# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Seldowitz v. Office of Inspector General

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 2001
- **Citation:** 534 U.S. 813

## Text

Supreme Court,
% Us.

001558 APR - 9 200

In THE CLERK

Supreme Court of the United States

STUART M. SELDOWITZ,

Petitioner,
versus

THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GENERAL, U. S. Department of State,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

WILLIAM M. PALMER
Counsel of Record

60 State Street

Suite 700

Boston, Massachusetts 02109
Telephone: (617) 878-2120
Counsel for Petitioner,

Stuart M. Seldowitz

a

Curry & Taylor (202) 393-4141 /ussupremecourt@hotmail com

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40 FED. REG. 40456 (SEPTEMBER 2, 1975) .....c.cseccessesceseseess 10
OMB CIRCULAR A-108, 40 FED. REG. 28948 (JULY 9, 1975)
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l
REPORT AND OPINIONS BELOW

On April 8, 1998, Stuart M. Seldowitz filed a
complaint in the District of Columbia against the Office of
the Inspector General of the U.S. Department of State
(hereinafter “the OIG”). Mr. Seldowitz then filed an
amended complaint on August 13, 1998.

The OIG moved to dismiss the complaint. After
addressing the issue of venue, the District Court transferred
the case to the Eastern District of Virginia. The OIG then
filed a supplemental motion to dismiss.

The District Court held that the statute -of limitations
had expired on counts one and two of the complaint and
dismissed those counts. The OIG filed its motion for a
summary judgment as to the remaining count of the
complaint. The motion was granted.

On April 19, 2000, Mr. Seldowitz filed an appeal in
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of counts one and two of
the original complaint. The Court reversed and remanded the
remaining count for discovery.

Mr. Seldowitz filed a petition for a panel rehearing on
December 28, 2000. The Court denied the petition on
January 9, 2001.

This petition for writ of certiorari follows.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit entered on Nov. 13, 2000. Mr.
Seldowitz’s petition for a panel rehearing was denied by
order entered on January 9, 2001. This Court's jurisdiction to
consider this petition from the final judgment or decree is
invoked pursuant to Title 2, United States Code, Section
1254(1).

2

RELEVANT STATUTORY AND REGULATORY
PROVISIONS

See Appendix

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This appeal arose out of a civil case in connection
with a False Claims Act investigation. Pertinent judicial
Proceedings were held in both federal district and appellant
courts.

On April 8. 1998. Stuart M. Seldowitz filed a
complaint in the District of Columbia against the Office of

threaten a civil prosecution of Mr. Seldowitz under the False
Claims Act and sought compensatory damages. On August
13, 1998, Mr. Seldowitz filed an amended complaint, adding
a third count, also under the Privacy Act. This count
demand, that the OIG correct its records.

The OIG moved to dismiss Mr. Seldowitz’ complaint
on multiple grounds, including improper venue. Mr.
Seldowitz timely opposed this motion. The District Court
declined to decide any question other than that for venue. It
denied the OIG's request for dismissal on this ground, but
ordered that the case be transferred to the Eastern District of
Virginia.

After the transfer, the OIG filed a Notice of Hearing
on its motion to dismiss. U.S. District Judge Gerald B. Lee
granted the motion to dismiss without prejudice, erroneously
based on the ground that Mr. Seldowitz had failed to file an

_ Opposition. This order was ultimately vacated.

The OIG then filed a supplemental motion to dismiss.

The District Court held that the statute of limitations expired

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as to counts one and two before the initial complaint had
been filed, and dismissed those counts.

Discovery was thereafter stayed by order of the
Magistrate Judge upon motion of the OIG.

The OIG filed its motion for summary judgment as to
count three. The motion was granted in favor of the
government.

On Nov. 13, 2000 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part and
remanded.

On December 28, 2001, Mr. Seldowitz filed a petition
for a panel rehearing. The Court of Appeals denied the
petition by order dated and entered January 9, 2001.

This appeal follows.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I.

THE COURT'S OPINION
ERRONEOUSLY INTERPRETS THE
STATE DEPARTMENT'S REGULATION
GOVERNING THE INSPECTOR
GENERAL'S EXEMPTION TO THE
PRIVACY ACT AND FAILS TO APPLY
AN OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET REGLATION GOVERNING
THIS EXEMPTION

It is respectfully contended that the United State
Court of Appeals has misinterpreted the exemption
provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. Sec. 552a).

In deciding this case, the Court of Appeals was
required to interpret a regulation of the U.S. Department of
State (hereinafter "DOS" or "the State Department") issued
pursuant to the Privacy Act of 1974 (hereinafter "the Act").
The regulation concerns the Act's requirements whereby an

4

individual may have access to certain agency records
pertaining to that person and has the right to require
corrections to an inaccuracy or incompleteness in those
records.
: The regulation is found at 22 C.F.R. § 171.32, and it
has numerous sections. Generally, it can be viewed as
providing exemptions to the access and correction provisions
of the Act for records compiled and maintained by agencies
within the Department of State, including the Office of the
Inspector General. The regulation also contains exceptions to
this exemption.

It is the interpretation of these exemptions and their
exceptions that is at issue in this case.

A. Section 171.32(h) Limits the
Inspector General's Exemption
to Before Completion of the
Investigative and Judicial
Process

Two subparts of 22 C.F.R. §171.32 are of significant
import here. The first is Section171.32(h). In describing the
records that are authorized to be exempt from the Privacy
Act, it reads as follows:

Records originated by another agency when
that agency has determined that the record is
exempt under [the Act]. Also, pursuant to
Section (j)(2) of the Act, records compiled by
the Special Assignment Staff, the Command
Center, and the Passport and Visa Branch of
the Office of Security and by the [I]nspector
General may be exempted from the
requirements of any part of the Act except
subsections [not applicable to this case] to the
extent necessary to assure. effective

5

completion of the investigative and judicial
processes.

The first error contained in the Court of Appeal’'s written
opinion is found on page seven of that opinion. There, the
Court said:

Section 171.32(h) applies only to
"(rlecords originated by another
agency when that agency has
determined that the record is exempt"
under [the Act]. Accordingly, the
language of §171.32(h) making
reference to the completion of the
investigative and judicial process is
inapplicable.

To the contrary. Section 171.32(h) contains two parts,
comprised by the two sentences of that Section. These two
sentences define two distinct categories of records, and
address their exemption status separately. Only the second
category applies to records originating within the OIG.

