# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Scott v. Quigley (No. 07-1118)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 2007

## Text

Supreme Coud, US.
071118060 21 2007

No. THE CLERK
IN THE

Supreme Court of the
United States

RONALD K. SCOTT
Petitioner,
L

KEITH B. QUIGLEY, ET AL.

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari To .
The United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Michael D. Reed

Mette Evans & Woodside, P.C.
3401 North Front Street, Suite 202
Harrisburg, PA 17110

(717) 232-5000

Elizabeth J. Goldstein
Arthur R. Traldi
Elizabeth Goldstein, P.C.
355 North 21st Street, Suite 202
Camp Hill, PA 17011
(717) 724-0266
Counsel for Petitioner

QUESTION PRESENTED

(1) Whether prisoner’s clearly established Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights are
violated, giving rise to a cause of action under
42 U.S.C. §1983, when he is incarcerated for
four additional days after a judge orders his
release due to the implementation of a state
policy requiring the judge’s order to be
transmitted to the correctional institution
where he resides by U.S. mail.

**

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW

The following individuals are parties to the
proceeding in the court below:

Ronald K. Scott, Jeffrey A. Beard, Raymond J.
Sobina, District Attorney R. Scott Cramer,
Assistant District Attorney Chad Chenot, Public
Defender S.C. Walz, III, Clerk of Court Brenda
Albright, Perry County, the Honorable Keith B.
Quigley, President Judge, The Hon. C. Joseph
Rehkamp, and Magisterial District James R.
Moyer, Jr.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

OPINIONS BELOW AND
JURISDICTION

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY PROVISIONS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

REASONSING FOR GRANTING THE
PETITION

I. Defendants Detained Mr. Scott For
Several Days After Judge Rehkamp
Granted His Writ, Violating His
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
Rights and Creating a Cause of Action
CPU SOON TN oak sca ian kc icc svattpdidenns 1]

iv

A. By Detaining Mr. Scott for
Several Days After His Writ
Was Granted, Defendants Imposed
a Cruel and Unusual
Wares eiccic sce vesinscese 11-12
B. By Detaining Mr. Scott for
Several Days After His Writ
Was Granted, Defendants Violated
His Fourteenth Amendment Right
to be Free From Continued
ERTS CI fb 1 OOS ROY ON 25

Il. This Case Provides an Ideal Vehicle
for Addressing the Important Legal
Question of When a Plaintiff Subjected
to Overdetention may Recover

CHGOE EE Ty Beker; B RIGS ces vsisivsveicnvncsciesecic 32

A. There is a split in the circuits
a awh 32
B. Overdetention is a serious and

widespread problem.....................00e e000 41

C. This Case is an Ideal Vehicle for
Resolving the Question...................0.008 44

Sp ec DM a a ee a ae 45

APPENDIX |

United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit September 26, 2007
NN ete Ge sai ccc ckeuspsscvacgeiess esens 2-6

United States District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania
MNF) te Wo inst ccerp cannes sdccseccnees 7-22

Common Pleas Court of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, Opinion of Judge Rehkamp
NS ity MII 658s s os icndndsascae sheiessivins 23-24

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987)--------- 21

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242

ft 23

Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564

Ue I ication sconce 25

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)------------ 12, 17

Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144-46

PI a iiiicicctsninignisccticinaeinsccncrenacscatiiti 26

Banks v. Beard, 548 U.S. _ , (2006)--------------------- 18

Barnes v. District of Columbia, 2007 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 20856 (D.D.C. 2007)-------------------- 36, 42

Berry v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764 (9 Cir. 2004)

staan stebaaiibabiaieGniienicanniameainst 21, 25, 33, 38

Vil

Brass v. County of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 1192

OO ie CIE incinsnensccicssin ieprerccinnniiinnied 26, 3°
Bynum v. District of Columbia, 214 F.R.D. 27,
STL, Sais ccs cere 42

Cannon v. Macon County, 1 F.3d 1558 (11%

Cir. 1999) ---------------------------------------0-----=- 26

Cannon v. Macon County, 15 F.3d 1022

CRE Cie Binnie sectenineisstinnne 21

Carter v. Hennepin County, 162 Fed. Appx. 682

(8 Cir. 2006)-------------------------------------------- 34
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)--------- 23

Chortek v. City of Milwaukee, 356 F.3d 740

heal 1. | a 35

Commonwealth v. Morman, 541 A.2d 356 (1988)----5

County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44

f. | | NUMAN EER re eI 16, 19, 32, 37, 38

Davis v. Hall, 375 F.3d 703 (8th Cir. 2004)----------- 25

Vili

Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1980)------- 36

Dye v. Hennepin County, 162 Fed. Appx. 678

(8% Cir. 2006)---------------------------------+------0--- 34
Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510 (1997)----------------- 21
Emmund v. Florida, 458 U.S 782 (1982)--------------- 13
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003)---------------- 14
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) ------------- 24

Fairley v. Luman, 281 F.3d 913 (9% Cir. 2002)------- 26

Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992)--------------- 28

Fowler v. Block, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1268

(C.D. Cal 1998)---------------------------020-----e0-0e 22

Goldberg v. Hennepin County, 417 F.3d 808

BP ie, DOI re sciinsensenmtomrsiecn 33, 34

Gramenos v. Jewel Companies, Inc., 797 F.2d 432

(7% Cin, 19G onnsnnarannnencnninincvenicninnninisinisnsinitinnin 35

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)------------------ 17

iX

Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991)------ i4, 15

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)------- 11, 20

Heryla v. Hennepin County, 162 Fed. Appx.

en 34

Hodges v. Humkin, 80 Eng.Rep.

1015 (KB 1615)-------------------------------0--0-0e000- 13
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978)------------------- 12

Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005)--10, 19, 30

Lewis v. O'Grady, 853 F.2d 1366

(7 Cir. 1988)-------------------------------------+- 16, 35
Lund v. Hennepin County, 427 F.3d 1123
(8t Cir. 2005) -------------------------------------- 33, 34
Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545
(1990)----------------c-eae--neenenssen-neeseennenneenenee 24

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)------------ 18

McCurry v. Moore, 242 F. Supp. 2d 1167

eee 20, 30

Moore v. Marketplace Restaurant, Inc., 754 F.2d

1336 (7% Cir. 1985)-----------------.-------------- 35

Murphy v. County of Hennepin, 162 Fed. Appx. 677

CP Cllr. SID aman n nnn ten enna nennnesenenaes 34

Oertwig v. Hennepin County, 162 Fed. Appx. 683

I ae inicio 34

Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003)-------------- 18

Pederson v. Hennepin County, 170 Fed. Appx. 14

(8% Cir. 2006)----------------------.-----------ceeeee-2e- 34
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988)------------- 21

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,

530 U.S. 133 (2000)----------------------------- 24, 31
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)----------- 14
Roper v. Simmons, 125 U.S. 1183 (2005)--------------- 13
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980)--------------- 14

Russell v. Hennepin County, 420 F.3d 841

GUNN Ce, Na sails 33

4

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)-------------------- 24

Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099

(3d Cir. 1989)-------------------------------------------- 28
Sanders v. English, 950 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1992) -27

