# Opposition Brief — Yeager v. Camp

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386011_1405%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1993
- **Citation:** 506 U.S. 1049

## Text

- In The

Supreme Court of the United States
: October Term, 1992

S

WILLIAM N. YEAGER, JR. and
TIMBES & YEAGER, INC.,

Petitioners,
Vv.

BILLY JOE CAMP,
Respondent.

Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The Supreme Court Of Alabima

¢

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

~j
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
py FR Ga 2 sy, s.r eee ii
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.................-. 1
STAT Ge Cae ee es Bikd kus ov exe b 0k s Ree 2
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION......... 6
28 wht 8 PP ee eee rer Te re re 14

ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page

CAsEs:
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242 (1986)...10, 12

Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990)....7, 8

New York Times v. Sullivan, 374 U.S. 254 (1964)...... 11
St. Amant v. Thompson 390 U.S. 727 (1968)........ 12, 13
United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220 (1925).......... 6

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Roget's College Thesaurus, 481 (1985) ..............005. 7

Webster’s New World Dictionary Compact School and
Office Edition, S68 CIDRD) . .06sccsnnantunsdavnenssesas 7

wy

No. 92-585
«

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1992
*

WILLIAM N. YEAGER, JR. and
TIMBES & YEAGER, INC.,

Petitioners,

V.

BILLY JOE CAMP,
Respondent.

*

Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The Supreme Court Of Alabama
“

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
*

Respondent, Billy Joe Camp, respectfully requests
that the Court deny the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to
review the decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama
rendered on July 2, 1992.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Honorable Court should not exercise jurisdic-
tion in this case because the Petitioner has not pro-
pounded an important question of federal law which

1

should be settled by this Court, nor has Petitioner pre-
sented to the Court a federal question that conflicts with
the decision of another state court of last resort or which
has been decided in a way that conflicts with applicable
decisions of this Court. Sup.Ct. R.10.1.

2
vv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner’s statement of the case is incomplete.
Respondent adopts the assertions of the Petitioner while
setting forth additional facts previously omitted.

From 1980 through 1982, Billy Joe Camp (hereinafter
“Camp”), was President of the Alabama Public Service
Commission. During that period, there were three rate
increases granted to Alabama Power Company. Camp, as
Commission president, voted against each and every rate
increase (R.57). All three rate increases were granted pur-
suant to orders entered by the Alabama Supreme Court
(R.57). Over three years after leaving the Public Service
Commission, Camp’s consulting firm entered into agree-
ments with Georgia Power Company, a separate entity, to
perform certain consulting work regarding economic
development, labor relations, public relations and regula-
tory affairs pertaining to nuclear generation (R.41-42).

In the Fall of 1990, Camp was a Democratic nominee
for the office of Secretary of State in Alabama. Perry
Hand was his opponent. William N. Yeager, Jr., Petitioner
(hereinafter “Yeager”), was the media consultant to the
Hand campaign (R.31). Jack Edwards, a former Republi-
can Congressman, was the chairman of the Hand cam-
paign. Edwards was also a member of the board of

directors for the Southern Company, the utility holding
company which includes both Alabama Power Company
and Georgia Power Company (Edwards’ depo. 13).

Yeager was completely responsible for creating the
political ad referred to as the Cemetery Ad. This ad aired
from October 2, 1990 until October 9, 1990, on all major
television stations in the State of Alabama. The text of the
Cemetery Ad as it aired is reproduced below:

[Perry Hand]: Since becoming Secretary of
State, I’ve been working to keep these folks
from voting.

[Voice over]: While Perry Hand’s been fight-
ing to clean up the voters list and curb election
fraud, what’s his opponent done?

When Billy Joe Camp was president of the
Public Service Commission, we got hit with
three rate increases. As a reward, Georgia
Power paid him over 700 thousand dollars in
consulting fees. A clear choice, Perry Hand, a
tough secretary of state who’s cracking down
on corrupt politics.

(R.35). Emphasis added.

Yeager asserts that the ad was based upon informa-
tion that had first appeared in Bill Shipp’s Georgia, an
Atlanta political newsletter (R.37). Similar information
was republished in an Associated Press report of the Mont-
gomery Advertiser (R.36). Neither of these two publica-
tions mentioned any rate increases that occurred during
Camp’s tenure on the Public Service Commission.

The text of the ad as aired was not the first draft.
Yeager had previously revised the ad after receiving

information from the Hand campaign that Camp was not
responsible for the rate increases (R.38). The previous text
of the Cemetery ad included the following language:

[Perry Hand]: Since becoming Secretary of
State, I’ve been working to keep these folks
from voting.

