# Appendices — National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Pritt

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendices
- **Published:** January 1, 2002
- **Citation:** 537 U.S. 812

## Text

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APPENDIX A

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF
WEST VIRGINIA

September 2001 Term

No. 29326

CHARLOTTE PRITT,
Plaintiff Below, Appellant,

V.

THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, ET AL.,
Defendants Below, Appellees.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Fayette County
Honorable Charles M. Vickers, Judge
Civil Action No. 97-C-380(V)

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Submitted: October 3, 2001
Filed: December 12, 2001

JUSTICE DAVIS delivered the Opinion of the Court.

JUSTICE MAYNARD, deeming himself disqualified, did
not participate in the decision of this case.

JUDGE MADDEN, sitting by temporary assignment.

2a

JUSTICE ALBRIGHT concurs and reserves the right to file a
concurring opinion.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1. “A circuit court’s entry of summary judgment is
reviewed de novo.” Syllabus point 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192
W. Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994).

y “When a party filing a motion for reconsideration
does not indicate under which West Virginia Rule of Civil
Procedure it is filing the motion, the motion will be
considered to be either a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend
a judgment or a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from a judgment
order. If the motion is filed within ten days of the circuit
court’s entry of judgment, the motion is treated as a motion
to alter or amend under Rule 59(e). If the motion is filed
outside the ten-day limit, it can only be addressed under Rule
60(b).” Syllabus point 2, Powderidge Unit Owners
Association v. Highland Properties, Ltd., 196 W. Va. 692,
474 S.E.2d 872 (1996).

a “The standard of review applicable to an appeal from
a motion to alter or amend a judgment, made pursuant to W.
Va. R. Civ. P. 59(e), is the same standard that would apply to
the underlying judgment upon which the motion is based and
from which the appeal to this Court is filed.” Syllabus point
1, Wickland v. American Travellers Life Insurance Co., 204
W. Va. 430, 513 S.E.2d 657 (1998).

4. “A motion for summary judgment should be granted
only when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to
be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to
clarify the application of the law.” Syllabus Point 3, Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. v. Federal Insurance Co. of New
York, 148 W. Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963). Syllabus
Point 1, Andrick v. Town of Buckhannon, 187 W. Va. 706,
421 S.E.2d 247 (1992).” Syllabus point 1, Williams v.
Precision Coil, Inc., 194 W. Va. 52, 459 S.E.2d 329 (1995).

3a

>. “Roughly stated, a “genuine issue” for purposes of
West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) is simply one
half of a trialworthy issue, and a genuine issue does not arise
unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving
party for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for that party.
The opposing half of a trialworthy issue is present where the
non-moving party can point to one or more disputed
“material” facts. A material fact is one that has the capacity |
to sway the outcome of the litigation under the applicable
law. Syl. Pt. 5, Jividen v. Law, 194 W. Va. 705, 461 S.E.2d
451 (1995).” Syllabus point 2, Tolliver v. Kroger Co., 201

W. Va. 509, 498 S.E.2d 702 (1997).

6. “A candidate for political office is governed by the
same rules with regard to recovery for libel as a public
official and can sustain an action for libel only if he can
prove that: (1) the alleged libelous statements were false or
misleading; (2) the statements tended to defame the plaintiff
and reflect shame, contumely, and disgrace upon him; (3) the
statements were published with knowledge at the time of
publication that they were false or misleading or were
published with a reckless and willful disregard of truth; and,
(4) the publisher intended to injure the plaintiff through the
knowing or reckless publication of the alleged libelous
_ material.” Syllabus point 1, Sprouse v. Clay Communication,
Inc., 158 W. Va. 427, 211 S.E.2d 674 (1975).

Ws “In order for a public official or a candidate for public
office to recover in a libel action, the plaintiff must prove
that: (1) there was the publication of a defamatory statement
of fact or a statement in the form of an opinion that implied
the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for
the opinion; (2) the stated or implied facts were false; and,
(3) the person who uttered the defamatory statement either
knew the statement was false or knew that he was publishing
the statement in reckless disregard of whether the statement
was false.” Syllabus point 1, Hinerman v. Daily Gazette Co.,
Inc., 188 W. Va. 157, 423 S.E.2d 560 (1992).

4a

8. “A court must decide initially whether as a matter of
law the challenged statements in a defamation action are
capable of a defamatory meaning.” Syllabus point 6, Long v.
Egnor, 176 W. Va. 628, 346 S.E.2d 778 (1986).

9. “A statement of opinion which does not contain a
provably false assertion of fact is entitled to full
constitutional protection.” Syllabus point 4, Maynard v.
Daily Gazette Co., 191 W. Va. 601, 447 S.E.2d 293 (1994).

10. “[W]Jhether a statement is one of fact or opinion is an
issue that must be decided initially by a court.” Syllabus
point 7, in part, Long v. Egnor, 176 W. Va. 628, 346 S.E.2d
778 (1986).

11. “Plaintiffs who are public officials or public figures
must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendants made their defamatory statement with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not.” Syllabus point 2, in part, State ex rel. Suriano
v. Gaughan, 198 W. Va. 339, 480 S.E.2d 548 (1996).

12. _—_‘ In order for a public official or a candidate for public
office to recover in a libel action, he/she must prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the stated or implied facts were
false.

DAVIS, Justice.

The appellant herein and plaintiff below, Charlotte
Pritt [hereinafter referred to as “Ms. Pritt”], appeals from
orders entered May 15, 2000, and June 13, 2000, by the
Circuit Court of Fayette County. In the first order, the circuit
court granted summary judgment for the appellees herein and
defendants below, the Republican National Committee, et al.

