# Amicus Curiae Brief — Commercial Builders v. City of Sacramento

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1992
- **Citation:** 504 U.S. 931

## Text

aa Supreme Court, U.S
( 2) FILED
No. 91-1556 APR 22 1992
OFFICE THE CLERK
IN THE OFFICE OF

Supreme Court of the Anited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1991

COMMERCIAL BUILDERS OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA,
and its affected members,
Petitioner,
Vs

City OF SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA, et al.,
Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS,
INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF SHOPPING CENTERS,
ASSOCIATION FOR COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE,
NATIONAL REALTY COMMITTEE,
NATIONAL MULTI HOUSING COUNCIL, AND
NATIONAL APARTMENT ASSOCIATION
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A BRIEF
AMICI CURIAE
AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION

WILLIAM H. ETHIER
CoHN & BIRNBAUM, P.C.
100 Pearl Street
Hartford, CT 06103-4500
(203) 493-2200

Counsel of Record
April 22, 1992

Silicate mination eetnenendenienaetenene eeemeemenmnctnenedimeennneaeaianaenennetaneaneeneeee
PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203

IN THE

Supreme Court of the GAnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1991

No. 91-1556

COMMERCIAL BUILDERS OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA,
and its affected members,
Petitioner,
¥e

CITY OF SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA, et al.,
Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS,
INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF SHOPPING CENTERS,
ASSOCIATION FOR COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE,
NATIONAL REALTY COMMITTEE,
NATIONAL MULTI HOUSING COUNCIL, AND
NATIONAL APARTMENT ASSOCIATION
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A BRIEF AMICI
CURIAE

The National Association of Home Builders (NAHB),
et al., respectfully move this Court for leave to file
the accompanying brief amici curiae in support of
Petitioners.

These amici curiae have received the petitioner’s
written consent to file this brief in support of

petitioner and have filed the letter of consent with
the Clerk of this Court. The respondent city has not
responded to our request for consent to file a brief
in support of the petition.

The NAHB represents 157,000 builder and associ-
ate members organized in approximately 850 affiliated
state and local associations in all fifty states, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. Its members in-
clude not only people and firms that construct and
supply single-family homes but also apartment, con-
dominium, commercial and industrial builders, as well
as land developers and remodelers. It is the voice of
the American shelter industry.

The International Council of Shopping Centers
(ICSC) is the trade association of the shopping center
industry. It has approximately 24,000 members world-
wide and approximately 22,000 in the United States.
Its members, including developers, owners, retailers,
lenders and all others having a professional interest
in the shopping center industry, are engaged in the
day-to-day activities of designing, planning, construct-
ing, managing, financing, developing, leasing and
owning shopping centers and their retail stores. It
represents almost all of the 37,000 shopping centers
in this country and is the only U.S. trade association
specific to shopping centers.

The Association for Commercial Real Estate, for-
merly the National Association of Industrial & Office
Parks, is a professional organization of more than
6,000 individuals engaged in owning, managing and
developing office and industrial buildings in the United
States and internationally. Its members include not
only the nation’s leading commercial real estate de-
velopers but als» architects, brokers, master planners,

engineers, property managers, banks, insurance com-
panies and other real estate financial groups.

The National Realty Committee represents the na-
tion’s leading developers, owners and financiers of
income-producing real property. Its members include
individuals and firms that design, plan, develop, lease,
own, operate and finance income-producing real prop-
erty, including office buildings, shopping centers, in-
dustrial buildings, warehouses and apartment
buildings.

The National Multi Housing Council (NMHC) rep-
resents the country’s larger and most respected mul-
tifamily rental housing firms. Its members are
engaged in all aspects of the development and op-
eration of rental housing including the ownership,
building, financing, management, and conversion to
condominium of such properties. The National Apart-
ment Association (NAA) is an organization of local
and state associations representing owners, builders,
investors, developers and managers of multifamily
properties. The NAA represents the interests of more
than 200,000 multifamily professionals and the mem-
bers of the NMHC and NAA together own and man-
age about one third of the nation’s approximately 24
million rental housing units.

