# Amicus Curiae Brief — General Motors Corp. v. Goodwin

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386010_1681%3A3

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2002
- **Citation:** 537 U.S. 941

## Text

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
No. 01-1479 ~~ MAY 9 2002
— OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Supreme Court of the United States
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
Vv.
PAMELA R. GOODWIN,
io Respandent.

On PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES CouRT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

MOTION OF THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF
THE UNITED STATES FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF
AMICUS CURIAE AND BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

STEPHEN A. BOKAT ZACHARY D. FASMAN
Rosin S. ConrAD NEAL D. MOLLEN
NATIONAL CHAMBER Counsel of Record
LITIGATION CENTER, INC. Grecory R. WATCHMAN
1615 H Street, N.W. PauL, HASTINGS, JANOFSKY &
Washington, D.C. 20062 Wa ker LLP
(202) 463-5337 1299 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004-2400
(202) 508-9500

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
The Chamber of Commerce of the United States

173963 g

COUNSEL PRESS 29 py

(800) 274-3321 + (800) 359-6859

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS
CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FORA
WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Pursuant to S. Ct. Rule 37.2, the Chamber of Commerce
of the United States (“the Chamber”) moves for leave to file
a brief amicus curiae in support of Petitioner. That brief is
attached. The Chamber is filing this motion because
_ Respondent has refused to consent to the filing of this brief.
In further support of this Motion, the Chamber states:

1. The Chamber is the world’s largest business
federation, representing an underlying membership of more
than three million businesses and organizations of every size
and in every industry sector and geographical region of the
country. A principal function of the Chamber is to represent
the interests of its members in important matters before the
courts, the United States Congress, the Executive Branch,
and independent regulatory agencies of the federal
government. Accordingly, the Chamber has sought to advance
those interests, inter alia, by filing briefs in hundreds of cases
of significance in this Court and in the courts of appeals.

2. This case involves the administration of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII’), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq, to which the vast majority of the business that belong
to the Chamber are subject. The decision below both
exemplifies and exacerbates a profound division of authority
in the courts of appeals on two questions regarding
the application of Title VII’s statute of limitations. These
conflicts create confusion, uncertainty, and unnecessary
litigation expense for both employers and employees alike.

3. The court below held that an aggrieved individual
need not challenge a decision regarding his or her
compensation within the limitations period specified in the
statute — indeed is entitled to wait years or decades to
challenge such an allegedly discriminatory decision — so

long as the economic consequences of that decision continue
into the limitations period. This rule cannot be reconciled
with the Court’s decision in United Air Lines v. Evans,
431 U.S. 553 (1977), and it undermines the societal interest
in repose that is reflected by Congress’ choice of a brief
limitations period for charges of discrimination. As the Court
has previously observed, consistency and clarity in the law
are uniquely important with regard to statutes of limitation.
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985). The law on this
issue is in complete disarray and will not be clarified unless
and until the Court agrees to do so.

4. The decision below also chooses sides in a three-way
split of circuit authority regarding the remedial latitude of
district courts in awarding back pay to successful Title VII
plaintiffs. Some courts have held that a district court can
award back pay for a period extending no further than the
charge filing limitations period — at most 300 days prior to
the date of the charge. Others hold that the district court can
reach back as much as two years before the charge is filed.
Still others will permit a two year award but only when a
“continuing violation” has been shown. These doctrinal
differences lead to vastly different awards for materially
identical claims, depending on the geographic locale of the
litigation.

5. These persisting conflicts on important matters of
federal law are particularly problematic for Chamber
members that do business in multiple states, and for those
that do business in every state. More than anything else, the
Chamber’s members seek a single, clear, and reliable rule of
law, applicable to all of its members and all of their
employees. The Chamber asks for permission to participate
so that it might explain to the Court the difficulties the rules
adopted by the court below impose on its members.

Accordingly, the Chamber respectfully moves the Court
to grant this Motion and allow the filing of the attached brief.

Respectfully submitted,
STEPHEN A. BOoKAT ZACHARY D. FASMAN
Rosin S. ConraD Neat D. MOoLLeNn
NATIONAL CHAMBER Counsel of Record
LimiGATION CENTER, INC. Grecory R. WATCHMAN
1615 H Street, N.W. PauL, HASTINGS, JANOFSKY &
Washington, D.C. 20062 Wacker LLP
(202) 463-5337 1299 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004-2400
(202) 508-9500

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
The Chamber of Commerce of the United States

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Cited Amthorities ... 0... cc ccc ccc ccccens

Interests of the Amicus Curiae ..............45.

NE 6s wi aia als RUN hates kann

Summary Of ArgwMeMt 2. occ csc ccecccceceee

Reasons for Granting the Writ .................

I.

The Rule Established By The Courts
Of Appeals Eliminates Any Meaningful
Limitations Period In Title VII Cases,
Is Irreconcilable With This Court’s Opinions,
And Deepens A Division Of Authority Among
The Courts Of Appeals. .................

A. Congress Adopted Title VII’s Charge-
Filing Limitations Period to Achieve a
Careful Balancing of Employer and
Employee Rigits. 2.2... ccccessess

B. The Decision Of The Court Of Appeals
Effectively Undermines The Societal
Ipteraet Im RAOGG. oi eek cc iscnaa.

C. The Courts Of Appeals Are In Disarray
On The Application Of Title VII’s
Limitations Period, Especially In
Cases Characterized As “Pay” Or
“Compensation” Cases. .............

11

Contents
Page

1. The Court’s Cases Reflect A Unified
Standard To Limitations Questions
CRG DED WE é dcdSde dee cud 12

2. The Courts of Appeals’ Divergent
Interpretations of Bazemore Have
Created Inconsistent Rules
Governing the Application of
Title VII’s Limitations Periods
to Pay-Related Discrimination

COMME hc ocsicwewids aie cabes 14
a. The“Present Violation” Approach.

vecatsodwen sel edanaaweens 15

b. The“Paycheck” Approach. ... 16
Il. The Court Should Also Resolve The Split In
The Circuits Over The Calculation Of Title

Vile BERR FU AGES oc cen ccndéedocvece 18

CORSRIIIOR. . cnccecninecibussneceshne 20

iti

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page
Cases:
Acha v. Beame, 570 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1978) ....... 19
American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538
DE 06% d04ees candeadvessedersdsetoeers 6, 8
Anderson v. Zubieta, 180 F.3d 329 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
cu hbnadesdeddhedepokaskendedehevesnueane 15
Ashley v. Boyle's Famous Corned Beef Co., 66 F.3d
SE ED. chsees deeesacasaeees 10, 16, 18
Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986) ....... passim
Beavers v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 975 F.2d
SE, DEED Ga tehoevabedsaaaueenacas -18
Bempah v. Kroger Co., No. CV488-200, 1989 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6345 (S.D. Ga. June 5, 1989) ..... 18
Blake-McIntosh v. Cadbury Beverages, Inc., No.
3:96-CV-2554 (EBB), 1999 WL 643661 (D. Conn.
RR SR SPUD Abas ecdvcctcidcccaccccsscecs 18
Bosley v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 162 F.3d 665
re Ce tU iV abcekeisidcceonseses 15
Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes Training, Inc., 36 F.3d 336
DUMP EEE SESS EUG aesesesceccreccccces 3, 16

Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) ... 9

iv
Cited Authorities
Page
Calloway v. Partners Nat'l Health Plans, 986 F.2d
S46 CEG CHR, GED wb Sdincan dacladacadcacs 17
Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251 (3d Cir. 2001).. 17
Carter v. West Publ’g. Co., 225 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir.
BONED 5b dose kthsticandieti reins si weee | 17
Christiansen v. APV Crepaco, Inc., 178 F.3d 910
(Feet Ge BED Wb inne Se ckbwdeabadeos weeebass 15
Crawford v. Western Elec. Co., 614 F.2d 1300
CO CAE BOE Ki asas ce Bie cia eine 3
Dasgupta v. University of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 121
Pues SES Ca Gee WONED 6 0 Wks ca ibatacesna 15, 16
Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250
CSDGOD 0.6 cvidtonas de path tanidd dia hss adios 6,7
EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 1364
(S.D. Fla. 1998), vacated on other grounds,
220 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2000) .............. 18
EEOC v. O&G Spring & Wire Forms Specialty Co.,
38 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
1198 ER oc 64 kb dass 6 aetaweecia ces 18

EEOC v. Penton Indus. Publ’g Co., 851 F.2d 835
ee Fares poy 15, 16

Vv

Cited Authorities
Page

Eisenberg v. Pennsylvania State Univ., No. 3:00CV301,
2001 WL 202095 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 28,2001) .... 19

Estate of Pitre v. Western Elec. Co., 975 F.2d 700
(10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 972

Serr er er Severe e ey er rere 18
Garland v. USAir, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 715 (W.D. Pa.
SEE Apa caee wees cane teceeeeese Khe rere 19
Glass v. Petro-Tex Chem. Corp., 757 F.2d 1554
Co Ge EE i n.de RANWAAE EUS Ke Oe de dden ees’ 19
Hicks v. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. 502 (1993)
PCP re Te ee PANETT TE PET POT Eee eee 7
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S.
NEE Thniesk k did a KAS wie 0 RAO 6

Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179 (1997) ... 6,17

Lorance v. AT&T Tech., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989)

Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980) ....
ee ee eee i as ab dw ane hnes 3, 6, 8, 17

National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,
No. 00-1614, cert. granted, 533 U.S. 927 (2001)

Nealon v. Stone, 958 F.2d 584 (4th Cir. 1992) ....10, 17

vi
Cited Authorities
Page
Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355

CPT ER 6nd bus keee od hee-ensnwatheeendnahie 7,8
Pollis v. New Sch. for Soc. Research, 132 F.3d 115

Ce Ge SED: ans ddwdenw wks ca suek cee tas 17, 18
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,530 U.S. .

Eee CD dhe Sea ai cade dhacelwarsbeucies 7
Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549 (2000) ........... 9,11
Sabree v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners Local

No. 33, 921 F.2d 396 (1st Cir. 1990) .......... 19
Snider v. Belvidere Township, 216 F.3d 616 (7th Cir.

EE Sins tian cs Rea sn a aka bee eas 15
Sowell v. Alumina Ceramics, Inc., 251 F.3d 678

SS SED 6 ic bebe eX eKb ca dcnedawned es 18
Stallworth v. Shuler, 777 F.2d 1431 (11th Cir.

SEE Sack Gekxtse koe seems 19
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993)

PPP ET re PEE POO, OP rT Eee 11
Tademe vy. St. Cloud State Univ., 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20666 (D. Minn. Dec. 10, 2001) ....... 16

United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 533 (1977) ...
janes PrreT Terre ror res oe ee

Vii

Cited Authorities

US Airways v. Barnett, _U.S.___, 2002 U.S. LEXIS
Ce er Pee eee

Williams v. Munoz, 106 F. Supp. 2d 40 (D.D.C.
PE hues cove Oe Raa kdes Oke eA Sues ees

| Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) ..........
Statutes:

EP a PD. kk CWB Secu eas beeewancecses
J gy | el pee a eee ee ere ere eer
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-S(e) . ? SRR retry ee err ree re
M2 UBC. § 2000O-SUOM A) oc wc cece ec nsees
Oe eS BOG Wiebe bcd sewed esaaceeens
Other Authorities:

se BR OR Serer rer ere Terre reer Ter
eee OR Sh) ) re
B37 Come: Rec. SIS68S CIS91) on ic cece acwnese

De TU : PED GOWER Sok vine cnecdwevcevan

Page

18

14

i Si ee et aa = ~~ ee ee ee ee eee ee ee a ee ee

l

INTERESTS OF THE AMICUS CURIAE

The interests of the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States (“the Chamber”) are fully described in the accompanying
Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae. In the interest of
brevity, those matters will not be repeated here.'

STATEMENT

1. Respondent Pamela Goodwin was hired by Petitioner
- General Motors Corp. (“GM”) in 1976. Pet. App. 22a. Her career
at GM followed a fitful path of promotions, demotions, layoffs
and recalls. She was promoted in 1978, laid off in 1980, and
recalled to a job in a lower salary grade later that same year.
Id. at 22a-23a. Goodwin was laid off again in 1982 and recalled
in 1983. In the mid-1980s, she was denied a promotion because
GM planned to close the plant where she worked. /d. at 23a.
Goodwin was laid off when the plant closed in 1987. Jd.

Goodwin transferred to a temporary position at a different
GM facility later in 1987. Jd. She obtained a full-time position
shortly thereafter, and was promoted in 1989. /d. In 1991,
GM promoted Goodwin to labor relations representative; at the
time of this promotion, Goodwin earned less in the job than
three other employees already working as tabor-retations
representatives at the facility. Jd. at 24a. Over the ensuing seven
years, Goodwin received pay raises comparable to
those received by her peers, but the differential remained.
Id. at 14a n.10.

Goodwin filed a charge of race discrimination in 1998.
Id. at 6a. In her charge, Goodwin challenged recall and
promotion decisions occurring over an eighteen-year period.
None of the promotion, demotion, compensation or recall
decisions she challenged was made within Title VII’s charge-
filing limitations period. Jd. at 29a, 32a. Goodwin subsequently
filed suit in federal district court in the District of Kansas.

1. Counsel for amicus curiae authored the brief in its entirety.
No person or entity, other than the amicus, its members, or its counsel,
made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of the brief.

2

2. The district court granted GM’s motion for summary
judgment, concluding that Goodwin’s claims were time-barred.
Id. at 41a, 45a. The district court found that Goodwin was
challenging the “lingering effect” on her compensation of long-
past recall and promotion decisions rather than a “continuing
pattern of discriminatory conduct.” Jd. at 34a, 37a.

The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the “[c]Jontinuing
effects of prior discrimination are generally not actionable,”
but nevertheless reversed. Focusing on the pay differential
caused by the challenged recall, demotion, and promotion
decisions rather than the operative decisions themselves, the
court claimed that there is “a crucial distinction [between]
discriminatory disparities in pay” and all other types of
discrimination. Jd. at 7a. Relying on one sentence in Justice
Brennan’s concurring opinion in Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S.
385, 395 (1986), the court below held that pay discrimination
must always “be viewed as a continually recurring series of
violations,” because “each week’s paycheck” is a wrong
separately actionable under Title VII. Jd. at 8a, quoting, in part,
Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 395-96. The court of appeals concluded
that Goodwin’s pay discrimination claim was not time-barred,
and remanded the case for trial.

3. The Court is presently considering National Railroad
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, No. 00-1614, cert. granted,
533 U.S. 927 (2001), a case involving the so-called continuing
violation theory and its application to discrimination cases under
Title VII. In that case, the Chamber has urged the Court to limit
the application of the continuing violation theory lest the theory
swallow whole the principles of finality, prompt dispute
resolution, and repose that are central to the administration of
Title VII. |

No matter how this Court balances those interests in
Morgan, however, the dispute at issue in this case will remain.
Guidance as to when the continuing violation theory might be
applicable will not dispel the notion, reflected in the decision

3

below and adopted by five other courts of appeals, that
compensation cases are fundamentally different from those
involving other “tangible employment actions.”

Indeed, if the “paycheck” doctrine embraced by the court
below is left unaddressed by this Court, the work done by the
Court in Morgan may go for naught, as plaintiffs gerrymander
their claims to fit the special “paycheck” rules currently
applicable in six circuits. A writ of certiorari in this case — in
combination with a decision in Morgan — would do much to
resolve the intractable disputes roiling in the lower courts on
the application of Title VII’s limitations provisions.’

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1. After considerable debate, Congress consciously
imposed “quite obviously short deadlines” for filing charges of
discrimination under Title VII. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver,
447 U.S. 807, 825 (1980). An individual seeking to challenge
an allegedly discriminatory employment action must file an
EEOC charge within 300 days at the most. An action not
promptly challenged becomes “an unfortunate event in history
which has no present legal consequences.” United Air Lines v.
Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977).

2. The rule applied below — that every alleged wrong with
an impact on an employee’s paycheck remains actionable
throughout the employee’s tenure — eviscerates the deliberate
policy choices made by Congress in crafting a statute of
limitations for Title VII claims. That rule would allow an
employee to challenge actions occurring years and even decades
earlier, forcing employers to defend the conduct of supervisors -

2. Aruling in this case could also affect cases brought under other
federal discrimination statutes such as 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Equal Pay Act . The lower
federal courts have typically applied the Court’s Title VII precedents in
these contexts. See, e.g., Crawford v. Western Elec. Co., 614 F.2d 1300
(Sth Cir. 1980) (class action under Title VII and § 1981); Brinkley-Obu
v. Hughes Training, Inc., 36 F.3d 336, 345 n.19 (4th Cir. 1994).

4

long-since retired or dead, and involving records that have long
since been discarded.

3. The decision below exacerbates and intensifies a mature
and intractable circuit split on this vital issue that affects nearly
every employment discrimination claim. The Court has
previously acknowledged that when there is intra-circuit
“conflict, confusion, and uncertainty concerning” the limitations
rules applicable to civil rights cases, “compelling reasons [exist]
for granting certiorari.” Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266
(1985). Moreover, if the decision below is allowed to stand,
any accommodation of competing interests the Court might
reach in National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan,
No. 00-1614, concerning the continuing violation doctrine,
would be advisory only, as a plaintiff could always characterize
his or her claim as a pay disparity, and thereby challenge any
employment action during his or her entire tenure.

4. The court of appeals supposed that its decision was
compelled by Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986). Nothing
in Bazemore requires, or even recommends, the result reached
below. In Evans v. United Airlines, 431 U.S. 553 (1977),
and again in Bazemore v. Friday, the Court held that a
complainant must file a charge of discrimination promptly
following the occurrence of the unlawful act or practice the
complainant seeks to challenge, and cannot base a valid claim
solely on the continuing impact of a statutory violation occurring
outside the limitations period.

Bazemore also held that an employer could not defend a
facially discriminatory pay structure — one that currently
discriminates — by arguing that it had engaged in the same
discriminatory conduct outside the limitations period without
complaint. In the context of such a facially discriminatory
system, the Court observed that “[eJach week’s paycheck that
delivers less to a black than to a similarly situated white is a
wrong actionable under Title VIL, regardless of the fact that this
pattern was begun prior to the effective date of Title VII.”
478 U.S. at 395-96. As the Court has subsequently noted, this

rule is limited to currently operating, facially discriminatory
systems. No such system was alleged in this case.

Nonetheless, the court below, and at least six other courts
of appeals, have read this one sentence in Bazemore to eliminate
any meaningful statute of repose in Title VII cases involving
compensation. Four other courts of appeals have harmonized
Evans and Bazemore ina way that effectuates the plain language
of the statute, gives complainants a mechanism for vindicating
their civil rights, and underscores the importance of repose
inherent in every statute of limitations. This division of authority
will persist until this Court resolves it.

2. The courts of appeals are also sharply divided as to how far
back in time a district court may extend an award of back pay.
Some courts have held that the district court’s remedial authority
extends no further than the beginning of the charge-filing limitations —
period (either 180 or 300 days, depending on the jurisdiction)’;
others have held that the court can award back pay for a two-year
period prior to the date on which the charge was filed, although
some make the extended period available only with proof of a
continuing violation. This is a significant issue that arises in almost
every case in which a plaintiff is entitled to back pay, and can more
than double a plaintiff's back pay award. A clear rule is needed to
prevent forum-shopping and to ensure that similarly situated
plaintiffs recover comparable awards.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. THE RULE ESTABLISHED BY THE COURTS OF
APPEALS ELIMINATES ANY MEANINGFUL
LIMITATIONS PERIOD IN TITLE VII CASES,
IS IRRECONCILABLE WITH THIS COURT’S
OPINIONS, AND DEEPENS A DIVISION OF
AUTHORITY AMONG THE COURTS OF APPEALS.

“By choosing what are quite obviously short deadlines
[for filing charges of discrimination under Title VII], Congress
clearly intended to encourage the prompt processing of all

3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).

6

charges of employment discrimination.” Mohasco Corp. v.
Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 825 (1980). The rule adopted by the court
below ignores this compelling societal interest and eviscerates
Congress’ conscious design. The court felt compelled to reach
this result by a single sentence in Bazemore, but nothing in that
decision suggests that a complainant is entitled to lie in wait for
years — even decades — before forcing an employer to justify —
a discrete employment decision rendered by managers who may
well have quit, retired or died in the interim. The decision below
is fundamentally at odds with the notions of repose on which
administration of the Act depends.

A. Congress Adopted Title VII’s Charge-Filing
Limitations Period to Achieve a Careful Balancing
of Employer and Employee Rights.

Statutes of repose serve compelling societal interests.
They “promote justice by preventing surprises through the
revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until
evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses
have disappeared.” American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah,
414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974). Thus, a limitations period “reflects a
value judgment concerning the point at which the interests in
favor of protecting valid claims are outweighed by the interests
- in prohibiting the prosecution of stale ones.” Delaware State
College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 259-60 (1980) (internal quotes
omitted), quoting Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,
421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975).

By definition, every limitation period expresses society’s
interests in repose,‘ but those interests are particularly
compelling in the employment setting. Unlike litigants in the
great run of civil cases — who often are strangers or parties to
one-time or episodic commercial agreements — the relationship
between employers and employees is of central and continuing

4. See, e.g., Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 187 (1997)
(rejecting rule that “conflicts with a basic objective — repose — that
underlies limitations periods”); Wilson, 471 U.S. at 271 (“application of
any statute of limitations would promote repose”).

7

importance to both. Even employment decisions that appear on
their face to affect only a single employee usually have an impact
on many others; when one employee receives a promotion or is
allocated the top merit pay increase in her department, that
opportunity, or those dollars, cannot not go elsewhere.
Cf. US Airways v. Barnett, _U.S.__, No. 00-1250, 2002 U.S.
LEXIS 3034 (April 29, 2002). When an employer makes these
allocation decisions, then, everyone involved has an interest in
settling promptly any challenges to them.

Moreover, to defeat a claim of discrimination, an employer
must be able to articulate — convincingly — its rationale for
the challenged decision, Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000); Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr.
509 U.S. 502, 506-07, 513-14 (1993), but the employer’s ability
to muster a defense dissipates sharply as time passes. Memories
fade; managers quit, retire or die; records are lost or destroyed
to make way for still other records.‘ Business units are
reorganized, disassembled, or sold; tasks are centralized,
dispersed, or terminated altogether.

Unless an employer receives prompt notice that it will be
called upon to defend a specific decision, it will have no
“opportunity to gather and preserve the evidence with which to
sustain himself. . . .” Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 US.
355, 372 (1977) (quoting Congressman Erlenborn, 117 Cong.
Rec. 31972 (1971)). By compelling those injured to raise their
claims promptly, Title VII’s limitations period “protect{s]
employers from the burden of defending claims arising from
employment decisions that are long past.” Ricks, 449 U.S. at
256-57. Thus, “[e]ven if one has a just claim it is unjust not to
put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of
limitation. . . . [T]he right to be free of stale claims in time comes

5. The EEOC has said that, in most instances, an employer is
not obligated to keep personnel records for more than one year, tacitly
acknowledging that employers should not be called to account for
older decisions. See 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14 (requiring employers to
keep most employment records for one year).

to prevail over the right to prosecute them.” American Pipe &
Constr. Co., 414 U.S. at 554. In short, only a meaningful rule of
limitations makes it possible for an employer to articulate the
rationale of its managers for a discrete employment decision,
and only with such a rationale in hand can it hope to defend
against even the most baseless charge of discrimination.
Wilson, 471 U.S. at 271 (“[jjust determinations of fact cannot
be made when, because of the passage of time, the memories of
witnesses have faded or evidence is lost”).*

And that, of course, is precisely why Congress purposefully
selected a short charge-filing limitations period (either 180 or
300 days).’ See, e.g., Mohasco Corp., 447 U.S. at 825
(“Congress clearly intended to encourage the prompt processing
of all charges of employment discrimination”); Occidental Life
Ins. Co., 432 U.S. at 372 (1977) (Congress enacted Title VII's
limitations period “to protect fully the rights of the person or
persons against whom the charge is filed”) (quoting S. Rep.
No. 92-415, p. 25 (1971)).

B. The Decision Of The Court Of Appeals Effectively

Undermines The Societal Interest In Repose.

The rule adopted by the court of appeals cannot be
reconciled with these principles. The court below concluded
that a complainant could lawfully challenge a discrete
employment decision years or decades after the fact, so long as
the economic consequences of that decision persist into the
limitation period. That rule is incompatible with Congress’
design and the notions of “essential fairness to defendants”
that underlie all statutes of repose. American Pipe & Constr.
Co., 414 U.S. at 554.

6. The case for definitive and unambiguous rules of limitation
is at its strongest with “a statutory scheme in which laymen, unassisted
by trained lawyers initiate the process.” Mohasco Corp., 447 U.S.
at 816 n.19 (citation omitted).

7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); of 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (providing for
six-month limitations period for filing unfair labor practice charge).

9

Goodwin’s complaint sought to force GM to defend the
merits of employment decisions it made up to eighteen years
before she filed her charge. Pet. App. at 29a, 32a. She
complained, for example, that when she was recalled from a
layoff in 1993, she had been placed improperly in petitioner’s
salary grid. She protested her placement to two of petitioner’s
managers at the time she was “wrongfully” slotted, but she did
not file her charge of discrimination until as much as six years
later.* By now, however, one of the managers to whom she
claims to have complained is dead and the other is retired.
Pet. Br. at 7 n.1. “Preserving a right of action for such a vast
stretch of time would . . . thwart[] the basic objective of repose
underlying the very notion of a limitations period.” Rotella v.
Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 554 (2000).

According to the court of appeals, the rule it articulated is
applicable only to “pay discrimination” cases; for every other
mode of discrimination, complainants are obligated to act with
dispatch. The text of Title VII makes no such distinction, and as
explained infra at pp. 12-14, neither do the Court’s opinions.

But more fundamentally, experience teaches that the
distinction between “pay” cases on the one hand, and “everything
else” on the other, is an illusion. A discrimination case typically
begins with a demonstration that the plaintiff has suffered a
“tangible employment action”; for an employer’s conduct to
constitute tangible employment action, there must be
“a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing,
failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in
benefits.” Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998).
Thus, nearly every discrimination case will involve a decision
with a demonstrable impact on compensation. Any “exception”
to the ordinary rules of repose that would permit a plaintiff to
challenge adverse “employment actions” that are decades old,
based on a continuing impact on pay, would push the general

8. Goodwin claimed to be uncertain as to precisely when the
conversation occurred.

10

rule of repose to the margins of the statute, where it would come
into play only with respect to the claims of exceptionally inartful
plaintiffs.

This is not mere prediction. In Ashley v. Boyles Famous
Corned Beef Co., 66 F.3d 164, 167-68 (8th Cir. 1995), for
example, the Sixth Circuit — following the approach adopted
by the Tenth Circuit below — held that the plaintiffs filed their
charge too late to challenge their assignment to non-union jobs,
but nonetheless were entitled to challenge the pay disparity
resulting from that allegedly discriminatory assignment.
Similarly, in Nealon v. Stone, 958 F.2d 584, 591-92 (4th Cir.
1992),° the court followed this same rationale to conclude that
the plaintiff could challenge a job classification decision made
well outside the limitations period because that classification
decision had ongoing economic consequences, reflected in “each
paycheck” the plaintiff received.

Indeed, in Evans, the Court noted that in the limitations
arena, clever characterization could easily overcome reasoned
rules of law. There, the plaintiff sought to challenge the current
consequences of a decision made long ago — a decision that
deprived her of seniority, and thus compensation, within the
limitations period. The Court concluded that

the mere fact that a past event . . . has affected the
calculation of seniority credit [and thus the plaintiff's
present paycheck, does not give the plaintiff a timely
charge], even if the past event might at one time
have justified a valid claim against the employer.
A contrary view would substitute a claim for
seniority credit for alsaost every claim which is
barred by limitations.
Evans, 431 U.S. at 560 (emphasis added).

9. Nealon was an Equal Pay Act case, but it purported to apply
this Court’s Title VII limitations decisions.

11

C. The Courts Of Appeals Are In Disarray On The
Application Of Title VII’s Limitations Period,
Especially In Cases Characterized As “Pay”
Or “Compensation” Cases.

The courts of appeals are divided into two “camps” in
applying Title VII’s limitations period to claims characterized
as “pay” or “compensation” disputes, however ill-defined that
category might be. These are not merely academic differences
in analytical approach; in four circuits, Congress’s charge-filing
limitations period is enforced with some degree of rigor
(properly, in the Chamber’s view). In six other circuits, there
effectively is no limitations period in most “compensation”
cases. In these circuits, an aggrieved employee may, if he
chooses, file a charge within the statutory period following the
relevant adverse employment action he challenges, or he may
wait until he or she retires — years or decades later — without
any adverse consequences for the timeliness of the claim.

This remarkable divergence can be attributed to a single
passage — indeed, to a single sentence — in Bazemore v. Friday,
478 U.S. at 395-96.'° Heedless of the Court’s admonition that it
is “generally undesirable, where holdings of the Court are not
at issue, to dissect the sentences of the United States Reports as
though they were the United States Code,” St. Marys Honor
Ctr., 509 U.S. at 515, six courts of appeals have drawn from
this language in Bazemore an exception, not merely to the
Court’s other Title VII cases, but to the Court’s more general
conviction that excessive lenity in matters of timeliness “would
bar repose, prove a godsend to stale claims, and doom any hope
of certainty in identifying potential liability.” Rotella, 528 U.S.
at 559 (a period of limitations stretching eight years would defeat
interest in repose). That result is neither compelled nor even
permitted by the Court’s cases, as explained below.

10. The Court entered a brief per curiam opinion in Bazemore,
which indicated general agreement with the accompanying concurring
opinion of Justice Brennan, in which the other Justices joined. All of
the language cited in this brief and relied upon by the court below appears
in Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion.

12

1. The Court’s Cases Reflect A Unified Standard
To Limitations Questions Under Title VII.

United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977),
Bazemore’s precursor, establishes the prevailing Title VII
limitations rule: “a discriminatory act which is not made the
basis of a timely charge is the legal equivalent of a discriminatory
act which occurred before the statute was passed [even if that
act has] a continuing impact on [the charging party’s] pay and
fringe benefits. . . . [M]Jere continuity” of impact is not enough
to turn a stale claim into a timely one. Evans, 431 U.S. at 558.
Bazemore applied that rule to a facially discriminatory salary
system, as explained below.

a. Evans was a flight attendant. When she married, the
airline’s policies forced her to quit. When the no-marriage rule
was subsequently eliminated, she returned to work, but the
airline refused to give her seniority credit for the duration of
her compelled absence. When she sued the airline, she did not
seek back pay for the period predating her return but, because
her seniority determined her pay rate, and it had been depressed
by the airline’s prior discrimination, she sought compensation
for the shortfall in her current paychecks.

The Court held, however, that Evan’s ongoing economic
disadvantage was merely a lingering consequence of a statutory
violation occurring outside the limitations period, and thus was
time-barred. “United was entitled to treat that past act [i.e. Evan’s
termination] as lawful after respondent failed to file a charge
of discrimination” within the statutorily prescribed period.
Id. at 558. Although Evans claimed that a current violation
existed, because each paycheck she received contained less
money than she would have received had her seniority been
adjusted to remedy the prior discrimination, the Court rejected
Evan’s focus on her current paycheck. Nearly every claim has a
financial component, the Court observed, and the rule urged by
Evans “would substitute a claim for seniority credit for almost
every claim which is barred by limitations.” Jd. at 560.

13

b. Bazemore involved an overtly discriminatory pay policy
established before the employer, a state agency, was subject to
Title VII. 478 U.S. at 390-91. Although the agency eliminated
the race-specific categories that had characterized the system
once it became subject to the Act in 1972, the discriminatory
pay policy continued thereafter. Jd. at 391.

The court of appeals held that the employees’ discrimination
claims were time-barred, but this Court reversed. Jd. at 386-88.
An employer, the Court held, could not defend a current
facially discriminatory pay structure by arguing that it had
previously engaged in the same discriminatory conduct without
complaint. “[T]o the extent an employer continue[s} to engage in
[a discriminatory] act or practice [within the limitations period], it
is liable” under Title VII. Jd. at 394-96. It was in this context
that Justice Brennan observed that “[e]ach week’s paycheck that
delivers less to a black than to a similarly situated white is a wrong
actionable under Title VIL, regardless of the fact that this pattern
was begun prior to the effective date of Title VII.” Jd. at 395-96.

c. Twice, the Court has explained the relationship between
Evans and Bazemore. Bazemore itself explained the critical
distinction: the employer in Bazemore had continued to impose,
within the limitations period, a facially unlawful pay system
intended to perpetuate a discriminatory regime begun before
the Act applied to it. In contrast, the “Respondent [in Evans]
made no allegation that the seniority system itself was
intentionally designed to discriminate.” Bazmore, 478 U.S. at
396 n.6. The Court thus drew a distinct line between “system(s]
intentionally designed to discriminate,” which can be challenged
every time the system effects a discriminatory result, and
discrete, non-systemic employment decisions, which must be
challenged at the time they occur.

Similarly, in Lorance v. AT&T Tech., Inc., 490 U.S. 900
(1989), a case challenging an allegedly discriminatory seniority
system, the Court explained that with:

a facially neutral system, the discriminatory act occurs
only at the time of adoption. . . . [Conversely,] a facially

discriminatory system [like the pay structure at
issue in Bazemore] by definition discriminates
every time it is applied. This is a material
difference for purposes of the analysis we
employed in Evans and Ricks — which focuses
on the timing of the discriminatory act for
purposes of the statute of limitations. It .. . also
[explains the “each week’s paycheck” language]
of Bazemore v. Friday... ."'
Id. at 912 n.S (emphasis in original). Lorance thus
underscored the ingredient essential to the Bazemore holding:
a “facially discriminatory system” operating within the
limitations period.
2. The Courts of Appeals’ Divergent Interpreta-
tions of Bazemore Have Created Inconsistent
Rules Governing the Application of Title VII’s
Limitations Periods to Pay-Related Discrimi-
nation Claims.

Like the Lorance Court, the Sixth, Seventh, D.C. and
Federal Circuits have all found in Bazemore a special application
of the general rule of limitations, applicable to cases involving
“facially discriminatory system(s].” Lorance, 490 U.S. at 912
n.5. In these courts, the “critical question” is not the type of
employment benefit affected by the alleged discrimination —
pay, promotion, discharge, etc. — but “whether any present
violation exists.” Evans, 431 U.S. at 558. The Second, Third,
Fourth, Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, conversely, read
Bazemore as establishing a unique rule of limitations in cases
involving pay discrimination. These conflicting interpretations

11. Lorance’s application to seniority systems was superseded
by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, but the statute left the Evans
limitations rule unaffected outside of the seniority system context.
See, e.g., 137 Cong. Rec. $15485 (1991) (interpretive memorandum of
Sen. Danforth (“[t]his legislation should not be interpreted to affect the
sound rulings of the Supreme Court regarding ‘continuing violations’
theory under Title VII”).

15

of the Court’s decisions will not be reconciled unless and until
the Court determines which is correct.

a. The “Present Violation” Approach.

Dasgupta v. University of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 121 F.3d
1138 (7th Cir. 1997), is typical of the circuit opinions adopting
the “present violation” approach to Bazemore and Evans.
In Dasgupta, a professor alleged pay discrimination stemming
from decisions made over two decades, but during the
limitations period he had received raises that were comparable
to those received by his peers. Writing for the court, Judge Posner
found Bazemore inapplicable because in Bazemore “the illegal
act [was] repeated during the limitations period,” while in
Dasgupta, the plaintiff sought simply to “rectify the [economic]
consequences of time-barred” pay decisions. Jd. at 1140.
A contrary ruling, the court explained, would “unravel the statute
of limitations.” Jd.

The Seventh Circuit has reaffirmed this “present violation”
approach in two subsequent cases. See Snider v. Belvidere
Township, 216 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 2000) (“the continued
receipt of lower paychecks does not revive past allegedly
discriminatory conduct”); Christiansen v. APV Crepaco, Inc.,
178 F.3d 910, 915 (7th Cir. 1999) (claim that denial of skills-
based pay breached collective bargaining agreement was time-
barred; ongoing pay effect stemmed from decision six years
earlier and was not actionable). A number of other federal courts
of appeals — including those in the Sixth, D.C., and Federal
Circuits — have adopted a similar analysis in the context of
pay-related discrimination claims. See, e.g., Anderson v. Zubieta,
180 F.3d 329, 337 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (reversing summary
judgment for employer; where plaintiffs Offered evidence that
pay disparities were “caused by the continued maintenance of a
‘broadly discriminatory pay and benefits system,” new violations
occurred during limitations period); Bosley v. Merit Sys.
Protection Bd., 162 F.3d 665, 667 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (claim based
on denial of pay increase was time-barred even though monetary
effects continued into the future); EEOC v. Penton Indus. Publ’g

16

Co., 851 F.2d 835, 838 (6th Cir. 1988) (dismissing pay disparity
claim; claim challenged isolated employment decision outside
limitations period rather than long-standing and demonstrable
policy of discrimination).

b. The “Paycheck” Approach.

The court below expressly rejected the “present violation”
approach urged by Judge Posner in Dasgupta, and, based on its
reading of the “paycheck” language from bazemore, held that a
plaintiff need not act within the time limits prescribed by Section
706(e) to challenge a discrete compensation-related decision.
Indeed, the court drew from Bazemore a rule that would entitle
an employee to wait until the end of his or her career before
challenging such a decision.

The Second, Third, Fourth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits
have adopted the same rule. Most of these courts have described
these ongoing wage disparities as a continuing violation.
See Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 257-58 (3d Cir. 2001)
(discriminatory wage payments constitute a continuing
violation); Ashley v. Boyle’s Famous Corned Beef Co., 66 F.3d
164, 167-68 (8th Cir. 1995) (gender discrimination claim
regarding assignment of plaintiff to non-union job was time-
barred, but resulting pay disparity was still actionable seven
years later, based on Bazemore’s “paycheck” language);
Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes Training, Inc., 36 F.3d 336, 347-48
(4th Cir. 1994) (“an act of sex discrimination in compensation
first inflicted at the date of hiring can thereafter continually
violate the plaintiff’s rights” due to ongoing pay disparity, even
when hiring decision occurred outside limitations period);

12. See also Tademe v. St. Cloud State Univ., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20666, at *14 (D. Minn. Dec. 10, 2001) (plaintiff’s claim challenging
the ongoing economic consequences of a 1991 hiring placement decision
were time-barred; decision was “not a repeated and on-going decision”
by the employer and the resulting lower paychecks do not constitute
new violations); Williams v. Munoz, 106 F. Supp. 2d 40, 42-43 (D.D.C.
2000) (failure to promote claim was time-barred even though current
paychecks were lower as a result).

17

Calloway v. Partners Nat’l Health Plans, 986 F.2d 446, 449
(11th Cir. 1993) (reversing district court’s finding that hiring
decision that caused pay disparity was discrete act rather than
continuing violation; “[w]Jhen the claim is one for discriminatory
wages, the violation exists every single day the employee
works”); Nealon v. Stone, 958 F.2d 584, 591-92 (4th Cir. 1992)
(plaintiff could challenge employer’s job classification decision
even though it occurred outside the limitations period, because
of ongoing pay disparity; relying on Bazemore’s “paycheck”
language).'*

The Second Circuit has reached a similar conclusion, relying
on the Bazemore “paycheck” language, but has concluded that
wage disparities represent a series of discrete violations rather
than a continuing violation. Pollis v. New Sch. for Soc. Research,
132 F.3d 115, 119 (2d Cir. 1997) (pay discrimination
“is fundamentally unlike” other types of discrimination; quoting
Bazemore’s “paycheck” language).

- Therule adopted by these courts “would permit plaintiffs who
know of a [violation] to wait, ‘sleeping on their rights,’ as the . . .
damages accumulate, perhaps bringing suit long after the ‘memories
of witnesses have faded or evidence is lost.’ ” Klehr, 521 U.S.
at 187. If, as this Court has observed, “Congress clearly intended
to encourage the prompt processing of all charges of employment
discrimination,” that rule of law cannot stand. Mohasco Corp.,
447 US. at 825. The Court should grant review in this case to
eliminate this division of authority and correct the court of appeals’
misguided application of federal law.

13. The Eleventh Circuit has concluded that this “paycheck”
approach should be limited to wage disparities, and does not extend to
disparities in stock dividends. Carter v. West Publ’g. Co., 225 F.3d 1258,
1264-65 (11th Cir. 2000) (disparities in stock dividends constituted
“present effects of a one-time violation,” because they derived solely
from the employer’s previous decision as to who could participate in
stock program, and the program ended two years before a charge
was filed). The Eleventh Circuit’s hairsplitting on which types of

compensation should be covered by the “paycheck” exception
underscores that this reading of Bazemore is unworkable.

18

II. THE COURT SHOULD ALSO RESOLVE THE SPLIT
IN THE CIRCUITS OVER THE CALCULATION OF
TITLE VII BACK PAY AWARDS.

Section 2000e-5(g) of Title VII provides that “[b]ack pay
liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior
to the filing of a charge with the Commission,” but does not
specifically provide for when, or whether, a court may award
back pay for a period greater than 180 or 300 days, the filing
period for charges of discrimination under Title VII. The circuit
courts have produced at least three interpretations of how Section
2000e-5(g) should be applied.

Some courts have held that back pay is recoverable only
for a period beginning with the charge-filing limitations period."* —
Other courts have held that back pay may be recovered for two
years in every Title VII case, regardless of whether a continuing
violation is shown’; and a third group allows successful

14. In Ashley v. Boyle's Famous Corned Beef Co., the en banc
Eighth Circuit found a plaintiff’s discriminatory pay claim to be timely,
based on the continuing violation theory, but nevertheless limited
recovery to the 300-day charge-filing limitations period applicable to
Title VII claims in Missouri. 66 F.3d at 168. See also Sowell v. Alumina
Ceramics, Inc., 251 F.3d 678, 684 n.3 (8th Cir. 2001); Pollis v. New
Sch. for Soc. Research, 132 F.3d 115, 119 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Ashley
with approval); Beavers v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 975 F.2d 792,
800 (11th Cir. 1992) (even where a continuing violation exists, plaintiff
may recover only for 180-day filing period); Blake-McIntosh v. Cadbury
Beverages, Inc., No. 3:96-CV-2554 (EBB), 1999 WL 643661, at *8
(D. Conn. Aug. 10, 1999) (disallowing recovery of back pay beyond
300-day filing period).

15. See, e.g., EEOC v. O&G Spring & Wire Forms Specialty Co.,
38 F.3d 872, 880 (7th Cir. 1994) (district court “properly limited recovery
[of back pay] in accordance with the two year limitation of Title VIT”),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1198 (1995); Estate of Pitre v. Western Elec. Co.,
975 F.2d 700, 705-06 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 972 (1993);
EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1376 (S.D. Fla.
1998), vacated on other grounds, 220 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2000);
Bempah v. Kroger Co., No. CV488-200, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6345
(S.D. Ga. June 5, 1989).

19

plaintiffs to recover back pay measured by this two year window
only where there is a continuing violation."

For all of the reasons given in GM’s petition, the Chamber
believes that the Court should grant review on this issue as well.
In addition, the Chamber notes that it is inherently unsatisfactory
to have the nation’s primary anti-discrimination statute
administered in such a fundamentally inconsistent fashion based
solely on geography. Most of the individual businesses that
belong to the Chamber do business in more than one state,
and a great many do business in all or nearly all of them.
Widely disparate rules on questions of fundamental importance,
like the remedial reach question posed here, merely invite forum
shopping. Only the Court can harmonize the law on this point,
and the Chamber submits it should do so in this case.

16. See, e.g., Sabree v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners Local
No. 33,921 F.2d 396, 401 & n.11 (1st Cir. 1990); Stallworth v. Shuler,
777 F.2d 1431, 1435 (11th Cir. 1985); Glass v. Petro-Tex Chem. Corp.,
757 F.2d 1554, 1560 & n.4 (Sth Cir. 1985); Acha v. Beame, 570 F.2d
57, 65 (2d Cir. 1978); Eisenberg v. Pennsylvania State Univ.,
No. 3:00CV301, 2001 WL 202095, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2001)
(citing Garland v. USAir, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 715, 727 (W.D. Pa. 1991)).

:

20

CONCLUSION

The petition should be granted and the decision of the court
of appeals reversed.

Respectfully submitted,
STEPHEN A. BOKAT ZACHARY D. FASMAN
Rosin S. ConraD NEAL D. MOLLEN
NATIONAL CHAMBER Counsel of Record
LimiGATION CENTER, INC. | GreGoRY R. WATCHMAN
1615 H Street, N.W. PAuL, HASTINGS, JANOFSKY &
Washington, D.C. 20062 Waker LLP
(202) 463-5337 1299 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-2400
(202) 508-9500
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

The Chamber of Commerce of the United States

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386010_1681%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.