# Opposition Brief — Kolbeck v. General Motors Corp.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1992
- **Citation:** 506 U.S. 867

## Text

ihe BE ds SUN a eS SORES hal naa ge an! Se eat SU te a Ak a kT Be a (4) 4

No. 92-133

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED

October Term, 1992

MICHAEL J. KOLBECK,

Petitioner

~~

Vv.

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
Respondent

Ree Mees ye ee ep

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

a

Thomas Finarelli, Esquire
Counsel of Record
Edward A. Gray, Esquire
Michael D. Brophy, Esquire
LAVIN, COLEMAN, FINARELLI
& GRAY
Penn Mutual Tower
510 Walnut Street
12th Floor
PA 19106

(215) 627-0303

Attorneys for Respondent,
General Motors Corporation

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The Petition for Writ of Certiorari presents the
following questions for review, neither of which was
presented to the court below:

WHETHER THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT'S
REFUSAL TO ALLOW PETITIONER TO SUG-
GEST IN BANC RECONSIDERATION OF A DE-
NIED REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO
FILE FOR REHEARING BY THE THIRD CIR-
CUIT COURT OF APPEALS CONSTITUTES A
DEPRIVATION OF PETITIONER’S DUE PRO-
CESS RIGHTS.

WHETHER DENIAL OF PETITIONER’S PE-
TITION REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF
TIME TO FILE FOR REHEARING AND DENIAL
OF APPELLANT’S PETITION TO RECALL THE
MANDATE ISSUED BY THE THIRD CIRCUIT
COURT OF APPEALS WERE VIOLATIONS OF
PETITIONER’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.

STATEMENT PURSUANT TO SUPREME COURT
RULE 29.1

Respondent in this matter is General Motors Corpo-
ration. There is no “parent company” of General Motors
Corporation. The following are subsidiary companies
(other than wholly-owned subsidiaries) of General Mo-
tors Corporation:

AeroVironment Inc. (USA)
Alambrados Automatrices. S.A. de C.V. (Mexico)

Alambrados y Circuitos Electricos, S.A. de C.V.
(Mexico)

AMBRAKE Corporation (USA)
Applied Intelligence Systems, Inc. (USA)
Aralmex, S.A. de C.V. (Mexico) *

Automotive Polymer Based Composites Joint Ven-
ture and Development Partnership

Autos y Maquinas del Ecuador S.A. (AYMESA)
(Ecuador)

Avis, Inc. (U.S.A.)
Bujias Mexicanas, S.A. de C.V. (Mexico)
Cableados de Juarez, S.A. de C.V. (Mexico)

CABLESA-Industria de Componentes Electricos
Limitada (Portugal)

Calsonic Harrison Co., Ltd. (Japan)
Cami Automotive Inc. (Canada)

CEI Co., Ltd. (USA)

Comau Productivity Systems, Inc. (USA)

Compagnie De Faisceaux Tunisian International
S.A. (Tunisia)

Compania Nacional de Direcciones Automotrices,
S.A. de C.V. (Mexico)

Componentes Delfa, C.A. (Venezuela)

Componentes Mexicanos de Matamoros, S.A. de
C.V. (Mexico)

Conductores y Componentes Electricos, de Juarez,
S.A. de C.V. (Mexico)

Convesco Vehicle Sales GmbH (West Germany)
Daewoo Automotive Components, Ltd. (Korea)
Delco Electronics Corporation (USA)

Delkor Battery Company, Ltd. (Korea)

Delmex de Juarez, S.A. de C.V. (Mexico)
Delredo, S.A. de C.V. (Mexico)

Detroit Deere Corporation (USA)

Detroit Diesel Corporation (USA)

DEB — Componentes Automotivos S.A. (Brazil)
DEMS Industries, Ltd. (Korea)

Diffracto Limited (Canada)

DR DE CHIHUAHUA, S.A. de C.V. (Mexico)
Electronic Data Systems Corporation (USA)

Ensamble de Cables Y Componentes, S.A. de C.V.
(Mexico)

