# Appendix — Anderson v. Battle

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1992
- **Citation:** 504 U.S. 912

## Text

No.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1991

PARK ANDERSON, et al.,

Petitioners,
vs.

BOBBY BATTLE, et al.,

Respondents,
and

Intervenor,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

SUSAN B. LOVING
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OKLAHOMA

SUE WYCOFF*
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
DEPUTY CHIEF
FEDERAL and TORT DIVISION
420 West Main - Suite 550
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102
(405) 521-4274

March, 1992 *Counsel of Record

APPENDIX

Statutes Involved ose 6 2 «© o 6 o Reh

1986 Opinion of Court of Appeals ... 3

1989 Opinion of District Court .... 43

1991 Opinion of Court of Appeals ... 58

1991 Denial of Rehearing ....... 63

APPENDIX

The Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution:

Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.

42 U.8.C. § 1983:

Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
For the purposes of this section, any
Act of Congress applicable exclusive-
ly to the District of Columbia shall
be considered to be a statute of the
District of Columbia.

2

Rule 52 (a) Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure:

In all actions tried upon the facts
without a jury or with an advisory
jury, the court shall find the facts
specially a nd state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and
judgment shall be entered pursuant to
Rule 58; and in granting or refusing
interlocutory injunctions the court
shall similarly set forth the
findings of fact and conclusions of
law which constitute the grounds of
its action. Requests for findings are
not necessary for purposes ofreview.
Findings of fact, whether based on
cral or documentary evidence, shall
not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be
given to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge of the credibility of
the witnesses. The findings of a
master, to the extent that the court
adopts them, shall be considered as
the findings of the court. It will
be sufficient if the findings of fact
and conclusions of law are stated
orally and recorded in open court
following the close of the evidence
or appear in an opinion or memorandum
of decision filed be the court.
Findings of fact and conclusions of
law are unnecessary on decision of
motions under Rule 12 or 56 or any
other motion except as provided in
subdivision (c) of the rule.

3

Bobby Battle, et al.,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

Vv.
Park Anderson, et al.,
Defendants/Appellees,
and

United States of America,
Plaintiff/Appellee-Intervenor.

No. 84-1026

United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit.

April 16, 1986

The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Oklahoma, Frank
Howell Seay, Chief Judge, entered judgment
in ongoing litigation by prison inmates
concerning conditions. Judgment found
that system was constitutional, although
there were four Subjects of previous
orders found to be inadequate and not in

compliance, and granted motion to dismiss,

4
and inmates appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Holloway, Chief Judge, held that:
(1) evidence supported finding that access
to courts was adequate; (2) court's
findings regarding claims of racial
discrimination were inadequate; and (3)
evidence supported finding that conditions
were not in violation of Eighth Amendment.

Affirmed in part; vacated and
remanded in part.

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, and
BARRETT and DOYLE, Circuit Judges.

HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge.

I

This § 1983 class action was
initially commenced by inmate Bobby
Battle, pro se, Challenging various
conditions of confinement at the Oklahoma

State Penitentiary in 1972. The district

>

court held that conditions in the Oklahoma
prison system violated the Eighth Amend-
ment proscription against cruel and
unusual punishment. The subsequent
history of the controversy is detailed in
the opinions cited in the margin.’

In April, 1982, the district court

entered an order that defendants "should

"Since the district court held that
conditions in the Oklahoma prison system
violated the Eighth Amendment's
proscription of cruel and unusual
punishment in tle v nderson, 376
F.Supp.402 (E.D.Ok1a.1974}, the litigation
concerning constitutional compliance has
been ongoing. See Battle v. Anderson, 447
F.Supp. 516 (E.D.Okla.), aff'd, 564 F.2a
388 (10th Cir.1977); Ba e iv nderson,
457 F.Supp 719 (E.D.Okla. 1978), remanded
for further hearings. 594 F.2d 786 (10th
Cir.1979) ; vV._Anderson, 614 F.2d
251 (10th Cir. 1980); Battle v. Anderson,
708 F.2d = 1523 (10th Cir.1983) (per
curiam), cert. dismissed, 465 U.S. 1014,
104 S.Ct. 1019, 79 L.Ed.24a 248 (1984); see
also Vv nderson, 541 F.Supp. 1061
(E.D. Okla. 1982) (award of attorneys'
fees).

6
have and do hereby have the authority
indefinitely but not permanently’ to
double-cell where necessary," 708 F.2d
1523 at 1526, following increases in the
Oklahoma prison population. In October,
1982, the district court issued an opinion
following an evidentiary hearing on its
orders that had previously been entered.
The court stated that although it would
not conclude from the evidence that the
system had become unconstitutional in its
operation, it was clearly in a state of
decline. 708 F.2d at 1539. The court
continued jurisdiction over the case to
insure that the Oklahoma prison system did
not revert to an unconstitutional
condition. JId. The court ordered that a

statement of penal policy and detailed

plan of action be filed.

7
This court affirmed, one judge
dissenting. Battle v. Anderson, 708 F.2d
1523 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed,
465 U.S. 1014, 104 S.ct. 1019, 79 L.Ed.2ad
248 (1984). The majority of the panel
held that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in continuing its
jurisdiction to assure compliance with
past decrees and to prevent a recurrence
of unconstitutional conditions despite its
finding that the System was then currently
constitutional. id. at 1537-40.