Sizer v. County of Hennepin, 162 Fed. Appx. 681

Ce 25s... 34

Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 279 (1983) -------------- 14

Streit v. County of LA, 236 F.3d 552

(9th Cir. 2001)-----------------------<------------------ 22
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958)------------------- 12
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)-------------------- 10

Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 341 (1910) ------- 14

Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5 Cir. 1968), cert

denied, 396 U.S. 901------------- waneeee----- 35, 36, 43

Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2003)-------------- 29

Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)------------ 28

Xil

The United States Constitution

The Eighth Amendment -------------------------------- 9,14
The Fourteenth Amendment-------------------------------- 9
Federal Statute

42 U.S.C. Section 1983----------------------------------- 9

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

eee Bis ote 23

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Statute

42 Pa.C.S.A. Section 6109----------------------------------- 29

Law Review Article

Patricia E. Simone, NOTE, A __ Presumptive
Constitutional Time Limit for Administrative
Overdetention of Inmates Entitled to Release,

81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 719, 738 (2006)----------------- 38

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Ronald Scott respectfully petitions
for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW AND JURISDICTION

The opinion of the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals, Petitioner’s Appendix 2-6, is available at
2007 U.S. App. Lexis 22776. The opinion of the
District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania, Petitioner’s Appendix at 7-22, is
available at 2005 U.S. District Lexis 35692 and 2005
WL 1377893. The judgment of the Third Circuit was
entered into on September 26, 2007. The judgment of
the District Court was entered into on June 7, 2005.
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1254.

The District Court had had jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. §1331: “The district courts shall have original

jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that “Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted.”
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides in pertinent
part that “No State shall... deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
42 U.S.C. §1983 provides in pertinent part that
“Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof

D RRR I BP IIE FET TO AE RT TONE OR A al RN OE gn pe

|

to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress.”

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. Ronald Scott paid his bail on February 13,
2002. Raymond Sobina Declaration! at para. 8.
Scott’s lawyer filed a Writ of Habeas Corpus on
February 22, 2002. On February 25, 2002, Mr. Scott
sent a communication to Defendant Sobina, the
warden of the correctional institution at which he
was housed, informing Mr. Sobina that his bail had
been paid. Defendants have not presented at any
level any evidence that Defendant Sobina took any

action as a result of Mr. Scott’s communication. On

| The declarations of Raymond Sobina, Sheila Stailey, and
Donald Harcom are available in the Third Circuit record.

or before February 27, 2002, the Department of
Corrections was notified of Mr. Scott’s habeas corpus
petition and transported him to the Perry County
Prison in order to appear the next day at his Writ of
Habeas Corpus hearing. Harkcom Affidavit at para.
6. On Thursday, February 28, 2002, Mr. Scott
attended a habeas hearing, where Judge Rehkamp
granted Mr. Scott a Writ of Habeas Corpus as a
result of his finding that Mr. Scott had made bail.

2Petitioner’s Appendix at 23-24. Under Pennsylvania

2 Judge Rehkamp granted Mr. Scott’s writ subject to the terms
and conditions of bail, which under 234 Pa. Code § 526 are that
a bailee must:

(1) appear at all times required until full and final
disposition of the case;

(2) obey all further orders of the bail authority;

(3) give written notice to the bail authority, the clerk of
courts, the district attorney, and the court bail agency or other
designated court bail officer, of any change of address within 48
hours of the date of the change;

(4) neither do, nor cause to be done, nor permit to be done on
his or her behalf, any act proscribed by Section 4952 of the

“gated

- Ba) ik ae

Daten
re
a

law, the habeas writ “lies to secure the writ of one

who is detained unlawfully.” Commonwealth v.

Morman, 373 Pa. Super. 360, 541 A.2d 356 (1988).

On that same date, Sheila Stailey paid the
alleged outstanding detainers for Mr. Scott. Stailey
affidavit at para. 1. She returned receipt of these
payments to the Perry County Clerk of Courts Office
located at the Perry County Courthouse, Center
Square, New Bloomfield, Pennsylvania (hereinafter
the “Perry County Clerk’s Office”) between 12:30 PM
and 12:45 PM. Id. While at the Perry County Clerk’s
Office, she was told that the proper paperwork would
be sent to the State Correctional Institution at

Somerset (hereinafter “SCI-Somerset”), where Mr.

Crimes Code (relating to intimidation of witnesses or victims)
or by Section 4953 (relating to retaliation against witnesses or
victims), 18 Pa.C.S. § § 4952, 4953; and

(5) refrain from criminal activity.

Scott was imprisoned. Id. at para. 2. Her payment
was received, and the Perry County Clerk’s office
authorized its detainer against Mr. Scott to be lifted.
After returning home from the Perry County
Clerk’s Office (still on February 28, 2002), Stailey
spoke to Tonya, secretary for Mr. Scott's attorney,
Kevin Prosser, to tell her the detainers had been
paid. In that conversation, Stailey told Tonya that
the Perry County Clerk’s Office said that the proper
paperwork needed to be sent to SCI-Somerset in
order for Ronald Scott to be released. Stailey
Affidavit at para. 4. Tonya then responded that she
would call the Perry County Clerk’s Office to see if
they could fax the proper paperwork instead of
sending it to SCI-Somerset. Id. at para. 5. Tonya was
told that the Clerk’s Office said that SCI-Somerset

had to have an origina] Order and that it could not

be faxed to them, it must be mailed. Id. at para. 6.

Se eee eins eee teenie a Seer in.” aris

Then on the same day, February 28, 2002, Stailey
called the Perry County Clerk’s Office to see whether
she could drive a certified copy of the proper
paperwork up to SCI-Somerset instead of having it
mailed. Id. at para. 7. The person Stailey talked to
at the Perry County Clerk’s Office said that they had
already sent the paperwork. Id. This person also
said Stailey would just have to wait for SCI-
Somerset to receive the paperwork. Id. This person
told Stailey that SCI-Somerset should get the
paperwork by Friday, but because it was a Friday,
people might leave early for the weekend and Mr.
Scott might not be released until Monday, March 4,
2002. Id.

SCI-Somerset did not release Scott until Monday,
March 4, 2002, four days after Scott’s bail and all
alleged detainers were paid. Sobina Declaration at 9;

Harkcom Declaration at 7. The Department of

Corrections’ policy was that it would not release a
prisoner due to bail without, “a certified court order
allowing bail, an order setting bail and a signed
receipt that bail was paid.” Checklist attached to
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”)
Bulletin Number 11.5.1-4.4 The DOC interprets this
policy as requiring a mailed copy of the certified
order. Sobina Affidavit at 5; Harkcom Affidavit at 7

and final paragraph of the Affidavit which is

—> -

misnumbered with a second 7.
2. Mr. Scott brought suit in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania under Section 1983 alleging that
Defendants’ continued imprisonment of him after a
Judge had ordered his release violated, inter alia, his
rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth |

Amendments to the United States Constitution.

3 This document is available in the record below.

Judge Caputo granted the Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment. Petitioner's Appendix at 7-22.

