# Appendix — Front Royal & Warren County Industrial Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1992
- **Citation:** 503 U.S. 937

## Text

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IN THE DFFICE OF THE CLERK

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Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1991

FRONT ROYAL AND WARREN COUNTY
INDUSTRIAL PARK CORPORATION,

FRED W. MCLAUGHLIN AND
GLaDYs L. MCLAUGHLIN,
Petitioners,
¥>
TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL, VIRGINIA, et al.
Respondents.

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT C. FITZGERALD
Myron C. SMITH*
10560 Main Street
Suite 510
Fairfax, VA 22030
(703) 273-0001
JOHN F. CAHILL
JOHN HOLLAND FOOTE
GRAYSON P. HANES
HAZEL & THOMAS, P.C.
P.O. Box 12001
Falls Church, VA 22042
(703) 641-4200
“Counsel of Record

Attorneys for Petitioner

PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203

INDEX TO APPENDIX

Front Royal and Warren County Industrial Park
Corporation et al. v. Town of Front Royal, Vir-
ginia et al., 945 F.2d 760 (4th Cir. 1991) .....

Front Royal and Warren County Industrial Park
Corporation et al. v. Town of Front Royal, Vir-
ginia et al., 865 F.2d 77 (4th Cir. 1989) .......

Order of the Fourth Circuit Denying Rehearing of
PURINES TS TOI accra ccccokscorteekeancds es

Front Royal and Warren County Industrial Park
Corporation et al. v. Town of Front Royal, Vir-
ginia et al., 749 F.Supp. 1489 (W.D. Va.
POTD akin cadanmnamisndns eaesnbiaueiataareicitsdas sniccaae

Front Royal and Warren County Industrial Park
Corporation et al. v. Town of Front Royal, Vir-
ginia et al., 708 F.Supp. 1477 (W.D. Va.
IPE, Wiocssssbioicacarnbuicenieiclatiinsndins cabdciaradantalcewenidonnebdeens

Order and Opinion of the United States District
Court Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Af-
I IID a cncicdetaanercodimmcmicinecncchanetieas

October 28, 1991 Denial of Petition for Rehearing
before the United States Court of Appeals for
OU PRO CII cish tstrsdecirtcccenscinreccrcerscencinds

Decree of Annexation dated December 31, 1976 ..
Decree of Annexation dated December 31, 1978 ..
Annexation Court Order dated January 20, 1984 .

First Amended Complaint of Front Royal and War-
ren County industrial Park Corporation (87-
PNIIUIEE -Wiaissin\acrcacned nits vgseiaiasesinvuieectaonesnencisein

First Amended Complaint of Fred W. McLaughlin,
PE Se ee ID acs caicscnnccccntnedeuassuotanrzsseecatoonns

Page

18a

la

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 90- 1875

FRONT ROYAL AND WARREN COUNTY INDUSTRIAL PARK
CORPORATION, a Virginia Corporation; FRED W.
McLAUGHLIN; GLADYS L. MCLAUGHLIN,

Plaintiffs-A ppellees,
Vv.

TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL, VIRGINIA, a municipal corporation;
JOHN MARLOow, individually and as Mayor of the Town of
Front Royal; MICHAEL Kitts, individually and as a member
of the Town Council of the Town of Front Royal, Virginia;
EDWIN L. POMEROY, individually and as’a former member
of the Town Council of the Town of Front Royal, Virginia;
ALBERT G. RuFF, JR., individually and as a former member
of the Town Council of the Town of Front Royal, Virginia;
GEORGE E. BANKS, individually and as a former member
of the Town Council of the Town of Front Royal, Virginia;
BRACKENRIDGE H. BENTLEY, individually and as Town
Manager of the Town of Front Royal, Virginia,

Defendants-A ppellants,

VIRGINIA ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES; LOCAL GOVERNMENT

ATTORNEYS OF VIRGINIA, INCORPORATED,
Amicus Curiae.

2a

No. 90-1884

FRONT ROYAL AND WARREN COUNTY INDUSTRIAL PARK
CORPORATION, a Virginia Corporation; FRED W.
McLAUGHLIN; GLADYS L. MCLAUGHLIN,

Plaintiffs-A ppellants,
v.

TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL, VIRGINIA, a municipal corporation;
JOHN MARLOvW, individually and as Mayor of the Town of
Front Royal; MICHAEL KITTS, individually and as a member
of the Town Council of the Town of Front Royal, Virginia;
EDWIN L. POMEROY, individually and as a former member
of the Town Council of the Town of Front Royal, Virginia;
ALBERT G. RUFF, JR., individually and as a former member
of the Town Council of Front Royal, Virginia; GEORGE E.
BANKS, individually and as a former member of the Town
Council of the Town of Front Royal, Virginia;
BRACKENRIDGE H. BENTLEY, individually and as Town
Manager of the Town of Front Royal, Virginia,

Defendants-A ppellees,

VIRGINIA ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES; LOCAL GOVERNMENT

ATTORNEYS OF VIRGINIA, INCORPORATED,
Amicus Curiae.

Appeals from the United Stated District Court
for the Western District of Virginia, at Harrisonburg.
James H. Michael, Jr., District Judge.
(CA-87-19, CA-87-20)

3a

Argued: June 3, 1991
Decided: September 19, i991
Before ERVIN, Chief Judge, and SPROUSE and
WILKINS, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by published opinions. Chief Judge
Ervin wrote the opinion, in which Judge Sprouse and
Judge Wilkins joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Glenn M. Hodge, WHARTON, ALDHIZER &
WEAVER, Harrisonburg, Virginia, for Appellants. Harold
Jonathan Krent, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL
OF LAW, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Amici Curiae. Rob-
ert C. Fitzgerald, FITZGERALD & SMITH, P.C., Fairfax,
Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Douglas L. Guynn,
Mark D. Obenshain, WHARTON, ALDHIZER &
WEAVER, Harrisonburg, Virginia; David N. Crump, AD-
AMSON, CRUMP & SHARP, Front Royal, Virginia, for
Appellants. Harold P. Juren, G. Timothy Oksman, Joseph
P. Rapisarda, Jr., LOCAL GOVERNMENT ATTORNEYS
OF VIRGINIA, INC., Charlottesville, Virginia; C. Flippo
Hicks, VIRGINIA ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES, Rich-
mond, Virginia, for Amici Curiae. Myron C. Smith, FITZ-
GERALD & SMITH, P.C., Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellees.

OPINION
ERVIN, Chief Judge:

Plaintiffs in this consolidated § 1983 action are Warren
County Industrial Park Corporation (‘‘Front Royal Cor-
poration”) and two Front Royal, Virginia, landowners.
They sought damages from the Town of Front Royal
(‘Front Royal’’) and several Front Royal officials, alleging
that they violated plaintiffs’ fifth and fourteenth amend-

4a

ment rights. Although plaintiffs had remedies available to
them under state law, they did not pursue those remedies
but instead came into federal court seeking relief. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of
plaintiffs. We find that the district court should have ab-
stained from ruling in this case and therefore vacate the
order granting summary judgment.

I

Plaintiffs own parcels of land which were annexed by
Front Royal in 1976 and 1978 pursuant to separate An-
nexation Court orders. The orders directed Front Royal
to extend sewer service to the parcels of land covered by
the annexation orders as expeditiously as practicable, but
in any event within 5 years of the entry of the orders.
Front Royal failed to extend sewer--service to plaintiffs’
parcels. As a result, plaintiffs sought to vindicate their
rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments and 42
U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia.

Plaintiffs alleged that the refusal by the defendants to
extend sewer service to their parcels deprived them of all
economically viable uses of their property. Plaintiffs also
contended that they were denied equal protection of the
law because defendants provided sewer service to similarly
situated landowners within the annexed area, while de-
nying the same service to plaintiffs.

Defendants raised several affirmative defenses including
absolute legislative immunity and executive qualified im-
munity. The district court granted plaintiffs’ motion to
strike the absolute immunity defense, and defendants
appealed to this court in an interlocutory appeal. In a
previous holding, we upheld the district court’s holding
that absolute legislative immunity was not available to
defendants. Front Royal & Warren County Indus. Park

5a

Corp. v. Front Royal, 865 F.2d 77 (4th Cir. 1989) (“Front
Royal I’).

Thereafter, the district court granted plaintiffs’ motion
to strike defendants’ asserted qualified immunity defense.
Front Royal & Warren County Indus. Park Corp. v. Front
Royal, 708 F. Supp. 1477, 1480-82 (W.D. Va. 1989) (‘‘F’ront
Royal II’). On cross motions for summary judgment, the
district court granted plaintiffs’ motion on the § 1983 tak-
ings claim. Jd. at 1483-85. The court rejected defendants’
argument that (1) there was no compensable taking; and
(2) adequate state remedies existed which sho'd have
counselled the district court to abstain from hearing the
case at all. The district court also granted summary judg-
ment in favor of plaintiffs on the equal protection claim.
Id. at 1487. The court held that the actions taken by the
town counsel served no legitimate governmental purpose
and that the actions deprived plaintiffs of equal protection
of the laws. After granting summary judgment in favor
of plaintiffs, the district court held a bench trial on the
issue of damages and awarded the following amounts:
$176,526.56 to the individual landowners and $489,072.59
to the Front Royal Corporation. Front Royal & Warren
County v. Front Royal, 749 F. Supp. 1439, 1448-49 (W.D.
Va. 1990) (‘Front Royal III’).

Both parties appealed from the judgment of the district
court. Defendants alleged that there were numerous er-
roneous rulings by the district court, and plaintiffs as-
serted that the court should have awarded punitive
damages.

II

The defendants and amici curiae urge us to abstain
from ruling in this case. They assert that under Virginia
law, alternative remedies were available to plaintiffs. In
addition, they argue that land use policy is local in nature

6a

and that federal courts should not intrude into this area
unless absolutely necessary.

We note at the outset that we are not barred from
abstaining in this case because we previously issued an
opinion in F’ront Royal I, 865 F.2d 77. There, we addressed
the issue of absolute immunity on interlocutory appeal. We
held that the district court’s order dismissing the absolute
immunity defense was immediately appealable. Front Royal
I, 865 F.2d at 79. However, the fact that we had juris-
diction over the district court’s order regarding absolute
immunity did not permit us to review other claims raised
below. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 662-63
(1977). We could have considered the abstention issue only
if it fell within the exception to the final-judgment rule
set out in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541, 547 (1949). Therefore, it is proper for us to now
consider whether abstention is appropriate even though we
have already issued an opinion in this case.

Plaintiffs argue that we should not consider the ab-
stention issue because it was not raised by defendants, but
was raised by amici curiae on this appeal. We note, how-
ever, that we may apply the abstention doctrine at our
own instance even if no party urges the doctrine upon us.
Caleb Stowe Associates, Ltd. v. County of Albemarle, 724
F.2d 1079, 1080 (4th Cir. 1984); AFA Distributing Co. v.
Pearl Brewing Co., 470 F.2d 1210, 1213 (4th Cir. 1978).
Therefore, we turn to the issue of whether we should
abstain from ruling on the case before us.

In Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), the
Supreme Court set out a form of abstention which is ap-
propriate in order to prevent unnecessary interference by
the federal courts in the interpretation of a complex state
regulatory scheme. This court has explained the purpose
of the Burford abstention doctrine as follows:

The purpose of Burford abstention is to prevent
a federal court from interfering with a ‘“‘complex

Ta

state regulatory scheme concerning important
matters of state policy for which impartial and
fair administrative determinations subject to ex-
peditious and adequate judicial review are af-
forded.” Aluminum Co. v. Utilities Commission
of North Carolina, 713 F.2d 1024 (4th Cir. 1983),
Cert. denied, ___U.S. __, 104 S. Ct. 1326 (1984).

Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Baltimore County, 774 F.2d 77,
79 (4th Cir. 1985).

In Browning-Ferris, complex state regulations govern-
ing landfill operations were at issue. We held that ab-
stention was proper based on the following reason:

(T]he state regulations governing landfill opera-
tions are lengthy and detailed and involve com-
plex scientific questions that must be reviewed
before a permit for a waste disposal facility is
approved. The Burford requirement that a com-
plex state regulatory scheme be involved in order
for a district court to abstain is sufficiently pres-
ent in this case.

Additionally, land use questions, . . . are the
peculiar concern of local and state governments,
and traditionally, federal courts have not inter-
fered with state courts in the area of land use
policy.

Id. at 79. Similarly, in Caleb Stowe Associates, 724 F.2d
1079 (4th Cir. 1984), we abstained from deciding the case
because it involved a matter of state and local land use
law. Id. at 1080. There,

_ all of the plaintiffs’ state and federal claims
necessarily depended[ed] upon the construction of
state land use law concerning the scope of au-
thority of local planning bodies and Boards of
Supervisors, the proper interpretation of state

8a

and local land use law and county zoning prac-
tices and procedure.