The first sentence reads: "Records originated by
another agency when that agency has determined that the
_ record is exempt under [the Act]." This is the first category ~
of Section 171.32(h) records. Given the language of this
sentence, it is clear that records held by one agency that
originate within a second agency have a blanket authorization
for exemption when the second agency has made the required
determination. Since the records at issue here were compiled
by the OIG, they do not fall into this category, and this part
of the regulation does not apply.

The second sentence begins with the word, "Also."
This word indicates that another category of records, other
than those "originated by another agency . . . ," is authorized
as exempt under this Section. The express language of the
remainder of the second sentence confirms that this is the

;

correct interpretation of the Section. In pertinent part, it
reads: "Also . . . records compiled by the Special
Assignment Staff, the Command Center, and the Passport and
Visa Branch of the Office of Security and by the [I]nspector
General may be exempted to the extent necessary to assure
effective completion of the investigative and judicial
processes."

Through count three, Mr. Seldowitz seeks to amend
three categories of records: 1) those compiled by the OIG,
including the report provided to the U.S. Attorney’s Office
recommending that Mr. Seldowitz be prosecuted under the
False Claims Act; 2) those compiled by the OIG Office of
Audits concerning its Geneva audit and investigation, in
which are documents compiled for administrative/fiscal
purposes; and 3) those compiled by an OIG internal review
responding to allegations of misconduct and unethical
conduct on OIG’s part during its Geneva audits and
investigations.

All of the records at issue in this case were "compiled
by the [I]nspector General." For this reason, they fall within
the second category of Section 171.32(h) records. This being
the case, ihe remainder of the second sentence applies to
them: "!They] may be exempted to the extent necessary to
assure effective completion of the investigatory and judicial
processes."

Using the above analysis, it becomes clear that the
OIG records at issue can be exempted only the extent
necessary to insure the completion of an investigation or
judicial proceeding.

B. The Federal Register Notice
Supports this Limitation of the
Inspector General's Exemption
to the Completion of the
Investigative and Judicial
Process

7

The above analysis need not be taken in isolation. The
Notice published by the DOS during the promulgation of this
regulation provides ample support for this interpretation.

Public Notice 1298 of the Department of State, 56
Fed. Reg. 7071 (Feb. 21, 1991), proposed the language which
eventually amended 22 C.F.R. § 171.32(h) so that it now
includes the OIG's records as part of that Section’s second
category. These records are referred to as the "Records of
the Inspector General and Automated Individual Cross-
Reference System, STATE-53."

The last page of this Notice reads as follows:

Systems exempted from certain
provisions of the act:

Certain records
contained within this system of
records may be exempted from
the requirements of any part of
the Act [except requirements
not applicable to this case] fo
the extent necessary to protect
properly classified information
and to assure effective
completion of the investigative
and judicial processes. See 22
C.F.R. § 171.32. (Emphasis
added.)

From this language, and the Notice taken in total, it is
clear that the provision permitting an exemption for the
Inspector General's documents was promulgated
independently from those regarding records originating from
other agencies. It is also clear that the second sentence of
Section 171.32 creates a distinct and separate category of
authorized exemptions, which, as finally issued, limits such

8

exemptions “to assure the effective completion of the
investigative and judicial process."

C. The Opinion Erroneously
Reads Section 171.32(i) in
Isolation, Thereby Reaching an
Incorrect Interpretation

The Court of Appeals’ opinion relied upon Section
171.32(i) in holding that the OIG records were exempt from
the pertinent disclosure and amendment provisions of Privacy
Act. Specifically, the Court said the following:

The proper section in this case
is 22 C.F.R. § 171.32(i), which
provides that "[rjecords of the
Inspector General" . . . “are
exempted under [the Act] to the
extent authorized and
determined by the agency.”

(Opinion at 7.)

The Court of Appeals erred by effectively reading this
provision as "to the extent authorized [by the agency] and
determined by the agency." As will be demonstrated, the
correct reading is "to the extent authorized [by statute] and
determined by the agency." Once this interpretation is
understood, the reasons why the records at issue are not
exempt become clear.

Before beginning this analysis, it is valuable to
recognize two important principals of statutory construction:
(1) force should be given to every word or clause of a
legislative enactment. United States v. Mensche, 348 U.S.
528 (1955); U.S. Army Engineering Center v. Federal Labor
Relations Authority, 762 F.2d 4099 (4th Cir. 1985); and (2)
each part of a statute must be construed with every other part
so to produce a "harmonious whole." Jn re Public National

9

Bank of New York, 278 U.S. 555 (1928); see also Smith v.
United States, 508 U.S. 223, 113 S.Ct. 2050 (1993).

In order to give force to the second sentence of
Section 171.32(h), the interpretation of Section 171.32(i)
must be modified from that put forth by the Court on, page
seven of its opinion in the manner proposed by Mr.
Seldowitz. If such a modification is not made, the second
sentence of Section 171.32(h) has no meaning.

Mr. Seldowitz’ analysis of Section 171.32(i) begins by
focusing on the word "authorized." This word first appears
in the regulation in the introductory paragraph of the
regulation, which states: "The following exemptions are
authorized under authorized under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j) and (k):

As can be seen, a colon appears after the citation to
the Privacy Act. Following that colon is a list of nine
categories (with subcategories) of documents identified as
"authorized" to be exempt. They are labeled Sections
171.32(a) through (h). It should be noted at this point that
Sections 171.32(a) through (g) end with semicolons, while
Section 171.32(h) ends with a period. Mr. Seldowitz' analysis
is that Sections (a) through (h) describe documents which are
authorized to be exempted, but are not yet exempted. This
analysis is based upon the plain language of the regulation.

In contrast, the. remaining three sections of the
regulation, Sections 171.32(i) through (k), each end with a
period. A careful reading of Sections (j) and (k) show that
each expressly, and independently, exempts records: each
reads, "Portions of the following systems of records are
exempted from [specified provisions of the Privacy Act]."
(Emphasis added.) Nowhere in Sections (a) through (h) can
be found the words "are exempted."

Section 171.32(i) is different.’ Like Sections (j) and
(k), it expresses a means for the exemption of records.

y

' The full, pertinent text of Section 171.32(i) is:

10

However, unlike Sections (j) and (k), its exemption-provision
is limited. By its express language, it merely specifies
whether, or how, “portions” of a category of records already
authorized in subsections (a) through (h), can be made
exempt by agency action. It does not take such action itself;
therefore, it does not exempt any records within or outside
the categories described.