The just compensation clause serves as a vital shield
against oppressive governmental land use regulation.
It is, therefore, of paramount importance to these
amici, all non-profit trade associations, and our mem-
bers. The actual availability of an appropriate remedy
for the occasional government action that results in
a taking is critical to the livelihood of private land-
owners who either 1) have lost all reasonable eco-
nomic use of their property solely in order to serve

the broader public (i.e., governmental) interests, or 2)
are otherwise faced with overreaching governmental
requirements including those that fail to substantially
advance legitimate governmental interests. The latter
type of governmental requirement is presented in this
case by the city’s demand that individual private prop-
erty owners pay for society’s costs of providing hous-
ing to low income persons. That affordable housing
is needed by persons with low incomes is not the
question. The question is whether this housing must
be paid for by individual private property owners who
happen to provide employment opportunities for low
income people.

The NAHB has been before this Court as an amicus
curvae or as of counsel on behalf of the property
owner in prior “takings” cases involving govern-
ments’ land use decisions.. The NAHB and ICSC
joined to file an amici curiae brief in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, No. 91-453, currently be-
fore the Court. The NAHB’s brief was favorably cited
in this Court’s Nollan opinion, 483 U.S. at 840.

Nollan is at the heart of the present controversy.
The attached brief is submitted to show the need to
resolve the question of whether a fee exacted by the
government from an individual, as a condition for
using its own private property, is an unconstitutional

' Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987):
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County
of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); MacDonald, Sommer &
Frrates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, reh’g denied, 478 U.S.
1035 (1986); Williamson County Regional Planning Commission
v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); San
Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621
(1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).

taking of private property when the fee is used for
a legitimate public purpose but the individual does
not directly, substantially or in any other reasonable
and essential way contribute to the public’s need to
further such a purpose. These amici sincerely believe
that the accompanying brief will assist the Court be-
cause our concerns are much broader than those of
petitioners. Our members across the nation are faced
with countless regulatory decisions on a daily basis
that affect the use of privately held land. The vast
majority of these decisions come from local govern-
ments and, as pointed out in the accompanying brief,
some of these decisions do not respect the constitu-
tionally protected property rights of individuals. While
petitioner focuses its arguments on the harm the City
of Sacramento inflicts on its concerns, our brief ad-
dresses the broader mandates of takings law that
should be applied against those government decisions
that abuse private rights and cites authorities differ-
ent from those in petitioner’s brief.

For the above reasons, this Motion should be
granted.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM H. ETHIER
CoHN & BIRNBAUM, P.C.
100 Pearl Street
Hartford, CT 06103-4500
(293) 493-2200

Counsel for Amici

April 22, 1992

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TAA OE RU TERED cvncncsncesssscesscensnesscssvencseses ill
INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE .........cccceeeeeeeees 1

WHEREL scvndinenssansoennssseneasensontenerasepnesonevensseceonesseooncssseess 1

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ................... 4

I. THE QUESTION BEFORE THE COURT IS A
SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL QUESTION DE-
SERVING OF THIS COURT’S
PRE BEES VMIEAIEY xacvnccencesconenanccsaninvasncaseassnaccoasees +

A. The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause,
Which Ostensibly Prohibits Permit Con-
ditions That Do Not Substantially Ad-
vance Legitimate Government Interests,

Is In Jeopardy Of Becoming A Useless
Limitation On Government Power ......... 4

B. Sacramento’s Linkage Fee Requirement
Does Not Meet The Essential Nexus Re-
quirement This Court Established In Nol-
lan v. California Coastal Commission, 483
Biss Se MITE thdavckiseatiincealcekntsenbarninsouns 6

Il. THIS CASE REFLECTS A LOCAL LAND USE
PRACTICE THAT CLAMORS FOR THIS
COURT TO REITERATE ITS ADMONITION .
THAT THE GOVERNMENT MUST RESPECT
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF INDI-
VIDUALS WHEN REGULATING PRIVATE
ACTIONS PURSUANT TO ITS POLICE
PUFUE MEUEED vesnsccsesnveendasesnenssissatesnassentsavesscabsascess 9

ii

III. THE PROPER CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCE
BETWEEN LEGISLATIVE POWER AND JU-
DICIAL DEFENSE OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
DEMANDS THAT THIS CASE RECEIVE
PLENARY CONSIDERATION BY THE
SET shtsmincaminnamigntncite tia 14