Id.

In Fralin & Waldron, Inc. v. Martinsville, 493 F.2d 481
(4th Cir. 1974), we abstained from deciding a land use
case because ‘‘the courts of Virginia ha[d] extensive fa-
miliarity and experience with such matters, and. . . should
have the initial opportunity to pass upon them.” Jd. at
482.

We noted that a state adjudication might avoid: (1) the
necessity of a decision on the federal constitutional ques-
tions presented; and (2) ‘‘needless friction in federal-state
relations over the administration of purely state affairs.”
Id. at 483. We find the reasoning of the above cases per-
suasive. Here, we are asked to determine that Front Royal
violated the orders of the Annexation Courts and that, as
a result, plaintiffs’ land was taken without just compen-
sation, and plaintiffs were denied equal protection of the
law. All of plaintiffs’ claims stem from their assertion that
Front Royal violated the Annexation Courts’ orders.

In Virginia, Annexation Courts are established by stat-
ute to determine whether a city or town may annex ad-
jacent land. Va. Code Ann. § 15.1-1035 et seg. (1989 Repl.
Vol.). The Annexation Court is composed of three judges
designated by- the Supreme Court of Virginia. Va. Code
Ann. § 15.1-1038 (1989 Repl. Vol.). The Annexation Court
is to determine the ‘‘necessity for an expediency of an-
nexation” considering the best interests of the city or towr
and the people in the area to be annexed. Va. Code Ann.
§ 15.1- 1041(b) (Repl. Vol.). If the Annexation Court grants
the petition for annexation, the Court “shall set forth in
detail all such terms and conditions upon which the petition
is granted.”” Va. Code Ann. § 15.1-1041(d).

The Annexation Court ‘“‘shall enter an order setting forth
what it deemed fair and reasonable terms and conditions,

9a

and shall direct the annexation in conformity therewith.”
Va. Code Ann. § 15.1- 1042 (1989 Repl. Vol.). The An-
nexation Court remains in existence for 10 years from the
effective date of any annexation order entered. Va. Code
Ann. § 15.1-1047(a) (1989 Repl. Vol.). The Annexation
Court can be reconvened

_.. at any time during the ten-year period on its
own motion, or on motion of the governing body
of the county, or of the city or town, or on
petition of not less than fifty registered voters
or property owners in the area annexed; pro-
vided, however, if the area annexed contains less
than 100 registered voters or property owners,
then a majority of such registered voters or prop-
erty owners may petition for the reconvening of
the court.

Va. Code Ann. § 15.1-1647(b) (1989 Repl. Vol). The An-
nexation Court has the power during the ten year period
to enforce the performance of the terms and conditions
under which annexation was granted. Va. Code Ann.
§ 15.1-1047(c) (1989 Repl. Vol.). Any action by the An-
nexation Court under § 15.1047(c) is subject to review by
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. Va. Code Ann.
§ 15.1-1047(d) (1989 Repl. Vol.). In addition, “(mjandamus
and prohibition shall lie from the Supreme Court of Appeals
or any circuit court to compel a city or town to carry out
the provisions of [the annexation statute] or to forbid any
violation of the same.”’ Va. Code Ann. § 15.1-1048 (1989
Repl. Vol.).

In this case, the orders of two separate Annexation
Courts are at issue. The 1978 Annexation Court, whose
order covered property owned by the Front Royal Cor-
poration, reconvened itself in 1983 after being petitioned
by the Front Royal Corporation for the purpose of deter-
mining whether its order had been obeyed. Based on rep-
resentations made by the town at that hearing regarding

10a

their plans for adding sewer lines, the Annexation Court
found that Front Royal was in substantial compliance with
the 1978 order. The 1976 Annexation Court, whose order
covered the individual landowners’ property, was never
reconvened. *

At the heart of the case before us is the question
whether Front Royal ever complied with the orders of the
Annexation Courts. The answer requires interpretation of
the Annexation Courts’ orders, which is a determination
that the Annexation Court was uniquely qualified to make.
The annexation system as set up in Virginia is a complex
scheme. It involves a court system set up specifically to
deal with the annexation process. It provides for appeal
to the Virginia courts if the town fails to comply with the
Annexation Court’s orders. See Va. Code § 15.1-1048. We
believe that this annexation scheme is sufficiently local in
nature to warrant our abstaining from deciding the issues
before us. Like the claims in F’ralin and Caleb Stowe, all
of plaintiffs’ federal claims necessarily depend upon the
construction of state law—here the orders of the Annex-
ation Courts. The courts of Virginia have much greater
familiarity with the operations of the Virginia annexation
scheme, and we believe that they should have the first
opportunity to pass upon them. See Fralin, 493 F.2d at
482.

In addition, there are other state remedies which might
be available to plaintiffs. The Virginia Constitution pro-
vides due process protection to those who have been un-
lawfully deprived of their property. Va. Const. art. I, § 11.
Virginia courts have consistently recognized a common law

* We note that 10 years have now run from the date of the An-
nexation Courts’ original orders. Thus, there is a question whether the
Courts could be reconvened at this time. However, because of the
defendants’ behavior in this case contributing to the passing of these
deadlines, it might be that the Annexation Courts could reconvene
under the specia! circumstances of this case. That is not for us to
decide, however.

lla

cause of action to protect this right. See Groves v. Coz,
559 F. Supp. 772, 777 (E.D. Va. 1983); Morris v. Elizabeth
River Tunnel District, 203 Va. 196, 123 S.E.2d 398 (1962).

Because the annexation court system is a matter of
purely state and local law, and because there may be other
state remedies available to plaintiffs in this case, we vacate
the district court’s orders granting summary judgment and
damages in favor of plaintiffs. However, as think that it
is appropriate for the district court to retain jurisdiction
over the case pending the outcome of the state proceedings
because they may not fully dispose of all of the federal
claims. See Caleb Stowe, 724 F.2d at 1080-81 (directing the
district court to retain jurisdiction over the case pending
a state court determination); Forest Hills Utility Co. v.
City of Heath, Ohio, 539 F.2d 592, 596 (6th Cir. 1976)
(holding that the district court should have retained juris-
diction over the claims pending the outcome of state pro-
ceedings when it abstained under the Pullman and Burford
doctrines). Therefore, we vacate the district court’s orders
and remand with instructions to retain jurisdiction of the
case pending the outcome of the state court proceedings.

VACATED AND REMANDED
WITH INSTRUCTIONS

12a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 88- 2066

Front Royal and Warren County Industrial Park Corpo-
ration, a Virginia Corporation; Fred W. McLaughlin;
Gladys L. McLaughlin,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus

Town of Front Royal, Virginia; John Marlow, and as
Mayor; Michael Kitts, individually and as member of Town
Council; Edwin L. Pomeroy, individually and as member
of Town Council; Albert G. Ruff, Jr., individually and as
former member; George E. Banks, individually and as for-
mer member, Brackenridge H. Bentley, individually and
as Town Manager,
Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia, at Harrisonburg. James H.
Michael, Jr., District Judge. (CA-87-0019 and CA-87-0020).

Argued: October 5, 1988 Decided: January 9, 1989

Before WINTER, SPROUSE, and ERVIN, Circuit Judges.

Mark D. Obenshain (Glenn M. Hodge, WHARTON, AL-
DHIZER & WEAVER on brief) for Appellants. Robert C.
Fitzgerald (Myron C. Smith, FITZGERALD & SMITH,
P.C. on brief) for Appellees.

13a

ERVIN, Circuit Judge

Plaintiffs in this consolidated § 1983 action are two
Front Royal, Virginia, landowners and the Front Royal
and Warren County Industrial Park Corporation. Plaintiffs
seek damages from defendants, the Town of Front Royal
(‘Front Royal”) and various Front Royal officials, for al-
leged violations of plaintiffs’ fifth and fourteenth amend-
ment rights. The district court granted plaintiffs’ motion
to strike defendants’ absolute immunity defense. We hold
that the district court’s order striking the defense was
immediately appealable, and affirm.

I.

Plaintiffs own parcels of land annexed by Front Royal
in 1976 and 1978. At the times of annexation, the Virginia
Annexation Court ordered Front Royal to extend sewer
service to the annexed parcels as quickly as reasonably
possible, and in any event within five years. Plaintiffs al-
lege that Front Royal has denied their repeated requests
for sewer service. When plaintiffs filed suit on February
12, 1987, Front Royal had not yet extended sewer service
to the annexed parcels.

Plaintiffs’ complaints alleged that defendants’ failure to
provide sewer service had deprived plaintiffs of all eco-
nomically viable and reasonable uses of their land. Plaintiffs
also alleged that defendants had deprived them of equal
protection of the laws by withholding sewer service from
plaintiffs while providing service to other landowners whose
needs were no greater than plaintiffs’.

Defendants interposed a number of affirmative defenses,
among them that absolute legislative immunity insulated
them from suit. Plaintiffs moved to strike the absolute
immunity defense, contending that defendants had taken
no legislative action with respect to sewer service. The
district court granted plaintiffs’ motion to strike in an

l4a

order from which defendants noticed an interlocutory
appeal.! Plaintiffs in turn argue that the order is not im-
mediately appealable.

Il.

Plaintiffs advance the threshold contention that the dis-
trict court’s order is not immediately appealable under the
test articulated in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 102
S.Ct. 2690, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982).2 We disagree. The
Supreme Court has several times held that orders denying
claims of absolute immunity are immediately appealable.
Nixon, 457 U.S. at 742. ,

We also note initially that we have held that orders
denying absolute immunity are, as a general matter, im-
mediately appealable under the Nixon criteria. England v.
Rockefeller, 739 F.2d 140, 142 (4th Cir. 1984); Bever v.
Gilbertson, 724 F.2d 1083, 1086-87 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 948 (1984). Plaintiffs nonetheless contend that
this appeal presents no serious and unsettled question of
law. Because what defendants have asserted is essentially
the right to avoid trial, we believe the district court’s
denial of immunity presents a serious legal issue. We know

' The order also denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the action based
on absolute immunity.

2 Nixon declared that:

[A] small class of interlocutory orders are immediately
appealable to courts of appeals. ... [T]his class embraces
orders that ‘‘conclusively determine the disputed question,
resolve an important issue completely separate from the
merits of the action, and [are] effectively unreviewable on
appeal from a final judgment.” (quoting Coopers & Lybrand
v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)) ... [A]n additional
requirement [is] that collateral appeal of an interlocutory
order must “‘presen[t] a serious and unsettled question.”’
(quoting Cohen v Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541, 547 (1949)).

457 U.S. at 742 (citations omitted).

15a

of no Supreme Court case that has resolved an absolute
immunity claim similar to that broached by defendants.
See Nixon, 457 U.S. at 743. We therefore conclude that
the district court’s order in this case was immediately
appealable.

Ill.

It is well established that local legislators enjoy absolute
immunity from suit for decisions made in their capacity
as legislators. Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409,
1422-23 (4th Cir. 1983); Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272,
279 (4th Cir. 1980). The inquiry in this case is accordingly
whether the district court correctly concluded that the
defendants’ denials of requests for sewer service were not
legislative actions. We believe the district court was cor-
rect to conclude that the defendants’ decisions were not
legislative.*

In Scott, 716 F.2d at 1423, we held that when municipal!
officials ‘“‘do more than adopt prospective, legislative-type
rules and take the next step into the area of enforcement,
they can claim only the executive qualified immunity ap-
propriate to that activity.” We agree with the district
court that defendants’ decisions had to do with zoning
enforcement rather than with rulemaking. See First Vir-
yinia Bank-Colonial v. Baker, 301 S.E.2d 8, 11 (Va. 1983)
(municipal officer liable for misfeasance of a ministerial
duty); Howlett v. City of South Norfolk, 69 S.E.2d 346,
348 (Va. 1952) (construction of authorized public works as
a ministerial activity); Hoggard v. Richmond, 200 S.E. 619,
615 (1939). The order of the Virginia Annexation Court
removed what discretion defendants might otherwise have
had to approve or decline plaintiffs’ requests for sewer

* Plaintiffs did not appeal the district court’s denial of their motion
to strike defendants’ qualified executive immunity defense. Our decision
accordingly reflects no opinion on the applicability or effect of the
qualified immunity defense.

16a

service. Defendants have not argued that they could law-
fully have defied the annexation court’s order,‘ or that
their failure to comply with the order represented a policy
decision that to do so was in the best interests of Front
Royal’s citizens. Defendants have, in short, not claimed
that their failure to authorize sewer service is the sort of
discretionary, prospective determination that warrants ab-
solute immunity.

AFFIRMED.

‘ Counsel stated in oral argument that the Virginia Annexation Court
no longer exists, but did not contest the continuing validity of the
court’s orders with respect to plaintiffs’ parcels.

