# Reply Brief — Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff (No. 07-1180)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Reply Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2006

## Text

oo

FILED

y SUN 3 - 2005

OFFICE OFT
No. 07-1180 |_SUPREWE count h

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE AND SIERRA CLUB,

Petitioners,
¥.
MICHAEL CHERTOFF,
SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to
the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

ANDREW J. PINCUS DAN M. KAHAN
CHARLES A. ROTHFELD Counsel of Record
Mayer Brown LLP TERRI-LEI O’MALLEY
1909 K Street, NW Yale Law School
Washington, DC 20006 Supreme Court Clinic
(202) 263-3000 127 Wall Street
New Haven, CT 06511
ROBERT DREHER (203) 432-4800
BRIAN SEGEE

Defenders of Wildlife Counsel for Petitioners
1130 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 772-3225

Counsel for Defenders of Wildlife

WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO.., INC. — (202) 769-0086 — WASHINGTON, D.C. 20002

|

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTO iit vicsiscsiinséchscsxceedapndsgpietiaanas il

A. This Court Should Grant Review Now
To Resolve Definitively The Continuing
Controversy Surrounding The
Constitutionality Of The Secretary’s
WH Rita I since Sasi acs cates enzors 2

B. Judicial Review Is An Essential
Element Of The Intelligible Principle

UNM IINE a snaceccoanadesabudnncauneigeinninaaabinaaaince 8
C. The Secretary’s Waiver Is Equivalent
To The Repeal Invalidated In Clinton. .......... 10

COIN LESION sicsesncsccnvsasnasssetseiassatalneeennaeneernengeni 12

ll

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES:
Chicago & S., Air Line v. Waterman S.S.
A. ito. FOG CIB se ciccerescnecicncccssssssesecs 9
Clinton v. City of New York., 524 U.S. 417
SI ic sisicinsk cna aticaleide aebeebiactncaiedsiicecsbexainkyse ch eunekiale 10
County of El Paso v. Chertoff, No. 08-0196
(W.D. Tex. filed June 2, 2008)...................0..000 5
Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994)......0....000.0002... 9
Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892) .0.0................. 10,11
Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788
SERIE EIT EON eo Ste EES Pe Te RT 9
Gould v. Bowyer, 11 F.3d 82 (7th Cir. 1993).............. 5
Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1998)...........-.:0e+e00-00--- 9
NLRB vy. United Food & Commercial Workers
Cement GIG TFS, TAD CRBS von nccsnescccceccssacaccosees 9
South Dakota v. Dep’t of Interior,
69 F.34d 878 (8th Cir. 1995), vacated,
Be re sins scccecicsctscicascascciscdiveciausnacs 6
Touby v. United States,
SE I acc cccdcunandensaduntuabicdeatioen T
United States v. Bozarov, 974 F. 2d 1037
Re __ SE RENRMEOeneme ni atoms ett erty Sano Re 7
United States v. Students Challenging Regula-
tory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669............. 9

United States v. Widdowson, 916 F.2d 587
(10th Cir. 1990), vacated, 502 U.S. 801

United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy
a OEE Ci iacicevacrncecensscovanrecmeundaes 9

il

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page(s)
Texas Border Coalition v. Chertoff, No. 08-
00848 (D.D.C. filed May 16, 2008)................... 5
STATUTES:
Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 551
I iriiceaiiitncancinacnndbisdcunidbsiinacentecstnecncetiinnis 3

American Indian Religious Freedom Act,
ese 3

Archaeological and Historic Preservation Act,
16 U.S.C. § 469 et seq.);