Mr. Scott then appealed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which denied his
appeal September 26, 2007, without hearing oral

argument. Petitioner’s Appendix at 2-6.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment lays out one of the most fundamental
principles of any nation governed by the rule of law:
that no State shall “deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.
Const., Amend. XIV, Sec. 1. The Eighth Amendment
further provides “Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.” And the United
States Congress, in passing 42 U.S.C. §1983, has

recognized that victims of Constitutional violations

}
Reis

10

are entitled to be made whole by American tort law
like the victims of any other offense.

In the case at bar, Defendants continued to
detain Mr. Scott for four days after he was granted a
writ of habeas corpus. This was due to a policy that
required regular mail transmission of the writ to the
correctional institution, putatively due to concern for
prison security. While prison operations are entitled

to some deference, Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-

85, (1987), that deference is extremely limited in the
Eighth Amendment context “because the integrity of
the criminal justice system depends on full
compliance with the Eighth Amendment.” Johnson

v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 510-511 (2005). Unless

necessity is shown, searching judicial review is
appropriate. Id.
Moreover, Defendants are not shielded by

qualified immunity. Such immunity protects officials

11

whose “conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The right tu be

promptly released after a writ of habeas is granted is
evident, and its violation not shielded from suit.
I. Defendants Detained Mr. Scott For
Several Days After Judge Rehkamp
Granted His Writ, Violating His Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendment Rights and
Creating a Cause of Action Under Section
1983.
A. By Detaining Mr. Scott for Several

Days After His Writ Was Granted,

Defendants Imposed a Cruel and Unusual
Punishment.

1. Imprisonment subsequent to a lawful order

of release is ipso facto imprisonment without legal

12

authority. As such, it is a cruel, unusual, and
unlawful punishment.

This Court's precedents are clear that
overdetention may be a violation of the Eighth
Amendment. For a sanction imposed by the state‘ to

violate the Eighth Amendment, it must be cruel or

unusual and punitive. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96
(1958). Imprisonment is a punitive sanction. Hutto v.
Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978).

Some punishments violate the Eighth
Amendment because they are “always-and-

everywhere ‘cruel,” such as the rack and the

thumbscrew. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 349,

(2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting). A punishment may

also violate the Eighth Amendment if it violates the :

4 The Eighth Amendment has been interpreted as incorporated
to the states since Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329
U.S. 459 (1947).

13

“evolving standards of decency that mark the

progress of a maturing society.” Trop, supra, 356

U.S. at 101.5 Recently, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed that “cruel and unusual punishments”

must be judged by modern standards. Roper v.

Simmons, 125 U.S. 1183, 1190 (2005). “Cruel and

unusual” is a matter of proportion to the crime, and
specifically “must be tailored to [the defendant’s]

personal responsibility and moral guilt.” Emmund v.

Florida, 458 U.S 782, 801.® For instance, “even one

day in prison would be a cruel and unusual

5 The possibility of interpreting the Eighth Amendment in light
of evolving standards was contemplated at the Founding.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 321 at n.19 (Marshall, J.,
concurring), citing 1 Annals of Cong. 782-83 (1789).

6 The principle that punishment must be tailored to guilt was
handed down to us from the British legal tradition. See Hodges
v. Humkin, 80 Eng.Rep. 1015, 1016 (KB 1615) (“imprisonment
ought always to be according to the quality of the offense”),
Earl of Devon's Case, 11 State Tr. 133, 136 (1689) (overruling a

fine because it was “excessive and exorbitant, against magna
charta, the common right of the subject, and the law of the
land”).

14

punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common cold.”

Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).

This Court has also struck a mandatory life sentence
for overtime parking, a sentence of twelve to twenty
years at hard labor for falsifying public records, and
a life sentence without parole for a bounced check as

“grossly disproportionate.” Rummel v. Estelle, 445

U.S. 263, 273 (1980) , Weems v. United States, 217

U.S. 341, 381 (1910), Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,

279 (1983).?

7 While the application of the principle that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits excessive and disproportionate non-
capital punishments has been criticized, see Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966-985 (opinion of Scalia, J.), this
Court’s jurisprudence had for decades prior and in numerous
cases since interpreted the Eighth Amendment to provide such
protection. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20
(2003), citing Harmelin, supra, at 996-997 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring): “The Eighth Amendment, which forbids cruel and
unusual punishments, contains a ‘narrow proportionality
principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences,” a principle
originating in Anglo-American legal thought in Section 20 of
the Magna Carta and finding support, as well, in the 1689
Declaration of Rights’ rejection of excessive bail and excessive
fines (emphasis added). In this case, moreover, the issue is
incarceration subsequent to a court order granting 2 writ of

—- we ew

15

In this case, whether the punishment imposed
on Mr. Scott is proportional depends on whether this
Court interprets a judicial writ of habeas corpus to
be a decision an officer of a state correctional
institution must abide by immediately, or one he
may abide by at his leisure.

Moreover, the punishment imposed on Mr. Scott
is unusual. As Justices Scalia and Marshall have
noted, the primary precursor to the Bull of Rights,
the 1689 Declaration of Rights, uses “cruel and
unusual” and “cruel and illegal” interchangeably.

Harmelin, supra, at 973-974, citing Furman, supra,

at 318, (Marshall, J., concurring). Given the
centrality of the Declaration of Rights to the

mers understandin “cr and unusual,”
Framers derstand of “cruel and u ual

AS EIS . a

“unusual” must at least include “illegal” |

habeas corpus, rather than the proportionality of a lawfully
imposed sentence.

ROE TN AAT RE SP NRL AL TRG PLL LENE, VOTE REE

16

punishments. And under Pennsylvania law, habeas
relief is provided to those unlawfully, or illegally,

detained. Morman, supra.

Moreover, such punishment is unusual in the
colloquial sense. This Court has found that in a
pretrial context, detention of more than 48 hours
without a judicial finding legitimizing such detention

is impermissible. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,

500 U.S. 44, 58-59 (1991). In this case, Mr. Scott was
detained for twice as long after Judge Rehkamp had
issued an order setting him free. In contrast, the
Seventh Circuit has found that even an eleven-hour
delay in granting a prisoner’s release gives rise toa

jury question. Lewis v. O’Grady, 853 F.2d 1366 (7

Cir. 1988).
It would be relevant to this Court’s Eighth
Amendment inquiry if Mr. Scott’s punishment had

been sanctioned by legislatures, since “the clearest

17

and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary
values is the legislation enacted by the country’s

legislatures,” Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. at 312

(emphasis added; citation omitted). See also Gregg v.

Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 Goint opinion of Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). However, in this case, Mr.
Scott’s unlawful punishment resulted from the
issuance of an internal Department of Corrections
bulletin, which does not provide clear or objective
evidence of Pennsylvania's values, let hen the
nation’s. Where unelected bureaucrats impose
punishments by administrative fiat far from the
light of democratic scrutiny, those punishments do
not have the same democratic stamp of approval as
those imposed pursuant to publicly debated
legislation passed by representatives accountable to

their constituents.

