# Appendix — Tripati v. United States (No. 07-807) > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386010_0402%3A2 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Appendix - **Published:** January 1, 2007 ## Text A # Supreme Court US. 07-807 JUN 2- 2007 (2 OFFICE OF THE CLERK IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED S12a'1rES ) ANANT KUMAR TRIPATI, ) Petitioner, ) ) UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR ) THE NINTH CIRCUIT, GUNN McKAY; DEAN ) CHATFIELD; DONALD CONRAD; MARICOPA ) COUNTY ATTORNEY; COUNTY OF MARICOPA; ) TERRY BLAKE; RONALD HARRIS; DICK MESH; ) GERALD GRANT; RICHARD M. ROMLEY; ) TERESA ARCHULETA; VINCENT H. TOLINO; | ) ESTATE OF TERESA ARCHULETA; ED KING; ) BETSEY BAYLESS; TOM RAWLES; DON ) STAPLEY; MARY ROSE WILCOX; DORA ) SCHRIRO, ADOC DIRECTOR; TERRY GODDARD ) ATTORNEY GENERAL ARIZONA; MICHAEL ) MUKASEY, ATTONEY GENERAL UNITED ) STATES ) Respondents, ) ) APPENDIX IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT VOLUME ONE OF THREE ANANT KUMAR TRIPATI P.O. BOX 70662, PASADENA, CA 91117 (626)796-2231, PETITIONER PRO PER Appendix 03/09/07 Order Denying Mandate Recall 04/22/07 Order Denying Motion to Abate Time 11/03/06 Decision Court Appeals 09/16/04 Order Denying 144 Motion 10/16/03 Decision, Judgment 10/16/03 Order 09/27/04 Order Denying Reconsideration 10/26/93 Order Denying Summary Judgment 03/28/94 Order Adopting Stipulation 04/08/94 Order Adopting Stipulation 03/30/05 Order Denying Judgment On Pleadings 09/30/96 Denial of Summary Judgment 01/22/97 Denial of Heck 04/29/97 Denial of Reconsideration 09/16/07 Denial of Reconsideration . 70 . 74 12/04/01 Screening Order 04/22/02 Screening Order 07/15/02 Report 06/11/03 Order Adopting Report 06/11/03 Order 06/22/04; 455 Order 01/10/02; Fifth Amended Complaint 06/23/92: Return to Search Warrant ARVITA Missing Software Joint Pretrial Order Transcript of Pretrial Conference Motion to Recall Mandate Petition for Rehearing and Hearing En Banc 02/24/04 Order 03/08/04 Mandamus Petition to Recall Refusal to Submit Petition to Recall 01/28/04 Order 03/21/03 Order 12/23/03 Order Report and Recommendation Habeas Corpus 04/06/95 Letter By Victim To Arizona Attorney General 09/10/96 Victim's Affidavit 07/12/93 Letter Witness Tampering 06/16/93 Memo Falsifying Evidence 08/15/1994 Interview Memos on Lost Evidence Memo Terry Stewart Memo on Falsifying Evidence Inmate Response Letter Inmate Response Letter Affidavit of Witness Report On Judicial Misconduct 12/20/06, Memo Doc, Pp. 406 Pp. 420 Pp. 432 Pp. 447 Pp. 459 Pp. 461 Pp. 464 Pp. 465 Pp. 468 Pp. 475 Pp. 477 Pp. 479 Pp. 48] Pp. 482 Pp. 483 Pp. 485 Pp. 492 10/29/99 ADOC Report Pp. 497 Affidavit Judy Gabbert Pp. 499 Appeals Order Pp. 501 Court Orders Denying Relief Pp. 503 11/04/02 Minute Order Pp. 507 09/02/03 Minute Order Pp. 509 11/23/04 Minute Order Pp. 511 10/14/05 Minute Order Pp. 513 Inmate Response Letter Pp. 515 Doc Memo Pp. S17 Doc Inmate Letter Pp. 519 08/12/99, Inmate Grievance, Pp. 521 08/30/99, Inmate Grievance Inv. Report Pp. 524 08/31/99, ADOC Inmate Grievance, Pp. 526 05/01/98, ADOC Property Release Pp. 530 Rule 59 Motion To Vacate Judgment Pp. 531 Request for Certificate Of Appealability Pp. 547 03/30/05 Order Pp. 590 02/28/06 Order 11/22/02 Order 01/03/03 Order Judicial Reform Call To Investigate Ninth Circuit Proposition Proposition Tripati v. Schiro Writ of Mandamus Writ of Mandamus Denied Garcia Letter Supreme Court Letter 1 Supreme Court Letter 2 Supreme Court Letter 3 Pp. 591 Pp. $92 Pp. 600 Pp. 604 Pp. 607 Pp. 615 Pp. 625 Pp. 627 Pp. 637 Pp. 639 Pp. 641 Pp. 643 Pp. 645 FILED COPY MAR 09 2007 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS CLERK IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 04-17148 ) ) Anant Kumar Tripati, ) Plaintiff, ) Vv. ) ) ORDER Gunn McKay, et al., ) Defendants, ) ) CASE NO: No. 04-17148 D.C. Nos. CV-94-00170-ROS CV -94-00504-ROS CV-95-00702-ROS District of Arizona, Phoenix: Before: O'CONNOR, RYMER., and THOMAS, Circuit Judges. On December 20, 2006. the Court issued an order denying abatement of time for appellant to file a petition for rehearing en bane. On January 11, 2007, the mandate issued. The Court received appellant's motion to reconsider the order of December 20, 2006. That motion is denied. The Court also received appellant's motion to recall the mandate. That motion is also denied. The Court will entertain no further motions on this closed case. The Honorable Sandra Day O'Connor, Retired Associate Justice for the Supreme Court, sitting by designation. FILED COPY APRIL 22, 2007 US COURT APPEALS UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 