Archeological Resources Protection Act,

16 U.S.C. § 470aa et seq.............. cicidiamieieouoan 3
Arizona Desert Wilderness Act Pub. L.

No.101-628;

| ASE NRE RAED OTE ORT ite RET RI ON PN 3

Is cihticcicsercennschagieds xxcdaipanciaccaokeg aoukiaameime adie 3

I asiacsctcscisssic wscspncaiuicihis das incaidaiintaaiedanceak Mes 3

DO iicietisictsnnshakecicussnspeteleicl cpa luhad bem, aaai noes 3

8 EL TIS LLM TEEN RADNER Th STO 3

| USER RRR SO oa Srey cant nce AR eMC IN eta eaES Fe 9 3
Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. § 431 et seq. .............c.eeeeee 3
California Desert Protection Act (Pub. L. 103-

Ee i I ip ree soca detncathcas inet 3
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. ......... eee 3
Coastal Zone Management Act , 16 U.S.C. §

Pe ait cencace inane sid iatneredennecasisa’ 3

Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act, 42
rae I Oe I crininescticincniebndencnecacccnnennts 3

1V
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
Page(s)

Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668 et seq.;
the Native American Graves Protection
and Repatriation Act (25 U.S.C. 3001 et

ah i aks acide dasa ice nenalniodadnivccecssicies 3
Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43

Read ee A I aah cx tinecdsvtticensasninsscceasnanss 3
Farmland Protection Policy Act, 7 U.S.C. §

I a gle lic sickbiedstneciiens 3
Historic Sites, Buildings, and Antiquities Act,

Re er ee Oe Gierasch raccsspisadisnscniesasisnss 3
California Desert Protection Act, Pub. L. No.

a a | - Sey ae a 3
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et

a se ascansiidevinnbaanene 3
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (com-

monly referred to as the Clean Water

I Be as Oe EI, nich cissaes sc seccsersees 3
Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956 (Pub. L. 84-

BORE, SO UEC. FES8, OF COG.) vaccecssisscescscsccsccecs 3
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C.

i ccc etaenses 3

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208 § 102, (codified as amended

at 6 UB. © FIGS NOG wisi. ..ccsaccccenes 1, 2, 6, 7, 11
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703 et

aici tes i a A kashish gc ciag hc tetaiannteaas onsen 3
Multiple Use and Sustained Yield Act of 1960,

i III bid casicdvaneteanidvnniencencassincenecuass 3

National Environmental Policy Act,
A ee Oe EO i sedi caneitnnsesanncndcions 3

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page(s)

National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16

ec sncaccntacscscncncasascosseres 4
National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C.

a csenneaesienitcee TRESS eee Te 3
National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978,

I as ci calaanenccnacasasecnanssadecsensess 3

coc aicsaceustsdctcacoevevdxans 3

ick css qansandanandcnecdndoiuis 3

a 5, sata pasanbulinecbaasacesaasaieds 3
National Park Service General Authorities

Act,

16 § U.S.C. 1la-1 et seq............... sanaivinsnnianieaiionas 3
National Park Service Organic Act,

en csacessaciciececcscese 3
National Wildlife Refuge System Administra-

tion Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd-668ee.............0.0.... 3
Native American Graves Protection and Repa-

triation Act, 25 U.S.C. § 3001 et seq. ............... 3
Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4901 et seq................. 3
Otay Mountain Wilderness Act of 1999, Pub.

css. sc cataneostansaicsicandats 2

NESSES ESET ep SO ee 2

as ncanannascansnaccareisenss 2
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.

es ssannssunssicuanccucn 3
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,

ccs cnasmusteansctscscenannnse 3

Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300f et
seq.; the Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C.
ec cahdiniinecnnuncannnianen 3

vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
Page(s)

Secure Fence Act, Pub. L. No. 190-367, § 2(a),
IRIEL SES a 8

Solid Waste Disposal Act, as amended by the
Resource Conservation and Recovery

po aR Ss) PF a ae 3
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1281
Ratan Cabos Sesanbba bilipbbailoandapnasensuntencesaceed 3
Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1131 et seq. .................... 3
MISCELLANEOUS:
73 Fed. Reg. 19,077 (Apr. 8, 2008)...................... ee 3
73 Fed. Reg. 18, 293 (Apr. 3, 2008).......................cee 3