17a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 88-2066

Front Royal and Warren County Industrial Park Corp., et
al,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
Town of Front Royal, et al,
Defendants-Appellants.

FILED
JAN 31 1989
U.S. Court of Appeals
Fourth Circuit

On Petitior for Rehearing

Upon consideration of appellants’ petition for rehearing,

IT IS ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is de-
nied.

Entered at the direction of Judge Ervin, with the con-
currence of Chief Judge Winter and Judge Sprouse.

For the Court

JOHN M. GREACEN

CLERK

18a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

HARRISONBURG DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-0019-H

FRONT ROYAL AND WARREN COI
INDUSTRIAL PARK CORP.,

V.

TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL, VIRGINIA,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-0020-H

Judge James H. Michael, Jr.

FRED W. McLAUGHLIN, et ux.,

V%

TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL, VIRGINIA,

Clerk’s Office U.S. Dist. Court
at Harrisonburg, VA

Filed
Oct 22 1990
Joyce F. Witt, Clerk

By: /s/ P. Hensley
Deputy Clerk

NTY

Plaintiff

Defendants

Plaintiffs

et al.,
Defendants

19a

ORDER

For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memoran-
dum Opinion, the court hereby finds as follows:

(1) The Front Royal and Warren County Industrial Park
Corporation, plaintiffs in Civil Action No. 87-0019-H, are
entitled to recover compensatory damages in the amount
of $489,072.59, costs and attorney’s fees incurred through
December 4, 1989 in the amount of $68,096.25, plus ad-
ditional costs and fees as may be shown to the court; and

(2) Fred W. McLaughlin, et ux., plaintiffs in Civil Action
No. 87-0020-H, are entitled to recover compensatory dani-
ages in the amount of $176,526.56, costs and attorney’s
fees incurred through December 4, 1989 in the amount of
$39,371.30, plus additional costs and fees as may be shown

to the court.

In light of these findings, it is hereby

ADJUDGED AND ORDERED

as follows:

(1) The indicated damages amounts shall be paid by the
defendants.

(2) The plaintiffs herein shall make an appropriate show-
ing of such additional attorney’s fees and costs to the court
by November 12, 1990.

The Clerk of the Court is hereby directed to send a
certified copy of this Order to all counsel of record.
ENTERED: /s/ James H. Michael, Jr.
Judge
October 22, 1990
Date

A TRUE COPY, TESTE:
JOYCE F. WITT, CLERK
BY: /s/ P. Hensley
DEPUTY CLERK

20a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
HARRISONBURG DIVISION

Civil Action No. 87-0019-H

Clerk’s Office U.S. Dist. Court
at Harrisonburg, VA

Filed
Oct 22 1990
Joyce F. Witt, Clerk

By: P. Hensley
Deputy Clerk

FRONT ROYAL AND WARREN COUNTY
INDUSTRIAL PARK CORP.,
Plaintiff
v.

TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL, VIRGINIA, et al..,
Defendants

Civil Action No. 87-0020-H

Judge James H. Michael, Jr.

FRED W. McLAUGHLIN, et ux.,

Plaintiffs,

2la

TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL, VIRGINIA, et al.,
Defendants

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiffs in these consolidated actions own land in the
town of Front Royal, Virginia. As a result of the town’s
failure to supply the plaintiffs’ properties with sewer and
water service in a timely fashion, as required by a decree
of a state annexation court, this court previously held as
a4 matter of law that a Fifth Amendment taking of the
plaintiffs’ properties had been effected. Front Royal &
Warren County Industrial Park Corp. v. Front Royal, 708
F. Supp. 1477, 1484 (W.D. Va. 1989) (“Front Royal I’).
The court also granted plaintiffs’ motions for summary
judgment on their Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protec-
tion claims. Jd. at 1487. Subsequently these actions came
before the court, sitting without a jury, for a trial on
damages. The court heard testimony from January 30 to
February 1 and also on February 21, 1990. Plaintiffs seek
both actual and punitive damages. This court has jurisdic-
tion pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,
1343(3), (4). Both parties have submitted post-trial mem-
oranda and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law: this matter is now ripe for disposition.

The court fully set forth the facts which supported the
finding that a Fifth Amendment taking had occurred in
Front Royal I and will not recite them again here. The
court will, however, briefly summarize the facts from its
previous explication in order to place the present issue —
the amount of damages which the plaintiffs claim — in
context.

Plaintiffs are several individuals and a corporation who
own land in an area annexed from Warren County by the
Town of Front Royal (the ‘‘Town”’) under separate An-
nexation Court orders of 1976 and 1978. The orders of
annexation required the Town to extend sewer service to ¢

22a

the annexed areas as expeditiously as possible, but not
later than five years after the entry of the orders. At the
time the plaintiffs filed the present suits, the Town had
not yet provided sewer service to any of the subject par-
cels. Because the failure to provide the sewer rendered
the land unusable,’ this court found that a Fifth Amend-
ment taking had occurred. Additionally, although the Town
had not made sewer available to the plaintiffs’ properties,
it had made the service available to other similarly situated
parcels in the area. Most notably, the Town provided sewer
to property belonging to the then Mayor of the Town, who
was subsequently able to develop the property into a sub-
division. Based on these facts, the court further found that
the defendants’ actions violated plaintiffs’ Equal Protection
rights.

I

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), the
court finds the following facts.

Plaintiffs Fred W. McLaughlin and his wife. Gladys L.
McLaughlin, own as tenants in common a tract of land of
approximately 55 acres known as Happy Creek Knolls. The
McLaughlins purchased this tract of land for $14,350.00
as an investment property in July of 1964 when it was a
part of Warren County. On December 31, 1976, the Town
annexed a large parcel of land including the Happy Creek
Knolls tract. Immediately before the annexation, the
plaintiffs subdivided their property and it was taken into
the Town as a subdivision. The property is zoned R-1,
which allows the construction of single family homes on
lots_of at least 10,000 square feet.

‘Indeed, as is detailed more fully below, at the time of the trial on
damages the industriai park property had still not been provided the
required sewer and the individuals plaintiffs’ property had had sewer
services for only a matter of months.

23a

The Front Royal and Warren County Industrial Park
Corporation (the “‘Corporation’’) is a private stock com-
pany of which Fred W. McLaughlin is President. In 1973
and 1974 the Corporation purchased parcels of land to-
talling 86 acres in Warren County. The purchase price
was approximately $107,000.00. The Town annexed this
land, along with other property, in 1978. The Corporation’s
property was zoned industrial and had been subdivided into
16 lots before the annexation.

By Order of the annexation court in 1976, the Town
was given a maximum of five years within which to pro-
vide sewer service to the Happy Creek Knolls property.
In accordance with the annexation court’s order, sewer
was to have been available to the property no later than
December 31, 1981. Sewer service was not actually avail-
able to the property unti! October 11, 1989.

Because sewer vervice is now available to the Happy
Creek Knolls property, the court finds that the taking of
that property has ceased. The plaintiffs are entitled, how-
ever, to appropriate damages for the period of the taking.

By Order of the annexation court in 1978, the Town
had a maximum of five years within which to provide
sewer service to the Industrial Park property. In 1983 the
annexation court granted the Town a two year extension
of the sewer provision date. In accordance with the an-
nexation court’s order, the property was to be provided
with sewer no later than December 31, 1985. As of the
date of trial, sewer service was not yet fully available to
the Industrial Park property.”

The court finds that the failure of the Town to provide
sewer service in a timely fashion was the sole reason why

* Because the Industrial Park property was taken into the Town
already subdivided, the Town was required to provide service to each
of the lots, not merely to one point on the edge of the entire tract.
Service is currently available to some of the Industrial Park lots but
not the majority.

24a

the plaintiffs were unable to develop their property: the
defendants’ failure to provide appropriate sewer service
prevented the plaintiffs from putting their property to its
fullest and best use. Even though at various times during
the relevant period the property was not appropriately
configured to comply with local zoning ordinances, the
court finds that this was due entirely to the absence of
Sewer service. For the plaintiffs to have undertaken the
efforts necessary to comply with the ordinances when it
was readily apparent that sewer service would still be
unavailable, thus leaving the property still unsalable, would
have been futile.

II

As noted previously, the sole issue before the court is
the amount of damages to which the plaintiffs are entitled.
The court’s previous Orders have established that a con-
stitutional taking has occurred and that the defendants are
not immune from liability for damages. Some of the evi- .
dence offered at the hearing on damages represented ef-
forts of the parties, principally the defendants, to offer
new evidence which would bolster their arguments in op-
position to the court’s previous rulings on liability. The
court cautioned counsel on several occasions that it would
consider only the evidence adduced at the hearing solely
in regard to the issue of damages as the liability issues
had previously been resolved. Whether such non-damages
evidence was offered for the purpose of making a record
is immaterial; it was not considered on the damages issue
and obviously was not considered on the liability issue.

A. Compensatory Da mages

A takings action can fall under two constitutional pro-
visions, the fifth amendment of th; United States Con-

25a

stitution or 42 U.S.C. § 1983.5 In Front Royal I, this court
found that the defendants had effectuated a compensable
taking by violating the plaintiffs’ due process rights under
§ 1983. That the plaintiffs’ action arose under § 1983 and
not the fifth amendment does not affect the appropriate
measure of damages to which they are entitled. Wheeler
v. City of Pleasant Grove, 833 F.2d 267, 270 n.3 (11th Cir.
1987) [Wheeler III].

The question of which measure of damages the court
should employ in this case is hardly clear. The court has
looked to the vast array of takings jurisprudence and can-
not find definitive precedent on the issue before it. As
noted previously, this case does not involve condemnation
proceedings, nor does it concern a taking which resulted
from an unconstitutional regulation. The defendants effec-
tuated the taking by failing to act on the annexation court’s
order. However, when examined in light of the Eleventh
Circuit’s definition of a regulatory taking in Wheeler IJ/J—

*The fifth amendment, applicable to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment, provides ‘‘nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.”’ Though the government may
take property pursuant to formal condemnation proceedings, condem-
nation for ‘‘public use’’ is not a constitutional requisite. Government
regulation can so resirict the use of land that it constitutes a taking.
First Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los An-
geles, 482 U.S. 304, 316 (1987). Even where no regulation is involved,
government actions which interfere with a landowner’s beneficial use
of property can constitute a taking. Stoddard v. Western Carolina Re-
gional Sewer Authority, 784 F.2d 1200, 1206 (4th Cir. 1986). Takings
which do not result from condemnation proceedings are technically not
entitled to fifth amendment just compensation; however, such takings
may be the basis of a 42 U.S.C. § 1988 claim if they violate fourteenth
amendment due process rights. Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 833
F.2d 267, 270 n.3 (11th Cir. 1987). A governmental taking need not
be permanent; the government must compensate the landowner even
if a taking is temporary. First Lutheran Church, 482 U.S. at 318-319.

‘ Wheeler was appealed from the district court on four separate oc-
casions. The court will cite to both the third and fourth appellate court
decisions herein.

26a

“a taking that is ultimately invalidated by a court’’—id.,
the facts of this case can most appropriately be analogized
to a regulatory takings case.* Even so, the lack of defin-
itive precedent on compensating a temporary regulatory
taking compels the court to examine the relevant case law.

Just compensation for the government’s permanent ac-
quisition of private property is the property’s fair market
value at the time of the taking. Kirby Forest Industries.
Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). In a temporary
taking, however, ‘‘the Just Compensation Clause of the
Fifth Amendment requires that the government pay the
landowner for the value of the use of the land during this
period.” First Lutheran Church, 482 U.S. at 319; Yuba
Natural Resources, Inc. v. United States, 904 F.2d 1577,
1580-81 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (just compensation ‘“‘is the value
of the use of the property during the temporary taking,
i.e., the amount which the owner lost as a result of the
taking.”’); Nemmers v, City of Dubuque, 764 F.2d 502, 504-
05 (8th Cir. 1985) (‘for a temporary taking, the govern-
ment is responsible for compensating the owner for the
interim during which it effected the taking.”’).