D. The Controlling Regulation Issued by the
Office of Management and Budget Supports
| Mr. Seldowitz’ Reading of Section 171.32(i)

Mr. Seldowitz’ interpretation receives conclusive
support when the language of 22 C.F.R. Section 171.32 is
read in the context of the rulemaking which occurred shortly
after the Privacy Act was enacted.

The original version of the 22 C.F.R. § 171.32 was
first proposed in 1975, at 40 Fed. Reg. 40456 (September 2,
1975) and was promulgated as 22 C.F.R. §6a.6.

OMB was given authority under the Privacy Act to
issue guidelines and regulations controlling other federal
agencies’ rulemaking in the implementation of the Act. 5
U.S.C. £352a(v). "As a general rule, the OMB Guidelines
are entitled to the deference usually accorded the
interpretation of the agency that has been charged with the
administration of a statute." FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
Guipe & PRIVACY ACT OVERVIEW at 620 (U.S. Dept. of
Justice ed. Sept. 1998); see Quinn v. Stone, 978 F.2d 126,
133 (3d Cir. 1992); Baker v. Department of the Navy, 814
F.2d 1381, 1383 (9th Cir. 1987); Perry v. FBI, 759 F.2d

Portions of the following systems of records are
exempted from 5 U.S.C. 552a(j) to the extent
authorized and determined by the agency originating
the records. The names of the systems correspond to
those published in the FEDERAL REGISTER by the

Department.

11

1271, 1276 n.7 (7th Cir. 1985); Smiertka v. United States
Dep't of the Treasury, 604 F.2d 698, 703 n.12 (D.C. Cir.
1979).

The promulgation of 22 C.F.R. §6a.6 followed by
three months the issuance of OMB Circular A-108, 40 Fed.
Reg. 28948 (July 9, 1975). This Circular applies generally to
“Federal agencies” that collect “personal information about
individuals.” 40 Fed. Reg. 28948. It applies to all agencies
subject to the Privacy Act. Jd. The broad implications and
scope of the Circular are clearly stated: “Each agency head
shall establish and maintain procedures, consistent with the
Act, OMB guidelines, and related directives issued pursuant
to this Circular . . . .” Jd. (emphasis added.)

By misinterpreting 22 C.F.R. § 171.32(h), the Court
of Appeals bypasses the requirements of the OMB Circular,
which applies to these records and to records collected and
maintained by numerous federal agencies under the Privacy
Act. By failing to consider the requirements of the Circular,
the Court of Appeals renders the regulations moot.

As provided by that Circular:

In applying any of {the (j) and (k)
exemption provisions at issue in this case], it
is important to recognize the following:

No system of records is
automatically exempt from any
provision of this Act. To
obtain an exemption for a
system from any requirement
of the Act, the head of the
agency that maintains the
system must make a
determination that the system
falls within one of the
categories of system which are

12

permitted to be exempted, and
publish the determination as a~
rule in accordance with the

requirements . . . of the

Administrative Procedure Act.

That notice must include the

specific provisions from which

the system is proposed to be

exempted and why the agency

considers the exemption

necessary. 40 Fed. Reg. 28971

(July 9, 1975) (emphasis
added).

The Circular continues as follows: C.
552(j(2): Provided, however, That if any individual is
denied any right, privilege, or benefit for which he or she
would otherwise be eligible as a result of the maintenance of
such material, such material shall be provided to such
individual, except to the extent that the disclosure would
reveal the identity of the source would be held in confidence,
or , prior to the effective date of the regulations, under an
implied promise that the identity of the source would be held
in confidence;

(c) Records maintained in connection with providing
protective services to the President of the United States or
other individuals, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3056;

(d) Records required by statute to be maintained and used
solely as statistical records:

(e) Investigatory material complied solely for the purpose
of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for
Federal civilian employment, military service, Federal
contracts, nominations of referrals to international
organizations, or access to classified information, but only to
the extent that the disclosure of such material would reveal

—— ee

—— tC Ct™s™~—

59a

the identity of a source who furnished information to the
Government under an express promise that the identity of the
source would be held in confidence, or, prior to the effectiv3e
date of these regulations, under an implied promise that the
identity of the source would be held in confidence:

(f) Testing or examination material used solely to
determine individual qualifications for appointment or
promotion in the Federal service which would compromise
the objectivity or examination process if disclosed; or

(g) Evaluation material used to determine potential of an
individual for promotion in the armed services, but only to
the extent that the disclosure of such material wouid reveal
the identity of a source who furnished information to the
Government under an express promise that the identity of the
source would be held in confidence, or, prior to the effective
date of these regulations, under an implied promise that the
identity of the source would be held in confidence; or

(h) Records originated by another when that agency has
determined that the record is exempt under 5 U.S.C. 552a(j).
Also, pursuant to section (j)(2) of the Act, records compiled
by the Command Center, the Passport and Visa Fraud
Branch, and the Special Assignments Staff, all of which are
components of the Office of Security, may be exempt from
the requirements of any part of the Act, except subsections
(b); (c) (1) and (2); (€)(4) (A) through (F); (e) (6), (7), (9),
(10), and (11); and (i), to the extent necessary to assure the
effective completion of the investigative, judicial, and
protective processes.

(i) Portions of the following systems of records are
exempted under 552a(j) to the extent authorized and
determined by the agency originating the records. The names
of the systems correspond to those published in the Federal
Register on this same date by the Department.

60a
CASE No. 1: 98-CV-00897

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

STUART M. SELDOWITZ,
Plaintiff,

V.

THE OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GENERAL, U. S.
Department of State,
Defendant.

Judge Henry H. Kennedy

August 13, 1998

AMENDED COMPLAINT
Preliminary Statement

This complaint is based upon a willful violation of the
Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, committed by the Defendant,
the OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, during a
False Claim Act investigation of the Plaintiff, Mr. Stuart M.
Seldowitz, a Foreign Service Officer of the U.S. Department
of State. During this investigation, the Inspector General’s
Office substituted false documents, these being rental
receipts, in place of the true and corsect, annotated, receipts
initially attached by Mr. Seldowitz to his per diem travel
voucher, which voucher was submitted by Mr. Seldowitz to
the Department of State for travel compensation. The

6la

Inspector General’s Office then utilized these false,
unannotated rental receipts in furtherance of a False Claim
Act investigation and to unlawfully coerce Mr. Seldowitz
into a fraudulently induced settlement.