Border Fence Waivers Show Feds’ Arrogance,
The San Antonio Express-News, Apr. 3,
2008, available at http://www.mysan
antonio.com/ opinion/ editorials/ stories/
MYSA040408.010.Fence led.25ff92c.ht

Flattened By The Wall: Fence-Builders Should
Not Be Allowed to Bulldoze Past All
Laws, The (Syracuse) Post-Standard,
Apr. 15, 2008, available at
http://www.syracuse.com/ opinion/ in-
dex.ssf?/ base/ opinion-2/
1208249823169420.xml&coll=1; Op. Ed.......... 4

Michael Chertoff’s Insult, The New York
Times, April 3, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/ 2008/ 04/ 03/
opinion/ 03thu3.html?_r=l&em&
ex=1207368000&en=4c861a0cf3a609a3
&ei=5087%0A &oref=slogin ........ eee eeeeeeeeeeeee 5

Rusty Dornan, Border-fence Dispute Snares
Rare Jaguars, CNN, May 5, 2008,
available at http://www.cnn.com/ 2008/

vl

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
Page(s)

TECH/ science/ 05/ 05/ jag-
uars.fence/index. html; Op. Ed.................0........ 4

U.S. Wrong to Bypass Laws for Border Fence,
The San Diego Union Tribune, Apr. 3,
2008, available at http://www.signon
sandiego.com/ news/ op-ed/ editorial1/
20080403-9999-lzled3top. html; Op. Ed. ......... 4

Wall Project Must Not Trample Citizens’
Rights, Prerogatives, The Arizona Daily
Star, Apr. 3, 2008, available at
http://www.azstarnet.com/
ne Op.
a ns inasenaaccnnte 4

Skirting of Rules Shows Hypocrisy of Govern-
ment, The Yuma Sun, Apr. 2, 2008,
available at http://www.yumasun.com/
opinion/ rules_40766___article.htm]/
OREN RIE inc sisceendcieciniasnxesnsnoscnnsoneses 4

The government strives mightily to depict the
Secretarys Section 102(c) waiver authority as a
commonplace measure indistinguishable from prior
delegations of legislative power and prior waiver
provisions upheld by this Court. That argument ig-
nores reality, including:

e The three amicus briefs that confirm the con-
tinuing importance of the constitutional ques-
tions presented in the petition as well as the
waiver authority’s constitutional defects;

e The Secretary's new, and extremely broad,
April 2008 waivers—not even discussed by the
government—that have engendered very sub-
stantial controversy, including new lawsuits
challenging the validity of Section 102(c)
waivers;

e The government’s inability to point to even a
single decision by this Court relying on the in-
telligible principle standard to uphold a stat-
ute against a delegation challenge where the
exercise of the delegated authority was not
subject to some form of judicial review for
compliance with the congressional standard.
The district court rulings on which the gov-
ernment relies thus have no support in this
Court’s decisions.

Only this Court can dispel the profound and per-
sistent state of uncertainty that attends the Secre-
tary’s continuing issuance of waivers and the associ-
ated continued stream of litigation. “There are of
course no court of appeals decisions” (Opp. 9 n.4)
permitted under the truncated jurisdictional provi-
sions at issue. District court decisions, by their na-
ture, cannot generate binding precedent even within,

2

much less across, particular districts. Until this
Court addresses these issues, therefore, there will be
no authoritative answers to the important constitu-
tional questions posed by the Secretary's extraordi-
narily broad waiver authority—and its insulation
from judicial review for compliance with Congress's
standard—that is at issue in this case.

The government opposes certiorari on the ground
that further review would frustrate the goal of expe-
dition reflected in the “special statutory framework”
(Opp. 10) that eliminates court of appeals review and
bars consideration of nonconstitutional claims any-
where. But the newly-filed litigation over Section
102(c), combined with the truncated review provi-
sions and the short time-frame for the proposed con-
struction of the fence, make immediate review by
this Court imperative. Contrary to the government's
claim, the Secretary’s “statutory obligation to achieve
operational control over the Nation’s borders within
a matter of months” (Opp. 11) is not a reason to deny
certiorari; rather, it is a reason to grant review and
then to expedite this Court’s consideration of the
case, a procedure petitioners would welcome.