The instant controversy concerns
events following that decision. In
compliance with the district court's
order, the State filed a detailed "Plan of
Measures to be Taken to Assure Continued

Constitutionality of Oklahoma's Prisons"

in June, 1983, and in July the State filed

8
a supplement to the Plan. In September,
1983, the court held an evidentiary
hearing on the State's Plan and the
State's motion to dismiss the case. Judge
Bohanon recused in December, 1983, and the
case was assigned to Chief Judge Seay.
Following review of a portion of the
record, he entered the order on appeal
herein on December 30.

The court conciuded that "since
October 1982 to the present date the
conditions of confinement in the Oklahoma
prison system are constitutional and are
not cruel and unusual punishment." xX Jt.
App. 237. The court noted that there had
been "disturbances, problems, and
inadequacies in the Oklahoma prison system

since the court's last findings." Id. at

235. The court noted that there were four

9

Subjects of previous court orders still
found to be inadequate and not in
compliance - racial integration, access to
the courts, equal protection guarantees
for women, and vacating for human
habitation the East and West Cellhouses of
the Oklahoma State Penitentiary at
McAlester. Id.

The court concluded nevertheless that
the system was constitutional and "each
area of continued violation has been
Specifically addressed by the State and is
subject to a Specifically planned remedy."
Id. The court found that the State
legislature and prison officials were
aware of and sensitive to the
constitutional requirements and that the
court was satisfied "that there is no

reasonable expectation that

10

unconstitutional practices will recur in
the conditions of confinement in the
Oklahoma prison system." Id. at 238.
Concluding that it was mindful of its
obligation to enforce the constitutional
rights of all persons, the court granted
defendants' motion to dismiss the case in
its entirety. However, the court
concluded that "[ajll of this court's
orders and injunctions as modified
heretofore remain in full force and
effect." Jd. at 239.

In May, 1984, the district court
denied a motion by plaintiffs to stay the
dismissal order. Responding to a
complaint that the judge had not had the
full record to review, the judge noted
that he had had four of seven transcripts

from the September hearing for review

11

before entering the order; that he had all
the transcripts containing plaintiffs'
case-in-chief; and that he had earlier had
the transcript volume with the testimony
of the Governor and the Director of the
Corrections Department. In denying the
request for a stay, the court concluded
that "[a)fter a careful review and study
of the entire transcript, the court finds
no reason to change its order of December
30. 1983, and the court reaffirms that
order." Id. at 248. The court stated
that "(ajlthough the court noted problems
of compliance in certain areas, those
areas were not held to be constitutional
violations." -Id. (emphasis in original).

On April 25, 1984, a panel of this
court denied an application by the

——

plaintiffs for a stay of the dismissal

12
order, pending appeal. On May 25, 1985,
Plaintiffs filed a further motion for a
stay of the dismissal order, pending
appeal, contending that the State was
housing inmates in the East and West
Cellhouses in violation of the district
court's order of May, 1979. The state
responded that the inmates were
temporarily housed in those cellhouses on
May 13, 1985, as a result of a disturbance
at another State prison, and that the
inmates were removed from them On May 28.
Plaintiffs did not dispute these facts but
did request that this court stay the
dismissal order nevertheless. We denied
the renewed application for a stay,
stating that we would "consider the
propriety and scope of the district

court's December 30, 1983, order in our

re,

y
disposition of the pending appeal in this
cause." A motion to reconsider that
ruling was filed, but in view of our
disposition of the case the motion becomes
moot.

We turn now to the appellate
arguments challenging the correctness of
the district court's order of dismissal.

II

Plaintiffs challenge the district
court's holding that the prison system is
constitutional. They argue that the
system is unconstitutional with respect to
access to the courts, racial integration,
and equal protection guarantees for women
- areas that the district court found to
be "inadequate and not in compliance" with
previous court orders. Plaintiffs also

contend that the Oklahoma prison systen,

14

considering the totality of the
circumstances, is in violation cf the
Eighth Amendment.
A.
Access to the courts

(1) Plaintiffs attack the
defendants' reliance on inmate law clerks
to provide. meaningful access to the
courts.* Brief of Appellant 40-42; Reply
Brief of Appellants 18-20. We have
previously noted, however, that "[(u]nder
Bounds, the State is free to make a choice
between affording law library facilities
on a reasonable basis, or the alternative

means of having available counsel on a

. The constitutional right of

access to the court has been found to rest
on the guarantees of the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. See Ward v. Kort, 762 F.2d
856, 858 (10th Cir.1985).

re

15
reasonable basis." Ward v. Kort, 762 F.2d
856, 860 (10th Cir.1985). The district

court's dismissal order stated:

The court finds that’ the
mandated minimums of adequate
library facilities has not yet

been met. Bounds v. Smith, 430

U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52

L.Ed.2d 72 (1976). However,
testimony from Mr. Larry
Meachun, Director of the

Department of Corrections of
Oklahoma, at the September 1983
hearing, indicates and assures
this court that libraries will
be fully stocked and that
plaintiffs have and will be
assured continued access’ to
courts.