\UMTTTTE. seciensnrnonstiepnsapathisisdhusinicedcisiecuasseacncs... 17

a

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: Page
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) ..... 4
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) ........ ee. 5
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) ... 5
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) ......... ee. 15
Collis v. City of Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d 19 (Minn.
icekalicitarcrsnunseiaiedealacabulinnliaaccudbesseereiies 11

Commercial Builders of Northern California v. City
of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). 7,8

First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glen-
dale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304

SPIT a icautink ciccdtmsaniaiidetnaseiedaulidianienatincuareaes 16
Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, 21

Sie es IE sctseniutsichentitslicawatiqusiaianténiaavenseves 4 _
Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 264 A.2d

EEG UTEE 'coshaiotentinsssenniinntinabedetentiaeieusatecson 7
J.E.D. Associates, Inc. v. Town of Atkinson, 432

Sie Se ES FED Ubicrhantecscanphtadébentencenssnriesess 12
Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. De-

Benedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) ........ce eee 4
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct.

Be IIIT ca lonicnaaslatlsscinahuconetinknciuonencemeumenieneatsinsss 4,5
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S.

EE ITD cuhsinaciusdiehincudinshiaorenaslancanstnaatannensiniages passim
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New

York, 488 U.S. 104, 147 (1978) .........c.ccccccceees 16
Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988) ..... 15
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393

SIU: sisicsciabbivtrahichdaheiaigiseiunibiieinssleibmenabeananielaaneananes 3,16
Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v. Village of Mount

Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799 (Ill. 1961) .............. 7
Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 167 N.E.2d 230

Stes EE (Subaumcsacanen th lscadaateicmanbulpatonesedussdsnaabadian 7

ita eiaile

a

iv

Table of Authorities Continued

Page
Seawall Associates v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d
1059, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542, cert. denied, ___ U.S.
mm» SIO S. Ct. GOO (19BB) n.ccccccccccccccccccccceceee 5
Surfside Colony. Ltd. v. California Coastal Com-
mission, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1260 (1991) .......... 5
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S.
SUPE MUTED Sctsissihitenanstesicnticnisininttietendasaniibiceiaesiiiantnees. 4
West Park Avenue, Inc. v. Township of Ocean, 224
oe Fe ne eee 12
Yee v. City of Escondido, CA, No. 90-1947, slip op.
(U.S. April 1, 1992) cccccccccscsscccsceeees.. 4
MISCELLANEOUS:
Petition for Certiorari ..............ccccccccccscsscsoseososeees... 9
Babcock, Forward to Exactions: A Controversial
New Source For Municipal Funds, 50 Law &
Contemp. Probiems 1, 2 (1987) o.ccccccccccoscose-s.. 10
Bauman & Ethier, Deve t Exactions and Im-
pact Fees: A Survey Of American Practices, 50
Law & Contemp. Problems 51 i, a 9

Ethier & Weiss, Development Excise Taxes: An Ex-
ercise In Cleverness And Imagination, 42 Land
Use L. & Zoning Digest 3 (No. 2 Feb.
POON <atsliciainnsnhannntkaliningadanas cbaabeaieabaaaianenas es 9

Taub, Exactions, Linkages, and Regulat Takings:
The Developer’s Perspective, 20 The Urban
Oe ETE SS 10,11

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1991

No. 91-1556

COMMERCIAL BUILDERS OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA,
and its affected members,
Petitroner,
Vv.

City OF SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA, et al.,
Respondents.

BRIEF OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF HOME BUILDERS,
INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF SHOPPING CENTERS,
ASSOCIATION FOR COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE,
NATIONAL REALTY COMMITTEE,
NATIONAL MULTI HOUSING COUNCIL, AND
NATIONAL APARTMENT ASSOCIATION
AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE

The interest of the amici curiae is set forth in the
preceding motion for leave to file this brief.

