# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — New York State Department of Health v. Andrulonis

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1992
- **Citation:** 505 U.S. 1204

## Text

Cu Su Court, U.
9 a “104 9 FIL i. .
No. 91- MAR 2 5 1992
IN THE QFFICE OF He, CEE
Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1991

NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,

Petitioner,
against

JOANNA ANDRULONIS, Individually and as Conservator of the Property of
JEROME ANDRULONIS; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; GLATT AIR
TECHNIQUES, INC.; GLATT GmbH; WISCONSIN ALUMNI RESEARCH
FOUNDATION, INC.; WARF INSTITUTE, INC.; RALTECH SCIENTIFIC
SERVICES, INC.; RALSTON PURINA COMPANY; ELI LILLY AND COM-
PANY; and JOHN L. THOMPSON AND SONS COMPANY,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

ROBERT ABRAMS
Attorney General of the State of New York
Attorney for Petitioner
The Capitol
Albany, NY 12224
(518) 474-8101
JERRY BOONE
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record

PETER H. SCHIFF
Deputy Solicitor General

MICHAEL S. BUSKUS
Assistant Attorney General

Of Counsel

Dated: March 26, 1992

THE REPORTER Company, INC —Walton, NY 13856—800-252-7181
Syracuse Office, University Building, Syracuse, NY 13202—315-426-1235
NYC Office—30 Vesey St., New York, NY 10007—212-732-6978—800-800-4264

(1897A—LCS5-929—1992)

Questions Presented

1. Whether the Second Circuit on remand (see, New York
State Dept. of Health v Andrulonis, 112 S Ct 39, 116 L Ed 2d
18 [1991]), misinterpreted United States v Gaubert, 111 S Ct
1267, 113 L Ed 2d 335 (1991), and misapplied the discretion-
ary function exception (“exception”) of the Federal Tort
Claims Act (“FTCA”) by (1) virtually equating conduct
immunized under the exception with non-negligent conduct;
(2) holding that the errors and omissions by a Federal scientist
did not implicate any ‘“‘policy considerations” because the
agency did not promulgate detailed regulations to circum-
scribe the conduct of its researchers; and (3) equating the
scientific risk-assessment errors with negligent driving by a
government chauffeur.

2. Whether the exception precludes liability for errors or
omissions of a Government scientist in assessing the magni-
tude of risk of a public health experiment

il
Parties

The parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment
is sought to be reviewed are:

1. Joanna Andrulonis, Individually and as Conservator of
the Property of Jerome Andrulonis, Plaintiff:

2. The United States, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff:

3. The New York State Department of Health
(“NYSDOH”), the Third-Party Defendant; and

4. Glatt Air Techniques, Inc.; Glatt GmbH: Wisconsin
Alumni Research Foundation, Inc.; Warf Institute, Inc.:
Raltech Scientific Services, Inc.; Ralston Purina Company; Eli
Lilly and Company; and John L. Thompson and Sons and
Company, Defendants.

All of the non-governmental defendants (# 4 above) settled
with plaintiffs during trial and were not involved on the appeal
to the Court of Appeals. Only parties ## 1-3 were, and still are,
involved in this appeal.

ll.

Index to Appendix’

. Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals,

Second Circuit, Dated January 12, 1991 .....

. Opinion of the United States District Court for the

Northern District of New York, Dated Decem-
a ee ck ea’

. Opinion of the United States District Court for the

Northern District of New York, Dated October
Oe eo ae ee ee

. Order of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit Denying Petition for
Rehearing, Dated March 4, 1991 ...........

. Order of the United States Court of Appeals, Sec-

ond Circuit, Dated January 28, 1991, Issued as
Mandate March 12, 1991 .................

. Amended Judgment of the United States District

Court for the Northern District of New York.
Dated December 15, 1989 ................

Judgment of the United States District Court for
the Northern District of New York, Dated
SO OO Oo ck wa cw cunceacncaas

. Memorandum Decision of the United States

Supreme Court, Dated October 7, 1991......

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, Dated December 30, 1991

'The Appendix is a separately-bound document.

Page

A46

A390

A399

A406

IV.

Page

10. Order of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, Dated December 30, 1991,
Issued as Mandate February 14, 1992....... A416

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.

CASES:

Allen v United States, 816 F2d 1417 (10th Cir 1987),
cert. den., 484 US 1004 (1988)......... 17, 20, 21

Allen v United States, 588 F Supp 247 (D Utah 1984),
revd, 816 F2d 1417 (10th Cir 1987), cert. den.,
484 US 1004 (1988) ..2 0. 20

Andrulonis v United States, 593 F Supp 1336 (NDNY
sicpink REET CEE ET RT I core ee, 2,9

Andrulonis v United States, 724 F Supp 1421 (NDNY
ining EEE OE TE TOE TBO Peace BE hic 2, 8-9

Andrulonis v United States (“‘Andrulonis I’’), 924 F2d
Rew Cae Ge B90) ec ck, os passim

Andrulonis v United States (““Andrulonis II’), 952 F2d
GS2Z (20 Cir 1991). o.oo cc cece... Passim

Barnson v United States, 816 F2d 549 (10th Cir), cert.
den., 484 US 896 (1987) ................... 20

Begay v United States, 768 F2d 1059 (9th Cir 1985)... 20
Berkovitz v United States, 486 US 53] i. | re 10
Boruski v United States, 803 F2d 142] (7th Cir 1986) 19

Brown v United States, 790 F2d 199 (Ist Cir 1986), cert.
den., 479 US 1058 (1987)................. 11n4

Page
Caraballo v United States, 830 F2d 19 (2d Cir 1987).. 11n4
Consolidated U.S. Atmospheric Testing Litigation, In re,

v United States, 820 F2d 982 (9th Cir 1987), cert.
den. sub nom. Konizeski v Livermore Labs, 488

le We COD 65nd ou ca ceeste ev oruxeriaes 18, 20
Creek National Indian Housing Authority v United

States, 905 F2d 312 (10th Cir 1990) .......... 19
Dalehite v United States, 346 US 15 (1953).......... 17