Jurisdiction and Venue

1. This Court has jurisdiction over this Complaint
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1).

2. Plaintiff, Stuart M. Seldowitz (“Mr. Seldowitz”),
resides the District cf Columbia, and this Complaint is being
brought under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; venue is
therefore proper in this District under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(5).

Parties

3. Plaintiff, Mr. Seldowitz, is a resident and citizen of
the United States, and is employed as a Foreign Service
Officer with the United States Department of State.

4, The United States Department of State (“the U.S.
Department of State” or “the State Department”) is a
department of the United States, and is responsible for the
diplomatic relationship of the United States with foreign
countries, and for the negotiation and drafting of treaties
between and among the United States and foreign countries.

5. The Foreign Service is corp of professional
employees within the State Department who are responsible
for the diplomatic representation of the United States in
foreign countries and before foreign governments; the
function of the Foreign Service includes maintaining
diplomatic and consular posts and personnel in foreign
countries. |

6. The Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”) is an

62a

agency of the State Department, and is responsible for the
auditing and investigation of allegations of waste, fraud and
abuse of funds expended by the State Department and its
agencies, officials, employees, and contractors.

Definitions
7. At all times pertinent to this Complaint:

a) A Foreign Service Officer was a person, employed
by the State Department and serving in the Foreign Service,
whose duties included representing the United States in
diplomatic and consular posts in foreign countries.

b) The term "per diem” referred to a method of
payment whereby Foreign Service Officers, and other
employees of the State Department, were compensated by the
State Department for expenses incurred during temporary,
official travel.

c) the term “travel voucher” or “voucher” referred to
an official document used by employees of the State
Department to request and obtain compensation from the
State Department for expenses incurred during official travel.

The Privacy Act

8. At all times pertinent to this Complaint, the Privacy
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, was in full force and effect, and
required that each federal agency which maintained a system
of records to:

(a) Maintain Accurate Records: maintain all
records which are used by the agency in
making any determination about any
individual with such accuracy, relevance,
timeliness, and completeness as is reasonably

63a

necessary to assure fairness to the individual
in the determination, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §
552a(e\(5);

(b) Assure the Accuracy of Records: make
reasonable efforts, prior to disseminating any
record about an individual to any person other
than an agency. . . , to assure that such records
are accurate, complete, timely and relevant for
agency purposes, pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
§552a(e)(6); and,

(c) Establish Appropriate Safeguards for
Records: establish appropriate administrative,
technical, and physical safeguards to insure
the security and confidentiality of records and
to protect against any anticipated threats or
hazards to their security or integrity which
could result in _ substantial harm,
embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness
to any individual on whom information is
maintained, pursuant to 5 USC. §
552a(e){ 10).

9. At all times pertinent to this Complaint, the OIG was
subject to the requirements and restrictions of the Privacy
Act; this Act required the OIG to handle all records, obtained,
used, and maintained pursuant to its audits and investigations
of individuals, including employees of the State Department,
in accord with such requirements and restrictions.

COUNT ONE

10. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference
the allegations contained in paragraphs one through nine of
this Complaint, and further charges:

64a
The Stay in Geneva Switzerland

11. —_ In 1989, Mr. Seldowitz was assigned to the Office of
Strategic Nuclear Policy, within the Bureau of
Political/Military Affairs (“P/M Bureau”) of the State
Department.

12. Beginning in January 1990, Mr. Seldowitz served on
the United States delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks
(“NST”), in Geneva, Switzerland. Mr. Seldowitz initially
served as part of the NST delegation, in Geneva, for
approximately four months, from January 27, 1990, to May
26, 1990, and then returned to his home in the United States;
thereafter, from June 1990 until March 1991, Mr. Seldowitz
returned to Geneva, as part of the NST delegation, on three
separate occasions for various periods of time.

13. At all times pertinent to this Complaint, Mr.
Seldowitz’s wife, Rosalinda Seldowitz, was a civil service
employee of the State Department, and, in that capacity,
served as secretary to the Deputy Negotiator on the NST’s
Defense and Space negotiating group, in Geneva,
Switzerlend.

14. At all times pertinent to this Complaint, beginning
February 8, 1990, Mr. Seldowitz and Rosalinda Seldowitz
rented the same apartment facilities, and shared those
apartment facilities and rental expenses during their stays in
Geneva, Switzerland.

15. At all times pertinent to this Complaint, Mr.
Seldowitz and Rosalinda Seldowitz were each entitled to per
diem compensation: Mr. Seldowitz’s per diem was paid by
the P/M Bureau, authorized in the amount of approximately
$160 per day, and Rocalinda Seldowitz’s per diem was paid
by the Arms Control Disarmament Agency.

65a

16. During the period February 9, 1990, through May 26,
1990, Mr. Seldowitz and Rosalinda Seldowitz rented a
private apartment located at 141 Rue de Lausanne, Geneva,
and jointly paid rent for this apartment in a (total) amount of
2,300 Swiss Francs per month. Their landlady for this
apartment gave each of them two separate receipts:

(a) the first receipt, dated February 7, 1990, was for the
period February 9 through March 31, and included a one
month security deposit; this receipt was in the amount of six
thousand three hundred twenty-two (6,322) Swiss Francs;

(b) the second receip’, dated May 9, 1990, was for
the period May, 1990, and was in the amount of two
thousand three hundred (2,300) Swiss Francs; and

(c) Mr. Seldowitz and Rosalinda Seldowitz used
the one month security deposit from the receipt dated
February 7, 1990, to pay their rent for April 1990.

Submitting the Per Diem Vouchers

17. Prior to May 30, 1990, and while in Geneva,
Switzerland, Mr. Seldowitz sought instructions and advice
from State Department personnel, including the Executive
Secretary of the NST delegation, concerning whether he and
his wife should each submit a receipt, having at face value
the full amount of their rent, as attachments to theirper diem
vouchers. Mr. Seldowitz was told that, under the
compensation system in effect at that time, the amount of per
diem a traveler was entitled to receive did not depend on the
amount which that person actually paid for lodging, and, for
this reason, the receipts provided to Mr. Seldowitz and to
Rosalinda Seldowitz by their landlady, each indicating the
frill amount of the rent jointly paid by them, were acceptable
for submission with their separate vouchers.