A. This Court Should Grant Review Now
To Resolve Definitively The Continuing
Controversy Surrounding The Constitu-
tionality Of The Secretary’s Waiver Au-
thority.

The government opposes certiorari on the ground
that “there is no split of authority” concerning the
constitutionality of Section 102(c) of IIRIRA (Opp. 9).
This attempt to force-fit the “circuit conflict” tem-
plate onto the petition ignores the principal grounds
presented for granting certiorari: the persistent state
of legal controversy that will attend the continuing

3

exercise of the Secretary’s waiver authority; the divi-
sion in the lower courts with respect to the role of ju-
dicial review in nondelegation analysis; and the in-
ability of district courts to abate such controversy.

1. Any doubt regarding the continuing impor-
tance of the legal issues presented here is eliminated
by the Secretary’s issuance in April 2008 of two new
waivers, one of 27 laws covering 22 miles of fencing
in Hidalgo County, Texas, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,077 (Apr.
8, 2008), the other wiping out over 35 laws with re-
spect to more than four hundred seventy miles of
fence in four states, 73 Fed. Reg. 18,293 (Apr. 3,
2008).!

1 The broader waiver applies to the following federal statutes,
as well as “all federal, state or other laws, regulations, and legal
requirements of, deriving from, or related to the subject” of
these laws: National Environmental Policy Act, (42 U.S.C.§
4321 et seq.)); the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et
seq.)); the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (commonly re-
ferred to as the Clean Water Act) (33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.)); the
National Historic Preservation Act 16 U.S.C. § 470 et seq.));
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703 et seq.); the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq.; the Archeological Re-
sources Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470aa et seq.; the Safe
Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300f et seq.; the Noise Control
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4901 et seq.); the Solid Waste Disposal Act, as
amended by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42
U.S.C. § 6901 et seq.; the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et
seq.; the Archaeological and Historic Preservation Act, 16
U.S.C. § 469 et seq.; the Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. § 431 et
seq.); the Historic Sites, Buildings, and Antiquities Act, 16
U.S.C. § 461 et seq.); the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1281 et seq.; the Farmland Protection Policy Act, 7 U.S.C. §
4201 et seq.; the Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §
1451 et seq.; the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1131 et seq.; the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1701 et

4

The scope and diversity of the abrogated laws is
breathtaking. Cast aside are not just every signifi-
cant environmental protection and land use statute
but also laws protecting Native American graves and
religious practices as well as freedom of religion gen-
erally. The Secretary has waived the organic act of
one executive agency (the National Park Service) in
its entirety. He has even eliminated protection of the
bald eagle, the symbol of our Nation.

Not surprisingly, given the impact of the Secre-
tary’s most recent waivers and the immense public
controversy surrounding them,? this case is not the

seq.); the National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act,
16 U.S.C. § 668dd-668ee); the Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956, 16
U.S.C. § 742a, et seq.; the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act,
16 U.S.C. § 661 et seq.; the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 551 et seq.; the Otay Mountain Wilderness Act of 1999,
Pub. L. No. 106-145; Sections 102(29) and 103 of Title I of the
California Desert Protection Act, Pub. L. No, 103-433, 50 Stat.
1827, the National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1, 2-
4); the National Park Service General Authorities Act, 16
US.C. §la-1; Sections 401(7), 403, and 404 of the National
Parks and Recreation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-625; Sections
301(a)-(f) of the Arizona Desert Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No.
101-628; the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 403);
the Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668 et seq.; the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §
3001 et seq.; the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1996; the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb; the National Forest Management Act of 1976,
16 U.S.C. § 1600 et seq., and the Multiple Use and Sustained
Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 528-531).