[Voice over]: While Perry Hand’s been fight-
ing to clean up the voters list and curb election
fraud, what’s his opponent done?

As president of the Public Service Commis-
sion, Billy Joe Camp hit us with three rate
increases. As a reward, Georgia Power paid him
over 700 thousand dollars in consulting fees. A
clear choice, Perry Hand, a tough secretary of
state who’s cracking down on corrupt politics.

(Yeager depo. Ex. 8). Emphasis added.

Thus, at the time of the revision, Yeager was aware
that Camp was not responsible for the rate increases, but
rather the increases were the result of orders of the Ala-
bama Supreme Court (R.38). This demonstrates that the
ad, implying Camp was rewarded for the rate increases
with consulting contracts, was known to be false by
Yeager. Additionally, before the ad was aired, a facsimile
copy of the script for the ad was sent to Jack Edwards, the
Hand campaign chairman. Edwards, a member of the
board of directors of the Southern Company, told Yeager
that he felt “very uncomfortable with the commercial,
and I urged him not to use it.” (Edwards’ depo. 35).
Edwards told Yeager that he knew of nothing personally
which was illegal or improper in the relationship between
Georgia Power and Mr. Camp (Edwards’ depo. 35). What
made Edwards uncomfortable about the ad was that the

a Gaus Bae ee

language chosen “suggests some impropriety.” (Edwards’
depo. 63). Edwards requested that his name not be used
in connection with this ad (Edwards’ depo. 39).

Furthermore, candidate Hand also had a discussion
with Yeager, prior to the airing of this ad, with respect to
reservations Hand had concerning the language used in
the ad. Hand voiced his concern to Yeager that the words
“as a reward” could be misinterpreted to mean that Camp
had done something illegal or improper (Hand depo. 50).
Yeager likewise led Hand to believe that Jack Edwards,
the campaign chairman, had approved this ad (Hand
depo. 56).

At the time the ad aired Hand was trailing widely in
the polls. Yeager acknowledges that Edwards urged him
not to run the ad, but Yeager was of the view that this
was “the best ad that we could produce at that time to try
to help our candidate win the election, move the
numbers.” (Yeager depo. 67). Yeager agrees that there
was a negative connotation intended for the Camp ad,
and that this connotation would affect Camp’s reputation
(Yeager depo. 62).

On October 3, 1990, the day after the ad first
appeared on state wide television, The Huntsville Times
ran a newspaper article entitled, “Hand Accuses Camp of
Taking 770 Thousand For Utility Rate Hikes.” (Yeager
depo. Ex. 11).

A certified letter was sent to Yeager on October 16,
1990, demanding a retraction of the ad (Yeager depo. 81).
No such retraction has ever been issued by Yeager.

On November 6, 1990, Camp instituted this libel
action against Yeager and other Defendants. On October
4, 1991, the trial court granted Summary Judgment on
behalf of Petitioner Yeager. Camp appealed the granting
of Summary Judgment to the Alabama Supreme Court.
On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed the
lower court’s Summary Judgment and remanded the case
for trial in its Order of July 2, 1992. The Petition for Writ
of Certiorari followed.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

There is no special or important reason for this Court
to entertain this petition for writ of certiorari. The Ala-
bama Supreme Court has reversed an entry of summary
judgment, on an issue which involves a federal question,
but not in a way that conflicts with the decision of
another state court of last resort or of a United States
Court of Appeals, nor does the decision conflict with
applicable decisions of this Court.

I. THE ALABAMA SUPREME COURT’S HOLDING IS
CONSISTENT WITH THE PRIOR DECISIONS OF
THIS COURT.

The Alabama Supreme Court below correctly applied
the standards imposed by this Court in its decisions
interpreting the First Amendment. Petitioner merely dis-
agrees with result reached by the Alabama Court, not
with the standard of review utilized. This Court has
historically not granted certiorari to review evidence and
discuss specific facts. United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S.

220 (1925). The Petitioner in this case merely seeks an
additional review of the evidence on the issue of actual
malice. Such a request does not meet this Court’s stan-
dards concerning certiorari.

The Petitioner alleges that the Alabama Court’s rul-
ing below is in conflict with this Court’s holding in
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1(1990). The asser-
tion is made that the Cemetery Ad is not sufficiently
factual such that it is susceptible of being proven true or
false. This claim is meritless and ignores the lower court’s
ruling below. It likewise ignores the plain meaning of the
words carefully chosen by Yeager, the professional media
consultant.