Sa

[hereinafter collectively referred to as “RNC”],' concluding 3
that statements made in advertisements sponsored by RNC 5
during the 1996 West Virginia Gubernatorial race were not
false or published with actual malice as alleged by Ms. Pritt.
The circuit court’s second order denied Ms. Pritt’s “motion
for reconsideration.” On appeal to this Court, Ms. Pritt
assigns numerous errors, including (1) summary judgment
was not proper because there existed a genuine issue of
material fact; (2) the circuit court failed to determine whether
the statements in issue were defamatory; (3) deposition
testimony was erroneously excluded; and (4) in rendering its
decision, the circuit court neglected to address the remaining
counts asserted in her amended complaint. Upon a review of
the parties’ arguments, the record submitted for appellate
review, and the pertinent authorities, we agree with Ms. Pritt
that genuine issues of material fact do preclude the
disposition of this matter by summary judgment.
Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court’s ruling to the
contrary, and remand this case for further proceedings
consistent with this Opinion.

ep Pe Si TAN Se EE Ne PR

; In her complaint, Ms. Pritt named multiple defendants: the
National Republican Senatorial Committee, the West Virginia State
Victory Committee, John Doe, Jane Doe, and the appellee named herein,
the National Republican Committee, a.k.a. the National Republican
Party. For ease of reference, and to maintain consistency with the circuit
court’s order underlying the instant appeal, we will collectively refer to
these defendants below, who are also appellees herein, as the Republican
National Committee, or “RNC,” except where designation of specific
parties is warranted.

6a

I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1996, Ms. Pritt, a former West Virginia
schoolteacher and state legislator, was the Democratic party’s
candidate for the office of Governor of the State of West
Virginia. During the month immediately preceding the
general election, the National Republican Senatorial
Committee [hereinafter referred to as “NRSC”] formally
organized the West Virginia State Victory Committee
[hereinafter referred to as “Victory Committee”] pursuant to
the election laws of this State. See generally W. Va. Code
§ 3-8-1, et seg. Among other activities, the Victory
Committee sponsored and published numerous radio and
television advertisements, during the final weeks of the
campaign, which called into question Ms. Pritt’s character
and campaign platform. One of these radio spots specifically
charged:

Behind Charlotte Pritt’s campaign smile is a liberal
voting record she can’t hide from.

In the State Senate, Charlotte Pritt proposed
teaching first graders about condoms.

Surprised? You shouldn’t be.

Senator Pritt also voted to permit the sale of
pornographic Videos to children.

She even voted to allow convicted drug abusers to
work in our public schools.

If parents can’t trust Charlotte Pritt to protect our
children, think also of our veterans.

Charlotte Pritt voted against honoring the men and
women of West Virginia who fought in the Gulf
War.

Ta

Senator Pritt voted to allow the burning of the
American Flag that all veterans fought so hard to
defend.

She even opposed requiring students to begin their
day with the Pledge of Allegiance.

Look behind the Smile.
Charlotte Pritt — wrong on the issues.
Wrong for West Virginia[.]

Paid for by West Virginia State Victory Committee
Mary M. Dotter, Treasurer
Not authorized by Underwood for Governor

Television advertisements backed by the Victory Committee
made similar claims.

Given the temporal restraints of the campaign’s
culmination, Ms. Pritt was unable to respond to many of
these allegations.” Ultimately, she lost the general election to
the Republican nominee for Governor, Cecil Underwood.
Shortly after Governor Underwood assumed office, the
Victory Committee was dissolved.

Subsequently, on October 31, 1997, Ms. Pritt filed a
civil action in the Circuit Court of Fayette County against
RNC, NRSC, the Victory Committee, John Doe, and Jane
Doe. In her lawsuit, Ms. Pritt alleged that the defendants

’ Once the damaging advertisements were disseminated, the
Republican gubernatorial candidate, Cecil Underwood, denounced the
ads, disassociated himself therefrom, and requested the Victory
Committee to cease their further publication. The Victory Committee,
however, refused these requests and continued to endorse the
advertisements through Election Day 1996.

; Ms. Pritt filed an amended complaint on October 26, 1998.

8a

had defamed her,* exposed her to “false light” publicity, and
violated W. Va. Code § 3-8-11(c) (1995) (Repl. Vol. 1999).°
Following discovery, the defendants collectively moved for
summary judgment.° By order entered May 15, 2000, the
Circuit court granted the defendants’ motion, ruling, in part,
that

. Specifically, the circuit court denominated Ms. Pritt’s defama-
tion claims as defamation per quod (Count I) and defamation per se
(Count Il). See Black’s Law Dictionary 427 (7th ed. 1999) (defining
“defamation per quod “ as “[d]Jefamation that either (1) is not apparent
but is proved by extrinsic evidence showing its injurious meaning or (2)
is apparent but is not a statement that is actionable per se” and construing
“defamation per se “ to mean “[a] statement that is defamatory in and of
itself and is not capable of an innocent meaning”).

, W. Va. Code § 3-8-11 (1995) (Repl. Vol. 1999) criminalizes
various improper election practices. Pertinent to the instant proceeding is
subsection (c) thereof, which provides that

[aJny person who shall, knowingly, make or publish, or cause to
be made or published, any false statement in regard to any
candidate, which statement is intended or tends to affect any
voting at any election whatever...

[i]s guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be
fined not more than ten thousand dollars, or confined in jail for
not more than one year, or, in the discretion of the court, shall be
subject to both such fine and imprisonment.

W. Va. Code § 3-8-11(c).

. A motion for summary judgment is permitted by Rule 56(c) of

the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure when “there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.”

9a

As a former state legislator and candidate for the
office[ ] of Governor, plaintiff [Ms. Pritt] is a
“public figure” for purposes of this lawsuit. ..,

As a public figure, plaintiff must prove by “clear
and convincing evidence” that the statements at
issue were both false and published with “actual
malice” — that defendants had “knowledge at the
time of publication that they were false” or
published them with “reckless and willful disregard
for the truth.” ...

