# Appendix — Morgan v. Community Redevelopment Agency > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386011_0069%3A2 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Appendix - **Published:** January 1, 1992 - **Citation:** 503 U.S. 937 ## Text (G *, fF FILED ¢§ @irL1LITS | nov ig vw OFFICE OF THE CLERK No. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES CCTOBER TERM, 1991 DAVID MORGAN, ET AL, PETITIONERS VS. COMMUNITY REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF THE Gases OF LOS ANGELES, €T AL, APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT David Morgan 6262 Sunset Blvd. Hollywood, Calif. 90028 Petitioner in pro per A-1 APPENDIX A Order of California Supreme Court denying rehearing and depublication of Opinion dated August 22, 1991 Second Appellate District, Division Seven, NO. B042936 S021685 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN BANK DAVID MORGAN Et Al, Appellants Vv. COMMUNITY REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Et Al., Respondents Petitions for review DENIED. The request for an order directing depublication of the opinion is denied. LUCAS Chief Justice B-1l APPENDIX B Order of Second Appellate District Divison 7 denying rehearing dated June 17, 1991 OFFICE OF THE CLERK COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT ROBERT N. WILSON, CLERK DIVISION: 7 DATE: 06/17/91 David Morgan 6262 Sunset Blvd. Hollywood, CA. 90028 RE: Morgan, David Vs. Comm. Redeve. Agency/City of Los Angeles 2 Civil B042936 Los Angeles NO. C607002 THE COURT: PETITIONS FOR REHEARING ARE DENIED C-1 APPENDIX C Opinion of Second Appellate District Division 7 denying Appeal dated May 16, 1991 and published at 231 CA3d 243 (1991) (text of typed Opinion). Page 243 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SEVEN - No. B042936 (Super. Ct. No. C607002) DAVID MORGAN, NORTON HALPER, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants, Vv. COMMUNITY REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES, et al., Defendants/Respondents. SUSAN B. NELSON, President of SAVE HOLLYWOOD OUR TOWN, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants, Vv. COMMUNITY REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES, et al., Defendants/Respondents. mee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee” APPEAL from a judgment of the Supe- rior Courtof Los Angeles County. Barnet M. Cooperman, Judge. Affirmed. Page 244 David Morgan, for Plaintiff and Ap-.- pellant in pro. per. C-2 James K. Hahn, Los Angeles City At- torney, Patricia V. Tubert, Susan D. Pfann, and Kane, Ballmer & Berkman, R. Bruce Tepper, Jr., and Kathryn Reimann, attorneys for Respondents. Gronemeier & Barker, Elbie J. Hick- ambottom, Jr., and Dale L. Gronemeier, attorneys for Appellants/Plaintiffs, Susan Nelson, Karen Hale Wookey, Kather- ine Armour and Jamia Riehl, officers of Save Hollywood Our Town ("SHOT"). Gronemeier & Barker, Dale L. Grone- meier and Elbie J. Hickambottom, Jr., at- torneys for Appellant/Plaintiff, Norton Halper. Page 248 INTRODUCTION The Hollywood Redevelopment Project (the Project) was adopted by the Los An- + geles City Council on May 7, 1986 and Signed by the Mayor on May 9, 1986. It C-3 establishes a project area of approxi- mately 1100 acres in that part of the city known as Hollywood. The primary goals of the Project is the elimination of blight and revitalization of the area. The Project would divert tax increment funds to the Community Redevelopment Agency (CRA) during its lifetime of 30 years. The area encompassed is an older portion of Hollywood generally bounded by LaBrea Avenue on the west; Franklin Av- enue, the Hollywood Freeway ana” Hollywood Boulevard on the north; Serrano Avenue on the east; and Fountain Avenue and Santa Monica Boulevard on the south. Included in the area are residen- tial, commercial and industrial develop- ment constituting 796 net acres (exclusive of streets, freeways and other right of way) which are subdivided into 2908 sepa- C.-4 rate parcels of land with 2033 separate owners. The CRA commenced setting up a Pro- ject Area Committee (PAC) in 1983. Elec- tions to the PAC were conducted on Decem- ber 13, 1983 and Joint Public Hearings on the Project were held on April 16, 1986. The proceedings leading up to the adop- tion of the Redevelopment Plan (The Plan) was a process of Plan review which re- quired two and one half years, resulted in 120 community meetings, three days of public hearings and review by the City Planning Commission and the Los Angeles City Council. The Project Area Committee approved the adoption of the Redevelop- ment Plan. The Los Angeles City Council adopted the Plan by a two-thirds majority vote. Plaintiff/Appellant Norton Halper filed a validation action in the Superior C-5 Court of Los Angeles County which was consolidated with a similar action filed by parties identified as SHOT (Save Hol- lywood Our Town). Judgment was entered in favor of defendants/respondents the Community Redevelopment Agency and the City of Los Angeles on April 20, 1989, a timely notice of appeal was filed. Page 249 ISSUES Appellants have raised the following issues on appeal. 1. The Project Area Committee (PAC) did not meet the statutory requirements of self formation and representativeness. 2. The project area residents and property owners due process rights were violated by inadequate notice of the Pro- ject Area Committee (PAC) formation and the Joint Public Hearing. 3. The Los Angeles Community Rede- velopment Agency (CRA) and the Los Ange- C-6 les City Council were erroneous in their determination that the project area is blighted and that the determination is not supported by substantial evidence. 4. Appellants were improperly de- nied discovery by the trial court. 5. The trial court applied the im- proper standard of review in granting judgment upholding the validity of the Hollywood Redevelopment Project as ap- proved and adopted by the Los Angeles City Council. 6. The trial court's finding that there was no credible evidence of appel- lants' allegations of fraud by the Commu- nity Redevelopment Agency and the City of Los Angeles in the formation and adoption of the Plan. 7. That the Redevelopment is not consistent with the City of Los Angeles General Plan. Guw7 8. That the trial court erred in awarding costs to Respondents and against Appellants Susan B. Nelson, Karen Hale Wookey, Jamia Riehl and Katherine Armour. DISCUSSION The Project Area Committee (PAC) was Self Formed as required by law and was Representative within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 33385. The Legislature has made provisions for the formation of a project area com- mittee in section 33385 of the California Health and Safety Code. "The legislative body of a city or county shall call upon the residents and existing community organizations in a redevelopment project area, within which a substantial number of low- and moderate-income families are to be Page 250 eee C-8 displaced by the redevelopment pro- ject, to form a project area commit- tee. The project area committee shall include, when applicable, res- idential owner occupants, residen- tial tenants, businessmen, and mem- bers of existing organizations within the project area. The members of the committee shall serve without compensation. "Tne legislative body shall approve a representative pro- ject area committee in each project area within 60 days after the pro- ject area is selected." The trial court made the following findings regarding the formation of the PAC which are consistent with the record and supported by substantial evidence. The City adopted a resolution calling for the formation of a PAC to include prop- erty owners, residential tenants, C-9 business owners, and existing community organizations. Four community organiza- tions were to be appointed to the PAC by the council office; the remaining 21 mem- bers were to be elected by the community within the proposed project area. The Community Redevelopment Agency (CRA) sent two separate mailings of a No- tice of Formation of the Project Area Committee to the property owners of record in the proposed area and in addi- tion distributed approximately 25,000 circulars throughout the project area on two occasions in August and November of 1983. Notices were published in commu- nity newspapers by the Agency and other publicity was generated by newspaper ar- ticles. Six community meetings were held from June to November, 1983 at which re- development and the formation of the PAC ee aT C-10 was discussed. An election was held in the Hollywood High School Auditorium on December 13, 1983 to form the PAC. Over 250 community members attended, a secret ballot was conducted. Nominations were accepted by a procedure prior to the meeting and from the floor, all nominees were given an opportunity to speak. The trial court found that the election of the PAC members was reasonably and regu- larly conducted. The election resulted in a PAC con- Sisting of four residential property own- ers, four residential tenants, six business owners or tenants, three indus- trial or manufacturing property owners or operators and four community organiza- tions. Four additional community organi- zations were appointed to the PAC by the City Council office. With: n 60 days of the selection of the project area, C-11 the City Council approved as representa- tive the Project Area Committee (PAC). Health and Safety Code section 33385 as in effectin 1983 did not specify the method of the selection of the PAC mem- bers nor does the law provide for or re- quires election by the process of an election, appointment of mem- Page 251 bers is not precluded. The legislative body has broad discretion in the forma- tion of the Project Area Committee. The PAC as formed had 21 elected members and 4 appointed members. Substantial evidence supports the determination that the PAC was self formed and representative of the project area. The methods used in the formation of the PAC were consistent with Health and Safety Code section 33385 and inde- pendently reasonable. C- 12 There was no credible evidence that the PAC was unduly influenced or domi- nated by any group or agency in either its formation or functioning. Pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 33386 the Redevelopment Agency is to consult with and obtain the advice of the Project Area Committee. This was accomplished and the PAC approved the adoption of the Redevelopment Plan which was then adopted by the Los Angeles City Council by a two- thirds majority. The Agency Complied with the Law in Providing Adequate Notice of the PAC For- mation and the Joint Public Hearing. Health and Safety Code section 33385 as it existed in 1983 did not describe the nature of notice to be given to resi- dents of the project area and community organizations, "The legislative body of a city or county shall call upon the resi- C-13 dents and existing community organizations," regarding the formation of the Project Area Committee (PAC). As will be subsequently discussed no statute specifies the manner of notice of the Joint Public Hearing on the Redevelopment Plan. In the absence of statutory provi- sion the notice should be such as to reasonably give notice to those within the project area. During the formation of the PAC the Agency made two mailings to the property owners in the project area, on two occa- sions distributed approximately 25,000 flyers, published notice three times in newspapers and conducted six pre-PAC for- mation community meetings. There is a lack of credible evidence that any other form of notice would have been more ef- fective or that any persons were denied participation in the PAC formation. C-14 The Joint Public Hearing is a public hearing concerning the enactment of the Redevelopment Plan. Notice of the he@=r~ ing is provided for in Health and Safety Code section 33349: "Section 33349. "The agency shall publish notice of the hear ing not less than once a week for four successive weeks prior to the hearing. The notice shall be published in a news- paper of general circulation, printed and published in the community, or if there is none, in a newspaper selected by the agency. The notice of hearing shall in- Clude a legal description of the Page 252 boundaries of the area or areas desig- nated in the proposed redevelopment plan and a general statement of the scope and objectives of the plan. Copies of the notices shall be mailed to the last known assessee of each parcel of land in the C-15 area designated in the redevelopment plan, at his last known address as shown on the last equalized assessment roll of the county; or where a city assesses, levies, and collects its own taxes, as shown on the last equalized assessment roll of the city; or to the owner of each parcel of land within such boundaries as such ownership is shown on the records of the county recorded 30 days prior to the date the notice is published. Copies of the notices shall also be mailed to the governing body of each of the taxing agencies which levies taxes upon any property in the project area designated in the proposed redevelopment plan. The 1.otice shall be mailed by certified mail with return receipt requested." Pursuant to the code requirements the Agency sent notice by certified mail to the owners of property within the pro- C-16 posed project area as established by lists provided by the County of Los Ange- les in January, 1986. Additionally the Agency sent notice to all persons re- questing notice whoappeared on the pro- ject's mailing list, whether or not such person owned property within the proposed project area. Although not required by the code, the Agency on April 4, 1986 caused to be distributed approximately 21,600 noticesto residences and busi- nesses throughout the project area. Although Health and Safety Code section 33349 requires publication of the notice in one newspaper, the Agency published notice in two newspapers of general cir- culation distributed within the project area. The record also indicates that prior to and during the hearing process there was significant media coverage of the Redevelopment Plan and process. C-17 Apparently appellants urge that the Agency was required to send notices of the Joint Public Hearing toeach assessee on the 1985-1986 County tax assessment role, which would include all joint own- ers of the parcel of property, including spouses and children of joint owners and further if an assessee owned more than one parcel that the Agency would be re- quired to send he or she a notice for each parcel within the project area. The evidence indicates that numerous persons owned more than one parcel of property, several owning more than ten parcels each. Approximately 500 assessees own at least two parcels each in the Project area. There are 2,023 property owners for 2,908 parcels of real property. Health and Safety Code section 33349 provides that notice be sent to "the last known assessee" of each” parcel of land. C-18 If an assessee owns