18

3. The court below did not apply any of this
Court’s numerous relevant precedents in evaluating
Mr. Scott’s Constitutional claims. Instead, the panel
rested its decision on Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.

319, 335 (1976). However, Mathews deals not with

unlawful incarceration but with Social Security
benefits and with a Fourteenth Amendment property
interest rather than a liberty interest. This Court
has set out far more directly applicable precedent,

such as the Turner line of cases.

In Turner and its progeny, this Court has
recognized that prison operations are due deference.

Turner, supra, at 84-85, Overton v. Bazzetta, 539

U.S. 126, 132 (2003), Banks v. Beard, 548 U.S. _ ,

(2006). However, this Court has made clear that
such deference does not shield an “exaggerated

response,” Turner, 482 U.S. at 87, and that deference

is extremely limited where there are ready

19

alternatives for furthering the governmental
interest. Id. at 90 (additionally requiring that courts
consider the connection between a prison regulation
and the governmental interest at stake; alternative
means for prisoners to exercise the right at issue;
and the impact on guards, other inmates, and the

allocation of prison resources). In Johnson, supra,

this Court explained further that where a prisoner’s
right need not “necessarily be compromised for the
sake of proper prison administration,” “searching
judicial review” is appropriate. 543 U.S. at 510-511.
Defendants’ conduct in this case cannot withstand
such searching review. In the pretrial context, this
Court has placed explicit limits on the amount of
time for which a prisoner may be held awaiting a

probable cause determination. McLaughlin, supra.

While the issues accompanying release of a prisoner

are different than those facing officials preparing for

20

a probable cause determination, lower courts have
consistently found that if anything, release should be
a more expeditious process.

4. Qualified immunity does not shield

defendants’ unlawful conduct. Under Harlow, supra,

qualified immunity protects officials whose conduct a
reasonable person could have understood not to
violate any of the plaintiff's rights. In this case,
however, the right to promptly be released once a

court orders it is self-evident. See McCurry v. Moore,

242 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1178 (N.D. Fla. 2002) ("The
eduriyine constitutional right is well established.
When a prisoner's sentence has expired, he is
entitled to release.") Defendants adopted a dilatory
policy that would inevitably lead to the violation of
Mr. Scott’s constitutional rights and the rights of
every prisoner placed in a similar situation.

The question of whether a right is clearly established

nhe

21

is considered de novo. Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S.

510, 516 (1997), citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S.

552, 558 (1988). For a right to be clearly established,
it is not necessary that “the very action in question
has previously been held unlawful,” merely that “the

unlawfulness must be apparent.” Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987), cited in Cannon

v. Macon County, 15 F.3d 1022 (11t Cir. 1994).

Moreover, the fact that deliberate indifference has
infected an administrative procedure for releasing
prisoners rather than taking place only in an
isolated incident provides no heightened immunity.

Berry v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764 (9t Cir. 2004). In Berry,

three arrestees detained between 26 and 29 hours —
less than one-third of the overdetention imposed on
Mr. Scott — brought suit against a sheriff in his
official capacity. The Court of Appeals found that

summary judgment was inappropriate because there

22

was a question of fact as to whether the county’s
policy amounted to deliberate indifference to the
detainees’ Constitutional rights. Similarly, in this
case, the unreasonable and unnecessary use of
regular mail rather than a fax or a sheriff reflects
deliberate indifference to the certain overdetentions
that will result from a multiple-day delay before the
correctional institution in question can even begin

processing the prisoner’s release. See, e.g., Fowler v.

Block, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1277-79 (C.D. Cal. 1998),
rev'd on other grounds, 185 F.3d 866 (9th Cir. 1999)
(“"in the face of [a] state court's ‘clearly established'
release order, it was unreasonable for the [Sheriff] to
do more than simply "check-out" the Plaintiff after

he was returned to custody”), cited approvingly in

Streit v. County of LA, 236 F.3d 552, 556 at n.1 (9t

Cir. 2001).

23

At a minimum, summary judgment on this issue
is inappropriate. Summary judgment should be
granted only when “the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 56(c). To prevail, a
moving party without the burden of proof must
allege a lack of evidence which could meet the

burden in question. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The non-moving party may
then defeat the motion by setting out, by affidavit or
as otherwise provided in "Rule 56, “specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250
(1986); "Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 56(e). In evaluating a

summary judgment motion, the Supreme Court has

24

held that courts should draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530

U.S. 133, 150-151 (2000), citing Lytle v. Household

Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 554-555 (1990). In a Section

1983 case, a court’s role is to determine whether
"{t]Jaken in the lhght most favorable to the party
asserting the injury, [] the facts alleged show the
[defendants’] conduct violated a constitutional right,"

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).

In the instant case, Defendants implemented
a policy that was obviously going to result in the
unwarranted punishment of every prisoner who was
granted a habeas writ by delaying his release. This
Court has held that where the risk of such
unwarranted punishment is obvious, knowledge of
the risk on the part of the defendants may be

inferred. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844

SSRN AGE AA De LAE TE TUN RIES | BR

25

(1994). Consequently, Mr. Scott has raised a prima
facie case that Defendants knowingly violated his
rights. Whether such a violation constitutes
deliberate indifference and so gives rise to Section

1983 hability is “a classic issue for a fact finder.”

See Davis yv. Hall, 375 F.3d 703, 719 (8th Cir. 2004),

citing Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 577

(7 Cir. 1998). See also Berry, supra, at 769 (the

factors contributing to a delay in implementing a
prisoner's release are “issues of fact, however, not
matters of law” and so questions for a jury rather
than appropriate issues to resolve at summary
judgment).
B. By Detaining Mr. Scott for Several
Days After His Writ Was Granted,
Defendants Violated His Fourteenth

Amendment Right to be Free From

Continued Detention.

26

1. A United States citizen may be deprived of
his liberty only after being accorded due process of
law. An administrative procedure that incarcerates
him for several days after his release his been
ordered deprives him of his liberty and affords him
no process at all.

The Ninth Circuit has read this Court to suggest
that an imprisoned individual may have a due
process right to be released in a reasonable time

after the reason for his detention ends. Brass v.

County of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 1192 (9 Cir.

2001), citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144-

46 (1979). Lower courts have repeatedly recognized
a Fourteenth Amendment right “to be free from
continued detention after it was or should have
been known that the detainee was entitled to

release.” Cannon v. Macon County, 1 F.3d 1558,

1563 (11th Cir. 1993). See also Fairley v. Luman,

27°

281 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir. 2002); Sanders Vv.
English, 950 F.2d 1152, 1162 (5th Cir. 1992).

In the matter sub judice, once Judge Rehkamp
signed Mr. Scott’s writ of habeas corpus, it was and
should have been known that Mr. Scott was entitled
to release. To the extent that officials at SCI-
Somerset were not aware for an additional four days,
that delay was due to an official policy that
inevitably delayed their receipt of Mr. Scott’s writ.