Summary judgment on all four Counts is warranted
because the statements at issue are not false.
Defendants analyzed the legislative record and
explained at length why all but one of the statements
at issue are true, and why the last one is a protected
expression of opinion.... In particular, defendants
set forth plaintiff’s legislative votes that supported
each statement and countered the interpretations
giving rise to plaintiff’s claims. . . .

Summary judgment on all four Counts is also
warranted because there is no record evidence that
any defendant acted with “actual malice.”

(Citations omitted). In response to this ruling, Ms. Pritt filed,
on May 25, 2000, a “motion for reconsideration,” which the
circuit court denied by order entered June 13, 2000. It is
from these orders of the circuit court that Ms. Pritt now
appeals to this Court.

Il.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The instant appeal comes to this Court from decisions
of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of
RNC and denying Ms. Pritt’s post-judgment motion. We

Oe Bee Oe tt ee

10a

typically apply a plenary review to an order of a circuit court
deciding a summary judgment motion. “A circuit court’s
entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo.” Syl. pt. 1,
Painter v. Peavy, 192 W. Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994).
Also involved in this proceeding are numerous legal
questions, the resolution of which is integral to the summary
judgment ruling. In this regard, we likewise review anew a
lower tribunal’s determination of questions of law. “Where
the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a
question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we
apply a de novo standard of review.” Syl. pt. 1, Chrystal
R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W. Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415
(1995).

Finally, we must ascertain the appropriate standard of
review to apply to the circuit court’s order of June 13, 2000,
whereby it denied Ms. Pritt’s “motion for reconsideration.”
Generally speaking, “a ‘motion to reconsider’ is not a
properly titled pleading in West Virginia.” Richardson v.
Kennedy, 197 W. Va. 326, 329, 475 S.E.2d 418, 421 (1996)
(citations omitted). Nevertheless, we routinely re-
characterize such motions as those made pursuant to Rules
59(e) or 60(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure
depending upon when they were filed in the circuit court.

When a party filing a motion for reconsideration
does not indicate under which West Virginia Rule of
Civil Procedure it is filing the motion, the motion
will be considered to be either a Rule 59e)’ motion
to alter or amend a judgment or a Rule 60(b)*

: Rule 59(e) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure
permits a party to file a “motion to alter or amend the judgment... not
later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.”

, W. Va. R. Civ. P. 60(b) permits, in pertinent part,

(continued...)

lla

motion for relief from a judgment order. If the
motion is filed within ten days of the circuit court’s
entry of judgment, the motion is treated as a motion
to alter or amend under Rule 59(e): If the motion is
filed outside the ten-day limit, it can only be
addressed under Rule 60(b).

Syl. pt. 2, Powderidge Unit Owners Ass’n v. Highland
Props., Ltd., 196 W. Va. 692, 474 S.E.2d 872 (1996)
(footnotes added). Accord Syl. pt. 1, Richardson v.
Kennedy, 197 W. Va. 326, 475 S.E.2d 418 (“‘A motion to
amend or alter judgment, even though it is incorrectly
denominated as a motion to “reconsider”, “vacate”, “set
aside”, or “reargue” is a Rule 59(e) motion if filed and served
within ten days of entry of judgment.’ Syllabus Point 1,
Lieving v. Hadley, 188 W. Va. 197, 423 S.E.2d 600

(1992).”’).
In the case sub judice, it appears from the record that

Ms. Pritt filed her “motion for reconsideration” within ten
days of the circuit court’s summary judgment order.

[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve
a party or a party’s legal representative from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) Mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, or unavoidable cause;
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule
59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse
party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which
it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective

' application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment.

12a

Accordingly, we will treat this motion as one made pursuant
to Rule 59(e) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure.
See Syl. pt. 2, Powderidge, 196 W. Va. 692, 474 S.E.2d 872.

_ The standard of review applicable to an appeal from
a motion to alter or amend a judgment, made
pursuant to W. Va. R. Civ. P. 59(e), is the same
standard that would apply to the underlying
judgment upon which the motion is based and from
which the appeal to this Court is filed.

Syl. pt.1, Wickland v. American Travellers Life Ins. Co., 24
W. Va. 430, 513 S.E.2d 657 (1998). Therefore, we apply a
de novo standard of review to the circuit court’s ruling in this
regard. See Syl. pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W. Va. 189, 451
S.E.2d 755. Having established the standards of review
applicable to this case, we proceed to consider the parties’
arguments.

Il.

DISCUSSION

On appeal to this Court, Ms. Pritt raises numerous
assignments of error, including the circuit court (1)
improperly granted summary judgment to RNC when there
existed a genuine issue of material fact; (2) failed to
determine whether the Victory Committee’s advertisements
were defamatory; (3) erroneously excluded deposition
testimony; and (4) neglected to address the remaining claims
asserted in her amended complaint. Despite these various
contentions, however, the primary matter to be resolved by
this Court is the propriety of the circuit court’s summary
judgment ruling. It is with this issue, then, that we will begin
our deliberation and determination of this case.

“The function of summary judgment is ‘to pierce the
boilerplate of the pleadings and assay the parties’ proof in
order to determine whether trial is actually required.”

13a

Powderidge, 196 W. Va. at 697, 474 S.E.2d at 877 (quoting
Hanlon v. Chambers, 195 W. Va. 99, 106, 464 S.E.2d 741,
/48 (1995)). Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate if
“there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and... the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
W. Va. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In other words,

“‘Ta]_ motion for summary judgment should be
granted only when it is clear that there is no genuine
issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the
facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the-
law.’ Syllabus Point 3, Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co. v. Federal Insurance Co. of New York, 148 W.
Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963).” Syllabus Point 1,
Andrick v. Town of Buckhannon, 187 W. Va. 706,
421 S.E.2d 247 (1992).