Dube v Pittsburgh Corning, 870 F2d 790 (Ist Cir 1989) 21

Eklof Marine Corp. v United States, 762 F2d 200 (2d Cir
| ERE TERE TOR ES TTT TOT TO ree 1 1n4

Feyers v United States, 749 F2d 1222 (6th Cir 1984),
cert. Gee... 471 US Tz (F965) «oo 5 6 ek ean ss 18

First Nat. Bank in Albuquerque v United States, 552 F2d
370 (10th Cir), cert. den., 434 US 835 (1977) .. 20

Fried v United States, 674 F Supp 636 (ND III 1987).. 20
General Public Utilities Corp. v United States, 745 F2d
239 (3d Cir 1984), cert. den., 469 US 1228
CPEND: kink oe ON eae hake ee oe ere eee 17, 19
Hylin v United States, 755 F2d 551 (7th Cir 1985).... 16

Indian Towing Co. v United States, 350 US 61
(ORAS hs okie shea a eee ee ee 9, 11-12

Johns v Pettibone Corp., 843 F2d 464 (11th Cir

Vi.

Page
Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litigation (Rob-
inson), In re, 891 F2d 31 (2d Cir 1989)........ 21
Kennewick Irrigation Dist. v United States, 880 F2d
1018 (9th Cir 1989)... 0.0.0, 17, 21
Myslakowski v United States, 806 F2d 94 (6th Cir 1986),
cert. den., 480 US 948 (1987)................ 21
New York State Dept. of Health v Andrulonis, 112 S Ct
39, 116 L Ed 2d 18 (1991). ................ i, 12
Routh v United States, 941 F2d 853 (9th Cir 1991).... 20

Sea-Land Service, Inc. v United States, 919 F2d 888 (3d
Cir 1990), cert. den., 111 S Ct 2235, 114 L Ed 2d
ik, | nonin nr caf 9, 87! 9 21

a) er re Pett eee roe Deed 16, 18
Thompson v Dilger, 696 F Supp 1071 (ED Va 1988) .. 19
Totten v United States, 806 F2d 698 (6th Cir 1986).... 19
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v United States, 837

F2d 116 (3d Cir 1988), cert. den., 487 US 1235

ROWE soe Shh ee ae eee ee 19

United States v Gaubert, 111 S Ct 1267, 113 L Ed 2d 335
(RNP 6 vr eateakatel oe passim

Weiss v United States, 889 F2d 937 (10th Cir 1989)... 16

Wells v United States, 851 F2d 147] (DC Cir 1988), cert.
den., 488 US 1029 (1989) .................. 19

Vil.

Page

STATUTE:

2) 3 el eee ree eer rere. eres ee es oe 2-3

MISCELLANEOUS:

Comment, The Discretionary Function Exception and
Mandatory Regulations, 54 U Chi L Rev 1300
CL) Sree rary reer earerere ern ar 16

Stern, Gressman & Shapiro, Supreme Court Practice (6th

th

ed 1986), § 4.18, pp 224-26.................

Vill.

Page
Table of Contents.

(Question Presented ... ow... occ cece ccc nc. i
WE ds eee yeaa ete oe cee ll
ce | ll
Table of Autiiorities ........0.................... iV
I IE So oe coche ee ee 2
“oe ee ng OEE ee Or eta ra ane tel Pee oe 2
Pe Eo ey ee ee ee 3
pe ee Or een eee ee. 3
Reasons for Granting the Writ..................... 14
Cie cace cceas AEP PC AAI OAS Me oe HO 24

No. 91-
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1991.

NEw YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
Petitioner,
against

JOANNA ANDRULONIS, Individually and as Conservator of the
Property of JEROME ANDRULONIS; UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA; GLATT AIR TECHNIQUES, INC.; GLATT GmbH;
WISCONSIN ALUMNI RESEARCH FOUNDATION, INC.; WARF
INSTITUTE, INC.; RALTECH SCIENTIFIC SERVICES, INC.;
RALSTON PURINA COMPANY; EL! LILLY AND COMPANY; and
JOHN L. THOMPSON AND SONS COMPANY,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

ee ee ee

2
Opinions Below

The opinion of the court of appeals on remand (‘*Andrulonis
IT”) (App, A406-A415)2 is reported at 952 F2d 652 (1991).

This Court’s memorandum decision (App, A405), which
granted NYSDOH’s earlier petition for certiorari and vacated
and remanded for reconsideration in light of United States v
Gaubert, 111 S Ct 1267, 113 L Ed 2d 335 (1991), is reported
at 112 S Ct 39, 116 L Ed 2d 18 (1991).

The originai opinion of the court of appeals (‘‘Andrulonis
I’) (App, Al-A45) is reported at 924 F2d 1210 (1991).

The opinion of the district court (App, A46-A389) is
reported at 724 F Supp 1421 (NDNY 1989). An earlier opin-
ion of the district court (App, A390-A398) is reported at 593 F
Supp 1336 (NDNY 1984).

Jurisdiction

The judgment of the court of appeals (App, A416-A417)
was entered on December 30, 1991. This petition was filed on
March 26, 1992. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28
USC 1254(1).

Although no final judgment has been entered, in that a
purely state-law question of the proper apportionment of set-
tlement proceeds from private tortfeasors remains unresolved
(see App, A41-A45; Andrulonis 1, 924 F2d at 1226-27), no
further action in the trial court will enhance the ripeness for
review in this Court. See, Stern, Gressman & Shapiro,
Supreme Court Practice (6th ed.. 1986), § 418, pp 224-26. The
court below definitively resolved the federal Statutory ques-
tion under the FTCA. Nothing that might occur on remand to

"References to “App” are to pages of the Appendix to the Petition.

the trial court will increase the ripeness of the federal
question.

Statute Involved
28 USC § 2680(a)
§ 2680. Exceptions

The provisions of this chapter [28 USC §§ 2671 ef
seq.) and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply
to—(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an
employee of the Government, exercising due care, in
the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not
such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of
a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused.