X Jt.App.235. In this connection, the
defendants' Plan stated that the State
intended "to continue their current
approach to access to courts by providing
both law libraries and trained inmate law

clerks to assist inmates in framing legal

16

issues for presentation to the court." xX
R. 113; See jd. at 113-14.

There is record evidence that the
Department of Corrections has a large or
small library at each of the prison
facilities. Inventories were admitted in
evidence as Defendants' Exhibits 29, 30,
and 31 respecting the major law libraries
at the Oklahoma State Penitentiary, the
Mabel Basset Correctional Center, and the
Joseph Harp Correctional Center. V
Jt.App. 1041. Each library has a
supervisor. The fact finder appointed by
the district court had found an "appalling
lack of essential legal books’ and
reference materials at both major and
minor law libraries." VIII Jt. App. 119.
However, we note that the inventories do

list a substantial volume of basic

OE

17
materials in the libraries. See, e.g.,
Defendants' Exhibit 29 (containing

extensive listing of law books at Oklahoma
State Penitentiary Library). Further,
defendants' Plan represented to the court
that "the Department is continually
updating and supplementing its law library
inventories." xX Jt.App. 114°

In light of the testimony, the
documentary evidence, and the

representations accepted by the district

*In addition to the inventories of
materials at the libraries, we note that
the handbook "Civil Procedure for Inmate
Legal Research Assistants" itself covered
basic principles on federal habeas corpus
with chapters on the exhaustion doctrine,
procedural default, issues cognizable,
pleadings, preliminary procedure, and
evidentiary hearings. Statutory materials
and summaries on various cases from the
Supreme Court and the courts of appeals on
habeas proceedings were also included.

18

court, we hold that the finding of the
court that there was no constitutional
violation in this respect is not in error.
B.
The claim of racial discrimination
[2] Earlier practices of racial
discrimination in the Oklahoma prison

system were chronicled in Battle _v.

Anderson, 376 F.Supp. at 410-11. In that
opinion, the district court made
conclusions of law on these practices, id.
at 420-21, and entered orders designed to
remedy the discrimination. Id. at 428-
30. The State has endeavored since those
orders to comply with the constitutional
requirements.

In the instant proceeding there are
numerous allegations of racial

discrimination and segregation in the

ee

19

Oklahoma prison systen, including
discrimination in job assignments, dining
hall seating, and cell assignments.
Numerous examples are contained in the
fact finder's March 1983 final compliance
report, VIII Jt.App. 25-43, and in the
arguments and record citations in the
briefs of the Plaintiffs-appellants in
this phase of the controversy. Brief of
Appellants 15-16, 43; Reply Brief of
Appellants 12-14. The State and the
United States as intervenor argue that the
evidence supports a finding of
nondiscrimination. Brief of State
Defendants-Appellees 101-02; Brief for the
United States as Appellee 26-28.

In addition, the plaintiffs-
appellants argue that the trial court did

not address these issues in the December

20

30, 1983 order of dismissal. In that
regard, we note that the district court
did make the following findings and
conclusions respecting this claim of
racial discrimination:

Racial integration of the
occupants of double cells is
found to be almost non-existent
in the Oklahoma prison system.
Racial integration of cells is
strictly by voluntary action
only. However, a commitment by
defendants to fully integrate is
contained in the Defendants'
Plan. The court finds that the
Defendants ' Plan to be of
sufficient remedial effect and
has previously, in this order,
approved and ordered its
adoption.

X Jt. App. 235.

In view of the findings quoted above,
we cannot agree with the plaintiffs-
appellants that the trial court did not
address the racial discrimination claim at

all. Nevertheless, because of the several

aim i

21
distinct questions clearly raised by the
fact finder's findings and the specific
issues joined by the parties, we must
agree that the findings of the district
court are not sufficient under rule 52a),
Fed.R.Civ.P. We cannot perform our
appellate function without adequate
findings and conclusions by the trial
court on this issue of fundamental
constitutional importance. Battle v.
Anderson, 614 F.2d 251, 256 (10th Cir.

1980); Squirtco v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2a

1086, 1902 (8th Cir.1980). Without
expressing any view on the validity of the
constitutional - claim of racial
discrimination, we hold that the findings
and conclusions thereon are not sufficient

due to the sharp conflict on the several

claims of specific discriminatory

ee

22
treatment not addressed by the trial
judge.

Accordingly, with respect to this
Claim of racial discrimination, the
judgment of dismissal must be vacated and
the case remanded on that claim for such
further proceedings as the district court
deems proper. In view of the intervening
time lapse it may well be desirable that
further evidence on this claim be
received. After the further proceedings
which the trial court finds proper are
held, the district judge should then find
the facts specially and state separately
his conclusions thereon in detail, dealing
with the various claims of racial
discrimination in accordance with Rule

52(a).

23
Cc.
The claim of sex discrimination

(3) Under the Equal Protection Clause,
the Plaintiff-appellants argue vigorously
that women inmates in the Oklahoma prison
System are subjected to discrimination in
conditions of confinement, job
assignments, training programs, mental and
medical health services, and recreation.
These’ were objections made by the
Plaintiffs to ueficiencies in the fact
finder's final compliance report. <x Jt.
App. 58-61. The specific claims arise
from the fact that the State in a
Stipulation had agreed not to discriminate
against inmates on various grounds,
including sex, and had agreed further to
provide equal access to various programs

and work assignments. Brief of Appellants

24

22; Brief for the United States as

Appellee 30 n. 22.