Syl. pt. 1, Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc., 194 W. Va. 32,
459 S.E.2d 329 (1995).

On the other hand, and as suggested by Rule 56(c),

- this Court will reverse summary judgment if we

find, after reviewing the entire record, a genuine

issue of material fact exists or if the moving party is

‘not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In cases

of substantial doubt, the safer course of action is to
deny the motion and to proceed to trial.

Id., 194 W. Va. at 58-59, 459 S.E.2d at 335-36.

When assessing whether summary judgment is
appropriate, then, one of the main considerations is whether
there exists a genuine issue of material fact. See W. Va. R.
Civ. P. 56(c); Syl. pt. 1, Williams, 194 W. Va. 52, 459 S.E.2d
329.

“Roughly stated, a ‘genuine issue’ for purposes of
West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) is
simply one half of a trialworthy issue, and a genuine
issue does not arise unless there is sufficient

ROS a cat ead

14a

evidence favoring the non-moving party for a
reasonable jury to return a verdict for that party.
The opposing half of a trialworthy issue is present
where the non-moving party can point to one or
more disputed ‘material’ facts. A material fact is
one that has the capacity to sway the outcome of the
litigation under the applicable law.” Syl. Pt. 5,
Jividen v. Law, 194 W. Va. 705, 461 S.E.2d 451
(1995).

Syl. pt. 2, Tolliver v. Kroger Co., 201 W. Va. 509, 498
S.E.2d 702 (1997). In making such a determination,

[t]he circuit court’s function at the summary
judgment stage is not “to weigh the evidence and
determine the truth of the matter but to determine
whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct.
2505, 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 212 (1986).
Consequently, we must draw any _ permissible
inference from the underlying facts in the most
favorable light to the party opposing the motion. ...
In assessing the factual record, we must grant the
nonmoving party the benefit of inferences, as
“[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the
evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences
from the facts are jury functions, not those of a
judge [.]” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S. Ct. at
2513, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 216. Summary judgment
should be denied “even where there is no dispute as
to the evidentiary facts in the case but only as to the
conclusions to be drawn therefrom.” Pierce v.
Ford Motor Co., 190 F.2d 910, 915 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 887, 72 S. Ct. 178, 96 L. Ed. 666
(1951).

Williams, 194 W. Va. at 59, 459 S.E.2d at 336 (additional
citations omitted). Moreover,

15a

[a] nonmoving party need not come forward with
evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial
in order to avoid summary judgment. Celotex
Corp.[ v. Catrett ], 477 U.S. [317,] 324, 106 S. Ct.
[2548,] 2553, 91 L. Ed. 2d [265,] 274 [(1986)].
However, to withstand the motion, the nonmoving
party must show there will be enough competent
evidence available at trial to enable a finding
favorable to the nonmoving party.

Williams, 194 W. Va. at 60-61, 459 S.E.2d at 337-38
(citation omitted).

With these principles in mind, and upon a review of
the record submitted for appellate consideration in this case,
we conclude that there are genuine issues of material fact so
as to necessitate the presentation of this case to a jury.
Unlike the circuit court, we are not firmly convinced that the
factual issues herein have been finally resolved. Specifically,
before this Court, the parties repeatedly and continuously
have argued the facts giving rise to the instant appeal and
whether the allegedly defamatory statements were tainted
with falsity or laced with malice. When faced with such an
ongoing factual dispute, and inferences that, if viewed in the
nonmovant’s favor, could support a verdict for the
nonmovant, we must not continue to harbor these doubts as
to whether summary judgment is appropriate but rather hand
the case over-to a jury, in whose province such factual

: See Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc., 194 W. Va. 52, 59, 459
S.E.2d 329, 336 (1995) (counseling that, when deciding a motion for
summary judgment, the reviewing tribunal “must draw any permissible
inference from the underlying facts in the most favorable light to the
party opposing the motion. ... In assessing the factual record, [it] must
grant the nonmoving party the benefit of inferences... .” (citations
omitted)).

16a

determinations lie.'° Accordingly, we reverse the circuit
court’s rulings granting summary judgment to RNC, and
affirming the same, and remand this matter for further
proceedings consistent with this Opinion."

During our deliberation and decision of this case, it
has come to our attention that the litigation of a cause of

” We remain somewhat troubled by the circuit court’s decision,

during the summary judgment proceedings, to discredit the evidence
introduced by Ms. Pritt to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact. In prior cases we have held that

“(t]he West Virginia Rules of Evidence ... allocate significant
discretion to the trial court in making evidentiary ... rulings.
Thus, rulings on the admissi[bility] of evidence ... are
committed to the discretion of the trial court. Absent a few
exceptions, this Court will review evidentiary ... rulings of the
circuit court under an abuse of discretion standard.” Syl. Pt. 1,
in part, McDougal v. McCammon, 193 W. Va. 229, 455 S.E.2d
788 (1995).

Syl. pt. 9, Tudor v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 203 W. Va. 111,
506 S.E.2d 554 (1997). While the circuit court generally possesses broad
authority in this regard, where summary judgment proceedings are
concerned, the evidentiary standard to be satisfied by the nonmoving
party is not the same obstacle that he/she must overcome at trial. See
Williams, 194 W. Va. at 60, 459 S.E.2d at 337 (““A nonmoving party need
not come forward with evidence in a form that would be admissible at
trial in order to avoid summary judgment.” (citation omitted)).
Furthermore, Ms. Pritt suggests that the deposition testimony she offered
was admissible pursuant to several different provisions of the West
Virginia Rules of Evidence, and not just under the one relied upon by the
circuit court. Therefore, upon remand, we urge the circuit court to
consider these various evidentiary rules if Ms. Pritt seeks to re-introduce
this testimony.

a Based upon this disposition of the instant appeal, we need not

consider further Ms. Pritt’s remaining assignments of error.

