# Amicus Curiae Brief — Chase Manhattan Bank, N. A. v. American Land Title Ass'n

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1993
- **Citation:** 508 U.S. 971

## Text

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KF’ ©&D
Nos. 92-182, 92-645 WOW 12 BR

IN THE ‘ORRGE OF THE CLERK

Supreme Court of the Wuited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

THE CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, N.A.,
ig tition rs
Vv.
AMERICAN LAND TITLE ASSOCIATION, ef al,.

4 ;
ACSpowdedrts,

STEPHEN R. STEINBRINK,
ACTING COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ef al..
Petit f A

On Petitions fora Writ of Certiorarito the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE
INDEPENDENT INSURANCE AGENTS OF AMERICA,
INC., NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CASUALTY &
SURETY AGENTS, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LIFE
UNDERWRITERS, AND NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF PROFESSIONAL INSURANCE AGENTS,

IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

JONATHAN B. SALLET *
ANN M. KAPPLER
JENNER & BLOCK

601 Thirteenth Street, N.W.
Twelfth Floor

Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 639-6000

November 1992 Counsel for Amic:

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether national banks may engage in the title in-
surance agency business outside of the limitation estab-
lished by Congress in 12 U.S.C. 92 Y"
enactment to address the permissible scope of insurance
agency activities by national banks?

(1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED ue i
PM TPIT ME) FE RRMPERE © LEUED oo cccceccccaccsecccccccveccccvecescconnsucss V
INTEREST OF AMICI y)
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGU-
MENT 2
ARGUMENT Pas 5
I. THERE IS NO REASON TO ADDRESS THE
CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF SECTION 92 5
A. There Is No Meaningful Conflict Between the
Circuits . both faeces ae. 5
B. The Second Circuit’s Ruling, in Dicta, and
the D.C. Circuit’s Ruling Regarding Section
92’s Existence Do Not Create Conflicting
Obligations or Rights for Any Entity 9
C. The Issue Is Currently Percolating in the
Couris letee 10
Il. THERE IS NO NEED FOR THIS COURT TO
ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF THE INTERAC-
TION OF SECTIONS 92 AND 24 (SEVENTH)
OF THE NATIONAL BANK ACT . . 12
A. There Is No Real Conflict With Any Other
Court a Be 12
RB. Petitioners’ Dire Predictions of Threatened
National Bank Powers As a Result of the
Second Circuit’s Decision Are Pure, Un-
founded Speculation 14
C. None of Petitioners’ Arguments That the
Second Circuit’s Decision Is Wrong Is Per-
suasive 15

(iil)

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Page

Il. THE ISSUES ON WHICH PETITIONERS
SEEK REVIEW ARE NOT CLEANLY ]
SENTED

IV. THE CONTROVERSY REGARDING THE IN-
SURANCE-RELATED POWERS OF NA-
TIONAL BANKS SHOULD BE LEFT TO
CONGRESS

20)

CONCLUSION

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page
American Ins, Ass’n v. Clarke, 865 F.2d 278 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) - a. mae
American Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. v. Heimann,
683 F.2d 999 (6th Cir. 1982) _.........00000000cccccc cc. 19
American Land Tulle Ass'n v. Clarke, 968 F 24 150
Coe QaP. BP aicccss ee arte earn PRE At passim
Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 25] U.S. 292 (1956).. 18
Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474
oP Se 3s). | nen oe ee naan 19
Botany Worsted Mills v. U ited States. 278 U. S.
Be CRORE ise sseaeeeeee 8

Independent Ins. Agents o ‘in erica, Inc. v. C Naph é,

955 F.2d 731, reh’g, en oe denied, “ F.2d

1077 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (petitions for cert. pend-

ing) . sch Bedsddncétsaiiasrae ee ee passim
Independent Bankers Ass'n of America v. He imann,

613 F.2d 1164 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 823

E RTI D ove ccnuercnsacccsoncrioncseaavelael tee 12,13
2 ogan Count fy N t 7. Daal v. Tow HSE —y 139 U. Ss.
a: ee eo iene ccs neee cee 6

Midland Telecasting v. Midessa Te le vision Co., 617
F.2d 1141 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 449 US. 954

(1980) Pe EN Ne Roney rT Tt 8
National R. Passenger Corp. Netinaal Ass’n of

R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 168 (1974) a 8
Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 83 (1940)... 16
Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Moore, No. 91-3 (E.D.

Ky. Aug. 4, 1992) (appeals pending) scanvocse ale ae
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) eee 15
Savon v. Georgia Ass'n of Ind. Ins. Agents, Inec.,

399 F.2d 1010 (Sth Cir. 1968) . See 1,9
Stemnbrink v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am.,

Inc., No. 92-507 vi ein eyed ne ees 2,5
Texas & Pac. Ry. fac . Pottorf, 9294 U.S. 245

(1934) “Ad LEN atsoneee et ee 5, 6,8
United States National Sid of ee gon dia

pendent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., No. ob me 2

Variable gsi Life Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 786 F.
Supp. 639 (S.D. Tex. 1991), appeal pending, No.
92-2010 Pi NMR 5d heeetcsscectea a caeearaanas Ecsb padeens 2,11,14

Qty f } )
Pave
\ct of Keb >). LRG ( } ) 1] I? stat. 665
ACT OI 8S plember 7, 1916, Pub ,, No. 64 270. 39
stat. 752

7 -
xX" ]
National

‘
Bank Act

section 92

~ pa Ad
United States Code
o7T.e rs C F
12 | ee 8S 24 { ( eT) } pa yr
4 ’ ) . ‘ ard ‘
Ky. Rev. Stat. 287.030 0)
M NC ¢ llane OlSs
*) 4" ) > . nel rw ’ " ‘ -_
2 Fed. Reg. Bull. 73 (Feb. 1, 1916) 6,7
ro ‘ > ‘ y Py ’ “7 : . -— : =
v8 Cong. Rec. 11001 (daily ed July 14 Q16) 6.7.9

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OcroBper TERM, 1992

NO 92 182
Pre CHA HATTAN BANK, N.A.,
Petitione i.
AMERICAN LAND THLE ASSOCIATION, ef al.,

Ree sponde Ht I; .

