# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Southern California Rapid Transit District > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386011_0572%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari - **Published:** January 1, 1992 - **Citation:** 505 U.S. 1220 ## Text Supreme Court, U.S 91-174] FILED APR 50 1992 @reige OF THE CLERK No. In The Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1991 * THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, et al., Petitioners, VS. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT, HELEN M. BOLEN, Respondents. a Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The California Supreme Court ‘ PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI + Hitt, FARRER & BurriLu WituiaM M. BitTTING, Counsel of Record Kevin H. BROGAN Dean E. DENNIS Attorneys for Petitioners 445 S. Figueroa St., 34th Floor Los Angeles, California 90071 (213) 620-0460 COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964 OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831 QUESTIONS PRESENTED Does a statutory scheme of “weighted voting,” adopted as part of a transit special assessment, vio- late the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause where owners of comparable properties which are subject to the special assessment hold widely disparate voting power in a referendum on that levy? Specifically, does a referendum that allots votes using assessed property value under California’s acquisi- tion-value approach (Proposition 13) violate equal protection if the special levy is based on parcel square footage? Does the statutory voting scheme, which denies the right to vote to equally interested and affected per- sons, require a compelling state interest for the dis- tinctions drawn? ii LIST OF PARTIES AND RULE 29.1 LIST A. PARTIES BEFORE THE COURT: The following parties before the Court were par- ties below: Petitioners: (Interveners below) The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company National Railroad Passenger Corporation (AMTRAK) Keller Street Development Company S & P Company Plaza Development Associates Sam Rubinfeld Charles Terry John J. Wong Joe and Leona Fallas 510 Com Partnership Winard Realty Co. Eleanor Devin Johnson Philip Ordin Properties Fifth-Broadway Partnership Rowan Development Henry Mar Sierra Int. Investment Jerry & Oren Harlene Sally S. Ripley Bunker Hill East Nelson and Mary Moy Peter Lew, Jr. Robert Templeton Yim Young Kam John Carner Respondents: Southern California Rapid Transit District (Respondent below) Helen M. Bolen (Appellant below) iii LIST OF PARTIES - Continued B. CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS: The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. (“ATSEF”) is wholly owned by SFP Properties, Inc. (suc- cessor by merger to Santa Fe Industries, Inc.) which is wholly owned by Santa Fe Pacific Corporation. The non- wholly owned subsidiaries of ATSF are as follows: Alameda Belt Line, The Belt Railway Co. of Chicago, Central California Traction Co., The Denver Union Termi- nal Railway Co., Houston Belt and Terminal Railway Co., Kansas City Terminal Railway Co., The Oakland Terminal Railway Co., Oklahoma City Junction Railway Co., St. Joseph Terminal Railway Co., Sunset Railway Co., Texas City Terminal Railway Co., The Wichita Union Terminal Railway Co., Trailer Train Co. Plaza Development Associates is now Hope and Flower B.P. Partnership. The parent of Keller Street Development Co. is S&P Company. The non-wholly owned subsidiaries of Keller Street are General Brewing Co., Pearl Brewing Co., and Falstaff Brewing Co. The non-wholly owned subsidiaries of S&P Company are Keller Street Development Co. and Falstaff Brewing Co. National Railroad Passenger Corporation (AMTRAK) has no parent or non-wholly owned subsidiaries. iv LIST OF PARTIES - Continued C. PARTIES BELOW NOT BEFORE THE COURT: The following parties which were Interveners below do not petition this Court: Union Pacific Railroad Union Pacific Land Resources Corporation Los Angeles and Salt Lake Railroad Company Meruelo Properties, Inc. Los Angeles Car Wash Corp. L & R Investment Co. Knell Investment Co., Inc. Coast Fixtures & Liquidators Cor. Zuma Corp. Morse M. Preeman, Inc. Altshule Sales Co. Workmans Auto Insurance Co. Heet Sound Products Santa Fe Land Improvement Company Phillippe the Original Bruce Manley Southern Pacific Transportation Company - TABLE OF CONTENTS Page OPINIONS BELOW......----s-sscccerscerersser 2 JURISDICTION........-:eccceeersrsrnceseeee renee 2 STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED......------- 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE.....------2sser0t0rt? 3 A. QUESTIONS PRESENTED .....----------+7"° 3 B. ISSUES PRESENTED TO THE STATE COURT... 5 C. FACTS MATERIAL TO QUESTIONS PRE- RUUD ook s i cab hunk oes sets eae e wey ire ens te 8 ee eat 8 2. Cleanup Legislation......-------++s500" 12 3. Passage of the Resolution....-----------: 12 4. Legal Proceedings ...-------+-:-::*7*"°""" 13 REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ......-05+ 14 1. California No Longer Recognizes Equa! Protec- tion Limitations on Weighted Voting in Special Assessment Referenda ....-----++sss5rrrttt? 14 2. In its Zeal to Permit “Experimentation,” the California Court is Sending the Wrong Signals to State and Local Government ...-.---+----: a 3. This Statutory Scheme Wrongfully Denies the Right to Vote to Equally Interested and Affected Persons In Violation of the Fourteenth Bee 5 oa v5 5x 0 02 eo xR R RENEE OS OE 23 COMI na ene RE eee REET ST 27 vi TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page Cases Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster County, 488 U.S. 336, 109 S.Ct. 633, 102 L.Ed.2d 688 (1989) .... 18 Amador Valley joirt Union High School District v. State 3d. of Equalization, 22 Cal.3d 208 [149 Cal.Rpte. 239, 583 P.2d 1281} (1978) ............ 17, 18 Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. [6 Wheat.] 204, 5 L.Ed. Ls | eae ae ar rete MnO MS a rrr se ely 4 Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improv. Dist., 410 U.S. 743, 93 S.Ct. 1237, 35 LSE SP OR «6565.04 ws vens beeen eeeeeeeetas 18 Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 88 S.Ct. TERE, BD EOL Ge TAOS: cess svevensascdcveceases 4 Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 101 S.Ct. 1811, 68 ms 8 Et.) rea net are passim Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 he EO SENDS vo 40s kwh en sa VEER MSE ENSURE NC SES 20 Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 89 S.Ct. LORY, 2S LB OEP TEGO) soo on asaeceaneenws 18, 24 City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 90 S.Ct. EPP, OO Lee DED (OPPO s one svnvcenceeteays eas 18 Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50, 90 SAK. FOR, Ce LG. Oe BS TEs civic ceca sccascss 25 Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966)........... 6 Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 23 L.Ed.2d 583 (1969)...18, 24, 25 New York City Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 109 S.Ct. 1433, 103 L.Ed.2d 717 (1989)........ 20 Vii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued Page Nordlinger v. Hahn, No. 90-1912....--..--+++: 14, 15, 18 Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 109 S.Ct. 2324, 105 Re ee.) re ee 18 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d DO GIO has ccc ncn stncesrennas eens tae seesicce sess: 20 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 E Gd, 20 SOG (1964)... occ nc ccc ccc een eceweceneece: 23 Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105, 87 S.Ct. 1549, 18 L.Ed.2d 650 (1967)....-------eee errr rete: 4 Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 93 S.Ct 1224, 35 L.Ed.2d 659 IDF I ices pad eben aw ense tee vecasatean boson rs passim San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d ee. Weeeerre rt herr ret Cts nahi 18 Solvang Municipal Improvement Dist. v. Board of Supervisors, 112 Cal.App.3d 545 (1980) .......----- 22 STATUTES Oe voce 6 kaka Cans peeeseunann ire es eres 2 2B UBC. & BOOTD) . « «ene nce e erences eee ccnees 2 California Constitution, Article I, § 7..-.-------++++°> 6 California Constitution, Article XIIIA.......----+-++> 11 California Public Utilities Code § oc) ee 8 California Public Utilities Code § 33001.5(b).....-++-> 8 California Public Utilities Code § 33001.5(c)..-------- 9 California Public Utilities Code § 33002.2.....-.----- 9 OO —— lll Vili TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued Page California Public Utilities Code § 33002.3(a).......... 9 California Public Utilities Code § 33002.3(b).......... ) California Public Utilities Code § 33001(a)............ 8 California Public Utilities Code § 33002............. 10 California Public Utilities Code § 33002.3 ............ 9 California Public Utilities Code § 33002.5............ 9g California Public Utilities Code §§ 33000, et seq See REMOR CCAR Dekh 3 REMMI Eee CaaS eae Ss 3, 6, 8, 12 United States Constitution, Amendment 14......... 3, 6 OTHER L.A. Daily Journal, February 26, 1992, p. 5........... 14 Rapid Transit Financing: Use of the Special Assess- iii ee ae A, ee ere 22 - In The Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1991 ¢ THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, et al., Petitioners, vs. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT, HELEN M. BOLEN, Respondents. a Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The California Supreme Court + PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 4 To the Honorable, the Chief Justice of the United States and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States: Petitioners, The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Rail- way Company, et al., pray that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the opinion and judgment of the California Supreme Court. cea aa, OPINIONS BELOW The March 26, 1992 denial of Petitioners’ Petition for Rehearing appears in the Appendix at 1. The opinion of the California Supreme Court, reported at 1 Cal.4th 654, appears in the Appendix at 2. The opinion of the Califor- nia Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reported at 219 Cal.App.3d 1446, is reproduced in the Appendix at 53. The Statement of Decision and Judgment of the Los Angeles County Superior Court appear in the Appendix at 85 and 97. JURISDICTION The Judgment of the California Supreme Court was filed January 30, 1992, reversing the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District decision dated May 1, 1990. That decision reversed the judgment of the Los Angeles Superior Court dated January 4, 1988. The Cali- fornia Supreme Court denied a timely Petition for Rehearing, March 26, 1992. The jurisdiction jof this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257. Petitioners have served the Attorney Gen- eral of California; 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b) may be applicable. « STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED The following statutes are set forth in pertinent part in the Appendix at 102-113: ey Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution, Article One, Section Seven, California Constitution, California Public Utilities Code §§ 33000 - 33002.8 + STATEMENT OF THE CASE A. QUESTIONS PRESENTED There is, in the City of Los Angeles, an undeniable need for a public transportation system. A portion of the billions of dollars needed to finance such a system is coming from owners of property in the area surrounding new Metro Rail stations. The Southern California Rapid Transit District (“RTD”) will exact approximately $200,000,000 in assessments over a twenty-year period to “recapture” the “benefit” of being near a station.! How- ever, the enabling legislation establishing the financing structure for assessing the owners, in particular, the structure of the referendum on a benefit assessment dis- trict, was so poorly conceived that it cannot pass constitu- tional muster. The infirmities have resulted in a district formation which is fundamentally unfair and, if left uncorrected, will be repeatedly imposed as the transit line is extended to its ultimate length. The ten California appellate judges who have now reviewed the statutory scheme have divided, 5-5, on its constitutionality. Unfortunately, the frustrations of facing daily grid- lock have prevailed at the expense of Petitioners’ voting 1 References throughout this Petition are to page numbers in the state court Joint Appendix [JA], the RTD’s record of administrative proceedings [AR], or the Appendix attached hereto [App. at __]. — rights. Taking undue license with this Court’s opinions, the California high court majority which upheld the law was thematically unequivocal: “[t]he Constitution does not stand as a ‘roadblock[] in the path of innovation, experiment and development among units of local gov- ernment.’ (See Avery v. Midland County (1968) 390 U.S. 474, 485 [20 L.Ed.2d 45, 53-54, 88 S.Ct. 1114]).” [App. at 11-12.] The court later continued: “Early in our history, the high court observed that ‘the science of government is . . . the science of experiment.’ (Anderson v. Dunn (1821) 19 U.S. [6 Wheat.] 204, 226 [5 L.Ed. 242, 247].)....’ [V]iable local governments may need many innovations, numerous combinations of old and new devices, great flexibility in municipal arrangements to meet changing urban condi- tions.’ (Sailors v. Board of Education (1967) 387 U.S. 105, 110-111 [18 L.Ed.2d 650, 654-655, 87 S.Ct. 1549].) In the circumstances of this case, combining an old device with a new setting, we see ‘nothing in the Constitution to prevent experimentation.’ Id. at p. 111 [18 L.Ed.2d at p. 655].)” [App. at 40.] The history of this Court’s constitutional jurispru- dence, however, has not been one of complete and utter deference, especially where, as here, state and local gov- ernments are “experimenting” with the constitutional rights, especially the voting rights, of owners of private property. In addressing the sufficiency of the statute, the Cali- fornia courts paid great attention to the often perplexing question of the threshold selection of the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny. Yet, even if the lower level of scrutiny applies, the California Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the vote allocation formula is in such conflict with the fundamental principles of equal protection and fairness which have guided this Court’s voting cases, that it commands this Court’s attention. The specific questions presented are therefore: 1. Does a statutory scheme of “weighted vot- ing,” adopted as part of a transit special assessment, violate the Fourteenth Amend- ment’s Equal Protection Clause where owners of comparable properties which are subject to the special assessment hold widely disparate voting power in a referen- dum on that levy? Specifically, does a refer- endum that allots votes using assessed property value under California’s acquisi- tion-value approach (Proposition 13) violate equal protection if the special levy is based on parcel square footage? 