Applying the Mathews test to overdetention, as

the Third Circuit suggested, demonstrates
Defendants’ actions were constitutionally

impermissible. Under Mathews, a court should

balance three factors in determining the adequacy of
procedural safeguards provided to individuals whose
property interests are at stake: (1) the private

interest that will be affected by the official action; (2)

the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest

28

through the procedures used, and probable value, if
any, of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the
government's interest, including the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedures would entail. 424 U.S. at 332-
335. Here, an interest in avoiding unlawful
incarceration is very strong, stronger than any
possible peawente interest. That freedom is “at the
core of the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause.” Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)
(citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316
(1982)). Indeed, "next to bodily security, freedom of
choice and movement has the highest place in the
spectrum of values recognized by our Constitution."
Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1109 (3d Cir.
1989). As a result, Justice Kennedy has written,

“where the right at stake is the right to be free from

confinement at all” prisoners are entitled to

29

substantial procedural protections. Wilkinson v.

Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 225 (2003).

It is certain that individuals will wrongfully be
deprived of their protected liberty interest if the
government employs a more time-consuming
procedure, and the government has merely asserted
but provided no evidence to support the contention
that there is any fiscal or administrative benefit to
using regular mail rather than a speedier means of
communication. Forging a document and sending it
through the mail, for instance, is not obviously more
complicated than forging a document, faxing it, and
calling for confirmation.® Indeed, mailing the

original poses an unacceptable risk that it could be

8 Indeed, Pennsylvania permits faxed copies to be admitted into
evidence in court — so Defendants would suggest that they can
serve as the basis for a conviction or an acquittal, but not as a
justification for release. See 42 Pa. C.S.A. §6109. Sending the
order, or a copy, with the sheriffs who will return the prisoner
to his correctional institution is likely to be more secure than
either a fax or regular mail.

30

lost in the mail, requiring an additional hearing to
issue a second “original” order.

Defendants’ assertions fall well short of
demonstrating that the policy in question is
“necessary for proper prison administration,” as
required by Johnson, supra. Defendants have also
not shown that alternative methods would be more
expensive or more administratively complicated.

2. Qualified immunity does not shield
defendants’ unlawful conduct. As supra, qualified
immunity protects officials whose conduct a
reasonable person could have understood not to
violate any of the plaintiffs rights. The right to be
promptly released once a court orders it is self-

evident. McCurry, supra.

3. At the least, summary judgment on this
issue is inappropriate. Defendants have provided

only a rote, conclusory assertion that transmitting

31

original orders by regular mail is essential to prison
security. Courts draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the non-moving party at this stage of the

litigation, Reeves, supra. Thus for summary

judgment to be appropriate, defendants would have
to have proffered enough evidence to convince this
Court that it would be unreasonable to draw the
inference that faxing Judge Rehkamp’s order or
sending it with the sheriffs who returned Mr. Scott
to the prison would be equally consistent with the
demands of prison security and the genuine need to
avoid forgery and improper release of prisoners. The
entire body of evidence submitted in support of this
assertion is the statement that “This policy is
necessary for security reasons and is required in
order to guard against falsification of records and to
ensure that the inmate’s release is proper and in

accordance with the Court’s instructions.” Sobina

32

Declaration at para. 6. This Court can and shovid
give deference to the reasonable needs of prison

operations under Turner, but that deference does not

extend to shielding unlawful conduct based on brief,
conclusory, and unsubstantiated assertions like
Defendant Sobina’s.

II. This Case Provides an Ideal Vehicle
for Addressing the Important Legal Question
of When a Plaintiff Subjected to Overdetention
may Recover Under 42 U.S.C. §1983.

A. There is a split in the circuits on this
issue.

1. There is no consensus in the lower courts on
what constitutes a permissible length of time to

effectuate an inmate’s release. Berry v. Baca, 369

F.3d at 771. In Berry, the Ninth Circuit noted that it

was not clear that the 48-hour period set out for pre-

trial detention in McLaughlin, supra, was

Pear

pe

33

appropriate for detention subsequent to court-
ordered silat and that Lewis, supra, set out no
zone of presumptive reasonableness. Id.

Since Berry, the Eighth Circuit has also
addressed the issue in a number of cases, See, e.g.

Russell v. Hennepin County, 420 F.3d 841(8th Cir.

2005); Golberg v. Hennepin County, 417 F.3d 808

(8th Cir. 2005); Luckes v. Hennepin County, 415

F.3d 936 (8th Cir. 2005) and Lund v. Hennepin

County, 427 F.3d 1123 (8 Cir. 2005). The panel in

Lund, summarizing, noted that in cases involving a

24 hour detention after an inmate was told he would

be released “shortly after booking”, Luckes, a 10

hour overdetention due to a new computerized .
prison management system, Golberg, and a six day
overdetention due to an administrative error,

Russell, that Circuit had upheld summary judgment

in favor of administrators. 427 U.S. at 1127.

34

Consequently, the panel found that “Lund's claim...
that the County's outprocessing procedures delayed
his release for twelve hours with the knowledge of
the County and its officials” was also inadequate. Id.
Lund has been followed by numerous Eighth Circuit

cases since. See, e.g., Pederson v. Hennepin County,

170 Fed. Appx. 14 (8 Cir. 2006), Oertwig v.
Hennepin County, 162 Fed. Appx. 683 (8* Cir.

2006), Carter v. Hennepin County, 162 Fed. Appx.

682 (8th Cir. 2006), Sizer v. County of Hennepin, 162

Fed. Appx. 681 (8'> Cir. 2006), Dye v. Hennepin

County, 162 Fed. Appx. 678 (8th Cir. 2006), Murphy
v. County of Hennepin, 162 Fed. Appx. 677 (8 Cir.

2006), and Heryla v. Hennepin County, 162 Fed.

Appx. 676 (8‘» Cir. 2006). However, none of these
appellate cases involve an overdetention of more

than 24 hours.

The Seventh Circuit’s seminal case on the

35

subject is Lewis, supra. As noted supra, it provides
no zone of presumptive reasonableness to shield
overdetentions from judicial review. Indeed, the
Circuit has required justifications for even
detentions as short as four hours. Moore v.
Marketplace Restaurant, Inc., 754 F.2d 1336 (7 Cir.
1985), Gramenos v. Jewel Companies, Inc., 797 F.2d
432 (7'h Cir. 1986).9

The Fifth Circuit’s caselaw is vaguer. Whirl v.

Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5+ Cir. 1968), cert denied, 396

U.S. 901, 90 S. Ct. 210, 24 L. Ed. 2d 177, notes that a

jailer’s duty to effect his prisoner’s release is

9 In a subsequent decision, the Circuit held that Bradley Center
ticket scalpers who were detained up to twenty-one hours did
not have a cause of action for their overdetention. Chortek v.
City of Milwaukee, 356 F.3d 740 (7*» Cir. 2004). However,
Chortek dealt with individuals detained for less than one day

rather than four, immediately subsequent to their arrest rather
than subsequent to the issuance of an order granting their
release, and delayed only by the “natural backlog in processing
at PPS” rather than the inevitable result of government policy.
Id. at 748.

36

breached after “a reasonable length of time,” though
considerably less than the nine months at issue in
that case. Id. at 792. Applying Whirl, the Fifth
Circuit also found that thirty days was
unreasonable. Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527, 532
(5th Cir. 1980).