G f Pe TROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ef al

Pe fifiopie -

» TITLE ASSOCIATION, ef al,
Respondents,

On Petitions fora Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE
INDEPENDENT INSURANCE AGENTS OF AMERICA,
INC. NATIONAL ASSOCTATION OF CASUALTY &
SURETY AGENTS, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LIFE
UNDERWRITERS, AND NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF PROFESSIONAL INSURANCE AGENTS,

IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

9
INTEREST OF AMICI

Amici curiae Independent Insurance Agents of Amer-
ica, Inc., National Association of Casualty & Surety
Agents, National Association of Life Underwriters, and
National Association of Professional Insurance Agents
are non-profit national trade associations that represent
hundreds of thousands of insurance agents and their em-
ployees throughout the United States. Amici are respond-
ents in United States National Bank of Oregon v. Inde-
pendent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., No. 92-484, and
Steinbrink v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., No.
92-507, which the Solicitor General has suggested should
be treated the same as this case.

Amici have long maintained that their members’ in-
terest in sustaining and improving the insurance business
environment is served by endorsing the separation of
banking and insurance as provided under current law.
In this regard, amici and their state affiliates have par-
ticipated as parties and amici in numerous federal ac-
tions concerning the power of banks to engage in the
business of insurance, including several cases that peti-
tioners contend are relevant here. See Owensboro Nat’l
Bank v. Moore, No. 91-3 (E.D.Ky. Aug. 4, 1992) (ap-
peals pending) ; Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Clarke,
786 F. Supp. 639 (S.D. Tex. 1991), appeal pending, No.
92-2010 (5th Cir.) ; and American Ins. Ass’n 1. Clarke,
865 F.2d 278 «D.C. Cir. 1988).

Amici fully support the arguments presented by Re-
spondents and submit this brief to supplement those
arzuments.'

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In its decision below, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit unanimously held that. na-

1 All the parties to this action have consented to the filing of this
amicus brief in support of Respondents. Their letters of consent
have been lodged with the Court.

3

tional banks are not empowered by the National Bank
Act (the “Act”) to act as agents for insurance companies
in the sale of title insurance. American Land Title Ass’n
“. Clarke, 968 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1992) (“ALTA”). The
court ruled that Section 92 of the National Bank Act
limits national banks’ incidental powers under Section 24
(Seventh) of the Act. The Court concluded that “the
language of Section 92 evinces Congress’ intent to bar
national banks that fall outside of the provision’s geo-
graphical restrictions from acting as insurance agents.”
Id. at 155. The Court further concluded that the con-
temporaneous legislative history “indicate|s| that when
Congress enacted Section 92, it did so in the belief that
under existing banking law (specifically 12 U.S.C. § 24
(Seventh!) national banks had no authority to engage in
insurance agency activities. Furthermore, the Comptrol-
ler’s [1916] letter provides evidence that Congress in-
tended to withhold from national banks, located in towns
with over 5,000 inhabitants, the authority to sell insur-
ance.” /d. at 156.

Without having received briefing or hearing argument
on the issue, the Second Circuit, as a preliminary point,
sua sponte concluded that Section 92 had not been re-
pealed, disagreeing with the D.C. Circuit's contrary hold-
ing in Independent lus. Ayents of America v. Clarke, 955
F.2d iol, rely, Ch baie, deni d, 965 F.2d 1077 (Ee... Cir.
1992) (“/14A") ‘petitions pending). By contrast, the
D.C. Cireuit, sitting en hance, considered fully-briefed
arguments on both sides of the issue before declining to
vacate the //AA panel’s ruling that Section 92 no longer
exists... The D.C. Circuit’s well-reasoned decision in IJAA.
effectively endorsed by the full court sitting en bane,
correctly resolves the issue of Section 92's continued
existence.

There is no meaningful conflict on this issue. Petition-

ers misread the Second Circuit’s decision below in assert-

“No member of the full D.C. Circuit court voted io rehear the
panel’s decision regarding the existence of Section 92.

4

ing that there is such a conflict. To be sure the court, in
dicta, disagreed with the D.C. Cireuit’s conclusion that
Section 92 does not exist. But the key to the court’s
reasoning is that Section 92 was enacted in the first in-
stance—a conclusion that no one challenges. Having en-
acted Section 92, Congress made clear its view that See-
tion 24 (Seventh) does not provide for any insurance
powers. The subsequent history of Section 92—whatever
it is—sheds no additional light on the meaning of Section
24 (Seventh!. Thus, the Second Cireuit’s decision below
would be no different even if it had concluded that Sec-
tion 92 was repealed. Moreover, the issues presented to
the two courts, and the court's holdings, are very differ-
ent. No one-is subject to conflicting directives as a
result of the two decisions. Further, the question of See-
tion 92’s continued existence may arise in two other Cir-
cuits and there is no need to address the issue now.