2. Does the statutory voting scheme, which - denies the right to vote to equally interested and affected persons, require a compelling state interest for the distinctions drawn? B. ISSUES PRESENTED TO THE STATE COURT This action was filed as a “friendly” bond validation suit by the RTD against its own Secretary, Helen M. Bolen, in the hopes of obtaining a favorable appellate decision ensuring the security of the bonds against fur- ther legal challenge. Because of the inherent potential for conflict of interest and in order to assure a full and fair hearing of all challenges to the formation of the district, Petitioners herein, a representative cross-section of large and small downtown Los Angeles property owners and one tenant, AMTRAK, intervened. The issues raised herein were first presented to the trial court. [App. at 92-93.] Of specific concern was the voting scheme contained in the enabling legislation, Pub- lic Utilities Code §§ 33000, et seq. This scheme, devised by RTD and adopted by the Legislature, was the only oppor- tunity for assessees to protest the formation of the dis- trict. Since the Legislature provided an election as part of the establishment of this district, the Constitution com- pels that the election be open, fair and meaningful. Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966). This election, however, draws impermissible distinctions which do not reason- ably relate to the statutory purpose in violation of the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Califor- tia Constitutions. [Amendment 14, U.S. Const., Article I, § 7, Cal. Const.] Specifically, it “weights” voting strength based on economic status (one vote per $1,000 of assessed value) even though the assessment is levied based upon parcel and floor area. There is no relationship between relative voting strength and the amounts paid in special assessments. 2 The terminology tends to become confusing when using “assessed value” for property (ad valorem) tax purposes and “special assessment” or “assessment district.” The two con- cepts are functionally distinct. “Assessed value” refers to the appraised value of the property upon which property taxes are paid. A “special assessment” is a special charge applied to a (Continued on following page) peeecreeneeerceaenaeacinat ei ecenaac dan: is aacananael The scheme was imbalanced even more by the impact of California’s Proposition 13. Cal. Const., Article XIIIA. After the passage of Proposition 13, properties were reas- sessed only upon transfer. Recently transferred and reas- sessed properties were accorded more votes than equally or more valuable properties that had not been reassessed. This resulted in a nonsensical skewing of the voting scheme where votes were awarded based not on how much in benefit assessments one paid but on the utterly random and irrelevant fact of a more recent property transfer (those recently purchased or constructed result- ing in a reassessment to a higher value and more votes). The law does not permit such random and unjustified dilution of voting strength. As a constitutional concept, weighted voting power is not an issue unique to this case. Dilution of voting strength has been found constitutionally permissible in special purpose elections so long as the method of vote allocation rationally relates to a legitimate governmental objective. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 93 S.Ct 1224, 35 L.Ed.2d 659 (1973); Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 101 S.Ct. 1811, 68 L.Ed.2d 150 (1981). Typically, the rationale has been based on propor- tionality, i.e., those who are most affected should be entitled to the most say. Although the California Supreme Court points out that the Constitution does not require a perfect fit between the burdens of the assessments and the benefit of the vote, the Constitution and the decisions (Continued from previous page) property, for some form of public improvement (e.g., streets, sidewalks, etc.) which has no relation to property taxes except that the two are usually collected simultaneously. [App. at 5.] of this Court, at the very least, require some rational “fit”; under the present scheme there is none. C. FACTS MATERIAL TO QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. The Statute In 1983, the California Legislature enacted Public Utilities Code §§ 33000, et seg., which authorized RTD to establish a special benefit assessment district to finance construction, operation and maintenance of rail transit operations.’ The Legislature also authorized RTD to issue bonds funded by the assessment of property within the district. The legislation provides that if the RTD Board finds that property will receive a special benefit by reason of its location near a rail transit station, it can pass a resolution providing for notice and hearing of its intention to estab- lish such a district and levy assessments. [§ 33001(a).] The Board may thereafter determine to proceed with the establishment of the district. [§ 33001.5.] The RTD then submits the resolution to the City of Los Angeles. The City Council “shall, after a public hear- ing . . . approve, or amend and approve, as amended, or disapprove the geographic boundaries of the district and the method of assessment.” [§ 33001.5(b).] The City returns the resolution to the RTD Board which decides 3 Unless otherwise noted, statutory citations are to the California Public Utilities Code. The relevant statutory provi- sions are set forth in full at App. 103-113. whether to create the district as approved by the City Council. [§ 33001.5(c).] (The Election Scheme) The sole means to protest the formation of the district is by a special, one-time election. The property owners are entitled to an election only if they file a petition, signed by the owners of at least 25% of the assessed value of real property within the benefit district, within 30 days after the conclusion of the public hearing. [§§ 33002.2, 33002.5.] The only voters in that election are the owners of real property within the district that is to be assessed. [§ 33002.3.] The election scheme classifies voters on the basis of (1) property ownership, a prerequisite to vote, and (2) economic status. Higher assessed properties are allocated more votes. Section 33002.3(a) defines “voter” as “an owner of real property which is assessed or proposed to be assessed under this Chapter and which is within the boundaries of the benefit district.” The statute expressly disenfranchises all non-property owners inside and out- side the district including all tenants of assessed prop- erty. Section 33002.3(b) allocates voting strength based upon the value of the property so that “each voter . may cast one vote for each one thousand dollars ($1,000) or fraction thereof, worth of land or improve- ments owned by the voter . . . as shown on the most recent equalized assessment roll.” Conversely, the burden of the assessment, what each owner must pay each year, 10 is based upon the greater of parcel area or improvement floor area. [§ 33002.] (How the Scheme Discriminates) In a properly formulated assessment election, those with the most votes also pay the highest assessments. Here, there is no relationship whatsoever between votes awarded and assessment paid; votes are calculated based on assessed value, but the assessment is based on parcel or floor area. The property at 612 Flower Street in Los Angeles has 455,148 square feet which at $.30 per square foot equals an assessment of $136,544.40 per year. That property is assessed at $59,797,959, resulting in 59,798 votes. [JA 1057.] However, the Biltmore Hotel pays assessment on 1,047,835 square feet or $314,350.50 per year, but has only 33,416.1 votes. The contrasts get more extreme. The property at 601 S. Broadway will pay $406,527 per year and has only 1,656.6 votes. [JA 1059.] This is three times the assessment of 612 Flower, but with 3% of the votes! Likewise, a number of buildings have similar square footage (and thus pay similar assessments), but have widely divergent numbers of votes. Property Area (sq. ft.) Votes 631 S. Hill 89,300 8,787.6 403 W. 8th 90,500 4,085.1 220 W. 5th 91,768 2,246.0 632 S. Hill 92,648 1,066.8 620 S. Maine 89,010 410.4 (JA 1057-1065.] 11 Since there is no correlation between market value and assessed value due to the effects of Proposition 13, the value at the time of acquisition or construction is the governing factor. Cal. Const. Art. XIIIA. Turning to the question of who is most affected by the assessment, the disenfranchisement of all non- property owners most severely impacts tenants, given the standard “pass through” clauses in commercial leases that require the tenant to pay all taxes and assessments. This is especially true in the large buildings (i.e., large square footage) whose owners control the majority of the votes in the district. An RTD report addresses “specific issues that may be pivotal in the establishment of benefit assessment dis- tricts for MOS-1:” “Moreover, the vast majority of buildings in the CBD benefit assessment district have pass through provisions in the tenant lease agree- ments.” [AR 2387.] One report prepared by the RTD’s consultants notes that newer buildings utilize a pass-through formula while many older buildings do not. [AR 868.] That same consul- tant, when studying the assessment districts in Washing- ton, D.C. and Atlanta, which RTD used as a model, wrote: “beyond the issue of rate of assessment, the ability to directly pass on the assessment to the tenant was abso- lutely essential.” [AR 1206.] Disenfranchisement of ten- ants eliminated the voice of those with the most to lose. 12 2. Cleanup Legislation.‘ In 1984, the RTD sponsored Senate Bill 1463, as a legislative amendment to §§ 33000, et seq. Among other things, this bill would have allocated voting power based upon parcel or floor area, thus making the allocation of votes consistent with the method of assessment and elim- inating assessed value as the measure of voting power. [AR 652a, 654.] Although passed by the Legislature, Sen- ate Bill 1463 was vetoed by the Governor for unrelated reasons.° 3. Passage of the Resolution On February 14, 1985, the RTD Board passed a Reso- lution to Proceed with Establishment of Special Benefit Assessment Districts for MOS-I. [AR 1831.] This resolu- tion exempted residential uses and imposed an initial assessment rate ranging from $.30 per square foot per year of the greater of land or improvements, with the maximum rate being $.42. [Id.] The Board then submitted the resolution to the City Council, which approved the geographic boundaries and returned the resolution to the RTD Board for _— approval. [AR 1875.] On July 11, 4 “Cleanup” was RTD’s own terminology. [AR 938.] > In addition to the change in the vote allocation formula, the RTD and Legislature attempted to exempt residential prop- erty from the assessment. [AR 652a, 663a.] The Governor ve- toed it on the specific ground that his Legislative Counsel opined that the exemption of residential property was uncon- stitutional. [AR 2320.] Despite this fact, RTD exempted residen- tial property when the district was adopted. 13 1985, the Board passed a resolution creating Special Bene- fit Assessment Districts Al (the Central Business District) and A2 (Wilshire/ Alvarado). [AR 1709.] After levying the assessment in 1986° and following a public hearing in May 1987, the Board adopted two reso- lutions authorizing the sale of revenue bonds in an amount up to $200 million. Bolen, in her capacity as Secretary of the SCRTD, refused to certify the vote on these resolutions, contending that the assessment scheme did not meet constitutional standards, that there was no special benefit to the properties within the districts, and that the RTD had failed to comply with various statutory requirements. 4. Legal Proceedings. On August 4, 1987, RTD filed this action against its Secretary for the purpose of validating the assessment district and the bonds. Petitioners were granted leave to intervene. The case was tried to the court, and on January 4, 1988 it filed a written Statement of Decision and entered Judgment which upheld the statutory scheme. [App. at 85-101.) Respondent Bolen and Petitioners appealed. On May 1, 1990, the Court of Appeal filed its decision reversing the trial court on these issues. [App. at 53-84.] RTD then sought review in the Supreme Court of California which was granted by order dated August 16, 1990. On January 6 RTD levied the assessment in 1986 but later abated the assessments from 1987 through 1992 while Metro Rail con- struction is in progress. [App at 8.] 14 30, 1992, the California high court issued its opinion reversing the California Court of Appeal. [App. at 2-52.] ¢ REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT 1. California No Longer Recognizes Equal Protection Limitations on Weighted Voting in Special Assess- ment Referenda. The national press widely reported that this term’s oral argument in Nordlinger v. Hahn, No. 90-1912, included a suggestion by Justice Scalia that the California property tax system “was close enough for government work.”7 In its opinion in this case, the California Supreme Court takes this lassez faire approbation and runs with it to an absurd, even dangerous extent. Petitioners advanced below the seemingly unremark- able proposition that equal protection requires that those who pay the most in assessments be allotted the most votes in a referenda. Absent at least a rough propor- tionality to link voting power and financial burden, the statutory voting scheme lacks a rational basis. To this end, Petitioners cited this Court’s justification upholding the limited franchise and weighted voting scheme in Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 101 S.Ct. 1811, 68 L.Ed.2d 150 (1981): “Arizona could rationally make the weight of their vote dependent upon the number of acres they own, since that number reasonably reflects the relative risks they incurred as landowners and the distribution of the benefits and burdens 7 L.A. Daily Journal, February 26, 1992, p. 5. of the District’s water operations.” 451 U.S. at 371. Unimpressed by this authority, the California Supreme Court held that while proportionality justified the district in Ball, such a relationship is not required by the Equal Protection Clause. Dismissing the language in Ball, the court below opined: “We cannot regard these brief remarks as definitive on the issue, however, impli- edly condemning alternative vote allotment schemes.”