Fabrica Columbiana de Automotores S.A. (“Colo-
motores”) (Columbia) ~

General Motors de Brasil, Ltda. (Brazil) :
General Motors de Colombia S.A. (Colombia)
General Motors de Ecuador S.A. (Ecuador)
General Motors de Mexico, S.A. de C.V. (Mexico)

- . ——

General Motors Egypt, S.A.E. (Egypt)

General Motors Espana, S.A. (Spain)

General Motors (Europe) AG (Switzerland)
General Motors France (France)

General Motors Hellas, A.B.E.E. (Greece)

General Motors Iran Limited (Iran)

General Motors Kenya Limited (Kenya)

General Motors del Peru S.A. (Peru)

General Motors de Portugal, Limitada (Portugal)
Genie Mecanique Zairose, S.A.R.L. (Zaire)

GM Allison Japan Limited (Japan)

GMFanuc Robotics Corporation (USA)

Hua Tang Automotive Corporation (Rep. of China)
IBC Vehicles Limited (England)

Ilmor Engineering, Ltd. (England)

Industries Mecaniques Maghrebines, S.A. (Tunisia)
Industrija Delova Automobila, Kikinda (Yugoslavia)

INLAN-Industria de Componentes Mecanicos, Lda.
(Portugal)

Isuzu Motors Limited (Japan)
Isuzu Motors Overseas Distribution Corp. (Japan)
Kabelwerke Reinshagen GmbH (West Germany)

Kabelwerke Reinshagen Werk West Berlin GmbH
(West Germany)

Kabelwerke Reinshagen Werk Neumarkt GmbH
(West Germany)

Koram Plastics Company, Ltd. (Korea)
Metal Casting Technology, Inc. (USA)

iv

Motor Enterprises, Inc. (USA)

New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (USA)
New Venture Gear, Inc. (USA)

NHK Inland Corporation (Japan)

Omnibus BB Transportes, S.A. (Ecuador)
Packard Electric Ireland Limited (Ireland)
Perceptron Inc. (USA)

Promotora de Partes Electronics Automotrices (Mexic:
P.T. Mesin Isuzu Indonesia (Indonesia)

Rimir, S.A. de C.V. (Mexico)

Rio Bravo Electricos, S.A. de C.V. (Mexico)
Robotic Vision Systems, Inc. (USA)

Senalizacion y Accesorios del Automovil Yorka, S.A.
(Spain)

Shinsung Packard Company, Ltd. (S. Korea)

Sistemas Electricos y Commutadores, S.A. de C.V.
(Mexico) .

Sung San Company, Ltd. (Korea)

Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd. (Japan)

Tactical Truck Corporation (USA)
Teknowledge, Inc. (USA)

TEREX Equipment Limited (Scotland)
Vauxhall Motors Limited (England)
Vestiduras Fronterizas, S.A. de C.V. (Mexico)
View Engineering (USA)

Volvo GM Heavy Truck Corporation (USA)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
yi gl” eT ePEET TT ere er Tre rT ri vii
SOMEONE GE TIO GORD a once ce ckececcescveccesess 1
SUMMMATY OF ATBUUIIEE. occ ccc eccscccescsveswusa 2
iy | SPPTUTTI LIT UPT TELE LETT 2
CONNER 4 oo a dnccdccv an aveeksencubanaebaneres 9

senna

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASE LAW Page
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48

Re SR rrr eS eee err ra 8
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52

ge te te ee re rae 4
Dillinger v. Caterpillar, Inc., 959 F.2d 430 (3d Cir.

PAE Gaerne Kkckecescuke ee renes Ee ee
Duignan v. United States, 274 U.S. 195, 47 S.Ct.

