# Opposition Brief — Mobley v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1992
- **Citation:** 506 U.S. 998

## Text

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“ERILED
No. 92-279 . WOVE 992

DFPIOE GE JHE CLERK
In the Supreme Court of the Anited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

GERALD I. MOBLEY, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
IN OPPOSITION

KENNETH W. STARR
Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 514-2217
RICHARD L. PURDON

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the prosecutor’s references to petitioner’s
failure to testify at trial were harmless beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.

2. Whether petitioner was denied a fair trial when an
automobile belonging to the husband of the murder
victim was returned to its owner before petitioner was
afforded an opportunity to inspect it.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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Argument ............... li oleae ai cui shaksaeal a 9
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:
Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) ............. . 15, 16,17
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (19638) ....................00e. 15
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) ............ 15, 16, 17
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) 0.0.0.0... eee. 10

Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985) ...................... 10

Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231 (1961) ..........000.... 16

Lent v. Wells. 861 F.2d 972 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,

I an sa neuntbabunnanenntnnd 11

United Staies v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) ............. 10

Statutes:

Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. 801 ef seq.:
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Jn the Supreme Court of the Anited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

No. 92-279
GERALD I. MOBLEY, PETITIONER
Uv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The order of the Court of Military Appeals affirm-
ing petitioner’s conviction, Pet. App. la, is not yet
officially reported. The opinion of the Air Force
Court of Military Review on remand, Pet. App. 2a-12a,
is reported at 34 M.J. 527. An earlier opinion of the
Court of Military Appeals, Pet. App. 13a-30a, is re-
ported at 31 M.J. 273. An earlier opinion of the Air
Force Court of Military Review, Pet. App. 3la-52a, is
reported at 28 M.J. 1024.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Military Appeals was
entered on May 15, 1992. The petition for a writ of

(1)

certiorari was filed on August 13, 1992. The Court’s
jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1259(3).
STATEMENT

Following a general court-martial at Bergstrom
Air Force Base in Texas, petitioner, a member of the
United States Air Force, was convicted on one count
of premeditated murder and one count of attempted
rape, in violation of Articles 118 and 80 of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. 918 and
880. He was sentenced to confinement for life, a
dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and
allowances, and a reduction in rank to the lowest
enlisted grade. The convening authority approved the
findings and sentence except for the forfeitures,
which he reduced to $300 of pay per month for 16
months. The Air Force Court of Military Review
initially affirmed the findings, as modified, and the
sentence approved by the convening authority. The
Court of Military Appeals granted discretionary
review, set aside the decision of the Air Force Court
of Military Review, and remanded the case to that
court to address certain questions regarding the
prosecutor’s closing argument. On remand, the Air
Force Court of Military Review found that some
aspects of the prosecutor’s closing argument were
improper, but held that the improper remarks were
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. On further
consideration, the Court of Military Appeals affirmed.

l.a. The victim was the 25-year-old wife of an
airman first class. She worked as a cashier at the
Noncommissioned Officers’ (NCO) Club at Bergstrom
Air Force Base. When she did not return home on the
night of February 7, 1987, her husband became

concerned and drove to the NCO Club to look for her.
He found her lying unconscious and bleeding on the
floorboard of the front seat of her car, the apparent
victim of a beating, sexual assault, and strangulation.
Her body was transported to a hospital, where it was
determined that she was “brain dead.” Pet. App. 15a,
a9,

Jad.

The victim had been severely beaten. There was
trauma to her head caused by at least four blows from
the assailant’s fist. The injuries to her neck were
caused by use of the car’s seat belt strap to strangle
her. There were bruises on the victim’s legs caused
by sustained pressure from the assailant’s hands to

separate the victim’s legs. Tr. 996-1001. The cause of

death was asphyxia due to strangulation. Pet. App.
l5a, 32a. There was no eyewitness to the crime, but
various items of circumstantial evidence proved that
petitioner had assaulted and murdered the victim.