Nor does that portion of the Second Circuit's reasoning
concerning the interaction of Section 92 and Section 24
(Seventh) warrant review by this Court. Contrary to
petitioners’ assertions, there is no real or direct conflict
With the decisions of other courts; the reasoning is con-
sistent with the language and legislative history of the
Act; and the decision does not threaten national banks’
previously-authorized insurance-related activities.

Petitioners’ belief that national banks should be per-
mitted to engage in a wide range of non-banking activi-
ties—including the sale of title insurance-——should be
addressed to Congress. This Court is not the forum for
effectuating policy changes.

»
ARGUMENT

I. THERE IS NO REASON TO ADDRESS THE CON-
TINUED EXISTENCE OF SECTION 92.

The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. (“Chase”) alone re-
quests review of the Second Circuit’s conclusion that
Section 92 of the National Bank Act continues to exist.
The Solicitor General, on behalf ef the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (‘Comptroller’), pointedly
refrains from raising that issue here, asking this Court
instead to review the D.C. Cireuit’s ruling in //AA.
Steinbrink v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Ine., No.
92-507. The issue does not warrant this Court’s review
in either case." ;

A. There Is No Meaningful Conflict Between the
Circuits.

Contrary to petitioners’ representations, there is no
meaningful conflict between the Second Cireuit and the
D.C. Circuit. The Second Circuit’s conclusion below was
dicta: the court need not have resolved the issue of Sec-
tion 92’s continued existence in order to conclude that
national banks are not empowered to act as agents for
title insurance companies. It is the enactment of Section
92 that evinces Congress’ intent to limit national banks’
power to sell insurance. Its subsequent history, however
construed, cannot change this conclusion. Regardless
Whether Section 92 exists or nct, national banks are not
permitted to engage in the sale of title insurance as
agents for insurance companies. For that reason, there
Was no necessity for the court to decide whether Section
92 had been repealed.

It is well-established that national banks are limited to
those activities authorized them by law. E.g., Texas &

* Amiei, respondents to the petitions seeking review of the D.C.
Cireuit’s decision in J7AA, will more fully address the reasons why
review of this issue is not warranted in their opposition brief. in
ITAA, That brief is due to be filed on November 21, 1992.

6

Pac. Ry. Co. ve. Pottor ff, 291 US, 245, 253 (19384): Logan
Cow) iif Nat'l Bank v. Townsend. 139 U.S. 67, 73 t1sS91).
Congress enacted the predecessor of Section 24 (Seventh)
In 1863. Act of Feb. 25, 1863, Ch. 58, $ 11, 12 Stat. 665,
bbS. Like the current version, the statute identified a
series of express powers, and included the provision. of
“incidental” and “necessary” powers. See 12 U.S.C. § 24
(Seventh).

In 1916, then-Comptroller of the Currency, John Skelton
Williams, wrote a letter to the Senate Banking and Cur-
rency Committee requesting that national banks located
In small towns be permitted to act as insurance agents.
93 Cong. Ree. 11001 (daily ed. July 14, 19161." The
Comptroller expressed a desire to find a statutory mecha-
nism whereby “the powers of small national banks might
be enlarged so as to provide them with additional sources
of revenue and to place them in a position where they
could better compete with local State banks and. with
companies Which are sometimes authorized under the law
to do a class of business not strictly that of commercial
banking.” Id. ‘emphasis added). The Comptroller stated,
however, that “from the standpoint of public policy and
banking efficiency this authority should be limited to
banks in small communities.” /d. Accordingly, the Comp-
troller proposed an amendment to the National Bank Act.
explicitly noting that national banks were conferred “‘in-
cidental” and “necessary” powers, Comptroller Williams
explained that his proposed amendment was nevertheless
required because “|n]ational banks are not given either
expressly or by necessary implication the power to act as
agents for insurance companies.” /d... Comptroller Wil-

‘The letter was entered into the congressional record by Sena

This view conformed with the opinion of the Board of Gove rnors

i. ee . , i } | } -

ft the Federal Reserve, which held in 1915 that national banks had

no authority, express or implied, to engave in insurance agence.
écese *y* , P ] > ] | es 4 . .

activities The Board ruled that tiny such evtension of the

poWers of national banks must be left to the consideration of Con-

liams therefore clearly understood that a national bank’s
acting as agent for an insurance company was not an
“incidental power... necessary to carry on the business
of banking.” /d.

In response, Congress enacted Comptroller Williams’
proposed amendment. Act of September 7, 1916, Pub. L.
No. 64-270, 39 Stat. 752-53 (the “1916 Act”). The critical]
language of the 1916 Act, provides:

Section fifty-two hundred and two of the Revised
Statutes of the United States |Section 13 of the Fed-
eral Kheserve Act of 1913] is hereby amended so as to

“That by addition to thie pow? PS pow vested by law
in national banking associations organized under the
laws of the United States any such association located
and doing business in any place the population of
Which does not exceed five thousand inhabitants, as
shown by the last preceding decennial census, may,
under such rules and regulations as may be pre-
scribed by the Comptroller of the Currency, act as the
agent for any fire, life, or other insurance company
authorized by the authorities of the State in which
said bank is located to do business in said State, by
soliciting and selling insurance and collecting pre-
miums on policies issued by such company; 4
(fi mphasis added).