In sum, there is considerable disagreement
within the circuits on the deference courts ought to
provide for prison administrators in granting a

7 reasonable amount of time to ensure a prisoner's
release. However, the District Court for the District
of Columbia recently found that “the great weight of
precedent suggests that release must occur within a
matter of hours after the right to it accrues, and that
after some period of hours -- not days -- a

presumption of unreasonableness, and thus

unconstitutionality, will set in.” Barnes v. District of

Columbia, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20856 (D.D.C.

37

2007), at 12.

As the D.C. District Court’s conclusion
suggests, while the circuits are divided on what
amount of elapsing time will forfeit administrators’
presumption of reasonableness, it is clear that in the
matter sub judice, the Third Circuit’s brusque
dismissal of Mr. Scott’s constitutional claims placed
it on the most extremely deferential end of the
spectrum in terms of standing up against state
overdetention.

2. This case provides an opportunity for this
Court to resolve the Circuit split by adopting a

presumptive limit, akin to Mclaughlin’s, for

overdetention of prisoners whose release has been

ordered or whose sentences have expired. Several

decisions argue for a lower limit. See Brass, 328 F.3d
at 1202 (“One might conclude that when a court

orders a prisoner released - or when, for example, a

38

prisoner's sentence has been completed - the outer
bounds for releasing the prisoner should be less than
48 hours’); Berry, 379 F.3d at 771-72 (‘Applying
McLaughlin's stringent proof requirement to post-
release detentions of less than forty-eight hours
would be difficult to reconcile with the fact that, for
the plaintiffs at issue here, there has been a judicial
determination that they are entitled to freedom from
the criminal justice system. Thus, the societal
interest in the processes that result in delay, while
significant, may not be as weighty as in the probable
cause context’).

Analyzing those cases, one commenter has
proposed a 24-hour presumptive limit.!° Patricia E.

Simone, NOTE, A Presumptive Constitutional Time

Limit for Administrative Overdetention of Inmates

10 Justice Scalia proposed a 24-hour time limit for probable
cause determinations in McLaughlin. 500 U.S. at 70 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).

39

Entitled to Release, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 719, 738

(2006). In the instant case, McLaughlin's
presumptive time limit was doubled — so whether or
not the jurisprudence and scholarship suggesting a
lower time limit is appropriate in this context are

correct or feasible, the McLaughlin standard itself

was dramatically exceeded and liability is
appropriate. Moreover, the Eighth Circuit cases

refusing to impose liability all dealt with shorter

it
i
;
}
i”
j
;
|
3

time periods. Consequently, the ambiguity of the

caselaw on this issue is important, but does not in

any way alter the conclusion that to incarcerate a

prisoner for four days after he is granted a writ of

RAS

habeas corpus violates his Constitutional rights.
) Writing for the McLaughlin court, Justice

O’Connor also explained why a bright-line rule is

necessary and desirable:

40

[A]s lower court decisions applying Gerstein
have demonstrated, it is not enough to say that
probable cause determinations must be
“prompt.” This vague standard simply has not
provided sufficient guidance. Instead, it has led
to a flurry of systemic challenges to city and
county practices, putting federal judges in the
role of making legislative judgments and
overseeing local jailhouse operations.
500 U.S. at 55-56 (citations omitted).
Similarly, overdetention has been challenged in a
wide variety of ways, and different Circuits have
adopted different standards. A bright-line rule
delineating where the zone of presumptive
reasonableness, if any, ends, and when prisoners
have a clearly established right to release, would end
the proliferation of different “federal law” standards
in different circuits, provide guidance to
administrators and confidence in a genuinely prompt

release to prisoners.

3. The circuit split does not mitigate against the

conclusion that Mr. Scott’s clearly established

41

Constitutional rights were violated. Initially, the
appellate cases reflectin, the proliferation of
standards applied by different Circuits to cases like
Mr. Scott’s differ on whether the right to release in
certain time periods is clearly established, not
whether it exists. Moreover, while there is division
among the Circuits about where to draw the line on
overdetention, neither Defendants nor the Third
Circuit have cited caselaw finding an overdetention
this lengthy to be reasonable. In a legal context
where the Circuits are deeply divided, the Third
Circuit has dramatically decreased prisoners’ legal
recourse when subjected to administrative
overdetention.

B. Overdetention is a serious and
widespread problem.

1. Several circuits have had to confront suits

challenging overdetention of prisoners. Los Angeles

Hg

42

County has been forced to settle a suit by a class of

400,000 overdetained inmates for $27 million.
Simone, supra, at 721, citing Steven H. Pollak,

Georgia County Faces Class Action over Jail

Procedures, Recorder (S.F.), Apr. 30, 2004, at 3.

Similar claims have arisen in Atlanta, Chicago,

Washington, Hawau, and now Pennsylvania. Id. at

719-720, citing Rhonda Cook, Fulton Jailers Accused

of Holding Inmates Too Long, Atlanta J.-Const., Jan.

28, 2005, at Al; James G. Sotos, Holding Pattern: |
Detainee States Claim, Chi. Daily L. Bull., July 22,

2004, at 6; Jason Cherkis, Hard Time: Federal Judge

Slams the District for Overdetaining Inmates, Wash.

City Paper, April 4, 2007; Barnes, supra; Bynum v.

District of Columbia, 214 F.R.D. 27, 42 (D.D.C. :
2003); Tapaoan, et al. v. Hawan, Civil No. 1-000815

(D.Hi. 2003) (settled for more than $1 million).

2. In each case, overdetention hits at the heart

43

of a society based on the rule of law: the principle
that the government may not hold one of its citizens
in custody without judicial approval. Federal courts
have long recognized, as the Fifth Circuit did in
Whirl, that to hold officials liable before a
“reasonable” amount of time has passed would be
unjust. However, without guidance from this Court,
what constitutes a reasonable amount of time can
and does vary case-by-case and circuit-by-circuit. On
such a fundamental issue, a consistent rule is
necessary and appropriate. Such a rule would
provide prison officials better guidance and inmates
awaiting release surety that they could expect to be
released within a certain amount of time and, if not,

that thoy would have legal recourse.

44

C. This Case is an Ideal Vehicle for
Resolving the Question.

This case presents no extraneous issues.
Defendants’ statements are clear that Mr. Scott
remained in prison subsequent to Judge Rehkamp’s
order granting his release due to official Department
of Corrections policy, and give a cursory justification
of that policy. See Sobina Declaration. This cursory
justification is inadequate to support summary
judgment, so the issue in the case is clear: whether
an inmate who has been detained for several days
after the issuance of a court order granting his

release has a cause of action to recover.

45

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for a

Writ of Certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted by,

f-

Michael D. Reed
Mette Evans & Woodside,
P.C.

3401 North Front Street,
Suite 202

Harrisburg, PA 17110
(717) 232-5000

Dated: 12/20/07 _—si By:

Elizabeth J. Goldstein
Arthur R. Traldi
Elizabeth Goldstein, P.C.
355 North 215 Street,
Suite 202

Camp Hill, PA 17011
(717) 724-0266

RONALD K. SCOTT
Petitioner,
v.