| A receipt bearing petitioner’s name was found in the front
seat of the victim’s car. Pet. App. 16a, 32a. Petitioner’s
permanent duty station was in California, but he had been
temporarily assigned to attend the Bergstrom NCO Academy
at the time of the murder. Jbid. A bloody palm print and
fingerprint were found in the vehicle on a piece of paper, and
the palm print positively matched a known print of petition-
er’s. Pet. App. 17a, 33a. A forensic test on saliva taken from
petitioner matched semen found on the carpet of the car and
on the victim’s dress and panties. A pubic hair found in the car
matched the unusual pubic hair sample taken from petitioner.
Pet. App. 16a, 17a, 32a. Blood on both sides, the sleeves, and
the cuffs of a leather jacket seized from petitioner’s residence
matched the rare blood type of the victim. Pet. App. 16a. An
expert testified that the odds of the blood found on the jacket
not being the victim’s were one in 330. Tr. 954.

b. In the early morning hours of February 7, 1987,
Detective Hesskew of the Austin Police Department

A witness testified that a man matching petitioner’s descrip-
tion, wearing a leather jacket, walked in and out of the
Bergstrom NCO Club several times on the night of the murder,
acting in a manner that frightened the witness. Pet. App. 16a,
32a; Tr. 592-595. A dusty shoe imprint taken from the window
of the victim’s car matched the sole of one of the shoes
petitioner was wearing when he was contacted by the police.
Pet. App. 16a, 32a-33a. Petitioner had cashed a number of
checks at the NCO Club. On the day of the murder, the victim
had cashed one of petitioner’s checks. An academy classmate
of petitioner’s quoted petitioner as saying of the victim that
“he wouldn’t kick her out of bed for eating crackers and
wouldn’t mind having a piece of her ass.” Tr. 669, 714, 760-763;
PX 9.

Petitioner had injured his right thumb playing basketball on
January 30, 1987. The thumb was x-rayed and had a splint
placed on it at the base hospital. When petitioner was
interviewed by investigators, he complained about the thumb,
saying he had only limited, painful movement of it. The
contusions on the victim’s calf, which indicated strong,
sustained pressure to keep her legs apart, were caused by
someone who used the four fingers of a right hand without also
using the thumb. Tr. 751-752, 778, 1000-1001; PX 15, at 45-46.

When he was contacted by investigators, petitioner had
several scratch marks on his face and neck. He claimed that he
got the scratches playing basketball at the NCO Academy.
None of the men with whom petitioner had played ball
corroborated his story. Petitioner was at a barbecue at another
classmate’s home for five hours during the afternoon of the
murder, a Saturday. The classmate did not notice any
scratches on petitioner at that time. The following Monday
morning, the classmate noticed that petitioner had scratches on
his face. An expert testified that the scratches on petitioner
were consistent with a frontal assault by an individual facing

(APD) and Special Agent Brown of the Air Force
Office of Special Investigations (OSI), together with
an identification specialist (Koschell) from the APD,
returned to review the crime scene after seeing the
victim at the hospital. The car door handle was
fingerprinted first, so that entry into the vehicle
would not destroy potential evidence. Due to the poor -
lighting in the NCO Club parking lot and heavy
condensation that would retard fingerprinting efforts,
the car was sealed and transported to a locked garage
at the APD station. Pet. App. 33a; Tr. 646-648.
Later that day, APD Detective Hesskew began an
examination of the vehicle. First, the car was pho-
tographed several times. Detective Hesskew, who
was the State of Texas’ expert in blood splatter
analysis, scrutinized the array of blood and blood
splatters throughout the front seat area of the car.
Koschell extensively analyzed the interior and ex-
terior of the car for prints. He found prints from the
victim, the victim’s husband, and others he classified
as “unidentified.” Hesskew inventoried the interior
of the vehicle using rubber gloves and tweezers to
remove objects. The car was divided into sections and
a special vacuum cleaner was used on each one; the
contents were removed and sealed after each section
was swept. A special fluorescent light was used to
detect any blood, semen, or other evidence of fluids.
Hesskew observed and detailed each of the items he
found and removed from the car—including semen,
hairs, the victim’s shoes, her keys and purse, a piece

him, and were not consistent with petitioner’s explanations.
Pet. App. 16a; Tr. 781-784, 995-996

of folded paper, and another piece of paper with a
bloody print on it. The front seat belt, which appeared
to have blood stains on it, was also cut out and
subjected to analysis. Pet. App. 33a-34a; Tr. 652-667;
PX 29.