In Webster’s New World Dictionary Compact School and
Office Edition, 368 (1989), the word reward is defined as
“something given in return for something done.” In
Roget's College Thesaurus, 481 (1985), common synonyms
for the word “reward” include terms such as “recom-
pense”, “compensation”, “payment” and “payoff”. If one
substitutes the synonym “payoff” for the word “reward”

in the Cemetery Ad, the applicable text now reads:

When Billy Joe Camp was president of the
Public Service Commission, we got hit with
three rate increases. As a payoff, Georgia
Power paid him over 700 thousand dollars in
consulting fees.

Thus, the plain meaning of this ad is inescapable. It
implies that Camp received the consulting fees as com-
pensation or a payoff for the rate increases. This is pre-
cisely what the Alabama Court below held in its ruling
that the ad’s plain meaning would be understood as

imputing corrupt conduct to Camp (A-6). Certainly an
implication that Camp had engaged in criminal or cor-
rupt conduct is an event that is sufficiently factual as to
be objectively verifiable. Such conduct is verifiable as it is
done with regularity in criminal cases charging public
officials with bribery.

The Alabama Court's holding is consistent with this
Court’s holding in Milkovich and its analysis of this issue
as concerns the effect of a statement upon the recipient.
This Court stated:

The dispositive question in the present
case then becomes whether or not a reasonable
factfinder could conclude that the statements
in the Diadiun column imply an assertion that
Petitioner Milkovich perjured himself in a
judicial proceeding. We think this question
must be answered in the affirmative ... .

We also think the connotation that Peti-
tioner committed perjury is sufficiently factual
to be susceptible of being proved true or false.

Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct. 2695,
2707 (1990).

The facts in this case are directly in accord with
Milkovich. Here the viewer of the Cemetery Ad could
reasonably conclude that the statements imply that Camp
was guilty of criminal conduct, namely bribery. This con-
notation that Camp is guilty of bribery is analogous to the
connotation that the Petitioner in Milkovich was guilty of

perjury.

Yeager simply attempts to retreat from his own care-
fully chosen words, “as a reward,” suggesting now that

he was implying only that Camp was rewarded for his
“service” on the Public Service Commission. If that had
been the true implication, it would not have been neces-
sary to mention the rate increases. Likewise, his revision
of the ad further suggests that Yeager intended to link the
later consulting contracts to the earlier rate increases.

Yeager also asserts in his Petition that “no reasonable
viewer could have concluded that ‘as a reward’ implied a
prior agreement to employ Camp in’ exchange for rate
increases and, hence, signal bribery or corruption (Peti-
tion 6-7)”. Yeager’s assertion is meritless. The Alabama
Court below disagreed and for good reason. Jack
Edwards specifically urged Yeager not to run this ad
because it “suggested some impropriety to him”
(Edwards depo. 63). Clearly if the script of the ad implied
this to the chairman of the Hand campaign, it would have
a similar impact on an ordinary viewer. Likewise, a simi-
lar concern was voiced by candidate Hand, who cau-
tioned Yeager about a possible misinterpretation of the
ad. (Hand depo. 50). Additionally, on the day after the ad
was aired, an Alabama newspaper, The Huntsville Times,
ran a story with the headline reading “Hand Accuses
Camp of Taking 770 Thousand Dollars For Utility Hikes.”
(Yeager depo. Ex. 11). Thus, there was clear and convinc-
ing evidence that the ad would be interpreted by a rea-
sonable viewer as implying corruption. This is in accord
with the Alabama Court’s ruling below (A-6).

rele et SENT a, ante an sin tee io a gn Soc eae i wowed Sake et kite
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10

Il. THE ALABAMA SUPREME COURT CORRECTLY
APPLIED THE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVI-
DENCE STANDARD ON THE ISSUE OF ACTUAL
MALICE.