more than one parcel of landa single notice is sufficient un- der the statute. Likewise the statute does not require a notice to be sent to each joint owner of the parcel of prop- erty. Page 253 In the case of Herrington v. Weigel (1978) 82Cal.App.3d 676, 682-683, the court held that a directive to send no- tice to assessees does not require that each assessee receive a separate notice. A co-tenant's due process rights were not violated because separate notices of an "Intent to Deed Property to the State" for failure to pay back taxes were not sent. In that case section 3701 of the Revenue and Taxation Code provided; " .. - the tax collector shall send a notice by registered mail of the intended sale to the last assessee of each portion of C-19 » the property at his last known address.” The court held that "there is no requirement in the code that "each" assessee be sent a separate copy or copies. The assessees have some duty to designate how they want their names to appear on the tax rolls." In Herrington the co-tenant could lose his interest in the real property by forfeiture if not notified by the co-owner assessee who received notice, a harsh result, the instant case would not result in such a drastic action but rather involves the designation of the property as a parcel within the Community Redevelopment Plan. Although it is reasonable to con- clude from the record that some assessees may have not received a notice by certi- fied mail of the Joint Public Hearing, the number is disputed by the parties and substantial evidence supports the conclu- C-20 sion that the Agency made a good faith effort to satisfy the code requirements, of notice to those property owners within the project area. Any defects were technical and not substantial. There is substantial evidence that the Agency at- tempted to inform the public and property owners in the project area as to the var- ious steps and meetings in the process of the adoption of the Redevelopment Plan, there is no credible evidence that the Agency pursued a policy of suppressing or failing to make available notices and in- formation regarding the Redevelopment Project. The meetings were well publi- cized and well attended. in In Downtown Palo Alto Committee for Fair Assessment v. City Council of Palo Alto (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 384, 389, 390, a Streets and Highway Code section 36522 required the notice of the adoption of an C-21 assessment district be mailed to “each business in the proposed, or established area." The facts indicated that about 25 percent of the businesses did not receive notice, 179 of 727. The appeals court affirmed the trial court's holding that the City had substantially complied with the statute. The court held at pages 394- 396: "Literal compliance with the statute would also be unreasonably burdensome to cities seeking to establish improvement areas. .. . And if we were to demand strict compliance with the statute, fail- ure to send the requisite notice to a single business in the proposed improve- ment area could result in Page 254 the invalidity of the entire procedure. Nothing in the statutory scheme suggests C-22 that the Legislature intended such a harsh result. ... "The requisite notice must promote and satisfy the objectives of the law; but if it does so, mere technical, insub- stantial noncompliance with the provision - « « that notice of the hearing must be sent to ‘each business' in the proposed improvement area will not invalidate the proceedings." The appellants each received notice of the Joint Public Hearing and no claim of lack of notice was made at the Joint Public Hearing. Appellants have failed to show that a substantial number of per- sons failed to receive notice or that any owners of property sustained prejudice by lack of notice. Any error, irregularity Or omission by the Agency did not affect the parties substantial rights. In re De- C-23 velopment Plan for Bunker Hili (1964) 61 Cal.2d21, 43, 44.) The Determination by the CommunityY Redevelopment Agency and the City of Los Angeles that the Project Area is Blighted is Supported by Substantial Evidence. The statutory provisions applicable in order to make a determination of blight are as follows: "Section 33030. Existence of blighted areas "It is found and declared that there exist in many communities blighted areas which constitute either physical, social, or economic liabilities, .. . requiring redevelopment in the interest of the health, safety, and general welfare of the people of such communities and of the state. " . . .- A blighted . .. area is one which is characterized by one or more of C-24 those conditions set forth in Sections 33031 . . .or 33032, causing a reduction of, or lack of, proper utilization of the area to such an extent that it consti- tutes a serious physical, social, or eco- nomic burden on the community which can- not reasonably be expected to be reversed or alleviated by private enterprise act- ing alone. "Section 33031. Blighted area; un- fit or unsafe buildings "A blighted area is characterized by the existence of buildings and structures, used or intended to be used for living, commercial, industrial, or other purposes, or any combination of such uses, which are unfit or unsafe to occupy for such purposes and are conducive to ill health, transmission of disease, infant mortality, juvenile delinquency, and crime because of any one C-25 or a combination of the following factors: "(a) Defective design and character of physical construction. Page 255 "(b) Faulty interior arrangement andexterior spacing. "(c) High density of population and overcrowding . "(d) Inadequate provision for ventilation,light, sanitation, open spaces, and recreationfacilities. "(e) Age, obsolescence, deterioration, dilapidation, mixed character, or shift- ing of uses." Health and Safety Code section 33032. Blight is also found where proper- ties suffer from economic dislocation, deterioration or disuse because of one or more of the following factors: C-26 "(a) The subdividing and sale of lots of irregular form and shape and inadequate size for proper usefulness and development. "(b) The laying out of lots in dis- regard of the contours and other topogra- phy or physical characteristics of the ground and surrounding conditions. "(c) The existence of inadequate public improvements, public facilities, open spaces, and utilities which cannot be remedied by private or governmental action without redevelopment. "(d) A prevalence of depreciated values, impaired investments, and social and economic maladjustment." The Los Angeles City council in adopting the Redevelopment Plan had be- fore it the Agency's Report to the Council consisting of 640 pages which in- Cluded 219 pages describing conditions in C-27 the project area. The community of Hol- lywood was originally a low density resi- dential area which now consists of old and deteriorating buildings, seriously overcrowded housing conditions and a sub- stantial number of seismatically unsafe commercial buildings. There is a lack of adequate housing, Open space and trans- portation. Twenty-five percent of the commercial structures suffer construction defects in that they were built with un- reinforced masonry. The population of the project area increased 25 percent from 1970 to 1980, however, during the same period available housing only increased 2 percent. In 1980 approximately 5000 households had three or more occupants but only 2000 housing units had two or more bedrooms. Areas originally designed and built as i a C-28 low density residential have been trans- formed into Page 256 high density multi-family dwellings. The project area is deficient in park land. The buildings are old and show dete- rioration. At least 36 percent of the Single family residences show deferred maintenance, an additional 27 percent re- quire moderate to heavy rehabilitation. There is adult entertainment in Close proximity to schools and residences, There are incompatible industrial uses in the area. Hotels and motels have shifted to use as transient rentals and regional re- tail uses have shifted to transient specialty shops. | The project area is poorly subdi- vided making proper development difficult because of land ownership patterns. Land C-29 values have depreciated. There is a need for housing due to overcrowding but 86 percent of the residential parcels are below the threshold size for development. Over 20 percent of the land parcels fail to meet minimum zoning standards. Ninety-two percent of the residential property is separately owned but only 6 percent of the housing is owner-occupied. New development and reinvestment in the area is unlikely due to the low income of residents and their inability to support higher rents. The project area does not have the ability to support the present level of government services. The reported crime rate for the pro- ject area is double the City-wide rate. The street scene is dominated by youthful runaways and the homeless. Private revitalization of the area is highly un- likely. The Redevelopment Agency and the is; i C- 30 City Council heard testimony and evidence for and against the adoption of the Rede- velopment Plan. The City Council adopted the Redevelopment Plan and made a deter- mination that the project area was blighted. The trial court in addition to reviewing the record before it from the Redevelopment Agency and the City Council hearings permitted appellants to present contradictory evidence to the Record of Proceedings. The court heard 60 half days of testimony and reviewed documents presented by the appellants. After review of all the records and the addi- tional testimony the trial court found the decisions and determinations of respondents in adopting the Redevelopment Plan, including the determination that the project area was blighted was supported by substantial evidence. C-31 In the case of (In re Development Plan for Bunker Hill (1964) 61 Cal.2d 21, the California Supreme Court was faced with a factual situation very similar to the case at hand. The Redevelopment Plan for Bunker Hill was a massive Page 257 redevelopment within the central city area of the City of Los Angeles. The re- spondents objected to the final Redevelopment Plan, the determination of blight and the standard of judicial re- view. The Supreme Court upheld the final Redevelopment Plan and the determination of blight. "It becomes immaterial whether the actions of the agency and the city council in adoption of the Bunker Hill project be termed 'legislative' or ‘administrative' in either event the trial court was correct in its refusal to reweigh the evidence and in confining it- C-32 self to determining whether the findings and determinations of the inferior bodies were supported by substantial evidence." (At p. 40.) "The trial court was correct in its refusal to exercise its indepen- dent judgment on the evidence upon which the agency and the city council acted." (At p. 41.) "Moreover, objections are being accorded a judicial determination on the issue of blight through the substantial evidence review made in the subject proceeding by the trial court, and which is now before us on appeal." (At p. 41.) The Supreme Court in the Bunker Hill case on page 40 in defining the scope of judicial review cited the matter of Pitts v. Perluss (1962) 58 Cal.2d 824, 833, 835,"As to the quasi-legislative acts of administrative agencies, judicial review is limited to an examination of the pro- C.33 ceedings before the officer to determine whether his action has been arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evi- dentiary support." "The substitution of the judgment of a court for that of the administrator in quasi-legislative mat- ters would effectuate neither the leg- islative mandate nor sound public pol- icy.” In the matter of Fosselman's v. City of Alhambra (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 806, 811-812, the appellant challenged the Re- development Plan adopted by the City and the finding of blight. The court held "In Community Development Law the Legis- lature delegated to the agency and the city council the power to determine blight as well as the power to adopt and implement redevelopment plans, the acts of the agency and the city council in carrying out such functions have been C.34 termed legislative." (At p.811.) "The substantial evidence standard, not the independent exercise of the court's judg- ment, governs judicial review of the findings and determinations of an agency and legislative body in the adoption and approval of a redevelopment plan." (At p. 810.) The Redevelopment Agency, the City Council and the trial court found sub- stantial evidence of blight within the project area. This court finds: that there is substantial evidence to sustain the determination by these bodies of blight, and the actions by the Agency and Council were neither arbitrary, capri- cious nor entirely lacking in evidentiary support. Page 258 Differences of opinion, no matter how strongly presented, do not warrant C-35 rejection of respondent's action, where it has been demonstrated that respondents were presented with opposing viewpoints, considered them extensively and on the basis of evidence selected one alterna- tive rather than another. (Karlson v. City of Camarillo (1980) 100 Cal.App.3d 789, 803.) THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN LIMITING DISCOVERY The scope of judicial review of a leg- islative type activity is limited to an examination of the record before the au- thorized decision makers to test for suf- ficiency with legal requirements. (Fosselman's, Inc. v. City of Alhambra (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 806, 811-812.) A substantial evidence review is limited to the record before the Community Redevel- opment Agency and the City Council, it is an examination of the proceedings before C-36 the entities to determine if their ac- tions were arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support. The trial court reviews the decision mak- ing process of the administrative agency and does not conduct its own evidentiary hearing, thus discovery is limited. California Community Redevelopment Law section 33000 et seq., Sections 33360-33364 set forth detailed provisions to challenge the adoption of a Redevelop- ment Plan, it established an administra- tive procedure to challenge the Plan's adoption. Notices are given and public hearings are held, objectors are given an opportunity to participate in the statu- tory hearing process. (Redevelopment Agency of County of Riverside v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1487.) If the objectors fail to exhaust their administrative remedies they are fore- C-37 closed from raising issues before the trial court not properly raised during the administrative hearing process. Appellants attempted to subpoena parties and notice depositions, respon- dents filed a motion to quash. In each hearing before the court appellants failed to make a sufficient showing to justify said discovery in a limited review situation. Appellants had partic- ipated in the public hearings and were given an opportunity to present evidence and raise whatever issues they thought were important and relevant. Their fail- ure to raise an issue or present evidence at the public hearings operates as a waiver of presenting such evidence or raising said issue before the trial court, whose function it is to review the record. The record exceeded 9000 pages in length. Appellants were afforded an C.