Following the inventory of the car, and on the same
day, Detective Hesskew interviewed the victim’s
husband at the APD. Agent Brown and Detective
Hesskew’s supervisor were also present. The hus-
band was advised of his rights as a suspect, but based
on the resu'ts of the interview and other evidence in
the case, Detective Hesskew and Agent Brown
quickly and independently concluded that he was not a
suspect. Pet. App. 34a; Tr. 666-667, 713-714.

Kight to ten days after the murder, and after no
major breaks had occurred in the case, Detective
Hesskew began to review the evidence in the case. He
noted that the folded piece of paper that was retrieved
from the front seat of the car appeared not to have
been fingerprinted. He took it to Koschell to have it
examined. Koschell returned about an hour later
with the paper unfolded, showing it to be the receipt
with petitioner’s name on it. Following a personnel
check on petitioner and a review of the cashiers’
records at the NCO Club, Detective Hesskew and
Agent Brown flew to California to interview peti
tioner, which they did on February 17, 1987. The
investigators noted and photographed the scratches
on petitioner; petitioner was interviewed; the shoe
and leather jacket were seized; and the blood, saliva
and hair samples were taken from petitioner. There
after, petitioner’s friends and acquaintances from the

NCO Academy were interviewed. Pet. App. 16a, 32a;

Tr. 669, 715; PXs 6, 23, 24 ;
Petitioner was placed in pretria nfinement at

Bergstrom on February 24, 1987; he was formally
charged the following day. Between February 17 and
February 24, petitioner consulted with a Captain
Mahone, who had been detailed to represent him. On
February 25, lead defense counsel, Captain Nix, was
detailed to represent petitioner. Pet. App. 18a, 34a;
Tr. 88-88.

On February 25, Detective Hesskew and his super-
visors at the APD released the car to its owner, the
victim’s husband. That action was in accordance with
standard operating procedures of the APD. Detective
Hesskew called Agent Brown and told him that they
were releasing the vehicle. Under APD procedures,
the officers were not required to notify anyone other
than the owner of the property. The APD had used
the same procedure for at least 15 years. Pet. App.
17a, 18a, 34a; Tr. 102-105.

The defense did not learn until mid-March that the
ar had been released to the victim’s husband. No
defense counsel had called APD seeking permission
to look at the vehicle. The physical evidence taken
from the vehicle was available to the defense for
inspection. Pet. App. 18a, 34a; Tr. 85-86, 218.

ce. During his closing argument, the prosecuting
attorney posed various questions to the members of
the court-martial panel and then answered the
questions based on evidence admitted at trial.2. The

“ The appendix to the Court of Military Appeals’ initial
opinion contains excerpts of the prosecuting attorney's closing
argument. Pet. App. 28a-30a

defense did not object, and the trial judge did not
intervene sua sponte. After the prosecutor had com-
pleted his argument, the defense moved for a mistrial,
asserting that the prosecuting attorney had called
attention to the fact that the petitioner did not
testify. Pet. App. 2a. The trial judge viewed the
argument as acceptable commentary, but gave a
curative instruction to the court-martial panel. The
defense did not object to the instruction as given, nor
did the defense request any additional instruction.
Pet. App. 8a-9a, 24a-25a.

2. The court of military review affirmed. Pet. App.
Sla-52a. The court found no prejudicial error in the
release of the car to the victim’s husband on March
24, 1987. The court noted that the physical evidence
actually removed from the vehicle and the forensic
tests conducted on that evidence were available for
examination by the defense. The court viewed the car
as the crime scene itself, and concluded that the
authorities were not required to preserve the crime
scene until defense representatives could examine it.
[he court found no evidence of bad faith on the part of
the government in releasing the car; the court also
noted that any benefit that might have resulted fron

defense examination of the vehicle while it was i

police custody was purely speculative. Pet. App. 3la
5ba.