~ ee Bk 4 2 er ererre 4
Duncan v. Tennessee, 405 U.S. 127, 92 S.Ct. 785,

ee) Se ee er rr 6
United States v. Hohri, 482 U.S. 64, 107 S.Ct.

es Te Me PE LEED a oc eves cciceess 8
United States v. Williams,504U.S. ,112S.Ct. ,

eee BE ee 4
Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg,501 U.S. _ ,

111 S.Ct. 2749, 115 L.Ed.2d 929 (1992) ...... 4

| Western Pac.R.Corp. v. Western Pac.R.Co., 345
| U.S. 247, 73 S.Ct. 656, 97 L.Ed. 986 (1953)... 4, 5

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41

ST OE cca ce bes cchcsstcntnvens 4
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
pppoe FO Lt . errr err eer reer er 1, 6
| ee Tis sv avcasaccesesgsetecue i, 4,5
RULES OF COURT
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 40(a) ........ * ix
Internal Operating Procedures of the Third Circuit
PLGA Ces bib wecdncsecheeeeseeseoeses 3
Chapter 10..... MOS eRe sebaEGS CeObRRS CSR ORSES 1
Dy Gee UD BD vc cc scceccsescccsecseses 6
vii

i , J

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — (Continued)

TREATISES AND OTHER TEXTS Page
Restatement Second of Torts, § 402A............ 7

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondent, General Motors Corporation, accepts
petitioner’s recital of the relevant procedural history
appearing at pages 5-6 of Michael Kolbeck’s Petition for
Writ of Certiorari (referred to herein as “Petition”). The
issue of a “seat belt defense,” Petition at 6, specifically
required interpretation of the Pennsylvania Occupant
Protection Act, 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 4581-85, by the lower
federal courts. See Petition at 6; Appendix to Petition,
A-12 through A-28 inclusive. Respondent does not ac-
cept petitioner’s statement of the reasons offered to
explain his failure to timely file a petition for rehearing
in banc. Respondent also disagrees with petitioner’s
interpretation of the decision in Dillinger v. Caterpillar,
Inc., 959 F.2d 430 (3d Cir. 1992). See Petition at 7-8 and
Argument, infra.

- Contrary to petitioner’s statement of the case, Mr.
Kolbeck was allowed to file a “suggestion for rehearing”
in banc which was ultimately reviewed and rejected by
a three-judge panel of the court of appeals. Curiously,
petitioner omitted from his Appendix the “Petition for
Rehearing In Banc” filed April 27, 1992, (acknowledged
by the Clerk’s letter of April 28, 1992, which appears at
A-8 and A-9 of the Appendix) which expressly requested
rehearing in banc. Reference of such matters to a
three-judge panel was appropriate pursuant te 28 U.S.C.
§ 46 and Internal Operating Procedure 10.3.3 of the
Court of Appeals.

Kolbeck’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari, served on
counsel for respondent on July 22, 1992, presents for
review in this Court two questions not preserved for
appellate review below. Each suggests a due process

1. The releyant statutory provisions appear in the Petition at
3-4. Briefly, 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) authorizes rehearing in banc in the
courts of appeals where so ordered by the judges of the circuit.
Chapter 10.3.3 of the Third Circuit’s Internal Operating Procedures
governs submission of certain motions for reconsideration or re-
hearing.

2

violation which was neither presented to nor decided by
the court of appeals.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Petition for Writ of Certiorari inaccurately states
that petitioner was not allowed to “suggest” the need for
rehearing in banc in the court of appeals. Kolbeck’s
Petition for Rehearing In Banc, though filed several
months out-of-time, was presented to and rejected by an
appropriately constituted panel of the court below. The
constitutional arguments presented for the first time
here not only lack support in case precedent, but seek to
excuse petitioner’s failure to timely file a petition for
rehearing in banc in the court below. Finally, the court
of appeals properly rejected the merits of petitioner’s
underlying state law claims which, on their face, would
not justify the exercise of discretionary jurisdiction by
this Court.

ARGUMENT

I. The Procedures Adopted By The Court Of Appeals
Allowed Petitioner, Who Purposefully Elected Not To
File A Timely Petition For Rehearing In Banc, The
Opportunity To Request Such Rehearing Out-Of-Time
And To Present Legal Argument To A Three-Judge
Panel Of The Court.