The district court's order of

dismissal contains the

discussion of this issue:

following

The court finds that equal

protection guarantees for women
inmates are inadequate in terms
of programs, medical care, and
exercise. However, Director
Meachum testified there is a
$62,000.00 current special
appropriation for women's
programs and detailed the
specific remedies outlined in
the Defendants' Plan. The court
finds the proposed measures will

continue constitutionality.

X Jt.App. 236.

With respect to the claim of

violation of the Equal Protection Clause

in the treatment of women inmates, we feel

that the findings are not inadequate. The

trial court specifically

found

inadequacies in terms of programs, medical

25
care, and exercise. We feel that the
remaining claims of inadequate housing
were thus implicitly rejected.
Furthermore, the trial judge specifically
identified the testimony which ~ he
credited, that of Director Meachum. His
testimony concerning a $62,000 current
special appropriation for women's programs
was identified. Moreover, the court
concluded that the program laid out by
Director Meachum would be constitutionally
sufficient. We note that Director
Meachum's testimony explained the reason
for not having an intermediate health unit
for the Mabel Bassett facility in the
Oklahoma City area. He pointed out that
they had a psychiatrist assigned to the

Mabel Bassett facility addressing the

26
mental health needs of women. VII Jt.
App. 95-97.

On consideration of the evidence
relied on by the plaintiffs, the evidence
cited by the trial judge, and the resolve
shown in the testimony of Director Meachum
to solve the problem, we cannot say that
the findings and conclusions of the trial
judge on this constitutional claim were in
error.

D.
The Eighth Amendment Claim

(4) Plaintiffs further vigorously
challenge the findings and conclusions of
the district court which rejected their
claim that the totality of the
circumstances in the Oklahoma prison

system amounts to cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the prohibition

27

of the Eighth Amendment. More
specifically, they seriously complain
about overcrowding, food and kitchen
facilities, ventilation, educational and
training programs, medical and mental
health services, and the occupation
temporarily of the East and West
Cellhouses at the Oklahoma State
Penitentiary in violation of the May 4,
1979 order of Judge Bohanon.

In connection with this
constitutional claim and the detailed
complaints made, the district court's
findings and conclusions against the

plaintiffs were as follows:

(T)he court finds that
management problems exist in the
Oklahoma system. Problem areas
can be determined in food
preparation and service,
maintenance of equipment and
facilities, distribution of

28

clothing and essential supplies,
and inmate idleness. These
management problems exist
despite the extremely
professional staff of the
Oklahoma prison system. These
problems are found to be
primarily a direct result of
increases in prison population.

Unfortunately, there will always
be problems and inadequacies.
We are considering a large,
confined population of convicted
felons, not a nursery school.
As noted by Judge Barrett, "The
Rhodes majority observed that
harsh or restrictive conditions
of confinement are part of the
punishment criminal offenders
justly receive because’ the
Constitution does not mandate
comfortable prisons. Justice
Powell wrote that "To the extent
that such conditions [of
confinement] are restrictive and
even harsh, they are part of the
penalty that criminal offenders
pay for their offenses against

society. ' 452 U.S. [337] at
p.347 [101 S.Ct. 2392 at p.
2399, 69 L.Ed.2dad 59)." Battle

vs Anderson, supra at page 1535.

The court finds, considering the
totality of circumstances, these
inadequacies, problems, and

29

shortcomings do not constitute
cruel and unusual punishment
under the test of Rhodes.

, Supra at page
347 [101 S.Ct. at page 2399).
The court finds no evidence at
this time to show that the
Plaintiffs' present conditions
of confinement in the Oklahoma
prison system have changed from
one of constitutionality to
unconstitutionality. Thus, the
court finds that since October,
1982 to the present date the
conditions of confinement in the
Oklahoma _ prison System are
constitutional and are not crue]
and unusual punishment.

X Jt.App. 236-37.
For reasons we will outline
generally, from our review of the record
testimony and exhibits, and from the
arguments about the record evidence by
Plaintiffs, we conclude that the district
court's findings were not Clearly
erroneous, that the conclusions drawn were

Supported by the findings and record, and

oe

30
that the determination of the court to
dismiss the cause in its’ entirety,
retaining in full force and effect the
prior orders and injunctions against
constitutional violations, was not in
error.

We have noted that there are specific
complaints concerning conditions of
confinement, including overcrowding, food
and kitchen facilities, ventilation,
educational and training programs, medical
and mental health services, and the
temporary occupancy of the East and West
Cellhouses. See Brief of Appellants 4-
22, 30-36. However, the ban on cruel and
unusual punishment prohibits conditions
that "involve the wanton and unnecessary

infliction of pain, [or are) grossly

disproportionate to the severity of the

31
crime warranting imprisonment." Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.s. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct.

2392, 69 L.Ed.2da 59 (1981); see Whitley v.
Albers, __ U.S. . , 106 S.Ct.