2 See, e.g., Rusty Dornan, Border-fence Dispute Snares Rare
Jaguars, CNN, May 5, 2008, available at http://www.cnn.com/
2008/ TECH/ science/ 05/ 05/ jaguars.fence/index.html; Op. Ed.,
Flattened By The Wall: Fence-Builders Should Not Be Allowed
to Bulldoze Past All Laws, The (Syracuse) Post-Standard, April
15, 2008, available at http://www.syracuse.com/ opinion/ in-
dex.ssf?/ base/ opinion-2/ 1208249823169420.xml&coll=1; Op.

SE

5

only pending challenge to the Secretary’s actions.
Two new suits have been filed in the last month
alone. See County of El Paso v. Chertoff, No. 08-0196
(W.D. Tex. filed June 2, 2008); Texas Border Coallt-
tion v. Chertoff, No. 08-00848 (D.D.C. filed May 16,
2008).

By granting review here, this Court would re-
solve conclusively the issue in those cases; otherwise,
that litigation—and the associated uncertainty—will
continue. Absent review by this Court, moreover,
none of these district court lawsuits will quiet the
controversy surrounding the fence, because none, as
a matter of law, can. It is well established that dis-
trict court decisions do not create binding precedent
for other district courts, either wit®in or across dis-
tricts. See, e.g., Gould v. Bowyer, 11 ©.3d 82, 84 (7th
Cir. 1993) (Posner, J.) (“[a] district court decision
binds no judge in any other case”). Because Con-
gress, in addition to restricting district court review

Ed., U.S. Wrong to Bypass Laws for Border Fence, The San
Diego Union Tribune, Apr. 3, 2008, available at
http://‘www.signonsandiego.com/ news/ op-ed/_ editoriall/
20080403-9999-lzled3top.html; Op. Ed., Wall Project Must Not
Trample Citizens' Rights, Prerogatives, The Arizona Daily Star,
Apr. 3, 2008, available at http://www.azstarnet.com/
altds/pastframe/opinion/232564; Op. Ed., Skirting of Rules
Shows Hypocrisy of Government, The Yuma Sun, Apr. 2, 2008,
available at http://www.yumasun.com/ opinion/
rules_40766___article.html/ hypocrisy_roads.htm]; Editorial,
Border Fence Waivers Show Feds’ Arrogance, The San Antonio
Express-News, Apr. 3, 2008, available at
http://www.mysanantonio.com/ opinion/ editorials/ — stories/
MYSA040408.010.Fenceled.25ff92c.html; Editorial, Michael
Chertoff's Insult, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/ 2008/ 04/ 03/ opinion/
03thu3.html?_r=1&em &ex=1207368000&en=4c861 a0cf3a609a3
&ei=5087%0A &oref=slogin.

6

to constitutional challenges, extinguished jurisdic-
tion of the courts of appeals to review decisions chal-
lenging the Secretarys | waivers (IRIRA
§ 102(c)(2)(A)-(C)), the only court that can authorita-
tively resolve the issue presented in this case is this
one. Until that happens, adversely affected parties
will continue to seek legal redress, the federal gov-
ernment will continue to expend the resources neces-
sary to defend the Secretary’s actions, and district
courts will continue to be obliged to render decisions,
for as long as it takes the Government to complete
the border fence.

2. We explained in the petition (at 15-16) that
the district court’s ruling (and the government’s posi-
tion) conflict with lower court decisions in other
statutory contexts holding that the availability of
statutory judicial review is essential to upholding
delegations of legislative authority under the intelli-
gible principle standard.

The government responds (Opp. 9) that “this
Court vacated the only decisions * * * that invali-
dated statutory provisions on unconstitutional dele-
gation grounds because of the unavailability of judi-
cial review.” But this Court did not reject the princi-
ple that judicial review is a key element of the intel-
ligible principle test. To the contrary, that principle
was reaffirmed in both cases—in South Dakota, the
government voluntarily revised its regulation to au-
thorize judicial review (rather than seeking reversal

3 Although the 14-mile fence segment that was the subject of
the waiver at issue in this action has been substantially com-
pleted, the government concedes (Op. 8-9 n.3) that the continu-
ing possibility of relief to abate violations of law associated with
that fence segment precludes a claim of mootness.