As the Fifth Circuit has recognized, prior to enactment
of Section 92, ‘no national bank possessed any power to
act as insurance agents.” Sawvon v. Georgia Ass’n of Ind.
Ins, Agents, 8399 F.2d 1010, 1016 (5th Cir. 1968) (em-
phasis in original). By its explicit addition to national

gress.” 2 Fed. Reg. Bull. 73, 74 (Feb. 1, 1916) (emphasis added
At the time-——as now— national banks were ¢ranted the power “[t lo

+

exercise ... all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry

»
,

on the business of banking.” See fd. at

8

banks’ powers, Section 92 constituted the sole source of
authority for national banks to engage in’ insurance-
agency activities.” Section 92 was thought necessary pre-
cisely for the reason that, as was universally understood,
national banks otherwise had neither the express nor in-
cidental power to sell insurance. Section 92 thus reflects
Congress’ understanding that insurance-ageney powers
were beyond the powers conveyed by the other provisions
of the National Bank Act-—including the grant of “such
incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the
business of banking.” See Tewas & Pac. Ry. Co. +. Pot-
torff, 291 US. at 258 & n.13 ‘amendment to National
Bank Act to provide limited power to pledge assets to
secure deposits “indicates that Congress believed that the
original act had not granted general power to pledge as-
sets to secure deposits”) (citing legislative history simi-
lar to that of Section 92).

In 1918, as the D.C. Circuit correctly ruled in //AA,
Congress repealed Section 92. Section 92 is the only stat-
utory enactment that has ever addressed the insurance
agency powers of national banks. The effect of Congress’

8 See Botany Worsted Mills +. United States, 278 U.S, 282. 289
(1929) (“When a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular
mode, it includes the negative of any other mode.’): National R
Passe nger Corp. ». Natronal Ass'n of R. Passe YYETS, 114 U.S: 453.
158 (1904) (same); Midland Telecasting v. Midessa Television Co.
617 F.2d 1141, 1145 n.7 (Sth Cir.) (“The existence of 2 Specific
statutory | exemption covering certain acts is evidence that Con
yress did not intend to grant in munity to other acts not covered 1)

the explicit exemptions.”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 954 (1980

* The Court noted in Pottor# that the fact that Congress enacted
the limited power in a separate section, rather than as an amend
ment to Section 24( Seventh), indicates that ¢ ongress did not mean
merely to clarify that the power of a national bank to pledge its
assets to secure deposits was contained in the grant of “incidental”
powers. 2917 U.S. at 259. Similarly, the enactment of the limited
insurance-agency authority in a separate statutory provision (Se
tion 92) refutes any suggestion that it was me rely a clarification

of powers already conferred by Section 24(Seventh

gy

repeal of Section 92 is thus plain: there is no longer any
authority for national banks to sell insurance. The repeal
of Section 92 reinforces Congress’ intention to deprive
national banks of even the limited authority to sell insur-
ance in small towns that it briefly permitted from 1916
to 1918. Congress thus reinstated the law as it existed
prior to Section 92’s enactment: “no national bank pos-
sesse[s] avy power to act as insurance agents.” Saaon,
399 F.2d at 1016 (emphasis in original).

Yet the Comptroller, in his decision at issue in this
case, has authorized national banks to engage in this
very activity. He has authorized Chase to act as agent
for title insurance companies. This is precisely the power
once permitted (in small towns only) that Congress re-
scinded in 1918. As Comptroller Williams recognized 75
years ago, “the Comptroller of the Currency has no right
to authorize or permit a national bank to exercise powers
not conferred upon it by law.” 53 Cong. Rec. 11001
(daily ed. July 14, 1916).

Thus, contrary to petitioners’ assertions, even if. this
Court were to grant review and determine that the Second
Circuit incorrectly ruled on Section 92’s continued exist-
ence, that determination would not alter the outcome of
the Second Circuit's decision.

Bb. The Second Circuit’s Ruling, in Dicta, and the D.C.
Circuit’s Ruling Regarding Section 92’s Existence
Do Not Create Conflicting Obligations or Rights for
Any Entity.

In /JAA, these amici challenged the Comptroller’s rul-
ing permitting the United States National Bank of Ore-
gon to sell insurance from its office located in a town of
less than 5,000 to customers located throughout the
United States, pursuant to Section 92 of the National
Bank Act. Amici argued, in JJAA, that a national bank’s
insurance-agency activities must be confined to the “small
town” in which it is located. The D.C. Circuit held that

10

Section 92 no longer exists. Because the Comptroller had
cited no other authority for its challenged ruling, the
court concluded that the ruling was not in accordance
with law. 955 F.2d at 739. That is, the D.C. Cireuit held
that the Comptroller cannot invoke Section 92 as a source
of authority to permit national banks to sell insurance
from ‘“‘smail towns.”’

By contrast, the decision below presents and addresses
only the narrow issue of national banks’ authority to sell
title insurance. The Second Circuit held that, given Sec-
tion 92, the Comptroller cannot invoke Section 24 (Sev-
enth) as a source of authority to permit national banks
to sell title insurance from offices that are not located in
small towns.

The two decisions address very different issues. And
the two holdings concern entirely different topics. 1992
——_—_—
IN THE GFFICE OF THE CLERK |

Supreme Court of the Anited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1992

THE CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, N.A.,
Petitioner,
V.