® [App. at 33.] As this Court is well aware after Nordlinger, assessed value for property tax purposes in California bears no 8 The California Court claims that the weighted voting in this case is very similar to that employed in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, 410 U.S. 719, 93 S.Ct. 1224, 35 L.Ed.2d 659 (1973). [App. at 34.] The method of assessment was neither at issue in that case nor disclosed by the facts. In Salyer the votes were apportioned based on appraised value of land while the exact amount of the assess- ments was to be determined in the future by the district “in accordance with the benefits accruing to each tract of land.” 410 U.S. at 724. How the assessment was to be imposed in Salyer was not yet decided. The language actually used in Salyer (“in accordance with the benefits that will accrue to each tract of land”) is the language of proportionality. The court jumps from the premise that because this court upheld Salyer’s district, which included a method of vote allocation which was not clearly disproportional, this Court should uphold RTD's method which is clearly disproportional. Salyer was also decided prior to the adoption of Proposition 13, at a time when similarly situated parcels bore roughly proportional assessed values. 16 relation whatsoever to current or actual value. It also bears no relation to square footage. Proposition 13 there- fore has a “wild card” effect on the vote allotment scheme, according more votes to recently transferred properties and less votes to properties long held, based upon an acquisition-date formula, utterly without regard to the square footage of the respective properties. Such a scheme undeniably results in gross disparities in voting power and assessment burden of properties of compara- ble square footage. As noted, the voting power of compa- rably sized parcels within the district may vary by as much as (in one case) a factor of 20, depending on the date of acquisition.? [App. at 34, n.8.] That said, however, the California Supreme Court still found no constitutional infirmity; even though the votes allocated to properties paying comparable assess- ments can vary by as much as 2,000%, the Court found no denial of equal protection. And what were the reasons? The opinion does not disclose much beyond its thematic underpinning that the Court should not interfere with the Legislature’s “experimentation.” ° Warehouse space, for example, is heavily assessed due to its large square footage, but it will receive little or no benefit from increased commercial traffic. Its voting power should not be diluted in favor of less space-intensive buildings that have high assessed values merely because they were recently trans- ferred. Simiiarly, the double digit appreciation experienced by commercial properties in downtown Los Angeles during the 1980s, means that a smali commerciai building acquired in 1990 will have a much higher assessed value than a much larger commercial structure that continues to have its assessed value tied to the 1975 Proposition 13 base year value. es eee 17 Searching for some justification, the California Court makes the astonishing statement: “[W]e think that the Legislature was entitled to assume that within these relatively small benefit assessment districts, assessed valuation bears a rough relationship to lot or building size and that the vote allotment and assessment formulas are thus not unreasonably disproportionate for equal protection purposes.” [App. at 34.] There is no “rough relationship” here; in fact, there is no relationship at all. Assessed value is an entirely random measure when compared to square footage. The Court concedes as much in its further discussion. The mere fact that the Court makes this statement, after deriding Peti- tioners’ linkage argument, is, however, a telling conces- sion.!° The Court also concludes without explanation that its rationale upholding “substantial inequalities in the assessed value for property tax purposes against equal protection challenge,” (citing Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Bd. of Equalization, (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 233-236 [149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281] which upheld the constitutionality of California’s “wel- come stranger” doctrine), should apply with equal force to substantial inequalities in voting rights. [App. at 35, n.8.] While this Court has allowed the states wide latitude in 10 Nor is this a “relatively small benefit assessment dis- trict.” Two hundred million dollars are at stake, an amount ten times greater than the largest benefit assessment district RTD’s task force studied in planning this district. [AR 669-670.] 18 making choices in the tax area,!! the same cannot be said of this Court’s decisions on voting rights — even in those cases which have permitted deviation from the principle of one-person, one-vote.'? Moreover, while allotting votes based on assessed value might be valid for an election to approve an increase in property taxes, it is not a relevant measure where the levy is based upon square footage.!* 11 See e.g., San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 41, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16, 47 (1973). 12 Compare: Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 23 L.Ed.2d 583 (1969); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 89 S.Ct. 1897, 23 L.Ed.2d 647 (1969); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 90 S.Ct. 1990, 26 L.Ed.2d 523 (1970); Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 109 S.Ct. 2324, 105 L.Ed.2d 74 (1989), with Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, 410 U.S. 719, 93 S.Ct. 1224, 35 L.Ed.2d 659 (1973); Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improv. Dist., 410 U.S. 743, 93 S.Ct. 1237, 35 L.Ed.2d 675 (1973); Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 101 S.Ct. 1811, 68 L.Ed.2d 150 (1981). 13 The issue here is not whether similarly situated proper- ties may be taxed differently as in Amador. Amador held that it is not a violation of equal protection for similarly situated properties to be assessed for property tax purposes based on acquisition value rather than current value, despite the fact that this will inevitably result in substantial tax disparities between properties recently transferred and those in long- standing, continuous ownership. Amador, 22 Cal.3d at 232-237. This issue is currently before the Court in Nordlinger. See also, Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster County, 488 U.S. 336, 109 S.Ct. 633, 102 L.Ed.2d 688 (1989). If the Legislature had created this benefit assessment district so that both the amount one pays and the amount of votes one receives were based on assessed value, the Amador issue would be implicated. The Court would then be presented with the questions of whether the Amador rationale for tax cases is equally applicable to (Continued on following page) 19 The Court below could only respond in the most conclusory way: “The fact that such a constitutionally valid tax assessment system may have the marginal result of diluting voting power in an assessment refer- endum is an inequality that the Legislature can remedy by amending the voting scheme, it does not constitutionally invalidate the voting classi- fication per se.” [App. at 35, n.8.] In light of the utter lack of any basis to support the distinctions drawn, Petitioners must ask, “why not?” - a proposition this Court will hopefully take up. Finally, the Court takes pains to justify the basing of assessment levy calculations on square footage or parcel size because of the “rough but reasonably direct relation- ship resulting from the economic benefits resulting from the location of Metro Rail facilities... .” [App. at 36.] This is a proposition Petitioners do not disagree with, but which has no bearing on the use of assessed value to “weight” the vote. “Likewise,” the Court continues (although there appears to be no connection), “the Legis- lature’s direction that current ad valorem tax assessment roles be used to identify qualified voters and allot votes has the merit of accuracy, simplicity and administrative (Continued from previous page) benefit assessments and how that rationale interfaces with this Courts’ rules for weighted voting. Here, however, the Legisla- ture has already chosen a method of assessment, square foot- age, that treats similarly situated properties the same. The issue, therefore, is whether it makes any sense, practically or legally, for the Legislature to use a vote allocation formula that bears no relation to that method of assessment. 20 convenience” which are “virtues that are not lightly aban- doned.” [App. at 36.] “Administrative convenience,” however, cannot alone supply a constitutionally sufficient rational basis. It cannot help explain why the distinction between square footage and assessed value furthers a legitimate govern- mental interest. It does not demonstrate why one build- ing should be accorded more votes than another. A justification which has some plausible rational basis still requires some nexus between the burden of the assess- ment and the method of vote allocation, otherwise any measure could be validated under an “administrative convenience” rationale.14 Why not base the votes on con- venient notions like the height of the building? Or its color? Neither of these absurd suggestions has any less relation to square footage than California’s acquisition- based assessed value. Restrictions on the franchise that violate equal protection cannot be justified “on exigencies of history or convenience.” New York City Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 703, n.10, 109 S.Ct. 1433, 103 L.Ed.2d 717, 733 (1989). Moreover, although the California Supreme Court dismisses the “cleanup legislation” as a “post hoc event” 4 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225, 229-230 (1971) (statute granting males preference in administrating estates held invalid despite the potential reduc- tion in probate workload), and Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675, 680 (1965) (statute denying servicemen the right to vote held invalid even though deter- mining their eligibility was difficult.) 21 of “little force,” [App. at 36, n.9], the fact that the Legisla- ture tried to amend the statutory scheme to mandate vote allotment and assessments on a square footage or parcel basis demonstrates that it, at least, did not believe a consistent or proportional scheme to be administratively unworkable or even “inconvenient.” RTD, for its part, acknowledged that it could and, in fact, wanted to use square footage as the measurement to allocate the votes by its sponsorship and support of the clean-up legisla- tion.!5 The California court’s brush-off (“the issue before us is one of constitutional limitations on the scope of legisla- tive classifications, not ‘fairness’ simpliciter” [App. at 36, n.9]) fails to recognize that the concepts of equal protec- tion and fairness are not unrelated. That court’s willing- ness to adopt the government's position, especially on a voting rights issue, with an “it may not be fair but its not unconstitutional” whitewash, eliminates any meaningful equal protection limitations under a rational basis anal- ysis. The statutory scheme overreached in its “experimen- tation” and “innovation,” and not even a rationality test will support it. 1S The California Supreme Court's further argument that information on assessed value was readily available, while square footage of buildings in the proposed district was not [App. at 37], is belied by the fact that RTD was collecting (and had to collect) the square footage data in order to calculate the assessments. Now, of course, if the Legislature is required to correct this defect, the square footage information is readily available since in 1986 assessments were already levied. 22 2. In its Zeal to Permit “Experimentation,” the Cal- ifornia Court is Sending the Wrong Signals to State and Local Government. The California Supreme Court’s focus on experimen- tation and innovation is sending a clear message: bring us a statute with the proper ends, and we will justify the means. Not only is this assessment district (presently at $.30 to $.42 per square foot per year) extremely burden- some for Petitioners and others who must pay it, the court obviously intends the effects of its decision to reach well beyond the confines of this case. One of the results of Proposition 13’s limitations on new property taxes in California has been the prolifera- tion of assessment districts which are not subject to the mandatory two-thirds majority voting requirement which Proposition 13 imposes on new taxes. [See e.g., Solvang Municipal Improvement Dist. v. Board of Supervisors, 112 Cal.App.3d 545, 550-557 (1980).] Although not constitu- tionally mandated, such districts typically provide for some form of landowner referendum on the establish- ment of the assessment district. [See Note, Rapid Transit Financing: Use of the Special Assessment (1977) 29 Stan.L. Rev. 795.] Allowing the decision to stand in this case not only accords state and local government carte blanche in the structuring of these sham, meaningless elections to the detriment of private property owners and other bur- dened voting groups, it diminishes the impact of the decisions of this Court which have carefully kept the principles of fairness, inclusion and equality in voting rights paramount and kept exceptions to full enfranchise- ment tightly constrained. 23 Because by definition the rational basis test allows for wide latitude, it is no doubt somewhat rare for this Court to review “close-calls” in the state and local legisla- tive process. This voting rights decision, however, from one of the most influential state courts in the nation, is so far reaching, so at odds with basic equal protection prin- ciples, and sends such an inherently wrong message that it should not continue as an example for “innovators” and “experimenters” to follow. 3. This Statutory Scheme Wrongfully Denies the Right to Vote to Equally Interested and Affected Persons In Violation of the Fourteenth Amend- ment! The underpinnings for this Court’s landmark deci- sion in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed. 2d 506 (1964), were those broader principles of voting equality embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment distinct and apart from the one person, one vote require- ment and issues of population based representation. That decision was solidly founded on, inter alia, the traditional view that the concept of equal protection requires the uniform treatment of persons standing in the same rela- tion to a questioned or challenged governmental action. 16 Because of the attention given to the appropriate /evel of constitutional scrutiny, both by the majority and dissent in the California Supreme Court, Petitioners present the issue for this Court’s consideration, although the application of the compel- ling state interest standard is unnecessary in light of the utter failure of the statutory scheme to satisfy the rational basis test. 24 Id. at 565. This fundamental protection is never more crucial than when, as here, voter classifications exclude persons as equally interested and affected as those who are included. Cipriano v. Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706, 89 S.Ct. 1897, 23 L.Ed. 2d 647 (1969). Benefit assessments to finance Metro Rail are to be levied directly on commercial property owners in down- town Los Angeles with the certainty that tenants will ultimately bear much of that burden due to pass-through clauses in their leases. Yet these same tenants, many of whom agreed to such pass-through clauses long before Metro Rail was even contemplated, have been denied the right to vote on whether the very assessments they will pay should be levied in their current form or at all. This decision process from which the tenants were excluded will have substantial financial impacts on them for the next 20 years, contractually bound as they are to bear that burden. Under circumstances such as these, the statutory vot- ing scheme must be strictly scrutinized: “{I}f a challenged state statute grants the right to vote in a limited purpose election to some otherwise qualified voters and denies it to others, ‘the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compel- ling state interest.’” Cipriano, 395 U.S. at 704, quoting, Kramer v. Union Free Scnool Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 23 L.Ed. 2d 583 (1969). That determination must necessarily consider the inter- ests of those persons disadvantaged by the classification. Kramer, 395 U.S. at 626. 25 “Whether classifications allegedly limiting the franchise to those resident citizens ‘primar- ily interested’ deny those excluded equal protec- tion of the laws depends, inter alia, on whether all those excluded are in fact substantially less interested or affected than those the statute includes.” Kramer, 395 U.S. at 632. A state cannot choose the mechanism of popular election to accomplish its aims and then skew voter classifications in order to evade equality of voting power among those similarly impacted by legislative pronouncements. Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50, 59, 90 S.Ct. 791, 25 L.Ed. 2d 45 (1970). Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., supra, and Ball v. James, supra, established a two-prong test for reviewing an electoral scheme that does not implicate the principle of one person, one vote. Disen- franchising distinct classes of voters does not invoke strict scrutiny if: (a) The election involves special and not merely general governmental powers, and (b) There is a disproportionate effect on the class permitted to vote. The overriding rational of both Salyer and Ball was based upon a factual finding that the districts in those cases primarily affected property owners (as opposed to others) in the district, to wit, those who pay should vote. Because, to use RTD’s own finding, “the vast majority of buildings in the CBD [Central Business District] benefit assessment district have pass-through provisions in the tenant lease agreement” [AR 2387], and tenants have no 26 right to vote, those who actually must pay the assessment in this district have no voice in the decision at all.!7 17 Although this Court considered the pass-through ques- tion in Salyer, the facts surrounding the district there were far different from the facts herein. In Salyer the water district consisted of 193,000 acres, all of it agricultural land, 85% farmed by one or another of four corporations. In discussing the tenant issue, the case did not reveal what percentage of the land in the district was under lease. Nevertheless, it is obvious from the general constitution of the district that it was far different from the heavily urban, iargely commercial district which the RTD has formed in downtown Los Angeles. While there is no evidence in the record of exactly how many build- ings in the MOS-1 are owner occupied and what percentage are leased, it is not reasonably disputable that many buildings in downtown Los Angeles are principally in the business of com- mercial leasing. Nor is there any reasonable dispute about the pervasiveness of the pass-through provisions for the buildings in this particular district. In Salyer the Court only addressed the issue of indirect tenant responsibility for the assessments because of informal pass-throughs in the form of increased costs. It did not address the issue as presented here where the RTD knew that tenants in the “vast majority” of buildings have a direct contractual responsibility for paying the assessments pursuant to the express terms of their leases. 410 U.S. at 732-733. Salyer was also concerned about the difficulty of differentiating between tenants with leases and those on a month-to-month or similar basis. Id. Here, a vote could reasonably be limited to the inclusion of tenants with pass-through provisions in their leases; for purposes of this election, their interests are indis- tinguishable from those of the owners. Most importantly, Salyer found that “California has not left the lessee without remedy for his disenfranchised state” since the right to vote for the directors of the district is ongoing, and if that right to vote is of (Continued on following page) 27 This is not to say that a properly formulated district which permitted only owners and tenants to vote would not satisfy the requirements of Salyer and Ball. In an intensely commercial district like downtown Los Angeles, providing residents the right to vote on a one-person, one-vote basis when they don’t pay the assessments would also be extremely unfair to the owners and ten- ants. However, the inequalities of the statutory voting scheme, as presently configured, are fundamentally repug- nant to the broad protections of the Fourteenth Amend- ment. CONCLUSION The Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be granted to ensure a meaningful referenda prior to imposing the special assessments. Respectfully submitted, Hitt, FARRER & BurriLi WILLIAM M. BiTTING, Counsel of Record Kevin H. BROGAN DEAN E. DENNIS Attorneys for Petitioners (Continued from previous page) sufficient interest to the tenant he can negotiate with his land- lord for that right in future-elections. Id. Here, of course, there is no such opportunity. This election is a one-shot deal. If the tenant is not accorded the right to vote in the initial election, its economic interests are prejudiced for the entire 20-year life of the bonds, and its lease payments will drastically increase without its consent. ~ This analysis compels a simiiar conclusion here. As the United States Supreme Court recognized, a vote on a revenue measure cannot be divorced from the facilities and services to be financed by the revenue. Here, the issue addressed by the special benefit assessment election is not just the imposition of the assessment, but also the construction of the mass transit stations that the assess- ments will finance. The stations will generate an increase in commercial activity in the areas around the stations, as the majority acknowledges. This increase in commercial activity will make the areas more attractive for certain App. 50 kinds of high volume businesses (e.g., fast-food outlets), and less attractive for other, more neighborhood-oriented businesses (e.g., laundromats). Inevitably, all residents of the benefit assessment area, not just the owners of com- mercial property, will be affected in important ways by the change in the commercial environment resulting from the location of the transit station. * The effects will not be confined to commercial activ- ity. In most instances, residential property located near proposed rapid transit stations will increase in value in recognition of the convenience of ready access to the transit system.! This increase in value will translate into higher rents for rented dwellings and higher sales prices for owner-occupied dwellings. These increases in housing costs will significantly affect the residents of the area immediately surrounding the proposed stations. Because the construction of the transit stations affects all community residents in important ways, the exclusion of residents who own no commercial land is presump- tively a violation of equal protection. Although the assessments will be levied initially on the owners of commercial property, they can redistribute the burden to other community residents. Rents charged to commercial tenants will certainly increase. Indeed, it is undisputed 1 There may be situations in which a rapid transit station would depress the value of adjacent residential property. For instance, this could occur in the unlikely event that the station were to be located in a neighborhood of expensive single- family residences. For present purposes, the essential point is that construction of a rapid transit station is virtually certain to have some effect, either positive or negative, on the value of nearby residential property. = — Eee App. 51 that most commercial leases in the benefit assessment areas contain “pass through” provisions under which the tenant assumes liability for any tax or assessment levied on the property. The occupant of the premises who pays the assessment, whether landowner or tenant, can recover the cost from consumers, many of whom will be local residents, by increases in the prices of goods and services produced or sold on the taxed property. Under the test articulated in Phoenix, supra, 399 U.S. 204, which this court is required to employ, the election on the SCRTD’s special benefit assessments is an election of general interest, in which restrictions other than resi- dence, age, and citizenship must be subjected to strict scrutiny. The restriction imposed, which limits the fran- chise to owners of commercial property, concededly can- not withstand such scrutiny. Accordingly, the existing system for the SCRTD special benefit assessment elec- tions, by disenfranchising all but owners of commercial property subject to assessment, violates the equal protec- tion guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. IT] Like the other members of this court, | am reluctant to accept a conclusion that might impede the construction of needed public facilities, and the need for a modern and efficient rapid transit system in the greater Los Angeles area cannot be denied. Yet, as the United States Supreme Court has noted, restrictions on the franchise that violate equal protection cannot be justified “on exigencies of history or convenience.” (New York City Bd. of Estimate v. App. 52 Morris (1989) 489 U.S. 688, 703, fn. 10 [103 L.Ed.2d 717, 733, 109 S.Ct. 1433].) Thus, like the Court of Appeal, I conclude that, under controlling federal precedent, the existing electoral system for the SCRTD’s special benefit assessments is invalid on its face. Because the electoral system is invalid for the reasons I have stated, I find it unnecessary to consider the other bases on which that system has been challenged in this litigation. Having concluded that the existing electoral system violates the federal Constitution, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. Pin Mosk, J., concurred. App. 53 [No. B032265, Second Dist., Div. Two. May 1, 1990.] SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HELEN M. BOLEN, Defendant and Appellant; ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COM- PANY et al., Interveners and Appellants. COUNSEL Marilyn L. Garcia, Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, John J. Wasilczyk and Earle Miller for Defendant and Appellant. Hill, Farrer & Burrill, William M. Bitting, Kevin H. Brogan and Dean E. Dennis for Interveners and Appel- lants. Bird, Marella, Boxer, Wolpert & Matz, Vincent J. Marella, Dorothy Wolpert and Mark T. Drooks for Plaintiff and Respondent. OPINION COMPTON, J. - The Southern California Rapid Transit District (SCRTD) initiated this action to validate two spe- cial benefit assessment districts created to fund a portion of the cost of the first 4.4-mile segment of the Los Angeles Metro Rail rapid transit system. Revenue collected from these districts eventually will be used to repay bonds the SCRTD intends to sell pursuant to resolutions adopted by its board of directors (Board). Helen Bolen, the secretary of the SCRTD, refused, however, to certify those resolu- tions on the ground that the statutory scheme (Pub. Util. Code, § 33000 et seq.) authorizing the creation of the App. 54 districts was constitutionally infirm and that, in any event, the Board had not complied with the law in impos- ing the assessments. Several corporations and individuals who own or lease real property located within the assess- ment districts subsequently intervened in the action. After finding that the districts had been validly cre- ated and that there was no other impediment to the issuance of the bonds, the trial court granted a writ of mandate directing Bolen to certify the Board’s resolu- tions. This appeal follows.! We reverse. The facts giving rise to this litigation are not in dispute. The SCRTD is a rapid transit district created in 1964 by the California Legislature pursuant to Public Utilities Code sections 30100 and 30101.2 Connecting four counties and servicing some eighty cities in Los Angeles County alone, the SCRTD has virtual autonomy in self- governance, limited only by the regulations of the Public Utilities Commission. (Los Angeles Met. Transit Authority v. Public Util. Com. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 863, 868-869 [31 Cal.Rptr. 463, 382 P.2d 583]; Rapid Transit Advocates, Inc. v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 996, 1000 [230 Cal.Rptr. 225].) Formed both as a public agency and a public corporation (§§ 30007 and 30101), it has its own board of directors, with powers to make contracts, employ a police force, acquire and construct rights of ways, rail lines, incur indebtedness, exercise ' Named as appellants on this appeal! are Bolen, in her capacity as secretary of the SCRTD, and interveners, The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company et al. 2 All further statutory references are to the Public Utilities Code unless otherwise indicated. App. 55 eminent domain, and levy and collect taxes. (§§ 30005, 30200, 30502, 30503, 30504, 30530, and 30701.) The declared purpose of the SCRTD is to create “a compre- hensive mass rapid transit system in the southern Califor- nia area, and particularly in Los Angeles County” that will lessen traffic congestion and “foster the development of trade and the movement of people in and around the Los Angeles area for the benefit of the entire state.” (§ 30001, subd. (a).) In keeping with its statutory mandate, the SCRTD, in 1979, proposed the construction of Metro Rail, a 18.6-mile subway line between downtown Los Angeles and North Hollywood. To finance the project’s multibillion dollar cost, the transit district sought funding from a variety of sources, including the Urban Mass Transit Administration (UMTA), an agency of the federal government. Initially, UMTA committed its financial support. A change in fed- eral policy and a concomitant reduction in available funds, however, later forced it to withdraw from the Project. In hopes of securing at least some federal funding the SCRTD proposed an alternative plan, designated MOS-1 for Minimum Operable Segment-1, consisting of the first 4.4 miles of the 18.6-mile system extending from Union Station in downtown Los Angeles to Wilshire and Alvarado Boulevards on the outskirts of the central busi- ness district.