Petitioner, Michael Kolbeck, whose liability claims
against General Motors Corporation have been rejected
by a district court jury and by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, now seeks to expand both
settled constitutional precedent and federal appellate
procedure to excuse his admitted failure to timely file a
petition for rehearing in banc in the lower court.

Kolbeck’s petition makes superficial reference to
numerous constitutional provisions yet offers not a sin-
gle precedent to support the central proposition of his

3

case, namely, that a litigant has a constitutionally pro-
tected interest sufficient to compel review of an un-
timely filed petition for rehearing in banc. This argu-
ment lacks support in the Constitution, in common law
and in common sense as well. It is also contradicted in
fact by the lower court record.

Kolbeck’s petition argues that the court of appeals,
acting through its clerk, would not allow him “to suggest
that appropriate circumstances exist warranting sub-
mission of his request for an extension of time to file for
a rehearing to an im banc session of the court.” Petition
at 9. To the contrary, Kolbeck’s Petition for Rehearing In
Banc was submitted to and rejected by a three-judge
panel of the court. See Appendix to Petition at A-8
through A-11. That the clerk may have submitted the
rehearing petition to the court accompanied by a trans-
mittal form treating the document as a “motion for
reconsideration” of an earlier order did not deprive the
petition of its character or its content. Petitioner’s claim
that he was denied access to the courts notwithstanding,
the appellate record confirms both presentation and
proper judicial consideration of Kolbeck’s arguments.?

The order which affirmed judgment for General
Motors Corporation was entered November 27, 1991.
For a period of 14 days thereafter, counsel for petiticner
was entitled as a matter of right to file a petition for
rehearing. Fed. R.App.P. 40(a). When timely filed in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
petitions for rehearing are circulated to all active circuit
judges pursuant to Chapter 9 of the court’s Internal
Operating Procedures and 28 U.S.C. § 46. Petitioner’s
failure to pursue this opportunity cannot be excused, ex

2. Petitioner has failed to include in his Appendix any of the
substantive motions filed in the court of appeals, review of which
demonstrates that the same substantive arguments which underlie
the pending petition were twice presented to and rejected by
three-judge panels. See Appellant’s “Petition to Recall the Mandate”
filed March 8, 1992 and Appellant’s “Petition for Rehearing In
Banc” filed April 27, 1992.

4

post facto, on transparent constitutional claims of lack of
due process or denial of access to the courts.

In his petition, which criticizes the procedure
adopted by the court of appeals for disposition of rehear-
ing petitions, Kolbeck now contends for the first time
that his due process rights were abridged.* He relies
heavily on this Court’s decision in Western Pacific
Railroad Corp. v. Western Pacific Railroad Co., 345
U.S. 247, 73 S.Ct. 656, 97 L.Ed. 986 (1953), to support
his position. Arguments similar if not identical to those
advanced by Kolbeck here, however, were expressly
rejected in Western Pacific. Interpreting the powers
granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46, the Court observed
that “$46(c) is not addressed to litigants. It is addressed
to the Court of Appeals. It is a grant of power. It vests in
the court the power to order hearings en banc. It goes no
further.” Id., 345 U.S. at 250. In terms applicable to

3. Petitioner concedes that precedent interpreting the right of
access to the courts addressed constitutional deprivations not in
evidence here. Petition at 11, citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817,
97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed. 2d 72 (1977). The right of access to the
courts “is founded in the Due Process Clause and assures that no
person will be denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary
allegations concerning violations of fundamental constitutional
rights.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2986,
41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). Kolbeck’s various allegations, which do not
rise to the level of fundamental constitutional rights, were “pre-
sented” on several occasions to the court of appeals.