SUMMARY OF THE REASONS FOR GRANTING THE
WRIT

This Court has repeatedly stated that a govern-
mental action violates the takings clause of the Fifth

Amendment if the action does not substantially ad-
vance legitimate government interests. The leading
application of this aspect of takings doctrine appears
in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S.
825 (1987). This rule is essential to guard against
governmental acts that would impose on individuals
costs that properly belong with the public as a whole
even though the individual has not been denied eco-
nomically viable use of its property.

The City of Sacramento’s “linkage fee’ does not
substantially advance a legitimate government inter-
est. The city justifies its fee through a purported
nexus between office construction and the city’s af-
fordable housing needs. This justification, while clever
and imaginative, is far too tenuous to pass consti-
tutional scrutiny. If it is allowed to stand, local gov-
ernments will stampede to require payments of money
from new projects to fund any and all types of gov-
ernment purposes. Indeed, governments at all levels
would be free to contrive any nexus, no matter how
flimsy, between an individual’s proposed use of his
or her land and the furtherance of a legitimate public

purpose.

There is something horrific in the city’s position
that those who bring in businesses, create jobs and
provide employment to low income people thereby
create the burden that low income people admittedly
shoulder to find decent and affordable housing. Some-
thing more than this slim reed must be required.
Something more substantial is required by the Con-
stitution’s just compensation clause. -

Conditioning the use of private land to effectuate
a public purpose causes an irreparable harm when the
proposed land use has no “essential nexus’ to that

public purpose and the government does not compen-
sate the owner for his or her loss. This harm must
be redressed by the Constitution. Nollan, 483 U.S. at
837. Regardless of whether the unconstitutional con-
dition involves the payment of a fee or dedication of
land the condition should be struck down.

Planning for and acquiring the necessary land and
capital to build adequate public facilities to support
our cities and towns, such as affordable housing for
people of less financial means, is an important goal
in maintaining society’s quality of life. But proposi-
tions that further those ends must respect the prop-
erty rights of individuals. Anything short of that
proper respect, as has occurred here, is repugnant to
the higher considerations expressed in the Constitu-
tion. The Constitutional rights at issue in this case
must be confirmed by this Court.

These amici respectfully request the Court to grant
certiorari in order to evaluate, after plenary consid-
eration of the issues presented, the appropriate nexus
“required by the Constitution’s takings clause. It is :
our hope that after the Court reviews the case it will
send anew the message to all governments that ‘“‘a
strong public desire to improve the public condition
is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a
shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for
the change.”’ Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393, 416 (1922).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. THE QUESTION BEFORE THE COURT IS A SUBSTAN-
TIAL FEDERAL QUESTION DESERVING OF THIS
COURT’S SUPERVISION

A. The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, Which Os-
tensibly Prohibits Permit Conditions That Do Not
Substantially Advance Legitimate Government Inter-
ests, Is In Jeopardy Of Becoming A Useless Limi-
tation On Government Power

This Court has reiterated that a regulatory taking
occurs if either the regulation or government action
denies a property owner economically viable use of
the property or the regulation or government act does
not substantially advance a legitimate government in-
terest. Yee v. Escondido, CA, No. 90-1947, slip op.
at 1 (U.S. April 1, 1992); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834;
Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. De-
Benedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987); Agins v. City
of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). The importance
of maintaining the distinction between these two tak-
ings tests is self-evident. There are occasions where
a government’s actions substantially advance legiti-
mate government interests but nonetheless deny a
particular landowner all economically viable use of the
private property.' Likewise, there are situations, such

' See, e.g., Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, 21
Cl. Ct. 161 (1990); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21
Cl. Ct. 153 (1990); Cf United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
474 U.S. 121, 127 (1985) (While upholding the Clean Water Act’s
grant of jurisdiction to regulate certain wetlands, the Court noted
that a property owner can still bring a takings claim in U.S.
Claims Court if a dredge or fill permit is applied for and denied
and the ‘‘effect of the denial is to prevent ‘economically viable’
use of the land in question’’).

as in this case, where a government’s actions do not
deny a landowner economically viable use of the prop-
erty but nonetheless do not substantially advance a
legitimate government interest. Nollan, 483 U.S. 825;
Surfside Colony, Ltd. v. California Coastal Commis-
sion, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1260 (1991). These two tests
are an important part of this Court’s effort to protect
individuals in situations where it would be unfair to
impose costs on an individual that properly belong
with the public. Cf, Armstrong v. United States, 364
U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (the Just Compensation Clause bars
forcing on some people alone those ‘‘public burdens,
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole.’’). See also, Seawall Associates
v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1065-66 (N.Y.
1989).