Statement of the Case*
1. Factual background and proof at trial.

Plaintiff, a research scientist employed by the New York
State Department of Health (“‘NYSDOH’’), tragically contrac-
ted rabies and sustained permanent brain damage from expo-
sure to an experimental rabies virus. App, A3. The experiment
was conducted by NYSDOH scientists on NYSDOH prem-
ises. App, A3, Al22, A217. The accident happened when
airborne particles (aerosols) of rabies virus leaked from a Uni-
Glatt machine. App, A6-A7. NYSDOH scientists had been
using that machine to encapsulate the virus in sugar-coated

’References to “Tr. — * refer to pages of the trial transcript.
References to “Exh. refer to trial exhibits. References to “J. App.
—__—” refer to pages of the Court of Appeals Joint Appendix.

Te

4

tablets. App, A6-A7. The objective was to produce a vaccine
which would be eaten by wildlife (e.g., foxes and raccoons) in
order to immunize the animals from, and thereby prevent the
spread of, rabies. App, A6-A7.

Although the experiment was devised, controlled and oper-
ated by NYSDOH scientists in a State laboratory, a Federal
scientist offered advice and supplied the virus. App, A9,
A122, Al29-A130, A217. Dr. George Baer, the Chief of Viral
Zoonosis Research at the Federal Center for Disease Control
(“CDC”’), was regarded as one of the world’s leading rabies
experts. App, A7, A9, A232. CDC’s mission, as well as its
policy of facilitating public health research, encouraged its
Scientists to share research results. etiologic agents (such as
viral materials) and ideas with professional colleagues in the
public and private sector. App, A7, A9: Tr. 2051-56, 2067-68,
2172-73. It was, therefore, entirely consistent with CDC pol-
icy that Dr. Baer would collaborate with NYSDOH
researchers in furtherance of a public health experiment. App,
A7, AY; Tr. 2051-56, 2067-68, 2172-73.

It is unnecessary to grasp the intricate details of NYSDOH’s
rabies research (App, A109-A 150), or to focus on the specifics
of this experiment (App, A150-A157), or to absorb the history
of rabies research generally (App, A60-A109), in order to
understand whether Dr. Baer’s errors or omissions were pro-
tected by the Exception of the FTCA. After a brief factual
background, we will demonstrate that Dr. Baer’s errors and
omissions—his failures properly to assess the risk of aerosol
exposure to the rabies virus and to warn other sophisticated
scientists that their research methods were unsafe—were
within the protection of the exception.

The objective of NYSDOH’s project was the creation of a
vaceine, which is a modified virus. App, A7. Vaccines, which
are attenuated or weakened viruses, work by creating anti-

5

bodies so that the body’s own immune system can resist a
“challenge” by later exposure to the disease. App, A7, A76.

NYSDOH had encountered technical difficulties in formu-
lating a rabies vaccine. App, A9. Conventional laboratory
techniques failed to yield a vaccine with enough potency, or
titer. App, A9. Accordingly, NYSDOH asked for he!p from
CDC’s Dr. Baer, who was regarded as the “expert’s expert”
on rabies research. App, A7, A9. Dr. Baer agreed to, and later
did, furnish a more potent strain of rabies virus which he had
used at CDC. App, A8-A10.

Like other professionals potentially exposed to the rabies
virus (e.g., veterinarians, postal delivery personnel), Dr. Baer
had been vaccinated with the commercial (Eli Lilly) rabies
vaccine. App, A8, All, A91. Also, his blood levels of rabies
antibody had been confirmed after testing. App, A&8.
NYSDOH and CDC researchers all assumed that, in the event
of accidental exposure, they were not at risk. App, A8-A10.
Despite accidental exposures to the most potent “street virus”
from rabid animals in laboratories, no scientist immunized
with the Lilly vaccine had ever contracted rabies. App, A8, Tr.
1027-28, 1421, 2113-14, 2224-25.

Dr. Baer, as a bystander and observer of the NYSDOH
project, stood next to plaintiff during the experiment. App,
A12. Although we will never know why plaintiff was the only
scientist there to contract rabies, he was probably exposed to
greater concentrations of the aerosol because he spent more
time with the machine and was closer to the aerosol leak. App,
A10, Al2-A13, A66, A137.

Dr. Baer’s error in gauging the risk of the NYSDOH experi-
ment was his underestimation of the risk of aerosol exposure.
App, Al10-Al1. NYSDOH and CDC scientists knew that there
were two “routes of transmission” of the rabies virus: blood-

6

strcam or aerosol (airborne). App, All, A232-A233. In the
more typical example, such as a dog bite, the rabies virus
enters the body directly through the bloodstream. App, A10-
All, A54, A62, A68. For that route of transmission, the Lilly
vaccine had always been effective. App, All.

Plaintiff contracted rabies by the aerosol route of transmis-
sion after the Uni-Glatt machine leaked. App, A10-A11. The
virus traveled from the nerve endings in his nasal mucosa
directly to his brain. App, All, Al105-A107. Thus, the virus
bypassed the rabies antibodies in the blood. App, All, A105-
A107.

At trial, plaintiff established that NYSDOH scientists had
operated an unsafe laboratory, which lacked adequate contain-
ment devices to prevent aerosol exposures. App, All. How-
ever, since State law barred tort suits against NYSDOH (plain-
tiff’s employer) in that the receipt of workers’ compensation
benefits was an exclusive remedy, plaintiff’s theory at trial
was that the Government was a joint tortfeasor. App, A6.
Plaintiff contended that CDC’s Dr. Baer either should have
halted the State project or should have warned that it was
unsafe to conduct it in the NYSDOH laboratory. App, A22.