The issues before the Supreme Court in First Lutheran
unfortunately did not include how to measure appropriately
‘the value of the [temporary] use of the land” in tem-
porary regulatory takings cases. The Court offered some
guidance, however, when it held that a temporary regu-

* Although the taking at issue in this case is technically not a “‘reg-
ulatory taking,”’ the cases concerning regulatory takings are analogous
for the purpose of determining the appropriate compensation. As in a
regulatory taking, the defendants in this case have prevented the
plaintiffs from developing their property as they chos2 without initiating
formal condemnation proceedings. The City Council in Wheeler passed
an ordinance forbidding the plaintiff to build, whereas the Town of
Front Royal made the conscious decision not to act according to the
mandate of the annexation court’s order. The governing bodies in both
cases took affirmative steps to deny unconstitutionally the plaintiffs use
of their property, and therefore the facts are comparable.

sik saa aaa ae

27a

latory taking is no different from the government’s tem-
porary use of private property and should be similarly
compensated.® First Lutheran, 482 U.S. at 318-19. Indeed,
the Court contemplated this measure of damages for tem-
porary regulatory takings — that just compensation for
such a taking should be determined as is just compensation
for the temporary use of private property — on two oc-
casions prior to First Lutheran. In United States v. Dow,
357 U.S. 17 (1958), the Court stated that if the govern-
ment were to abandon a condemnation proceeding, the
taking would be temporary and ‘“‘{iJn such cases compen-
sation would be measured by the principles normally gov-
erning the taking of a right to use property temporarily.”
Id. at 26. Justice Brennan similarly expressed this in his
dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450
U.S. 621 (1981). In his discussion of the proper measure
of relief in a temporary regulatory taking, Justice Brennan
stated, “Rules of valuation for temporary ‘takings’ may
be particularly useful ... although additional rules may
need to be developed.” Jd. at 659 (Brennan, J. dissenting)
(citations omitted).

Although the Supreme Court has yet to rule definitively
on the proper measure of just compensation in a temporary
regulatory taking, some of the United States Courts of
Appeals which have addressed the issue have adopted Jus-
tice Brennan’s approach in San Diego Gas. See Nemmers,
764 F.2d at 505 n.2. In so doing, the courts have for-
mulated a computation for damages which parallels that
used for temporary use of private property takings.’ See
Wheeler III, 833 F.2d at 271; Nemmers, 764 F.2d at 505.

*In Furst Lutheran, the Court found that temporary regulatory tak-
ings were compensable by comparing them to takings in which the
government temporarily exercises its right to use private property, in
which cases the owners are entitled to compensation for the temporary
use. First Lutheran, 482 U.S. at 318-19.

’The method for determining appropriate damages for cases in which

28a

The Eleventh Circuit recently addressed the issue of
measuring damages from a tempcrary regulatory taking
in a case similar to this one, Wheeler v. City of Pleasant
Grove. 896 F.2d 1347 (11th Cir. 1990) [Wheeler IV]. The
plaintiff in Wheeler had obtained a building permit to con-
Struct an apartment complex on his property. After com-
munity opposition to the project, the City Council passed
an ordinance which forbade the construction of the com-
plex. Wheeler brought his action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983
and 1985. A federal district court found that the ordinance,
as applied to the plaintiffs, was unconstitutional,* Wheeler
ITI, 833 F.2d at 268-69, even though it did not deny the
plaintiff all use of his property. Wheeler IV at 1351.

In Wheeler III, the Eleventh Circuit set forth the fol-
lowing guidelines by which the district court was to de-
termine the amount of damages suffered by the plaintiffs:

In the case of a temporary regulatory taking,
the landowner’s loss takes the form of an injury
to the property’s potential for producing income
or an expected profit. The landowner’s compen-
Sative interest, therefore, is the return of the
portion of fair market value that is lost as a
result of the regulatory restriction. Accordingly,

the government has exercised its right to temporarily use private prop-
erty is well established. In such cases, the government essentially takes
over an ongoing concern of the plaintiff, and just compensation is the
fair rental value of the property over the period of the taking. Kimball
Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 7 (1949) (‘[T}he proper
measure of compensation ... is the rental that probably could have
been obtained.”) For example in Yuba, where the government had
temporarily taken the mineral rights in the plaintiff's property, the
Federal Circuit noted that “the usual measure of just compensation for
a temporary taking ... is the fair rental value of the property for the
period of the taking.”” Yuba, 904 F.2d at 1581.

‘The court further held that the City Council had arbitrarily and
capriciously enacted and implemented an ordinance which was confis-
catory in nature and had no rational purpose. Wheeler III, 833 F.2d
at 268-69.

29a

the landowner should be awarded the market rate
return computed over the period of the tempo-
rary taking on the difference between the prop-
erty’s fair market value without the regulatory
restriction and its fair market value with the re-
striction.

Wheeler III, 833 F.2d at 271 (citations omitted) (footnote
omitted).

On remand, the district court chose not to follow the
appellate court’s instructions, finding instead that the
plaintiffs could recover nothing because ‘“‘the value of the
property had increased despite the ordinance and since the
ordinance had not destroyed the highest and best use of
the land, ‘the fair market value of the ... property was
not diminished by the enactment of [the ordinance].’”’
Wheeler IV, 896 F.2d at 1350 (citing the memorandum
opinion of the district court). Once again on appeal, how-
ever, the Eleventh Circuit reversed. While noting that the
land’s fair market value probably did not decline as a
result of the government action, id. at 1351, the appellate
court rejected the district court’s determination that the
property’s increase in value over the period of the taking
necessarily negated the plaintiff's right to recover dam-
ages.’ Repeating its previous instructions for adequately
compensating the plaintiff, the Eleventh Circuit held that
the district court should have determined the ‘difference
in the fair market value of appellants’ right to develop
their property when they received their building permit

* The Supreme Court has also rejected the proposition that ‘the dif-
ference between the market value of the fee on the date of the taking
and its market value on the date of its return’’ was the appropriate
measure of just compensation for a temporary taking because ‘“‘there
might frequently be situations in which the owner would receive no
compensation whatever because the market value of the property had
not decreased during the period of the taker’s occupancy.’’ Kimball
Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 7 (1949).

30a

and the fair market value of what remained after the
City’s actions against appellants.” Jd. Applying this
method, the appellate court took the amount of the
plaintiff's interest in the undisputed fair market value, at
the time of the taking, of the complex which appellants
had a right to build, and subtracted from that the plaintiff's
interest in the value of the land only to get the ‘difference
in fair market value lost as a result of the regulatory
restrictions.”’ Jd. The court then computed the market rate
of return on that amount to arrive at the correct amount
of damages. Id. at 1352.

To determine the appropriate computation of damages
in the Wheeler cases, the Eleventh Circuit relied upon the
Eighth Circuit’s analysis in another temporary regulatory
takings case, Nemmers v,. City of Dubuque, 764 F.2d 502
(8th Cir. 1985). In Nemmers, the plaintiff had invested in
developing his land as an industrial park. The land was
subsequently annexed and zoned residential, and the dis-
trict court found that a temporary taking had occurred.
The Eighth Circuit held that the proper method for cal-
culating the damages which resulted from the taking was
to determine “‘the difference between the property’s fair
market value when zoned [for industrial use] and its fair
market value when zoned (for residential use].”’ Jd. at 505.
That amount, plus the return over the number of years
at the appropriate interest rate, was the plaintiffs just
compensation. Jd.

This court finds the opinions of the Eighth and Eleventh
Circuits persuasive on the appropriate measure of damages
for a temporary regulatory taking. Both Nemmers and
Wheeler indicate that, in computing damages, the court
should determine the market value as of the date of the
taking. Wheeler, 896 F.2d at 1351; Nemmers, 764 F.2d at
904. This is consistent with permanent takings jurisprud-
ence, which bases just compensation on the fair market
value at the date of the taking. Furthermore, the approach
mirrors that used in takings involving the temporary use

3la

of private property — in which cases the owners are com-
pensated for the period of use only — as the Supreme
Court in Dow and Justice Brennan in San Diego Gas in-
dicated would be proper. By determining the difference in
value between what the plaintiff would have had absent
the taking and what remained after the taking became
effective, and adding the appropriate interest, the court
can grant a remedy which is fair and adequate. The eval-
uation accounts for the fact that the owner still retains
the property after the taking is invalidated and thus the
plaintiff is justly compensated.

Before the court can apply the damages formula to the
case at hand, it must briefly address alternative damages
calculations proposed by the parties. During the hearing
on damages, and in the parties’ briefs on damages, the
parties offered evidence as to the appropriateness of fac-
tors besides fair market value which the court could con-
sider in determining the appropriate amount of
compensatory damages. In particular, the plaintiffs seek
economic redress for development expenses which accrued
during the period of the taking. In essence, the plaintiffs
suggest that they are entitled to compensation for con-
sequential damages.

Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence conclusively es-
tablishes that when the government effectuates a taking,
‘[t]he owner is to be put in the same position monetarily
as he would have occupied if his property had not been
taken.’”’ United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 15-16
(1970). Consequently, the Court has indicated in both per-
manent and temporary takings cases that just compensa-
tion does not include the consequential damages which an
owner might suffer as a result of the taking. United States
v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 380 (1945) (“[T]hat
which is taken or damaged is the group of rights which
the so-called owner exercises in his dominion of the phys-
ical thing, and that damage to those rights of ownership
does not include losses to his business or other conse-

32a

quential damage.” (footnote omitted)). Indeed, courts have
uniformly held that lost profits, lost opportunities, and
other consequential damages suffered because of a taking
are not compensable. See United States v. 565.54 Acres of
Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) (“[F Jair market value does
not include the special value of the property to the owner
arising from its adaptability to his particular use.”’); United
States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Powelson, 319
U.S. 266, 282 (1943) (“[T]he sovereign must pay only for
what it takes, not for the opportunities which the owner
may lose.’’); Yuba, 904 F.2d at 1581-1582 (in a temporary
taking of mineral rights, the difference in the value of the
property’s gold during the taking period and after the
taking is “precisely the kind of claim for consequential
damages — here, lost profits — that is not an appropriate
element of just compensation for the temporary taking of
property.’’); Helenic Center, Inc. v. Washington Metro Area
Transportation Authority, 815 F.2d 982, 984 (4th Cir.
1987) (“ordinarily, indirect costs to the owner resulting
from the taking ... are not part of the just compensation
which the owner is entitled to recover.’’); United States v.
1735 N. Lynn St., Situated in Rosslyn, VA, 676 F.Supp.
693, 701 (E.D.Va. 1987) (Damages for frustration of ren-
ovation plans are impermissible because “{t]he Fifth
Amendment allows only fair market value, it does not
guarantee a return on investment.”). These cases clearly
indicate that consequential damages are not appropriate
in takings cases.

Despite the overwhelming authority against awarding
consequential damages, the plaintiffs have noted that many
courts have espoused the principle that courts are not

When courts have awarded damages akin to lost profits, the gov-
ernment had taken an existing business or going concern. See Kimball
Laundry, 338 U.S. at 15 (one element of just compensation was what-
ever “demonstrable loss of going-concern value’’ the taking caused.).
In this case, the taking did not involve an ongoing concern.

33a

bound by a specific formula in determining just compen-
sation. United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365
U.S. 624, 633 (1961); United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325,
332 (1949); United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo
Navigation Co., 338 U.S. 396, 402 (1949). Rather, courts
should examine the equities of a specific case to ascertain,
in fairness, the appropriate amount of damages. United
States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973); A.G. Davis Ice
Co. v. United States, 362 F.2d 934 (1st Cir. 1966); United
States v. Lee, 360 F.2d 449, 452 (5th Cir. 1966); Foster
v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 426, 446 (1983). The plaintiffs
advance compelling arguments that equity and fairness
concerns should compel this court to allow them damages
beyond those ascertained by the formula governing tem-
porary regulatory takings. They allege that economic relief
should lie for certain acts, aside from the ‘‘taking’’ act of
not providing sewer, which the defendants undertook dur-
ing the course of the takings."!

During the period of the takings, the Town of Front
Royal passed two measures which increased the plaintiffs’
expense of developing their property. The first, effected
in 1984, was a raise in the Town’s front foot charge for
sewer line extension from $6.00 per linear foot to $15.00
per linear foot. Because the Town should have provided
sewer service to the Happy Creek Knolls property by 1983,
the higher front foot charge would not have applied to

' Although the plaintiffs make claims for lost profits and interest
income caused by a lack of sewer service, the court need not address
them separately. In Wheeler, the Eleventh Circuit held that the formula
is used for compensating a temporary regulatory taking -- the measure
this court has adopted — accounted for landowner’s loss of ‘‘the prop-
erty’s potential for producing income or an expected profit.’’ Wheeler
III, 833 F.2d at 271. Moreover, specific claims of opportunity costs
clearly fal! within the scope of consequential damages which are rou-
tinely denied in takings cases. See Coastland Corp. v. Third National
Mortgage Co., 611 F.2d 969, 977 (4th Cir. 1979), Carley Capital Group
v. City of Newport News, 709 F. Supp. 1387 (E.D. Va. 1989). Cf Scott
v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409 (4th Cir. 1983).

34a

that property had the town abided by the annexation or-
der. The Town had an extension until 1985 to provide
sewer to the Industrial Park, however, and so the plaintiffs
would not have had the benefit of the lower cost for sewer
line extension to that property evén if the Town had com-
plied with the order.