-38 opportunity to review, challenge and proffer supplements to the Record of Proceedings. Appellants are not entitled to present additional or new evidence at the trial thus discovery pertaining to the introduction of new evidence is to be severely limited and within the sound discretion of the trial court. In the matter of Kahn v. East Bay Mun. Utl.District (1974) 41 Page 259 Cal. App.3d 397, 402, the petitioner attempted to introduce before the trial court evidence of water rates charged in some 23 communities to challenge the rates set by the municipal utility dis- trict. Said evidence was rejected in that petitioner was present at the public hearing on the setting of the water rates, and although he objected to the rates, he presented no evidence to sup- C-39 port his objections. Thus he could not present additional or new evidence to the trial court not introduced at the hearing. After the trial court had certified the Record of Proceedings as complete for purposes of review, the court denied ap- pellant's renewed motion for discovery. Thereafter the court ruled on other re- quests for depositions and discovery. At each hearing appellant was permitted to make a showing that the documents sought or depositions requested were relevant and material to the preparation of their case for trial and had not been previously produced. Each time the trial court denied the discovery after full consideration of the motions. The trial court exercised its discretion in determining whether the discovery sought would lead to relevant and material evi- C-40 dence. Appellants have failed to show that the trial court abused its discre- tion. Appellants sought to discover in- formation which it could have sought and presented at the public hearings and has failed to show said information was not available at the time of the public hear- ings. Jeffery v. City of Salinas (1965) 232 Cal. App.2d 29, 39.) Failure to raise an issue in protest at the public hearing constitutes a waiver of the right to have that issue determined by the council of the court. Discovery statutes vest a wide discretion in the trial court and exercise of that discretion will be disturbed only when it can be said there has been an abuse of discretion. An order compelling discovery must rest on a showing that the discovery is reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence in an adminis- C-41 trative mandamus proceeding. (Mobil Oil Corp. v. Superior Court (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 293, 304; City of Fairfield v. Superior Court, 14 Cal.3d 768, 774-775.) On April 8, 1988 appellant Nelson filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandate with the Appeals Court to seek appellate review of a discovery protective order issued by the trial court. It was denied for failure to show an abuse of discre- tion. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE AP- PROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW The trial court correctly determined that there was substantial evidence to Support the actions of respondents, it is not for the trial court to Page 260 involve itself in the decision making process of a Redevelopment Agency and a City Council, the Legislature delegated C-42 legislative decisions to those agencies and not to the courts. Judicial review is limited to whether there was substantial evidence to support the leg- islative decisions.(In re Redevelopment Plan for Bunker Hill (1964) 61 Cal.2d2l1, 40; Sanguinetti v. City Council of Stock- ton (1965) 231Cal.App.2d 813, 817; Na- tional City Business Assoc. v. National City (1987) 146 Cal.App.3d 1060, 1065; Fosselman's Inc. v. City of Alhambra (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 806,811-812.) "A de novo type of review does not apply to quasi-legislative acts of administrative officers and judicial review is limited to an examination of the proceedings be- fore the officer to determine whether his action has been arbitrary, capricious or entirely lackingin evidentiary support." The Redevelopment Agency and the City Council have authority to designate — C.43 redevelopment areas and the court is not empowered to substitute its determination for the determination of the agency or the legislative body. (Babcock v. Commu- nity Redevelopment Agency (1957) 148 Cal.App.2d 38.) "The trial court should not reweigh the evidence but confine it- self to determining whether the findings and determinations of the inferior bodies were supported by substantial evidence. . - « The trial court was correct in its refusal to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence upon which the agency and the city council acted." (In re Redevelopment Plan for Bunker Hill, 61 Cal.2d 21, 40-41.) Appellants urge that the trial court applied the improper standard of review by determining that all of the acts of the agency and city council were quasi- legislative, wherein appellants argue C.44 that certain acts such as the finding of blight, the factual findings that the redevelopment plan is economically sound and feasible and that the redevelopment plan conforms to the general plan of the community require factual findings which are quasi-judicial in nature. A redevelopment plan is a comprehen- Sive method to carry out the redevelop- ment of an area. Although the process of adoption of a redevelopment plan provides for the holding of public hearings and the taking of testimony along with exami- nation of various criteria in arriving at its determinations, these determinations remain essentially legislative in charac- ter (City of Santa Cruz v. LAFCO (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 381, 388); "An administra- tive agency such as LAFCO is nonetheless quasi-legislative in nature, though it holds public hearings and considers C-45 ‘testimony presented by any. . . inter- ested person who wishes to appear.’ .. . The Legislature and administrators exercising quasi-legislative powers com- monly resort to the hearing procedure to uncover, at least in part, the facts necessary to arrive at a sound and fair legislative decision. . .. Hence the presence of Page 261 certain characteristics common to the ju- dicial process does not change the basi- cally quasi-legislative nature of the subject proceedings." Sanguinetti v. City Council of Stockton (1965) 231 Cal.App.2d 813, 817- “818. ... =“Pirst it is to be observed that while the statutes refer to 'findings' to be made by the legislative body, in this case the city council, the word 'findings' is not to be equated with C-46 that term as used in statutory provisions as to judicial proceedings. The hearing before the city council is not a judicial proceeding, nor is it required to be car- ried out with all the nicety or require- ments for such proceedings. By the word 'findings' the Legislature plainly refers to certain specific determinations to be arrived at by the city council as a pre- requisite to adoption. ... Of course, the law does not contemplate that the legislative body will adopt a proposed redevelopment plan without determining generally that it complies with the applicable law and will be for the bene- fit of the community to be affected. .. -But all this is not to say that the Legislature required specific 'findings' and determinations in exact accord with the legislative language. Substantial compliance is sufficient." The California C-47 Legislature has delegated to redevelopment agencies as legislative bodies the power and authority to deter- mine blight and effectuate redevelopment. (In re Bunker Hill (1964) 61 Cal.2d 21, 52.) The court's function is to review the administrative record to determine if there is substantial evidence to support the determination of the administrative agency. It is only in those cases, unlike the facts herein, where a party has ac- guired a fundamental vested right and the administrative decision substantially af- fects that fundamental vested right that the court will conduct an independent re- view of the evidence and the record. In those cases the vested right is deemed substantially significant to preclude its extinction by a body lacking judicial power. However, this must be decided on C-48 a case by case basis. (Whalers Village Club v. California Coastal Commission (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 240, 251; Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 146; 301 Ocean Ave. Corp. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board (1981) 91 DAR 3970, 3971.) THERE IS NO CREDIBLE EVIDENCE OF FRAUD BY THE CRA OR THE CITY IN THE FORMATION OF ADOPTION OF THE PLAN Appellants convinced the trial court to permit testimony and documentary evi- dence, not contained in the administra- tive record, to support their allegations of fraud in the formation and adoption of the Redevelopment Plan. Page 262 The trial court made express find- ings that appellants "produced no credi- ble evidence supporting any of their fraud allegations against the Agency and the City of Los Angeles." Appellants were C-49 granted wide latitude in the presentation of evidence, the hearing commenced on May 27, 1988 and concluded on September 23, 1988 and encompassed 60 one-half days of trial. Appellants called 34 witnesses and offered 116 exhibits outside the record of the administrative proceedings. The court admitted 42 of the exhibits and after having weighed all of the testimony and evidence negated the fraud allegations. Unlike its review of the ad 3 > J > W (ct ry ww i tive record the trial court undertook an independent, de novo review of appellants fraud allegations. Although appell fy — (tT Ww have urged numerous allegations of fraud, each and every such allegation was re-~ jected by the court after reviewing the evidence as being "not credible.” O* hth = ho (Johnson v. Pacific Indemnity (196 Cal.App.2d 878, 880.) “The trial court, C-50 as the trier of fact .. . is the sole arbiter of all conflicts in the evidence, conflicting interpretations thereof and conflicting inferences which reasonably may be drawn therefrom; is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses ... and, in the exercise of sound legal discretion, may draw or may refuse to draw inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence." (Also see Milligan v. Hearing Aid Dispensers Examining Com. (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1005.) "The court's function... is to review er- rors of law and not pass on questions of fact. Even where a trial court must exer- cise its independent judgment on the evi- dence, the power of appellate courts begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evi- dence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the conclusion reached C-51 by the trier of fact." (Bailey v. County of Los Angeles (1956) 46 Cal.2d132, 137.) The appellate court will not disturb findings of fact which upport the trial court's orders; so far as it has passed on the weight of the evidence, the trial court's findings are conclusive. The court found that the Agency com- plied with the law in giving notice of the formation of the PAC committee and proper notice of the Joint Public Hear- ings, that the Agency neither manipulated nor dominated the PAC committee, that the operations of the PAC were open and demo- cratic, that the PAC was independent and that all hearings were well publicized, well attended and all public concerns were well aired. THE REDEVELOPMENT PLAN IS CONSISTENT WITH THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES GENERAL PLAN C-52 Appellants are requesting the court to invalidate the Redevelopment Plan by collaterally attacking the City of Los Angeles General Plan. Page 263 The Record of Proceedings establish the existence of a General Plan for the City of Los Angeles. (Record exhs. 65, 65A, 65B.) The Plan is a lengthy document containing maps, text and diagrams. The City Planning Commission considered and reviewed the Redevelopment Plan and found that it conformed to the City's General Plan. The City's General Plan was adopted at least ten years prior to the adoption of the Redevelopment Project in May 1986. The most liberal statute of limitation applicable to a challenge to the General Plan would be Code of Civil Procedure section 343 which provides, "an action C-53 for relief not hereinabove provided for must be commenced within four years after the cause of action shall have accrued." It is untimely for appellants to attack the General Plan. SHOT an appellant herein in another case previously challenged a trial court's determination that the plaintiff was barred by Code of Civil Procedure section 343 from attacking the suffi- ciency of the General Plan, Save Holly- wood Our Town v. City of Los Angeles, No.B030192, 2nd District (1988). In an unpublished opinion the Appeals Court up- held the trial court's decision. The same parties are before the court with the same issue for determination. The trial court's determination that the Hollywood Redevelopment Plan conforms to the City's General Plan is supported by substantial evidence. a 2-54 THE AWARD OF COSTS AGAINST SHOT APPEL- LANTS WAS PROPER The CRA and the City of Los Angeles filed a Cost Bill in the amount of $18,560.16, the court awarded costs against the SHOT appellants; Susan Nel- son, Karen Hale Wookey, Jamia Riehl and Katherine Armour only in the amount of $6,133.15. The court exercised its dis- cretion in reducing the amount of costs requested. The parties against whom costs were assessed are not property own- ers within the Project Area. Appellants contend that under the reasoning of In re Development Plan for Bunker Hill (1964) 61 Cal.2d 21,71, that costs cannot be assessed against an ob- jector in validation proceedings. In the Bunker Hill case the court held that the clearance of blighted areas and the redevelopment thereof are public uses. C-55 That a property owner in the redevelop- ment area may be reluctant to give up her property resulting in eminent domain pro- ceedings. That even though the party may not prevail in the trial court or on ap- peal she would be entitled to be free from costs in litigation of the action. (Collier v. Merced Irr. Dist.