With expert testimony from risk-appraisal scientists, plain-
tiff proved that Dr. Baer, although he did not believe this virus
posed dangers in the event of aerosol exposure, should have
known than an aerosol exposure was dangerous. App, All,
A233, Tr. 985-87, 999-1000, 1003, 1030, 1087-89, 1479-83.
Like other rabies experts, Dr. Baer was certainly aware of the
theoretical danger of aerosol exposure. Tr. 1038, 1176,
2138-39. Indeed, Dr. Baer was the expert’s expert, having
written countless articles and edited the definitive two-volume
scientific treatise on rabies. Exh 112, The Natural History of
Rabies, J.App. at 4735-5590; Tr. 111, 2330.

7

Although Dr. Baer negligently underestimated the risk of
aerosol exposure, App, All, his error was grounded in scien-
tific reasoning. He knew that the scientific literature, including
the rabies treatise he edited, had documented the aerosol route
of transmission of the disease, but, to borrow a legal metaphor,
he believed that those cases were distinguishable. Tr. 1172-76.
Dr. Baer was aware that a public health worker and a mining
engineer doing work in bat caves had apparently contracted
rabies from an aerosol route of exposure. App, A94-A99.
However, the cave workers’ levels of exposure were perceived
to be have been much higher and, more critically, they had not
been immunized with the commercial vaccine, which was first
distributed in 1957. App, A90, A94-A99; Tr. 1175, 2310.
Thus, Dr. Baer believed that exposure to aerosols in a labora-
tory posed no dangers for scientists immunized with the com-
mercial vaccine. App, A205-A206; Tr. 880-881, 2139, 2252,
2254, 2258-59, 2312-14, 2322, 2324.

There was one prior case of a laboratory worker who
contracted rabies. App, A99-A100. A scientist in Texas con-
tracted rabies after inhaling aerosols produced by mixing
rabies materials in a blender. App, A100. However, that case
was distinguishable from this case because the Texas labora-
tory worker had been vaccinated some 13 years before the
accident, but had not developed demonstrable blood anti-
bodies. App, A100. Thus, it was as if he had never been
immunized. App, Al100-A101.

Additionally, the Texas blender incident was distinguish-
able because that scientist was using the so-called “*Challenge
Virus Standard” (“‘CVS’’), the particularly lethal strain used
as the benchmark virus to “challenge” or kill animals as a
means of assaying the effectiveness of vaccines previously
administered. App, A85-A86, A99-A100; Tr. 1032-34. In con-
trast to the CVS virus which killed the Texas laboratory
worker, Dr. Baer furnished NYSDOH with an “ERA” strain

8

of rabies virus, which is an attenuated strain used to immunize
animals. App, Al26-A128; Tr. 1033-34, 2138-39.

Moreover, the viral strain which Dr. Baer brought from
CDC to NYSDOH’s laboratory had proven not dangerous to
foxes, a species peculiarly susceptible to rabies and therefore
regarded as an “indicator species” for the pathogenicity of a
virus. App, A145; Tr. 1209, 1211, 2143-48. The few adverse
effects upon some animal species which had been documented
in the scientific literature were discounted on factual or scien-
tific grounds as not suggesting any real risks for man. Tr.
1176, 2255, 2258, 2265-66.

Therefore, on the basis of his knowledge and expertise, Dr.
Baer discounted as insignificant, albeit mistakenly, the risk of
exposure to rabies aerosols. App, A233; Tr. 1032, 1173-74.
1884, 1979-80, 2255, 2313-14. With the benefit of hindsight,
everyone recognizes that Dr. Baer tragically miscalculated the
risk to which he exposed himself and plaintiff.

2. Decisions of the courts below.

The district court held the Government liable for Dr. Baer’s
mistakes. Andrulonis vy United States, 724 F Supp 1421
(NDNY 1989); App, A46 et seg. Because NYSDOH was only
a third-party defendant, the court recognized that NYSDOH’s
negligence with respect to unsafe laboratory conditions could
not give rise to liability of the Government. 724 F Supp at
1472; App, A181. The court found that the State scientists
were sophisticated members of the “community of rabies
experts” who were assumed to know the theories and concepts
of rabies work. 724 F Supp at 1474; App, A187. The court
also found that NYSDOH scientists should have known the
following: that pathogenicity of viruses could not be known
for certain; that safe laboratory practice required researchers to
assume that the experimental strain was dangerous to humans;

9

that the concentration of a virus directly affects its patho-
genicity; that aerosol exposure should be avoided; and that the
Lilly vaccine could not guarantee safety against aerosol expo-
sure. 724 F Supp at 1475-76; App, A188-A195. The court also
found that NYSDOH scientists knew that the Uni-Glatt
machine they were using was not airtight. 724 F Supp at 1476;
App, A193.

From all of those facts, the district court found that
NYSDOH should have been able to anticipate that this experi-
ment was unsafe, particularly given the absence of contain-
ment devices in the NYSDOH laboratory. 724 F Supp at
1476-79; App, A198-A202.

The district court then detailed why the Government was
liable for failure to warn. 724 F Supp at 1481-1496; App,
A210-A256. The court found that since Dr. Baer had superior
knowledge about rabies, he should have made sure that
NYSDOH’s scientists were fully aware of all of the dangers
associated with this experimental virus. 724 F Supp at
1488-89; App, A232-A236. The court held that because Dr.
Baer knew that NYSDOH’s laboratory did not have safety
equipment that would have minimized or averted aerosol
exposure, he should have warned NYSDOH scientists not to
continue the experiment. 724 F Supp at 1490-93; App, A238-
A24d.

The court, which had earlier denied the Government's
motion to dismiss on the basis of the exception, Andrulonis v
United States, 593 F Supp 1336 (NDNY 1984), App, A390-
A398, gave very brief mention to it. 724 F Supp at 1496-98;
App, A256-A264. The court relied heavily upon Indian Tow-
ing Co. v United States, 350 US 61 (1955). Andrulonis, 724 F
Supp at 1497; App, A259-A260. The court hinged its analysis
on the planning/operational distinctions which it understood to
be the measure of the exception. 724 F Supp at 1497-98; App,
A259-A260.

10

The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the exception
did not apply. Andrulonis I, 924 F2d 1210, 1217-20; App,
A15-A23. The court applied what it understood to be a two-
part test derived from Berkovitz v United States, 486 US 531
(1988). Andrulonis I, 924 F2d at 1218; App, A18-A19.