The second Town action causing economic damage to
the plaintiffs was the passage of a slope ordinance in
1989." Again, had the Town not willfully disobeyed the
annexation court’s order, the plaintiffs would not have had
to comply with the slope ordinance. Because of the ordi-
nance, however, the plaintiffs are unable to develop some
of their lots, and additional lots will require a special use
permit.

These facts surrounding the plaintiffs’ situations present
a strong case for which equity and fairness demand com-
pensation for consequential damages. The losses plaintiffs
suffered at the hands of the Town government do indeed
seem greater than the amount which plaintiffs would re-
cover under the formula endorsed in Wheeler and Nem-
mers. Although the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits did not
specifically hold that just compensation for a temporary
regulatory taking does not include consequential dam-
ages,’* this court sees no reason to invoke an exception
to the well-established rule that consequential damages are
not recoverable. The facts in this case are indeed com-
pelling ones for this court to attempt to forge new ground
in fashioning an appropriate measure of damages by is-
suing a rule that would grant compensatory damages; how-
ever, absent guidance from this circuit to do so, the court
will follow the well-reasoned approaches of the Eighth and

* The ordinance prevents development of slopes of 25% or greater
and requires a special use permit for development of slopes between
15% and 25%.

‘* Neither court awarded compensatory damages, nor is it apparent
that the plaintiffs in those cases asked for such an award.

35a

Eleventh Circuits. Accordingly, the court will not_ award
relief for the plaintiffs’ consequential damages.

In addition to the lack of authority for granting con-
sequential damages, another reason exists for denying them
in this case. Concededly, because economic evaluations
often depend upon assumptions, some amount of specu-
lation is inherent in establishing market values. United
States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943); Foster v. United
States, 2 Cl. Ct. 426, 446-47 (1983). Nonetheless, a court,
in its consideration of just compensation, must be wary of
those elements of damages which are speculative and con-
jectural. Olsen v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 257 (1934);
Foster, 2 Cl. Ct. at 446. The court finds that the evidence
in the record pertaining to consequential damages is not
sufficiently founded to be the basis for compensatory relief.

Even if this court concluded that the increase in the
front foot charge is a consequential damage for which the
owners of the Happy Creek Knolls property could be com-
pensated, the record contains no evidence indicating how
many linear feet of sewer line are at issue. Thus, the court
could not compute the proper amount of damages suffered
due to the higher front foot charge. Likewise, had the
court found that the losses attributable to the slope or-
dinance were compensable consequential damages, the
plaintiffs must have proved that they indeed sustained such
damages by showing that they would have sold or devel-
oped the properties subject to the ordinance before it was
passed in order to recover for those losses. If no demand
for the affected lots existed before the regulation became
applicable, then the plaintiffs suffered no damages because
of it. Based on the evidence before it, the court could not
find that the lots subject to the slope ordinance would
have been sold or developed prior to 1989 even if the lots
had sewer. Consequently, the court concludes that, even
if it could appropriately award consequential damages, the
evidence does not sufficiently establish the extent — if any
— to which the plaintiffs sustained such damages.

36a

Having determined the appropriate method for meas-
uring damages, the court must now apply the formula to
the case at hand. The plaintiffs offered several experts on
the issue of damages. Although the defendants cross-ex-
amined these witnesses, they did not present their own
experts to testify on damages. They have relied instead
on their assertion that the plaintiffs have not been able
to complete their subdivisions because of their own failure
to comply with various zoning requirements, not because
of the Town’s failure to provide sewer service. Thus, the
defendants argue, their temporary taking did not cause
any damages beyond those already resulting from the
plaintiffs’ noncompliance with applicable regulations. The
court believes that this contention is fatally flawed be-
cause, to put it in the vernacular, it puts the cart before
the horse: it assumes that the plaintiffs would have per-
formed objectively futile activities, hoping that such actions
would spur the defendants to meet obligations which, de-
spite a court order, they had refused to do. Consequently,
if the plaintiffs’ experts’ testimony on damages meets ac-
ceptable standards for determining the applicable market
values, the court will use them to determine just compen-
sation.

The plaintiffs’ expert on the market value of the land
used a comparable sales approach to determine the value
of both properties at the dates of the takings. The com-
parable sales approach — analyzing sales of similar com-
mercial property in order to arrive at a fair market value
— is generally accepted as providing the best evidence of
fair market value. United States v. 179.26 Acres of Land,
644 F.2d 367, 371 (10th Cir. 1981); Houser v. United States,
12 Cl. Ct. 454, 472-73 (1987). The Eighth Circuit has ap-
proved the use of the evidence of comparable sales as the
“best evidence’ of damages on the rationale that com-
parable sales ‘‘on the whole reflect the principle of a will-
ing seller and a willing buyer concluding arms-length
negotiations.’ ’’ Nemmers, 764 F.2d at 505 (citing United

37a

States v. 47.17 Acres of Land, More or Less, 674 F.2d 722,
725 (8th Cir. 1984)). =

The comparability of real estate sales involves such fac-
tors as time of transaction, location of the property, quan-
tity and quality of property sold, nature of the sale, the
primary interests of the parties as well as other factors
peculiar to a particular transaction. The plaintiffs’ experts
engaged in such an examination in order to estimate the
fair market values of the properties, both with and without
sewer. Because they supported their findings with a strong

| factual and analytical framework, and as their testimony
was essentially unrebutted, the court adopts their figures
in order to obtain the appropriate amount of damages.

In 1981, the time of the taking of the McLaughlin prop-
erty, the fair market value of that property was $148,000
with sewer and $66,000 without sewer, leaving a difference
of $82,000. The period of the taking, that time in which
the City ought to have provided sewer but did not, ex-
tended from January 1, 1981, to October 11, 1989. Ap-
plying the applicable interest rates, with interest
compounded annually, to $82,000 for the period of Decem-
ber 1981 to October 11, 1989,'* the court finds that the

| amount of just compensation is $176,526.56.

In 1985, the time of the taking of the Industrial Park
property, the fair market value of that property was
$405,000 without sewer and $810,000 with sewer, leaving
a difference of $405,000. Because the record shows that
sewer lines run through three of the sixteen lots in the
Industrial Park, and as the evidence does not show the
value of the remaining thirteen lots with and without sewer

« The plaintiff's experts provided the market rates of return through
December of 1988. Because the record contains no evidence of the
applicable interest rates from December 31, 1988 through the present,

_ the court has used the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
52-week Treasury Bill Rate Table of Changes to determine the appro-
priate amount of interest accrued after January 1, 1989.

38a

service at the time of the taking, the court will reduce
the $405,000 difference in value by three-sixteenths, leav-
ing an amount of $329,062.50. The period of the taking
has extended from January 1, 1985 to the present time.
Again using the interest rates indicated above, the just
compensation for the Industrial Park property to date is
$489,072.59. The owners of the Industrial Park property
shall continue to receive compensation, determined as this
court has outlined, until the defendants cease their taking
and provide the sewer service mandated by the annexation
court.

B. Punitive Damages

The Supreme Court has endorsed punitive damages
awards in § 1983 actions. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30,
51 (1983). Such damages are appropriate when the
defendants violate federal law with evil motive or intent,
or when they act with “reckless or callous disregard for
the plaintiff's rights” Jd.

The Fourth Circuit summarized the Supreme Court’s
precedent for awarding punitive damages in Stephens v.
South Atiantic Canners, Inc., 848 F.2d 484, (4th Cir. 1988).
The appellate court stated that such damages are ‘‘an
extraordinary remedy . . . designed to punish and deter
particularly egregious conduct.” Jd. at 489 (citing City of
Newport v. Fact Conceris, Inc. 453 U.S. 247, 268 (1981)).
In Cooper v.Dyke, 814 F.2d 941, 948 (4th Cir. 1987), the
court discussed the standard for awarding punitive dam-
ages, stating, “‘the callous indifference required for puni-
tive damages is essentially the same as the deliberate
indifference required for a finding of liability on the § 1983
claim.”” Although this court’s determination that the
defendants effected a deprivation of the plaintiffs’ rights
under § 1983 and the equal protection clause could support
a punitive damages award, see Smith, 461 U.S. at 51-55:
Cooper, 814 F.2d at 948, the evidence on record does not

39a

satisfy this court that such an award is meritorious. The
plaintiffs’ contention that the defendants need only act
with “reckless or callous indifference to the [plaintiffs’]
federally protected rights” is correct; they need not show
malicious or evil intent. Piver v. Pender County Bd. of
Education, 835 F.2d 1076, 1082 (4th Cir. 1987).

In its opinion granting summary judgment on the taking
issue, this court concluded that the ‘defendants ought to
have known, and that a reasonable person in their shoes
would have known, that the defendants were under a legal
obligation to provide sewer service to the parcels in ques-
tion.” Front Royal and Warren County Industrial Park
Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, and McLaughlin, et ux., v.
Town of Front Royal, 708 F. Supp. 1477, 1482 (W.D. Va.
1989). However, this court did not make a finding re-
garding the defendants’ malicious intent or callous indif-
ference. The same is true regarding the equal protection
claim. The basis for this court’s summary judgment on the
equal protection claim was not that the defendants had
acted with “invidious discrimination’’, but because no per-
missible state interest existed to which defendants’ deci-
sion could bear a rational relationship. Jd. at 1487. After
reviewing the evidence on damages, the court reaches the
same conclusions as to the defendants’ subjective intent.

The record contains no evidence showing that the four
council members who actually voted on the plaintiffs’ ap-
plication for sewer service were reckiess or callously in-
different to the plaintiffs’ rights. The Mayor and the Town
Manager testified about the meetings at which the council
discussed the applications for sewer, but the court cannot
attribute their testimony to the voting members of council.
Nor can the court base an award of punitive damages on
inferences that the defendants acted egregiously or with
malice. Stephens, 848 F.2d at 492. Though the evidence
does show that the Town Attorney told the council, “You
are required to provide [sewer] to whoever wants it within
the entire annexed areas’, the record does not sufficiently

40a

demonstrate that the defendants acted contrary to their
understanding — however skewed or incorrect it may have
been — of this advice. As to the Town Manager and Mayor
Marlow, neither voted on the sewer service applications.
Moreover, the strong evidence of Mayor Marlow’s pur-
ported bad faith is contradicted by the factual differentia-
tions between his application for sewer and those of the
plaintiffs. Although the court is not completely convinced
that the plaintiffs’ allegations of corruption, impropriety
and graft on the part of the defendants are without some
merit, the record does not contain the substantially high
measure of evidence necessary for a punitive damages
award. Consequently, the court will not award punitive
damages.

Because the plaintiffs brought these actions under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, the court has discretion to award attorneys
fees to the prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The
court believes that this is an appropriate case for such an
award. The Front Royal-Warren County Industrial Park,
Inc., expended $68,096.25 for legal fees and costs in this
litigation as of December 4, 1989. The plaintiffs in the
McLaughlin case incurred similar expenses of $39,371.30
through the same date. The court hereby orders such
amounts, plus any additional fees incurred from December
4, 1989 to the present date as may be shown to the court,
to be paid by the defendants as reasonable attorney’s fees.

An appropriate order shall this day issue.

ENTERED: /s/ James H. Michael, Jr.
Judge
October 22, 1990
Date

A TRUE COPY, TESTE:
JOYCE F. WITT, CLERK
BY: /s/ P. Hensley
DEPUTY CLERK

4la

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
HARRISONBURG DIVISION

Civil Action No. 87-0019-H

FRONT ROYAL AND WARREN COUNTY
INDUSTRIAL PARK CORPORATION,
Plaintiff
Vv.
TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL, VA, et al.,
Defendants

Civil Action No. 87-0020-H
Judge James H. Michael, Jr.

FRED W. McLAUGHLIN, et ux.,
Plaintiffs
V.
TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL, VA, et al.,
Defendants

Clerk’s Office U.S. Dist. Court
at Harrisonburg, VA

Filed
MAR 16, 89

Joyce F. Witt, Clerk
By: /s/ P. Hensley
Deputy Clerk

42a

ORDER

For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memoran-
dum Opinion, it is this day

ADJUDGED AND ORDERED
that:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment shall be,
and it hereby is, denied.

2. Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment shall be, and
it hereby is, granted.

The clerk is hereby directed to send a certified copy of
this Order, and the accompanying Memorandum Opinion,
to all counsel of record.

ENTERED: /s/ James H. Michael, Jr.
Judge

March 16, 1989
Date

A TRUE COPY, TESTE
JOYCE F. WITT, CLERK
BY: /s/ P. Hensley
DEPUTY CLERK

43a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
HARRISONBURG DIVISION

Civil Action No. 87-0019-H

FRONT ROYAL AND WARREN COUNTY
INDUSTRIAL PARK CORPORATION,
Plaintiff
v.
TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL, VA, et al.,
Defendants

Civil Action No. 87-0020-H
Judge James H. Michael, Jr.