66a

18. | Upon return to the United States, on or about May 26,

1990, Mr. Seldowitz completed his travel voucher for his

compensation for his first stay in Geneva, Switzerland. This

travel voucher (“the May voucher”) was dated May 29, 1990,

by Mr. Seldowitz, and was submitted by him to the Executive

Office of the Bureau of Political/Military Affairs (“the P/M

Bureau”) of the State Department, in Washington, D.C., on or

about that date. In completing this voucher, Mr. Seldowitz-
followed the instructions and advice he had received while in

Geneva from the aforesaid State Department personnel.

19. | Mr. Seldowitz attached to and made part of the May
voucher copies of his rental receipts dated February 7, 1990,
and May 9, 1990; however, to insure that the United States
would have full knowledge of his true rental expenses, Mr.
Seldowitz annotated these receipts, as submitted, as follows:

(a) for the receipt dated February 7, 1990, Mr.
Seldowitz crossed out the amount of “6,322” in Swiss Francs,
and wrote in the amount of “3,161” in Swiss Francs;

(b) for the receipt dated May 9, 1990, Mr.
Seldowitz crossed out the amount of “2,300” in Swiss Francs,
and wrote in the amount of”1,150” in Swiss Francs.

20. On or about June 1, 1990, Mr. Seldowitz received a
telephone call from a person at the Executive Office of the
P/M Bureau, who instructed Mr. Seldowitz that: (a) there was
no need to annotate receipts; (b) the per diem amouni to
which a traveler was entitled did not depend upon the amount
he or she paid for lodging; and (c) travelers were strongly
urged to not annotate their receipts. Following these
instructions, Mr. Seldowitz did not annotate future lodging
receipts when he submitted subsequent vouchers after future
travels to Geneva.

67a slag
The Investigation by the Office of the Inspector General

21. ‘In or about 1991, the Office of the Inspector General
of the Department of State began an investigation into the
submission of travel vouchers by members of the United
States delegation to the NST; among the individuals whose
travel vouchers where examined as part of this investigation
were Mr. Seldowitz and Rosalinda Seldowitz.

22. During the period 1991 through 1995, the
investigators of the OIG contacted and interviewed Mr.
Seldowitz and Rosalinda Seldowitz, and informed these
individuals that they were under investigation for submitting
false claims against the United States in that they had both
submitted vouchers with receipts specifying the full amount
of theft monthly rental expenses for the time periods they had
spent in Geneva, whereas they had each incurred only one-
half of such expenses during those-time periods.

23. During the aforesaid investigation, orally and in
writing, Mr. Seldowitz informed the OIG that he had been
instructed by State Department personnel that he could
submit his rental receipts without annotations; that he was
elligible for the frill per diem ameunt-for travel regardless of
the actual amount of his rent; that he had submitted receipts
with his first voucher, annotating these receipts so as to
indicate his true share of the rent: and that he had thereafter
been instructed by State Department personnel to not
annotate such receipts in future submittals of travel vouchers.

24. On or about May 9, 1995, Mr. Seldowitz and
Rosalinda Seldowitz received a letter from the United States
Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia (“the
U.S. Attorney’s Office”), which letter was based upon a
report prepared by the OIG and transmitted to the US.
Attorney’s Office. This letter accused Mr. Seldowitz and
Rosalinda Seldowitz of willfully submitting false claims to

68a

the State Department in tiat they had both submitted
vouchers which included receipts specifying the full amount
of their monthly rental expenses, whereas they had each
incurred only one-half of such expenses. This letter further
threatened both Mr. Seldowitz and Rosalinda Seldowitz with
civil prosecution under the False Claim Act, 31 U.S.C. §§
3729 et seq., and was accompanied by a draft complaint of a
False Claim Act civil suit naming Mr. Seldowitz and
Rosalinda Seldowitz as defendants.

25. The above described draft complaint alleged that Mr.
Seldowitz had included in his May voucher two rental
receipts, described as follows:

One was dated February 7, 1990, signed on
the bottom by [the landlady] and “Stuart
Seldowitz” and inscribed, “Today I received
from Stuart Seldowitz the amount of 6°322 in
Swiss Francs, for the rent of Apt. #53 located
at 141 Rue de Lausanne, Geneva. This will
cover the remaining of February, until the 31
of March, also this is to include 1 month
security deposit of 2,300 S.F. which will be
returned when the appartment [sic] is
vacated.” The other receipt was dated May 9,
1990, signed at the bottom by [the landlady]
and “Stuart Seldowitz” and inscribed “Today |
received from the U.S. Mission

empioyee S. Seldowitz, the amount of 2,300
Swiss Francs to cover the rent fees for the
month of May. The Apartment is located at
141, Rue de Lausanne, #53, Geneva,
Switzerland.”

26. On or about June 15, 1995, Mr. Seldowitz met with
investigators from the OIG and with an Assistant U.S.
Attorney, in the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Alexandria,

69a

Virginia, for the purpose of discussing the OIG investigation
and the aforesaid letter (“the June meeting”).

27. During the June meeting, the OIG investigators and
the Assistant U.S. Attorney again stated their agencies’ threat
to bring a civil prosecution against Mr. Seldowitz and
Rosalinda Seldowitz. Mr. Seldowitz explained his position,
as previously described in paragraph twenty-three above.

28. During the June meeting, Mr. Seldowitz, asked to see
the rental receipts which he had submitted to the government.
The Assistant U.S. Attorney, in the presence of, and acting as
the agent for the investigators from the OIG, showed to him
two rental receipts dated February 7, 1990, and May 9, 1990.
Neither of these rental receipts were annotated, and both
showed the full monthly rent for each pertinent period.

29. Based upon the rental receipts showed him by the
Assistant U.S. Attorney, Mr. Seldowitz was convinced that
his memory was at fault, and that he had not submitted
annotated rental receipts as part of his May voucher.

30 For the reasons set forth in the above paragraph, and to
avoid the expense, inconvenience, risk, and the further
anguish, humiliation, and harm to his career which a civil
prosecution, defense, and trial would necessarily incur, Mr.
Seldowitz was convinced to enter into a settlement with the
OIG and the U.S. Attorney’s Office, and to enter into such
settlement within the deadline for acceptance then imposed
by those agencies, thereby terminating the OIG investigation
and the threatened civil False Claim Act prosecution.

31. Subsequent to the June meeting, Mr. Seldowitz
retained the services of an attorney, from a law firm in
Washington, D.C., (“the Law Firm”) to represent him with
regard to the above described matter, including the
settlement.