17a

action for defamation can prove to be a daunting task for
even the most learned jurist or the most experienced
counselor. Therefore, in an attempt to clarify this nebulous
area of the law, we will briefly set forth the various tenets
applicable to the case sub judice, pursuant to which remand
proceedings should be conducted. First, due to the status of
the complainant herein, the case must proceed as directed by
the first Syllabus point of Sprouse v. Clay Communication,
Inc., 158 W. Va. 427, 211 S.E.2d 674 (1975):

A candidate for political office is governed by the
same rules with regard to recovery for libel’? as a
public official and can sustain an action for libel
only if he can prove that: (1) the alleged libelous
statements were false or misleading; (2) the
statements tended to defame the plaintiff and reflect
shame, contumely, and disgrace upon him; (3) the
statements were published with knowledge at the
time of publication that they were false or
misleading or were published with a reckless and
willful disregard of truth; and, (4) the publisher
intended to injure the plaintiff through the knowing
or reckless publication of the alleged libelous
material.

(Footnote added). Thus, to sustain a cause of action for
defamation, a public official, after establishing the existence
of an allegedly defamatory statement, must prove that the
statement was (1) false and (2) published with actual malice:

23 Generally speaking, “defamation” is “[a] false written or oral
statement that damages another’s reputation.” Black’s Law Dictionary
427 (7th ed. 1999). The specific type of “defamation” complained of
herein is “libel,” which is defined as “[a] defamatory statement expressed
in a fixed medium, esp. ... [an] electronic broadcast.” /d. at 927.

18a

In order for a public official or a candidate for
public office to recover in a libel action, the plaintiff
must prove that: (1) there was the publication of a
defamatory statement of fact or a statement in the
form of an opinion that implied the allegation of
undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the
opinion; (2) the stated or implied facts were false;
and, (3) the person who uttered the defamatory
statement either knew the statement was false or
knew that he was publishing the statement in
reckless disregard of whether the statement was
false.

Syl. pt. 1, Hinerman v. Daily Gazette Co., Inc., 188 W. Va.
157, 423 S.E.2d 560 (1992).

The next step in a public official’s defamation case
requires the presiding court to ascertain whether the
statements complained of are defamatory. “A court must
decide initially whether as a matter of law the challenged
statements in a defamation action are capable of a
defamatory meaning.” Syl. pt. 6, Long v. Egnor, 176 W. Va.
628, 346 S.E.2d 778 (1986). In making this assessment, the
tribunal must also consider whether the allegedly defamatory
statements could be construed as statements of opinion. “A
statement of opinion which does not contain a provably false
assertion of fact is entitled to full constitutional protection.”
Syl. pt. 4, Maynard v. Daily Gazette Co., 191 W. Va. 601,
447 S.E.2d 293 (1994). “[W]hether a statement is one of fact
or opinion is an issue that must be decided initially by a
court.” Syl. pt. 7, in part, Long v. Egnor, 176 W. Va. 628,
346 S.E.2d 778.

Once this hurdle has been overcome, a public official
must prove the cause of action’s elements. Falsity, the first
such element, was explained by this Court in our prior case
of State ex rel. Suriano v. Gaughan, as follows:

19a

The law of libel takes but one approach to the
question of falsity, regardless of the form of the
communication. It overlooks minor inaccuracies
and concentrates upon substantial truth. Minor
inaccuracies do not amount to falsity so long as the
substance, the gist, the sting, of the libelous charge
be justified. A statement is not considered false
unless it would have a different effect on the mind
of the reader from that which the pleaded truth
would have produced.

Syl. pt. 4, 198 W. Va. 339, 480 S.E.2d 548 (1996). Actual
malice, the second element to be proved in a public official’s
defamation action, is present if the statement at issue was
made “with knowledge that [the statement] was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280, 84 S. Ct. 710, 726,
11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 706 (1964). See also Syl. pt. 1, Sprouse,
158 W. Va. 427, 211 S.E.2d 674. “Reckless disregard” has
been further defined by the United States Supreme Court in
St. Amant v. Thompson as indicative that “the defendant in
fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his
publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless
disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice.”
390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S. Ct. 1323, 1325, 20 L. Ed. 2d 262,
267 (1968).

Finally, to establish actual malice, the complaining
public official must prove its existence by clear and
convincing evidence. “Plaintiffs who are public officials or
public figures must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the defendants made their defamatory statement with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.” Syl. pt. 2, in part, Suriano, 198
W. Va. 339, 480 S.E.2d 548. See also Sullivan, 376 U.S. at
285-86, 84 S. Ct. at 729, 11 L. Ed. 2d at 710 (observing that
a public official must prove actual malice with “convincing
clarity”). But see Dodd v. Pearson, 277 F. Supp. 469, 471

20a

(D.D.C. 1967) (requiring public official to prove actual
malice by “a fair preponderance of the evidence’’). Similarly,
“[{iJn order for a public official or a candidate for public
office to recover in a libel action, he must prove by clear
and convincing evidence that ... the stated or implied
facts were false.”'*> Hinerman, 188 W. Va. at 168-69, 423
S.E.2d at 571-72 (citations omitted). Cf. Harte-Hanks
Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 661
n.2, 109 S. Ct. 2678, 2682 n.2, 105 L. Ed. 2d 562, 572 n.2
(1989) (noting that “[t]here is some debate as to whether the
element of falsity must be established by clear and
convincing evidence or by a preponderance of the evidence,”
but concluding that the Court “express[es] no view on this
issue”). But see Rowden v. Amick, 446 S.W.2d 849, 857
(Mo. Ct. App. 1969) (concluding that public official’s burden
of proof as to falsity and actual malice is by a
“preponderance of the evidence” standard).'* This burden of