FRED W. McLAUGHLIN, et ux.,
Plaintiffs
V.
TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL, VA, et al.,
Defendants

Clerk’s Office U.S. Dist. Court
at Harrisonburg, VA

Filed
MAR 16, 89
Joyce F. Witt, Clerk

By: /s/ P. Hensley
Deputy Clerk

44a

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is presently before the court on cross mo-
tions for summary judgment. For the reasons elaborated
below, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied
and plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is granted.

:.

The plaintiffs in this matter are the Front Royal and
Warren County Industrial Park Commission and two Front
Royal, Virginia land owners. Plaintiffs own parcels of land
in an area annexed by the Town of Front Royal under
separate Annexation Court orders of 1976 and 1978. The
orders of annexation directed the Town of Front Royal to
extend sewer service to the parcels of land covered by the
annexation orders as expeditiously as was practicable and,
in any event, within five years of the entry of the orders.
Since the Town of Front Royal has not yet extended sewer
service to the annexed parcels owned by plaintiffs,
plaintiffs seek to vindicate their rights under the fifth and
fourteenth amendments and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 through this
consolidated action.

Plaintiffs allege that the refusal by defendants to extend
sewer service to their parcels has deprived plaintiffs of all
economically viable uses of their property. In addition,
plaintiffs also contend that their right to equal protection
of the law has been violated because, while defendants
provided sewer service to land owners whose parcels in
the annexed area were situated similarly to plaintiffs’ par-
cels, defendants have refused to extend the sewer lines to
instant plaintiffs’ parcels. Defendants have offered several
affirmative defenses, among them the defenses of absolute
legislative immunity and executive qualified immunity. By
an earlier order of this court dated February 22, 1988,
this court granted plaintiffs’ motion to strike the affirm-
ative defense of legislative immunity and, conversely, de-

45a

nied defendants’ motion to dismiss on the grounds of
legislative immunity.

Defendants entered an interlocutory appeal before the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in regard to the dismissal
of their claim of absolute legislative immunity. After not-
ing that the denial of a claim of absolute immunity is
appropriate for interlocutory appeal, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that ‘‘We agree with the district court that
defendants’ decisions had to do with zoning enforcement
rather than with rule making.” Front Royal and Warren
County Industrial Park Corp., et al. v. Town of Front
Royal, Virginia, et al., No. 88-2066, slip op. at 5 (4th Cir.
Jan. 9, 1989). Therefore, the Fourth Circuit found that
“The district court was correct to conclude that the
defendants’ decisions were not legislative’ and, thus,
defendants were not entitled to a defense of absolute im-
munity. Jd. at 4.

Il.

Defendants also offer the affirmative defense of qualified
executive immunity. Earlier, this court had denied
plaintiffs’ motions to strike the qualified immunity defense
(and, concomitantly, denied defendants’ motion to dismiss
on the basis of the qualified immunity defense) because
“The court finds that the present record provides an in-
adequate basis for making such a determination.” Front
Royal and Warren County Industrial Park Corp., et al.
v. Town of Front Royal, Virginia, et al., CA Nos. 87-0019-
H and 87-0020-H, slip. op. at 4 (W.D. Va. Feb. 22, 1988).
After recourse to materials not available within the con-
fines of a motion to dismiss and after consideration of the
briefing materials submitted, the court finds that
defendants’ claim of qualified immunity is an issue which
is ripe for disposition on summary judgment. Accordingly,
the court finds that defendants are not entitled to the
defense of qualified immunity and therefore now denies
that portion of their motion for summary judgment.

46a

Qualified immunity is, in essence, the right not to have
to stand trial if, among other conditions, the acts at issue
were performed by defendants within the context of their
official, executive capacity. As the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals has held,

Qualified immunity thus protects government of-
ficials not only from liability, but from trial, in
recognition of the fact that subjecting officials
unnecessarily to trial leads to ‘distraction of of-
ficials from their governmental duties, inhibition
of discretionary action, and deterrance of able
people from public service.’

Turner v. Dammon, 848 F.2d 440, 444 (4th Cir. 1988)
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982))
(emphasis in original). Qualified immunity is largely a mat-
ter of getting the incentives right in order to provide the
proper context within which government officials can con-
scientiously discharge their duties without fear of harass-
ment through litigation and, at the same time, they can
be held liable for the violation of a clearly established
constitutionally-protected right. If an official had no re-
course to qualified immunity, the Damoclean sword of po-
tential litigation would always push the official in favor of
inaction, for ‘‘the person aggrieved by official actions may
be quite willing to sue but the losses to society as a whole
that come from official inaction may be more diffuse and
thus less likely to result in a lawsuit.” Turner, 848 F.2d
at 444. The scope of this protection has been set out by
the Supreme Court in Harlow. In that decision, the Court
held that ‘“‘government officials performing discretionary
functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” 457 U.S. at 818.
Recently, the Fourth Circuit has summarized the test for
qualified immunity in this way, ‘Public officials ... are
clothed with qualified immunity in the performance of dis-

|

47a

cretionary functions when the action does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which the official knows or reasonably should be aware.”’
Bright v. McClure, No. 88-3974, slip op. at 5-6 (4th Cir.
Jan. 17, 1989).

As Harlow has indicated and as a number of subsequent
decisions have reaffirmed, the standard for an official seek-
ing to shield himself under the qualified immunity defense
is an objective and not a subjective standard. 457 U.S. at
818; see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107
S.Ct. 3034 (1987). The issue is not whether the official in
| question actually knew that he was violating a right of
the plaintiff, but whether a reasonable person in that of-
ficial’s place would have known that such a right was being
violated. Turner, 848 F.2d at 448; Young v. Lynch, 846
F.2d 960, 963 (4th Cir. 1988). The question is one of
“whether an official acting under the circumstances at
issue reasonably could have believed that his action did
not violate the constitutional rights asserted.’ Sevigny v.
Dicksey, 846 F.2d 958, 956 (4th Cir. 1988). As Justice
Powell, in writing for the Fourth Circuit, has noted, the
question of the applicability of qualified immunity has no
reference at all to the actual good faith of the official, but
rather simply to the objective test as outlined in Harlow
and its progeny. Lane v. Griffin, 834 F.2d 403, 408 (4th
Cir. 1987). Thus, the issue is not what the instant
defendants believed but merely what reasonable people in
the defendarits’ position would have believed about whether
the acts in question violated plaintiffs’ rights.

~ However, it is not necessary for this court to inquire
deeply into the objective standard and ask what a rea-
sonable person in instant defendants’ position would have
known, for another component of the qualified immunity
defense is lacking in the defendants’ position. The qualified
immunity defense applies to government officials who are
performing ‘‘discretionary functions.’’ Anderson, 403 U.S.
at___ , 107 S.Ct. at 3038. In order to make use of qualified

2

48a

immunity protection, defendants would have to show that
their provision of sewer lines to the annexed area — or
their refusal to provide such lines — was a discretionary
function appropriate to an executive, and-not a mere min-
isterial act. Using both the common language understand-
ing of discretionary acts as well as the standards normally
applied by courts, this court finds that the provision of
sewer lines, under the specific aegis of two very explicit
annexation orders, was not a discretionary function em-
blematic of the executive and suitable for qualified im-
munity, but was indisputably a ministerial function.'

Defendants argue that the provision of sewer lines for
the annexed area is a discretionary function and attempt
to rely on comments from the bench made in the context
of the reconvening of the Annexation Court in 1984 as
evidence that the Annexation Court intended to leave with
defendants a degree of discretion, not merely in the timing
but also in the actual provision of sewer lines to parcels
of land in the annexed area. Defendants’ Reply Memoran-
dum In Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgement and in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment, as 12-13. Defendants argue that because
Judge Moon of the Annexation Court opined that it would
not be reasonable for plaintiffs to force defendants to blast
through rock at the cost of several million dollars per lot
in order to provide sewer lines, defendants are free to
exercise their discretion and engage in sweeping cost-ben-
efit analysis for the provision of any sewer service to
plaintiffs’ lots. Jd. at 13.

‘One federal court has defined ‘“‘discretionary function” in this way:
“Discretionary functions have been defined as those in which a gov-
ernment official determines what action to take based on an individual,
case-by-case analysis and in which his decision includes elements of
judgment and discretion.”” Biscayne Fed’l Savings & Loan Assoc. v.
Pratt, 646 F. Supp. 371, 376 n. 8 (D.C.D.C. 1986). The clear mandates
of the Annexation Court left defendants without the leeway for judg-
ment and analysis necessary to convert the provision of sewer service
to the annexed area into a discretionary function.

49a

Two responses are appropriate to this contention by the
defendants. First, it is important to note that the situation
about which Judge Moon spoke was obviously an extreme
hypothetical, a situation far different from that presented
by the facts in the case before this court.’ Furthermore,
Judge Moon went on to say that “They [defendants] have
to exercise that discretion reasonably and in accordance
with the representations they have made here.” Jd. Here,
he was referring to representations by defendants that
sewers would indeed be provided to those parcels affected
by the annexation order. Jd. Judge Moon went on to note
that the original annexation order was quite clear and that
the deliberations of this reconvened Annexation Court did
not uncover any significant ambiguity in the terms of that
original annexation order. Jd.

Second, as this court will note in greater detail infra,
the terms of the annexation orders are specific and clear
and therefore suffice to undercut defendants’ claim that
the provision of sewer lines to the parcels owned by
plaintiffs could be considered an act of discretion. In re-
jecting defendants’ attempt to shield themselves with the
defense of absolute immunity, the Fourth Circuit concluded
that “The order of the Virginia Annexation Court removed
what discretion defendants might otherwise have had to
approve or decline plaintiffs’ requests for sewer service.”
Front Royal and Warren County Industrial Park Corp.,

Judge Moon observed that, ‘‘Well, I think they will have to exercise
some discretion, because certainly you [plaintiffs] are not going to make
them go out there and blast through rock that is going to cost several
million dollars to develop a single lot.’’ Defendants’ Reply Memorandum
in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and in Op-
position to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, at 13. There is
absolutely no evidence in the record that provision of sewer service to
any of the lots in the annexed area would involve a cost-to-benefit ratio
which could even remotely resemble Judge Moon's hypothetical, despite
defendants’ plea that having to provide sewer service to the annexed
area, under the annexation orders, ‘‘would spell financial disaster for
the Town.” Jd. at 11. Such a claim is simple, overheated hyperbole.

50a

slip op. at 5.8 Even though the Fourth Circuit made this
observation within the context of ruling on the absolute
immunity claim and did not address the merits of the
qualified immunity claim in their opinion, this court finds
that their characterization of the lack of the element of
discretion in the provision of sewer lines to plaintiffs’ par-
cels is of considerable guidance in reaching the issue before
us.

Even if one were to construe, as this court does not.
the provision of sewer service for the parcels in question
as a discretionary function, still this court would find the
defendants are unable to utilize the shield of a qualified
immunity defense. Defendants claim that they acted in
good faith in refusing to provide sewer service to plaintiffs’
parcels because they did not believe that they were under
any obligation to provide such service. However, since the
relevant legal test for determining the applicability of qual-
ified immunity is an objective and not a subjective stand-
ard, claims by the defendants about what they knew or
believed to be the case are beside the point. The legal
standard is what someone, standing in shoes of the
defendants, ought to have realized about the rights of the
plaintiffs and the defendants’ legal obligations to the
plaintiffs. Examining the explicit and clear language of the
annexation orders and noting that the Town’s iegal officer
had repeatedly advised defendants that the orders of the
annexation court required the provision of sewer service
to the plaintiffs’ properties, this court concludes that
defendants ought to have known, and that a reasonable
person in their shoes would have known, that the
defendants were under a legal obligation to provide sewer

‘This court is fully aware that the Fourth Circuit ruled simply ‘on
the absolute immunity defense and that that defense is an issue quite
separable from the question of qualified immunity. The Fourth Circuit
did take care to note that “Our decision accordingly reflects no opinion
on the applicability or effect of the qualified immunity defense.”’ Front
Royal and Warren County Industrial Park Corp., slip op. at 4, n. 3.

ik am

dla

service to the parcels in question. The advice given to
defendants by their own counsel, the Town’s legal officer,
over a period of several years was on occasion blunt and
specific, advising defendants that the order of the annex-
ation court brooked no interpretation, and that provision
of sewer service to the lands of plaintiffs and to the lands
of others in the annexed area who sought the service was,
in a word, required. This bears dispositively on the ques-
tion of whether the defendants should reasonably have
known of the legal obligation created by the annexation
order. Thus, this court finds that defendants are singularly
ill-placed to attempt to make use of a qualified immunity
defense.

Ill.