7

of the lower court’s decision on the merits) and
sought a remand for reconsideration (Pet. 15-16 n.5);
and in Widdowson the Court remanded for reconsid-
eration in light of its decision in Touby that the rele-
vant statute provided sufficient judicial review to
satisfy the nondelegation doctrine’s requirement.

The government also fails even to acknowledge
the two appellate decisions in which courts upheld
delegations on the ground that the relevant statutes
provided for judicial review (see Pet. 15). And it ig-
nores the fact that in Bozarov, which the government
characterizes as “the most relevant decision” (Opp.
10), the court of appeals expressly relied on the
availability of some judicial review in upholding the
delegation (see Pet. 16 n.6).

The lower court decisions thus confirm that judi-
cial review is a key part of the intelligible principle
test. Indeed, the government does not point to a sin-
gle lower court decision outside the Section 102(c)
context endorsing its position that judicial review is
irrelevant. The stark contrast between the decision
below and the other lower courts’ decisions address-
ing this issue provides yet another basis for granting
review here.4

4 The government states (Opp. 15) that the legal argument ad-
vanced in the petition was “neither pressed nor passed upon in
the court below * * *.” But the government does not make a
claim of waiver, nor could it. The contention that Section 102(c)
violates the nondelegation doctrine was squarely advanced be-
low, and that argument relied in part on the lack of judicial re-
view. Certainly the government, which frequently modifies in
this Court the legal arguments advanced in lower courts, does
not argue that a party may only advance in this Court the pre-
cise legal argument it advanced below.

8

3. As the government notes, Congress directed
the Secretary to take “all actions the Secretary de-
termines necessary and appropriate,” including the
construction of fences, “to achieve and maintain op-
erational control over the entire” United States bor-
der within an 18-month period. Secure Fence Act,
Pub. L. No. 190-367, § 2(a), 120 Stat. 2638. The gov-
ernment argues that this “statutory obligation to
achieve operational control over the Nation’s borders
within a matter of months” counsels against the
granting of certiorari. Opp. 11.

In fact, exactly the opposite is true. The very
speed with which the Secretary is obliged to complete
the fence—and that he contends impels him to abro-
gate all manner of law in the process—makes it all
the more imperative that this Court grant certiorari
now to resolve the constitutional question defini-
tively

B. Judicial Review Is An Essential Element
Of The Intelligible Principle Standard.

The bulk of the government’s Opposition consists
of arguments on the merits. Put simply, however,
there is no support in this Court’s decisions for the
government’s position (Opp. 11) that existence of an
intelligible principle is the sole consideration of the
nondelegation inquiry and judicial review for compli-
ance with that principle is entirely irrelevant. That
contention turns on its head a fundamental pillar of
separation of powers by arguing that absence of judi-
cial oversight does not implicate constitutional con-
cerns.

The government is unable to cite any case in
which the Court has expressly stated that judicial
review is not required to satisfy the intelligible prin-

9

ciple standard. Indeed, we have not been able to lo-
cate a decision of this Court upholding a delegation
under the intelligible principle standard where the
agency's compliance with the intelligible principle
was not subject to such judicial review.

The cases on which the government relies (Opp.
19-23) all involve delegations not subject to the intel-
ligible principle standard (see Pet. 17-19).5 Thus, in
each of the cases that it cites, the delegation was up-
held without reference to the intelligible principle
standard, either because there was no law to apply
(United Food & Commercial Workers and Lincoln) or
because of the Executive’s inherent authority (Water-
man Steamship Corp. and Knauff).®

Moreover, the government blithely ignores the
repeated statements in this Court’s opinions that ju-
dicial review is an important element of the intelligi-
ble principle standard. Pet. 13-15. While the gov-
ernment understandably prefers formulations that

5 The government conceded below that the constitutionality of
Section 102(c) is governed by the intelligible principle standard.
See Pet. 19. Its assertion that it “possesses independent author-
ity over the subject matter” (Opp. 13-14) is therefore irrelevant.
And it plainly does not possess independent authority over the
subject matter relevant here—the subjects of the waived stat-
utes.