70a

32. Had Mr. Seldowitz not been shown, during the June
meeting, copies of the rental receipts, dated February 7 and
May 9, 1990, missing the written annotations which clanfied
his share of the rental expenses incurred by himself and his
wife in Geneva, Mr. Seldowitz would not have entered into
the above described settlement.

33. The above described settlement was executed on July
31, 1995. Pursuant to this settlement, Mr. Seldowitz paid to
the government fifteen thousand doliars ($15,000).

34. Mr. Seldowitz incurred attorney’s fees in the amount
of five thousand dollars ($5,000) to the Law Firm for the
representation provided by that law firm to Mr. Seldowitz
and Rosalinda Seldowitz in the above described matter.

The Discovery of the OIG’s Willful Use of False Rental
Receipts

35. During the period July 1995, through October 3,
1995, Mr. Seldowitz requested, by telephone from the
National Finance Center (“the Finance Center”) a copy of the
original May voucher, with attachments, which he had
submitted on or about May 29, 1990.

36. On or about October 5, 1995, Mr. Seldowitz received
the aforesaid voucher, with attachments, from the Finance
Center. The rental receipts which accompanied said voucher
were annotated in the method and manner described in
paragraph nineteen, above.

37. | Upon receiving the above described voucher with
attachments, Mr. Seldowitz became ?? aware that the U.S.
Attorney’s Office had possession of incorrect records, these
being the aforesaid unannotated rental receipts; however, Mr.
Seldowitz was still unaware that the OIG had willfully and

intentionally obtained, maintained, and used an incomplete

“Tila

and inaccurate record, that is, a copy of the May voucher
with attachments, in the False Claim Act investigation and
prosecution of himself and Rosalinda Seldowitz

38. On or before September 25, 1995, Mr. Seldowitz
asked the attorney, who had previously represented him in
the above described settlement, if he would ask the U.S.
Attorney’s Office for copies of the voucher with attachments
which had been supplied to that office by the OIG (“the OIG
voucher record”). This attorney agreed, and subsequently
obtained these documents from the U.S. Attorney’s Office.

39. By letter dated April 15, 1996, and postmarked April
17, 1996, the aforesaid attorney transmitted the OIG voucher
record to Mr. Seldowitz.

40. The OIG voucher record included false rental
receipts, in that the rental receipts included in the OIG
voucher record were not annotated; and omitted documents
which were part of the May voucher, including the back page
of the voucher form itself. Further, (a) pertinent pages in the
May voucher, with attachments, obtained from the National
Finance Center, were marked with tk: letters “NFC.”
whereas the equivalent pages in the OIG voucher record did
not bear such marking; and (b) the front page of the voucher
form, as included in the OIG voucher record, had been
stamped with the word “PROCESS,” whereas that page in the
May voucher did not bear such stamp.

41. | Upon comparing the copies of the May voucher, with
attachments, received from the Finance Center with the OIG
voucher record, received from the U.S. Attomney’s Office, it
became apparent to Mr. Seldowitz that the OIG had willfully
and intentionally obtained and provided to the US.
Attorney’s Office an incomplete and inaccurate record,
specifically, an incomplete and maccurate copy of the May
voucher, with attachments, which Mr. Seldowitz had

72a

submitted to the P/M Bureau, the originals of which were
then stored by, and accessible through, the Finance Center.

42. — Inthe aforesaid manner, and at the aforesaid time, Mr.
Seldowitz became aware that the OIG had willfully and
materially misrepresented the OIG voucher record, to the
U.S. Attorney’s Office and to Mr. Seldowitz, as being a
complete and accurate copy of the May voucher, with
attachments, which Mr. Seldowitz had submitted to the P/M
Bureau.

43. For the purpose of unlawfully

; (a) coercing Mr. Seldowitz into agreeing to,
executing, and making payment upon a fraudulently induced
settlement agreement, and,

(b) inducing the U.S. Attorney’s Office into
pursuing and accepting a civil False Claim Act prosecution
against Mr. Seldowitz and Rosalinda Seldowitz, and pursuing
and accepting the resulting settlement,

the OIG willfully, intentionally, and materially
misrepresented, to the U.S. Attorney’s Office and to Mr.
Seldowitz, the OIG voucher record as being a complete and
accurate record of the May voucher, with attachments, which
Mr. Seldowitz had submitted to the P/M Bureau on or abcut
May 29, 1990.

The Charge

44. Beginning on an unknown date, and continuing until
July 31, 1995, the Office of the Inspector General of the U.S.
Department of State, and U.S. Department of State, willfully
’ and intentionally, failed to maintain the above described May
voucher, with attachments, including rental receipts, with
such accuracy, relevance, and completeness as was necessary

73a

to assure fairness in the determination relating to the
character, rights, and opportunities of Mr. Stuart M.
Seldowitz that was to be made on the basis of such record,
and, consequently, a determination was made which was
adverse to Mr. Seldowitz, this being a decision to pursue a
civil False Claim Act investigation and prosecution, and to
coerce from Mr. Seldowitz a settlement in the amount of
fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000); all in violation of 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(g 1 XC) and (4).

45. As a result of the conduct of the Defendant, as
described in this Count, the Plaintiff, Stuart M. Seldowitz,
suffered actual damages.

COUNT TWO

46. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference
the allegations contained in paragraphs one through nine, and
paragraphs eleven through forty-three of this Complaint, and
further charges:

47. In furtherance of the aforesaid purpose, described in
paragraph forty-three. the OIG willfully and intentionally
violated the requirements and restrictions of the Privacy Act,
which Act mandated the OIG to:

(a) | Maintain Accurate Records, pursuant to 5
U.S.C. § 552a(e5);

(b) Assure the Accuracy of Records, pursuant to 5
U.S.C. § 552a(e\6); and,

(c) Establish Appropriate Safeguards for Records,
in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1 0).

The Charge

74a

48. Beginning on an unknown date, and continuing until
July 31, 1995, the Office of the Inspector General of the U.S.
Department of State, and the U.S. Department of State,
willfully and intentionally, failed to obtain, maintain, and use
the above described May voucher, with attachments,
including the rental receipts, in accord the above described
provisions of the Privacy Act, in such as way as to have an
adverse effect upon Mr. Seldowitz, this adverse effect being:
(a) an unlawfully coerced settlement, of a wrongfully
threatened False Claim Act prosecution, in the amount of
fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000); (b) the legal fees
expended by Mr. Seldowitz for representation during the
negotiation of this settlement, in the amount of five thousand
dollars ($5,000); (c) the mental anguish and humiliation of
Mr. Seldowitz during the investigation leading to the
wrongfully threatened False Claim Act prosecution; and (d)
the resulting damage to the reputation, career, and career
opportunities of Mr. Seldowitz as a result of the
investigation, the threatened civil prosecution, and the
unlawfully coerced settlement; each violation of the above
described provisions of the Privacy Act being in violation of
5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)1)(D) and (4).