Plaintiffs seek summary judgment under a claim that
the refusal of defendants to extend the sewer lines de-
prived the plaintiffs of constitutionally protected property
rights. Plaintiffs argue that defendants’ culpable omission
was an action under color of state law and constitutes a
compensable taking.

Defendants respond to this charge by arguing that
plaintiffs have not been deprived of all possible usages of
their land. Further, defendants contend that plaintiffs
should not be able to maintain a federal cause of action
since adequate state remedies exist for plaintiffs to pursue.
For instance, presumably, plaintiffs could seek to have the
Annexation Court reconvened, for yet another time. In the
alternative, defendants argue that plaintiffs are free to
maintain an independent state cause of action to seek re-
dress.

However, it is proper for plaintiffs to be before this
court on a takings claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Clearly,
the defendants acted under color of state law and, further,
this court finds that said action (the action in this case
consisting of an omission or a denial of a request for a

52a

required action) did deprive plaintiffs of property rights
and does constitute a taking. A restriction on the use
which can be made of property can result in a taking
without compensation and, thus, would qualify a plaintiff
for redress.‘ Board of Supervisors of James City County
v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 216 S.E.2d 199 (1975). It is true,
as defendants implicitly argue, that the taking or restric-
tion on the use of plaintiffs’ property is temporary in that
the origin of plaintiffs’ claims would be undercut if sewer
service were to be provided in the future.* While that
observation is true, it is not determinative of the takings
issue, for redress is available even in the instance of what
can be arguably construed as a “‘temporary”’ taking. First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 107 S.Ct. 2378 (1987).°

In addition, this court finds it is not established that
adequate state remedies exist for the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs
are not able to force, at least unilaterally, a reconvening
of the Annexation Court. Even if the plaintiffs were in a
position to obtain through their own efforts a reconvened
Annexation Court, that court would not be equipped to

‘As Justice Holmes concluded, for the Court, ‘The general ruie at
least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).

* This is not to suggest that plaintiffs’ claims would evaporate if sewer
lines were installed, for the issue of past damages suffered by plaintiffs
still would remain. As the Supreme Court has recently concluded,
“[W]here the government’s activities have already worked a taking of
all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve
it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during which the
taking was effective.” First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, ___; 107 S.Ct. 2378, 2389 (1987).

* This court notes that the opinion of the Supreme Court in First
Englist Evangelical Lutheran Church effectively prevents defendants
from relying on Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), to argue that
the temporary nature of the interference with the use of the property
in question removes it from the category of a taking.

Teer

53a

provide the necessary relief for these plaintiffs since an-
nexation courts have only limited remedies at their dis-
posal. An annexation court in Virginia is a creature of
statute and not a court of general jurisdiction. Town of
Christiansburg v. Montgomery County, 216 Va. 654, 222
S.E.2d 5138 (1976).

In this court’s view, there is no need for the Annexation
Court to reconvene vet again. Its original orders were
clear and when it was previously reconvened it not only
reaffirmed those orders but it indicated that the directives
regarding the provision of sewer lines in those orders were
also clear. Defendants attempt to argue that the annex-
ation order contains language which is either conditional
or sufficiently ambiguous in order to justify its position
that defendants were under no legal obligation to provide
sewer lines to parcels of the plaintiffs. However, the an-
nexation order of December 31, 1976, contains the follow-

ing language:

Sewer Facilities: The Town of Front Royal shall
proceed to construct interceptor and collector
sanitary sewer lines in the areas herein decreed
to be annexed as shown for such areas on Town
Exhibit 13, the lines as shown on said exhibit for
the annexation area hereby decreed shall be in-
stalled as soon as they become reasonably nec-
essary and it becomes economically feasible so to
do to serve the residents of the annexation area,
but said improvements shall in any event be com-
pleted within five years from the effective date of
annexation.

Order of the Special Court, € 5(c) (2), page 4, Dec. 31,
1976, (emphasis added). The 1978 Annexation Decree con-
tains parallel language regarding the provision of sewer
lines. Defendants argue that the constraints of reasonable
necessity and economic feasibility operate as conditions
which bracket and define their entire set of ultimate legal

54a

obligations to plaintiffs. Defendants maintain that ‘The
terms of the annexation decrees mandate no more than
that the town treat requests for sewer extensions in the
annexed area just like a request from anywhere else within
the Town.” Defendants Reply Memorandum in Support of
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and in Op-
position to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, 10-
11.

Therefore, defendants conclude that considerations of
economic feasibility could justify never extending sewer
lines to the plaintiffs’ parcels. This is clearly contrary to
the plain language of the annexation orders. Those orders
set out a terminus ante quem for the provision of sewer
service and cost-benefit analysis can operate only within
the temporal boundary set by that terminus. The two an-
nexation orders establish that the Town is obligated to
provide sewer service to the parcels in question within a
certain period and, while the speed with which the sewer
lines are extended may be constrained by an equation of
cost and benefit during the five-year period specified by
each order, it is clear that any such calculus is meant only
to operate prior to the expiration of each five-year period.
When the annexation orders cite the constraints of ne-
cessity and feasibility, that phrase of the orders suggests
a mandate which has the aura of “all deliberate speed.”’
It is nevertheless clear that the discretion granted to
defendants expired within five years of the annexation
orders. In order for defendants to construe the annexation
orders as they wish, they must rely on an interpretation
which runs directly contrary to the clear and unambiguous
language of the orders.’ In short, the defendants can sus-

‘This case is to be distinguished from those cases where the annex-
ation orders are very general in terms and grant localities what is in
effect an open ended arena for discretion. For example, the annexation
orders which establish the legal rights of instant plaintiffs are very
different from the order at issue in City of Staunton v. Cash, where

(Footnote Continued)

tain this position only by eliminating from the annexation
orders the language quoted supra, namely, “‘but said im-
provements shall in any event be completed within five
years from the effective date of annexation.”’

Normally, the question of whether there has been a
taking would be an issue for the trier of fact, but the
affidavits offered reveal that there can be no dispute that
plaintiffs’ parcels are worth so much less that they have
been deprived of property rights. Therefore this court
finds, as a matter of law, there was a taking for which
plaintiffs are entitled to compensation. However, while this
court finds that there can be no genuine dispute about an
issue of material fact which would establish that there was
a taking, there is such a dispute about the amount of
damages which would be appropriate to award in this case.
Therefore, while the court finds that there was a taking
for which defendants are liable, the court also finds that
it is not appropriate within the context of summary judg-
ment to determine the extent or amount of liability. As
plaintiffs concede in their motion for summary judgment,
this issue must be reserved for the trier of fact.

the Supreme Court of Virginia found that

While the annexation decree clearly imposed upon the City
a duty to make improvements in the annexed area, we do
not agree that the duty was of the absolute nature asserted
by [the defendants]. The decree did not require the City to
make any particular improvement at any given time. Ex-
pressing in general terms the duty imposed, the decree left
to the City, in the exercise of discretion, the determination
of what improvements should be made and when they should
be accomplished. The decree contemplated that, in exercis-
ing this discretion, the City properly should consider the
public necessity of proposed projects and the economic fea-
sibility of suggested undertakings.

220 Va. 742, 747, 263 S.E. 2d 45, 49 (1980).

,

56a

IV.

Plaintiffs allege that their rights have been violated un-
der the fourteenth amendment of the United States Con-
stitution in its equal protection clause. They argue that
sewer service was provided to other properties which were
similarly situated to the parcels owned by the plaintiffs.
Therefore, to deny sewer service to plaintiffs’ parcels would
constitute unlawful, unequal treatment. In evaluating
plaintiffs’ equal protection claim, it is necessary to distin-
guish between what may be a denial of equal treatment
and what is a legally cognizable denial of equal protection
of the law. For example, burdening citizen X and not
burdening citizen Y when both citizens are members of
the same general class may be unequal treatment, but it
is not necessarily a denial of equal protection. Often, equal
protection refers to violations in regard to certain suspect
classifications such as gender or sex. Instant plaintiffs’
equal protection claim involved a different kind of classi-
fication and must call for a different type of scrutiny or
analysis by the court.

Defendants argue that there has been no equal protec-
tion violation because the factors which led to a denial of
sewer service to plaintiffs’ parcels are those factors which
are appropriate to consider in making decisions about util-
ity extensions. They argue that other municipalities can
consider costs in deciding whether to extend sewer lines.
One initial problem with defendants’ argument is that the
other municipalities to which defendants are comparing
themselves may not be under an explicit, detailed order
of an annexation court to provide sewer lines. Therefore,
it would misconstrue the legal situation for these
defendants to be considered as operating with a blank slate
or in the same position as any other municipal corporation.
Defendants are correct when they note that legislative
activity involving land management and similar decisions
has uniformly been held to merit considerable deference

—

57a

from courts. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1
(1973).*

But, the actions of the defendants are not legislative
activities, but are nondiscretionary ministerial functions
carried out under the aegis of a specific, detailed court
order. The defendants are arguing that the decision not
to extend sewer service must be considered as a garden
variety municipal services decision. Yet, the annexation
orders which form the legal backdrop to this entire matter
mean that the defendants are not free simply to engage
in a cost benefit analysis or to weigh the factors which
municipalities ordinarily weigh when they consider whether
to extend sewer service.

In the area of economic regulation, regulations which
are challenged as violating equal protection clause are not
subject to strict scrutiny by the courts. Rather, the
Supreme Court has stated that

Unless the classification trammels fundamental
personal rights or is drawn upon inherently sus-
pect distinctions such as race, religion, or alien-
age, our decisions presume the constitutionality
of the statutory discriminations and require only
that the classification challenged be rationally re-
lated to a legitimate state interest.... [I]n the
local economic sphere, it is only the invidious
sphere, the wholly arbitrary act, which cannot
stand consistently with the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.

New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1976) (cita-
tions omitted). In order to prevail on a motion for sum-

‘In this case, the Supreme Court concluded that ‘“‘We deal [here]
with economic and social legislation where legislatures have historically
drawn lines which we respect against the charge of violation of the
Equal Protection Clause if the law be ‘reasonable, not arbitrary’ and
bears ‘a rational relationship to a (permissible) state objective.” Village
of Beile Terre v. Boras, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1973) (citations omitted).

58a

mary judgment under an equal protection claim. plaintiffs
would have to show that there was no rational relationship
between a legitimate state interest and the decision not
to provide sewer lines to plaintiffs’ parcels—that the
defendants’ refusal to provide sewers was invidious and
wholly arbitrary.

In ferreting out the existence of a rational relationship
between the defendants’ decision and state interests, it is
important to note that it is “a legitimate state interest,”
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432.
440 (1985) or ‘‘a (permissible) state objective,” Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U-S. 1,8 (1973), to which a
rational relationship must point. Obviously, avoiding the
mandate of the order of the annexation court or preferring
certain property owners for private, self-referential rea-
Sons cannot quality as a “legitimate” or “permissible” state
interest. To what legitimate or permissible state interest
could defendants point? Most equal protection challenges
which are adjudicated under the rational relationship
standard fail, in large measure because the vast majority
of defendants in those cases are Operating within the nor-
mal legal context where a panoply of possible state inter-
ests can be cited. However, as noted passim, instant
defendants are operating within a more constricted legal
universe. State interests which, in other settings, would
be considered legitimate or permissible and would serve
to vindicate a legislative (or administrative) decision are
not available to instant defendants because of the orders
of the annexation court. These orders rightfully circum-
scribe the range of decisions which defendants can lawfully
make. Absent the explicit orders of the annexation court,
defendants could point to the results of cost-benefit anal-
ysis to justify their decision not to extend sewer service.
However, by the very terms of the annexation orders,
defendants are no longer free to cite such considerations

59a

to justify their refusal to extend sewer service.’ Further,
the provisions of the annexation orders are not subject to
challenge as being arbitrary or capricious or overreaching,
for those provisions were reflections of assurances given
to the annexation court by the Town in the course of the
annexation proceedings.

Were this court faced only with a common law claim
that defendants were obligated to provide sewer service
to plaintiffs’ parcels, the outcome of the equal protection
challenge might be quite different. Defendants do allege,
through affidavit, that they based their decision not to
extend the sewer lines on the sort of garden-variety eco-
nomic factors which courts historically conclude merit ju-
dicial deference. Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment, 8-10. Reading this testi-
mony in the light most favorable to defendants, as this
court must do in passing on plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment, we find that the purposes articulated by
defendants for their refusal to extend sewer service cannst
count as legitimate state interests, given the legal mandate
imposed upon the town by the annexation orders.
Defendants allege that “The terms of the annexation de-
crees mandate no more than that the Town treat requests
for sewer extensions in the annexed area just like a re-
quest from anywhere else within the Town.” Defendants’
Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion

*This court takes note, once again, of Judge Moon’s hypothetical
where he opined that, if it would require blasting through rock and
cost several million dollars, defendants could exercise some discretion.
See infra. However, no evidence has been offered which would suggest
that the situation in any way begins to approach the extreme hypo-
thetical constructed by Judge Moon. For all practical purposes, and
certainly for the purpose of this case, defendants do not have the
discretion to decline to provide sewer service to plaintiffs’ parcels on
the basis of cost and, thus, the expense involved in the provision of
sewer service cannot count as a legitimate or permissible state interest.