. The Court of Military Appeals reject
tioners argument that the release of the vel
denied him a fair trial. Pet. App. 17a-22a. The rt
held that the Constitution does not requir
government to preserve a crime scene for e»

tion DY defense representatives LiL!

was critical of the timing of the release of the car, the
court noted that the car was not released by military
police, but by the Austin city police, and detected no
bad faith on the part of the APD officers involved.
Pet. App. 20a, 22a. After reviewing the record, the
court found no basis to conclude that exculpatory
evidence was destroyed because the car was returned
to its owner. Pet. App. 2la. The Court of Military
Appeals, however, was troubled by the possibility that
the prosecutor may have commented on petitioner’s
silence at trial. The court therefore remanded the
case to the court of military review for it to readdress
this issue. Pet. App. 27a.

1. On remand, the court of military review found
improper certain aspects of the prosecutor’s argu-
ment. Pet. App. 3a-5a. Nevertheless, the court con-
cluded that any error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Pet. App. lla.

5. On further review, the Court of Military Ap-
peals summarily affirmed. Pet. App. la.

ARGUMENT

1. Petitioner argues that the prosecutor’s closing
argument Was Improper since he referred to the fact
that petitioner remained silent at trial.* The court of

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10

military review agreed with petitioner, concluding
that the prosecutor’s argument indirectly called
attention to efendant’s failure to testify at trial.
Accordingly, this case does not present that question.
The only question that is properly at issue here is the
correctness of the ruling of the military appellate
courts that the prosecutor’s closing argument was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Although peti-
tioner challenges the rulings below in that regard,
Pet. 6, the fact-bound ruling of the military appellate
courts to the contrary does not warrant review by
this Court.

A prosecutor’s improper comment on a defendant’s
failure to testify at trial is subject to harmless error
analysis. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499
(1983). “The primary task of this Court upon review
of a harmless-error determination by the court of
appeals is to ensure that the court undertook a
thorough inquiry and made clear the basis of its
decision.” Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 326 n.10
(1985). Here, the court of military review correctly
explained that the inquiry, under Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), is whether the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Pet. App.
9a. In undertaking that inquiry, the court carefully
reviewed the record and considered four factors,
which are appropriate to a harmless error analysis:
(1) whether €¢he prosecutor’s argument was man-
ifestly intended as a comment on the defendant’s

addition, although the prosecutor in rebuttal commenced an
argument about the defense’s failure to call witnesses, the
defense objected before he completed those remarks, and the
trial judge sustained the objection. Pet. App. 12a-13a; Tr. 1049.

11

failure to testify, or would naturally and necessarily
have been so understood by the court-martial panel;
(2) whether the improper comments were isolated or
extensive; (3) whether the proof of the defendant’s
guilt was overwhelming; and (4) whether and when
curative instructions were given. Pet. App. 10a,
citing Lent v. Wells, 861 F.2d 972, 975 (6th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1100 (1989).

With regard to the first factor, the court of military
review noted, as did the Court of Military Appeals,
that appellate judges are at a disadvantage in judging
arguments of counsel, because they are not present to
observe the attorney’s demeanor, tone of voice, voice
inflections, pauses, or nuances of his language. Pet.
App. 4a, 25a. The reviewing courts found it signifi-
cant that there was no contemporaneous objection by
defense counsel, and the trial judge did not feel the
need to intervene sua sponte. Pet. App. 7a, 25a. In
denying the defense motion for a mistrial. the trial
judge said: “I find that it was evident [that] the
pattern of rheterical questions were just that,
rhetorical in nature only, and obviously, under the
circumstances, not asked in a manner which invited
attention to the fac. that the accused did not testify in
his own behalf in this trial.” Tr. 1035. While it
disagreed with the trial judge’s characterization of
portions of the argument, the court of military review
did not find the argument “so egregious as to have
required the military judge to interrupt on his own
motion.” Pet. App. 7a. The court of military review
specifically found that the prosecuting attorney “did
not deliberately” engage in impermissible argument,
and did not find that the prosecutor “manifestly

12

intended” to comment on petitioner’s silence. Pet.
App. 10a. That finding is entitled to respect, since the
courts of military review have independent fact-
finding authority under Article 66(c) of the UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. 866(c). Similarly, the court did not find that
the jury would “naturally and necessarily” construe
the argument as a reflection on petitioner’s failure to
testify. Pet. App. 10a.