(1931) 213 Cal. 554, 572.) The owner is entitled to full compensation for her property, free from costs. Page 264 The appellants herein who have been ordered to pay costs are not property owners within the Project Area. Their property will not be subject to condemna- ‘tion and thus the assessment of costs would not reduce the value of their property. The court specifically struck costs against any appellants who owned real a C-56 property within the Project Area to con- form to the Bunker Hill holding. As the prevailing parties the re- spondents are entitled to the costs in the reduced amount awarded by the trial court. (Cabello v. ITT General Controls (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 1009, 1013; Code Civ. Proc., Sections 1032, 868.. The judgment is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUB- LISHED. KALIN, J. We concur: JOHNSON, Acting P.J. WOODS (Fred), J. (Text of typewritten Opinion from Court of Appeal used, supra. Published version has minor differences). ANNOTATIONS TO APPELLATE OPINION, supra, 231 CA3d 243 (1991), presented by Appel- lant Morgan in Petition for Review to California Supreme Court: Page 248 C-57 1. Concealed goals should be men- tioned which include the imposition of eminent domain for private developers un- der the legal fiction of public use and the confiscation of $ 922 million prop- erty taxes to subsidize private develop- ers that would otherwise protect life and property. Ze Court correctly ruled CRA set up PAC thus it could not have been "self- formed.” Page 249 36 List of issues omits several issues such as Neighborhood Impact Report and includes fraud which was not subject of appeal. Page 250 4. Since Council ordered 4 commu- nity organizations to be appointed PAC was not "self-formed." C-58 Se Decision omits fact electorate was expanded to add businesses and absen- tee property owners not specified as electors in HSC Section 33385. 6. Decision does not comment on Plaintiff survey showing 7859 of 16,000 residential units not notified. 7. Decision is false. CRA attor- neys stipulated there was no paid newspa- per notice of PAC election or formation. (RT 1417:25-27, ARB 32). 8. Decision omits key fact voters were only allowed by CRA to vote in own category. Page 251 9. Appointment by the residents and existing community organizations is not precluded but appointment by CRA or Council is precluded by HSC Section 33385. C-59 10. Actually HSC Section 33385 only allows the legislative body two discre- tionary actions: 1) Whether to call a PAC. 2) Whether to approve it. 11. Uncontradicted testimony was there was a voting bloc controlling PAC and bribed members (RT 3477-87, AOB 34). ‘ 12. See note 7, no paid newspaper notice was published. 13. Extremely detailed PAC Notice Survey evidence was offered and not ad- mitted showing 7859 residential units not notified and why. No court has ever weighed the evidence. See Appellant's Mo- tion to Admit Project Area Committee Evi- dence filed May 31, 1991 which was not heard. Page 252 14. This misstates Appellant posi- tion. See Petition for Rehearing at vii, C-60 notes 11:18 - 12:14. Simply notice must address each owner being notified with each parcel number being notified. Page 253. 15. Subjecting tenants and owners to eminent domain for 30 years for resale to private developers is certainly harsh and a drastic action. Tenants got no mailed notice at any time which is not due process. Page 254 16. In CCP Sections 860-870 action as in class action rights of parties not appearing are litigated so irrelevant whether appellants noticed. Strict com- pliance is required due to imposition of eminent domain powers when CRA did not even substantially comply, prejudicing hundreds of assessees. Page 255 C-61 17. Appellate Court did not use the current text of HSC Section 33032 de- scribing the 7 step "blight" hierarchy effective Jan. 1, 1985 and has quoted ob- solete 1976 text with a very lax standard of "blight," which was given James Regan (AOB 24, RT 5284:14-5285:27). 18. Many alleged "facts" are ut- terly false on page 7091. See detailed criticisms in Petition for Rehearing at viii-ix. This is a prime example of the Court not finding the truth. Page 256 19. The project area buildings are the exact opposite of Bunker Hill which had 60 % dangerous. Not over 3 % to 7 $% in Hollywood could be called dangerous by CRA's own evidence. Page 257 C-62 20. Bunker Hill never ruled "blight" findings quasi-legislative. 21. Term “substantial evidence” is not the same as "scintilla of evidence" which goes with "arbitrary, capricious, entirely lacking in evidentiary support." Due to imposition of eminent domain strict scrutiny de novo review is re- quired. Page 258 22. See analysis in Petition for Rehearing at ix-xi. Since there were fraud allegations discovery denial was improper. 23. HSC Sections 33360-33364 were not in effect in 1986 thus no exhaustion of remedies was required. Page 260 24. A CRA is an executive body and the City Council is its legislative body. Page 261 C-63 25. Court failed to show its rea- soning why rights to life, health, prop- erty, due process do not exist or can be arbitrarily taken without strict scrutiny de novo review by preponderance of the evidence standards. Page 262 26. Misstates Appellant position. Respondents admitted the General Plan was invalid. (Federation of Hillside and Canyon Associations v. L. A., LASC 526 616, Ap 7715, AOB 42-43, ARB 49). Simply no redevelopment plan could be adopted until there was a legal general plan. When Hamilton exposed this the Mayor threatened to fire him. (See also list at pages vi-xii in Appel- lant Petition for Rehearing and Supple- mental Briefing filed May 31, 1991 and discussions.) ah D-1 APPENDIX D Order of Second Appellate District Divi- sion 7 denying leave to file Appellant's Motion to Admit Project Area Committee Evidence dated May 31, 1991. ORIGINAL JUN 12 1991 Permission to file DENIED Johnson A. P. J. — E-1 APPENDIX E Judgment of April 20, 1989 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES No. C 607 002 Consolidated With No. C 607 295 *** JUDGMENT Trial in the above-captioned Consol- idated Actions came on before the Honor- able Barnet M. Cooperman on May 27, 1988, in Department 59 of the above Court. Plaintiff David Morgan appeared in Pro- pria persona in Case No. C 607 002. Plaintiffs, Susan B. Nelson, Karen Hale Wookey, Jamia Riehl and Katherine Armour in Case No. C 607 295 and Norton Halper, Plaintiff in C 607 002, appeared through their counsel of record, Christopher Sutton, of Gronemeier, Barker & Huerta. Defendants, the City of Los Angeles and The Community Redevelopment Agency of the E-2 City of Los Angeles, California, appeared through their counsel of record, William F. Childs, Deputy City Attorney, and R. Bruce Tepper, Jr. and Kathryn Reimann of Kane, Ballmer & Berkman. Trial was held for in excess of 60 court half-days. Argument over the admis- Sion of exhibits was heard over an addi- tional 11 Court half-days. Plaintiffs ex- amined 34 witnesses. A total of 33 Ex- hibits were received into evidence, in- Cluding the 10,000 page Record of Pro- ceedings certified by Judge Warren H. Deering on July 6, 1988. Both sets of Plaintiffs each submitted Trial Briefs; Defendants jointly submitted a Trial Brief; Plaintiff David Morgan submitted a Reply Trial Brief. Supplemental Trial Briefs were also submitted by both Plain- tiffs and Defendants during the course of Trial. In addition, both sets of Plain- E-3 tiffs each submitted written Final Argu- ment; Defendants submitted a joint Final Argument. Plaintiffs also submitted sepa- rate Reply Final Arguments. After a re- view of all papers in support of and in opposition to the Amended Complaints, after hearing testimonial evidence, and after hearing oral argument in support of and in opposition to the Amended Com- plaints, and after signing the Statement of Decision for the within action, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as a judgment which is and shall be for- ever binding and conclusive upon the par- ties hereto and all persons interested in the validity of the Hollywood Redevelop- ment Project, as follows: ie A. Ordinance No. 161,202 of the City Council of the City of Los Angeles ap- proving and adopting the Redevelopment Plan for the Hollywood Redevelopment Pro- —_ E-4 ject is hereby declared to be adequate, sufficient, legal and valid in all respects. B. The Redevelopment Plan for the Holly- wood Redevelopment Project and the Holly- wood Redevelopment Project are hereby declared to be adequate, sufficient, le- gal and valid in all respects. C. Plaintiffs shall take nothing by these consolidated actions. II. Judgment is entered in favor of De- fendants and against plaintiffs on all Causes of Action. III. Defendants are to recover costs against Plaintiffs Susan B. Nelson, Karen Hale Wookey, Jamia Riehl, and Katherine Armour only. Dated: Apr 20 1989 BARNET M. COOPERMAN Judge of the Superior Court F-1 APPENDIX F Statement of Decision of April 20, 1989 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES No. C 607 002 Consolidated With No. C 607 295 STATEMENT OF DECISION Trial in the above-captioned Consol- idated Actions came on before the Honor- able Barnet M. Cooperman on May 27, 1988, in Department 59 of the above Court. Plaintiff David Morgan appeared in pro- pria persona in Case No. C 607 002. Plaintiffs, Susan B. Nelson, Karen Hale Wookey, Jamia Riehl and Katherine Armour in Case No. C 607 295 and Norton Halper, Plaintiffs in C 607 002, appeared through their counsel of record, Christopher Sutton, of Gronemeier, Barker & Huerta. Defendants, the City of Los Angeles and The Community Redevelopment Agency of the F.-2 City of Los Angeles, California [collect- ively, "Defendants"], appeared through their counsel of record, William F. Childs, Deputy City Attorney, and R. Bruce Tepper, Jr. and Kathryn Reimann of Kane, Ballmer & Berkman. During pre-trial proceedings, certain causes of action were dismissed by Plaintiffs and judgment entered pursuant to Code of Civil Proce- dure Section 631.8. Immediately prior to Trial, Plaintiff David Morgan was permit- ted to amend his complaint in certain respects in order that it conform to the causes'of action filed in Case No. C 607 295 by Plaintiffs, Susan B. Nelson, et al. In doing so, however, a cause of ac- ticn for violation of Public Records Act was not permitted because of Morgan's failure to plead the issue previously in a timely manner. As amended, the Com- F.-3 plaints enumerated the foilowing causes of action: Morgan et al. v. All Persons Interested Case No. C 607 002 [First Amended Com- plaint] CAUSES OF ACTIONI. I. Finding of Blight Not Supported By The Evidence II. Illegal Inclusion of Non-Blighted Property Within the Project Area Liz. No Provisions Have Been Made for Payment for Property to be Acquired IV. Project Fails to Promote General Welfare of Community ~ V. Inadequate Information for the Purpose of Determining the Economic Fea- sibility of the Redevelopment Plan VI. Failure of the Redevelopment Plan to Adequately Describe the Redevelopment that is Contemplated VII. Failure to Make Adequate Findings F.4 VIII. Lack of Substantial Evidence to Support Finding that Private Enterprise Acting Alone Would Not Develop The Area Ix. The Effect of Tax Increment Fi- nancing Will Cause a Severe Financial Burden or Detriment on Any Taxing Agency Deriving Revenues from the Project Area xX. Violation of Purposes of Redevel- opment Law XI. Failure to Organize a Project Area Committee To Fairly Represent the Commu- nity as an Independent Public Body XII. Lack of Feasible Method or Plan for Relocation of Displaced Families XIII. No Basis for Finding of eed tai 1s ity of Substitute Dwellings at Comparable Costs TEV. Failure to Provide Full and Fair Hearing F.5 XV. The Redevelopment Plan is not Re- sponsive to the Fiscal Review Committee Report XVI. The Redevelopment Plan Does not conform to the General Plan XVII. Inadequate and Misleading Prelimi- nary Report XVIII. Validation Action by All Plain- tiffs Against All Defendants XIX. Violation of Plaintiffs’ Due Pro- cess and Equal Protection Rights by all Plaintiffs Against Agency and City XxX. Injunction to Restrain Illegal Ex- penditures and Waste of Public Funds Pur- Suant to C.C.P. Section 526(a) By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XXI. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants | F-6 XXII. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XXIII. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XXIV. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P.Section 1085 By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XXV. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XXVI. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P.Section 1085 By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XXVII. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XXVIII. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants Fal XXIX. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XXX. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XXXI. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XXXII. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XXXIII. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XXXIV. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XXXV. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants titeieieiaeante F.8 Rea Le Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XXXVII. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XXXVIII. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XXXIX. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XL. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XLI. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XLIII. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1094.5 By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants F.9 XLVI. Project Area Committee Continu- ing Violations Pursuant to Health & Safety Code Sections 33385, et seg. By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XLVII. Conflict of Interest Violations Pursuant to Government Code Section 8710C et g. for Injunction By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants Susan B. Nelson et al. v. CRA. et al. Case No. C 607 295 [First Amendec Com- plaint] CAUSES OF ACTION le Validation Action by all Plain- tiffs Against All Defendants II. Violation of Plaintiffs’ Due Process and Equal Protection Rights by all Plaintiffs Against Agency and City III. Injunction to Restrain Illegal Expenditures and Waste of Public Funds Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 526 (a) by all Plaintiffs Against All Defendants F-10 IV. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 by All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants Vv. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 by All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants VI. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 by All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants VII. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 by All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants VIII. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 by All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants IX. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Secticn 1085 by All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants X. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 by All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants F.11 Rie Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 by All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XII. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 by All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XIII. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.Cc.P. Section 1085 by All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XIV. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 by All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XV. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 by All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XVI. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 by All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XVII. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.Cc.P. Section 1085 by All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants F'.12 RVisse Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 by All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XIX. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 by All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XX « Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 by All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XXI. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 by All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XXII. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 by All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XXIII. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 by All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XXIV. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1085 by All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants F.13 XXV. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.Cc.P. Section 1085 by All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants [DISMISSED October 21, 1987] XXVI. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 1094.5 by All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XXVII. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 526(a) by All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants [DISMISSED October 21, 1987] XXVIII. California Public Records Act Order to Show Cause, Injunction, Pursuant to Government Code Section 6250, et seq. By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XXIX. Project Area Committee Continu- ing Violations Pursuant to Health & Safety Code Section 33385, et seq. By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XXX. Conflict of Interest Violations Pursuant to Government Code Section F-14 87100, et seg. for Injunction By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants XXXI. Injunction for Violation of Ralph M. Brown Open Meeting Law, Govern- ment Code Section 54950, et seq., By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants [DISMISSED October 21, 1987] During Trial, Plaintiffs introduced evidence and made argument on the follow- ing material issues among others as disclosed by the transcripts of proceed- ings: (1) the formation and operation of the Project Area Committee; (2) the preparation of reports and the Record of Proceedings; (3) the existence of blight in the proposed project area; (4) the provision of notice of the Joint Public Hearing; and (5) allegations of fraud in the adoption process. Trial was held for in excess of 60 court half-days. Argument over the admis- RAR anna itn F-15 sion of exhibits was heard over an additional 11 Court half-days. Plaintiffs examined 34 witnesses. A total of 33 Ex- hibits were received into evidence, in- cluding the 10,000 page Record of Pro- ceedings certified by Judge Warren H. Deering on July 6, 1987. Both sets of Plaintiffs each submitted Trial Briefs; Defendants jointly submitted a Trial Brief;Plaintiff David Morgan submitted a Reply Trial Brief. Supplemental Trial Briefs were also submitted by both Plain- tiffs and Defendants during the course of Trial. In addition, both sets of Plain- tiffs each submitted written Final Argu- ment; Defendants submitted a joint Final Argument. Plaintiffs also submitted sepa- rate Reply Final Arguments. After a re- view of all papers in support of and in opposition to the Amended Complaints, after hearing testimonial evidence, and F-16 after hearing oral argument in support of and in opposition to the Amended Complaints, the Court rules as follows: I. Defendants complied with all of the mandates and requirements of the Com- munity Redevelopment Law [Health and Safety Code Sections 33000, et seq.] in preparing and adopting the Redevelopment Plan for the Hollywood Redevelopment Project [the "Redevelopment Plan"]. A. Standard of Review: Judicial review in these actions concerning the preparation and adoption of the Redevelopment Plan is limited to that of review of legislative or quasi-legisla- tive action and is a substantial evidence review. Accordingly, in their decisions and determinations, the actions of the Defendants must be sustained unless their decisions are “arbitrary, capricious, en- tirely lacking in evidentiary support or eee einai F’.17 if [the Defendants] failed to follow the procedure and give the notices required by law" [Fosselman's, Inc. v. City of Al- hambra, 178 Cal.App.3d 806, 812 (1986)]. It has also been held that such actions must be sustained "unless there is no reasonable justification for their actions" [In Re Bunker Hill, 61 Cal.2d 21, 38 (1964)]. De novo type of review does not apply to judicial review of the preparation and adoption of a redevelop- ment plan. B. Defendants fully complied with all applicable statutory procedures in preparing and adopting the Redevelopment Plan. 1. The Hollywood Project Area Com- mittee (the "PAC") was properly formed. Health and Safety Code Section 33385 provides that if a proposed redevelopment project could result in the displacement F-18 of a substantial number of low- and mod- erate-income families, the legislative body shall call for the formation of a project area committee. A project area committee is an advisory committee to the Agency which must be formed and approved as representative within 60 days of the selection of the proposed project area. In complying with these procedures, the Defendants took the following ac- tions: ae The City adopted a resolution calling for the formation of a PAC to in- clude property owners, residential ten- ants, business owners, and existing com- munity organizations. Four community Organizations were to be appointed to the PAC by the Council office; the remaining 21 members of the PAC were to be elected by the community within the proposed pro- ject area. a F.-19 De The Agency provided two sepa- rate mailings of a Notice Of Formation of Project Area Committee, by first class mail, to all property owners of record in the proposed project area. The Agency also caused approximately 25,000 circu- lars to be distributed throughout the proposed project area on two separate oc- casions, in August and November, 1983. In addition, the Agency caused a number of newspaper articles and notices to be published in community newspapers in the area,concerning the formation of the PAC. Ce The Agency conducted a total of six community meetings from July to November, 1983, at which meetings the concept of redevelopment and the forma- tion of the PAC were discussed. d. On December 13, 1983, an elec- tion was held for members of the commu- nity in the Hollywood High School Audito- EE F.20 rium for the formation of the PAC. In ex- cess of 250 community members attended and participated in the formation of the PAC. Secret ballots were passed out and collected, liberal election qualification requirements were verified, nominations were accepted both by prior qualification and from the floor, and nominees were ac- corded an opportunity to speak. There was no evidence that any qualified individual was denied the opportunity to participate in this election. The election of members to the PAC wac reasonably and regularly conducted. e. A PAC consisting of four (4) residential property owners, four (4) residential tenants,six (6) business own- ers or tenants, three (3) industrial or manufacturing property owners or operators, and four (4) community organi- zations was selected by the community at F.21 that election. Four (4) additional commu- nity organizations were subsequently ap- pointed to the PAC by the Council office. £. On January 6, 1984, within 60 days of the selection of the project area, the City Council approved as repre- sentative the PAC members elected at the community meeting of December 13, 1983 and the four members appointed by the Council office. The efforts of the Defendants in un- dertaking the above-described course of action were reasonable, complied with no- tions of due process, were supported by substantial evidence, and did not violate any statutory or decisional guidelines concerning the formation of a project area committee. The categories of PAC membership mentioned in the statutory scheme are not exclusive, but serve as guidance for a determination of represen- F’.22 tativeness. The actions of Defendants were reasonable and calculated to include as many persons in the PAC formation pro- cess as possible and practical. Ze The operation of the PAC was regularly and openly conducted, and the Agency fully complied with its duty to consult with and obtain the advice of the PAC. The PAC or its subcommittees met in excess of 100 times to advise and consult with the Agency on the preparation of the Redevelopment Plan. Actions taken were by majority rule and minutes of the PAC meetings were regularly prepared, re-_ ‘ viewed, approved and maintained. Copies of approved PAC Minutes were included in the Agency's Report to Council. No request for funding of legal counsel or other material or services was made by the PAC to the legislative body, as required by Section 33388. Evidence F.23 established that the PAC was aware of this provision and consciously took no action. The Agency reasonably provided services and materials pursuant to the : "equivalent resources" provision of Sec- tion 33388. There was no evidence that any information material to the PAC's op- eration was withheld from the PAC. 3. The actions of Defendants leading to the preparation and adoption of the Redevelopment Plan *ully complied with the requirements of the Community Redevelopment Law. All the documents re- quired to be prepared and all the reviews required to be undertaken were performed and were adequately set forth in the Record of Proceedings, which was reviewed and upheld by Judge Deering on July 6, 1987 and accepted into evidence by this Court on October 21, 1988. The Record of Proceedings shows clearly what actions F.24 were taken by Defendants in adopting the Redevelopment Plan, and the reasons therefor. The Record of Proceedings Clearly shows that the Redevelopment Plan as adopted was the product of consensus and compromise to the needs of the commu- nity as perceived by the persons and or- ganizations who involved themselves in the process, including the Hollywood PAC, residents and business owners of the pro- ject area, the City's Planning Depart- ment, and the Councilperson representing the district in which the project area is located. Approval of the Redevelopment Plan was not the result of duress or un-_ due pressure on the part of any person or group. The application of City Charters 97.2 is preempted by the State Community Redevelopment Law. 4. The Redevelopment Plan was adopted in conformity with the General F-25 Plan for the City of Los Angeles. The is- sue was considered twice by the City Planning Commission which found the Rede- velopment Plan to be in conformance with the General Plan. There is substantial evidence in the Record of Proceedings supporting the City Council's determina- tion of conformity, pursuant to Health and Safety Code Section 33367. 5. The actions of Defendants in providing notice of the Joint Public Hearing fully complied with the statutory provisions set forth in Health and Safety Code Section 33349, as well as notions of due process. In addition to providing ad- equate certified mail notice to property owners in the project area, as estab- lished by the Record of Proceedings, the Defendants also caused notice of the Joint Public Hearing to be distributed door-to-door in the project area, and a —— F-26 caused the Notice of Joint Public Hearing to be published in two community newspa- pers. Separate certified mail notice for each parcel or for each individual as- sessee is not required. Cc. The decisions and determina- tions of Defendants in adopting the Rede- velopment Plan, including the determination that the project area is blighted, are supported by substantial evidence, contained in the Record of Pro- ceedings. The Agency's Report to Council consisted of 640 pages of materials, in- Cluding 219 pages describing the existing conditions in the project area. These materials were made available to the pub- lic in advance of the Joint Public Hear- ing. Testimony in favor of and against the adoption of the Redevelopment Plan was heard and considered by Defendants. The existence of objections to the Rede- aa cee aaa F.-27 velopment Plan did not operate to nullify the substantial evidence presented to the City Council indicating, inter alia, the existence of blight within the defini- tions of Health and Safety Code Sections 33030, et seq. Differences of opinion, no matter how strongly presented, do not warrant rejection of Defendants’ action, where it has been demonstrated that De- fendants were presented with opposing viewpoints, considered them extensively and on the basis of evidence selected one alternative rather than another. Karlson v. City of Camarillo, 100 Cal.App.3d 789, 803 (1980). In any event, even at Trial, Plaintiffs adduced no evidence contra- dicting the material contained in the Re- port to Council. II. There is no evidence to support any of Plaintiffs' allegations of fraud against the Agency or City. Because of F.