AMERICAN LAND TITLE ASSOCIATION, et al.,
Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari
To the United States Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit

BRIEF OF THE AMICI CURIAE
AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, ET AL.,*
IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITIONER

JOHN J. GILL III
Counsel of Record

MICHAEL F. Crottry

AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION
1120 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 663-5026

Attorneys for Amici Curiae
November 12, 1992

(“Complete list of sponsoring organizations and counsel on
inside of cover.|

PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203

RICHARD M. WHITING

ASSOCIATION OF BANK HOLDING COMPANIES
730 15th Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 398-1158

JAMES T. MCINTYRE

McNAIR LAW FIRM

1155 15th Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 659-3900

Attorney for Association of
Banks in Insurance

MARCIA Z. SULLIVAN

CONSUMER BANKERS ASSOCIATION
1000 Wilson Boulevard

Arlington, Virginia 22209

(703) 276-1750

JOHN S. JACKSON

MINNESOTA BANKERS ASSOCIATION
730 Second Avenue South
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402
(612) 338-5137

WADE L. NASH

MISSOURI BANKERS ASSOCIATION
207 E. Capitol

Jefferson City, Missouri 65101
(314) 636-8151

JOHN E. KNIGHT

BOARDMAN, SUHR, CURRY & FIELD

P.O. Box 927

Madison, Wisconsin 53701

(608) 257-9521

Attorney for Wisconsin Bankers
Association

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether Section 92 of the National Bank Act,
granting insurance agency powers to national banks
in small towns that are ‘‘in addition to the powers
now vested by law in national banking associations,”’
constitutes an implied limitation upon the incidental
powers of national banks, granted elsewhere in the
statute, where such banks are located in larger towns.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

nnn WEE ccs atu chee iaabiaaieeeuieuenuanens
Be ee I scr sctcecounslcceasnesturcossasdasansakens
SCRTORE OF CG ATIC TUTIRG scccsicsssesesscvsecsssesccsoves
Reasons for Granting the Writ ................ eee
1. The Conflicts Among the Circuits ...............
II. The Important Question of Federal Law
III fone arca tacks cptasaakuitank aicesseanccnsap eel daies

ill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

American Insurance Association v. Clarke, 865 F.2d
BIO (IVC. Civ, TORR) coccccccscscessesecesaxccercanecassecsds

American Land Title Association v. Clarke, 772 F.
Supp. 1353 (S.D. N.Y. 1991) wocceccccceeeceseeeeee

American Land Title Association v. Clarke, 968
Be LGO (Sa Cir. TOD) rciviccsvecsscccsecessacereacsuce

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
v. Dimension Financial Corp., 474 U.S. 361
CRUE shieisossncneheanccatciacacanebehe See ura ee

Clarke v. Securities Industry Association, 479 U.S.
SOE CED s creresscomnncnusaniestahseaeee en Renee

Crawford Fitting Company v. J.T. Gibbons Inc., 482
ath Se EMRE yhrserntnmeatanaie ee ee

First National Bank of Eastern Arkansas v. Taylor,
907 F.2d 775 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct.
Ge GEREE tcematindanaaseie eee ee

Independent Bankers Association of America v. Hei-
mann, 613 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 823 (1980) occ cccccccccceceeeee.

Independent Insurance Agents of America v. Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
736 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1984) occ cccceccccee.

Independent Insurance Agents of America v. Clarke.
955 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1992) oo cceeccccceceee.

Saxon v. Georgia Association of Independent Insur-
ance Agents, 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968) ...

Securities Industry Association v. Clarke, 885 F.2d
1035 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070
SRIND scipeceevch taubiaG erate tetas eee oe:

Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. v. Clarke, 786
F. Supp. 639 (S.D. Tex. 1991), appeal pending,
No. 92-2010 (5th Cir.) ..cccccccccccccscscssesecccccceecs,

Page

5,10

Table of Authorities Continued

Page
Statutes:
Be Blethen Oe CO UOROND i iccSoiiiseassosessscgesscsoasavees passim
ea Ai TOP h copesvarsvimcrsicnccianen ake ee passim
Act of Sept. 7, 1916, ch. 461, 39 Stat. 752
RII <sedininnnrnschsovcdchessdavauaee bee iGeiens eae 2
Miscellaneous:

Comptroller Interp. Letter No. 499 [1989-90 Trans-
fer Binder] Federal Banking Law Rep. (CCH)— -
BOP COD, 10, BODO) csscscesnsssercsnciascsersotrine 1]

Comptroller Interp. Letter No. 331 [1985-87 Trans-
fer Binder] Federal Banking Law Rep. (CCH)—
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McFadden American Bank Directory, Spring, 1992
EPP URED x scruskccvncnecsupunousnladin le eadaiecaneae eae ll

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

No.92-482

THE CHASE MANHATTAN BANK. N.A..,
Petitioner,
Vv.
AMERICAN LAND TITLE ASSOCIATION, et al.,
Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari
To the United States Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit

BRIEF OF THE AMICI CURIAE
AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, ET AL..
IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITIONER

The American Bankers Association, et al. hereby
respectfully submit this brief as amici curiae in sup-
port of the Petitioner in accordance with the provi-
sions of Rule 37.2 of the Supreme Court Rules. All
parties have consented to this filing, and their written
consents are filed with this brief.

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE

The American Bankers Association, Association of
Bank Holding Companies, Association of Banks in In-

ro

surance and Consumer Bankers Association are all
national trade associations of the commercial banking
industry. A large majority of commercial banks in the
United States, their employees or the bank holding
companies that own them are members of one o”
more of the associations. The Minnesota, Missouri and
Wisconsin Bankers Associations are the principe]
trade associations for the banking industry within
their respective ‘states. All of the associations rep-
resent the interests of both national banks and state-
chartered banks in the legislatures, regulatory agen-
cies and in the courts on issues that are of widespread
importance to the industry. This is such a case for
the reasons set forth below.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I. The Conflicts Among the Circuits

There are two conflicts among the circuits pre-
sented in this case. The first is whether or not Section
92 of the National Bank Act continues to exist: the
second is over how to construe Section 92 assuming
it does exist. For purposes of this case, the second
is the more important of the two.