First, we must consider whether the conduct was a
matter of choice for the acting employee, and if so, we
must then determine whether the employee’s actions
involved public policy considerations. 924 F2d at
1218; App, A18.

The court acknowledged that there was no statute, regulation
or any other directive which mandated what Dr. Baer should
have done or which forbade him from what he did. 924 F2d at
1218; App, Al9.

No such directive was applicable to Dr. Baer in this
Case; at the critical points in these events he had the
power to choose his actions. 924 F2d at 1218; App,
Al9.

Thus, in the view of the Second Circuit, Dr. Baer’s conduct
was “discretionary” in the sense of not being circumscribed
by regulations as in Berkovitz. Andrulonis I, 924 F2d at 1218:
App, Al9.

But this does not end the inquiry. As we have noted, to
qualify for the exception, Dr. Baer’s critical choices
had to involve policy considerations, and here they did
not. 924 F2d at 1218; App, A19.

_The court also relied on the operational/planning dichotomy

1]

which the Second Circuit had embraced on authority of /ndian
Towing.* Andrulonis I, 924 F2d at 1218-19; App, A19-A20.

The court conceded that the execution of policy decisions
might occasionally be protected by the exception. 924 F2d at
1219; App, A21. However, actions to implement policy would
be protected only “when the steps in the execution process
also require policy judgments”. 924 F2d at 1219; App, A21.
Essentially, the court required proof of conscious, deliberate
and explicit balancing of risks, benefits and costs; in the
absence of such an evidentiary record, the Government would
not be protected by the exception. 924 F2d at 1219; App, A21.

Applying those principles to this case, the court held that
the Government’s decisions to encourage rabies research, to
provide funding to NYSDOH and to furnish the virus were all
protected “policy” decisions. 924 F2d at 1219; App, A22.

The same is not true, however, with Dr. Baer’s alleged
failure to warn of the extreme dangers presented by the
particular circumstances of the March 29th experiment
which Dr. Baer failed to interrupt. The situation simply
did not lend itself to policy balancing, not [sic] is there
any indication that Dr. Baer considered the policy
implications or the pros and cons of allowing the
experiment to proceed. Once he became aware of the
risks, Dr. Baer was obligated to give warning. His is
precisely the type of negligent omission for which
congress waived the government’s sovereign immunity
in order to provide redress to citizens for the torts of
government actors. 924 F2d at 1219; App, A22.

4See, e.g., Caraballo v United States, 830 F2d 19, 21-22 (2d Cir 1987)
(the manner of patrolling a national park was not discretionary); and Eklof
Marine Corp. v United States, 762 F2d 200, 203 (2d Cir 1985) (the manner
of marking navigation obstacles was not discretionary). Eklof Marine was
sharply criticized by the First Circuit in Brown v United States, 790 F2d
199, 202 (Ist Cir 1986), cert. den., 479 US 1058 (1987).

12

NYSDOH filed a petition for certiorari. New York State
Dept. of Health v Andrulonis, No. 90-1864. This Court granted
the petition, vacated the judgment and remanded for further
consideration in light of United States v Gaubert, 111 S$ Ct
1267, 113 L Ed 2d 335 (1991). New York State Dept. of Health
v Andrulonis, 112 S Ct 39, 116 L Ed 2d 18 (1991); App, A405.

After further briefing but without oral argument, the Second
Circuit reinstated its original decision. Andrulonis II, 952 F2d
652 (1991); App, A408-A415. The court stated that ““Gaubert
does not undermine our original opinion”. Andrulonis I], 952
F2d at 652; App, A408. The court denied that, in its first
opinion, it had relied heavily on /ndian Towing or had adopted
the planning/operational dichotomy on authority of Indian
Towing. Andrulonis II, 952 F2d at 654: App, A412-413; but
see, Andrulonis 1, 924 F2d at 1218-19: App, Al7-A18. The
court interpreted Gaubert as limiting the scope of the excep-
tion to actions and decisions demonstrably based on considera-
tions of public policy. Andrulonis II, 952 F2d at 654: App,
A412.

In defining what “policy” was protected by the exception,
the court claimed to find support in Gaubert for the conclusion
that the Government must demonstrate conscious balancing of
risks and benefits. Andrulonis II, 952 F2d at 655: App, A413-
A414.

The government also argues that Dr. Baer’s decision to
allow the experiment to proceed was necessary to
fulfill the policy objectives of the CDC and as such,
should be protected by the exception. It interprets
Gaubert as focusing on whether the government agent
was allowed discretion, not whether he actually con-
templated different policy implications. Andrulonis II,
952 F2d at 655; App, A413-A414 (emphasis added).

13

The court also understood Gaubert to stand for the proposi-
tion that comprehensive regulations implied wide discretion,
with the converse also true. Andrulonis I], 952 F2d at 655;
App, A414. The court believed that the outcome in Gaubert
hinged on the fact that the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
had ‘‘a clear regulatory scheme [which] entrusted government
agents with discretionary powers to effectuate a clearly-
defined policy.” Andrulonis II, 952 F2d at 655; App, A414.
Because CDC did not have a detailed set of regulations to
circumscribe the conduct of CDC scientists, the Second Cir-
cuit held that Gaubert was distinguishable. Andrulonis I], 952
F2d at 655; App, A414.

With respect to its conclusion that the errors in risk-assess-
ment by Dr. Baer did not involve any “policy”, the court
focused on the result of injury and, reasoning backwards and
with the benefit of hindsight, stated that “‘it is hardly conceiv-
able that the CDC would ever have a policy to keep silent
about obvious, easily-correctable dangers in experiments
using drugs supplied by the CDC.” Andrulonis II, 952 F2d at
655; App, A414. The court then likened Dr. Baer’s errors in
assessing the risk of this research project to mundane errors of
a government chauffeur in driving an automobile. 952 F2d at
655; App, A414-A415.