The Court does not have before it an allegation
that the city’s actions will deny economically viable
use of property. The issue presented is whether the
city’s demand that the property owner pay for low
income housing (on the basis that the property owner
creates jobs for low income persons) substantially ad-
vances, in the Constitutional sense, the city’s legiti-
mate interest in providing such housing. “(T]he
determination that there has been a taking ‘ultimately
calls as much for the exercise of judgment as for the
application of logic.’’’ Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v.
United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 160 (1990) (citing An-
drus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979)). Here, the
petitioner who uses its property in a way that creates
jobs is penalized by the forced payment of fees into
a public fund that supports the housing costs of those
who might fill these jobs. Can this be the concept of
fairness and justice embodied in the Fifth Amend-

ment? If it is, then this Court’s 1987 Nollan decision,
after only a few years, is collapsing under the weight
of lower court interpretations, and the “substantial
advancement of legitimate government interests” tak-
ings test has become meaningless.

B. Sacramento’s Linkage Fee Requirement Does Not
Meet The Essential Nexus Requirement This Court
Established In Nollan v. California Coastal Commis-
sion, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)

This case is very much like the Nollan case, where
the Court admonished the government for its attempt
to compel a property owner to contribute to the re-
alization of an easement, even though the government
“may well be right that [the easement] is a good
idea.” Id., 488 U.S. at 841. The Court stated in Nol-
lan, 483 U.S. at 842, that if the government ‘“‘wants
an easement across the Nollans’ property, it must pay
for it.”’ Similarly here, Sacramento may well be right
that providing assisted housing for low income per-
sons is a good idea. But, if the city wants to provide
such housing, it must pay for it.

These amici believe this Court’s opinions stating
that a government’s actions must “substantially ad-
vance a legitimate government interest’’ mandates, in
the takings context, a direct connection between the
government action and both the burden the individual
places on the community and the benefits the indi-
vidual will receive from the government action. In
reviewing this direct connection (the Court’s ‘“‘essen-
tial nexus,”’ Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837) the Court has
stated that it requires more than the standard applied
in due process or equal protection cases. Nollan, 483
U.S. at 834 n.3. The traditional due process standard
that says “the State ’could rationally have decided’

the measure adopted might achieve the State’s ob-
jective” is not sufficient when analyzing government
actions under the just compensation clause. Jd.

Where the government requires a property owner
to pay a fee that has little, if any, connection (and
certainly no direct, substantial or essential connection)
to the relevant burdens imposed on the community
by the owner’s proposed land use or a fee that will
not benefit the proposed land use in some direct,
substantial or essential way, the government fee must
be struck down as transgressing the limitations im-
posed upon it by the takings clause.

We recognize that the takings clause does not re-
quire that development exactions and fees be precisely
tailored to the burdens and benefits attributable to
the property being assessed. See, for example, the
specifically and uniquely attributable test employed by
some courts to evaluate impact fees. Rosen v. Village
of Downers Grove, 167 N.E.2d 230 (Ill. 1960); Pioneer
Trust and Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect,
176 N.E.2d 799 (Ill. 1961); Frank Ansuini, Inc. v.
City of Cranston, 264 A.2d 910 (R.I. 1970). But, the
decision below, which equates the takings analysis
with the extremely deferential due process level of
scrutiny, is the other extreme. In disputing the
petitioner’s claim that Nollan requires more than a
“due process” basis to support the city’s asserted
nexus, the Ninth Circuit below states that ‘‘Nollan
holds that where there is no evidence of a nexus be-
tween the development and the problem that the ex-
action seeks to address, the exaction cannot be
upheld.” Commercial Builders of Northern California
v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir.
1991) (emphasis added). In other words, according to

8

the Ninth Circuit’s reading of Nollan, only a scintilla
of evidence is necessary to Support a constitutional _
nexus. We find this remarkable. How can the Ninth
Circuit rationalize its statement with this Court’s
words?