Concerning the second factor, the court of military
review noted that the rhetorical questions did not
“account for a large portion of the total argument
presented.” Pet. App. lla. In addition, as the court
of military review remarked, the lack of any defense
objection “contributed to the extent of improper
argument.” Ibid.

As to the third factor, the Court of Military Ap-
peals and two separate panels of the court of military
review characterized the evidence of petitioner’s guilt
as “overwhelming.” Pet. App. 16a, lla, 43a. Without
undertaking an exhaustive review of the evidence, the
evidence included: the receipt containing petitioner’s
name in the front seat of the automobile; the bloody
palm/finger print in the vehicle that positively mat-
ched petitioner’s; the forensic analysis of the seminal
fluid and pubic hair found in the vehicle; the com-
parison of blood samples from the crime scene and
petitioner’s clothing; the imprint on the car window of
the sole of a shoe that matched one worn by peti-
tioner; petitioner’s expressed sexual interest in the
victim; and the scratches on petitioner’s face and
neck.

Respecting the final factor, although the trial judge
did not find the argument to be in error, he provided a

13

proper and effective curative instruction in response
to the defense motion for a mistrial. He told the jury,
Pet. App. 24a n.4 (emphasis omitted).

The accused has an absolute right to remain
silent. You will not draw any inference adverse to
the accused from the fact that he did not testify as
a witness in this case. The fact that the accused
has not testified on any other matter must be
disregarded by you. And, in this regard, you heard
the trial counsel during the course of. his
argument of the evidence, ask certain rhetorical
questions which appeared to be directed towards
the accused, Sergeant Mobley. I think it was
obvious to you that these were [a] rhetorical form
of questions and a rhetorical form of argument,
but I do caution you again, that the accused has an
absolute right to remain silent, and you will not
draw any inference adverse to the accused from
the fact that he did not testify as a witness.

That instruction, of course, was in addition to the
judge’s other instructions that the burden of proof
was solely upon the government and that the
argument of counsel was neither evidence nor a
statement of the law for them to follow. Tr. i055,
1061.

The decision below clearly reflected a carefully
considered analysis of the harmless error issue.
Moreover, the decision was correct. As the court of
military review explained, the proof of petitioner’s
guilt, although circumstantial, was overwhelming.
Pet. App. lla, 43a. The prosecutor’s comments, even
if erroneous, could not have prejudiced petitioner.

14

2. Petitioner argues that he was denied a fair trial
by the government’s use of evidence obtained from a
search of the victim’s car. The military courts,
however, correctly rejected that claim, and their
decisions do not warrant review by this Court.

While defense counsel’s motion in limine focused
on Detective Hesskew’s testimony regarding blood
splatters, petitioner’s written motion to suppress and
the petition filed in this Court attempt to include all
of the evidence seized or derived from the car. Pet.
App. 17a. At the outset, it must be noted that all of
the physical evidence and forensic tests were pre-
served and available to the defense. Pet. App. 21a, 36a.
Accordingly, there is no issue in this case whether
the government properly disclosed to the defense the
evidence it obtained from an examination of the
victim’s car. Rather, the question is whether the
government acted improperly in some way by
returning the car to its rightful owner without first
allowing petitioner to examine the car, or informing
him about its imminent release.

The court of military review correctly character-
ized the car as the “crime scene” in this case, Pet.
App. 35a, and correctly noted as well that there is no
constitutional requirement that the government
maintain and secure a crime scene for lengthy periods
of time while a suspect is captured and his attorney
has a chance to examine it, ibid. Petitioner’s rights
were adequately protected by the preservation of the
evidence taken from the car, the numerous photo-
graphs taken, the availability of the examiners for
interview and cross-examination, and even the avail-
ability of the vehicle after it was released.