1078, 1082-86, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986).
Although prison inmates may not be
deprived of the "minimal Civilized measure
of life's necessities, ... conditions
that cannot be said to be cruel and
unusual under contemporary standards are
not unconstitutional. To the extent that
such conditions are restrictive and even
harsh, they are part of the penalty that
criminal offenders pay for their offenses
against society." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2399,

A little over two years ago a panel
of this court agreed that the overall

conditions of the Oklahoma prison system

32
at that time were constitutional. Battle
v. Anderson, 708 F.2d at 1533, 1537. We
have considered the plaintiffs' complaints
and the arguments in their briefs
concerning the evidence in this subsequent
case and are not convinced that the
findings of the district court are clearly
erroneous. The State defendants and the
intervenor United States have persuasively
argued that the evidence of record does
not demonstrate conditions of confinement
constituting cruel and unusual punishment
under the strict standard of Rhodes v,.
Chapman. See Brief of Defendants- —
Appellees 2-88; Brief for the United

States as Appellee 15-23.°

z The plaintiffs argue that they

were denied due process when Chief Judge
Seay entered his order of dismissal after
having received only four of seven

33

We note one item in particular, the
complaint that facilities at the Oklahoma
State Penitentiary were not air-
conditioned. The complaint concerning the
heat was covered by the testimony of Mr.
Hutto. The testimony was that the new
housing units at the Oklahoma State
Penitentiary were air-conditioned. IV
Jt.App. 597. The East and West Cellhouses

were not air-conditioned, but as discussed

transcripts of the hearing held earlier
before Judge Bohanon. Judge Seay had
before him at the time of his dismissal
the transcripts of the Plaintiffs' entire
case in chief, among other things, and the
testimony of Governor Nigh and Director
Meachum, and the exhibits were apparently
available, including those we have cited
earlier concerning access to the courts.

=

34
below, they were vacated, except for
limited emergency use, in compliance with
the orders of Judge Bohanon.

With respect to the East and West
Cellhouses, the May 4, 1979 order of Judge
Bohanon was that the State no longer house
inmates at those East and West Cellhouses
due to the inadequate facilities there.
In the dismissal order of December 30,
1983, the district court noted that the
State was not in compliance with that
order but was satisfied from’ the
assurances of Director Meachum_= and
Governor Nigh that the cellhouses would be
vacated as soon as feasible. X Jt.App.
236.

On May 25, 1985, plaintiffs filed a

motion for a stay pending appeal in this

court stating that inmates were being

3$

housed in the East and West Cellhouses in
violation of the May 4, 1979 order. The
State responded to that motion,
representing that the inmates were placed
in the cellhouses on May 13, 1985, as the
result of a disturbance at another state
prison and that the inmates were removed
from these East and West Cellhouses on May
28. Plaintiffs did not challenge these
representations.

There was a further motion for a stay
filed December 27, 1985, in which the
Plaintiffs again represented that some
inmates had been placed into the East and
West Cellhouses. However, this was again
related to a riot problem and the
defendants informed the plaintiffs'
counsel that the forty-three inmates

housed in the East Cellhouse following the

36

riot were all removed by January 6, 1986.
See Response of the United States to
Appellants' Motion to Reconsider Order
Denying Stay Pending Appeal 3. There was
no dispute of those facts concerning the
removal of the inmates from the East
Cellhouse after the problem of temporary
occupancy. We therefore conclude that the
complaint concerning the East and West
Cellhouses is not supported in our record,
and we are not persuaded that these
temporary emergency uses of the cellhouses
should be held a constitutional violation.

In sum, we are not persuaded by the
arguments of the plaintiffs and the
evidence that the findings of the district
sourt that there was no violation of the
Eighth Amendment were clearly erroneous.

In addition, we are not convinced that

Ne ee RY ee eRe

37
there was an abuse of discretion by the
district court in determining to dismiss
the cause as he did, retaining in force
and effect the prior orders and

injunctions against constitutional

violations.° the majority in Battle v.

. As noted, the district court
here expressly stated that "[(ajll of this
court's orders and injunctions as modified
heretofore remain in full force and
effect." X Jt.App. 239. This is in
accord with the principle that "(ijt has
long been settled that the court's power
to grant injunctive relief survives
discontinuance of the illegal conduct.

E.g., “—
U.S. 629, 633, 73 S.Ct. 894, 897, 97 L.Fad.
11303 (1952). » 708

F.2d at 1538 n.4. If the district court
had intended any dissolution of the prior
orders, its order "should have contained
a definite provision for the dissolution"
of those provisions. , 185
F.2d 863, 865 (Sth Cir. 1950). We are
convinced that it is unmistakably clear
that the orders and injunctions protecting
the inmates against constitutional]
violations, as previously modified, were
in no way intended to be relaxed and that
they remain in full force and effect.

38
Anderson, 708 F.2d at 1537, concluded that
“a court should exercise supervisory power
over the suit until it can say with
assurance not only that eighth amendment
violations do not presently exist but
there is no reasonable expectation that
unconstitutional conditions will recur."
In dealing with the various issues before
him, the district judge concluded that he
was satisfied that the defendants intended
permanent compliance with constitutional
conditions in the Oklahoma prison systen.
X Jt.App. 232, 234-37. The Memorandum
Opinion and Order stated that "this court
finds that it is now satisfied that there
is no reasonable expectation that
unconstitutional practices will recur in

the conditions of confinement in the

Oklahoma prison system." Id. at 238.