“{Ojur opinions do not establish that these
standards are the same as those applied to
due process or equal-protection claims. To the
contrary, our verbal formulations in the tak-
ings field have generally been quite different.
We have required that the regulation ‘sub-
stantially advance’ the ‘legitimate state in-
terest’ sought to be achieved, ... not that
the ‘State ‘‘could rationally have decided” the
measure adopted might achieve the State’s
objective.’ ”’

Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835 n.3 (citing cases). Yet, the
Ninth Circuit says it is “not persuaded that Nollan
materially changes the level of scrutiny”’ that must
be applied to the ordinance at issue. Commercial
Builders, 941 F.2d at 874. With respect, the nexus
required in a ‘‘substantial advancement”’ takings case
is something more than the Ninth Circuit would have
us believe. Our view does not make the due process
clause meaningless. There will be situations where the
nexus tied to a regulatory requirement is sufficient
to withstand the higher level of scrutiny demanded
by the takings clause yet, nonetheless and for -non-
nexus reasons, the regulation is otherwise arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable and subject to a due proc-
ess claim.

—

Il. THIS CASE REFLECTS A LOCAL LAND USE PRAC-
TICE THAT CLAMORS FOR THIS COURT TO REITER-
ATE ITS ADMONITION THAT THE GOVERNMENT
MUST RESPECT THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
INDIVIDUAL CITIZENS WHEN REGULATING PRI-
VATE ACTIONS PURSUANT TO ITS POLICE POWERS

It has been a long-standing governmental practice
to demand land (e.g., development exactions and land
dedications) or money (e.g., impact fees and fees in
lieu of dedications) from property owners who propose
to build on their land. See, for example, Bauman &
Ethier,Development Exactions and Impact Fees: A
Survey Of American Practices, 50 Law & Contemp.
Problems 51 (1987), and authorities cited therein. Lin-
kage fees, see Petition for Certiorari at 7 - 12, are
the next step beyond impact fees in the evolution of
charges on new development.” But few developers and
builders litigate when municipal governments unfairly
and unconstitutionally exact fees and property that
have little relation to the services or benefits provided
to a proposed project or the burdens placed on the
community by the project. These entities are entre-
preneurs and businesses that simply find it impractical
in almost all cases to challenge unconstitutional gov-
ernment requirements. It does not take a rocket sci-
entist, therefore, to understand why much of the

* Sadly, linkage fees are not the latest step in this evolutionary
process. Most recently, ‘“‘development excise taxes’’ have been
enacted and proposed in several towns across America where
the fee to be used for public uses is imposed on the alleged
privilege of pursuing development. These governments assert
that no nexus, not even a rational nexus, is required to support
these fees. See Ethier & Weiss, Development Excise Taxes: An
Exercise In Cleverness And Imagination, 42 Land Use L. &
Zoning Digest 3 (No. 2 Feb. 1990).

SE ————

10

impact fee and exaction litigation nationwide has been
brought by their organized membership trade asso-
ciations rather than the individual property owners.
However, these associations with their limited re-
sources must pick their fights carefully. Consequently,
many of the demands and exactions imposed on in-
dividuals by local governments go unchallenged.

In a national symposium on development exactions,
Professor Babcock, the dean of American land use
law, cited examples of abusive exactions and followed
with this discussion:

In each of these cases one can imagine the
initial reaction of the “extractee”’ - outrage.
In each case he surely went to his attorney
and asked two questions: (1) How long will
it take to get a final answer in court if we
challenge this condition?; and (2) How much
will it cost?

The answers probably were: (1) It will take
three to four years, with the possibility of
defeat; and (2) It will cost tens if not
hundreds of thousands of dollars.

By the time the developer approaches his
attorney, he has invested a large sum of
front-end money and has a great deal of in-
terest in obtaining a permit. Moreover, he
wants the permit immediately. He takes out
his pencil, does some calculating, and decides
to pay up. This example is a classic illustra-
tion of what I call ‘municipal leverage.”