15

Insofar as the car itself had any evidentiary value,
the fact remains, as noted by the court of military
review, that “any benefit that might have resulted
from a defense examination of the vehicle while it was
in police custody is purely speculative.” Pet. App.
36a. The trial judge found “no indication whatsoever
that any evidence in the car, either inculpatory or
exculpatory, material or otherwise, was lost, over-
looked, or not removed.” Pet. App. 19a n.3. And the
Court of Military Appeals’ review of the record
“suggest[ed] no reasonable theory upon which we
could conclude that ‘evidence favorable to an accused’
was destroyed because the car was returned to the
victim’s husband.” Pet. App. 21a, citing Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

The constitutional duty to preserve evidence is
limited to evidence that might be expected to play a
significant role in the suspect’s defense. The ev-
idence must possess an exculpatory value that was
apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and the
defendant must be unable to obtain comparable
evidence by any other reasonably available means.
Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988): Cal-
fornia v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984). The failure
to preserve potentially useful evidence does not
constitute a denial of due process unless the de-
fendant can establish bad faith on the part of the law
enforcement authorities. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488
U.S. at 58. Petitioner cannot make that showing.

In ruling on the motion to suppress at trial, the
judge found:

There is no indication whatsoever that the action
of the Austin Police Department in returning the

16

auto to its owner after an exhaustive crime scene
examination of the interior was motivated by an
intention to circumvent disclosure requirements.
It was, rather, done in good faith and in accor-
dance with the department’s standard practice.

Pet. App. 18a n.3.4 The court of military review said,
“we can find no evidence of bad faith on the part of the
Government, including agents of the Office of Special
Investigations,” who maintained the liaison with the
APD. Pet. App. 35a. And the Court of Military Ap-
peals concluded that “[petitioner] has made no show-
ing of ‘bad faith.’” Pet. App. 20a (quoting Arizona v.
Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58). Even defense counsel,
who testified on petitioner’s motion to suppress, dia
not believe that either the federal government or the
APD tried to conceal evidence. Tr. 88. Defense
counsel also acknowledged that the defense had not
sought permission to examine the car and that the
defense had access to the vehicle after it was released.
Tr. 85-86. See T'rombetta, 467 U.S. at 488; Aillian v.
United States, 368 U.S. 231, 242 (1961).

Petitioner attempts to distinguish Youngblood
from his case, noting that in Youngblood the State
did not use test results based on evidence that was
lost or destroyed before it could be examined by the
defense. Pet. 21. That purported distinction lacks

4 The Court of Military Appeals emphasized, “the vehicle
was returned to the victim’s husband by the Austin city police
officials, not by the military police. It is doubtful that those
officials would be cognizant of the high standards created by
Article 46 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and we
detect no bad faith on their part in releasing the car as they
did. Arizona v. Youngblood, supra.” Pet. App. 22a.

17

merit, however, for several reasons. First, the bulk of
the evidence in this case proving petitioner’s guilt
was preserved. Second, this Court held that the
evidence not preserved in Trombetta was properly
used against the defendant in that case. 467 U.S. at
491. Third, since this case did not involve a failure to
disclose material, exculpatory evidence in violation of
Brady, Youngblood required petitioner to prove that
the APD and OSI acted in “bad faith” in failing to
preserve “potentially” useful evidence. 488 U.S. at 58.
Petitioner has not made such a showing.
CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
denied.

Respectfully submitted.

KENNETH W. STARR
Solicitor General

RICHARD L. PURDON

Col., AFLSA, USAF
JEFFERY T. INFELISE

iF Col... AF LSA. USAF
THOMAS EF. WAND

Capt., AFLSA, USAF

Aj pe llate Government Counsel

Government Trial and Appe llate

’ }
Counsel Division

NOVEMBER 1992

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386011_1139%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