04-17148 ) ) Anant Kumar Tripati, ) Plaintiff, ) Vv. ) ) ORDER Gunn McKay, et al., ) Defendants, ) eee D.C. Nos. CV-94-00170-ROS CV-94-00504-ROS CV-95-00702-ROS, Before: O'CONNOR,* RYMER, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges. The appellant's motion to abate time in order to file a petition for rehearing and/or petition for rehearing en banc is DENIED. The Honorable Sandra Day O'Connor, Associate Justice for the Supreme Court of the United States (Ret.), sitting by des ynatior FILED COPY NOV 03 2006 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 04-17148 Anant Kumar Tripati, Plaintiff, Vv. GUNN MCKAY; DEAN CHATFIELD; DONALD CONRAD, Maricopa County Attorney; COUNTY OF MARICOPA; TERRY BLAKE; RONALD HARRIS; RICHARD MESH; GERALD GRANT; RICHARD M. ROMLEY; TERESA ARCHULETA; VINCENT EH. TOLINO; ESTATE OF TERESA ARCHULETA, ED KING; BETSEY BAYLESS; TOM RAWLES; DON STAPLEY; MARY ROSE WILCOX, ee i a a a a a a oe D.C. Nos. CV-94-00170-ROS CV-94-00504-ROS CV-95-00702-ROB, Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, Roslyn 0. Silver, District Judge, Presiding This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.! Submitted October 26, 2006**San Francisco, California Before: O'CONNOR, Associate Justice, Retiree", RYMER, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.’ Anant Kumar Tripati appeals the district court's decision dismissing his pro se civil rights action against Maricopa County and _ various. Maricopa County officials. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. Because the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural history of this case, we will not recount it here. This panel {unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). l The Honorable Sandra Day O'Connor, Associate Justice for the Supreme Court of the United States (Ret.), sitting by designation. BREST AVAILABLE COPY | I. The district court correctly held that Tripati's federal claims—only one of which he asserts on appeal—were barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Tripati argues that the district court erred by holding that Tripati's illegal search and seizure claim was barred by Heck. If "a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence," the complaint must be dismissed. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Because evidence obtained in the allegedly illegal search and seizure was used for his conviction, the district court did not err in barring his Fourth Amendment claim under Heck. See Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 2000) (interpreting Heck as precluding any such claim). I]. As to the non-federal claims, we conclude that the district court did not make impermissible credibility and evidentiary determinations in granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendants. In rendering judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, a district judge "must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). However, to defeat a judgment as a matter of law, "the nonmoving party must come forward with more than a scintilla of evidence." See Miller _v. Glen Miller Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 988 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., A77 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). Here, the defendants have offered an overwhelming amount of evidence to refute Tripati's allegations and to substantiate that the search and seizure was the culmination of an extensive investigation into Tripati's fraudulent practices—an investigation that ultimately led to a criminal conviction. ‘'ripati's conclusory statements and self-serving declarations are too speculative to survive a motion for judgment as a matter of law. See United States v. Wilson, 881 F.2d 596, 601 (9th Cir. 1989). Thus, the district court did not err in granting judgment as a matter of law for each of his claims. We conclude that any error that the district court committed by granting judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 during the pretrial phase of the proceedings, see McSherry v. City of Long Beach, 423 F.3d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir. 2005), was harmless because Tripati was afforded ample opportunity to respond to _ the deficiencies undergirding the court's judgment as a matter of law, see id., at 1021 (the purpose of Rule 50 is to afford the non-moving party an “opportunity to present evidence, and the court must evaluate the evidence in order to grant a motion under Rule 50"); see also Waters v. Young, 100 F.3d 1437 (9th Cir. 1996) (a "major purpose" of a motion under Rule 50 is to