Babcock, Foreword to Exactions: A Controversial New
Source For Municipal Funds, 50 Law & Contemp.
Problems 1, 2 (1987). See also Taub, Exactions, Link-

11

ages, and Regulatory Takings: The Developer’s Per-
spective, 20 The Urban Lawyer 515, 518 (1988) (‘‘The
fact that developers are willing to pay suggests the
power of the local government’s position, not the rea-
sonableness of the exaction.’’).

Local governments are often well aware of the
amount of time, money and other resources a builder
of a large development (or even, in relative terms,
of a single house) has invested in a project before the
first application for approval is submitted. Local gov-
ernments are usually free to exercise their municipal
leverage to extract all types of property interests and
money from project applicants. Only occasionally will
courts scrutinize the exercise of this municipal lever-
age in ringing terms:

While in general subdivision regulations are
a valid exercise of the police power, made
necessary by the problems subdivisions create
- 1e., greater needs for municipal services
and facilities -, the possibility of arbitrariness
and unfairness in their application is none-
theless substantial: A municipality could use
dedication regulations to exact land or fees
from a subdivider far out of proportion to
the needs Created by his subdivision in order
to avoid imposing the burden of paying for
additional services on all citizens via taxation.
To tolerate this situation would be to allow
an otherwise acceptable exercise of police
power to become grand theft.

Collis v. City of Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d 19, 26
(Minn. 1976);

12

We have no doubt the municipality was
conscious of the illegality of what it did and
for that reason refrained from adopting an
ordinance, seeking instead to achieve its ends
through the guise of “voluntary” contribu-
tions with spurious “agreements” to make
them stick.

Defendants argue that even if the pay-
ments were illegally extorted, as we think
they were, nonetheless plaintiff ought not re-
cover ....

Defendants’ position boils down to the
proposition that one who buys with notice of
municipal lawlessness thereby becomes bound
by it. Thus understood, defendants’ position .
is frivolous.

West Park Ave., Inc. v. Township of Ocean, 224 A.2d
1, 4-5 (N.J. 1966);

Regulation H requires the dedication of
seven-and-one-half per cent of the total land
comprising the subdivision without any con-
sideration of the town’s need for the land.
Moreover, there is evidence, that was im-
properly excluded, which indicates that some
developers would be permitted to pay the
town the value of the land in lieu of its ded-
ication. This appears to us to be an out-and-
out plan of extortion... .

J.E.D. Associates, Inc. v. Town of Atkinson, 482 A.2d
12, 14 (N.H. 1981); see also Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.

13

The just compensation clause is one of the few con-
straints on the public’s use of its regulatory powers
over the use of an individual’s land. Its full application
is needed by property owners of all types to provide
some balance to weigh against a municipality’s le-
verage.

As difficult as a takings challenge is for the prop-
erty owner, the just compensation clause should re-
main a fundamental crutch to support the property
owner in fighting the heavy-handed leverage brought
to the table by the municipality. The Ninth Circuit’s
opinion below fatally damages this constitutional
crutch.

These amici do not mean to suggest that all local
governments—counties, cities and towns—are ruthless
and unreasonable in conducting the affairs of their
daily land use decision making processes, although at
times in the trenches of local planning board hearings
it appears so from the project applicant’s viewpoint.
Many, if not most, local governments are reasonable
and sincere in their efforts to promote the public’s
health, safety and welfare. But while it is our view
that too many communities disrespect Constitutional
considerations for the sake of political or financial
expediency, if only one community forsakes one of its
citizen’s rights, the Constitutional damage is done and
we are all worse off because of it. It is exactly be-
cause of these situations that Constitutional doctrine
must be developed to protect individual rights, in-
cluding property rights. The courts must step in to
correct the constitutional damage and restore fairness
and justice.