* The SCRTD estimated the cost of that ° As planned, the complete trip from Union Station to Wilshire and Alvarado will take approximately seven minutes with stops at the Los Angeles Civic Center, Fifth and Hill Streets, and Seventh and Flower Streets. Today, that same trip takes one-half hour by automobile at peak hours of travel. App. 56 project at $1.25 billion. After determining that the plan would provide “a viable contribution to the greater Los Angeles urban transportation infrastructure,” the UMTA signed a full funding contract with the SCRTD, agreeing to release an initial $225 million for the construction of MOS-1. Although federal grants under the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 eventually will total in excess of $695 million, receipt of those funds is conditioned on the availability of nonfederal financing from the state, other local governmental entities, and the private sector. The State of California, through the California Trans- portation Commission, has committed $214 million over a period of seven years as its portion of the funding for MOS-1 and Los Angeles County, through its transporta- tion commission, has pledged $177 million. The City of Los Angeles will contribute $34 million to the project, with the remainder of the cost, approximately $130 mil- lion, to be derived from the planned issuance of tax exempt bonds secured by special benefit assessments on certain real property located along the route of the sys- tem. In 1983, the state Legislature enacted a series of amendments to the Public Utilities Code, commencing with section 33000, that authorized the SCRTD to form special benefit assessment districts in the vicinities of proposed rail stations.4 Under this legislation, the SCRTD 4 Similar legislation, enacted in 1968 as the “Mills Act” (§ 99000 et seq.), granted rapid transit districts throughout the (Continued on fo'lowing page) App. 57 Board may, after conducting public hearings, estimate the benefit to a district from the operations of the local sta- tions, levy assessments in p-oportion to those benefits, and issue bonds repayable through the special assess- ments. Section 33000, subdivision (b) provides in pertinent part that the Board is “the conclusive judge of the propor- tion of special and general benefits produced by the facilities and of the distribution of the special benefits among parcels of property within the benefit assessment district.” Moreover, section 33002 declares in no uncertain terms that the special assessments imposed on real prop- erty within a district do not “constitute ad valorem taxes or any other form of general tax ot The sole means to protest the formation of a special assessment district is by referendum election. Property Owners are entitled to an election only if they file a petition, signed by owners of at least 25 percent of the assessed value of real property within the district, not later than 30 days after the conclusion of the SCRTD’s public hearings on the issue. (§§ 33002.2, 33002.5) The oniy voters who may participate in that election are the Owners of real property subject to the assessment. (Continued from previous page) State the authority to form special assessment districts in the vicinity of transit stations for the Purpose of funding any bonded indebtedness. To our knowledge, however, these pro- visions never have been utilized. The Mills Act and the special assessment law at issue in this case appear to be the first transit funding mechanism of their kind in the United States. App. 58 (§ 33002.3.) Each voter may cast one vote for each $1,000 worth of land and improvements owned by the voter according to the most recent equalized assessment roll. (§ 33002.3.) The Board may levy the assessment only if the majority of votes cast in the election approves of the district. (§ 33002.8.) Beginning in 1984, the SCRTD undertook to establish two special assessment districts in the central business area of Los Angeles to finance a portion of the cost of MOS-1. In July 1984, the Board appointed a benefit assessment policy task force (BATF) to develop recom- mendations for structuring the district and implementing the assessment. The BATF, composed of community leaders and various representatives from the proposed districts, submitted its initial recommendations to the Board in December 1985. The study essentially found that the property within the recommended district boundaries would benefit from the operation of the planned MOS-1 stations through increased land values, lease rates, occu- pancy levels, retail sales, visitor access, reduced parking costs, and the ability to develop land more intensively. The BATF also found that all of these benefits were attrib- utable to increased pedestrian traffic, and thus, princi- pally confined to areas within walking distance of the transit stations. In December 1984, the SCRTD Board adopted a reso- lution which, in accordance with the BATF’s recommen- dations, proposed the creation of two special assessment districts, one covering real property within one-half mile of the four Metro Rail Stations to be located in the central business area, and one covering real property within one- App. 59 third mile of the Wilshire Alvarado station. The resolu- tion further proposed to exempt residential uses, as well as certain classes of tax exempt property, and to impose initial assessment rates from $.28 per square foot graduat- ing to $.40 as a maximum rate. As required under section 33001.5, the Board con- ducted a public hearing on the proposal and, in February 1985, passed a resolution to proceed with the formation of the districts. The resolution also increased the initial rate of the assessment to $.30 per square foot of the greater of land or improvements, set the maximum rate at $.42 per square foot, and provided that the assessments would terminate in the year 2008 or earlier. Under this plan, all property subject to assessment within the dis- tricts would be assessed at the same rate, regardless of its current use, zoning classifications, value or distance from the Metro Rail stations.5 In accordance with the procedures set forth in section 33001.5, subdivision (b), the Board submitted the resolu- tion to the Los Angeles City Council for approval, mod- ification, or disapproval. After conducting a public hearing on the issue in May 1985, the council approved > The resolution provided that the assessment rates would be applicable to all “assessable” parcels and improvements in the districts. “Assessable improvements” were defined as improvements used for office, hotel, motel, commercial and retail purposes. All parcels are “assessable” unless specifically exempt. The resolution exempted three types of property from the assessment: property used for residential purposes (other than hotels and motels), property that is both publicly owned and used for a public purpose, and property that is both owned and used by specified nonprofit organizations. App. 60 the plan, subject to the condition that all residential prop- erty within the districts be exempt from the assessment,® and returned the matter to the SCRTD for final approval or rejection. (§ 33001.5, subd. (b).) In July 1985, the Board passed a resolution creating special assessment districts A-1 (the central business district) and A-2 (Wilshire/ Alvarado) and placing a limit on total assessments from the two districts of $130.3 million plus administrative expenses. One year later, in August 1986, the Board instructed the general manager of the SCRTD to levy the assessments at the uniform rate of $.30 per square foot. Assessment bills were sent to commercial property owners within the districts in October and November 1986. The Board, however, later elected to defer collection of the assessments until 1992. Following a public hearing in May 1987, the Board adopted two resolutions authorizing the sale of revenue 6 This condition apparently was mandated by section 427 of the Los Angeles City Charter, which provides in pertinent part as follows: ” “(b) Neither the City Council nor any City board, com- mission, officer or employee in the exercise of any power or authority it may have shall authurize or approve any grant of funds for a rail transit project unless the district, agency or entity proposing to initiate or implement the project has first entered into a contract with the City which binds the district, agency or entity (1) to not levy any assessments on any prop- erty in residential use or under construction prior to April 9, 1985, . . . and (2) to pay or fully refund to the payers thereof any assessments required by law to be levied thereon.” App. 61 bonds in an amount up to $200 million.” Bolen, in her capacity as secretary of the SCRTD, refused to certify the vote on these resolutions as required by law, contending that the assessment scheme did not meet constitutional standards, that there was no special benefit to the proper- ties within the districts, and that the SCRTD had failed to comply with various statutory requirements. In response, the SCRTD sought a writ of mandate in superior court to compel Bolen to certify the resolutions and thus allow the sale of the bonds to proceed. By stipulation of the parties, interveners subsequently joined the action also to contest the formation of the districts and the imposition of the assessments. After a lengthy hearing, the trial court rejected each of the arguments advanced by Bolen and interveners and issued the writ. On this appeal, the parties advance numerous argu- ments in opposition to and in support of the constitu- tionality of the statutory scheme authorizing the creation of assessment districts. Both Bolen and interveners (appellants) maintain that they are not opposed to Metro Rail, but merely the manner in which the assessments have been formulated and levied solely on the commer- cial property owners within the districts. The SCRTD counters that the assessments have been fairly imposed on those who will benefit the most from the project and that every effort has been made to include both the Property owners and the public at large in the decision- making process. ” The issuance of district A-1 and district A-2 bonds was not to exceed $187 million and $13 million, respectively. App. 62 The transit district asserts that the attack on the assessment districts is nothing more than a thinly dis- guised political assault on the legislative determination to construct Metro Rail in the first instance. Despite these differences, the parties seem to agree on the importance of the issues raised by these proceed- ings, especially in terms of their impact on the future of the project as a whole. The SCRTD suggests, not too subtly, that without the monies made available by the imposition of the assessments the federal government will withdraw its participation, thus leading to the pro- ject’s ultimate demise for lack of adequate funding. In reviewing these issues, we think it important to emphasize at the outset that we do not consider or weigh the economic or social wisdom or general propriety of the statutory scheme enacted by the Legislature, or of the decision to construct Metro Rail in the first instance. Our sole function is to evaluate the legislation in light of established constitutional standards. (Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian (1989) 48 Cal.3d 805, 816 [258 Cal.Rptr. 161, 771 P.2d 1247]; Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 219 [149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281].) The first of the constitutional challenges raised here is directed at the petition and election procedures manda- ted by section 33002.2 et seq. Appellants contend that these procedures violate the equal protection clauses of both the state and federal Constitutions by invidiously discriminating against those who do not own property within the districts but are nonetheless affected by the App. 63 construction of a large-scale mass transportation project such as Metro Rail. In support of their argument, appellants point out that although such groups as commercial tenants will bear the brunt of the assessments because of standard “pass through” clauses in their lease agreements, they are given no voice in the decisionmaking process. The same is said to be true of other residents, both within and without the districts, who will be impacted by the project but are denied the right to vote.§ Appellants further contend that there is a denial of equal protection because of the discriminatory manner in which the statutory scheme distinguishes between the allocation of votes and the amount of an assessment. Section 33002.3, subdivision (b) allocates voting Strength based upon the value of the property so that “each voter . . . may cast one vote for each one thousand dollars ($1,000), or fraction thereof, worth of land or improvements owned by the voter . . . as is shown on the most recent equalized assessment roll.” At the same time, however, assessments are calculated on the basis of parcel size or floor area. (§ 33002, subd.(a).)9 8 Section 33002.3, subdivision (a) defines “voter” as “an owner of real property which is assessed or Proposed to be assessed under this chapter and which is within the bound- aries of the benefit district.” ® Section 33002, subdivision (a) provides: “In determining the amount of a special benefit assessment, the board may measure the benefit to real property in the benefit district or zones therein by the parcel area of unimproved real property (Continued on following page) App. 64 Appellants insist that this classification scheme is flawed because property owners with the most votes do not necessarily pay the highest assessments. The absence of any relationship between votes awarded and the assessment paid is made more onerous, at least according to appellants, because under article XIII A of the Califor- nia Constitution (i.e., Proposition 13) there is no longer any correlation between market value and assessed value. As a result, the statutory scheme purportedly awards more votes to many properties less valuable than others, but more recently reassessed. In reviewing these claims, we start with the proposi- tion that the federal Constitution grants the states “broad powers to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised.” (Lassiter v. North- ampton Election Bd. (1959) 360 U.S. 45, 50 [3 L.Ed.2d 1072, 1076, 79 S.Ct. 985].) But “once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsis- tent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections (1966) 383 U.S. 663, 665 [16 L.Ed.2d 169, 171, 86 S.Ct. 1079].) When a state excludes citizens from the electorate, it generally must justify the exclusion under the harsh “compelling state interest” test. (Hadley v. Junior College District (1970) 397 U.S. 50, 59 [25 L.Ed.2d 45, 52-53, 90 S.Ct. 791]; Choudhry v. Free (1976) 17 Cal.3d 660, 664 [131 (Continued from previous page) and by the parcel area and the floor area of real property and improvements thereto of improved real property, as deemed appropriate by a resolution adopted by a two-thirds vote of the members of the board.” lL App. 65 Cal.Rptr. 654, 552 P.2d 438].) Under that standard, the state bears the burden of establishing not only that it has a compelling interest which justifies the law but that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further its purpose. (Curtis v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 7 Cal.3d 942 [104 Cal.Rptr. 297, 501 P.2d 537]; see also Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 597 [96 Cal.Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241, 41 A.L.R.3d 1187]; Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 784-785 [87 Cal.Rptr. 839, 471 P.2d 487].) Although not every legislative voting classification is subject to strict scrutiny, the compelling interest test must be applied if a classification has a “ ‘real and appreciable impact’ upon the equality, fairness and integrity of the electoral process.” (Choudhry v. Free, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 664, citing Bullock v. Carter (1972) 405 U.S. 134, 144 [31 L.Ed.2d 92, 100, 92 S.Ct. 849].) Applying the strict scrutiny standard, the United States Supreme Court has invalidated requirements of property ownership for voters in a school district election (Kramer v. Union School District (1969) 395 U.S. 621, 632 [23 L.Ed.2d 583, 592-593, 89 S.Ct. 1886]),!° as well as 0 In Kramer, the court considered a voter qualification Statute that limited eligibility to vote in local school board elections to owners or lessees of taxable real property within the district, or their spouses, and to parents or guardians with children enrolled in a district school. The district argued that the state had a legitimate interest in limiting the district elec- tions to those “primarily interested” in such elections,” [sic] and that it could “reasonably and permissibly” conclude that Property taxpayers and parents of school children were those who were primarily interested. The court held that even if such a (Continued on following page) App. 66 elections to approve the issuance of bonds for the con- struction of a city library (Hill v. Stone (1975) 421 U.S. 289, 297 [44 L.Ed.2d 172, 178-179, 95 S.Ct. 1637]), revenue bonds for the use of a municipal utility district (Cipriano v. City of Houma (1969) 395 U.S. 701, 705-706 [23 L.Ed.2d 647, 651-652, 89 S.Ct. 1897]),11 and general obligation bonds to finance municipal improvements (Phoenix v. (Continued from previous page) purpose was constitutionally legitimate, the statute’s system of classification was not precisely tailored to accomplish it. The classification was over-inclusive in that it included many per- sons tangentially interested in school affairs and under-inclu- sive in that it excluded many persons with a substantial interest in decisions affecting education. In so concluding, the court made it clear that the fact that the district was financed by revenue derived from a property tax did not mean that the impact of the assessment ultimately affected only property owners or lessees. 11 In Cipriano, the court extended its Kramer analysis to a Louisiana statute which allowed only landowners to vote in a revenue bond election called to finance the operations of a city’s utility system. As in Kramer, the city argued that property owners held a “ ‘special pecuniary interest’ in the election, because the efficiency of the utility system directly affect[ed] ‘property and property values’ and thus ‘the basic security of their investment in [their] property [was] at stake.’ ” (Id. at p. 704 [23 L.Ed.2d at p. 651].) Without deciding whether or not the franchise could be restricted to those “primarily inter- ested,” the court found that the statutory scheme did not fulfill the city’s articulated goal since those excluded had as much interest in the outcome of the election as those the statute included. This conclusion was based on the fact that both property owners and nonproperty owners used the services of the utility, paid for its operations, and benefited by the projects financed by its revenues. I aianietnireeernreaieanniiaiiaamaiaaiemamatneramanettie App. 67 Kolodziejski (1970) 399 U.S. 204 [26 L.Ed.2d 523, 90 S.Ct. 1990]).12 The California Supreme Court has applied a similar standard in striking down statutes which allowed only landowners to vote on local governmental measures. (See Fullerton Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Educa- tion (1982) 32 Cal.3d 779 [187 Cal.Rptr. 398, 654 P.2d 168]; Choudhry v. Free, supra, 17 Cal.3d 660; Curtis v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 7 Cal.3d 942; Burrey v. Embarcadero Mun. Improvement Dist. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 671 [97 Cal.Rptr. 203, 488 P.2d 395].) 2 In Kolodziejski, the court invalidated an Arizona consti- tutional and statutory scheme which permitted only real prop- erty taxpayers to vote on the issuance of municipal general obligation bonds. Unlike Cipriano, where the bonds and the interest were to be paid wholly by the revenues of the facility being financed, in Kolodziejski property tax revenues were to be used to repay the bonded indebtedness and interest on such indebtedness. The city asserted that a special burden had been placed on property taxpayers for the benefit of the entire community, and that this burden was unsharable and unshift- able, resulting in the equivalent of a lien on all real property within the city. While acknowledging that the interests of Property owners were somewhat different from the interests of nonproperty owners, the Supreme Court found that the inter- ests of nonproperty owners were not substantially less than those included within the grant of the franchise. It pointed out that all residents of the city, property owners and nonproperty Owners alike, had an interest in the services and facilities financed by the bonds and would be “substantially affected by the ultimate outcome of the bond election. .. . ” (Id. at p. 209 (26 L.Ed.2d at p. 527].) Based upon this analysis, the court held that “[p]lacing such power in property owners alone can be justified only by some overriding interest of those owners that the State is entitled to recognize.” (Ibid.) App. 68 The fundamental principle expressed in these deci- sions is that where a governmental decision subject to a referendum will have a substantial impact on all citizens, any classification restricting the franchise on grounds other than residence, age, and citizenship cannot stand unless supported by a compelling state interest. As the court observed in Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, supra, 399 U.S. at page 209 [26 L.Ed.2d at page 527], “when all citizens are affected in important ways by a governmental decision subject to a referendum, the Constitution does not permit weighted voting or the exclusion of otherwise qualified citizens from the franchise.” In applying this rule, the court has held “that all voters have an important interest in the benefits of adequate service and favorable rates of a utility district (Cipriano), that both property owners and those who do not own property are called upon either directly or indirectly to pay for the improve- ments acquired from the proceeds of bonds (Phoenix, Hill), and that those who do not own property may have as direct an interest in school affairs (Kramer) or in a library (Hill) as those who do.” (Choudhry v. Free, supra, 17 Cal.3d 660, 666.) In a line of cases beginning with Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water Dist. (1973) 410 U.S. 719 [35 L.Ed.2d 659, 93 S.Ct. 1224], however, the court carved out an exception to the strict scrutiny requirement and upheld property qual- ifications for voters in certain “special purpose” districts. (See also Ball v. James (1981) 451 U.S. 355 [68 L.Ed.2d 150, 101 S.Ct. 1811]; Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Water- shed Improvement District (1973) 410 U.S. 743 [35 L.Ed.2d 675, 93 S.Ct. 1237].) Because these decisions are the only App. 69 ones which permit this type of voter restriction, the argu- ments of the parties here focus largely on the appli- cability of Salyer and its progeny to the case before us. The plaintiffs in Salyer challenged the voting scheme for the governing board of a California water storage district that extended the franchise only to landowners, with votes apportioned according to the assessed valua- tion of the land owned. The Supreme Court, after examin- ing the nature of the services performed by the district, concluded that “by reason of its special limited purpose and of the disproportionate effect of its activities on landowners as a group” (410 U.S. at p. 728 [35 L.Ed.2d at P. 666]), the strict one person, one vote equal protection analysis advanced in Kramer and its progeny did not apply. Critical to an understanding of Salyer is the factual setting of the case. The water district consisted of 193,000 acres, all of it agricultural land, 85 percent farmed by 1 or another of 4 corporations. It had a total population of 77 residents, 18 of whom were children. Assessments against landowners were the sole means of paying expenses of the district, so that landowners as a class bore the entire financial burden. Moreover, the reason for the district’s existence and continued operation was to provide water for farming, and, as stressed by the court, the primary effect of its operations was upon agricultural lands. Although the district had the authority to undertake cer- tain flood control activities, the court found these powers were incident to the exercise of its primary functions of water storage and distribution. The court specifically noted that the district provided “no other general public services such as schools, housing, transportation, utilities, App. 70 roads, or anything else of the type ordinarily financed by a municipal body.” (Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water Dist., supra, 410 U.S. at pp. 728-729 [35 L.Ed.2d at pp. 666-667].) Based on its “limited purpose” and the “dispropor- tionate effect” of district operations on landowners, the Salyer court found it understandable that the “statutory framework for election of directors . . . focuse[d] on the land benefited, rather than on people as such.” (Ibid.) Tracing the development of equal protection analysis of apportionment and voter qualifications in local elec- tions, the court observed that in cases invoking the rigid one person, one vote standard, the local entities there involved exercised “general governmental powers” or performed “important governmental functions.” (Id. at p. 727 [35 L.Ed.2d at p. 666].) By distinguishing the water storage district from the governmental entities involved in Kramer and its progeny, the court explicitly denied the applicability of a strict standard of review and relied solely upon the less strin- gent rational relation test to uphold the voting scheme. In its search for a rational justification for the disen- franchisement of lessees and other residents, the court found several reasons, including the need to attract land- owner support for the formation and operation of the district, the avoidance of possible ballot manipulation, and problems of voting administration.'9 13 The Supreme Court reaffirmed its position in Ball v. James, supra, 451 U.S. 355, which upheld an Arizona state law permitting only landowners to vote for directors of a water (Continued on following page) App. 71 Unlike Salyer, the case before us involves a matter of substantial interest to property owners and nonproperty owners alike. It is beyond question that the development of a mass rapid transit system is crucial to the orderly and efficient growth of any metropolitan area. This is particularly true in Los Angeles where the dreams of elevated monorails and underground subways have eluded municipal planners for decades. Once described as “six suburbs in search of a city,” Los Angeles today is a vast megalopolis encircled by a web of crowded city Streets and congested freeways. Given the dramatic growth of the area in recent years, it is no wonder that the establishment of an inte- grated mass transit system has taken on so much impor- tance. In recognition of the need for expanded transportation services that can assume part of the load of the private automobile, existing bus lines, and prolif- erating freeways, the SCRTD proposed metro rail [sic]. (Continued from previous page) storage and distribution district. As in Salyer, the court found that the district did not exercise crucial government powers. Moreover, the district’s water functions, which constituted the primary and originating purpose of the district, were held to be narrow. California courts have applied a similar analysis to elec- tions concerning a recreation and park district (Simi Valley Recreation & Park Dist. v. Local Agency Formation Com. (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 648 [124 Cal.Rptr. 635}), a reclamation district (Philippart v. Hotchkiss Tract Reclamation Dist. 799 (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 797 [127 Cal.Rptr. 42]), and a small irrigation dis- trict (Schindler v. Palo Verde Irrigation Dist. (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 831 [82 Cal.Rptr. 61]). App. 72 Whether that project will fulfill the promise of its promoters is a question open to considerable debate. Be that as it may, there can be little doubt but that its financing, construction and operation will impact all seg- ments of the population. As we see it, public transportation, like public educa- tion, is an issue affecting al! citizens. (Cf. Kramer v. Union School District, supra, 395 U.S. 621.) The Legislature itself recognized the statewide importance of the metro rail [sic] project, proclaiming that it is “in the best interest of the citizens of the state to authorize the Southern Califor- nia Rapid Transit District to levy special benefit assess- ments for needed public rail rapid transit facilities and services.” (§ 33000.) “There is an imperative need,” the statute declares, “for a comprehensive mass rapid transit system in the Southern California area, and particularly Los Angeles County.” (Ibid.) Viewed in light of these legislative expressions of intent, we think it clear that the issues raised here involve the basic governmental function of providing mass trans- portation and affect all who live, work, and visit the area. These concerns are substantially different from the ones which led the court in Salyer to uphold an election scheme which impacted only one segment of a “special” water storage district. Nonlandowners share an equal interest with land- owners in the creation of a mass transit system that, when completed, will stretch some 19 miles and link together such diverse areas as downtown Los Angeles and the San Fernando Valley. The nonproperty owning residents of the MOS-1 districts are no