6 The government's reference (Opp. 23) to Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures is baffling, because the passage
cited involved the district court’s inability to grant interim re-
lief, not a complete preclusion of judicial review. Similarly,
Franklin and Dalton did not involve nondelegation claims.
Moreover, the challenges in Franklin where entirely proce-
dural—there was no assertion that the President failed to com-
ply with the substantive statutory standard—and the statute in
Dalton imposed no constraints on the President’s discretion, the
paradigmatic sitwation in which there is no law to apply.

10

do not mention judicial review, this Court in fact has
referred to the courts’ role in applying the standard.

Finally, the importance of judicial review here is
confirmed by the government's half-hearted attempt
(Opp. 20 n.8) to justify the Secretary’s waiver. If all
that is required for a waiver is that it “allowed the
fence* * * to be constructed more expeditiously,” then
a waiver will be justified in any case in which any
statute may possibly apply to construction of the
fence. If Congress meant to adopt that incredibly le-
nient test, however, it simply would have enacted a
blanket waiver itself and saved the Secretary the
trouble of having to issue individual waivers. Con-
gress intended a more focused inquiry, with the ra-
tionale spelled out by the Secretary—something that
will occur only with statutory judicial review.

C. The Secretary’s Waiver Is Equivalent To
The Repeal Invalidated In Clinton.

To avoid Clinton v. City of New York., 524 U.S.
417 (1998), the government attempts to distinguish
“waiver” from “repeal” on the ground that “waivers”
suspend the application of existing law “in one or
more particular situations, while. leaving them oth-
erwise fully applicable.” Opp. at 24-25. But the Clin-
ton Court stated that the practical effect of the Ex-
ecutive’s action, not the term applied to it, is disposi-
tive. The government’s distinction elevates form over
substance by turning entirely on whether the rele-
vant underlying law is broad or narrow. Waiver of a
statute applicable only along the border, or only to
construction of a border wall, for example, would de-
prive the law of all substantive force and effect, and
be indistinguishable from repeal of such a law in its
entirety.

11

The government also argues (Opp. 24) that the
Secretary's waiver closely resembles the tariff waiver
upheld in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892). As we
discuss in the petition (at 21-24), the waiver provi-
sion here is far different from the one before the
Court in Field. The government asserts (Opp. 27-28)
that those differences do not matter, but again it is
unable to point to any precedent of this Court up-
holding under Field a provision with the unprece-
dented characteristics of Section 102(c). Moreover, a
key factor in Field—also central to the Court's de-
termination in Clinton—was whether the Executive's
action is mandatory upon the occurrence of particu-
lar future events, and thus truly represents Con-
gress's legislative decision. 143 U.S. at 693; see also
524 U.S. at 443-44. The discretionary waiver provi-
sion here fails that test. Review is warranted so that
this Court may determine whether Field's rationale
applies in this very different context.

12

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
granted.

Respectfully submitted.
ANDREW J. PINCUS DAN M. KAHAN
CHARLES A. ROTHFELD Counsel of Record
Mayer Brown LLP TERRI-LEI O’MALLEY
1909 K Street, NW Yale Law School
Washington, DC 20036 Supreme Court Clinic
(202) 263-3000 127 Wall Street
New Haven, CT 06511
ROBERT DREHER (203) 432-4800
BRIAN SEGEE

Defenders of Wildlife Counsel for Petitioner
1130 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 772-3225

Counsel for Defenders of
Wildlife

JUNE 2008

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386010_0736%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