39
We are convinced that the district
court's conclusion was based on findings
Supported by the record and that the
determination to dismiss in these
circumstances was not in error or an abuse
of discretion.
Irmr
As noted, there was a motion for a
Stay of the district court's dismissal
order filed on May 25, 1985, by the
Plaintiffs. This court denied that
motion, as noted, stating that we would
consider the propriety and scope of the
district court's December 30, 1983 order
of dismissal in our disposition of the
pending appeal. on December 27, 1985, the
Plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider
that order denying the May 25, 1985 motion

for a stay. Because of the disposition we

te 1 eel ars

40

are making in this opinion, we find that
motion now to be moot.

In addition, on February 4, 1986, the
plaintiffs filed a motion for partial
remand for the district court to make an
appropriate award of attorney's fees
pendente lite. In view of the fact that
this court was proceeding to disposition
of the case, we have deferred a ruling on
that motion. Since we are making a
partial remand of the case, the plaintiffs
will have the opportunity to have the
district court consider a further
application of attorney's fees when those
proceedings on remand occur. The trial
judge should entertain any such motion

with those proceedings.

41
Iv.

Accordingly, for the reasons stated
we make the following determinations and
order as follows:

1. The order of dismissal of
December 30, 1983, by the district court,
which retained in full force and effect
the previous orders and injunctions
protecting the rights of the plaintiffs
against constitutional violations, is
AFFIRMED except with respect to the claim
of racial discrimination discussed in Part
II-B of this opinion. The plaintiffs may
by further proceedings in the district
court seek relief from any violations of
those previous orders and Injunction
protecting their constitutional rights.

2. The order of dismissal of

December 30, 1983, is VACATED with respect

42

to the claim of racial discrimination in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment; as discussed
in Part II-B of this opinion, the cause is
REMANDED to the district court for further
proceedings and the entry of findings and
conclusions by the district court on that
constitutional claim as directed by this
opinion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

eT

43

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE EASTERN DISTRICT oF OKLAHOMA

Bobby Battle, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

Park J. Anderson, et al.,
Defendants.

OPINION

On December 30, 1983, this court

)
)
)
)
)
)

dismissed Plaintiffs' case in its
entirety, finding that the defendants were
in constitutional compliance. Defendants
appealed that order. On May 22, 1989, the
mandate of the United States court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit was filed in
this court affirming this court's order of
dismissal, except with respect to the
Claim of racial discrimination in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Circuit

Court remanded that portion of this

a4

court's dismissal for additional findings
of fact and conclusions of law. Battle v.
Anderson, 788 F.2d 1421, 1429 (10th Cir.
1986).

In accordance with that opinion, and
pursuant to Rule 52(a), Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, this court enters the

following findings of fact and conclusions
of law with respect to the plaintiffs'
Claim of racial discrimination:
Findings of Fact:

i. The court determines and finds that
there is sufficient evidence in record
from which to make findings of fact and
determine the racial discrimination issue,
such that additional hearings and evidence
are not needed.

2- Contrary to this court's order of

September 26, 1989, the court notes that

45

Plaintiffs' attorney has neither attached
nor made reference to testimony to support
his proposed Findings of Fact, and
Plaintiffs! attorney does not cite any
authority in his Proposed Conclusions of
Law.

3. The Fact Finder indicated, and others
testified, that there was a relatively low
number of racially mixed double cells.
(J.A. Vol. VII, pp. 152-153, 161-162, and
213 - Alback testimony; J.A. vol. Vv, p.
1029 - Douglas testimony; J.A. vol. VII,
P- 173 - Meachum testimony). The court
finds this was a result of the defendants!
initial policy of allowing all inmates to
voluntarily choose cellmates. (J.A. vol.
Ts WD 1029). Although the Equal

Protection clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment does not dictate the forcible

46
racial balancing of double cells, there
was evidence that the defendants were
attempting to racial balance double cells
by mandatory cell assignments, beginning
at the time the inmates first enter the
system. J.A. Vol. V, p. 1031 - Douglas
testimony; J.A. Vol. VI, p. 1275). The
Fact Finder testified that defendants made
improvements in racial balance, particular
in housing units. (J.A. Vol. III, p.
428). The President-elect of the American
Correctional Association, Terrell Hutto,
testified that he had seen no segregated
dorms in the systen. (J.A. Vol. IV, P
655). Director Meachum testified that
there was no intent or policy or practice
of defendants to racially segregate

inmates. (J.A. Vol. VII, p. 196).

iii i

47

4. This court finds no evidence of any
policy or practice by defendants which
deny plaintiffs equal protection of law
due to racial discrimination as concerns
housing or cell assignments. To the
contrary, this court finds that the intent
and purpose of defendants’! policies and
practices is to discourage and eliminate
racial discrimination in regard to
housing.

5. There was evidence of segregation in
the dining halls at the McAlester
facility. Again, this condition existed
due to voluntary, self-imposed segregation
by the inmates (plaintiffs), in that the
inmates were allowed to sit and eat where
they wished in the dining halls. (J.A.
Vol. II, pp. 237-238; Vol. VI, p. 1191).