KEITH B. QUIGLEY, ET AL.
Respondents.

Appendix

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 05-3330

RONALD K. SCOTT,
Appellant

VS.

KEITH B. QUIGLEY, Honorable Judge; JOSEPH
REHKAMP, Honorable Judge; R. SCOTT CRAMER,
District Attorney; CHAD CHENOT, District
Attorney; S.C. WALTZ III, Public Defender;

BRENDALBRIGHT, Clerk of Courts; ELIZABETH
FROWNFETTER, District Justice; JAMES MOYER,
JR., District Justice; JEFFREY A. BEARD,
Commissioner, PA DOC; RAY J. SOBINA,
Superintendent, SCI Somerset; PERRY COUNTY,
PA; PA DEPT OF CORRECTSION.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Civ. No. 03-CV-00768)
District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R.34.1(a)
September 18, 2007
Before: SLOVITER, SMITH and WEIS,

Circuit Judges
Filed September 26, 2007

Opinion

WEIS, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff in this action was convicted of
robbery in state court on April 17, 2000, and began to
serve his sentence. The court granted bail, which
plaintiff posted on February 13, 2002. At that time,
he was imprisoned in State Correctional Institution
at Somerset (“SCI-Somerset”). He was not released,
however, because of detainers lodged against him.

On Thursday, February 28, 2002, the
plaintiffs detainers were paid and the court ordered

him released on bail. That same day, the Perry

County Sheriffs Office sent a certified copy of the

order granting the plaintiffs released to officials at
SCI-Somerset via United States Postal Service. SCI-
Somerset received the order four days later on
Monday, March 4. Upon receiving the documents,
officials at SCI-Somerset completed esiilieakion
procedures and approved the plaintiffs release that
day.

At that time, Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections policies required satisfaction of all
outstanding detainers before an inmate could be
released. Moreover, an inmate was not to be
released on bail until prison officials received an
original, certified court order allowing bail, an order
setting bail, and a signed receipt that bail was paid.
Defendant, Superintendent Sobina, stated that these
policies were “necessary for security reasons and

[were] required in order to guard against falsification

of records and to ensure that the inmate’s release is

proper and in accordance with the court’s
instructions”.

Plaintiff alleges he was unlawfully detained
during the four days that elapsed between the state
court order and his actual release. He asserted
numerous federal and state constitutional claims
against various state officials. The District Court
dismissed all of the plaintiffs claims except his
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against
corrections officials Sobina and Beard. Summary
judgment was later entered in their favor. Plaintiff
has appealed the grant of summary judgment.

The District Court dismissed the plaintiff's
Eight Amendment claim because he did not show
that defendants acted with deliberate indiffvrence.

See Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682,686 (3d Cirt,

1993). The evidence supports the District Court’s

conclusion that prison officials responded promptly

to the plaintiffs request for inecenitiion and acted
quickly to release him once they received the
necessary paperwork. Moreover, plaintiff has not
shown that he was denied due process. The
regulatory procedures adopted by the Department of
Corrections are reasonable and constitutional. See

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)

(applying three-part analysis to determine
constitutionality of administrative procedures). The
District Court, thacelors, properly granted summary
judgment for defendants.

Accordingly, we will affirm the Order of the

District Court.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF
PENNSYLVNIA
RONALD K. SCOTT,

Plaintiff,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:03-CV-768

V.
(JUDGE CAPUTO)
KEITH B. QUIGLEY, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the Court is Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants
Jeffery A. Beard and Ray J. Sobina. (Dec. 40.) The
Court finds that Plaintiff has filed to submit evidence
from which a reasonable fact-finder could conclude
that Defendants Beard and Sobina, or any other
official, acted with deliberate indifference regarding

Plaintiffs complaint concerning his continued

incarceration. Accordingly, the Court will grant
Defendants’ motion. In addition, the Court will
dismiss Plaintiffs remaining state law claims for
lack of jurisdiction pursuant to § 1331 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367.
BACKGROUND

On April 17, 2000, Plaintiff Ronald K. Scott
was convicted of two counts of robbery. On April 27,
2000, Judge Quigley, formerly a defendant in this
matter, sentenced Plaintiff to a term of incarceration
of twelve to twenty-four years. Plaintiff then
appealed this conviction. On July 31, 2001, Judge
Rehkamp, also formerly a defendant in this matter,
issued an order granting Plaintiff bail pending his
appeal. Judge Rehkamp set bail at $35,000.00 to be
paid in a form approved by him. After an

unsuccessful attempt at posting bail with

unencumbered property, Plaintiff posted bail on

February 13, 2002, through a bail bondsman.
Plaintiff was not released, however, because of
previously imposed detainers. On February 28,
2002, Plaintiff paid all detainers and Judge
Rehkamp ordered that Plaintiff be released. A
certified copy of the order was sent via United States
Postal Service on February 28, 2002, and was
received by the Department of Corrections on March

4, 2002. Plaintiff was released on bail that same day.

Plaintiff commenced the instant action pro se
on May 7, 2003. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleged
violations of both the United States Constitution as
well as the Constitution of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. Defendants filed the instant motion
on February 28, 2005. Plaintiff filed a brief in

opposition, to which Defendants replied. The matter

if fully briefed and ripe for disposition.

10 mers

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if “the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.56(c).
A fact is material if proof of its existence or
nonexistence might affect the outcome of the suit
under the applicable substantive law. Se Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Where there is no material fact in dispute, the
moving party need only establish that it is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Where, however, there
is a disputed issue of material fact, summary
judgment is appropriate only if the factual dispute 1s

not a genuine one. See id. at 248. An issue of

11

material fact is genuine if “a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

Where there is a material fact in dispute, the
moving party has the initial burden of proving that:
(1) there is no genuine issue of material fact; and (2)
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR
R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: Civil 2D § 2727 (2d ed. 1983). The
moving party may present its own evidence or, where
the nonmoving party has the burden of proof, simply
point out the Court that “the nonmoving party has
failed to make a sufficient showing of an essential
element of her case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

All doubts as to the existence of a genuine
issue of material fact must be resolved against the

moving party, and the entire record must be

12

examined in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. See White v. Westinghouse Elec.
Co., 862 F.2D 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1988). Once the moving
party has satisfied its initial burden, the burden
shifts to the nonmoving party to either present
affirmative evidence supporting its version of the
material facts or to refute the moving party’s
contention that the facts entitle it to judgment as a
matter of law. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-257.
The Court need not accept mere conclusory
allegations, whether they are made in the complaint
or a sworn stateznent. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed’n,
497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990). In deciding a motion for
summary judgment, “the judge’s function is not
himself to weigh the evidence and determine the
truth of the matter but to determine whether there is

a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.