60a

for Summary Judgment, 10-11. Such is a manifestly in-
correct interpretation of the annexation orders. Parcel
holders in the annexed area do not stand in the same
relationship to the town as those from the original portion
of the town seeking sewer service. Defendants do not point
to any other state interest which could qualify as a per-
missible anchor for the rational relationships which wouid
justify defendants’ decision to treat plaintiffs differently
from (i.e., unequally) other parcel holders in the annexed
area. By defendants’ own evidence, this court finds that
defendants have identified no permissible state interest
which would allow them to survive plaintiffs’ motion for
summary judgment.

Since the only explanation for the refusal to extend
sewer service which is offered by defendants cannot count
as a legitimate state interest, this court is obligated to
determine if there are other conceivable state interests
which defendants could advance. The traditional test for
assessing the viability of the rational relationship is not
only whether the state has articulated a rationale, but
whether there is a conceivable basis for a rational rela-
tionship. Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983).

Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that “{[W]e think the Alabama
legislature could have reasonably determined that the royalty-owner
exemption would encourage investment in oil or gas production.” Exxon
Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 196 (1983) (emphasis added). See also
Allied Stores of Ohio Vv. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 529 (1959). By the Same
token, the Court has also struck down classifications, on the basis of
the rational relationship test, when it discerned impermissible purposes
behind the classification. Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S.
612, 622-23 (1985) (New Mexico cannot grant a special tax exemption
to Vietnam veterans only if they were residents of the state before a
certain arbitrary date); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (Alaska
cannot use length of residency as a differential in distributing dividends
from state’s oil reserves). As the Court concluded in Zobel. the state’s
objective “to reward citizens for past contributions’ cannot count as
‘‘a legitimate state objective.”” 457 U.S. at 63. (The Alaska legislature
had pointed to two other objectives, but the Supreme Court found that

6la

This court can construct no possible rationales for
defendants’ refusal, in the face of a clear court order, to
extend the sewer line except for reasons which ‘‘constitute[
| the very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal
Protection Clause was intended to prevent.”’ Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 878 (1985). The
issue is not the absence of a rational relationship between
defendants’ denial of sewer service and reasons for that
denial — what is missing is a legitimate or permissible
state interest vindicated by that denial.

Plaintiffs allege, in effect, that there was a conspiracy
among the defendants to provide sewerage to certain par-
cels for personal benefit and to deny it to plaintiffs. While
there is some evidence that this may have been so, the
record does not provide the basis for a finding, under Rule
56, that there was invidious discrimination by defendants
against plaintiffs because there are disputes regarding is-
sues of material fact which relate to defendants’ motiva-
tion in providing sewers and the effect of providing the
sewer lines to some parcels and not to others. However,
it is not necessary to find uncontroverted evidence of a
conspiracy by defendants to reduce the value of plaintiffs’
parcels or to impermissibly deny to plaintiffs sewer service,
for defendants themselves have not been able to identify
any permissible state interest to which defendants’ decision
could bear a rational relationship nor could there feasibly
be any such interest, given the strictures placed upon
defendants by the annexation orders. It is conceded by
this court that state actions are only very rarely struck
down on equal protection grounds under the rational re-
lationship standard. Yet, in this case, it is clear to the
court that defendants were under such a strictly con-
structed judicial mandate that the interests to which a

those objectives were net advanced by the legislative scheme and the
Court noted that, in upholding the law and applying it retroactively to
1959, the Alaska Supreme Court relied solely on the state interest
which was identified as impermissible. Jd. at 62-63.)

62a

rational relationship might ordinarily refer are simply in-
accessable to instant defendants. Therefore, this court
grants plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the
basis of a violation of their right to equal protection of
the laws and, likewise, denies defendants’ motion for sum-
mary judgment on this point.

iP

Defendants seek summary judgment because they argue
that these actions are time barred. They contend that the
statute of limitations for § 1983 actions is two years and
that, since the sewer lines were required to be installed
within five years of the annexation orders and those orders
are dated 1976 and 1978, the statute of limitations on the
actions would have run in 1983 and 1985 respectively. This
court has previously considered the statute of limitations
defense offered by defendants and has found that, since
there was a continuing wrong, plaintiffs’ actions are not
time barred. To this extent, the court reaffirms ~:id adopts
its decision and the reasoning supporting that decision in
its Order and Memorandum Opinion of February 22, 1988.

VI.

In conclusion, the court denies defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on the basis of the qualified immunity
defense and grants plaintiffs’ motion for summary judg-
ment in finding that defense to be inapplicable. The court
grants plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as to the
existence of a compensable taking by defendants, reserving
the question of the amount of appropriate damages for
trial. As regards plaintiffs’ claim of denial of equal pro-
tection, this court grants plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment and denies defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, also reserving for trial the question of damages
on this claim. Finally, this court denies defendants’ motion
for summary judgment on the basis of a statute of limi-
tations defense.

63a

An Appropriate Order shall this day issue.

/s/ James H. Michael, Jr.
Judge

March 16, 1989
Date

A TRUE COPY, TESTE
JOYCE F. WITT, CLERK
BY: /s/ P. Hensley
DEPUTY CLERK

64a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
HARRISONBURG DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-0019-H

CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-00120-H
JUDGE JAMES H. MICHAEL, JR.

FRONT ROYAL AND WARREN COUNTY INDUSTRIAL
PART CORPORATION.
Plaintiff
TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL. VA. et al.,
Defendants
FRED W. McLAUGHLIN, et ux..

Plaintiffs
y
TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL VA, et al..
Defendants

FILED
FEB 22 88
JOYCE F. WITT, Clerk
By: Deputy Clerk

ORDER

For the reasons stated in the accompanying Men

adum Opinion, it is this day

ADJUDGED AND ORDERED

65a

1. Plaintiffs’ motions to strike the affirmative defenses
of statute of limitations, legislative immunity, lack of
standing, res judicata, and failure to exhaust state rem-
edies shall be, and they hereby are, granted.

2. Plaintiffs’ motion to strike the defense of laches in
Civil Action No. 87-0020-H shall be, and it hereby is,
granted.

3. Plaintiffs’ motions to strike the defenses of qualified
immunity, failure to state a claim against defendants Mar-
lowe and Bentley, and failure to show deprivation of prop-
erty shall be, and they hereby are denied.

4. Defendants’ motions to dismiss based on the grounds
of statute of limitations, legislative immunity, qualified im-
munity, collateral estoppel, failure to state a claim as to
defendants Marlowe and Bentley, failure to state a claim
as to equal protection violations, failure to state due proc-
ess claims, and failure to state claims for inverse condem-
nation shall be, and they hereby are, denied.

5. Defendants’ motions to dismiss the claims for punitive
damages against the Town of Front Royal shall be, and
they hereby are, granted.

The clerk is hereby directed to send a certified copy of
this Order, and the accompanying Memorandum Opinion,
to all counsel of record.

ENTERED: — |
JUDGE

February 22, 1988

Date
A TRUE COPY, TESTE
JOYCE F. Wirt, CLERK
By: D. Rhodes
DEPUTY CLERK

66a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
HARRISONBURG DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-0019-H

CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-0020-H
JUDGE JAMES H. MICHAEL, JR.

FRONT ROYAL AND WARREN COUNTY INDUSTRIAL
PARK CORPORATION.
Plaintiff
V.
TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL, VA. et al..

Defendants
FRED W McLAUGHLIN. et uz.

Plaintiffs
V.
TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL, VA. et al..
Defendants
FILED
FEB 22 88

JOYCE F. WITT, Clerk
By: Deputy Clerk

MEMORANDUM OPINION

These companion cases come before the court on mo
tions to strike filed by the plaintiff and motions to dismiss
filed by the defendant. Because the motions filed in the
two cases were virtually identical, the court held one hear
ing and is issuing one opinion. Because

several questions

- 67a

are common to motions made by both sides, the court will
proceed by addressing each issue in turn, noting its rel-
evance to the motions made by the parties. Where ma-
terials outside the pleadings have been received and
considered with respect to an issue, the court will treat
the relevant motion as a motion for partial summary judg-
ment.

Statute of Limitations and Laches

The statute of limitations for § 1983 actions is the lim-
itation of the forum state for personal injury actions. Wil-
son v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938. 85 L.Ed.2d
254 (1985). The Code of Virginia provides a limitation of
two years for personal injury actions. Va. Code § 8.01-243.
For reasons the court cannot discern, defendants assert
that the cause of action arose in Civil Action 87-0020 on
December 31, 1981, but that the cause of action in Civil
Action 87-0019 did not arise until December 27, 1985. This
latter date was less than two years before the complaints
were filed; thus, plaintiffs’ motion to strike the statute of
limitations defense in Civil Action 87-0019 should be
granted on the face of the pleadings.

In both cases, the court finds that plaintiffs have made
out a claim for a continuing violation and continuing injury.
Cf. Ocean Acres, Ltd. v Dare County Bd. of Health, 707
F.2d 103 (4th Cir. 1983). In addition, the court finds that
the plaintiffs had good reason to believe that sewer service
would be provided until they were notifed othewise in a
letter from the City Manager on June 10, 1986. The com-
plaints were filed well within two years of that date. For
these reasons, the court will deny the defendants’ motions
to dismiss based on the statute of limitations grounds and
will grant plaintiffs’ motions to strike the defense. In ad-
dition, the court will grant plaintiffs’ motion to strike the
defense of laches, which was pled only in Civil Action 87-
0020,

68a

Immunities

Defendants have raised three immunity defenses. The
first is that members of the Town Council enjoy absolute
immunity from damage suits under § 1983 for legislative
acts. Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1980). Such
immunity applies to local legislators only when they ‘‘func-
tion in a legislative capacity.” Jd. at 279. Applying this
functional task in Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d
1409, 1422-23 (4th Cir. 1983), the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit determined that a county council func-
tioned in an executive capacity when it denied an appli-
cation for a building permit. In the present case, the Town
Council’s denial of a request for sewer services to a spe-
cific site must likewise be considered an executive act,
particularly in light of the annexation court’s order that
such services be provided. Accordingly, this court will grant
plaintiffs’ motions to strike the defense of legislative im-
munity and will deny defendants’ motions to dismiss as to
this ground.

Defendants have also pled the defense of qualified im-
munity. Officials acting as executives are entitled to con-
sideration of this defense under the standards stated in
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73
L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Scott, 716 F.2d at 1423. Harlow sets
forth an objective test under which officials “are shielded
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established Statutory or constitu-
tional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 St. Ct. at ARE
L.Ed2d at __.

Defendants in the present case assert that the Town
Council acted in good faith in denying plaintiffs’ request.
The complaints allege bad faith on the part of the
defendants, however, and material submitted by the
plaintiff provide some support for these allegations. There-
fore, a genuine issue of material fact remains as to

i

69a

defendants’ good faith. Moreover, the test of Harlow is
an objective one; it focuses on the “reasonableness of an
official’s conduct, as measured by reference to clearly es-
tablished law.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at _.
73 L.Ed.2d at __ . The court finds that the present record
provides an inadequate basis for making such a determi-
nation. The court therefore will deny defendants’ motions
at this time. Plaintiffs’ motions to strike the affirmative
defense of qualified immunity will also be denied.

Finally, defendants argue that the Supreme Court has
held that municipalities cannot be sued for punitive dam-
ages under § 1983. City of Newport v. Facts Concerts, Inc..
453 U.S. 247, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981). This
argument is well taken, and the court will grant the mo-
tions to dismiss the claims for punitive damages against
the Town of Front Royal.

Standing

Defendants’ objection to standing was based on omis-
sions from the original complaints of allegations that
plaintiffs’ property is located in the annexed area.
Plaintiffs’ § 1983 suit does not rest solely on the orders
of the annexation court, however, and in any case, the
omission has been cured in the amended complaints. The
court finds that the plaintiffs have standing to bring this
action, and the court will grant the motion to strike the
affirmative defense of lack of standing.

Estoppel

Defendants have raised the defense of res judicata, ar-
guing that plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the order issued
on December 13, 1984, by the annexation court denying
the plaintiffs’ prayer for an injunction. That order, how-
ever, merely sets forth the court’s decision that the Town’s
revised plan of May, 1984, for the sewage extension to
Happy Creek substantially complied with the annexation
order of October 20, 1978. Moreover, the court explicitl

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386011_0097%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