49. As a result of the conduct of the Defendant, as
described in this Count, the Plaintiff, Stuart M. Seldowitz,
suffered actual damages.

COUNT THREE

50. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference
the allegations contained in paragraphs one through nine,
paragraphs eleven through forty-three, and paragraoh ‘orty-
seven of this Complaint, and further charges:

51. At all times pertinent to this Complaint, the Privacy
Act, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(2), required each federal
agency maintaining a system of records to permit an

75a
individual to request an amendment of a record pertaining to
him; and required such agency, promptly thereafter, to either:

(a) make any correction of any portion of such
record which the individual believes is not accurate, relevant,
timely, or complete; or —

(b) inform the individual of its refusal to amend
such record in accordance with his request. _

52. By letter dated March 25, 1998, Mr. Seldowitz
requested, pursuant to the above described provision of the
Privacy Act, that the OIG:

(a) | amend the OIG voucher record to accurately
reflect the annotated rental receipts and the complete travel
voucher request submitted by Mr. Seldowitz to the P/M
Btreau of the State Department on or about May 29, 1990;
and

_(b) — amend the Inspector General’s Report and any
other files, records or conclusions regarding this matter
within the OIG to demonstrate that Mr. Se!dowitz submitted
accurate and annotated receipts, and a complete and accurate
travel voucher request, as described above. :

53. By letter dated April 7, 1998, the Deputy Counsel of
the OIG informed Mr. Seldowitz that the OIG would neither
amend the OIG voucher and other OIG records as requested,
nor make a decision refusing to amend such records, such

letter stating:

We understand that the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) is currently conducting a review of the issues
raised by Mr. Seldowitz, on behalf of the PCIE
[President’s Council on Integrity arid Efficiency].
Accordingly, it would be inappropriate to respond or to

76a
comment upon those issues until the conclusion of that

review.

54. By letter dated May 13, 1998, Mr. Seldowitz repeated
the aforesaid request to the Office of IRM Programs and
Services of the State Department (“the IRM Office”). By
letter dated June 1, 1998, the IRM Office notified Mr.
Seldowitz that it saw “no prospect of action being taken by
the OIG” on Mr. Seldowitz request to amend the OIG
voucher and other OIG records until completion of the above
described PCIE review.

55. Stuart M. Seldowitz has exhausted his administrative
remedies pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §

552a(d\(3); attached to this Complaint is a letter issued on
June 22, 1998, by the Appeals Officer of the IRM Office.

The Charge

56. Beginning on April 7, 1998, and continuing until the
date of this Amended Complaint, the Office of the Inspector
General of the U.S. Department of State, and the U.S.

Department of State, have:

(a) refused to amend the OIG voucher record to
accurately reflect the annotated rental receipts and the
complete travel voucher request submitted by Mr. Seldowitz
to the P/M Bureau of the State Department on or about May
29, 1990;

(b) refused to amend the Inspector General’s
- Report and any other flies, records or conclusions regarding
this matter within the OIG to demonstrate that Mr. Seldowitz
submitted accurate and annotated receipts, and a complete

77a
and accurate travel voucher request, as described above; and

(c) failed to make a review of such refusals in
conformity with 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d\3); all in violation of 5
U.S.C. § 552a(g\ 1A).

Request for Relief

The Plaintiff, Mr. Seldowitz, hereby demands and
seeks that judgment be entered in favor of himself, and
against the United States, as follows:

l. For fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) incurred by the
Plaintiff, as a direct result of the Plaintiff being unlawfully
coerced into executing the above described settlement
agreement and making payment on that agreement;

2. For five thousand dollars ($5,000) incurred by the
Plaintiff, as a direct result of the Plaintiff being required to
hire, and pay for, legal representation for the negotiation of
the aforesaid settlement agreement;

3. For interest on the above damages, from the date on
which the damages were incurred;

4. Additional actual damages, as compensation for
damage to the Plaintiffs reputation, career, and career
opportunities, and for mental anguish and humiliation, in the
amount of one million dollars ($1,000,000);

5. For an order compelling the Inspector General of the

U.S. Department of State, and the U.S. Department of State,
to amend:

(a) the OIG voucher record to accurately reflect
the annotated rental receipts and the complete travel voucher
request submitted by Mr. Seldowitz to the P/M Bureau of the

78a
State Department on or about May 29, 1990; and

(b) the Inspector General’s Report and any other
files, records or conclusions regarding this matter within the
OIG to demonstrate that Mr. Seldowitz submitted accurate
and annotated receipts, and a complete and accurate travel
voucher request, as described above;

6. For all reasonable costs and expenses incurred by Mr.
Seldowitz in relation to this civil action, plus all reasonable
attorney's fees and costs; and

7. For such other and further relief as the Court deems
just and equitable.

Demand for Jury Trial

Plaintiff hereby demands that this matter be tried before a
jury.

Respectfully submitted,

ANDREW GROSSO

D.C. Bar Number 358326

2300 N Street, N.W, Suite 600
Washington, D.C. 20037
Telephone: (202) 663-9041
Facsimile: (202) 663-9042
Attorney for Stuart M. Seldowitz

79a

United States Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

JUNE 22 1998

Mr. Andrew Grosso
2300 N Street, N.W. Suite 600
Washington, D.C. 20037

Dear Mr. Grosso:

I am writing in response to your letter of June 5, 199:3 to the
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs in which you appealed
because of a decision made by the Director of the Office of
IRM Programs and Services in connection with Privacy Act
request 199800301 by your client, Stuart M. Seldowitz.

This’ Privacy Act request is not subject to administrative
appeal at this time. The action taken by the Director of IRM
Program and Services was to suspend action on your case
pending the completion of an investigation. As the case is
still in process, there is no adverse determination ripe for
administrative appeal.

However, an individual may seek judicial review of an
agency’s determination not to amend a record, if the
individual contends that the agency has not considered the
request to review in a timely manner or otherwise has not
acted in a manner cDnsistent with the requirements.

