# Reply Brief — Rock Creek Ltd. Partnership v. California State Water Resources Control Board

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386011_1588%3A5

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Reply Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1993
- **Citation:** 507 U.S. 906

## Text

an | Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
No. 92-785
: MAY 20 1993
aso . OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Supreme Court of the United States—————

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

ROCK CREEK LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
Petitioner,
Vs
STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, et al,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit

PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO THE
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE
OF THE UNITED STATES

TIMOTHY B. DYK
(Counsel of Record)

SARAH L. WANNER

JONES, DAY, REAVIS
& POGUE

1450 G Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 879-3939

LOUIS L. TOUTON
JONES, DAY, REAVIS

Suite 4600
Los Angeles, CA 90013
(213) 489-3939

Counsel for Petitioner

IN THE
Supreme Court of the Hnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

No. 92-785

ROCK CREEK LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
Petitioner,
¥.
STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

PETITIONER’S RESPONSE TO THE BRIEF
AMICUS CURIAE OF THE UNITED STATES

The Acting Solicitor General’s opposition to the petition for
certiorari ("SG Brief") reflects a wholly idiosyncratic view of the
principles governing the award of attorneys’ fees, not shared by
the courts below or, so far as we are aware, any other court.
Contrary to this Court’s decisions in the area and those of the
lower courts, the Acting Solicitor General suggests that attorneys’
fees for work in collateral proceedings are not recoverable unless
the collateral proceeding is actually litigating the Section 1983
claim or unless the collateral proceeding leads to the entry of a
specific affirmative judgment in the 1983 action. (SG Brief at

2

5-9). That is not the law, and the Acting Solicitor General’s
effort to rewrite the statute provides no basis for declining to
review and resolve a persistent conflict.

1. The Acting Solicitor General argues that "the administrative
proceedings at issue here were not proceedings "to enforce’
petitioner’s civil rights claim" (SG Br. at 7), a rationale not
articulated by either the Court of Appeals or the district court
below. While it is quite true that the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission is not charged with adjudicating claims under Section
1983, that agency is charged with adjudicating the identical
federal right that formed the basis of the claim here under Section
1983: the right of a federal licensee to operate its hypdropower
plant in the manner prescribed in its Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission license without interference from conflicting
regulatory directives issued by the state. Decisions of this Court
and the lower courts are uniform in confirming that an identity in
federal rights asserted is sufficient to support an award of
attorneys’ fees for proceedings in collateral fora, and conflict only
with regard to whether those proceedings must be mandated by
Statute or court order. See, e.g., New York Gaslight Club, Inc.
v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980) (attorneys’ fees awarded under Title
VII for relief obtained in state court on employment
discrimination claim under state law); Pennsylvania v. Delaware
Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 560
(1986)(fees properly awarded under Clean Air Act for efforts to
protect Clean Air Act consent decree during state court litigation
and in proceedings before the Environmental Protection Agency);
Lampher v. Zagel, 755 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1985)(attorneys’ fees
awarded under Section 1988 after fee claimant’s intervention and
assertion of constitutional rights in action brought in state court
under Illinois Motor Vehicle Code resulted in state court ruling
invalidating state statute and ordering return of confiscated
vehicies); Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, 670 F.2d 760 (7th Cir.
1982)(attorneys’ fees awarded under Title VII following collateral
debarment proceeding brought pursuant to Executive Order 11246
raising employment discrimination claim), cert. denied, 461 U.S.
956 (1983). In each of these cases the court ruled that an award

3

of fees would be proper even though the collateral proceedings
were not themselves proceedings under Section 1983 or other
similar federal statutes.

2. The Acting Solicitor General places his sole reliance on
Webb v. Dyer County Bd. of Educ., 471 U.S. 234 (1985), as
supposedly supporting his point. Webb, however, merely holds
that, for purposes of "automatic" entitlement to attorneys’ fees
under Section 1988, "[a]dministrative proceedings established to
enforce tenure rights created by state law . . . are not any part of
the proceedings to enforce § 1983." 471 U.S. at 241 (emphasis
added). Webb does not purport to determine that federal
administrative proceedings brought, as here, to enforce the federal
right on which the Section 1983 claim rests are not "proceedings
to enforce § 1983" within the meaning of the fee-shifting statute.

3. The Acting Solicitor General also suggests that fees cannot
be awarded unless the collateral proceeding leads to the entry of
a specific affirmative judgment in the 1983 action. See SG
Br. at9 This Court, however, has expressly rejected such a
position. In Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980), the Court
considered whether attorneys’ fees could be awarded under
Section 1988 following settlement of a Section 1983 claim raising
both a statutory claim on which a fee award was arguably barred
by the Eleventh Amendment, and two constitutional claims not
subject to Eleventh Amendment strictures. The Court concluded
that neither the lack of a judgment on the merits, nor the
claimant’s presentation of an arguably "non-fee" claim, supported
reversal of the lower courts’ award of attorneys’ fees. 448 U.S.
at 129-33. In so holding, the Court relied on legislative history
expressly stating that “attorney’s fees may be allowed even though
the court declines to enter judgment for the plaintiff on that claim,
so long as the plaintiff prevails on the non-fee claim arising out
of a ‘common nucleus of operative fact’")(quoting legislative

history). /d. at 132 n.15. The Acting Solicitor General neither
acknowledges the Maher holding nor explains why a different rule
should apply on the mere fortuity that the "non-fee" judgment is

4

formally obtained in administrative proceedings rather than in the
district court.

4. The Acting Solicitor General also asserts that "the decisions
on which petitioner relies do not establish a conflict warranting
review by this Court." (SG Br. at 9). Notably, he does not, and
cannot, deny that the lower courts are in conflict regarding
whether collateral proceedings must be mandated by statute or
court order before fees are awardable. His contention instead that
review is not warranted because petitioner’s authorities "were
decided before this Court’s decision in Webb, which clarified the
relevant principles" is incorrect because, as shown above, his
reading of the law in this area fundamentally misstates the
relevant principles. Webb, as noted, turns on the fact that the
collateral proceeding in that case simply did not raise the federal
right later asserted in the Section 1983 action. The collateral
proceedings in this case raised just such a right, requiring the
Ninth Circuit to decide whether fees nonetheless were not
awardable in the absence of a statutory or court mandate referring
the parties to an alternative forum. That is an important issue on
which the circuits are divided, and on which resolution by this
Court is important.

2

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons stated in the
Petition and in the Reply Brief for Petitioner, certiorari should be
granted.

Respectfully submitted,

TIMOTHY B. DYK
(Counsel of Record)
SARAH L. WANNER
JONES, DAY, REAVIS &
POGUE

1450 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 879-3939

LOUIS L. TOUTON
JONES, DAY, REAVIS &
POGUE

555 West Fifth Street
Suite 4600

Los Angeles, CA 90013
(213) 489-3939

Counsel for Petitioner

May 20, 1993

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386011_1588%3A5. Public record. Not legal advice.
