of a joke and no offense taken in the eyes
of the whites and that Mr. Ruffin, himself,
had engaged in some horseplay or joking
use of the noose at the same time. Mr.
Ruffin's version, of course, was different as
to what happened and it has been different
in this trial.

Management, confronted with the

two different stories, without making a
decision as to which story or which version
to believe, said that certainly an apology
was due to Mr. Ruffin from the whites who
were involved and indeed that apology was
iven, far as management was aware.
that had satisfied Mr. Ruffin. Obviously it
did not satisfy him, but at least in terms of
responding later to management, he did not
indicate that he was still unhappy with what
had occurred or what action management

Sn a ee

had taken or failed to take of a more severe
nature.

(Pet. App. A-26 - A-27)(emphasis added). The Trial
Court emphasized that since 1987, the Company had taken
Steps designed to eliminate such incidents:

Since that incident in late 1987 it's clear to

the Court that management has taken a
more active role in reducing the amount of

perm egg and — that had been

in ri hat time

Management has taken disciplinary action
since that time with respect to individuals,
where it was reported to management, that
these things had occurred. [I]t is clear to
the Court based on the evidence presented
that management does view that as
inappropriate behavior and is Prepared to
impose appropriate discipline when called
to its attention.

(Pet. App. A-27 - A-28)(emphasis added). Although
Ruffin presented the Court with other harassment claims
allegedly directed toward him after the 1987 noose

incident, the Trial Court did not find any Title VII

violations regarding any of these occurrences. For

example, the Trial Court rejected Ruffin's racial claim that

his coworkers frequently referred to him as "Rondo." (Pet.

App. A-25 - A-26).

The Trial Court issued a very narrow injunction

requiring only that the employer be "more affirmative and

more aggressive” in its efforts to create a non-offensive

work environment in its shop area. The Court made clear

the limited scope of its injunction:

implement any new policy or procedure.

[ am going to enjoin the company to take
active steps to reduce and eliminate the
racial joking and siurs and episodes in the
shop area. The wording of an injunction of
this sort is very difficult. And it is, as I say,
clear to me that the company has attempted
Or started in that area, has undertaken from
time to time disciplinary action. But I think
the Court is essentially requiring now, given
this evidence, the company to be more
affirmative and more aggressive in its efforts
to correct that situation, that environment in
the shop.

(Pet. App. A-32 - A-33)(emphasis added). Significantly,

this nominal injunction did pot require Defendant to

It did not

require management to do any specific act regarding
Ruffin or to change anything it had already done to
address any coworker harassment incident. It only
required the Company to make more aggressive efforts to
create a non-offensive work environment.

The Trial Court denied Ruffin'’s request for
attorneys’ fees and summarized its decision as follows:

The plaintiff, I'm sure must feel like he has

lost in the case. I think it is fair to say in

general he has lost in this case even though

the Court does find on this area an

entitlement to relief.
(Pet. App. A-33). Ruffin appealed only the trial court's
denial of attorneys’ fees. The Eleventh Circuit decided
Judge Pointer had applied the correct legal standard in
evaluating Ruffin's request for attorneys’ fees;
nevertheless, it concluded the Trial Court had abused its
discretion in denying an attorneys’ fee award. (Pet. App.

A-5S8).

Garland standards for an attorneys’ fee award simply by

obtaining some injunctive relief.

The Appeals Court decided Ruffin had met the

outlined its analysis as follows:

(Pet.

omitted). Thus, the Appeals Court concluded that where

a remedial obligation exist vel non, a plaintiff qualifies for

By virtue of the court's grant of injunctive
relief, Great Dane is now under a legal
obligation to correct the racist behavior at
its jobsite. Accordingly, Ruffin may now
protect his rights through a civil contempt
proceeding in the event that Great Dane's
compliance with the court's injunction is not
forthcoming. Given the alteration of
Ruffin's legal rights and Great Dane's legal
obligations that resulted from the court's
grant of injunctive relief, there is no
Question that Ruffin prevailed on this issue
before the district court, or that,
consequently, he satisfied the Garland
standard and is entitled to an award of
attorneys’ fees.

App. A-S0-A-S1)(emphasis added)(citations

an award of attorneys’ fees.

The Appeals Court

The Appeals Court's analysis omits the key inquiry
under Garland: Does the judicial relief materially alter the
parties’ legal relationship? By failing to address this
question, the Appeals Court ignored a_ primary
requirement in Garland; i.e,, that a material alteration of
the litigants’ legal relationship result from the litigation.
The Appeals Court decision reflects an erroneous
interpretation of Garland that any remedial order at all,
regardless of how little it impacts the parties’ conduct
toward each other, constitutes a "material alteration.”