If you have questions regarding the specific issue of appeals,
please feel free to write to the Appeals Office, Office of
Information Resources Management, Programs, and Services,
Room 1512, Department of State, 2201 C Street, Washington
D.C. 20520-1512. Please refer to your FOIA case number in
any correspondence.

80a
Sincerely,

Charles Lahiguera
Appeals Officer
Office of IRM Programs and Services

8la

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

STUART M. SELDOWITZ,
Plaintiff,

Vv.

THE OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GENERAL, U. S.

Department of State,
Defendant.

Judge Henry H. Kennedy
October 26, 1998
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF STUART M. SELDOWITZ

I]. My name is Stuart M. Seidowitz, and I am the Plaintiff in
the above captioned case. This Affidavit is being submitted in
support of Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law and Points in
Opposition to United States of America’s Motion to Dismiss.

r Filed previously with this Court and attached to
Plaintiffs Motion for Default Judgment is another affidavit
which I submitted in support of that motion (“the First
Affidavit”). I do hereby adopt and incorporate the First
Affidavit, and the documents referenced and attached thereto,
as part of this affidavit.

3. In June 1995, 1 hired attorney Ralph Drury Martin of
the Washington, D.C., law firm Storch & Brenner to
represent me during my settlement negotiations with the U.S.
Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District ofVirginia. Those
negotiations concluded, and a settlement was executed in

82a
July 1995.

3. After the settlement was executed, I asked Mr. Martin
to obtain for me copies of the voucher documents, in the
possession of the U.S. Attorney’s Office, which the US.
Attorney's Office has received from the OIG.

4. Mr. Martin forwarded those voucher documents to me
in April 1996. Attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit A is a
copy of the transmittal letter from. Mr. Martin which
accompanied these documents, dated April 15, 1996.
Attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit B is 2: copy of the
envelope in which this letter, and the accompanying
documents, arrived. It is postmarked April 17, 1996.

5. As | explained in my First Affidavit, 1 did not have an
opportunity to compare the voucher documents I had earlier
obtained from the National Finance Center (“NFC”) with
those provided by the U.S. Attorney’s Office to Mr. Martin
until after April 17, 1996. It was not until I physically
compared these two sets of documents, page by page, that |
noticed the discrepancies between them. Among _ these
discrepancies are that: (a) certain pages in the voucher
documents obtained from the National Finance Center were
marked with the letters “NFC,” whereas the equivalent pages
in the voucher documents obtained from the U.S. Attorney’s
Office record did not bear such marking; (b) the front page of
the voucher form, as included in the U.S. Attorneys’s
documents, had been stamped with the word “PROCESS,”
whereas that page in the NFC’s documents did not bear such
stamp; and (c) the documents obtained from the U.S.
Attorneys Office omitted pages which were included in the
documents provided by the NFC. In addition, rental receipts
which did not have my written annotations on them were
included in the U.S. Attorney’s documents as if they were
part of the travel voucher I had submitted in May 1990,
whereas the actual travel voucher I had submitted, as well as

83a

the copies of those documents I obtained by me from the
NFC, had those annotations on them.

6. Based upon these observations, I learned for the first
time that the Inspector General’s Office ("OIG") had
misrepresented to the U.S. Attorney’s Office, and
subsequently to me, that its copy of my May 1990 trave!
voucher, and attachments, which it had used to investigate
me for allegations of submitting false claims to the
Department of State, was the actual travel voucher and
attachments (or a true copy thereof) which: (a) I had
submitted, and (b) had been received and was then being
maintained by the U.S. Department of State.

y I executed the settlement agreement with the U.S.
Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia, which
is dated July 26, 1995, and which is signed by myself, by my
wife, Rosalinda M. Seldowitz, and by Assistant U.S.
Attorney Richard Sponseller, on July 31, 1995. I executed
this agreement on that date because | was informed by the
- law firm which then represented me, Storch & Brenner, that
it had been told by the U.S. Attorney’s Office that. if |
delayed executing the agreement beyon” a specific date
(which date was on or shortly after July 31), the US.
Attorney’s Office would commence a civil suit against me
and my wife under the False Claims Act.

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I declare under penalty
of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 26 day of October, 1998,
in Washington, D.C.

STUART M. SELDOWITZ

84a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

STUART M. SELDOWITZ,
Plaintiff,

Vv.

THE OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GENERAL, U. S.
Department of State,
Defendant.

Judge Henry H. Kennedy
October 26, 1998
AFFIDAVIT OF RALPH DRURY MARTIN

l. My name is Ralph Drury Martin. I am an attorney and
a member of the bar of this court. I am also a partner in the
law form of Storch & Brermer, L.L.P., located at 10001
Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. Prior to
entering private practice | served as a senior prosecutor for
the Public Integrity Section of the U.S. Department of
Justice, and as a Special Counsel for the U.S. Department of
State.

2. On or about June 15, 1995, I was retained by Mr.
Stuart M. Seldowitz to represent him in a matter involving
the Office of the Inspector General of the U.S. Department of
State (“OIG”) and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern
District of Virginia (“the U.S. Attorney’s Office”). At that
’ time the OIG was alleging that Mr. Seldowitz and his wife,
Rosalinda Seldowitz, had presented false travel voucher
requests to the Department of State. Pursuant to my

85a

representation of Mr. Seldowitz, I negotiated a settlement
with the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the amount of fifteen
thousand dollars. ($15,000). The Assistant U.S. Attorney for
the Eastern District of Virginia who negotiated this
settlement on behalf of the government was Richard W.
Sponseller.

3. After the settlement was executed, Mr. Seldowitz
asked me to obtain on his behalf a copy of the May 29, 1990,
travel voucher (with attachments), submitted by Mr.
Seldowicz to the Executive Office of the Bureau of
Political/Military Affairs of the State Department, as thai
copy appeared in the files of AUSA Sponseller.

4. By letter dated September 25, 1995, AUSA
Sponseller provided those voucher documents to me.
Attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit A is a copy (from my
files) of the transmittal letter from AUSA Sponseller, and the
voucher documents which accompanied that letter.

5. I did not forward these voucher documents, supplied
by AUSA Sponseller, to Mr. Seldowitz until April 15, 1996.
Attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit B is a copy (from my
files) of the transmittal letter, dated April 15, 1996, which |
sent to Mr. Seldowitz with those voucher documents.

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I declare under penalty
of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

]
Executed this 26 of October, 1998,
in Washington, D.C.

RALPH DRURY MARTIN

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386010_1057%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.