Section 92 of the National Bank Act was enacted
in 1916. It was designed to grant to those national
banks located and doing business in small towns the
power to engage in the general insurance agency busi-
ness. The opening clause of Section 92 provided that
this power was to be “‘in addition to the powers now
vested by law in national banking associations.’”!
Among the powers then and now vested in national
banking associations was the power to exercise “all

‘Act of Sept. 7, 1916, ch. 461, 39 Stat. 752, 753 (1916)

such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry
on the business of banking.’’? The Comptroller of the
Currency is charged with the interpretation and en-
forcement of these and other provisions of the Na-
tional Bank Act. Clarke v. Securities Industry
Association, 479 U.S. 388, 403-04 (1987).

In this case, Chase Manhattan, located and doing
business in New York City, sought and received the
approval of the Comptroller to engage in the business
of selling title insurance as agent, as an exercise of
its ‘incidental powers.”’ The District Court upheld the
Comptroller’s action. American Land Title Associa-
tion v. Clarke, 772 F. Supp. 1853 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).

On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed. In doing
so, each of the court’s two key holdings place the
Circuit’s decision in direct and irreconcilable conflict
with decisions of other U.S. Courts of Appeals.

The most obvious conflict is with a District of Co-
lumbia Circuit opinion handed down four months ear-
lier in Independent Insurance Agents of America v.
Clarke, 955 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1992), and it concerns
the very existence of Section 92 of the National Bank
Act. Because of two arguably misplaced quotation
marks in the statute enacting Section 92, subsequent
legislation, enacted only two years later and on an
entirely unrelated subject, is said to have repealed
Section 92. The District of Columbia Circuit concluded
that Congress did what it did, and that “section 92
has ceased to exist.’”’ Jd. at 739. The Second Circuit.
in the case below, explicitly disagreed with the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit, holding that whatever hap-

#12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh).

pened in 1918 did not effect a repeal of Section 92.
American Land Title Association v. Clarke, 968 F.2d
150, 152 (2d Cir. 1992).

Obviously, this conclusion by the Second Circuit is
absolutely critical to its ultimate holding. If Section
92 does not exist, then there is no basis upon which
the court could find a “limitation” upon the incidental
powers of national banks. It would have to have
reached the question (which it declined to reach)
whether title insurance agency activities fit within the
incidental powers clause of the National Bank Act,
and the decision cannot stand.

The respondent title associations, the Comptroller
of the Currency, and your amici all take the position
that the Second Circuit’s decision upholding the con-
tinued existence of Section 92 is correct. Chase Man-
hattan- does not take a contrary position. (See Chase
Manhattan Bank v. American Land Title Association,
No. 92-482, Pet. for Cert. at 12-18). The conflict be-
tween the Second and the District of Columbia Cir-
cuits is before the Court on petitions for writ of
certiorari to review the District of Columbia Circuit
opinion in the Independent Insurance Agents case.
Steinbrink v. Independent Insurance Agents of Amer-
wa, No. 92-507; U.S. National Bank v. Independent
Insurqncee Agents of America, No. 92-484. The Court
can and should resolve the conflict over the existence
of the statute in the context of those cases.

But doing so will not resolve the second conflict
among the circuits that is created by the decision
below in this case. If Section 92 does exist, is it an
implied limitation upon the insurance powers of na-
tional banks in large towns or is it an independent
grant of insurance powers to national banks in small

towns? That conflict is separate and distinct, and sur-
vives the outcome of the dispute over the existence
of Section 92.

The Petitions for Writ of Certiorari in this and its
companion case correctly point out that the decision
of the Second Circuit here and of the Fifth Circuit
in Saxon v. Georgia Association of Independent In-
surance Agents, 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968) both
construe Section 92 of the National Bank Act as a
limitation upon the rights of national banks located
in larger jurisdictions to engage in the insurance busi-
ness, whether or not the particular insurance business
in question might be considered ‘‘incidental’’ to bank-
ing. On the other hand, the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit, in Independent Bankers Association of America
v. Hevmann, 613 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 823 (1980), and the Eighth Circuit,
in Independent Insurance Agents of America v. Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 736 F.2d
468 (8th Cir. 1984), both have clearly rejected the
idea that there is that kind of negative inference to
be drawn from Section 92.

While your amici agree with the Petitioners on this
point, we respectfully suggest that this particular con-
flict between the circuits is even deeper_and perhaps
more subtle than it appears at first blush. The conflict
has to do with the order in which the respective courts
analyze the applicable or arguably applicable statutes
in cases testing the powers of banks under the Na-
tional Bank Act, and the priorities that are assigned
to different sections of the law.

Here, the Second Circuit looked first at Section 92
of the Act. Having done so, it opted for an easy
answer: Title insurance is insurance; insurance can

only be offered by those national banks located in
small towns; Chase Manhattan is located in a large
town, so it cannot offer title insurance; all other con-
siderations are irrelevant. Had the Second Circuit in-
stead looked first to Section 24 (Seventh) of the
National Bank Act, it would have to have analyzed
the question whether title insurance agency sales fit
within the business of banking or, more precisely,
whether the Comptroller of the Currency was within
his rights in so concluding. If the court then had
decided that title insurance was part of the business
of banking, it could have dismissed sections of the
law governing nonbanking activities as irrelevant—
including Section 92. Other courts—even including an-
other panel of the Second Circuit—have done precisely
that, and the Second Circuit’s failure to do so in this
case creates a conflict in the framework for analysis
of this particular issue and related ones.