4. The traditional rules of this Court preclude grant of
certiorari when “the question presented was not pressed or passed
upon below.” United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. ,112S.Ct. ,
118 L.Ed.2d 352, 372 (1992) (Stevens, J. dissenting); see Duignan
v. United States, 274 U.S. 195, 200, 47 S.Ct. 566, 71 L.Ed. 996
(1927); cf. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg,501 U.S. ,111
S.Ct. 2749, 115 L.Ed.2d 929, 949 n.8 (1992) (issues not presented
to, but passed upon by, court of appeals may be reviewed by the
Court). Assuming Kolbeck’s characterization of the record to be
accurate — which it is not — his claim that the actions of the clerk
deprived him of his constitutional right of access to the courts
should have been presented to a motion panel of the court of
appeals. See Chapter 10, Internal Operating Procedures of the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

5

Kolbeck’s petition, the Court continued: “[Section 46(c)]
neither forbids nor requires each active member of a
Court of Appeals to entertain each petition for a hearing
or rehearing en banc. The court is left free to devise its
own administrative machinery to provide the means
whereby a majority may order such a hearing.” Jd.

Reviewing the statute’s legislative history, the Court
emphasized that “the determination of how the en banc
power was to be exercised was to rest with the court
itself — litigants should be free to suggest that a
particular case was appropriate for consideration by the
full court, but they should be given no right to compel ail
circuit judges to take formal action on the suggestion.”
Id., 345 U.S. at 252 (emphasis added); see 345 U.S. at
256-58. Recognizing the power of a court of appeals to
“delegate the responsibility for the initiation of the en
banc power to the divisions of the court,” 345 U.S. at
261, this Court cautioned that counsel in such circum-
stances should be allowed “access to the few circuit
judges who must act initially, and perhaps decisively, on
the matter for the others.” Jd. at 262.

In this case, Mr. Kolbeck was twice allowed such
access to a panel consisting of Circuit Judges Mans-
mann, Cowen and Higginbotham. On April 20, 1992,
this panel reviewed and rejected Appellant’s Petition to
Recall the Mandate, and on June 11, 1992, the same
panel denied Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing In Banc
(transmitted as a motion for reconsideration). Neither 28
U.S.C. § 46 nor the rulings of this Court require more.

II. The Court Of Appeals Properly Denied Petitioner’s
Requests To Recall The Mandate And Extend The Time
For Rehearing.

The substantive basis for petitioner’s request for
rehearing in banc was a claimed intracircuit conflict
over the admissibility of evidence relating to non-use of
seat belts, as manifested in decisions in this case and in
Dillinger v. Caterpillar. Should the Court overlook the

6

procedural and factual deficiencies in petitioner’s case, it
is nonetheless clear that the decisions in Dillinger and
Kolbeck can be easily reconciled and do not mandate
issuance of a writ of certiorari.5

Fundamentally, two critical distinctions differenti-
ate the Kolbeck and Dillinger decisions. First, the recon-
struction of the accident and theory of liability presented
at this trial required the jury to infer that Mr. Kolbeck
(who was seated in the right front seat) was not wearing
his seat belt. See Kolbeck’s Petition at 5 (“At the time of
the accident, Mr. Kolbeck was a front-seat passenger. . .
He alleges that he suffered his spinal cord injury when
his head struck the rearview mirror assembly .. . ”).

Kolbeck’s petition, in its reliance on Dillinger, asks
the Court to ignore the manner in which counsel tried
his case. Unlike in Dillinger, where a product manufac-
turer defendant charged with having caused an accident
sought to introduce evidence of seat belt non-use in an
attempt to mitigate damages, it was the plaintiff here
who placed that information before the jury. His claim
necessitated that course, otherwise he would have been
unable to explain the occupant kinematics which he
believed demonstrated he struck the rearview mirror.
Interestingly, a literal reading of the Pennsylvania Oc-
cupant Protection Act, supra, cited by Kolbeck, would
have prevented him from meeting his burden of proof on
causation. Kolbeck sought in the lower courts to apply
the Pennsylvania statute only when it favored his posi-

5. As noted in Respondent’s Statement of the Case, supra, the
substantive issue at the heart of Kolbeck’s petition involves alleg-
edly conflicting treatments of the Pennsylvania Occupant Protec-
tion Act. Such interpretations of state law matters generally do not
support grant of certiorari by this Court. See Supreme Court Rule
10; cf. Duncan v. Tennessee, 405 U.S. 127, 31 L.Ed.2d 86, 92 S.Ct.
785 (1972) (writ of certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted
where double jeopardy questions were so interrelated with state
procedure as not to warrant exercise of discretionary jurisdiction).