13

DISCUSSION

1) Federal Claims

As noted in the Court’s previous Memoranda,
the Complaint alleges violations of the Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth and fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution. In the Court’s September 9,
2003, Memoranda, all of the Plaintiffs claims
brought pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments were dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. (Doc. 16 at
8-15.) Therefore, the only remaining claim against
Defendants Beard and Sobina is that they violated
the rights afforded Plaintiff under the Eight
Amendment by failing to release him from prison
upon the order issued by the Honorable C. Joseph
Rehkamp on February 28, 2002, because of DOC

Policy 11.5.1-4.

ere

14

In its previous Memorandum, the Court raised
the question concerning the proper standard under
which Plaintiffs Eight Amendment claim should be
evaluated. (Doc. 16 at 15.) The Court noted that
under the standard set forth in Tuner v. Safley, 482
U.S. 78 (1987), DOC Policy 11.5.1-4 must be
reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests. (id.) This was in error. Eighth
Amendment claims are subject to the more exacting
deliberate indifference standard “because the
integrity of the criminal justice system depends on
full compliance with the Eighth Amendment.”
Johnson v. California.—U.S.--, 125 S. Ct. 1141, 1149-
50 (2005). Accordingly, the Court must evaluate the
constitutionality of DOC Policy 11.5.1-4 under the
standard set forth by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in Moore v. Tartler, 986

F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1993).

15

Plaintiff alleges that DOC Policy 11.5.1-4
caused him to be subject to incarceration without
penological justification. To establish § 1983 liability
for incarceration without penological justification in
violation of the Eighth Amendment, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
requires the convergence of three elements. Moore,
986 F.2d at 686 (3d Cir. 1993). First, Plaintiff must
demonstrate that a prison official had knowledge of
Plaintiffs problem, and thus of the risk that
unwarranted punishment was being, or would be
inflicted. Jd. Second, Plaintiff must establish that
the official either failed to act or took ineffectual
action under the circumstances, thus demonstrating
a deliberate indifference to the plight of Plaintiff. Jd.
Finally, Plaintiff must show a causal connection

between the official’s response to the problem and

the infliction of the unjustified detention. Jd.

16

On February 25, 2002, Plaintiff filed an
Inmate’s Request to Staff Members. (Doc. 41, Ex. 1-
B.) In the request, Plaintiff stated that his
incarceration was being continued despite the fact
that he had been granted bail. (td.) A Department of
Corrections official responded to Plaintiff the same
day indicating that the delay was caused by a lack of
certified paperwork. (id.) The evidence also suggests
that at the time Plaintiff filed the request, he was
not entitled to be released because of the existence of
detainers lodged against him. (Doc. 41, Ex. 1 { 8.)
The evidence submitted indicates that on February
28, 2002, Plaintiff satisfied the detainers in full. :
(Doc. 41, Ex. 1 | 9; Doc. 41, Ex. 1-E; Doc. 45, Ex. A {
1.) That same day, Judge Rehkamp ordered Plaintiff
be released from incarceration. (Doc. 41, Ex. 1-D.)

The order was then sent by the Perry County

Sheriffs Department to the Department of

eo

17

Corrections on February, 28, 2002. (Doc. 41, Ex. 1-C;
Doc. 45, Ex. A J 8.) The evidence submitted
indicates that a letter from the Perry County
Sheriffs Department and Judge Rehkamp’s order
was received by the Department of Corrections on
March 4, 2002. (Doc. 41, Ex. 1 | 9; Doc. 41, Ex. 2 { 7;
Doc. 41, Ex. 1-C.) Plaintiff failed to submit any
evidence to the contrary. It is undisputed that the
Department of Corrections released Plaintiff on
March 4, 2002.

Deliberate indifference may be established
where a prison official refuses to address a question
of incarceration without penological justification
brought to his attention by an inmate. Sample v.
Diecks, 885 F. .2d 1099, 1110 (3d Cir. 1989). Unlike
situations where prison officials stood idly by while

prisoners’ contentions about the legality of their

continued detention when unaddressed, there is no

18

evidence in the instance matter that plaintiff
suffered a similar fate. In fact, Plaintiff has filed to
submit any evidence from which a reasonable fact-
finder could conclude that Defendants Beard or
Sobina, or any other official, acted with deliberate
indifference. Rather, the evidence suggest quite the
opposite. Consequently, the Court will grant
Defendant’s motion.
2) State Claims

Although never addressed previously, a review
of Plaintiffs Complaint reveals that he has asserted
violations of various provisions of the Constitution of
the commonwealth of Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1 at 5.)
The Court may exercise jurisdiction over these

claims pursuant to § 1367. Section 1367(a) states:

[I]n any civil action of
which the district courts
have original jurisdiction,
the district courts shall
have supplemental

19

jurisdiction over all other
claims that are so related
to claims in the action
within such original
jurisdiction that they form
part of the same case or
controversy under Article
III of the United States
Constitution. Such
supplemental jurisdiction
shall include claims that
involve the joinder or
intervention of additiomal
parties.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Cases that “derive from a
common nucleus of operative fact” with federal
claims are part of the same case or controversy.
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
725 (1966). The state law claims raised by Plaintiff
derive from the same operative facts as the federal
law claims, giving the Court jurisdiction under §
1367(a). The Court, however, “may decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under

subsection (a) if ... the district court has dismissed

20

all claims over which it has original jurisdiction

.... 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The Supreme Court has
indicated that “if the federal claims should be
dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial
in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be
dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers, 383 U.S. at
726.

Here, the Court will grant summary judgment
on the only remaining federal claim. The remaining
claims allege violations of various provisions of the
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
The Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over these
state law claims. Therefore, the Court will dismiss
the remaining state law claims for lack of jurisdiction
pursuant to § 1367(c).

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff failed to submit any evidence that

Defendants Beard or Sobina, or any other official,

21

acted with deliberate indifference. Accordingly, the

Court will grant Defendants’ motion. In addition,

the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs remaining state law
claims for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to § 1367(c).

An appropriate Order follows:

June 7, 2005 /s/ A. Richard Caputo

Date A. Richard Caputo
United States District Judge

22

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
RONALD K. SCOTT,

Plaintiff , CIVIL
ACTION NO. 3:03-CV-768 ,

Vv.

(JUDGE CAPUTO)
KEITH B. QUIGLEY, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

NOW, this 7% day of Jude, 2005, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that:

(1) Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment
(Doc. 40) is GRANTED.

(2) Plaintiffs remaining state law claims are

DISMISSED.

(3) The Clerk of the Court shall mark this case
CLOSED.

/s/ A. Richard Caputo

A. Richard Caputo
United States District Judge

23

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF THE 41ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
PERRY COUNTY BRANCH

RONALD KEVIN SCOTT: NO. 501 OF 1999

ORDER

AND NOW, February 28, 2002, this matter
having come forward on a habeas corpus matter,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DIRECTED
that this Court’s order dated July 31, 2001, setting
bail in the amount of $35,000, in a form to be
approved by this Court; is hereby confirmed as it
appears to the Court this date that bail has been
posted by a bail bondsman,

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND DIRECTED

that the defendant be released on bail on the

standard terms and conditions of bail, with the

24

additional condition that if the defendant is involved

in any criminal activity, then bail shall be revoked.

cc:

BY THE COURT,

/s/

C. JOSEPH REHKAMP, JUDGE

DA’s Office

Kevin Prosser, Esq.
Probation

File

SCI

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386010_0679%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.