In First National Bank of Eastern Arkansas v.
Taylor, 907 F.2d 775 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct.
442 (1990), the bank proposed to offer ‘debt cancel-
lation contracts” to its customers, alleging (with the
agreement of the Comptroller of the Currency and
the Comptr6tier’s support as amicus curiae before the
Eighth Circuit) that such contracts were within the
incidental powers of national banks. The contracts
provided that, for a fee, the bank would cancel a
borrower’s then outstanding indebtedness upon the
borrower’s death or disability. The Arkansas Insur-
ance Department directed the bank to cease and des-
ist, claiming that the contracts were the functional
equivalent of credit life insurance policies and, as such
were subject to regulation by the Department, could |
not be sold without an insurance license, and that

Mccsaintinnsas

insurance licenses could not be issued to banks in
Arkansas. The bank argued that, as a national bank,
its powers were governed by preemptive federal law:
the Department countered that the federal McCarran-
Ferguson Act left regulation of the insurance business
exclusively to the states.

The Eighth Circuit looked first to Section 24 (Sev-
enth) of the National Bank Act to determine the pow-
ers of the national bank in question. It concluded that
debt cancellation contracts fit within the incidental
powers of banks. The court then turned to the statute
governing nonbanking activities to determine its appl-
icability to the case at hand. It did not deny that
debt cancellation contracts might be “‘insurance”’ for
state law purposes, but concluded that that was an
irrelevant consideration: “Because debt cancellation
contracts offered by FNB fall within the incidental
powers granted by the National Bank Act, they do
not constitute ‘the business of insurance’ under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act.” Jd., 907 F.2d at 779.

Had the Eighth Circuit looked first at the statute
governing nonbanking activities, as the Second Circuit
-did in this case, it could well have determined that
debt cancellation contracts were insurance and left to
the regulation of the Insurance Department, never
reaching the “incidental powers’ issue. That court
examined the arguably applicable statutes in the re-
verse order from the Second Circuit’s, the two de-
cisions therefore being in conflict with one another.

In Securities Industry Association v. Clarke, 885
F.2d 1034 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070
(1990), Security Pacific National Bank proposed to
pool its mortgage loans and sell participations in that

pool to investors. The Comptroller of the Currency
approved, and a trade association of the securities
industry sued, claiming that the bank would be en-
gaged in underwriting and selling securities in vio-
lation of the Glass-Steagall Act. The Second Circuit
upheld the Comptroller’s approval. It looked first at
Section 24 (Seventh) of the National Bank Act, and
found that that Section granted explicit powers to
national banks to negotiate promissory notes or other
evidences of debt, and that is precisely what Security
Pacific was doing. The Court then reached the pro-
visions of law governing the securities business, and
found them inapplicable because it had already deter-
mined the activities to be authorized by the statute
governing the banking business: -

Activity that falls within the “business of
banking”’ is not subject to the restrictions the
latter part of section 16 places on a bank’s
“business of dealing in securities and stock.”
Thus, the issues concerning the definitions of
“securities” and ‘‘underwriting”’ only become
relevant if the activity constitutes ‘“‘the busi-
ness of dealing in securities and stock.”’ If
the activity constitutes ‘“‘the business of bank-
ing,”’ then the Glass-Steagall Act prohibitions
SIA claims are violated here do not apply.

Id., 885 F.2d at 1048.

In this case, where the court looked first to the
statute governing nonbanking activities to determine
the powers of a bank, it has acted in conflict with a
different panel of the same court.

Obviously, this is not to say that the grant of power
to national banks to engage in the business of banking

DOO

found in Section 24 (Seventh) can overcome explicit
statutory prohibitions against banks engaging in a
particular business or in a particular way. But there
is no such prohibition here. Even if the Second Circuit
is right in holding that the law gives a power in one
section of the law and takes it away in another by
negative inference, there must still be some principled
way to choose which of those two sections actually
governs the outcome of a particular case. Here, the
Second Circuit claims to follow the rule of statutory
construction that the statute addressing the matter
under consideration in specific terms controls over
one that does so in a general manner. 968 F.2d at
157 (citing Crawford Fitting Company v. J.T. Gibbons
Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 445 (1987)). That is an entirely
fitting and proper rule of statutory construction where
it is applicable. It is not applicable here. There is no
reason to think that the term “act as the agent for
any fire, life, or other insurance company” found in
Section 92 is any more (or less) “‘specific’”’ than is the
term “carry on the business of banking’’ found in
Section 24 (Seventh), nor does the Second Circuit
opinion state why that court believes the former to
be more specific than the latter. It merely premises
its decision upon the unsupported assumption that it
is so.

The more appropriate rule of statutory construction ;
to follow—the one that is applicable in this case—is
the rule that requires courts to give effect to the
plain language of the statute. See, e.g. Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System v. Dimension
Financial Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 373-75 (1986). Here,
the court believed it was faced with the prospect of
choosing between Section 24 (Seventh) and Section

10

92. One of those sections directs the answer by its
own terms. The powers that are granted by Section
92 are “in addition to the powers now vested by law
in national banking associations.’’ With plain statu-
tory language like that, it would seem incumbent upon
the courts to decide—first—what those ‘‘other pow-
ers” might be. That would require looking—first—at
Section 24 (Seventh). The fact that the Second Circuit
here performed the statutory analysis upside down
| places it not only in conflict with the decisions of
other circuits, but also in conflict with this Court’s
“plain language’”’ rule of statutory construction.