less interested in the results of App. 73 an election called to validate the assessments imposed by the SCRTD than were the voters whose exclusion from the franchise was invalidated in Kramer, Cipriano, and Kolodziejski. If a voter who does not own property cannot consti- tutionally be excluded from voting on bonds to be used by a municipal utility district (Cipriano) or on city general obligations bonds (Kolodziejski) a fortiori, he may not be deprived of the right to petition for and vote in an election to authorize the formation of a special assess- ment district, the revenue of which will be used to par- tially finance the construction of a mass transit system. This is especially true since the ultimate social and economic cost of the MOS-1 project falls on property owners and nonproperty owners alike. The funding of Metro Rail has substantial implications throughout the community, not just among the property owners of the assessment districts. On this point, we agree with one commentator who has observed: “Because a special assessment will not finance the entire cost of a rapid transit system, part of the financing burden is likely to fall on nonlandowning persons inside the assessment district in the form of general property taxes, sales taxes and similar measures. In addition to this financing burden, nonlandowners within the district will have an interest in the proposed transit system’s impact on their neighborhood from an economic and aesthetic perspective. In sum, excluding nonlandowner special district residents from voting on the rapid transit assessment proposal appears to exclude persons with a sufficient constitutional interest in the App. 74 election to merit the franchise.” (Notes; Rapid Transit Financing: Use of the Special Assessment (1977) 29 Stan.L.Rev. 795, 809-810.) According to the SCRTD, however, the state is justi- fied in recognizing the unique interests of real property owners in the districts because they alone bear the bur- den of the special assessments. This is true, we are told, because unlike the general obligation bonds in Kolodziej- ski or the revenue bonds in Cipriano, a failure to pay the special assessment creates a lien on the property within the districts (§ 33017). We must disagree. In Kolodziejski, the Supreme Court set forth three reasons why nonproperty owners were as substantially interested as property owners in the city’s issuance of general obligation bonds. The court first pointed out that, regardless of how the debt on the bonds was serviced, nonproperty owners were significantly affected. If the bonds were to be serviced out of the city’s general reve- nues, all taxpayers would share the burdens. And, even if the debt were to be totally serviced by property tax revenues, the court found that “a significant part of the ultimate burden of each year’s tax on rental property will very likely be borne by the tenant rather than the land- lord since . . . the landlord will treat the property tax as a business expense and normally will be able to pass all or a large part of this cost on to the tenants in the form of higher rent.” (Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, supra, 399 U.S. 204, 210 [26 L.Ed.2d at p. 528].) Second, the court noted that any adverse effect caused by higher property taxes would be offset, at least in substantial part, by the increase in property values resulting from the improvements financed by the tax itself. On this point, the court further I oO App. 75 stressed that “the price of real estate appears to be more a function of the health of the local economy than a reflec- tion of the level of property taxes imposed to tinance municipal improvements.” (Id. at p. 212 [26 L.Ed.2d at p. 529].) Third, the court found that, short of a total collapse of the city’s economy, there was no foreseeable way in which the bond obligation could become an unshiftable burden resulting in the forfeiture of property. All three factors which influenced the court in Kolodziejski to require participation among property owners and nonproperty owners, are present in the spe- cial assessment election at issue here. The record in the instant case makes it clear that the actual burden of paying the assessments imposed by the SCRTD will, to a great extent, be borne by commercial tenants by virtue of “pass-through” clauses in their leases. Moreover, any adverse effects caused by the imposi- tion of the assessment will be offset by a concomitant increase in property values caused by the construction of the MOS-1 project itself. Indeed, the very definition of the term “special assessment” presupposes that there will be some benefit accruing to property because of a public improvement project.'4 Although a lien may be imposed for nonpayment of the assessment in the MOS-1 districts, the probability of property owners actually losing their 4 A special assessment is commonly defined as “a charge imposed on particular real property for a local public improve- ment of direct benefit to that property.” (Solvang Mun. Improve- ment Dist. v. Board of Supervisors (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 545, 552 [169 Cal.Rptr. 391].) App. 76 property is too insubstantial to justify the statutory dis- tinction between property and nonproperty owners. (See Gaines, The Right Of Non-Property Owners to Participate in a Special Assessment Majority Protest (1972-73) 20 UCLA L.Rev. 201, 230-232.) Viewed in light of these considerations, we are con- vinced that the benefits and burdens of the SCRTD’s assessment fall indiscriminately on property owner and nonproperty owner alike. As a result, there is no basis for concluding that nonproperty owners are substantially less interested in an election called to validate the assess- ment districts than are property owners. Next, the SCRTD justifies the distinction drawn by the statutory scheme between votes awarded and assess- ment paid primarily on the basis of administrative convenience. It argues that had the Legislature not used a vote allocation scheme based on assessed value, it would have been forced to allocate a single vote to each prop- erty owner irrespective of the value or size of the prop- erty being assessed. This, it contends,“‘would have been far more inequitable than the present system. We agree with appellants, however, that administrative difficulty is no excuse for fundamental unfairness. In fact, the argu- ment advanced by the SCRTD rings somewhat hollow in light of the fact that in 1984, it sponsored legislation which would have allocated voting strength based on parcel area. Although the Legislature adopted this App. 77 Proposal, it subsequently was vetoed by the Governor on other grounds and never became law.15 In contrast to Salyer, the voting scheme at issue in this case does not accord the most votes to the property Owner who must pay the largest assessment. Here, votes are calculated based on assessed value, but the assess- ment is based on parcel or floor area. Even under the less stringent rational basis test, there simply is no relation- ship whatsoever between votes awarded and assessment paid. The distinction drawn by the Statutory scheme is made more egregious because, under Proposition 13, the true economic status of the Property bears little relation- ship to the burden of the assessment. Under the circum- stances, we must conclude that the distinction drawn by the Legislature between votes awarded and assessment Paid does not pass constitutional muster. We also reject the argument that the Legislature was free to restrict the franchise in any way that it desired because special assessment elections are not constitu- tionally mandated. Although the state can deny the right to an election in a special assessment Proceeding (Hoff- man v. City of Red Bluff (1965) 63 Cal.2d 584, 594 [47 Cal.Rptr. 553, 407 P.2d 857]; County of Riverside v. Whitlock (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 863, 872 [99 Cal.Rptr. 710]), it can grant it only in strict compliance with equal protection S The legislation Proposed by the SCRTD also contained an explicit exemption for residential Property within the App. 78 requirements. (Kramer v. Union School District, supra, 395 U.S. 621, 628-629 [23 L.Ed.2d at pp. 590-591].) Neither property owners nor nonproperty owners in the MOS-1 districts may claim a constitutional right to vote on whether or not the assessment districts should be formed; similarly, the plaintiffs in Kramer, Cipriano, and Kolodziejski could assert no federal constitutional right to vote on the matters at issue in those cases. Once the right to vote is conferred, however, the equal protection clause requires that, in matters of gen- eral interest to the community, restriction of the franchise on grounds other than age, citizenship, and residence can be tolerated only upon proof that it furthers a compelling state interest. (Hill v. Stone, supra, 421 U.S. 289, 297 [44 L.Ed.2d at pp. 178-179].) As we have discussed, ante, no such interest exists here.!6 This brings us to the question of severability. Having found that the Legislature’s restriction on the franchise constitutes a denial of equal protection, we must now determine whether the remainder of the statutory scheme falls with the invalid portion of the legislation. If the election provisions are not severable, then “the void part taints the remainder and the whole becomes a nullity.” (In re Blaney (1947) 30 Cal.2d 643, 655 [184 P.2d 892]; accord Santa Barbara Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 315, 330 [118 Cal.Rptr. 637, 530 P.2d 605].) 16 Without reaching the issue, we note here that the restriction on the franchise contained in section 33002.2 et seq. is in apparent conflict with section 22, article I of the California Constitution. That section states: “The right to vote or hold office may not be conditioned by a property qualification.” TT App. 79 In considering this issue, we first note that the spe- cial assessment law set forth in section 33000 et seq. contains no severability clause of its own. Such a clause does appear, however, in section 31520.17 Although not conclusive, a severability clause normally calls for sus- taining the valid part of the enactment, especially when the invalid part is mechanically (i.e., grammatically) sev- erable.!® (McCafferty v. Board of Supervisors (1969) 3 Cal.App.3d 190, 193 [83 Cal.Rptr. 229].) The final determination depends on whether the remainder of the statute ” ‘is complete in itself and would have been adopted by the legislative body had the latter foreseen the partial invalidation of the Statute.” (Santa Barbara Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 331; see also Sonoma County Organization of Public Employees v. County of Sonoma (1979) 23 Cal.3d 296, 320 [152 Cal.Rptr. 903, 591 P.2d 1].) 17 Section 31520 provides: “If any section, subsection, sen- tence, clause, or phrase of this part, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is for any reason held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this part, or the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances, shall not be affected thereby. The Legislature hereby declares that it would have passed this part, and each section, subsection, sentence, clause, and phrase thereof, irrespective of the fact that one or more sections, subsections, sentences, clauses or phrases, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, be held invalid.” '® There is no dispute in this case that the invalid portion of the statutory scheme is mechanically severable from the remainder. Section 33002.2 et seq. is grammatically complete and distinct from the other Provisions of the special assess- ment law. App. 80 Section 31520 notwithstanding, we are convinced that the Legislature would not have enacted the special assessment law in this case without including some pro- vision for a referendum election or other protest scheme. We reach that conclusion for several reasons. First, we attach little weight to the general sever- ability provisions of section 31520. That statute was enacted in 1964, some 20 years before the enactment of the special assessment legislation at issue here, and it con- tains no language indicating its applicability to subse- quently added chapters. (Cf. Shouse v. Pierce County (9th Cir. 1977) 559 F.2d 1142.)19 The presumption of severability which would attach had the Legislature considered the issue in 1983, simply does not exist in this instance.?° 19 Shouse, heavily relied upon by the SCRTD, is not to the contrary. The severability clause in that case was included within the terms of the challenged legislation itself. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit expressly determined that the protest provi- sions at issue there were not an integral part of the statute and that the Washington State Legislature would have enacted the measure in any event. As we explain, infra, we reach a contrary result in this case. 20 One treatise sets forth the applicable rule as follows: “Although there are no measurable differences in effect between general separability acts and separability clauses in individual statutes, it is reasonable to infer that because a general act cannot control subsequent legislative intent and therefore is questionable evidence of it, less weight may attach to a general rule of separability than to a clause in a separate act.” (Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th ed. 1986) § 44.11.) EEE App. 81 Second, and more importantly, the legislative history of section 33000 et seq. makes it clear that the election provisions were a key inducement to the passage of the law. Although the early versions of the legislation did not allow for a referendum on the formation of the assess- ment districts, state Senator Diane Watson, the author of the bill (Sen. Bill No. 1238), Proposed the voting scheme eventually enacted as a direct limitation on the Board’s authority. This amendment, among others, apparently was designed to overcome considerable Opposition to the bill as originally proposed.21 Viewed in this light, there can be little question but that the election provisions were integral to the ultimate passage of the legislation. 