” In her brief, Ms. Pritt contends that a public official need prove
only by a preponderance of the evidence that the allegedly defamatory
statements were false. However, the cases cited in support of this
proposition do not definitively resolve this issue as their only references
thereto consist of recitations of jury instructions with no corresponding
rulings as to the appropriateness of such a standard therein. See Estep v.
Brewer, 192 W. Va. 511, 514 n.3, 453 S.E.2d 345, 348 n.3 (1994) (per
curiam); Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc., 158 W. Va. 427, 462
n.10, 211 S.E.2d 674, 697 n.10 (1975).

ai Although no longer relevant to the instant proceeding given that
this case cannot be disposed of summarily, we note that a public official
opposing a summary judgment motion must establish his/her prima facie
case of defamation, and the elements thereof, by clear and convincing
evidence:

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505,
91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986), requires a libel plaintiff who is a public
official or a public figure to resist a motion for summary

(continued...)

2la

proof likewise was recognized by Justice Miller in his dissent
to the majority’s opinion in Hinerman:

under First Amendment law, [a public official]
plaintiff [has] to prove by clear and convincing
evidence each of the ... elements [of libel] to
recover damages.... [Thus], the plaintiff [has] to
prove that the ... statements were, in the language
of Masson [v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.], false or
misleading to the extent that the true facts would
have produced a “‘different effect on the mind of
the reader’” because “[mJinor inaccuracies do not
amount to falsity so long as ‘the substance, the gist,
the sting, of the libelous charge be justified.’” [501]
U.S. [496,] [517], 111 S. Ct. [2419,] 2433, 115 L.
Ed. 2d [447,] 472 [(1991)] (Citations omitted).

188 W. Va. at 187, 423 S.E.2d at 590.

While the above survey of the law is not intended to
be exhaustive, we do hope that it provides the necessary
guidance for the continuation of the instant litigation. Thus,
it is with great optimism that we have provided this concise
rubric in the hope that future proceedings in this case will be
fairly and judiciously determined.

judgment by showing clear and convincing evidence of the
defendant’s actual malice. That is, the federal (and state)
constitutional protections of free speech require a stricter standard
of evidence to survive pretrial motions in such cases than is
required in other cases.

Crain v. Lightner, 178 W. Va. 765, 769 n.1, 364 S.E.2d 778, 782 n.1
(1987) (citing Long v. Egnor, 176 W. Va. 628, 635-36, 346 S.E.2d 778,
785-86 (1986)).

IV.

CONCLUSION

Because we find genuine issues of material fact
rendered summary judgment improper in this matter, we
reverse the May 15, 2000, and June 13, 2000, orders of the
Circuit Court of Fayette County and remand this case for
further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Reversed and Remanded.

Justice MAYNARD, deeming himself disqualified, did not
participate in the decision of this case.

Judge MADDEN, sitting by temporary assignment.
ALBRIGHT, Justice, concurring.

I fully concur in the judgment of the Court and in
Justice Davis’ opinion.

I write separately to note disagreement with a position
Appellees asserted. Appellees suggested to us, as I
understood them, that because the author of the commercials
at issue in this case asserted a belief that the information
contained in the commercials relating to Appellant’s past
actions was factually accurate, neither Appellee could be
found guilty of malice or be found to have defamed
Appellant.

Respectfully, I suggest that the issue is what
Appellees, or either of them, knew or should have known
regarding the factual content and the context of the
commercials. Appellees’ appreciation of the factual content
and the context of the commercials springs from the
knowledge and experience of the leadership, staff and
respective governing bodies of each of the Appellees. What

23a

a hired wordsmith knew or should have known is but a part
of the picture. Appellees cannot be permitted to hide behind
deficiencies in that wordsmith’s appreciation of what his
commiercials said to the public about Appellant.

I am authorized to state that Justice STARCHER
joins in this concurring opinion.

24a

APPENDIX B

Twelfth Judicial Circuit of West Virginia
Fayette County
Charles M. Vickers, Judge
P.O. Box 599
Fayetteville, West Virginia 25840
May 15, 2000

Michael W. Carey, Esq.

Carey, Hill, Scott, Winter & Johnson
P.O. Box 3884

Charleston, WV 25338

H.H. Roberts, Esq.

Suite 214, Professional Building
1036 Quarrier Street
Charleston, WV 25301

Re: Charlotte Pritt vs.
The Republican National Committee, et al.
Civil Action No. 97-C-380

Gentlemen:

The Court has reviewed the entire file in this action
and has given the parties an opportunity to submit a proposed
order prior to announcing a decision on defendants’ motion
for summary judgment.

The motion for summary judgment is granted, and the
findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth in the
proposed order are adopted by this Court as accurately
reflecting the existing law and the record.

Very truly yours,
s/ Charles M. Vickers

25a
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
FAYETTE COUNTY, WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLOTTE PRITT,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 97-C-380(v)

THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL
COMMITTEE, et al.,

Defendants.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER

The Court, having considered defendants’ motion for
summary judgment and the parties’ memoranda of law, and
having heard oral argument on August 26, 1999, hereby
GRANTS defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Plaintiff, Charlotte Jean Pritt, a former member of the
West Virginia state legislature, was the Democratic nominee
for Governor of West Virginia in 1996. She lost that
election. Defendants are the Republican National
Committee, the National Republican Senatorial Committee,
and the West Virginia State Victory Committee. From
October 24 until November 5, 1996 (Election Day), the
Victory Committee sponsored radio and _ television
advertisements that discussed the legislative voting record of

26a

plaintiff. These advertisements were created by political
consultant David Welch, who is not a defendant.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants on
October 31, 1997, and filed the Amended Complaint that is
the subject of this Order on October 26, 1998. The Amended
Complaint asserts that through the advertisements,
defendants defamed plaintiff per quod (Count I) and per se
(Count IID), violated W. Va. Code § 3-8-11(c) (Count II), and
exposed plaintiff to "false light" publicity (Count IV).
Plaintiff attached the radio advertisement to her Amended
Complaint and has identified several statements as the basis
of her claims.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

As a former state legislator and candidate for the
officer of Governor, plaintiff is a "public figure" for purposes
of this lawsuit. Long v. Egnor, 176 W. Va. 628, 630 (1986);
Sprouse v. Clay Commun., Inc., 158 W. Va. 427, 432, cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 882 (1975).