On the basis of that additional explanation and interpreta-
tion of Gaubert, the court reinstated its original opinion.
Andrulonis I], 952 F2d at 655; App, A415.

14
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The Second Circuit took much too narrow a view of
“policy” and “discretion”, contrary to the plain thrust of
Gaubert and previous cases. Additionally, the decision
below conflicts with many analogous cases from other
circuits.

There are several reasons to grant this Petition.

First, the court below took much too narrow a view of the
discretionary function exception. The Second Circuit inter-
preted Gaubert as pivoting on the existence of a comprehen-
sive scheme of regulations. Because CDC had not promul-
gated detailed regulations to dictate how scientists engaged in
cooperative research should act, the court below inexplicably
inferred that a CDC scientist, visiting a laboratory run by
other, competent scientists, had no discretion in how to deal
with those other scientists. Contrary to the view of the Second
Circuit, Gaubert did not hold that the absence of regulations
negated the existence of broad discretion. Additionally, the
court below defined “policy” so narrowly that it practically
equated it with non-negligent conduct. Finally, the court
below came to a preposterous conclusion by equating risk-
assessment errors in theoretical and experimental research
with mundane driving errors of a governmental chauffeur.

The decision below is also in conflict with opinions in other
circuits. Other courts have construed the exception much more
broadly to cover negligent risk-assessments or negligent fail-
ures to warn. Examples include misjudging the dangers of
open-air testing of nuclear weapons, failing to warn miners of
known hazards of mining uranium, failing to follow safe
procedures in the clean-up of toxic spills, failing to adopt
better safety precautions for the transportation of bombs, fail-
ing to enforce workplace safety rules on the premises of

15

Government contractors where the Government retained a
contract-based right to suspend production or work in the
event of safety hazards, and failing adequately to test or warn
about the Swine Flu vaccine prior to promoting and distribut-
ing it to the general public. The list could readily be expanded.
The point is that the overwhelming consensus of decisions
outside the Second Circuit have interpreted the exception to
cover negligent acts or omissions where there was no violation
of mandatory regulations.

Finally, the decision below is also in conflict with the
prevailing view in other circuits with respect to the burden of
showing that Governmental conduct is “discretionary” or
embraces permissible “policy” considerations. The majority
of circuits have adopted and applied the “susceptible to pol-
icy” test by which the Government enjoys the benefit of the
exception even if it is not able to demonstrate a conscious,
deliberate ‘‘balancing” or risk-evaluation prior to the act or
omission giving rise to liability. The Second Circuit rejected
this rule, holding that Dr. Baer’s conduct could not have
involved permissible “policy” because he had not given
enough advance thought to the risks.

We will now amplify these reasons for granting the Petition.
I.

The decision below is in direct conflict with Gaubert. The
Second Circuit held that Dr. Baer’s errors in judging the risk
of a public health research project were not within the excep-
tion because ignoring unsafe laboratory conditions did not
implicate any “policy” considerations. Andrulonis II, 952 F2d
at 655; App, A415. Yet, the court offered no guidance to
distinguish mere negligence from conduct outside the scope of
the exception and, astonishingly, equated the errors of Dr.
Baer—the Chief of Viral Zoonosis research for CDC—with

16

bad driving by a government chauffeur. 952 F2d at 655; App,
A414-A415. The court also distinguished the case at bar from
Gaubert on the basis that CDC did not channel, confine or
circumscribe policy for its Scientists, whereas the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board in Gaubert had “a clear regulatory
scheme [which] entrusted government agents with discretion-
ary powers to effectuate a clearly-defined policy.” Andrulonis
i, 952 F2d at 655; App, A414.

That analysis is directly contrary to Gaubert because, rather
than presuming discretion based on the absence of a manda-
tory regulation, the Second Circuit presumed the absence of
discretion unless a regulatory scheme explicitly conferred
broad discretion. In holding that Gaubert did not apply, the
Second Circuit stated that CDC had “neither a regulatory
framework nor a defined policy that could serve as the basis
for infusing all decisions of CDC employees with policy
implications.” Andrulonis II, 952 F2d at 655; App, A414.

This Court did not say in Gaubert that the absence of
regulations equated with the absence of discretion. The con-
siderable weight of pre-Gaubert precedent held that the failure
to promulgate regulations was, itself, a discretionary decision
protected by the exception. Comment, The Discretionary
Function Exception and Mandatory Regulations, 54 U Chi L
Rev 1300, 1332 (1987) (“The discretion of the government in
promulgating, or failing to promulgate, regulations is unques-
tioned”); Weiss v United States, 889 F2d 937, 939 (10th Cir
1989); Shuman v United States, 765 F2d 283, 29] (1st Cir
1985); Hylin v United States, 755 F2d S51, 554 (7th Cir 1985).

Thus, the decision of the Second Circuit can only be
described as a strained reading of Gaubert and one seriously
out of step with the mainstream of decisional law on the
exception,

17
II.

The decision below also conflicts with the decisions of other
courts of appeals which have refused to define the exception
sO narrowly that mere common law negligence is not covered
by the exception. The court below placed emphasis on the fact
that the negligence here involved safety precautions and, from
that premise, came to the conclusion that no “policy’’ could
have been implicated since no permissible “policy” would
tolerate any safety hazard. Andrulonis II, 952 F2d at 655; App,
A415. Aside from the fact that the same argument was rejected
long ago in Dalehite v United States, 346 US 15, 37-38 (1953)
(involving safety hazards in the storage, handling and labelling
of an explosive substance), it has been consistently rejected in
the other circuits. Despite compelling proof of common law
negligence with respect to lapses in safety or the failure to
warn, the other circuits have refused to equate common law
negligence with conduct outside the coverage of the exception.
See, e.g., Kennewick Irrigation Dist. v United States, 880 F2d
1018, 1030 (9th Cir 1989) (“Such a rule would collapse the
discretionary function inquiry into the basic issue of negli-
gence”); Allen v United States, 816 F2d 1417, 1421 (10th Cir
1987), cert. den., 484 US 1004 (1988) (“It is irrelevant to the
discretion issue whether the [Government] or its employees
were negligent in failing to protect the public’); General
Public Utilities Corp. v United States, 745 F2d 239, 243-245
(3d Cir 1984), cert. den., 469 US 1228 (1985) (same).