21 In a statement delivered April 27, 1983, before a Senate committee, Senator Watson observed: “SB 1238 authorizes the SCRTD Board of Directors to establish benefit assessment dis- tricts around Metro Rail stations when the land would receive special benefit by virtue of being near the station. The measure also authorizes the Board to issue bonds to be paid by the assessment. The benefit districts could be formed and the bonds issued without the necessity of holding an election.” (Italics added.) In a subsequent statement proposing an amendment to the bill, Senator Watson commented: “Under SB 1238, SCRTD could establish Benefit Assessment Districts around the Metro Rail stations. . . . [{] My bill would also allow SCRTD to issue bonds to be paid by these assessments. .. . [%] I have amended this bill to address several concerns which arose during policy committee. One of the amendments allows for an election to be held if property owners protest the assessment formula. Another amend- ment distinguishes this assessment from a tax, since these assessments would be based on parcel size and/or floor area.” (Italics added.) App. 82 Third, and lastly, although a special assessment may be imposed without any election whatsoever (see discus- sion, ante), our review of assessment legislation in this state demonstrates that some form of referendum or other protest scheme nearly always has been provided by law. (See, e.g., Sts. & Hy. Code, §§ 5000 et seq., 8500 et seq., 10000 et seq., 22500 et seq.; Gov. Code, §§ 53311 et seq., 54703 et seq.; Pub. Util. Code, § 99000 et seq.) Given this history of loyalty to the electoral process, we seriously doubt that the Legislature would have enacted the assess- ment statutes in this case without some provision for voting rights. Based upon the foregoing, we can only conclude that the election provisions of the statute are not separable from the remaining portions of the enactment, and that, as a result, the statutory scheme in its entirety must fall as unconstitutional. Even were we to find no constitutional defect in the voting scheme enacted by the Legislature, we would be forced to hold that the SCRTD was without the authority to create an exemption for residential property. As we have noted earlier, the statutory scheme itself exempts neither residential uses nor property owned by nonprofit organizations. It also contains no language permitting an administrative exemption of such property. Although leg- islation sponsored by the SCRTD in 1984 would have specifically excluded residential property from the assessment, the Governor ultimately vetoed the measure. (See discussion, ante.) Lacking express statutory authority, the SCRTD could not fashion an exemption from the special assessment law ————————— App. 83 for any class of persons or property. Over a half century ago, our Supreme Court observed that “[e]xemption from local assessment should, even more than exemption from general taxation, be based on express statutory authority, for every such exemption increases the burdens of other Property owners... . ” (Hollywood Cemetery Assn. v. Powell (1930) 210 Cal. 121, 135 (291 P. 397, 71 A.L.R. 310); italics added.) Only the Legislature Possesses the power to exempt Property from special taxation or local assessment. (14 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d ed. rev. 1987) § 38.80.) Here, the statutory scheme vests the SCRTD with the authority only to create the special assessment dis- tricts and to levy the assessment on Property benefited by its proximity to the Metro Rail Stations. Under the cir- cumstances, the administrative creation of an exemption for residential Property constituted nothing more than an “end run” around the statute and the legislative process. We think it clear that the SCRTD may not do by adminis- trative fiat what the Legislature was Prevented from doing by the Governor’s veto. This is true even though the City of Los Angeles may have coerced the SCRTD into creating the exemption by the passage of an ordinance conditioning the city’s multi- million dollar contribution to the MOS-1 project on the exclusion of residential Property from the assessment. While the city may have possessed the authority to fash- ion such an exemption if it had been granted the power under the statute to levy the assessments in this first instance, the SCRTD most certainly did not. App. 84 Based upon the foregoing, we find it unnecessary to reach the other issues raised on this appeal. Although we express no opinion as to the wisdom or utility of the legislation creating the special assessment districts, well- established constitutional principles require that we invalidate the law as presently enacted. We recognize the necessity of permitting legislative experimentation to meet the often novel problems con- fronting local communities. This is particularly true in the case of a regional mass transportation system costing billions of dollars and affecting millions of people. As this case illustrates, it is often difficult to decide when such experimentation and political compromise have resulted in an impermissible and unduly burden- some statutory scheme. We have no doubt, however, that the legislation at issue here cannot stand when measured against the applicable constitutional standards. The judgment is reversed. Appellants to recover costs on appeal. Roth, P.J., and Gates, J., concurred. App. 85 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA Case No. RAPID TRANSIT C 656503 DISTRICT, STATEMENT OF Petitioner, DECISION VS. (Filed HELEN M. BOLEN, 1/4/88) Respondent. THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CO., et al., ) ) Intervenors. The Court submits its Statement of Decision as Fol- lows: THE ULTIMATE QUESTION: Should this court issue a Writ mandating that Respondent Bolen certify SCRTD’s two (2) Resolutions authorizing sale of: (1) Special Benefit Assessment District A-1 Revenue Bonds and, (2) Special Benefit Assessment District A-2 Revenue Bonds? Respondent and Intervenors have raised numerous issues in opposition to SCRTD’s petition for writ, in essence, challenging the legality, indeed, the constitu- tionality of the District’s authority, including certain leg- islation and resulting proceedings out of which the Resolutions arise. App. 86 The State Legislature has found and declared (in Section 33000, et seq. of the Public Utilities Code that: inter alia, “(a) It is necessary and in the best interest of the citizens of the State to authorize the Southern California Rapid Transit District to levy special benefit assessments for needed pub- lic rail rapid transit facilities and services on the property which benefits from those facilities and services.” “(b) The rail rapid transit facilities and services provide special benefits to parcels of land, and improvements thereon, in the vicinity of rail rapid transit stations, and provide gen- eral benefits to the community at large. The Board of Directors of the (SCRTD) shall be the conclusive judge of the proportion of special and general benefits produced by the facilities and of the distribution of the special benefits among parcels of property within the benefit assessment district.” And at Section 33001 it requires: “(c) . . . The boundaries of the benefit dis- trict and of each zone, if any, therein shall be drawn so as to reflect, as accurately as possible, the areas in which special benefits are conferred by reason of the proximity and operation of one or more rail transit stations.” Other sections provide: Section 33002: “(a) In determining the amount of a spe- cial benefit assessment, the board may measure the benefit to real property in the benefit dis- trict... by the parcel area and the floor area of App. 87 real property and improvements thereto of improved real property.” “(b) The special benefit assessment consti- tutes a charge imposed on particular real prop- erty for a district project of direct benefit to that Property, and does not constitute ad valorum taxes or any other form of general tax levy applying a given rate to the assessed valuation of all taxable Property within the district... ” “(d) The revenue from a special benefit assessment, . . . shall be used only for financing of the facility for which it was levied...” Section 33002.1: “The board may order benefit assessment without an election, except as otherwise pro- vided in Section 33002.2.” Section 33002.2: “An election shall be held if the board finds that a petition requesting that the proposal be Submitted to confirmation by the voters has been signed by the owners of at least 25 percent of the assessed value of real property within the benefit district. Section 33002.3: “(b) . . . In any election... . each voter - - May cast one vote for each one thousand dollars ($1,000) or fraction thereof, worth of land or improvements owned by the voter in the benefit district as shown on the most recent equalized assessment roll.” That is the basic mandate which the State has given to the SCRTD; it is the responsibility of this court, in App. 88 considering the ultimate question, to review that author- ity and the conduct of the District which supposedly depends upon it. All apparently agree that the standard for our exam- ination here is extremely limited; what has been done, either by the State Legislature or the SCRTD cannot be undone unless it is contrary to law, e.g., the unconstitu- tionality of Section 33000 et seq. itself, or there is substan- tial mistake, fraud or their equivalence or lack of benefit. The scope of judicial review was defined by the Dawson case, stating: “ ...(T)he court will not declare the assess- ment void unless it can plainly see from the face of the record, or from facts judicially known, that the assessment . . . is not proportional to the benefits, or that no benefits could accrue to the property assessed.” (16 Cal.3d 676, 684) With this standard in mind, the entire administrative record has been carefully examined and the cases reviewed with the attitude referenced in Jones v. San Diego, “. . . not as barriers to growth, but as the guidelines to accomplish the needs of tomorrow.” (157 Cal.App.3d 745, 758) Respondent’s and Intervenors’ burden to demon- strate from the faces [sic] of the statute, the administra- tive record and matters of which this court may take judicial notice, that the assessment district suffers from fatal infirmities is a substantial and difficult one to carry. For all the reasons set forth in petitioner’s (SCRTD) Reply Memorandum the Court is impressed that they have not met that burden and that their opposition must fail. App. 89 Interestingly, the Court was asked to take judicial notice of many pages of printed matter, but the prac- the great importance of this litigation and its final resolu- tion to the economic health and prosperity of Los Angeles in its several Parts. It is abundantly clear that bold efforts are underway, employing cooperation and concensus development on behalf of government and persons who would be assessed in order to enhance the value of their Property while Supporting the general 800d. The clarity of legislative Purpose and intent in this regard is exceeded only by the scrupulously careful efforts of SCRTD to follow that charge. By way of illustration only, consider SCRTD’s efforts to establish and quantify “benefits” as required by the legislation (see Draft Report of the Benefit Assessment Task Force on Benefit Assessment Districts (BAPTF) [sic], January, 1985, Administrative Record, PP. 2490-2598). The data therein contained is powerful evidence that exten- Sive benefits will result from the assessments, abundantly Supportive of decisions which followed. At (id.) p. 2516, the report states: “Implementation of a major public improve- ment such as a rapid rail System offers the Opportunity for the private development market to focus land use and development decisions in Specific areas. These decisions may result in a variety of economic impacts. The documented experiences of North American Cities that have App. 90 implemented major rail transit systems since 1970 suggest that the economic impacts of tran- sit systems on property and property owners can be divided into two broad categories, based on the size of the area impacted. The first . . . (is) community wide . . . The second category includes benefits that accrue to specific parcels of land...” “Examination of the benefit experiences of other cities with major rail transit systems in light of the existing economic conditions in Los Angeles indicates that similar benefits can be expected to occur as a result of implementation of the Metro Rail system. Forecasted benefits for the Central Business District station areas range from a low of $729 million to a high of $1.46 billion.” Details of expected benefits are provided covering such areas as: Recipients of specific benefits, including owners of real property and the proprietors of hotel, retail, commercial office and other commercial establish- ments; Categories of Specific Benefits, e.g., appreciation of land value; ability to command premium lease rates; increased sales activity; higher occupancy levels, reduced parking costs, etc. (id. p. 2520); Specific Benefits Experi- enced in other North American Cities, e.g., Toronto, Atlanta, Miami; and Forecast of Monetary Benefits For the Los Angeles Central Business District, indicating “... (a) range of benefits from $729 million to $1.45 billion by the year 2000.” (id. p. 2529) The Court elects to deal with the subject of benefits primarily because of objectors great emphasis on the requirement of “proportionality” between benefits and 684) uses the language, “. . . not Proportional to the benefits, or that no benefits could accrue to the property assessed,” and in a footnote cites the Harrison (44 Cal.App.3d 852) and Spring Street Co. (170 Cal.24) cases as examples of actions rejected because the Standard was not met, the former citing the latter as follows: “... That the return to the property owner by way of benefits is . - . basic . . . becomes apparent from the consideration that if we are not able to say that the owner for the specific charge imposed is compensated by the increased value of the Property, then most manifestly we have a special tax upon a minority of the prop- erty owners, which tax is for the benefit of the Public and which tax is special, unequal and ununiform.” “Therefore, the compensating benefit to the Property owner is the warrant, and the sole warrant, for the Legislature to impose the bur- den of the Special assessment.” (pp. 856-857) In our context “proportional” means “not more than.” There is nothing before the Court, including in the declarations of objector’s experts, which denies that the benefits will be more than the assessments. App. 92 THE ELECTION ISSUES: The SCRTD’s voting scheme is constitutional under equal protection and due process clauses of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the California Constitution. There is no requirement that residents and commercial tenants be extended the franchise on a “one person, one vote” prin- ciple. Our facts are more akin to those in Salyer v. Water District (410 US 719) than to those which are controlled by Kramer v. School District (395 US 621) and Phonix [sic] v. Kolodziejski (399 US 204). Here, as there, to quote from Salyer: “ ...(T)he district, by reason of its special limited purpose and the disproportionate effect of its activities on landowners as a group, is an exception to the rule... ” (extending “one person, one vote” principle to certain types of elections) (pp. 727-728) 4“ ... (T)here is no way that the economic burdens of the district operations can fall on residents qua residents, and the operations of the districts primarily affec [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386011_0572%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.