7

tion; but being the party who introduced the disputed
evidence, to argue for its preclusion was incongruous.®

The negligence claim so actively pursued by Mr.
Kolbeck represents the second major distinguishing
feature of this litigation. Plaintiff proceeded at trial on a
negligence theory entirely separate from his product
liability claim. He requested and received jury instruc-
tions on this issue from the trial judge, the Honorable
Daniel H. Huyett, II. Mr. Coben’s closing argument to
the jury also repeated his negligence claims. Having
elected this course, plaintiff could not close the record to
evidence of his contributory negligence. Accordingly,
the Dillinger court’s review of the dichotomy in Penn-
sylvania law which forbids introduction of negligence
concepts into a product liability action is inapplicable.
The issue decided by Judge Huyett, whether Mr. Kol-
beck’s non-use of ihe seat belt was evidence of contrib-
utory negligence, was not even addressed in Dillinger.
Therefore, the decisions do not conflict.7

6. In terms of its effect on the outcome of the trial, the
evidentiary issue is a false one. The principal disagreement between
the parties was not whether Mr. Kolbeck was restrained or unre-
strained, but what portion of the vehicle’s interior he struck with his
head. In his opening speech to the jury, and again in closing,
counsel for Mr. Kolbeck identified the movement of his client’s body
within the vehicle after impact as the critical conflict between the
parties, emphasizing that unless the jury found his client struck the
rearview mirror, his case was lost. That essential issue was resolved
in favor of General Motors Corporation. While finding the rearview
mirror negligently and defectively manufactured, the jury decided
against the plaintiff on causation.

7. Much of the Dillinger opinion is devoted to Pennsylvania
case law which “refused to permit any evidence of negligence on
the part of the plaintiff to be introduced to defeat a claim under”
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Dillinger,
supra, 959 F.2d at 435. Although referencing and criticizing Judge
Huyett’s opinion in Kolbeck, the Dillinger panel did not address the
presence of a negligence count in Mr. Kolbeck’s complaint. Its
analysis is confined solely to the traditional “refusal” of Pennsylva-
nia courts to allow contributory negligence to be asserted as a
defense in § 402A cases, and thus does not address the particular
legal issue decided in Kolbeck. Judge Huyett’s scholarly analysis of

8

Similarly, seat belt non-use as contributory fault was
inconsequential. The jury did indeed find Mr. Kolbeck
partially responsible for his injury, but it found no
responsibility on the part of General Motors Corporation.
The negligent manufacture of the rearview mirror was
found not to be a substantial factor, not because Mr.
Kolbeck failed to wear his seat belt, but because Kolbeck
did not strike his head on the mirror. Simply put,
plaintiffs cause was lost before the jury even considered
the effect of his negligence.

NOTES (Continued)

this state law issue presents an additional obstacle to Kolbeck’s
petition, as this Court traditionally affords “great deference” to a
district judge’s determination of state law questions. See United
States v. Hohri, 482 U.S. 64, 74 n.6, 107 S.Ct. 2246, 96 L.Ed.2d 51
(1987); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 346 and n. 10, 96 S.Ct. 2074
(1976).

9
CONCLUSION

Petitioner’s deliberate failure to avail himself of
post-decision remedies should not be excused by this
Court, particularly where petitioner’s substantive claims
were properly considered and decided by the lower
federal courts. The court of appeals heard and rejected
Kolbeck’s “suggestion” for rehearing in banc, thus pro-
viding him with all of the process to which he was due.

For these reasons, it is respectfully submitted that
the Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,
LAVIN, COLEMAN, FINARELLI & GRAY

By: /s/ THOMAS FINARELLI

Thomas Finarelli, Esquire
Edward A. Gray, Esquire
Michael D. Brophy, Esquire
Attorneys for Respondent,
General Motors Corporation

DATED: August 21, 1992

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386011_1005%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.