The Second Circuit took the view that no “discretion” or
“policy” was involved because Dr. Baer should have known
better. Andrulonis II, 952 F2d at 655; App, A414-A415. That
view might have had some validity if this case had involved an
accident within a CDC laboratory, because CDC had a Labo-
ratory Safety Manual (Exh G-136; J.App. at 9243-9445) which
would have required its own scientists to use aerosol-contain-
ment devices in a CDC laboratory. App, A238. However, the

18

Second Circuit ignored the fact that there was absolutely no
CDC regulation, practice, or rule requiring a CDC scientist
visiting the laboratory of another competent scientist to
attempt to tell that scientist how to run his own laboratory.
Moreover, as we have already demonstrated in our Statement
of the Case (supra, pp 5-8), Dr. Baer did not actually know the
hazard posed by exposure to this virus and, in fact, obviously
believed that the Lilly vaccine would be adequate protection
since he put himself in the same laboratory conditions in
which plaintiff worked. Thus, the court below failed to recog-
nize that the decision of a visiting scientist (CDC’s Dr. Baer)
not to interfere with the project of another competent scientist
(NYSDOH'’s Dr. Debbie) was itself a discretionary decision by
Dr. Baer. App, A120, A151, 263-264; Tr. 2074-77, 2170,
2180.

The Second Circuit’s findings that Dr. Baer should have
intervened to stop NYSDOH'’s project (Andrulonis I, 924 F2d
at 1219; App, A22; Andrulonis II, 952 F2d at 655; App, A413-
A414), are in conflict with cases involving the Government's
failure to exercise a contractually-retained right to intervene in
the event of safety violations by an independent contractor.
Those cases hold that however blatant or obvious the safety
hazard on someone else’s premises, when the Government has
delegated safety decisions to such contractors, the act of dele-
gating safety responsibility is itself the discretionary decision
protected by the exception. Feyers v United States, 749 F2d
1222, 1226-27 (6th Cir 1984), cert. den., 471 US 1125 (1985)
(“the decision to delegate responsibility for safety to Chrysler
was based on a perception by government negotiators that
Chrysler was a prudent contractor capable of implementing its
own Safety program”); Shuman v United States, 765 F2d 283,
292-93 (1st Cir 1985) (decision to delegate safety decisions to
an independent contractor doing governmental work was dis-
cretionary, even though the practical effect was that there was
little or no safety program); Jn re Consolidated U.S. Atmo-

19

spheric Testing Litigation, 820 F2d 982, 995-96 (9th Cir
1987), cert. den. sub nom. Konizeski vy Livermore Labs, 485
US 905 (1988) (same); Johns v Pettibone Corp., 843 F2d 464,
467 (11th Cir 1988) (“safety decisions represent an exercise of
discretion giving rise to governmental immunity”’); see also,
Thompson v Dilger, 696 F Supp 1071, 1077-79 (ED Va 1988)
(actions of Government in aiding and encouraging an inventor
in the development of an armor-piercing rifle included a dis-
cretionary determination that the inventor was sufficiently
knowledgeable about safety so that the Government need not
supervise or control his conduct).

The decision below also conflicts with many decisions
which have construed the exception broadly to encompass
judgmental errors in risk-assessment. Boruski v United States,
803 F2d 1421, 1429 (7th Cir 1986) (approval of vaccines for
Swine Flu vaccination program); Wells v United States, 851
F2d 1471, 1476-78 (DC Cir 1988), cert. den., 488 US 1029
(1989) (assessment of the risks to a residential neighborhood
posed by a lead smelter); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v
United States, 837 F2d 116, 120-23 (3d Cir), cert. den., 487
US 1235 (1988) (assessment of the risks to a residential
neighborhood posed by cleanup of a leaking toxic tank car);
Creek National Indian Housing Authority v United States, 905
F2d 312, 313-i4 (10th Cir 1990) (selection of safety precau-
tions for purposes of transporting bombs on public highways);
Totten v United States, 806 F2d 698, 700-02 (6th Cir 1986)
(cleanup of hazardous solid rocket fuel); Genera! Public Util-
ities Corp. v United States, 745 F2d 239, 243-46 (3d Cir
1984), cert. den., 469 US 1228 (1985) (errors by nuclear
safety experts in underestimating the significance of prior
incidents at Three Mile Island).

The decision below also conflicts with many “failure to
warn”’ cases where complaints were dismissed on the basis of
the exception despite compelling expert proof that the Gov-

20

ernment knew of particular safety hazards but failed to warn
those demonstrably at risk from the hazard. See, e.g., In re
Consolidated U.S. Atmospheric Testing Litigation, 820 F2d
982, 985 (9th Cir 1987), cert. den. sub nom. Konizeski v
Livermore Labs, 485 US 905 (1988) (open air nuclear testing
without warning area residents of the risks of nuclear fallout);
Allen v United States, 816 F2d 1417, 1423-24 & n 8 (10th Cir
1987), cert. den., 484 US 1004 (1988) (same); Barnson v
United States, 816 F2d 549, 553-57 (10th Cir), cert. den., 484
US 896 (1987) (decisions of Public Health Service and Sur-
geon General not to warn about the health hazards of working
in uranium mines); Begay v United States, 768 F2d 1059,
1064-66 (9th Cir 1985) (same); First Nat. Bank in Albuquer-
que v United States, 552 F2d 370, 374-77 (10th Cir), cert.
den., 434 US 835 (1977) (approval of warning labels for
fungicide which caused mercury poisoning in children); see
also, Fried v United States, 674 F Supp 636, 638-40 (ND II!
1987) (furnishing radioactive isotopes to a private university
without taking precautions for handling and storage of those
substances); contra, Routh v United States, 941 F2d 853,
855-857 (9th Cir 1991) (the failure of a United States Forest
Service contracting officer to require a contractor to provide
adequate safety equipment was not a public policy decision).