The Appeals Court decision was not premised
solely on a restricted view of the Garland requirements.
The Appeals Court further explained its decision by
holding that the Petitioner's failure to appeal the Trial
Court's factual findings, legal conclusions or remedy
somehow confirmed that the narrow injunction here
constituted a "material alteration" under Garland. The

Appeals Court explained:

10

Appellee [employer] does not challenge the
award of injunctive relief, nor does jt
Suggest that the court's finding that Great
Dane has failed to address adequately the
problem of jobsite racism is clearly
erroneous. Given the district court's
unchallenged findings, we cannot hold that
the court's injunction did not materially
alter the relationship... .

(Pet. App. A-57)(emphasis added). This purported
justification provides no relevant consideration for
evaluating whether a material alteration has occurred.
Carried to its logical end, this backward reasoning
penalizes a party for not appealing the merits of a case in
which it scored a substantial victory if there is any minor
injunctive relief ordered by a court. Such a result could
generate appeals even where a trial court's injunction in
no meaningful way changes the parties’ relationship,
notwithstanding the fact that a defendant really was the
‘prevailing party" in the case. In such circumstances,

compliance with a nominal injunction is a far easier thing

to bear rather than the costs of a protracted appeal.

REASONS FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI

l. The Appeals Court Failed To Apply The

Standards Set Forth In Garland, 489 U.S.
782 (1989).

A plaintiff has crossed the statutory threshold to a
fee award only when he has succeeded ". . . ‘on any
significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the

benefit the parties sought in bringing the suit’ . .

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (quoting

Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978))

(emphasis added). However, to achieve success on "any
Significant issue" means more than simply a_ judicial
determination that a violation has occurred. A plaintiff

must obtain "some relief on the merits," Garland, 489 U.S.

at 790 (citing Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 757

(1980))(emphasis added). Under Garland, such "relief"

must not only "change the legal relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant. . . ." (489 U.S. at 792); it must

also be a material change in their relationship:

| F

The touchstone of the prevailing party
inquiry must be the material alteration of

the legal relationship of the parties in a
manner which Congress sought to promote
in the fee statute.

489 U.S. at 792-93 (emphasis added). Thus, where there
has been no legal relationship change or, where only a
minor or de minimis alteration of the parties’ relationship
would result, an attorneys’ fee is not authorized under
Title VII or § 1988.

A remedy which is only technical or de minimis

would fail to satisfy even the "generous formulation"

adopted in Garland:

[A] technical victory may be so insignificant,
and may be so near the situations addressed
in Hewitt and Rhodes, as to be insufficient
to support prevailing party status .
Where the plaintiff's success on a legal
claim can be characterized as purely
technical or de minimis, a district court
would be justified in concluding that even
the "generous formulation" we adopt today
has not been satisfied. (quoting Nadeau v.
Helgemoe, 581 F.2d at 279, n.3).

13

489 U.S. at 792 (emphasis added). To be "so near the

situations” represented by Hewitt and Rhodes’ cannot be

limited only to cases where plaintiffs receive absolutely no
benefit from litigation. In Ruffin, the Eleventh Circuit has
failed to apply this part of Garland by its misdirected
focus upon the mere availability of an enforcement
mechanism.°

Many cases, like the present one, qualify as de

inimis or technical victories. District Judge Pointer was

*Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 107 S.Ct. 2672 (1987):
Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 202 (1988).

*The Eleventh Circuit's underlying rationale in Ruffin
ignores the analytical principles required by Garland, even
while purporting to follow Garland's analytical framework.
The Supreme Court in Garland focused on how w a remedy

impacts the parties’ relationship, not what couid happen if
a party elects to ignore the remedy. The Eleventh
Circuit's decision that Ruffin should be a prevailing party
simply because injunctive relief could later be enforced
through a contempt proceeding does not begin to address
the correct question. Any remedy, injunctive or otherwise,
would certainly satisfy the Eleventh Circuit's elementary
test.

14

certainly correct, in light of the nominal relief ordered in

this case, in finding that Ruffin did not qualify as a
prevailing party. The court's conclusion that Plaintiff had
‘lost in this case" (Pet. App. A-35), is entirely consistent
with Garland's standards for denying an attorneys’ fee.
Although a minimal injunction was ordered in this case,
the limited scope of the injunction fully supports the Trial
Court's decision that an attorneys’ fee was not
appropriate. Compared with the laundry list of injunctive
and monetary remedies Ruffin actually sought in this
litigation (Pet. App. A-6- A-7), the court's minimal
injunction clearly constitutes, at most, only a minor change
in the Company's relationship with him.