-28 the seriousness of allegations of fraud against public entities and the impor- tance of the Redevelopment Plan to the City and County of Los Angeles, this court has reviewed all of Plaintiffs' al- legations of fraud under a de novo, independent standard of review, pursuant to the foundational requirements of City of Fairfield v. Superior Court, 14 Cal.3d 768, 775 (1976). Plaintiffs did participate in and were heard at the Joint Public Hearing. There is nothing in the Record of Proceedings and no evidence was adduced to show that Plaintiffs made any allegations of fraud at that time, or that they were otherwise prevented from making such allegations. After carefully considering all the evidence offered by Plaintiffs on this issue, the Court finds no credible evidence to support any of their fraud een nbeeamaaa F-29 allegations. Plaintiffs accused the Agency of committing fraud at nearly every step in the development of the plan, including the preparation of the Record of Proceedings. No evidence was adduced which supported such allegations. III. There is no evidence to suggest that any violation of the Political Re- form Act has occurred. No evidence was adduced with respect to any conflict by any member of the City Council or Agency Board of Commissioners. Similarly, no evidence was presented to support any claim by Plaintiffs that the Hollywood PAC, at the time of its formation or at the time the Redevelopment Plan was adopted, was required to but failed to comply with any guideline or requirement of the Political Reform Act. The opinion of In Re Rotman, 10 FPPC Opinions 1 (1987), overturning the prior opinion of F-30 In Re Bonfa, 2 FPPC Opinions 146 (1976), was not issued until May, 1987, more than one year after the Redevelopment Plan was adopted. No probative evidence of any conflict by any person was adduced. IV. No evidence was presented of any violation of the Public Records Act by Defendants. V. The actions of the City Council of the City of Los Angeles, and the Board of Directors of The Community Redevelop- ment Agency of the City of Los Angeles, California, in connection with the prepa- ration and adoption of the Hollywood Re- development Plan are therefore validated. The Hollywood Redevelopment Plan is therefore found and held to be valid and effective. Dated. APR 20 1989 BARNET M. COOOPERMAN Judge of the Superior Court G-1 APPENDIX G Statutes, rules involved U. S. Constitution Amendment I provides, in part: Congress shall make no law... abridging... the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. U. S. Constitution Amendment V provides, in part: No person shall...be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. U. S. Constitution Amendment XIV provides in part: ...No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities or citizens of the Untied States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor G-2 deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws... California Constitution Article III, Sec- tion 1 provides: The State of California is an inseparable part of the United States of America, and the United States Constitution is the supreme law of the land. California Health and Safety Code ("HSC") provides: HSC 33032 (Amended Stats 1976 ch 1336 Sec. 3) (effective until December 31, 1984 was superseded). HSC 33032 (Stats 1984 ch 147 Section 2, effective after January 1, 1985 and nam- ing elements 2B, 3, 4, numbers added in- fra). A blighted area is characterized by [2B] properties which suffer form economic dislocation, deterioration, or disuse be- aia a G-3 cause of one or more of the following factors which cause [3] a reduction of, or lack of, proper utilization of the area to such an extent that it consti- tutes a serious physical, social, or eco- nomic burden on the community which [4] cannot reasonably be expected to be re- versed or alleviated by private enter- prise acting alone. (a) The subdividing and sale of lots of irregular form and shape and inadequate Size for proper usefulness and develop- ment. (b) The laying out of lots in disregard of the contours and other topography or physical characteristics of the ground and surrounding conditions. (c) The existence of inadequate public improvements, public facilities, open spaces and utilities which cannot be G-4 remedied by private or governmental ac- tion without redevelopment. (d) A prevalence of depreciated values, impaired investments, and social and eco- nomic maladjustment... HSC 33320.1. ..."predominantly urban- ized" means that not less than 80 percent of the privately owned property in the project area: (1) Has been or is developed for urban uses; or ; (2) Is characterized by the conditions described in subdivisions (a), (b), or (e) of Section 33032; or (3) Is an integral part of an area de- veloped for urban uses... HSC 33321. A project area need not be restricted to buildings, improvements, or lands which are detrimental or inimical to the public health, safety, or welfare, but may consist of an area in which such I aaa G-5 conditions predominate and injuriously affect the entire area... HSC 33385. (as in effect in 1986 until December 31, 1988). The legislative body of a city or county shall call upon the residents and existing community organi- zations in a redevelopment project area, within which a substantial number of low- and moderate-income families are to be displaced by the redevelopment project, to form a project area committee. The project area committee shall include, when applicable, residential owner occu- pants, residential tenants, businessmen, and members of existing organizations within the project area. The members of the committee shall serve without compen- sation. The legislative body shall approve a representative project area committee in G-6 each project area within 60 days after the project area is selected. For project areas selected prior to March 7, 1973, the legislative body may, but shall not be required to, call upon the residents and existing community or- ganizations to form a project area com- mittee. If the project will not displace a substantial number of low- and moderate- income families the agency shall either call upon the residents and existing com- munity organizations to form a project area committee or the agency shall con- sult with, and obtain the advice of, res- idents and community organizations as provided for project area committees in Section 33386 and provide such persons and organizations with the redevelopment plan prior to submitting it to the leg- islative body. G-7 Nothing contained in this section shall prevent an agency, or the legisla- tive body of any city or county, from creating any other committee for a pro- ject area. HSC 33385. (As amended Stats 1988 ch 1404 sec. 1 effective after January 1, 1989) CT 20185). Formation of committee; Duties (a+ The legislative body of a city or county shall call upon the residents and existing community organizations in a re- development project area, within which a substantial number of low- and moderate- income families are to be displaced by the redevelopment project, to form a pro- ject area committee. (b) The legislative body shall, by reso- lution, adopt a procedure pursuant to this section for the formation of the project area committee. The procedure G-8 shall include, but not be limited to, all of the following: (1) Publicizing the opportunity to serve on the project area committee. (2) Conduct by the agency of a minimum of one public meeting to explain the es- tablishment of, functions of, and oppor- tunity to serve on, the project area com- mittee. At the public meeting, the agency shall distribute copies of the procedure adopted pursuant to this subdivision, the redevelopment plan or the pertinent por- tions thereof, and any other materials the agency determines would be useful. (3) Providing published notice of all meetings, hearings, or plebiscites con- ducted by, or on behalf of, the agency or legislative body relative to the forma- tion and selection of the project area committee in the same manner as specified G-9 in subdivision (a) of Section 65090 of the Government Code. (4) Providing written notice to all res- idents and businesses in the project area of all meetings, hearings, or plebiscites conducted by, or on behalf of, the agency or legislative body relative to the for- mation and selection of the project area committee. This mailed notice requirement shall only apply when mailing addresses to all individuals and businesses, or to all occupants, are obtainable by the agency at a reasonable cost. The notice shall be mailed by first-class mail, but may be addressed to "occupant." In lieu of providing separate notice for each meeting, hearing, or plebiscite, the agency may provide a single notice pur- Suant to this paragraph stating all dates, times, and locations of any meet- ings, hearings, and plebiscites relative G-10 to the formation and selection of the project area committee. If the agency has acted in good faith to comply with the notice requirements of this paragraph, the failure of the agency to provide the required notice to resi- dents or businesses eaknoen to the agency or whose addresses cannot be obtained at a reasonable cost, shall not, in and of itself, invalidate the formation or ac- tions of the project area committee. (5) Any other forms of assistance which the legislative body requires in connec- tion with the formation of the project area committee. (c) The project area committee shall in- Clude, when applicable, residential owner occupants, residential tenants, business owners, and representatives of existing organizations within the project area. G-1ll The members of the committee shall serve without compensation. (d) The legislative body shall approve a representative project area committee in each project area within 60 days after the project area is selected. (e) For project areas selected prior to March 7, 1973, the legislative body may, but shall not be required to, call upon the residents and existing community or- ganizations to form a project area com- mittee. ‘£) If the project will not displace a substantial number of low- and moderate- income families the agency shall either call upon the residents and existing com- munity organizations as provided for pro- ject area committees in Section 33386 and provide such persons and organizations with the redevelopment plan prior to sub- mitting it to the legislative body. G-12 (g) Nothing contained in this section shall prevent an agency, or the legisla- tive body of any city or county, form creating any other committee for a pro- ject area. However, these committees Shall not be merged into the project area committee subsequent to the formation thereof and the members of these other committees shall not vote in meetings of the project area committee. (h) The agency may charge fees to per- sons purchasing or leasing property from the agency in the project area and to persons participating in redevelopment of the project area under an owner partici- pation agreement to defray any cost to the agency or legislative body in imple- menting this section. HSC 33386 The redevelopment agency through its staff, consultants, and agency members shall, upon the direction G-13 of and approval of the legislative body consult with, and obtain the advice of, the project area committee concerning those policy matters which deal with the planning and provision of residentail fa- cilities or replacement housing for those to be displaced by project activities... Ordinance 161 202 excerpts: Section 5. The City Council hereby finds and determines: (1) The project area is a blighted area, the redevelopment of which is necessary to effectuate the public purposes de- Clared in the Community Redevelopment Law of the State of California. (6) The condemnation of real property, as provided for in the Redevelopment Plan for the Hollywood Redevelopment Project, is necessary to the execution of the Re- development Plan for the Hollywood Rede- velopment Project and adequate provisions G-14 o have been made for payment for property to be acquired as provided by law. HUD Local Public Agency Letter No. 458. Exhibit 108A, pages LC-56 through LC-59 (pages 123 - 126). DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20410 | June 24, 1968 OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR RENEWAL AND HOUSING ASSISTANCE LOCAL PUBLIC AGENCY LETTER NO. 458 SUBJECT: Increased Citizen Participation in Urban Renewal Projects - The Department of Housing and Urban Develop- ment is expanding its program require- ments in order to increase opportunities for citizen involvement in the planning, development, and execution of HUD- assisted activities. Accordingly, LPA's shall encourage resident involvement G-15 in all phases of urban renewal projects to the fullest possible extent. This Letter requires the establish- ment of a Project Area Committee (PAC), made up of residents of the project area, for all urban renewal projects which in- volve residential rehabilitation and which are not yet in execution. In addi- tion, the Letter also encourages the es- tablishment of a PAC for all other urban renewal projects, irrespective of the re- newal treatment involved or the project stage. Citizens should have clear and di- rect access to decision-making in all Stags of the urban renewal process in or- der to achieve: 1. More accurate determination of needs projects should meet and the development of policies and programs responsive and relevant to these needs. G-16 2. Involvement by citizens in the development and execution of policies and programs in order to further their own growth and development. 