In one instance, a guard directed a black

48

inmate from the dining hall containing
white inmates to the dining hall
containing black inmates. That inmate
filed a grievance. The Warden testified
that he wrote an executive memorandum to
the effect that there would be no racial
discrimination within the facility and
anyone purporting to advocate such a thing
would face disciplinary action. (J.A.
Vol. VI, pp. 1159-1160 - Brown testimony).
After this incident the defendants began
to assign inmates to the dining halls by
"runs", which are racially mixed, in order
to better integrate the dining halls.
(J.A. Vol. V, pp. 1159-1161 - Brown
testimony; Vol. VII, p. 120 - Meachum
testimony).

6. The court finds that the above dining

hall grievance was an isolated incident,

49

and that there is no evidence of any
policy or practice by the defendants which
denies plaintiffs equal protection of law
due to racial discrimination as concerns
seating or eating assignments in the
dining halls of the defendants’
facilities. To the contrary, this court
finds that the expressed intent and
purpose of defendants’ Policies and
practices to discourage and eliminate
racial discrimination in regard to dining
facilities.

Ve There were allegations and some
testimony of racial discrimination,
Principally between black and white
inmates, in "desirable" job assignments.
(J.A. Vol. II, P- 236 and Vol. III, Pp. 428
- Albach testimony). This was noted in

Situations where there were a small number

50

of positions available in an assignment,
primarily at the unit level. However the
Fact Finder testified that he believed the
defendants were making progress in that
area to eliminate discrimination, by
Director Meachum's efforts in stressing
the need to eliminate any vestiges of
discrimination at the unit level through
memos and staff meetings. (J.A. Vol. III,
pp. 428-429 - Albach testimony).

8. The court finds that there is no
policy, practice, or intent by defendants
to discriminate racially in job
assignments. The court finds’ that
defendants are eliminating any vestiges of
racial discrimination in job assignments
by their expressed policy and intent to
eliminate any racial imbalance in that

area.

"~~~ »p

51
9. There have been some disturbances in
which racial groups ban together to
express their animosity toward another
group or the institution. However, there
is no evidence that such behavior is due
to racial discrimination. Inmates of
whatever race associate with others and
groups of their own race to provide
themselves with a Support system and
because it is human nature to do so,
whether in a prison environment or in the
free world. (J.A. Vol. II, Pp. 41 - Kamka
testimony; Vol. VII, p. 129 = Meachum
testimony). This court finds that such
individual voluntary, self-imposed
segregation by inmate Plaintiffs is not
racial discrimination by defendants which
violates the equal protection clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment.

52
10. The plaintiffs’ expert witness,
Gordon Kamka, testified that he did not
find the defendants sanctioning or
condoning racial discrimination or
segregation. (J.A. Vol. II, pp. 82-83).
This court agrees and so finds, and
further, this court finds that it is the
expressed policy, practice, and intent of
defendants to discourage and eliminate any
racial discrimination.
Conclusions of Law:
1. This court has jurisdiction and
venue. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 28 U.S.C. §
1391(b).
2. Inmates of penal institutions, such
as plaintiffs herein, are protected
against invidious racial discrimination by

the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. Turner v. Safley,

53

482 U.S. 78, 84 (1986), citing Lee v.
Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).

3. A law, policy, or other official act
is not unconstitutional solely because it
has a racially disproportionate impact or
effect. Evidence or proof of a racially
discriminatory purpose or intent is
necessary to sustain a denial of equal
protection clain. Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 239-245 (1975); see, Andrews
Vv. Shulsen, 802 F.2d 1256, 1271 (10th Cir.
1986), note 11, wherein this Circuit,
citing the Washington case, recognized
that evidence of a discriminatory intent

is required to prove a denial of equal

protection; also, Personnel _ Admin. of
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1978).

4. It is well recognized that the

federal courts should accord deference to

ee

54
the appropriate state prison authorities

in the administration of prison affairs.

Turner _v. Safley, supra, at 84-85, citing
Procunier _v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405
(1974); Cruz _v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321
(1971).

S. This court certainly agrees with this
Circuit that the pronouncement in Lee v.
Washington, supra, "that prison
authorities have the right, acting in good
faith and in particularized circumstances,
to take into account racial tensions in
maintaining security, discipline, and good
order in prisons and jails", recognizes
the principle that in the administration
of prison affairs there may arise unusual
situations in which security and

discipline demand segregation for limited

periods. United States _v. Wyandotte

55

County, Kansas, 480 F.2d 969, 970-971
(10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1068. Like the United States Supreme
Court in the concurring opinion of Lee v._
Washington, supra, at 334, this court is
“unwilling to assume that state or local
prison authorities {defendants} might
mistakenly regard such ... pronounce-
ment as evincing any dilution of this
Court's firm commitment to the Fourteenth
Amendment 's prohibition of racial
discrimination." (Emphasis added).

Pursuant to the above Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, this court
having found no evidence of a racially
discriminatory purpose or intent on the
part of defendants, and having found, to
the contrary, that the defendants’

expressed intent, practices, and policies

56

are to prohibit and prevent invidious
racial discrimination, the court finds
that the defendants have not _ denied
plaintiffs of equal protection of law
under the Fourteenth Amendment by racial
discrimination. Accordingly, plaintiffs'
equal protection of law claims pursuant to
the Fourteenth Amendment due to racial
discrimination are denied and dismissed.