Property owners and builders are loathe to sue the
government because the costs of litigation and delay

nS

14

outweigh the costs of complying with the govern-
ment’s unconstitutional demands. Also, the same gov-
ernmental agency a builder sues today has to provide
the necessary permits on the next project the builder
wants to undertake tomorrow—a very uncomfortable
position in which to put yourself. Another compelling
reason property owners refrain from litigating is that
most are financially incapable of sustaining such a
lawsuit. Therefore, it is vitally important that this
Court grant certiorari rather than wait and see how
the issue develops in future cases. Practically speak-
ing, there very well may be no future “‘linkage’’ fee
cases if the Ninth Circuit’s decision is allowed to
stand. Counsel would be hard pressed to advise any
permit applicant to pursue any linkage fee litigation
and these unconstitutional permit conditions will crush
merrily forward.

III. THE PROPER CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCE BE-
TWEEN LEGISLATIVE POWER AND JUDICIAL DE-
FENSE OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS DEMANDS THAT
THIS CASE RECEIVE PLENARY CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT

This Court has eloquently stated that the legislature
is the domain for identifying the public’s interest in
legislation.

An attempt to define [the police power’s]
reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for
each case must turn on its own facts. ...
Subject to specific constitutional limitations,
when the legislature has spoken, the public
interest has been declared in terms well-nigh
conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not
the judiciary, is the main guardian of the

15

public needs to be served by social legislation

Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). With equal,
if not greater force, however, the judiciary must re-
main the guardian of individual and property rights.
The legislature defines the scope of the public’s in-
terest, but when individual property rights are de-
stroyed to further those interests, the courts must
step in. The role of the courts is to define when the
government has gone too far and insure that adequate
remedies exist to redress the individual’s loss. The
Ninth Circuit failed to exercise its duty of supervision
in the conflict between the public’s interest and the
private property owner’s rights.

While the takings clause in general does not act to
prohibit transfers of wealth deemed appropriate by
the majoritarian branches of government, courts ought
to be suspicious of governmental actions that affect
a narrow class of individuals as such actions can be
taken without the usual political constraints. Justice
Scalia recognized this danger in Pennell v. City of
San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 21-23 (1988) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting). Thus, when wealth is exacted from a narrow
class of individuals, as here, the takings clause should
wield its power to limit governmental actions.

This Court warned that it would be particularly
careful about the adjective “‘substantial” in the sub-
stantial advancement takings test where “the actual
conveyance of property is made a condition to the
lifting of a land-use restriction, since in that context
there is heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance
of the compensation requirement, rather than the
stated police power objective.” Nollan, 483 U.S. at
841. Similarly here, to admonish the cleverness and

16

imagination of local governments, this Court should
demand that lower courts be particularly careful about
the level of nexus allowed to justify a project fee
where the payment of the fee is made a condition to
the lifting of a land-use restriction or the issuance of
a permit. In this context too there is heightened risk
that the government’s intent is to avoid placing pay-
ment for its police power purpose on the public as a
whole. “‘It is exactly this imposition of general costs
on a few individuals at which the ‘taking’ protection
is directed.’’ Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City
of New York, 488 U.S. 104, 147 (1978) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).

The Court has noted that

many of the provisions of the Constitution
are designed to limit the flexibility and free-
dom of governmental authorities, and the
Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment is one of them. As_ Justice
Holmes aptly noted more than 50 years ago,
‘“‘a strong public desire to improve the public
condition is not enough to warrant achieving
the desire by a shorter cut than the consti-
tutional way of paying for the change.’
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.,
at 416.

First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glen-
dale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321- 22
(1987). The context of the present case is a perfect
vehicle within which the Co:rt may elaborate on and
reaffirm these just compensation clause principles.

Local government decisions, such as those below,
that vitiate federal Constitutional guarantees must be

17

reversed. Property owners and builders, who are in
an excruciating minority position when it comes to
local government land use controls, have nowhere else
to turn. The regulated and, we presume, most of the
regulators await with hope for more United States
Supreme Court guidance on this critical issue.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above and in the Petition
for Certiorari, this Court is urged to issue a writ of
certiorari to review the judgment and opinion of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Respectfully Submitted,

WILLIAM H. ETHIER
CoHN & BIRNBAUM, P.C.
100 Pearl Street
Hartford, CT 06103-4500
(203) 493-2200

Counsel for Amici

April 22, 1992

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386011_0409%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