The writ should not issue in this case because the
Alabama Supreme Court has correctly applied the stan-
dard of review as espoused by this Court in its decision
in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
Anderson, like the case at bar, involved the standard of

review in a defamation case at the summary judgment
level. This Court held:

In sum, we conclude that the determination of
whether a given factual dispute requires sub-
mission to a jury must be guided by the sub-
stantive evidentiary standards that apply to
case. This is true at both a directed verdict and
summary judgment stages. Consequently,
where the New York Times “clear and convinc-
ing” evidence requirement applies, the trial
judge’s summary judgment inquiry as to
whether a genuine issue exists will be whether
the evidence presented is such that a jury
applying that evidentiary standard could rea-
sonably find for either the plaintiff or the
defendant. Thus, where the factual dispute
concerns actual malice, clearly a material issue
in a New York Times case, the appropriate sum-
mary judgment question will be whether the
evidence in the record could support a reason-
able jury finding either that the Plaintiff has
shown actual malice by clear and convincing
evidence or that the plaintiff has not.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 255, 256 (1986).

11

This is precisely the test as enumerated by the Ala-
bama Supreme Court below. The Alabama Court noted
that the First Amendment requires that an alleged defam-
atory statement concerning a public official must be made
with actual malice. Actual malice, as defined by this
Court in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964),
means the statement was made with “knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not.”

The court below appealed the evidentiary standard
on the issue of actual malice as follows:

We have looked at the evidence in the record,
viewing the evidence in the light most favor-
able to the non-movant, Camp, and allowing
all reasonable inferences from that evidence,
to determine whether the trial court correctly
found that Yeager and Timbes & Yeager, Inc.
were entitled to a summary judgment based on
the issue of actual malice. ...

We have assessed the trial judge’s view at
the above matter within the framework of the
“clear and convincing” standard. We are now
compelled to conclude that the trial judge
erred when he granted Yeager and Timbes &

Yeager’s Motion for Summary judgment.

We are satisfied that Camp has presented
evidence, that, if believed by a jury, would be
sufficient to support a ing, by clear and
convincing evidence, that Yeager knew that the
statement, as understood, was false. (A-6).

The Petitioner does not argue that the Alabama
Supreme Court failed to use the New York Times v. Sullivan
standard on the issue of actual malice. Likewise, the

12

Petitioner does not argue that the court employed an
inappropriate test for the sufficiency of the evidence as
espoused in Anderson. Rather, the Petitioner merely sug-
gests that the court reached the wrong result while
employing the proper constitutional standards of review.

Petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari for the purpose of
having this Court re-examine the record and reach a
different result. Certiorarf is an inappropriate vehicle for
such a factual review. There has been no verdict entered
in this case, only a reinstatement of a state law defama-
tion action. No constitutional error has occurred to date.

Yeager seeks to insulate himself from an action for
defamation based solely upon his “honest belief” that the
ad which he created was true. This Court has rejected the
notion that the inquiry ends based on the self-serving
statement of the Defendant. In St. Amant v. Thompson, 390
U.S. 727 (1968), this Court noted:

The defendant in a defamation action
brought by a public official cannot, however,
automatically insure a favorable verdict by tes-
tifying that he published with a belief that the
statements were true. The finder of fact must
determine whether the publication was indeed
made in good faith. Professions of good faith
will be unlikely to prove persuasive, for exam-
ple, where a story is fabricated by the defen-
dant, is the product of his imagination, or is
based wholly on an unverified anonymous
telephone call. Nor will they be likely to pre-
vail when the publisher’s allegations are so
inherently improbable that only a reckless
man would have put them in circulation. Like-
wise, recklessness may be found where there

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13

are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of
the informant or the accuracy of his reports.

St. Amant, Supra 732. ;

Here the Court below has held that there were
obvious reasons for Yeager to doubt the truth of this ad.
Yeager had received documents from the Hand campaign
which indicated that the Alabama Supreme Court, and
not Camp, was responsible for the rate increases. Addi-
tionally, Yeager was warned by Edwards that there was
no impropriety concerning the consulting contracts and
Edwards urged Yeager not to run the Cemetery Ad.
Yeager likewise ignored warnings from Hand.

The Alabama Supreme Court has not ruled as a mat-
ter of law that Yeager was guilty of actual malice in
creating and publishing the Cemetery Ad. Rather, the
court has only held that the Plaintiff has put forth clear
and convincing evidence which, if believed by a jury,
would warrant a verdict against Yeager for defamation
(A-6). The court has simply held that a jury issue has
been presented. There is no constitutional error in the
lower court’s decision construing the record in this case.

+

14

CONCLUSION

The Petition for writ of certiorari should be denied.
The Petitioner simply does not raise a federal question
appropriate for review by this Court.

Respectfully submitted,

TED TAYLOR

TayYLor & ROBERSON

2112 First Avenue North ;
Birmingham, Alabama 35203 |
(205) 323-3300

Attorney for Respondent

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386011_1405%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