36 Firmer commitment of citizens to projects. This Letter explains how urban re- newal projects are affected by this policy and sets forth pertinent proce- dures designed to carry out the policy. The provisions of the Letter do not apply to urban renewal projects in model neighborhoods under the Model Cities Pro- gram. In cases of urban renewal projects in areas being planned as model neighbor- hoods, Model Cities guidelines and per- formance standards for citizen participa- tion will apply. NEW REQUIREMENTS All Urban Renewal Projects G-17 The Survey and Planning Application for all urban renewal projects shall in- clude a statement from the Workable Pro- gram Citizens Advisory Committee on the appropriateness of the timing and loca- tion of the proposed project. Urban Renewal Projects Involving Residen- tial Rehabilitation A Project Area Committee (PAC) shall be established for all urban renewal pro- jects, except those in model neighbor- hoods, in which residential rehabilita- tion activities are contemplated. The PAC shall be established in co- operation with local residents and groups. It shall be representative of a fair cross section of the residents of the urban renewal area and shall adopt no financial deterrents to membership or participation by residents of the urban renewal area. G-18 The LPA shall work closely with the PAC to assure that citizens participate in the formulation and execution of plans for renewal of the area and improvement of the condition of its residents. Suffi- cient information about the project shall be made available to residents for these purposes. Where an existing neighborhood orga- nization in the project area either meets the requirments for a PAC or adapts it- self to meet them, it may serve as the PAC. Other neighborhood organizations which may exist or be formed in the pro- ject area shall relate to the LPA through the PAC. The PAC shall be the forum for these organizations to participate in the project. The LPA may also make arrangements with the PAC for the PAC to assist in the utilizations of residents in various ca- G-19 pacities in the project such as inter- viewers or relocation aides. Arrangements may include the PAC selecting residents or setting up training programs fo them. The LPA may provide the PAC with neces- Sary technical assistance. Other Urban Renewal Projects The LPA is encouraged to establish a PAC for all other urban renewal projects, in which residential rehabilitation ac- tivites are not contemplated, and to sup- port and work with such a PAC as de- scribed above. Establishment of a PAC for such projects is not a program re- quirment, however. ELIGIBLE COSTS Eligible costs include amounts to cover the LPA providing the PAC with nec- essary technical assistance, administra- tive and secretarial staff, and office Space and equipment. Costs of arrange- G-20 ments with the PAC in connection with the utilization of residents in the project area are also eligible. Estimated costs for support of the PAC shall be submitted with the Survey and Planning Application and with Part I of the Application for Loan and Grant. APPLICABILITY The submission requirements set forth above apply to all urban renewal projects which have not received approval of the initial Part I or an Application for Loan and Grant prior to issuance of this Let- ter. With respect to projects for which a Part I has been approved, the initial Part II submission shall include the re- quired documentation with respect to a PAC to be established for the execution stage of the project. The HUD Regional Office will advise the LPA if the docu- mentation described in this Letter is re- G-21 quired to be submitted in connection with a Survey and Planning Application or with Part I or Part II or an Application for Loan and Grant presently under review or approved after the date of this Letter. MANUAL REVISIONS TRANSMITTED Section 4-2-1, Page 3. A new code Item, R 217, requiring a Report on Citi- zen Participation, has been added. Section 10-2-3. A new section, Citi- zen Participation, has been added requir- ing the establishment of a Project Area Committee (PAC) for projects involving residential rehabilitation activities and setting forth related criteria for LPA support of the PAC. The section also de- scribes documentation required to be sub- mitted with the Survey and Planning Ap- plication and with Part I of the Applica- tion for Loan and Grant with respect to the PAC. G-22 Section 109-4-1, Page 3. The Report on Urban Renewal Area, submitted with the Survey and Planning Application, has been expanded to add Item No. 13 covering data about the PAC, and Item No. 14 requiring a statement from the Workable Program Citizens Advisory Commitee as to the tim- ing and location of the proposed project. Section 10-4-2, Page 4. A paragraph ("Report on Citizen Participation') has been added describing data required to be Submitted with Part I of the Application for Loan and Grant to substantiate that the Project Area Committee has been es- tablished and that it meets the require- ments set forth in Section 10-2-3. Section 12-1-3, Page 1. Under the heading "Survey and Planning and Project Execution, "Item No. (2) has been ex- panded to incorporate material formely set forth under Items NO. (1) (c) and G-23 (1) (d), and to cover the eligibility of costs for staff, consultant, and other Suppoortive services to the PAC. Section 31-2-2, Page 2. Under the heading "Rehabilitation and Conservation Activities," a sentence has been inserted to cover eligible costs of supportive services to the PAC. s/ Assistant Secretary Attachements H-1 APPENDIX H How federal question 1) of failing to no- tify the residents was raised in state courts Morgan First Amended Verified Com- plaint, filed April 20, 1988, CT 17494 at 17535. EIGHTEENTH/FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION. A. Project Area Committee Violations... (ii) Agency managerial employees Donald W. Cosgrove, Donald Pelegrino, David Lewis and others in mutual agreement and conspiracy with one another avoided the requirements for the call of Health and Safety Cod Section 33385 by stating to the Los Angeles City Council that such a call would be made and then with knowl- edge of the requirement for the call failing to send notices to the residents, businesses and existing community organi- zations within the proposed Project Area as required by Section 33385 and by Los H-2 Angeles City Council Resolution 83-1273 by, inter alia: (a) electing to employ a flier distribution company to satisfy the requirements of Health and Safety Code Sec. 33385 and Los Angeles City Council Resolution 83-1273 rather than using direct mail to persons throughout the proposed Project Area, with prior know- ledge that such flier distribution com- panies, and in particular Certified Dis- tributing Service, had failed to deliver all requisite notices in the past causing numerous complaints about lack of notifi- cation from community members in other redevelopment projects; (b) constructing deceptive wording of the purported no- tices, with knowledge from prior experi- ence that the wording was decep-tive, which had the intended effect of not fully informing residents and community members and the intended effect of affir- H-3 matively misleading residents and commu- nity members such that the purposed no- tices did not constitute a "call" within the meaning of Section 33385;... CT 17602. NINETEENTH/SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION. Violation of Plaintiff's Due Process and Equal Protection Rights by All Plaintiffs Against Agency and City.... By failing to call upon the residents to form a Project Area Committee,... by failing to mail re- quired notices,... See Petition for Review in California Supreme Court filed June 25, 1991 by David Morgan, page 3, Issues presented. 4) Did 1983 PAC and 1986 hearing notices fail to meet requirements of actual not- ice and warning or rights to be infringed (Am I, V, XIV)? DO OVER 30,000 TENANTS GET DUE PROCESS NOTICE OF PAC FORMATION SO THEY CAN USE THE PAC TO DEFEND THEM- SELVES FROM RELOCATION OR DO AMENDMENTS H-4 I, V AND U. S. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS NOT APPLY? See Appendix P herein, Notice to Resi- dents; See Appendix S herein, Declaration of David Morgan Re: 1983 PAC Election Notice and Residential Unit Survey by Plaintiffs of September 22, 1988 ("Survey"), with list of evidence. I-1 APPENDIX I How federal question 2) of diluting vot- ing rights of residents was raised in state courts Morgan First Amended Verified Com- plaint, filed April 20, 1988, CT 17494 at 17516. ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION. Failure to Organize a Project Area Committee To Fairly Represent the Community as an In- dependent Public Body. Defendants did not call upon the residents and existing community organizations to form the pro- ject area committee. Some members of the project area committee were appointed. The committee did not adequately repre- sent residential owner occupants, resi- dential tenants and members of existing organizations within the project area. Low and moderate income families were not adequately represented on the Project Area Committee. Sixteen of twenty-five [-2 members of the PAC were businessmen, many of whom had conflicts of interest. CT 17538 EIGHTEENTH/FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION. [Defendants] manipulated the categories of membership on the Project Area Commit- tee for the 1983, 1985 and 1986 Committee elections in a way which controlled the composition of the Committee and excluded persons who would otherwise be opposed to or critical of the proposed redevelopment project in Hollywood and did so with knowledge that their actions would have these effects; such manipulation in- cluded, inter alia; (a) unilaterally fix- ing the number of seats in each candidate category; (b) unilaterally creating an illegal category of "absentee property owner" and then combining this candidate category with the "residential owner-oc- cupant" category mandated by Health and Safety Code Section 33385 with the in- [.3 tended effect of allowing absentee prop- erty owners to take Committee seats form residential owner-occupants in violation of Section 33385; unilaterally creating an illegal category of "industrial/ manufacturing/warehousing" as a separate category in addition to the "business" category mandated by Section 33385 with the intended effect of allowing busines- ses, in particular, members of the Hollywood Chamber of Commerce, which made the initial request to have the Community Redevelopment Agency create a project area in Hollywood and which advanced the Community Redevelopment Agency $ 150,000 for an initial study, to acquire a disproportionately large dominant number of seats on the Project Area Commit- tee;... allowing businesses, absentee property owners and others favoring the Project to acquire a disproportionately I-4 large number of seats thereby excluding residents and persons opposed to the Pro- ject; and this conspiracy is reflected in memoranda and other writings between con- Spirators;.. (viii)...(b) by unilaterally deciding to limit to one vote each resi- dential household with the intended ef- fect of disenfranchising thousands of residents and skewing the qualified voter list in favor of businesses and specifi- cally in favor of the co-conspirator mem- bers of the Hollywood Chamber of Commerce tee CT 17602. NINETEENTH/SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION. Violation of Plaintiff's Due Process and Equal Protection Rights by All Plaintiffs Against Agency and City. 122/19. By failing to call upon the res- idents of the Project Area to form a Pro- ject Area Committee, by failing to honor the Project Area Committee represen- tativeness requirements, by engaging in ll I i lea I-5 widespread fraudulent, collusive and cor- rupt actions, with knowledge of the false and corrupt nature of such actions, by failing to mail the required notices, and by failing to follow statutory procedures with respect to consideration of the re- development Plan thereto by a representa- tive Project Area Committee, plaintiffs and other interested persons were denied notice of their right to representation through a Project Area Committee, were denied their right to influence decision- making through a duly-constituted Project Area Committee, and were denied their right to require a 2/3 vote of the City Council to enact Ordinance No. 161,202. See Petition for Review in California Supreme Court filed June 25, 1991 by David Morgan, page 3, Issues presented. 5) Were residents and organizations de- nied protection form CRA via self-form- I-6 ing PAC and fair voting (Am I, HSC Sec- tion 33385)? ARE THE RESIDENTS THREATENED WITH LOSS OF HOMES AND TENANCIES ENTITLED TO FORM A PAC TOTALLY INDEPENDENT OF THEIR ADVERSARIES, THE CRA AND CITY, OR CAN THE CONDEMNORS RIG THE NUMBER IN SEAT CATEGORIES, APPOINT MEMBERS, ADD BUSI- NESSES TO THE ELECTORATE, AND PREVENT RESIDENTS FROM VOTING FOR ALL CLASSES OF SEATS? 6) Did CRA/City prevent PAC from full and fair hearings, acting as inde- pendent body and arms length bargaining (Am I, V, HSC Section 33366)? MAY CRA CONCEAL THE PAC VETO POWER, SLIP IN THE CRA ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT THE PAC ALSO AND GIVE FALSE LEGAL ADVICE, DOCTOR THE MINUTES, OBSTRUCT THE PUBLIC FROM SPEAK- ING AND SUBVERT THE ENTIRE INTENT OP PAC LAW? See Appendix N herein. Memorandum of Points and Authorities on Legislative In- I-7 tent of Health and Safety Code Section 33385, Project Area Committees, June 20, 1988, by David Morgan, CT 17908. See Appendix O herein. Plaintiff's Memo- randum Re Statutory History of Health and Safety Code Section 33385 et al, Project Area Committees, June 20, 1988, by Christopher Sutton, CT 17889. See Appendix Q herein. City Council mo- tion to form PAC, November 18, 1983. See Appendix R herein. City Council reso- lution to approve PAC, January 6, 1984. J-1 APPENDIX J How federal question 3) of taking eminent domain powers over predominantly non- blighted areas was raised in state courts Morgan First Amended Verified Com- plaint, filed April 20, 1988, CT 17494 at CT 17496, FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION, Finding of Blight not Supported by the Evidence. CT 17500, Paragraph 17, The project area defined by the redevelopment plan which is the subject of this action is not predominated by any of the elements of "blight" as set forth in Health and Safe- ty Code Sections 33030 through 33032, nor is any substantial portion of such area so characterized or predominated. The project area, in fact, does not exhibit a preponderance of deteriorating structures wherein the inhabitants of the area are subjected to physical dangers or health hazards. CT 17502 SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION, J-2 Illegal Inclusion of Non-Blighted Proper- ty Within the Project Area. CT 17511 EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION. Lack of Substan- tial Evidence to Support Finding that Private Enterprise Acting Alone Would Not Develop the Area. CT 17531 EIGHTEENTH/ FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION. Validation Action by All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants. CT 17582. i. Inadequate Public Use/Blight Findings and Violations. CT 17584. J. The Requisite Blight Finding was Insupport- able. CT 17585. K. Failure to Make Specific Blight Findings. CT 17585 L. Inadequate Eminent Domain Findings and Violations. There was no evidence of proposed developments for the Project Area requiring the use of eminent domain for parcel assembledge... There was no evidence of blight in the record to justify a public-purpose required for eminent domain by California Constituion J-3 Article I, section 19, and U. S. Consti- tution Amendments 5 and 14... CT 17593. R. Violations of the 80% "Predominantly Urbanized" Independent Blight Threshold --. defendants City and Agency failed to make a finding ... that 80% (eighty percent) of the private property in the Project Area is specifically character- ized by the blight conditions of section 33032 (a) and (b)... CT 17612. TWENTY- EIGHTH/ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION. Inade- quate blight findings in 4 sub-parts. CT 17613. TWENTY-NINTH/TWELFTH CAUSE OF ACTION. Inadequate blight findings. CT 17614. THIRTIETH/THIRTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION. Inadequate eminent domain find- ings. CT 17615. THIRTY-SECOND/FIFTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION. Inadequate private enterprise paralysis findings. CT 17618. THIRTY-SIXTH/ NINETEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION. 80 % of private property not "blighted." es J-4 CT 17619. THIRTY-SEVENTH/TWENTIETH CAUSE OF ACTION. Conclusive presumption uncon- Sstitutional and violates due process, equal protection and property rights. See Petition for Review in California Supreme Court filed June 25, 1991 by David Morgan, page 3, Issues presented. 