As a public figure, plaintiff must prove by "clear and
convincing evidence” that the statements at issue were both
false and published with "actual malice" — that defendants
had "knowledge at the time of publication that they were
false" or published them with "reckless and willful disregard
for the truth." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
280 (1964); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350-
51 (1974). West Virginia courts are familiar with these
requirements. Long, 176 W. Va. at 630; Sprouse, 158 W.
Va. at 432. The court must "decide initially" whether the
statements at issue are “capable of a defamatory meaning,"
Long, 176 W. Va. at 637, and "independently decide"
whether plaintiff has come forward in response to a well-
supported summary judgment motion with clear and

27a

convincing evidence of actual malice. Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of U.S., 466 U.S. 485, 511-12 (1984).

Summary judgment on all four Counts is warranted
because the statements at issue are not false. Defendants
analyzed the legislative record and explained at length why
all but one of the statements at issue are true, and why the
last one is a protected expression of opinion. Maynard v.
Daily Gazette Co., 191 W. Va. 601, 604-06 (1994). In
particular, defendants set forth plaintiff's legislative votes
that supported each statement and countered the
interpretations giving rise to plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff's
only record evidence concerning falsity (other than her own
assertion) consists of deposition testimony from Michael
Withers and Lyle Sattes, who served with plaintiff in the
state legislature. These witnesses offered their opinion that
two of the statements at issue falsely construed their intent in
voting as they and plaintiff voted on the bills at issue.
Opinion testimony, however, is not probative unless provided
by an expert witness designated pursuant to W. Va. R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(4), and plaintiff has not designated either of these
witnesses as an expert. Neither witness disputed that plaintiff
cast the votes at issue, or that the legislation could reasonably
be interpreted as summarized in the advertisements. Their
testimony does not create a genuine issue of material fact.

Summary judgment on all four Counts is also
warranted because there is no record evidence that any
defendant acted with "actual malice." Plaintiff contends that
David Welch, who created the advertisements but is not a
defendant, "should have known" the statements at issue were
false. What Mr. Welch "should have known" is irrelevant
because negligence does not satisfy plaintiffs burden of
proof. Masson v. The New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496,
510 (1991). Further, Mr. Welch testified at his deposition
that he reviewed the legislative record and believed the
advertisements were "absolutely truthful." Craig Engle,
General Counsel of defendant National Republican

28a

Senatorial Committee, also stated in an Affidavit that he
studied the advertisements, compared their statements with
plaintiff's votes, and approved them for publication only after
he was satisfied that they were true. There is no genuine
issue of material fact concerning “actual malice."!

CONCLUSION

It is therefore ORDERED that defendants’ motion for
summary judgment is GRANTED as to plaintiffs Amended
Complaint.

s/
Judge Charles M. Vickers
Circuit Court of Fayette County

ENTERED this 15 day of _May_, 2000.

The Court notes but does not consider defendants’ contentions
that all four Counts are time-barred, that plaintiff cannot prove any injury
caused by the advertisements, and that neither Count II nor Count IV
states a sufficient claim.

29a

APPENDIX C
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR

FAYETTE COUNTY, WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLOTTE PRITT,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 97-C-380(v)

THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL :
COMMITTEE, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
"MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION"

The Court, having considered the "motion for
reconsideration" filed by plaintiff Charlotte Pritt, and having
also considered the memoranda filed in support of and in
opposition to said motion, hereby DENIES said motion as
providing no basis for the Court to conclude that it erred in
entering summary judgment for defendants by Order dated
May 15, 2000.

s/
Judge Charles M. Vickers
Circuit Court of Fayette County

ENTERED this 13th day of _June_, 2000.

30a
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
At a Regular Term of the Supreme Court of Appeals
continued and held at Charleston, Kanawha County, on the

3rd day of April, 2001, the following order was made and
entered:

Charlotte Pritt, Plaintiff
Below, Appellant

vs.) No. 29326

The Republican National Committee,
et al., Defendants Below, Appellees

On a former day, to-wit, December 8, 2000, came the
petitioner, Charlotte Pritt, by H. H. Roberts, her attorney, and
presented to the Court her amended petition praying for an
appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Fayette
County, rendered on the 13th day of June, 2000, with the
record accompanying the petition. Thereafter, on the 5th day
of January, 2001, came the respondents, the Republican
National Committee, the National Republican Senatorial
Committee and the West Virginia State Victory Committee,
by Carey, Scott & Douglas, and Michael W. Carey, and
Covington & Burling, Bobby R. Burchfield and Jason A.
Levine, their attorneys, and presented to the Court their
written response in opposition thereto.

Upon consideration whereof, the Court is of opinion
to and doth hereby grant said petition for appeal. Justice
Maynard would refuse.

It is hereby ordered that the above-captioned
proceeding be submitted upon the original record, briefs of
counsel and oral argument if requested by the parties.

i

3la

It is further ordered that the appellant file an original
and nine copies of a brief within thirty days of receipt of this
order; the appellees to file a like number of briefs within
thirty days of receipt of the appellant’s brief, with any reply
brief deemed necessary to be filed within fifteen days of
receipt of appellees’ brief.