In virtually every one of the cases just cited (supra, pp
18-20), the courts either found that plaintiff had proved, or
assumed that plaintiff could prove, that the Government's
errors and omissions were negligent when judged either by a
common law tort standard of reasonable care under the cir-
cumstances or by a professional malpractice standard. In some
of the cases, impressive expert testimony bolstered plaintiffs’
theories that the Government woefully underestimated the
risks of a particular activity. See, e.g., Allen v United States,
588 F Supp 247, 260-329 (D Utah 1984) (detailing expert
proof of what Government scientists either knew or should
have known when they conducted open-air atomic tests), revd,

21

816 F2d 1417, supra. Yet, the courts dismissed the complaints
on the basis that the errors or omissions were discretionary,
judgmental decisions protected by the exception, notwith-
standing that human safety was compromised by erroneously
made decisions.

Ill.

The decision below is also in conflict with Myslakowski v
United States, 806 F2d 94, 96-97 (6th Cir 1986), cert. den.,
480 US 948 (1987), and similar cases which apply the “‘sus-
ceptible to policy analysis” test to determine whether particu-
lar-conduct is protected by the exception. This test gives the
Government the benefit of the exception even when the Gov-
ernment is not able to prove that advance, conscious risk-
assessment decisions were made. The Sixth Circuit in
Myslakowski held that the decision by the Government to
dispose of surplus jeeps on an “as is” basis was protected by
the exception. Despite the fact that the Government was actu-
ally aware of the propensity of the jeeps to roll over (since a
Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory test and report had warned
the Government of the hazard), the court held that negligent
failure to warn purchasers of those surplus jeeps was
embraced within the scope of the exception. Myslakowski, 806
F2d at 97-98. Most other circuits are in accord. See, ¢.g., Sea-
Land Service, Inc. v United States, 919 F2d 888, 892 (3d Cir
1990), cert. den., 111 S Ct 2235, 114 L Ed 2d 477 (1991);
Kennewick Irrigation Dist. v United States, 880 F2d 1018,
1028 (9th Cir 1989); Allen v United States, 816 F2d 1417,
1422 n 5, 1423-24 & n 8 (10th Cir 1987), cert. den., 484 US
1004 (1988); contra, Dube v Pittsburgh Corning, 870 F2d 790,
798-99 (Ist Cir 1989).

The Second Circuit initially stated its acceptance of the
“susceptible to policy analysis” test. See, In re Joint Eastern
& Southern Dist. Asbestos Litigation (Robinson), 891 F2d 31,

7

a ee

37 (2d Cir 1989). However, for reasons not clearly stated in
Andrulonis I or in Andrulonis 11, the court below did not apply
the “susceptible to policy analysis” test in the same manner in
this case. While purporting to apply that test, the Second
Circuit found that Dr. Baer was not engaged in policy-making
because he failed to consider the relevant risks. Andrulonis [,
924 F2d at 1219; App, A21-A22; Andrulonis II, 952 F2d at
655; App, A415. The court never explained why Dr. Baer’s
errors and omissions — in failing to consider, or discounting
as insignificant, the risk of aerosol exposure — could be
described as nor involving “policy” when a panoply of com-
parable risk-assessment errors have been treated by other
courts of appeals as discretionary matters implicating policy.

Likewise, Dr. Baer’s decision to defer to the competency of
NYSDOH scientists after delivering the virus was a judgmen-
tal, policy decision. Tr. 1155, 1162-63, 2070-74. While plain-
tiff established Dr. Baer’s negligence in the classic common-
law sense, the record established that Dr. Baer, in fact, had the
authority and discretion to make judgments as to the compe-
tence of NYSDOH to receive and handle etiologic substances
such as this rabies virus. Tr. 2186, 2263-64. Dr. Walter
Dowdle, the Deputy Director of CDC, explained it as follows
in his testimony (J.App. 2185):

Q. Dr. Dowdle, in 1976 and up to March of 1977,
were there any standards which governed the CDC
practice in providing etiologic agents to another
laboratory?

A. At the Class 2 level and even at the Class 3 level,
the responsibility there rests with the experts in that
particular area. In other words, the branch chief had the
authority to provide those strains to people that he felt
competent to receive them.

23

Q. With respect to rabies viruses in 1976 and 1977,
with whom did that discretion lie?
A. Dr. Baer.

Even after remand in light of Gaubert, the Second Circuit
failed to explain why it interpreted the ‘“‘susceptible to policy
analysis” test differently from the other courts of appeals.
Instead, the court seemed determined to justify and adhere to
its original decision in Andrulonis I. In reasoning that pro-
ceeded backwards from the fact of injury, the court charac-
terized the limits of permissible “policy” as not including any
errors Or Omissions which lead to injury. Andrulonis 11, 952
F2d at 655; App, A415.

Looking at the ‘nature of the conduct’ in this situation,
we do not see how Dr. Baer’s negligent omission could
possibly have been grounded in CDC’s policy scheme.
Nothing indicates that CDC policy required, or even
encouraged, Dr. Baer to ignore unsafe laboratory con-
ditions and thereby unnecessarily place the lives of
laboratory workers at risk in order to further a scien-
tific cause or any other objective of the government.
The general policy of wanting to eradicate rabies and
granting officials some discretion to achieve those
ends is far too broad and indefinite to insulate Dr.
Baer’s negligent conduct in the circumstances of this
case. 952 F2d at 655; App, A415.

This conflict in the circuits on so basic a point as the
“burden of proof” or the required evidentiary showing that a
decision embraces “discretion” is further reason to grant the
petition.

24

CONCLUSION
This Court should grant the writ

Dated: Albany, New York
March 26, 1992

Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT ABRAMS
Attorney General of the State of New York
Attorney for Petitioner
JERRY BOONE

Solicitor General
Counsel of Record

PETER H. SCHIFF
Deputy Solicitor General

MICHAEL S. BUSKUS
Assistant Attorney General

Of Counsel

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386011_0404%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