On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit's
misdirected analysis is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's rationale in Hensley. There, this Court noted:

The result is what matters .... Congress

has not authorized an award of fees
whenever it was reasonable for a plaintiff to

—"
WN

bring a lawsuit or whenever conscientious
counsel tried the case with devotion and
skill. Again, the most critical factor is the
degree of success obtained.

461 U.S. at 435-436 (emphasis added). Clearly, this
Court's recognition of "degree[s] of success" confirms that
the specific circumstances of Hewitt and Rhodes do not
represent the only two examples of technical or de
minimis victories in which Congress expected trial courts
to deny attorneys’ fees.

In Garland, this Court demonstrated the analysis ‘t
now requires before an attorneys’ fee is allowed. This
Court cited with approval examples of purely technical or

de minimis successes which failed to qualify a plaintiff as

a prevailing party. Each example represents a judicial
result greater than those achieved in Hewitt and Rhodes.
In fact, in each case, the plaintiff achieved a materially
more significant victory than resulted in this case. For

example, in Garland itself, the trial court invalidated a

16

school district's rule requiring a school principal's approval

in advance of teachers’ meetings on school grounds after
regular school hours. 489 U.S. at 786-87. The plaintiffs
clearly succeeded in getting judicial relief requiring the
defendants to stop using this rule. Nevertheless. this
Court recognized that this example of a limited judicial
victory would have been insufficient to recognize them as
prevailing parties for purposes of an attorneys’ fee. "If this
had been petitioners’ only success in the litigation, we
think it clear that this alone would not have rendered
them ‘prevailing parties’ within the meaning of § 1988."
489 U.S. at 786-87.

Here, Judge Pointer's narrow injunction did not
require Petitioner to stop doing anything at all; in fact, it
only required Petitioner to increase the types of things
which, on its own initiative, it had already begun doing to
reduce incidents of coworker harassment. It is significant

that the injunction here requires no particular steps or any

17

new policy from management. Clearly, the court believed
that this very mild injunction was sufficient in light of the
factual findings and legal conclusions it had made.
Additionally, however, it also demonstrates how little
success Ruffin can claim in this case, especially when the
narrow injunction is compared to the numerous injunctive
and monetary remedies Ruffin sought through this
litigation. (Pet. App. A-5 - A-6).

Next, the Supreme Court in Garland also cited with

approval New York City Unemployed & Welfare Council

v. Brezenoff, 742 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1984)(Brezenoff I1)*,

as another example that every victory by a plaintiff does
not justify "prevailing party" status. In that case, plaintiffs
obtained a court order requiring defendants to modify one

out of four regulations challenged by the iawsuit. Se

——

“See also, New York City Unemployed and Welfare

Council v. Brezenoff, 677 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1982)
(Brezenoff I).

18

ee

Brezenoff_ I, 677 F.2d at 235. This court-ordered

modification of defendants’ regulation achieved one of the
goals for the litigation; it allowed plaintiffs’ greater access
to welfare patients. Nevertheless, this Court endorsed the
Second Circuit's holding that "[t]he district court's denial
of attorney's fees in this instance is reasonable in relation
to the results obtained." 742 F.2d at 724, n.4 (quoting

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 438, 103 S. Ct. at 1942.);

Garland, 489 U.S. at 792.

Clearly, as shown by Bresenoff II, every judicial

"remedy" does not justify an attorneys’ fee. The plaintiffs,
like Ruffin here, had unsuccessfully sought far more
remedies through the litigation. However, their limited
judicial "success" resulted in only a minor or nominal
change. Thus, while Hewitt and Rhodes may represent
the clearest examples, they do not represent the exclusive
remedial circumstances where an attorneys’ fee should be

denied. The Eleventh Circuit decision in Ruffin

19

necessarily rejects both principles from Court's Garland
decision.
A The Eleventh Circuit's Application _of

Garland Conflicts With Other Appeals
Courts’ Decisions.

In Ruffin, the existence of a defendant's remedial
obligation vel non, satisfied the Appeals Court's
interpretation of Garland's requirement for a material
alteration. In contrast, other appeals courts have correctly
applied Garland to reject certain plaintiffs as prevailing
parties where their victories were found to be only
technical or de minimis under Garland.

Examples of correctly decided decisions include
notable damage awards which, when juxtaposed with the
actual remedial goals each plaintiff sought through
litigation, were judged to be insufficient under Garland.

For example, in Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co. v.

Proctor & Gamble Co., 924 F.2d 633, 641-42 n.11 (7th Cir.

1991), a piaintiffs recovery of $45,000 was held to be de

minimis in light of his claim for more than $5 million.