II. The Important Question of Federal Law

The Petitions for Writ of Certiorari in this case
and-its companion case correctly point out the impact
that the Second Circuit’s decision will have upon the
operations of a great many national banks if the de-
cision stands and, particularly, if it is followed as
precedent elsewhere.

Literally thousands of national banks act as agent
in the sale of credit-related insurance—credit life and
credit disability—in the exercise of their incidental
powers, with the approval of the Comptroller of the
Currency (12 C.F.R. § 2.6 (1991)) and the courts,
without regard for the size of the jurisdiction in which
they are located and doing business. Independent
Bankers Association of America v. Hermann, supra,
613 F.2d 1164.

A substantial and growing number of national banks
sell both fixed and variable rate annuities as agents,
over the objection by representatives of the insurance
industry that annuities are “‘insurance”’ products. Such
sales are likewise approved by the Comptroller of the

— <x rrr

11

Currency as an exercise of the incidental powers of
national banks, again without regard to the size of
the town in which the bank operates (Comptroller
Interp. Letter No. 499 [1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed-
eral Banking Law Rep. (CCH) { 83,090 (Feb. 12,
1990); Comptroller Interp. Letter No. 331 [1985-87
Transfer Binder] Federal Banking Law Rep. (CCH)
§85,501 (April 4, 1985), and approved by the U.S.
District Court in the only challenge to the Comp-
troller’s approvals. Variable Annuity Life Insurance
Co. v. Clarke, 786 F. Supp. 639 (S.D. Tex. 1991),
appeal pending, No. 92-2010 (5th Cir.).

The Comptroller of the Currency has approved the
sale of municipal bond insurance by national banks,
including a national bank in New York City, as an
exercise of incidental powers of the banks, and the
courts have upheld that action. American Insurance
Association v. Clarke, 865 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

The Comptroller approved the sale of debt cancel-
lation contracts by national banks as an incidental
power. The Eighth Circuit upheld that action in First
National Bank of Eastern Arkansas, supra, 907 F.2d
775, even though the bank in question is located in
Forrest City, Arkansas, population 13,364.°

The Second Circuit’s decision is incompatible with
all of the above regulatory action and court decisions
and, if nothing else, casts doubt upon the validity of
considerable portions of the activities of national
banks of long standing, undertaken in reliance upon
earlier regulatory and judicial approval.

3 McFadden American Bank Directory, Spring, 1992 (Arkan-
sas) page 23. ;

|e —— :

12

But national banks are not the only banks with an
important interest in the outcome of this matter. State
chartered banks are affected by it as well. In as many
as 37 states, there are so-called ‘‘wild card” or “‘par-
ity’”’ statutes.‘ With quite a few variations, these stat-
utes generally provide that state chartered banks may
have and exercise any powers that may be exercised
by national banks located in the same state, notwith-
standing other provisions of state law. In many ju-
risdictions, the “‘wild card’’ statute is the only source
of authority for state-chartered banks to engage in
one or more of the ‘‘incidental’’ functions described
above for national banks. Consequently, if the Second
Circuit decision remains unreviewed and unreversed,
the loss of “incidental” powers by national banks shali
inevitably result in the loss of comparable powers by
a great many state chartered banks as well. Like their
national brethren, state-chartered banks have invested
in the development of “‘incidental”’ business and es-
tablished business relationships with customers over
a long period of time in justified reliance upon fa-
vorable regulatory and judicial action. The Second
Circuit’s decision threatens to disrupt much of settled
practice, to the great detriment of both national and
state chartered banks and their customers. It there-
fore presents a question of federal law of sufficient
importance to warrant review by this Court, even
independent of the two conflicts among the circuits
that are created by the Second Circuit’s decision.

‘See Appendix to this brief for complete listing.

ne ve

13

CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons stated herein and in the
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, the writ should be
granted.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN J. GILL
Counsel of Record

MICHAEL F. CROTTY

AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION
1120 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 663-5026

Attorneys for Amici Curiae

November 12, 1992

APPENDIX

Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
Colorado
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii

Idaho

Illinois
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nevada

New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon

South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas

Utah
Vermont

la

APENDIX
Wild Card/Parity Statutes

Sec. 06.01.020

Sec. 6-184(2)

Sec. 23-32-701(16)

Sec. 11-2-103

See. 655.057

Sec. 7-1-61(a)1)

Sec. 403-47.1

Sec. 26-1101(3)

Ch. 311.95(11)

Sec. 9-1715

Sec. 287.020

Tit. 6, §242(A\15), Revised Stat.

Tit. 9B, §416

Sec. 5-504 of Fin. Inst. Art.

Sec. 48.15 (Subd. 2)

Sec. 81-5-1(10)

Sec. 362.105.3

Sec. 32-1-362

Sec. 662.015(1\f)

Ch. 394-A

Sec. 17:9A-24a and 17:9A-25(12)

Sec. 58-1-54

Sec. 6-03-38

Sec. 1125.23

T.6, §203

Sec. 707.340

Sec. 34-1-110

Sec. 51A-2-14

Sec. 45-2-601

Sec. 342-113(aX4) of Civil
Statutes

Sec. 7-1-301(3)

‘T.8, §1163

Virginia Sec. 6.1-5.]
Washington Sec. 30.04.215
West Virginia Sec. 31A-3-2(ay5\B)
Wisconsin Sec. 220.04(8)

Wyoming Sec. 13-3-704

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386011_1316%3A5. Public record. Not legal advice.