give the non-moving party notice, and opportunity to cure, deficiencies of proof). Given this holding, we need not reach any of the other claims of error asserted by Tripati as to the non-federal claims. III. Tripati also contends on appeal that the district court erred in denying his request for a Franks hearing, and in preciuding the admission of Teresa Archuleta's statements. There is no basis in the record to show that Tripati ever requested a Franks hearing, or that the district court refused to admit statements of Teresa Archuleta. IV. Finally, Tripati argues that Judges Silver and Strand abused their discretion in denying Tripati's motion to recuse presiding Judge Silver, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § § 455, 144. In order to prevail on a motion for recusal, a petitioner must show either extrajudicial bias or a deep-seated unequivocal antagonism toward the petitioner. Liteky uv. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 554-55 (1994). Because Tripati demonstrated neither, the district court judges did not abuse their discretion in denying these motions. AFFIRMED. Q FILED COPY SEP 16 2004 CLERK S DISTRICT COURT ARIZONA IN THE 'UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE, DISTRICT OF ARIZONA No. 94-0170-PHX- ROS (DKD) Anant Kumar Tripati, Plaintiff, Vv. ORDER Gunn McKay, et al., Defendants, at Sail Sie Nae” eet at Sa” Neat Nee Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Anant Kumar Tripati's Motion for Change of Judge for Cause pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144 [Doc. # 575], which was referred to this Court for decision. Having considered Plaintiffs motion, along with the attached affidavit and transcript, Defendants' Response, Plaintiff's Response (Reply), Piaintiffs Supplemental Brief, Defendants’ Response and Plaintiffs Reply thereto, as well as pertinent portions of the record and the applicable law, the Court now rules. A. Background On December 23, 2003, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Change of Judge for Cause pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 10 144 and 455, alleging that Judge Roslyn O. Silver “acted as counsel for the defendants" in the above- entitled matter and requesting that she be disqualified and that the case be reassigned to another judge. In an Order filed on June 22, 2004, Judge Silver found that Plaintiff had not established any basis for recusal under § 455' and therefore denied the Motion for Change of Judge pursuant. to 28 U.S.C. § 455. Judge Silver also considered Plaintiffs Motion for Change of Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 144. 3Pursuant to 3 28 U.S.C. § 455 provides in pertinent part: (a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. (b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances: (1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding[.] Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding. The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before the beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be shown for failure to file it within such time. A party may file only one such affidavit in any case. It shall be accompanied by a certificate of record stating that it is made in good faith. the requirements of that subsection, Judge Silver assessed the sufficiency of Plaintiffs affidavit and found it to be inadequate. Although Judge Silver was not required to proceed any further under § 144, she nevertheless ordered that Plaintiffs motion under § 144 be heard by another district judge, giving Plaintiff yet another opportunity for review. Accordingly, this Court will now review the merits of Plaintiffs motion. B. Discussion In his Motion for Change of Judge, Plaintiff contends that Judge Silver demonstrated bias and prejudice against him based on events occurring at the September 17, 2003 Final Pretrial Conference, at the close of which Judge Silver granted judgment as a matter of law for Defendants. In his affidavit supporting his motion, Plaintiff alleges that Judge Silver (1) "acted as the lawyer for the defendants," "asked the questions," and then failed to allow him to answer fully; (2) expressed "hostility" and "bias" by her "refusal ... to review {Plaintiffs] motions in limine"; (3) was "so hostile" that she failed to rule consistently with her prior decisions in the present case; and (4) was "biased and hostile" based on Plaintiffs "personal experience" and his review of her decisions in other cases. The standard for disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 144 is “whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Mayes v. