# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Hansen v. Aerospace Defense Related Industry District Lodge 725 > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386010_1595%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari - **Published:** January 1, 2002 - **Citation:** 535 U.S. 1078 ## Text 01138 6 JAN 24 2002 No. OFFICE OF THE CLERK In The Supreme Court of the United States ¢ ROBERT T. HANSEN and MARLA DES ERMIA, Petitioners, AEROSPACE DEFENSE RELATED INDUSTRY DISTRICT LODGE 725 OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, Respondent. ¢ On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The Superior Court Of California, County Of Los Angeles ¢ PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI + SANFORD L. Horn Counsel of Record Law OFFICES OF SANFORD L. Horn 301 North Lake Avenue Suite 320 Pasadena, California 91101-4108 (626) 795-7295 COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO, (800) 225-6964 OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831 Soe? athens QUESTIONS PRESENTED Are there any circumstances in which an employee of a labor union can prosecute an action for wrongful termi- nation in violation of public policy under state law which is not preempted under federal labor law? In the case of Plaintiff Hansen, may an elected union official who is discharged by the union for exposing union corruption to the union membership prosecute a state action for wrong- ful discharge in violation of public policy, or does the policy of promoting union democracy as set forth in Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 103 S. Ct. 1867, 72 L. Ed. 2d 239 (1982) preempt such a claim under federal law? In the case of Plaintiff Des Ermia, may an employee of a labor union who is employed pursuant to a collective bargain- ing agreement and who is discharged by the union in retaliation for blowing the whistle on union officials’ theft of union funds prosecute a state action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, or is such an action preempted by federal labor law because of the ~ need for uniformity in interpreting collective bargaining agreements? li LIST OF PARTIES The Petitioners are Robert T. Hansen and Marla Des Ermia. The Respondent is Aerospace Defense Related Indus- try District 725 of the International Association of Machi- nists and aerospace Workers. Calvin Duncan, Barbara Powley and Does 1-100, inclusive, were dismissed from the case. ill TABLE OF CONTENTS Page CPM ASEND POREIME EDD oo ccc ccc sccccccedsuceian i EEE 5 6 50M 64055 656659 6k 6 perce endaens ii OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW ................ 1 TT SUSGe Sale saddecbi ee ssss-06ecsseevec 1 STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVI- i ct is inne eivandee éeceescsenes 1 EPUREEIE GO EEO GAN, cosas denescscsessccces 2 WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE GRANTED ........... 9 i PM osc neesbaencsadccccucecccecce 12 iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page Cases Bloom v. General Truck Drivers, 783 F.2d 1356 (9th Ck Se accucebn ss enkse hen eeesanaeenaesewsas sane 13 Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S 431, 103 S. Ct. 1867, 72 me Bf 2: perp perr rere 8, 12, 13, 14 Foley v. Interactive Data Corporation, 47 Cal. 3rd i ee cs ee SU cd bes co cece bchse tas tadceaws 9 Lingle v. Norge Division, Magic Chef, 486 U.S. 399, 100 L. Ed. 2d 410, 108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988)....... 14, 16 Screen Extra’s Guild, Inc. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3rd 1017, 275 Cal. Rptr. 395 (1990)................ 13 Sheet Metal Workers v. Lynn, 468 U.S. 347, 109 S. Ct. xe ee ee rrr erry 14 U.S. v. Haverlick, 195 F. Supp. 331 (N.D.N.Y. 1961), affirmed, 311 F.2d 229 (2d Cir. 1963)............... 11 STATUTES ae EE Svan Nha hades de akee cake eae eerceaes 1 Te Ns og hee fhe S aN es 1 pee oe ee | PTT TT TTT rey eee Tee 1,9 et Re Te NE UA Sieuwae betes de Chabb cacuacareas 11 es OP Rs as bap Sha aw en kad eae ea esa oeadeneeh 1, 11 RULES Rule 10(c) of the Rules of the United States ND TUE ss oon es ccd hadenctescpnvewsanesusaces 1 OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW The jury verdicts and judgments thereon in the trial court are set forth at Appendix 13-22. The Court of Appeal decision is reported at 90 Cal. App. 4th 977, 109 C.R. 2d 667 and is set forth in the Appendix 1. The denial of review by the California Supreme Court is set forth in Appendix 23. JURISDICTION This Court’s jurisdiction is based on section 1257(3) of the Judicial Code (28 U.S.C. § 1257(3)) and Rule 10(c) of the Rules of the United States Supreme Court. It involves an important question of federal law that has not been decided by this Court and a decision by a State Court which is inconsistent with the principles previously artic- ulated by this Court. The Court of Appeals of the State of California reversed a jury verdict in favor of Plaintiffs in this case on the basis that the Plaintiffs’ causes of action were preempted by the Labor Management and Report- ing Act set forth at 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. and section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, set forth at 29 U.S.C. § 185. . STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED The statutes involved are sections 185, 401 and 524 of Title 29 of the United States Code. These are set out at Appendix 24. | tv STATEMENT OF THE CASE The International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers is one of the largest labor unions in the country. It consists of several divisions. There is an International. Below the International are subordinate units which are called districts. The districts are made up of a number of local lodges. (R.T. p. 604) The plaintiffs in this case were long-time employees of the Machinist Union. Hansen was an elected business agent of District 720, whose term of office was four years. Des Ermia was an elected treasurer of District 727. In the ' early nineties the machinists union began to experience a reduction in its membership that paralleled the reduction in the aerospace industry. This reduction led to a reorgan- ization of some of the districts and locals under the auspices of the International. In January of 1994 the defendant in this case, District 725 was created. It was made up of a number of other districts in the southern California area. Among those districts which became a part of District 725 was District 720 and District 727. (R.T. p. 606) ee When the districts which employed the plaintiffs herein were merged into District 725 the plaintiffs’ employment was transferred to the new district. Plaintiff Hansen continued to function as an elected business agent. It was defendant's contention at the trial that at this point Hansen was an appointed business agent. Hansen contended that he was elected to a four-year term by the membership and continued in that capacity. (R.T. pp. 1290-1294, 613.) Des Ermia’s position as an elected secretary-treasurer was eliminated. She was employed in a the new district as a clerical worker, and her new employ- ment was subject to a collective bargaining agreement. (The Machinist Union had a collective bargaining agree- ment with the Office Workers Union that covered its clerical employees.) There was no break in Des Ermia’s employment. (R.T. pp. 616, 617) Calvin Duncan became the president and directing business agent of-the new District 725 by means of a new method of selecting presidents. He was elected by dele- gates who had been selected by the local lodges. He was not elected by a vote of the membership. Previously the district presidents had been directly elected by the union membership. (R.T. p. 606) Duncan terminated Hansen’s employment effective May 31, 1996. He terminated Des Ermia’s employment effective January 1, 1997. Duncan’s stated reasons for terminating Hansen were his poor performance as a busi- ness agent and his insubordination which was, in effect, undermining Duncan's authority in his management of District 725. He also stated Hansen’s termination was for seconding a motion before the delegate body to have business agents elected instead of appointed. Duncan's stated reason for terminating Des Ermia was that she was being laid off for lack of work. In the case of each of the plaintiffs, the jury unanimously found these reasons to be false and pretextual and adopted the plaintiffs’ theory of the reasons for their termination. (R.T. pp. 513-515, 520-522) Each of the plaintiffs presented evidence from which it could be reasonably inferred that they were terminated because they were exposing corruption and thievery on the part of their superiors and when warned about reporting such conduct refused to remain silent and par- ticipate in a cover up. The methods by which they exposed this corruption were different. Des Ermia discovered that her supervisor, Barbara | Powley, was using the union credit card to make personal purchases. She was purchasing such items as horse feed and clothing and charging them to the union. Des Ermia discovered five separate transactions involving personal expenditures with union funds. (R.T. pp. 628, 634) The supervisor was also converting monies from the union’s petty cash fund. (R.T. p. 642) When Des Ermia discovered this misuse of union funds, she reported what she found to an auditor with the International. (R.T. pp. 630-640) This precipitated an investigation which in retrospect appeared to be part of the cover up. The investigation was conducted by an auditor from the International named Jay Borman. His investigation was limited to inquiring of the suspected thief if she had an explanation for her conduct. She claimed everything was an innocent mistake and her explanation was accepted. The auditor never questioned Des Ermia concerning the misappropriation of union funds, nor apparently anyone else. Nor did he attempt to determine whether or not other credit card charges made by the supervisor Powley were legitimate. (R.T. pp. 651 and 2163, 2174) The evidence established that after making this report Des Ermia was subjected to a course of conduct that was calculated to make her resign. She was subjected to numerous forms of harassment which included, among ul other things, falsely accusing her of misconduct in her job performance. Her employment benefits, such as sick leave and vacation time, were taken away from her and later returned. She was subjected to extreme criticism and ordered to engage in physical labor that was calculated to and did, in fact, cause her physical injuries. (R.T. pp. 657, 684-687) When this tactic failed, she was terminated. The stated reason for her termination was she was laid off for lack of work. However, Des Ermia offered evidence that there was an abundance of clerical work that remained even several years after her termination. This was true irrespective of the issue of seniority rights. There was a backlog of work that would require at least five of six months work when she was purportedly terminated for lack of work. (R.T. p. 920) Hansen’s method of exposing corruption within the union was different. He spoke out to the membership about the thefts revealed by Des Ermia and the fact that his superiors condoned such conduct. He also spoke to the membership concerning the handling of large amounts of money by Duncan. At the time the new district was created each of the old districts controlled real estate and money belonging to the district through what were known as building corps. The money and real estate from these entities were supposed to be transferred to the new district. Although Duncan had publicly stated that he had transferred such funds from the old District 720, Hansen discovered that this was not true. Approxi- mately $90,000 in such funds were not accounted for. Hansen spoke out to the membership about Duncan’s misrepresentations and his handling of these funds. (R.T. p. 1524) Hansen's reports to the membership occurred in the following context. Hansen was an elected official of the union and felt as a result his first responsibility was to the membership. The situation he was confronted with occurred as a result of anonymous flyers that began circu- lating among the members which accused the union hier- archy of condoning thefts by office manager Barbara Powley and misrepresentations by president Calvin Dun- can as to the handling of union funds. Members would approach him as an officer of the union with inquiries as to the validity of these charges. Hansen felt an obligation as an officer of the union to respond to these inquiries truthfully. His responses indicated that the anonymous charges being circulated in the flyers were true. (R.T. pp. 1524, 1528-1530) Hansen spoke out to the membership in this fashion both before and after he was threatened with the loss of his job if he did so. Calvin Duncan accused him of authoring these flyers and stated that if he knew Hansen was speaking out in this fashion he would be fired. Hansen’s choice was to lie to the membership, remain silent and conceal what he knew were improprieties in the handling of union funds, or to inform the member- ship of the true facts. He chose the latter course of action and was fired as a result. (R.T. pp. 1522-1530) This case was tried to a jury with each plaintiff asserting a single cause of action for wrongful termina- tion based on a violation of public policy. (Several of the original causes of action were dismissed on preemption grounds when the cases were removed to federal district court, with that Court denying such motions as to the wrongful termination in violation of public policy claims.) Both plaintiffs asserted that they were harassed and terminated for exposing the fact that union officials were embezzling union funds and misrepresenting the status and location of other union funds entrusted to those officials. The defendant contended that one of the plaintiffs, Hansen, was terminated because of policy dif- ferences with management and poor work performance. The defendant asserted that the other plaintiff, Des Ermia, who was a clerical employee and employed pur- suant to a collective bargaining agreement, was termi- nated for lack of work. The jury was instructed that they should find for the defendant if the plaintiffs failed to prove that the defen- dant’s stated reason for the terminations was false. (R.T. pp. 495, 496) The jury returned a unanimous verdict finding in the case of Hansen that his termination was not because of policy differences with his union superior. In specific interrogatories submitted to the jury they unani- mously found that Hansen reported to union officials or the membership that another employee committed theft or embezzlement against the union; and that defendant’s stated reason for terminating Hansen, (that is, policy differences between him and management) was not a “, .. true reason but a pretext to retaliate against Mr. Hansen for responsibly reporting that another employee committed theft or embezzlement against the union.” (R.T. p. 533) - With respect to Des Ermia, the jury was instructed to find for the defendant if the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant’s stated reason for termination, that is, because of a lack of work, was false. In answers to special interrogatories submitted to the jury on Des Ermia’s Xe claim, the jury also unanimously found that the stated reason for the termination was false and that “ ... the defendant’s stated legitimate reason for terminating Marla Des Ermia’s employment was not its true reason, but a pretext to retaliate against Ms. Des Ermia for responsibly reporting that another employee committed theft or embezzlement against the union.” The jury returned unanimous verdicts for each of the plaintiffs, finding that they were terminated in violation of public policy because their termination was caused by their exposure of corruption within the union. The Cali- fornia Court of Appeal held, at 90 Cal. App. 4th 977, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 482 that the cause of action asserted by plain- tiff Hansen was preempted by the federal labor law : because to permit such a cause of action would interfere with the promotion of union democracy under the doc- trine enunciated in Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S 431, 103 S. Ct. 1867, 72 L. Ed. 2d 239 (1982). The Court of Appeal further held that the cause of action asserted by plaintiff Des Ermia was preempted under the federal labor law because permitting such a cause of action under the cir- cumstances required an interpretation of a collective bar- gaining agreement thereby jeopardizing uniformity in the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements. A Petition for Review was duly filed with the California Supreme Court. Review was denied by the California Supreme Court on October 31, 2001. FLAY» eS Ps ¢ State law causes of action for wrongful termination of employment in violation of public policy are well estab- lished in the law. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corporation, 47 Cal. 3rd 654, 254 C.R. 211 (1988). In this case the public policy being promoted is to encourage people to expose and route out corruption in labor unions. The encourage- ment of such conduct is forcefully expressed in the fed- eral Labor Management and Reporting Act. Sections 401(a) 401(b) of Title 29 of the United States Code rather eloquently describe the purpose of unions and the public policy of protecting the integrity of unions. They provide WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE GRANTED as follows: “§ 401. Congressional declaration of findings, purposes, and policy (a) Standards for labor-management relations The Congress finds that, in the public interest, it continues to be the respon- sibility of the Federal Government to pro- tect employees’ rights to organize, choose their own representatives, bargain collec- tively, and otherwise engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid or protec- tion; that the relations between employers and labor organizations and the millions of workers they represent have a substan- tial impact on the commerce of the Nation; and that in order to accomplish the objec- tive of a free flow of commerce it is essen- tial that labor organizations, employers, and their officials adhere to the highest standards of responsibility and ethical conduct in administering the affairs of 10 their organizations, particularly as they affect labor-management relations. (b) Protection of rights of employees and the public The Congress further finds, from recent investigations in the labor and management fields, that there have been a number of instances of breach of trust, corruption, disregard of the rights of indi- vidual employees, and other failures to observe high standards of responsibility and ethical conduct which require further and supplementary legislation that will afford necessary protection of the rights and interests of employees and the public ; generally as they relate to the activities of labor organizations, employers, labor rela- tions consultants, and their officers and representatives.” Some of the cases have further refined the public policy set forth by these statutes. For example: “Purpose of this chapter is to insure that full information concerning financial and internal administrative practices and procedures of labor organization is available to union mem- bers. U.S. v. Goad, 490 F.2d 1158 (C.A.8 (Mo.) 1974), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 3068, 417 U.S. 945, 41 L. Ed. 2d 665 (1974).” Purpose of this chapter is to provide guaran- ties of fair treatment to members of unions at the hands of those with whom they deal, including the labor organization itself. Wirtz v. Teamsters Indus., 257 F.Supp. 784 (N.D. Ohio 1966). 11 These statutes do not contemplate that the goals to be achieved be obtained solely by means of federal regula- tion. Indeed, section 524 of Title 29 of the United States Code expressly provides that these statutes are in no way designed to diminish a state’s right to enforce its criminal laws, particularly such laws directed at theft and em- bezzlement. See also U.S. v. Haverlick, 195 F. Supp. 331 (N.D.N.Y. 1961), affirmed, 311 F.2d 229 (2d Cir. 1963), which holds that 29 U.S.C. § 501c that sets forth the penalties for embezzling union funds does not diminish or impair a state’s right to enforce its criminal laws. The decision of the Court of Appeal in this case effectively forecloses the possibility of an employee who is employed by a labor union from ever prosecuting an action against his or her employer on the basis that the termination was in violation of the public policy of the state of California. It also dramatically limits the right of any unionized employee who is employed pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement to sue for wrongful ter- mination in violation of public policy. Based on the Court of Appeal decision if the employer asserts that there is a need to interpret the collective bargaining agreement all considerations of public policy are preempted. The Court of Appeal’s opinion applies the doctrine of preemption under the Labor Management and Reporting Act in such a sweeping manner that all unionized employees in the state of California have lost important rights and protec- tions which are available to non-union employees. It has eliminated any protection for employees of unions who attempt to expose and root out corruption in their unions. In addition to its expansion of the concept expressed in Finnegan the Court of Appeal stated as follows with 12 respect to the goal of uniformity in interpretation of collective bargaining agreements: “As far as Des Ermia, the charge was that she was laid off in retaliation for her reporting that her supervisor was misusing appellant's funds. But because appellant asserted a legitimate reason for her termination, interpretation of the CBA was required. A state’s public policy, no matter how strongly reflected by its statutes, is in itself an insufficient barrier to preemption in the face of such a necessary interpreta- tion.” In other words, the Court of Appeal’s ruling is if the employer asserts a legitimate reason for the termina- tion based on the collective bargaining agreement, even if the trier of fact finds that such assertion is false, the plaintiff’s cause of action is nevertheless preempted. The Court should grant review to promote the policies under- lying the Labor Management and Reporting Act and to encourage and protect employees who come forward to expose corruption in labor unions. ¢ LEGAL DISCUSSION The Court of Appeal’s holding that Hansen’s claim is preempted is based on its interpretation of the holding in Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 103 S. Ct. 1867, 72 L. Ed. 2d 239 (1982). In that case the Court held that a newly elected union president could ‘fire an appointed business agent who had campaigned for his opponent. The Court held that the fired, appointed, business agent did not have a cause of action for violation of his rights under the LMRDA. The rationale of the court was that elected union officials were entitled to select their own appointed staff in order to carry out the policies for which they were a a 13 elected thereby promoting union democracy. The Califor- nia Supreme Court expanded on this ruling, holding a state law cause of action for wrongful termination based on breach of an implied contract not to terminate without good cause was preempted for the same reason in Screen Extra’s Guild, Inc. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3rd 1017, 275 Cal. Rptr. 395 (1990). Until the current decision, the California courts have not dealt with the issue of preemption where the fired union employee was elected and the reason for the termi- nation was the exposure of corruption by that employee of superior officers of the union. However, this issue has been dealt with by the federal appellate courts. The most closely related case to the facts in the case of Plaintiff Hansen is the case of Bloom v. General Truck Drivers, 783 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1986). The Bloom case involved a wrongful termination action wherein the discharged employee claimed he was fired for refusing to falsify minutes of a meeting. The falsification of the minutes would have had the effect of covering up improper expenditures of union funds. (One of the precise issues in this case.) The Ninth Circuit held that such state wrongful termination actions were not preempted, and that such actions implicated important state interests and had no impact on the goals of the LMRDA in promoting union democracy. Given this situation, the reasoning in Fin- negan which was calculated to promote union democracy did not apply. ; The Court of Appeal’s decision in this case does not promote the goal of union democracy as expressed in the Labor Management Reporting Act and by this Court in the Finnegan case. It has the opposite effect. It ignores the 14 fact that Hansen was originally an elected official and by union fiat was turned into an at-will appointed official during the term of office for which he was elected by the union membership. The fact that Hansen was elected is of paramount importance in the context of federal labor law. This Court has so held in Sheet Metal Workers v. Lynn, 468 U.S. 347, 109 S. Ct. 639, 102 L. Ed. 2d 307 (1988). In this case an elected union official was terminated for express- ing views related to the financial management of the local that were contrary to that of the trustee who was running the local. The local had been placed in trusteeship because of financial difficulties after the election of the business agent in question. The trustee was newly installed and had been placed there by the International. Arguably, the trusteeship created a new entity as is the contention made by the union here. However, the fact that the business agent was elected by the membership was deemed a critical fact by this Court. This, of course, is consistent with the reasoning of Finnegan that deemed the promotion of union democracy to be the underlying purpose of the Labor Management Reporting Act. The Court of Appeal, in its decision in this case, held that Des Ermia’s claim was preempted because it would involve an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. This Court has addressed the preemption doctrine as it relates to the inter-relationship between a state cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy and securing uniformity under federal law in the administration of collective bargaining agree- ments in Lingle v. Norge Division, Magic Chef, 486 U.S. 399, 100 L. Ed. 2d 410, 108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988). This case did not involve an employee who was terminated for exposing el 15 union corruption. It involved an employee whose employment was governed by a collective bargaining agreement who was terminated for allegedly filing a false worker’s compensation claim. The union processed a grievance on her behalf and was successful in having her reinstated with back-pay. She then filed a tort action, which was permitted under Illinois law, for retaliatory discharge by an employer for asserting her rights under the Workers Compensation laws. The Supreme Court held that such a tort action was not preempted under section 301 of the L.M.R.A. The Court held that preemp- tion is only appropriate where resolution of the state claim depended on interpreting the terms and conditions of the collective bargaining agreement. The reason for preemption is to avoid conflicting decisions from the various state courts in interpreting the terms and condi- tions of collective bargaining agreements. The Court held this was true even though the tort action and the arbitra- tion would involve an analysis of the same facts. In discussing why state law claims for discriminatory employment practices are not preempted the Court stated as follows: “12[b] A collective-bargaining agreement may, of course, contain information such as rate of pay and other economic benefits that might be helpful in determining the damages to which a worker prevailing in a state-law suit is enti- tled. See Baldracchi v Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Div., United Technologies Corp., 814 F2d, at 106. Although federal law would govern the inter- pretation of the agreement to determine the proper damages, the underlying state-law claim, not otherwise pre-empted would stand. Thus, as a general proposition, a state-law 16 claim may depend for its resolution upon both the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement and a separate state-law analysis that does not turn on the agreement. In such a case, federal law would govern the inter-preta- tion of the agreement, but the separate state- law analysis would not be thereby preempted. As we said in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v Lueck, 471 US, at 211, 85 L. Ed. 2d 206, 105 S. Ct. 1904, ‘not every dispute .. . tangentially involving a pro- vision of a collective-bargaining agreement, is preempted by Section 301...’”. The Court of Appeal in this case essentially rejected the reasoning of Lingle. In doing so, it has undermined the purposes of the policies which are expressed in the Labor Management Reporting Act. ¢ CONCLUSION The rights of union members and employees to ensure that their unions are run democratically and hon- estly has been seriously undermined by the ruling in this case. This Court should grant the Petition and once again promote the policies designed by federal labor law to assure the citizens of California that their unions are run honestly and democratically. Respectfully submitted, Law OFFICES OF SANFORD L. Horn SANFORD L. Horn Attorney for Petitioners ——————— App. 1 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR ROBERT HANSEN and | MARLA DES ERMIA, | Plaintiffs and Respondents, | wIIse ‘ | (Super. Ct. Nos. | EC022470 and AEROSPACE DEFENSE | RELATED INDUSTRY | | | DISTRICT LODGE 725, et al., Defendant and Appellant. EC024833) (Filed July 20, 2001) APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of ‘Los Angeles County, Charles W. Stoll, Judge. Reversed. Morrison & Foerster, Lisa Von Der Mehden and B. Scott Silverman for Defendant and Appellant. Sanford L. Horn for Plaintiffs and Respondents. Allison Beck; Van Bourg, Weinberg, Roger & Rosen- feld and David A. Rosenfeld for International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. Appellant Aerospace Defense Related Industry Dis- trict Lodge 725 of the International Association of Machi- nists and Aerospace Workers (appellant) is a subordinate unit of a labor union that represents aerospace workers. App. 2 Respondents Robert Hansen and Marla Des Ermia are two former employees of appellant who pursued wrong- ful termination claims against it. Their cases were consol- idated prior to trial. Hansen obtained a jury verdict in the amount of $335,000 plus punitive damages of $17,782. Des Ermia was awarded $368,000 plus punitive damages in the amount of $17,782. Appellant appeals, We reverse the judgments. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Des Ermia Des Ermia was a clerical employee in appellant’s Burbank office. In January 1996, she called appellant's regional office and reported that her office manager, Bar- bara Powley, had made unauthorized purchases with her union credit card. Appellant’s president, Calvin Duncan, reported the matter to the union office and an indepen- dent investigator was assigned to the matter. The investi- gator subsequently concluded that Powley had not intentionally misused the union credit card. Duncan, however, suspended Powley for 30 days without pay.! Des Ermia was laid off in January 1997. The stated reason given by appellant was that the Burbank office was being closed and her position had been eliminated. Des Ermia filed this lawsuit in January 1998, alleging that she had been wrongfully terminated because of the Pow- ley incident. She initially filed her suit in state court, alleging causes of action for violation of public policy and 1 The circumstances surrounding Powley’s suspension shall hereinafter be referred to as “the Powley incident.” a App. 3 intentional infliction of emotional distress. It was removed to federal court. The United States District Judge dismissed the emotional distress claim, finding it to be preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 United States Code section 151, et seq. (LMRA), and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of the pub- lic policy claim. Des Ermia’s First Amended Complaint, refiled in state court on September 15, 1998, alleged only a single cause of action for violation of public policy. Hansen Hansen was the Business Representative for appel- lant. In or around February 1996, a one page leaflet was distributed to union members criticizing the way in which the Powley incident had been handled. The authors of the leaflet identified themselves only as “the Over-the-Hill Gang.” Approximately one month later, another leaflet written by “the Over-the-Hill Gang” was distributed, criticizing president Duncan about union financial matters. Hansen made comments regarding the leaflets to cer- tain rank and file union members, essentially agreeing with the accusations made in the leaflets, but he denied writing the leaflets. In May 1996, President Duncan terminated Hansen’s employment, giving the reason that Hansen had made disparaging remarks about appellant’s leadership and had attempted to undermine Duncan’s authority. Hansen filed his lawsuit on May 27, 1997, for wrong- ful termination in violation of public policy. The com- plaint was initially filed in state court, alleging causes of App. 4 action for (1) discharge in violation of public policy; (2) breach of employment agreement; (3) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress. The case was removed to United States District Court. The District Court judge dismissed the claims for breach of employment agreement and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, finding these claims were preempted by the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 United States Code sections 401-531 (LMRDA). Upon remand to state court, the emotional distress claim was dismissed on summary judgment. Only the public policy cause of action proceeded to trial. Des Ermia’s case was consolidated with Hansen’s for trial in October 1999. | DISCUSSION 1. Preemption Appellant contends, among other things, that both Hansen’s and Des Ermia’s claims are preempted by fed- eral law. a. Hansen The LMRDA guarantees to every member of a labor organization the rights of equal voting, free speech and assembly. (29 U.S.C. § 411.) It also makes it unlawful for a union to “fine, suspend, expel, or otherwise discipline” any of its members for exercising those rights (29 U.S.C. App. 5 § 529), and allows any person whose rights have been violated to bring a lawsuit in federal district court. (29 U.S.C. § 412.) Appellant contends, therefore, that Hansen’s claims against it are preempted by the LMRDA. In support of its argument for preemption, appellant relies primarily on Finnegan v. Leu (1982) 456 U.S. 431. In Finneagan, supra, 456 U.S. 431, a union president discharged his appointed business agents. The agents filed suit, claiming a violation of the LMRDA. In holding that the LMRDA did not protect the discharged agents, the Supreme Court held that: “[T]he [LMRDA]’s overrid- ing objective was to ensure that unions would be demo- cratically governed, and responsive to the will of the union membership as expressed in open, periodic elec- tions. [Citation.] Far from being inconsistent with this purpose, the ability of an elected union president to select his own administrators is an integral part of ensuring a union administration’s responsiveness to the mandate of the union election. [J] . . . Nothing in the [LMRDA] evinces a congressional intent to alter the traditional pat- tern which would permit a union president under these circumstances to appoint agents of his choice to carry out © his policies. [{] . . . in enacting Title I of the [LMRDA], Congress simply was not concerned with perpetuating appointed union employees in office at the expense of an elected president’s freedom to choose his own staff. Rather, its concerns were with promoting union democ- racy, and protecting the rights of union members from arbitrary action by the union or its officers.” (Id. at pp. 441-442.) In Screen Extras Guild, Inc. v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1017, a business agent appointed by the union was —— App. 6 discharged and brought an action in state court against the union for wrongful discharge, defamation and negli- gent and intentional inflection of emotional distress. The Supreme Court held that the action was preempted by the | LMRDA, stating that: “Elected union officials must neces- sarily rely on their appointed representatives to carry out their programs and policies. As a result, courts have recognized that the ability of elected union officials to select their own administrators is an integral part of ensuring that union administrations are responsive to the ‘will of union members. [Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 1024-1025.) The Court also noted: “[W]hile the Court of Appeal through it important for the purposes of preemp- tion analysis to distinguish between claims against a union that relate to the purposes of the LMRDA and claims that are routine disputes between an employer and employee, the reverse is actually the case. It is important not to base a preemption rule on such a subjective distinc- tion. To do so would permit wrongful discharge claims against unions by business agents that would inhibit the ability of elected union officials to freely choose their staffs and would thus impermissibly frustrate full realiza- tion of the goals of the LMRDA. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1028.) In Sheet Metal Workers v. Lynn (1989) 488 U.S. 347, another discharged business agent brought a lawsuit against a local union, claiming a violation of the LMRDA. The Supreme Court held that Finnegan did not control because the business agent was an elected, rather than an appointed official. It stated: “The consequences of the removal of an elected official are much different. To begin with, when an elected official . . . is removed from his App. 7 post, the union members are denied the representative of their choice.” (Sheet Metal Workers, supra, at p. 355.) The agent was therefore allowed to maintain his cause of action under section 102 of the LMRDA. Respondents argue that Lynn, not Finnegan or Screen Extras, controls because Hansen became a business agent pursuant to an election and was performing the same duties for which he was elected when he was discharged. This reasoning masks the true facts, however. Hansen was initially elected to the post of business agent for District 720 in 1993. In January 1994, the union was reorganized and District 720 and a few other districts were merged into District 725, the appellant in this action. Calvin Duncan became the president of the new District, and pursuant to its new by-laws, appointed Hansen as its business representative. The stated reasons given for Hansen’s termination were his poor performance, and his insubordination in criticizing the management of the District. Duncan had the right to have an appointed business agent who sup- ported his agenda. Accordingly, Hansen’s claim for wrongful discharge was preempted by the LMRDA. (Screen Extras, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1032.) b. Des Ermia Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 United States Code section 185, preempts 2 Section 301(a) states: “Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing App. 8 state law claims that are based directly on a collective bargaining agreement or are substantially dependent on an interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. (Wooddell v. Electrical Workers (1991) 502 U.S. 93, 101-102; Aguilera v. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. (9th Cir. 2000) 223 F.3d 1010, 1014.) Des Ermia contends that her lawsuit only periph- erally involves the collective bargaining agreement and therefore should not be preempted for that reason. She argues that interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement was not necessary to a [sic] resolve the dis- pute; the jury was not asked to analyze the contractual terms of the agreement. Des Ermia was initially an elected officer of the union’s District Lodge 727. That Lodge and others were merged to form District Lodge 725 (appellant) in January 1994 and Des Ermia lost her position. After the merger, the appellant’s Office Manager offered Des Ermia work as a clerical employee. As a clerical worker for appellant, the terms and conditions of Des Ermia’s employment were governed by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between appellant, and a local branch of the Office and Professional Employees International Union. The CBA provided that in “all cases involving . . . layoffs, seniority based on continuous service with the employer employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in [the LMRA], or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.” (29 U.S.C. § 185, subd. (a).) App. 9 shall govern.” The CBA also provided that seniority would be by regional “Area.” When Des Ermia was ter- minated, she was told that it was due to the lack of work resulting from the closure of the Burbank office. Des Ermia’s claim is that she was terminated for pretextual reasons - that interpretation of the CBA was only necessary to determine evidence relating to motive and calculation of the proper measure of damages, citing Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc. (1988) 486 U.S. 399. In Lingle, a worker who filed a workers compensa- tion claim was terminated because the employer felt the claim was false. The worker’s union filed a grievance which was sent to arbitration pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. An arbitrator ruled in the worker’s favor and ordered her reinstated. She then filed a wrongful discharge suit which was removed to federal court. The employer filed a motion to dismiss on preemp- tion grounds. The United States Supreme Court held that although the dispute involved a factual inquiry into the conduct and motivation of the employer, it did not require the court to interpret the collective bargaining agreement and held that there was no preemption. (Id. at pp. 409-410.) One of Des Ermia’s main allegations was that appel- lant violated the CBA by laying her off before other, less senior, employees. Des Ermia argued that her “seniority date” under Article 16 of the CBA was January 1, 1994, the date which she became Secretary-Treasurer for Dis- trict Lodge 727. Appellant argued that her seniority date was March 1994, the date that she became a clerical employee for the Burbank office. Des Ermia also argued | App. 10 that the District violated the CBA by denying her a posi- tion in another area office, by failing to recall her after her layoff when another clerical employee quit and that she was wrongfully denied vacation and sick leave pay. In order to find there was a pretext for laying her off, the jury necessarily had to find that she was laid off out of seniority order, or that appellant violated the provi- sions of the CBA. Interpretation of the CBA was therefore a prerequisite to resolution of her claim. As a result, her claim was preempted by the LMRA. c. Effect of District Court’s Prior Ruling Both Hansen and Des Ermia argue that because the United States District Court only dismissed certain causes of action and remanded the remainder of each case back to state court, the remanded causes of action cannot now be deemed federal causes of action. The fact that the federal court did not retain each case at the pleading case, however, does not constitute a pronouncement that the remaining causes of action were state court causes of action. “When a federal court grants a motion for remand [to the state court], it does nothing more than determine the complaint fails, either directly or by operation of the ‘artful- pleading’ doctrine, to state a question arising under federal law. It does not determine whether a pre- emption defense can be successfully offered in state court when the entire case is considered.” (Moreau v. San Diego Transit Corp. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 614, 621.) ‘laa ke ag App. 11 2. Violation of Public Policy Respondents contend that because their claims involve alleged violation of public policy, the preemption doctrine does not apply. With respect to Hansen, they argue that there is a substantial state interest in ensuring that employees are not discharged because they voice their opposition to management policy. In Hansen’s case, however, he was employed as a business agent, and therefore was a representative of union management. It was therefore clearly within the president's rights to dis- charge him for voicing his contrary views. Hansen relies on Bloom v. General Truck Drivers (9th Cir. 1986) 783 F.2d 1356, claiming that one of the reasons he was discharged was because he refused to conceal the facts surrounding Powley’s embezzlement of union funds. This allegation was contained in his complaint; however Hansen did not establish at trial that he had reported criminal behavior or that he refused to aid and abet any criminal acts. In addition, Hansen alleged that Powley had not been bonded. However, any evidence on this issue was excluded at trial. All Hansen was able to prove at trial was that he was discharged because of his remarks criticizing Duncan’s performance. For this rea- son, Bloom is inapposite. " As far as Des Ermia, the charge was that she was laid off in retaliation for her reporting that her supervisor was misusing appellant’s funds. But because appellant asserted a legitimate reason for her termination, inter- pretation of the CBA was required. “A state’s public policy, no matter how strongly reflected by its statutes, is in itself an insufficient barrier to preemption in the face App. 12 of such a necessary interpretation. [Citation.]” (Moreau v. San Diego Transit Corp., supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 627.) DISPOSITION The judgments are reversed. The matter is remanded to the superior courts with instructions to dismiss the two lawsuits. (Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck (1985) 471 U.S. 202, 220.) The parties are to bear their own costs. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION HASTINGS, J. We concur: VOGEL (C5S.), PJ. EPSTEIN, J. TE ee ee a ee Pee Sa SPB AAP OENE I DFO HOGS OO App. 13 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES ROBERT T. HANSEN, Plaintiff, EC 22470 vs AEROSPACE DEFENSE RELATED, INDUSTRY DISTRICT LODGE 725 OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, et al Defendant. JUDGMENT ON VERDICT (Filed June 10, 1999) Nee ee eae eee ee ae OOS This action came on regularly for trial on May 26, 1999; in Department NCD of the Superior Court, the Honorable Charles W. Stoll Judge Presiding: the plaintiff appearing by attorneys, SANFORD L. HORN; and the defendant appearing by attorneys MORRISON & FOERSTER by: B. Scott Silverman and Lisa Von Der Mehden. A jury of 12 persons was regularly impaneled and sworn and agreed to try the cause. Witnesses were sworn and testified. After hearing the evidence and argument of counsel, the jury was duly instructed by the Court and the cause was submitted to the jury with directions to return a verdict on special issues. The jury deliberated and thereafter returned into court with its verdicts consis- ting of the special issues submitted to the jury and the answers given thereto by the jury, which said verdict was in words as follows, to wit: App. 14 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES ROBERT T. HANSEN, | Plaintiff, Case No. EC 022470 Vv. AEROSPACE DEFENSE SPECIAL VERDICT RELATED INDUSTRY FORM AS TO DISTRICT LODGE 725 OF | PLAINTIFF MARLA THE INTERNATIONAL DES ERMIA ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS; CALVIN DUNCAN; BARBARA POWLEY; and DOES 1-100 inclusive, Defendants. (Filed June 10, 1999) AND CONSOLIDATED CASE We, the jury in the above-entitled action, find the following Special Verdict on the questions submitted to us: WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF PUB- LIC POLICY: PLAINTIFF MARLA DES ERMIA QUESTION NO. 1: Did Plaintiff Marla Des Ermia have a reasonable and good faith belief that another employee committed theft or embezzlement against the union? ANSWER: Yes X No App. 15 If you answered Question No. 1 “yes,” answer Ques- tion No. 2. If you answered “no,” please sign, date, and return this form. QUESTION NO. 2: Did Marla Des Ermia responsibly report to union officials or the membership that another employee com- mitted theft or embezzlement against the union? ANSWER: Yes Xx No If you answered Question No. 2 “yes,” answer Ques- tion No. 3. If you answered “no,” please sign, date, and return this form. QUESTION NO. 3: Did Calvin Duncan, in making the decision to lay off Marla Des Ermia, know or believe that Ms. Des Ermia had reported that another employee committed theft or embezzlement against the union? ANSWER: Yes X No If you answered Question No. 3 “yes,” answer Ques- tion No. 4. If you answered “no,” please sign, date, and return this form. QUESTION NO. 4: Was the defendant's stated legitimate reason for ter- minating Marla Des Ermia’s employment not its true reason, but a pretext to retaliate against Ms. Des Ermia App. 16 for responsibly reporting that another employee commit- ted theft or embezzlement against the union? ANSWER: Yes X No If you answered Question No. 4 “yes,” answer Ques- tion No. 5. If you answered “no,” please sign, date, and return this form. QUESTION NO. 5: Did District Lodge 725’s conduct in terminating Ms. Des Ermia’s employment cause her damages? ANSWER: Yes X No If you answered Question No. 5 “yes,” answer Ques- tion No. 6. If you answered “no,” please sign, date, and return this form. QUESTION NO. 6: If you are answering this question, you have found District Lodge 725 liable for wrongful termination in violation of public policy as to Marla Des Ermia. Taking into account Ms. Des Ermia’s obligation to make reason- able efforts to find comparable employment, what is the ~ total amount of economic and non-economic damages, if any, caused by District Lodge 725 in terminating Ms. Des Ermia’s employment? ANSWER: (a) Economic $ 68,000.00 (b) Non-economic §$ 300,000.00 App. 17 QUESTION NO. 7: Did Plaintiff Marla Des Ermia prove by clear and convincing evidence that District Lodge 725, by the con- duct of an officer, director, or managing agent, acted with oppression or malice towards her in terminating her employment? ANSWER: Yes X No Sign, date, and return this verdict form. Dated: 6/10/99 /s/ David E. Rush Signature of Jury Foreperson App. 18 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES ROBERT T. HANSEN, Case No. EC 022470 Plaintiff, V. AEROSPACE DEFENSE SPECIAL VERDICT RELATED INDUSTRY FORM AS TO DISTRICT LODGE 725 OF | PLAINTIFF ROBERT THE INTERNATIONAL HANSEN ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND . AEROSPACE WORKERS; (Filed June 10, 1999) CALVIN DUNCAN: BARBARA POWLEY: and DOES 1-100 inclusive, Defendants. AND CONSOLIDATED CASE We, the jury in the above-entitled action, find the following Special Verdict on the questions submitted to us: WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF PUB- LIC POLICY: PLAINTIFF ROBERT HANSEN QUESTION NO. 1: Did Plaintiff Robert Hansen have a reasonable and good faith belief that another employee committed theft or embezzlement against the union? ANSWER: Yes X No App. 19 If you answered Question No. 1 “yes,” answer Ques- tion No. 2. If you answered “no,” please sign, date, and return this form. QUESTION NO. 2: Did Robert Hansen responsibly report to union offi- cials or the membership that another employee commit- ted theft or embezzlement against the union? ANSWER: Yes X No If you answered Question No. 2 “yes,” answer Ques- ~ tion No. 3. If you answered “no,” please sign, date, and return this form. QUESTION NO. 3: Did Calvin Duncan, in making the decision to termi- nate Plaintiff Robert Hansen’s employment, know or believe that Mr. Hansen had reported that another employee committed theft or embezziement against the union? ANSWER: Yes X No If you answered Question No. 3 “yes,” answer Ques- tion No. 4. If you answered “no,” please sign, date, and return this form. QUESTION NO. 4: Was the defendant’s stated legitimate reason for ter- minating Robert Hansen’s employment not its true rea- son, but a pretext to retaliate against Mr. Hansen for App. 20 responsibly reporting that another employee committed theft or embezzlement against the union? ANSWER: Yes X No If you answered Question No. 4 “yes,” answer Ques- tion No. 5. If you answered “no,” please sign, date, and return this form. QUESTION NO. 5: Did District Lodge 725’s conduct in terminating Mr. Hansen cause him damages? ANSWER: Yes X No If you answered Question No. 5 “yes,” answer Ques- tion No. 6. If you answered “no,” please sign, date, and return this form. QUESTION NO. 6: If you are answering this question, you have found District Lodge 725 liable for wrongful termination in violation of public policy as to Robert Hansen. Taking into account Mr. Hansen’s obligation to mitigate his dam- ages, what is the total amount of economic and non- economic damages, if any, caused by District Lodge 725 in terminating Mr. Hansen’s employment? ANSWER: (a) Economic $ 185,000.00 (b) Non-economic $ 150,000.00 App. 21 QUESTION NO. 7: Did Plaintiff Robert Hansen prove by clear and con- vincing evidence that District Lodge 725, by the conduct of an officer, director, or managing agent, acted with oppression or malice towards her in terminating her employment? ANSWER: Yes X No Sign, date, and return this verdict form. Dated: 6/10/99 /s/ David E. Rush Signature of Jury Foreperson It appearing by reason of said verdict that plaintiff, Robert T. Hansen, is entitled to judgment against Defen- dant, Aerospace Defense Related Industry District Lodge 725 of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers. Now, therefore, it is ordered adjudged and decreed that plaintiff, Robert T. Hansen, shall have and recover by way of his Complaint against defendant, Aerospace Defense Related Industry District Lodge 725 of the Inter- national Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers the sum of $185,000.00 as Economic damages and $150,000.00 as Non-economic damages plus $17,782.00 as Punitive damages for a total of $352,782.00 and further, plaintiff, Robert T. Hansen, is entitled to recover costs and disbursements amounting to the sum of $ 7,712.56 It appearing by reason of said verdict that plaintiff, Marla Des Ermia, is entitled to judgment against Defendant, Aerospace Defense Related Industry District Lodge 725 of App. 22 the International Association of Machinists and Aero- space Workers. Now, therefore, it is ordered adjudged and decreed that plaintiff, Marla Des Ermia, shall have and recover by way of his [sic] Complaint against defendant, Aerospace _ Defense Related Industry District Lodge 725 of the Inter- national Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers the sum of $68,000.00 as Economic damages and $300,000.00 as Non-economic damages plus $17,782.00 as Punitive damages for a total of $385,782.00 and further, plaintiff, Marla Des Ermia, is entitled to recover costs and disbursements amounting to the sum of $ Dated: 6-10-99 /s/ Charles W. Stoll CHARLES W. STOLL SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE App. 23 Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four - No. B135132 $100223 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA En Banc (Filed Oct. 31, 2001) MARLA DES ERMIA et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, i Vv. AEROSPACE DEFENSE RELATED INDUSTRY DISTRICT LODGE 725, Defendant and Appellant. Petition for review DENIED. /s/ GEORGE Chief Justice App. 24 29 U.S.C. § 185. Suits by and against labor organiza- tions (a) Venue, amount, and citizenship Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in contro- versy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties. (b) Responsibility for acts of agent; entity for pur- poses of suit; enforcement of money judgments Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter and any employer whose activities affect com- merce as defined in this chapter shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States. Any money judgment against a labor organization in a district court of the United States shall be enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individ- ual member or his assets. (c) Jurisdiction For the purposes of actions and proceedings by or against labor organizations in the district courts of the United States, district courts shall be deemed to have App. 25 jurisdiction of a labor organization (1) in the district in which such organization maintains its principal office, or (2) in any district in which its duly authorized officers or agents are engaged in representing or acting for employee members. (d) Service of process The service of summons, subpena, [sic] or other legal process of any court of the United States upon an officer or agent of a labor organization, in his capacity as such, shall constitute service upon the labor organization. (e) Determination of question of agency For the purposes of this section, in determining whether any person is acting as an “agent” of another - person so as to make such other person responsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts per- formed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling. (June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title III, § 301, 61 Stat. 156.) 29 U.S.C. § 401. Congressional declaration of findings, purposes, and policy (a) Standards for labor-management relations The Congress finds that, in the public interest, it continues to be the responsibility of the Federal Govern- ment to protect employees’ rights to organize, choose App. 26 their own representatives, bargain collectively, and other- wise engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection; that the relations between employers and labor organizations and the millions of workers they represent have a substantial impact on the commerce of the Nation; and that in order to accomplish the objective of a free flow of commerce it is essential that labor organizations, employers, and their officials adhere to the highest standards of responsibility and ethical conduct in administering the affairs of their organizations, partic- ularly as they affect labor-management relations. (b) Protection of rights of employees and the public The Congress further finds, from recent investiga- tions in the labor and management fields, that there have been a number of instances of breach of trust, corruption, disregard of the rights of individual employees, and other failures to observe high standards of responsibility and ethical conduct which require further/and supplemen- tary legislation that will afford necessary protection of the rights and interests of employees and the public generally as they relate to the activities of labor organiza- tions, employers, labor relations consultants, and their officers and representatives. (c) Necessity to eliminate or prevent improper prac- tices The Congress, therefore, further finds and declares that the enactment of this chapter is necessary to elimi- nate or prevent improper practices on the part of labor organizations, employers, labor relations consultants, and PS fee ne eeaee F App. 27 their officers and representatives which distort and defeat the policies of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, as amended [29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq.], and the Railway Labor Act, as amended [45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq.], and have the tendency or necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by (1) impairing the efficiency, safety, or operation of the instrumentalities of commerce; (2) occurring in the current of commerce; (3) materially affecting, restraining, or controlling the flow of raw mate- rials or manufactured or processed goods into or from the channels of commerce, or the prices of such materials or goods in commerce; or (4) causing diminution of employ- ment and wages in such volume as substantially to impair or disrupt the market for goods flowing into or from the channels of commerce. —_ 29 U.S.C. § 524. Effect on State laws Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to impair or diminish the authority of any State to enact and enforce general criminal laws with respect to robbery, bribery, extortion, embezzlement, grand larceny, burglary, arson, violation of narcotics laws, murder, rape, assault with intent to kill, or assault which inflicts grievous bodily injury, or conspiracy to commit any of such crimes. App. 28 LAW OFFICES OF SANFORD L. HORN SANFORD L. HORN, ESQ., SBN 39686 301 North Lake Avenue, Suite 320 Pasadena, CA 91101 Telephone: (626) 795-7295 Attorneys for Plaintiff SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES ROBERT T. HANSEN, Plaintiff, CASE NO. EC 022470 VS. AEROSPACE DEFENSE RELATED INDUSTRY DISTRICT LODGE 725 OF THE ) ) ) ) ) NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ) ) ) INTERNATIONAL (Filed June 15, 1999) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) JUDGMENT ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, Defendants. AND CONSOLIDATED CASE TO AEROSPACE DEFENSE RELATED INDUSTRY DISTRICT LODGE 725, etc., et al., defendants, and to their attorney of record: NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on June 10, 1999, judgment was entered in the above-entitled action in favor of plaintiffs ROBERT T. HANSEN and MARLA DES App. 29 ERMIA against AEROSPACE DEFENSE RELATED INDUSTRY DISTRICT LODGE 725 OF THE INTERNA- TIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AERO- SPACE WORKERS. Dated: June 14, 1999 LAW OFFICES OF SANFORD L. HORN by /s/ Sanford L. Horn SANFORD L. HORN Attorney for Plaintiffs --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386010_1595%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.