IT I8 ALL 8O ORDERED this _22. day of
December, 1989.

(8) FRANK H. SEAY
United States District Judge

57

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

Bobby Battle, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

Vv. No. 72-095-C

Park J. Anderson, et al.,
Defendants.

JUDGMENT

Pursuant to this Court's Order of

)
)
)
)
)
)

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
filed herein on December 22, 1989, the
court orders judgment entered for the
defendants on plaintiffs' claim of denial
of equal protection of law under the Four-
teenth Amendment due to racial
discrimination and judgment dismissing
this case.

IT I8 80 ORDERED this _8 £day of

January, 1990.

United States District Judge

58

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

BOBBY BATTLE, et al.,
Plaintiff-Appellants,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Intervenor,
Vv. No. 90-7012
(E.D. Okla)
No. 72-95-CIV)
(D.C.)
PARK ANDERSON, his succes-
sOr;RICHARD CRISP, Warden,
Oklahoma State Penitentiary,
and his successor;J.M.
SUNDERLAND, Warden, Oklahoma
State Reformatory, and his
successor ;DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS ;F.WARREN BENTON,
Director, his successor, and
the current;BOARD OF
CORRECTIONS, STATE OF OKLA-
HOMA; FRANK E. CAREY, JR.,
President; LEROY KIRK;
PATRICIA MONTGOMERY; GARY M.
COOK; CHESTER T. CURTAIN;
SETH MILLINGTON; WILLIAM R.
THOMPSON,as members and
their successors,
Defendants-Appellees.

Filed October 3, 1991

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

59

Bobby Battle, the class representa-
tive of inmates incarcerated in the
Oklahoma State Penitentiary, appeals from
the dismissal of his claim of a denial of
equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment because of racial
discrimination.

Upon consideration of the record, the
briefs, and the arguments of counsel, the
order and judgment of the district court
is VACATED. This case is remanded for a
full evidentiary hearing concerning
compliance at the present date by the
Oklahoma Department of Corrections (DOC)
with the existing orders and injunctions
in this action concerning racial

\
discrimination in violation of the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, see Battle v. Anderson, 376

60

F.Supp. 402, 428-30 (E.D. Okla. 1974);
Battle, 457 F. Supp. 719, 739-40 (E.D.
Okla. 1978), along with such further
actions and orders in connection therewith
or resulting therefrom as may be
appropriate. The evidentiary hearing
should focus on job assignments, but
should also cover segregation in celling
and dining, as well as other Claims of
discrimination.

This court is mindful of appellees'
concern that forcible mixed race double
celling, and other actions, could pose a
security and management problem to the
DOC. See Corrected Appellees' Answer
Brief at 22. As three Justices noted in

their concurrence to Lee v. Washington,

“prison authorities have the right, acting

in good faith and in particularized

61
circumstances, to take into account racial
tensions in maintaining security,
discipline, and good order in prisons and
jails." 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (Black,
J., concurring) .* See also Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (prisoners
retain those constitutional rights "not
inconsistent ... with the legitimate

penological objectives of the corrections

* This court expresses no view as to
whether the DOC has made or can make the
Showing necessary to satisfy

° We also note that Lee held
that invidious racial] discrimination is as
intolerable within a prison as outside
except where essential to prison security
and discipline. . See , 468
U.S. 517, 523 (1984) (dictum).

62

system") (quoting » 437
U.S. 817, 822 (1974)). However, "a vague
fear on the part of the authorities that
desegregation may result in violence . .
- + is not enough." United States v.
-, 480 F.2d 969, 971
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1068
(1973).
JUDGMENT VACATED AND CASE REMANDED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge

63

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

BOBBY BATTLE, et al.,
Plaintiff-Appellants,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Intervenor,

PARK ANDERSON, his succes-
sor ;RICHARD CRISP, Warden,
Oklahoma State Penitentiary,
and his successor;J.M.
SUNDERLAND, Warden, Oklahoma
State Reformatory, and his
successor;DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS ; F. WARREN BENTON,
Director, his successor, and
the current;BOARD oF
CORRECTIONS, STATE OF OKLA-
HOMA; FRANK E. CAREY, JR.,
President; LEROY KIRK;
PATRICIA MONTGOMERY; GARY M.
COOK; CHESTER T. CURTAIN;
SETH MILLINGTON; WILLIAM R.
THOMPSON,as members and
their successors,
Defendants-Appellees.

ORDER
Entered December 13, 1991

BEFORE LOGAN, MOORE, ANDERSON,
Circuit Judges

64

This matter comes on for
consideration of appellants' suggestion
for rehearing en banc, which the court
treats as a petition for rehearing and
suggestion for rehearing en banc.

Upon consideration whereof, the
petition for rehearing is denied by the
panel that rendered the decision.

In accordance with Rule 35(b),
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the
suggestion for rehearing en banc was
transmitted to all of the judges of the
court who are in regular active service.
No member of the panel and no judge in
regular active service on the court having
requested that the court be polled on

rehearing en banc, Rule 35, Federal Rules

65
of Appellate Procedure, the suggestion for
rehearing en banc is denied.
Entered for the Court

(8) ROBERT L. HOECKER, CLERK

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386011_0345%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