Similarly, the First Circuit in Lewis v. Kendrick, 944 F.2d

949, 954-56 (Ist Cir. 1991), recognized that a jury verdict
of $1,000 was only a technical and de minimis victory
because the plaintiff had sought $300,000. Likewise, the
Fifth Circuit recognized that nominal damages of $1.00
was insufficient under Garland to qualify a plaintiff as a
prevailing party where 17 million dollars had been sought.

Estate of Farrar v. Cain, 941 F.2d 1311 (Sth Cir. 1991),

cert. granted, U.S. __, 112 S. Ct. 1159 (1992).
Other circuit courts have similarly denied prevailing
party status in cases not involving monetary awards. For

example, in Christopher P. v. Marcus, 915 F.2d 794 (2nd

Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1081 (1991), the

plaintiff obtained temporary injunctive relief which
effectively placed him back in the school which was a
primary goal of his lawsuit. However, after analyzing the

Garland requirements, the plaintiff was found not to be a

21

—

"prevailing party.” Id. at 805. Similarly, in Slade v. United

States Postal Service, 952 F.2d 357, 361-62 (10th Cir.

1991), the Tenth Circuit concluded that plaintiff was not
a prevailing party although he had obtained the important
right to be evaluated in his employment based on
nondiscriminatory criteria.

The First Circuit has also demonstrated the proper
application of Garland by rejecting an attorneys’ fee for a
plaintiff who had "won" only nominal nonmonetary relief.

In Langton v. Johnston, 928 F.2d 1206, 1226 (ist Cir.

1991), the plaintiff had failed on many issues in a case
involving prisoner rights. However, he had achieved
success On a single issue involving the defendants’ practice
of "double bunking" inmates. The appeals court held he
should not be awarded an attorneys’ fee if that issue was

of only minor significance:

And if, indeed, the double-bunking point
was of "minor significance" given the scope
and tenor of the litigation as a whole, legal

services rendered in respect to it would not

be compensable. See Texas Teachers, 489
U.S. at 792, 109 S. Ct. at 1493.

These other appeals courts have properly concluded
that certain judicial remedies, although greater than the
unique situations represented by Hewitt and Rhodes, did
not materially alter the litigants’ relationships as required
by Garland. The Eleventh Circuit's Ruffin decision stands
in stark contrast to this array Of appeals court decisions
which have properly applied Garland to deny attorneys’
fees to plaintiffs who succeeded only in a minor or
technical sense.

The Eleventh Circuit's departure from the results
in these comparable cases is Significant beyond the
inconsistency itself. Garland's requirements cannot be
reduced to a mechanical determination of whether or not
an enforcement proceeding is available. Indeed, if the

Eleventh Circuit's cursory analysis is allowed to determine

23

prevailing party status, this Court's consistent analysis in

Hensley, Hewitt, Rhodes, and particularly Garland, was

unnecessary for resolving attorneys’ fee disputes. This
Court should resolve the Ruffin decision's conflict with
other circuit courts' proper application of Garland.

k This Court's Decision To Grant Certiorari
In Estate of Farrar v. Hobbey, 941 F.2d
1311 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, yaad
U.S. 112 S. Ct. 1159 (1992), Confirms
The Importance Of Resolving This Case
Under A Proper Interpretation Of Garland.

Granting this Petition provides this Court with an
excellent opportunity to fully clarify Garland's proper
application when a trial court orders only nominal relief.
This case presents essentially the same issue accepted for
review in the Hobbey decision; i.e., whether a plaintiff's
success in litigation which results in only a minimal
remedy justifies an award of an attorneys’ fee. In Hobbey

the sole relief obtained was a monetary judgment for

nominal damages; here, the sole relief obtained was a

a

nominal injunction. The judicial character of the relief
should not alter the critical determination of whether any
minimal judicial relief constitutes a technical or de
minimis victory under Garland. Thus, this case should be
reviewed along with Hobbey.

Here the Trial Court correctly determined that its
nominal injunction failed to qualify Ruffin for an
attorneys’ fee award. The Eleventh Circuit's mechanical
reasoning for reversing the lower court represents a
misguided approach which should not remain unresolved
by this Court. The Eleventh Circuit's erroneous analysis
in this case, not present in Hobbey, Strongly supports a
need to fully clarify this Court's Garland criteria so that
lower courts can properly resolve attorneys’ fee disputes

when only nominal injunctive relief is awarded.

ho
WN

0 ee

CONCLUSION

The decision of the Eleventh Circuit in Ruffin
represents an erroneous and distorted application of
Garland which should be reviewed and reversed by this
Court.

Respectfully submitted,

By: . .

ames B. Spears, Jr/ ]
AYNSWORTH, BALDWI!

JOHNSON & GREAVES. P.A.
910 W. Trade Street

Suite 1050

Charlotte, NC 28210

(704) 342-2588

November 1992

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386011_1623%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.