A True Copy

Attest: s/

Clerk, Supreme Court of Appeals

32a

APPENDIX D

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
IN VACATION

Charlotte Pritt, Plaintiff Below, Appellant
vs.) No. 29326

The Republican National Committee,
et al., Defendants Below, Appellees

On a former day, to-wit, July 9, 2001, came the
appellees, the Republican National Committee, et al., by
Carey, Scott & Douglas, and Michael W. Carey, and
Covington & Burling, Bobby R. Burchfield and Jason A.
Levine, their attorneys, and presented to the Court their
motion in writing requesting the voluntary disqualification of
the Honorable Larry V. Starcher, Justice of the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia, for the reasons stated
therein.

Thereafter, on this day came the Honorable Larry V.
Starcher, Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia, pursuant to Rule 29(f) of the Rules of Appellate
Procedure, and notified the Clerk of the Court of his refusal
to voluntarily disqualify himself.

DONE IN VACATION of the Supreme Court of
Appeal this 10th day of July, 2001

Honorable Larry V. Starcher, Justice

33a

Received the foregoing order this 10th day of July,
2001, and entered the same in Order Book No. 142.

A True Copy

Attest: s/

Clerk, Supreme Court of Appeals

34a

APPENDIX E
Supreme Court of Appeals
Charleston, West Virginia
25305
LARRY V. STARCHER
Justice
July 10, 2001
MEMORANDUM
TO: Rory Perry, Clerk
FROM: Justice Starcher
RE: In Re: Appeal No. 00-2519

A Motion to Disqualify Justice Starcher has been
filed asking that I recuse myself “from presiding over or
taking any action in this proceeding.” The motion was filed
on July 9, 2001, pursuant to Rule 29 of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure for the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia.

The Motion suggests that I should recuse myself from
this matter because I was a candidate in 1996 and
campaigned some with the Plaintiff-Appellant. Furthermore,
it is suggested that I “made comments on the record
seemingly prejudging this appeal” during oral arguments
before the Court on April 3, 2001.

I was a candidate for election to the Supreme Court in
1996, but also were two other sitting justices — Justice Elliott
Maynard and Justice Joseph Albright. It’s also true that I did
comment on the case in Court on April 3, 2001, as did other

35a

justices. Justices are provided briefs before oral argument
and do not come to the Courtroom uninformed. But whether
my inquiries were “prejudicial,” or whether I might have
been playing the “devil’s advocate,” cannot be judged from
the comments standing alone. Regardless, this would not bar
me from sitting as an appellate judge on this case.

I decline to recuse myself from my judicial duties
pursuant to Rule 29 of our Rules of Appellate Procedure
because I neither have any financial or relationship interests
in the matter, nor have I prejudged the legal or factual issues
of the case. Despite my inquiry during oral arguments, and
my being a candidate along with the Plaintiff-Appellant and
two other justices in 1996, I can fairly sit on this matter and
properly, correctly and fairly apply the law, whichever way it
goes.

I respectfully decline to step aside in this matter.
LVS:lw

xc: Other Justices (with motion)

en ee

36a
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

At a Regular Term of the Supreme Court of Appeals
continued and held at Charleston, Kanawha County, on the
2nd of October, 2001, the following order was made and
entered:

Charlotte Pritt, Plaintiff
Below, Appellant

vs.) No. 29326

The Republican National Committee,
et al., Defendants Below, Appellees

This day came the Honorable Elliott E. Maynard,
Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia,
and notified the Clerk of this Court, pursuant to Rule 29(b) of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure, of his voluntary
disqualification from participating in the above-captioned
matter.

A True Copy

Attest: s/

Clerk, Supreme Court of Appeals

37a

DAVID WELCH ASSOCIATES

Client: WV State Victory Committee

“Record”

TV/ :30 Seconds

WVE.001

VISUAL AUDIO (Voice over with music
bed)

Start close on CP’s faced; BEHIND CHARLOTTE
pull out-to reveal smile PRITT’S CAMPAIGN SMILE

IS A LIBERAL VOTING
RECORD SHE CAN’T HIDE
FROM.
Slow, grainy b&w of CP IN THE STATE SENATE,
with kids. CHARLOTTE PRITT
CG — Proof: 1989 Senate PROPOSED TEACHING
Bill 531 FIRST GRADERS ABOUT
with bill image CONDOMS.
CG white on black: SURPRISED? YOU
Surprised? SHOULDN'T BE.
Adult video store...to close SENATOR PRITT ALSO
up of little girl VOTED TO PERMIT THE
CG: Proof: 1990 Senate SALE OF PORNOGRAPHIC
Bill 184 VIDEOS...TO CHILDREN.
with bill image
Kids at school SHE EVEN VOTED TO
CG: Proof: 1990 Senate ALLOW CONVICTED DRUG
Bill 639 ABUSERS TO WORK IN

with bill image OUR PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

:

38a

Return to CP’s smile and LOOK BEHIND THE SMILE

el etal bale ool cee oe ee

freeze. CHARLOTTE PRITT.

CG: Charlotte Pritt. WRONG ON THE ISSUES.

Wrong for West Virginias WRONG FOR WEST

Paid by West Virginia VIRGINIA.

State Victory Cmte.

I rt rete mre nor meen —_r-werrnenre

39a

APPENDIX F
First Amendment

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.

Fourteenth Amendment

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among
the several States according to their respective numbers,
counting the whole number of persons in each State,
excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at
any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice
President of the United States, Representatives in Congress,
the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members
of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except
for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of
representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the
whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in
such State.

Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative
in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or

40a

hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or
under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or
as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or
judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the
United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each
House, remove such disability.

Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United
States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for
payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing
insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither
the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt
or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion
against the United States, or any claim for the loss or
emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and
claims shall be held illegal and void.

Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386010_1544%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.