2) Has right to employment, work and business been infringed by adoption of false private sector Paralysis and no fiscal detriment findings (Am Vv, XIV, HSC Sections 33030, 33032)? 3) Did CRA/City infringe rights to property by failing to meet seven strict "blight" requirements (Am V, HSC Sections 33030, 33032)? IS THE 40 YEAR OLD STATUTORY AND CASE LAW MANDA- TORY PREREQUISITE OP 51 % TO 80 % DANGER- OUS OR SUBSTANTIALLY DETERIORATED BUILD- INGS NOW OVERRULED SO 3 ¢ TO 7 % IS ENOUGH? See Appendix L herein. K-1 APPENDIX K Quotations of authorities on condemnation for private uses. See Reply Brief of Appellant Morgan, Mar. 18, 1991, 2 - 15. A. THE TIME OF MOSES "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house, thou shalt not covet thy neigh- bor's wife, nor his manservant, nor his maidservant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor any thing that is thy neighbor's." (Exodus, 20:17 (ca. 1500 B. C.). B. ROMAN TIMES "And it is not pretended that, even under the arbitrary government of the Roman emperors, it was lawful or justifiable for the sovereign to take the property of one citizen and give it to another, where the public interest was not concerned in such transfer." (1 Domant's Civil Law, b. be Gees: 2s 13). K-2 (Varick v. Smith and the Attorney General, 5 Paige 137, 159 (N. Y. 1835). C. THE TIME OF MAGNA CARTA 31. Neither we nor our bailiffs shall take another's wood for castles or for other private uses, unless by the will of him to whom the wood belongs (Magna Carta, Ch. 31, 1215 A. D.). "Law of the Land" refers to Magna Carta (Ch. 39 (a. k. a. Ch. 29), 52, 56). Private use disseizure of land was termi- nated after 17 years: "The constitution of 1777 did not delegate any authority to the legislature to take the property of One person and give it to another, with or without compensation...The words "by the law of the land," have been held to mean by due course and process of law." (Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 140.). They do not mean, a statute passed for the purpose of working the wrong. (Ibid. 145) K.3 Justice Bronson, in the above case, holds that the section was taken, with some modifications, from a part of the 29th Chapter of Magna Charta, which provides, that no freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, but by the lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land. (2 Story on Const. 661, { 1783.) (Embury v. J. and W. C . Conner, 4 N. Y. Super. Court 98, 106 (4 Sandford) 1848) (See also 3 N. Y. 511 (1850) emphasis added). See: Nesbitt v. Trumbo, 39 Ill. 110, 113, 117 (1866). D. THE TIME OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION That they are entitled to life, lib- erty, and property, and they have never ceded to any sovereign power whatever, a right to dispose of either without their consent. (Declaration of Rights, In Congress at Philadelphia, Oct. 14, 1774). K-4 See: Associates of the Jersey Co. v. Mayor and Common Council of Jersey City and John C. Morgan, 8 N. J. Eq. (4 Halst.) 715, 722 (1850); Daniel J. Hoye Vv. James Swan, 5 Md. 237, 244 1853); Dickey v. Tennison, 27 Mo. 373, 374, 376 (1858); Moore v. Smaw, 17 C 199, 218-9 (1861); Dunham and Beach v. Williams and Parker, 36 Barbour 136, 163 (N. Y. 1862); (Bennett v. Boyle, 40 Barbour (N. Y.) 551, 555 (1863); Coster v. The Tide Water Co., 18 N. J. Eq. (3 C. E. Green) 54, 68 (1866); Memphis Freight Co. v. Mayor and Aldermen of Memphis, 44 Tenn. 419, 428 (4 Coldwell) (1867) Sherman v. Buick, 32 C 241, 242 (1867). "And it seems to us that the assertion of a right on the part of the legislature to take the property of one citizen and transfer it to another, even for a full compensation, where the public K-5 interest is not promoted thereby, is Claiming a despotic power, and one inconsistent with every just principle and fundamental maxim of a free government. (Osborn v. Hart, 24 Wis. 89, 93 (1869) emphasis added). See: (Loughbridge v. Harris, 42 Ga. 500, 504, 505 (1871); New Central Coal Co. and Alexander Shaw v. George's Creek Coal and Iron Co., 37 Md. 537, 551 (1872); Joshua Allen v. Inhabitants of Jay, 60 Me. 124, 139, 142 (1872); (Con. Channel Co. v. CPRR Co., 51 C 269, 727-3 (1876); Edgewood RR Co's. Appeal, 79 Pa. St. 257 (29 P. E. Smith) (1876); (Moulton v. Parks, 64 C 166, 183 (1883); Mc Quillen v. Hatton, 42 Ohio St. 202, 204, 205 (1884); Eureka Basin Co. 96 N. Y. 42, 48, 49 (1884); (Nickey v. Stearns Rancho Co., 126 C 150, 153 (1899); (In Re K-6 Opinion of the Justices, 98 NE 611, 614; 211 Mass 624 (1912)). E. TWENTIETH CENTURY GERMANY "3. The judge has no right to scrutinize decisions made by the Fuhrer and issued in the form of a law or decree. The judge is also bound by any other decisions of the Fuhrer which Clearly express the intention of establishing law." (Jan. 14, 1936 directive to judges, Pridham, Geoffrey, ed., Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945, Viking Press, N. Y., 1945, at 273. F. JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELOCATIONS "SO sweeping is the panel majority's new rule, the executive branch may remove American citizens from their homes and impound them in camps, solely on the grounds of race, and courts will not in- terfere, no matter what facts are shown. (Hohri, 793 F. 2d 305). K-7 G. POSTWAR RELOCATIONS "It is inconceivable that any one would seriously contend that the acquisi- tion of real estate for the declared pur- poses set forth in the proposed Redevel- opment Plan is for a public use or pur- pose." (Adams v. Housing Authority of Daytona Beach et al, 60 So. 2d 663, 668-9 (1952). See: Housing Authority of City of Atlanta et al v. Johnson et al, 74S. E. 2d 891, 893-4 (1953); City and County of San Francisco v. Ross, 44 Cal. 2d 52, 59; 279 Pac. 2d 529 (1955); People ex rel Department of Public Works v. Lagiss, 223 CA2d 23, 41; 35 CR 554 (1963)). STON th rrasamnedane tee L-1 APPENDIX L Declaration of David Morgan on Conditions of Buildings, Exhibit 110. October 18, 1988, CT 20904, extract DECLARATIONS OF DAVID MORGAN, PATRICIA MORLEY, AND DOROTHY HALPER RE; PARCELS ALLEGEDLY "BLIGHTED" ACCORDING TO EX- HIBITS 43, 44, TRANSFER SHEETS DECLARATION OF DAVID MORGAN, October 14, 1988, text omitted *** DECLARATION OF PATRICIA MORLEY, October 14, 1988, text omitted *** DECLARATION OF DOROTHY HALPER, October 14, 1988, text omitted *** CT 20915 - 20945, extract COMPILATION OF DATA FROM TRANSFER SHEETS OF HOLLYWOOD LAND USE DATABASE ("LUDB") Re: Parcels alleged blighted There were about 2920 parcels in the project area, as of late 1983 - early 1984, (CAR page 2813). L-2 There are about 3424 primary struc- tures in the project area. (CAR page 1992). According to Baseline Market Assess- ment parcels with buildings in the cate- gories of substantial deterioration ("SD"), heavy rehabilitation ("RH") and moderate rehabilitation ("RM") are al- leged "blighted." ” (CAR page 2870). Parcels in the SD, RH and RM cate- gories have been listed at pages A - xX, herein. Dividing 695 by 2920 (the number of parcels in the project area) yields 23.80 % of the parcels with buildings al- legedly blighted in all categories. Some 169 parcels have buildings in the categories of heavy rehabilitation and substantial deterioration. Dividing 169 by 2920 (the number of parcels in the project area) yields 5.78 % of the L-3 parcels with buildings allegedly blighted in these categories. The Project Area contains 1100 acres or 47,960,000 square feet. According to the sums of the areas of parcels on pages A - X there are 214,850 square feet of parcels with the worst condition of a building substantially deteriorated or 0.45 % of the project area, 1,374,463 Square feet of parcels with the worst condition of a building heavy rehabilita- tion or 2.87 % of the project area and 4,990,414 square feet of parcels with the worst condition of a building moderate rehabilitation or 10.41 % of the project area. The total area of parcels with the worst building condition substantially deteriorated, heavy rehabilitation or moderate rehabilitation is 6,579,727 L-4 Square feet or 13.72 % of the project area. The total area of parcels with the worst building condition substantially deteriorated or heavy rehabilitation is 1,589,313 square feet or 3.31 % of the project area. ABBREVIATIONS USED IN TABLES Page is the page number in the hand- written Transfer Sheets, Ex 43 and 44. Prefix A refers to Ex 43 and B to Ex 44. Area is the size of the parcel in square feet. For convenience REF refers to the page number from LUDB, ex 73-75. # refers to the number of the entry on the LUDB page, which have 10 entries per page. Building conditions are shown as follows: L.5 Designation Abbreviation Sound S Deferred Maintenance DM Moderate Rehabilitation MR Extensive Rehabilitation, Heavy Rehabilitation RH Substantially Deteriorated SD Public Improvement Deficiencies ("PUBIMPRV") are designated (Exhibit 33 B, page 1-25, CAR page 2008): Designation Abbreviation Curbs and Gutters CG Driveway Aprons DA Street Lighting LI Sidewalks SI Street surfaces, trees, maintenance, alleys ST For comparison blight claimed by LUDB is marked Y for yes and N for no but these designations do not appear as such I L-6 in Ex 43 and 44. "LOT" means a vacant lot. Parcel # is Los Angeles County As- sessor's parcel number. DUP BLDGS means duplicate buildings where more than one building is on a par- cel. (Pages A —- X omitted ***) OTHER DATA SUMMARIZED On page Y there are reproduced the summa- tions of the columns from pages A - xX. L.7 PAGE Y TOTALS FROM PAGES A - xX TOTALS BY COUNTS OF BUILDINGS PG S DM RM RH SD_ PUB LOT IMPRV ONLY | A 3 15 28 4 21 i | B 3 5 23 16 2 6 | c 11 " 17. 13 31 | D 4 7 24 15 17 | E 4 5 21 17 2 15 1 | F 5 10 26 4 25 4 G 3 5 37 4 13 1 H 4 4 28 11 2 11 | I 4 5 39 ss 11 J 2 30 16 1 - 1 K 1 39 : 2 9 ‘ 1 $6 a2 8 M 4 a. Wika 6 1 N r a 23 2 3 26 3 O 3 4 26 «117 3 1 P 2 - 37 3 11 Q 1 4 i 4a 7 1 R 3 3 31 9 12 S 5 5 37 3 24 T : 9 25 6 2 20 | U 4 2 22 16 2 9 4 | V 1 5 33 8 1 14 1 W 4 4 32 9 14 x 2 35 12 «1 7 TOTALS 86 130 714 220 25 324 19 L-8 PAGE Z TOTALS FROM PAGES A - xX TOTALS BY COUNTS OF PARCELS PG AREA # PARCELS RM+RH+SD WITH BLDG PARCELS CONDITION (sq. ft.) GIVEN S DM RM RH SD A 162,695 38 3 9 23 3 B 296,995 37 3 2 19 10 2 Cc 156,004 33 8 7 ka 4 D 352,863 42 3 6 20 13 E 199,455 42 4 4 20 + 2 F 118,627 38 5 3 19 2 G 374,828 44 2 4 32 4 H 244,926 39 4 4 24 3 2 I 226,324 29 2 5 18 1 3 J 329,932 39 2 23 11 1 K 514,093 36 1 6 26 1 2 L 588,607 40 1 28 9 2 M 360,536 44 3 27 11 N 141,242 43 ee © i? 2 1 O 241,526 35 3 4 12 10 P 190,850 Lh 2 7 24 3 Q 289,875 43 1 3 28 9 R 211,298 37 2 2 20 8 S 184,512 25 3 4 16 3 T 273,011 41 7 8 21 4 2 U 214,871 38 4 2 19 4 2 V 283,250 43 1 2 2S 7 1 W 380,866 37 3 4 21 9 x 242,541 34 1 2$ 7 1 TOTALS 6,579,727 912 7%©6COAQ0 ) «=6S26.~6 «6146 +=~ 23 M-1 APPENDIX M Quotations and Citations of authorities on health and mortality effects of relo- cation. (See Appellate Opening Brief 6- 18, sources reproduced in appeal appendix, "Ap")." It is a matter of common knowledge, and hence of judicial notice, that highway construction (such as the Hollywood Freeway), and redevel- Opment (such as that on Bunker Hill, Los Angeles) resulted in the displacement of thousands of persons... Eminent domain awards, depJeted by costs of moving and relocation, were insufficient... A natural disaster, perhaps, could not have created more personal havoc." (Parking Authority v. Nicovich, 32 CA3d 420, 427, 108 CR 137 (1973) emphasis added). .---federal urban renewal program has actually made it more difficult for low- income and middle-income groups to obtain aa la lie M-2 housing...by destroying much more of this kind of housing than it has created... Approximately two thirds of the people who are forced out of their homes are Ne- groes, Puerto Ricans, or ... minority... privately referred to as the "Negro re- moval” program...B y March of 1963 over 609,000 people had been forced to pack their belongings and leave their homes... (A Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University study, Anderson, Martin, The Federal Bulldozer, The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts (1964) (Ap5998, 6009-6010, emphasis added). San Francisco Yerba Buena redevelop- ment (extreme stresses on 4000 residents, mostly lower income and elderly, being displaced), in two books by Prof. Chester Hartman. (Yerba Buena, Land Grab and Com- munity Resistance in San Francisco, M.3 Ap6474) and The Transformation of San Francisco, Ap 6599). (Forced displace- ments for high rise offices, luxury developments and convention center) (Chronology, Ap6491, 6605). See: Hartman, Chester, Relocation: Illusory Promises and No Relief, Virginia Law Review, 57 (5), 745 (1971) (Ap6436); Hartman, Chester, The Housing of Relocated Fami- lies, J. of Amer. Inst. of Planners, 30 (4), 266 (1964) (Ap6413); Hartman, Chester, The Transformation of San Fran- Cisco, Rowman and Allanheld,San Fran- cisco, (1984) (Ap6599); Hartman, Chester, Yerba Buena, Land Grab and Community Re- sistance in San Francisco, Glide Publica- tions for the National Housing and Economic Development Law Project, Earl Warren Legal Institute, University of California, Berkeley, (1974) (Ap6474). M.-4 Public demolition of 2.38 million units showed much higher housing costs most adverse to poorer (Hartman, supra, Ap6413, 6436). 3. .--88.6 percent of the individu- als had experienced some level of grief which was associated with having to move. Four years later, 57.3 percent of the in- dividuals are still experiencing some level of grief. (Hawkins, Homer, Knowl- edge of the Social and Emotional Implica- tions of Urban Renewal and the Utility of this Knowledge to the Practice of Social Work, Michigan State Univ. Ph. D. Thesis, (1971), Ap6609). Even when patients were kindly moved to new ward after fire death rate rose from 7.5 % to 20 3%. (Aleksandrowicz, Dov R., M. D., Fire and its Aftermath on a Geriatric Ward, Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 25 (1) 23 (Jan. 1961) Ap5991). M-5 When home for chronically disabled was Closed for administrative reasons and its residents relocated anticipated mor- tality for all ages was 19 % but actual mortality was 32 % (Aldrich and Mendkoff, Ap5977). See Aldrich, C. Knight, Personality Factors and Mortality in the Relocation of the Aged, The Gerontologist, 4, 92 (1964) Ap5989)). See also: Aldrich, C. Knight, M. D. and Ethel Mendkoff, M. A., Relocation of the Aged and Disabled: A Mortality Study, Journal of the American Geriatrics Society, 11 (3), 185, 188 (March 1963), Ap5977) Stockton patients over 60 had mor- tality (Killian, Eldon C., Effect of Geriatric Transfers on Mortality Rates, Social Work, 15, 19-26, (January 1970) (Ap6636): 79 RELOCATED 65 RELOCATED TO TO STATE EXTRA~MURAL HOSPITALS HOMES M-6 % DEATHS WITHIN 4 MONTHS CONTROL, not relocated Leas. % 1.54 % EXPERIMENTAL, relocated 6.33 % i3.85 $% Mrs. A. C. Hagen testified on Dis- trict of Columbia: "Urban renewal is a traumatic expe [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386011_0069%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.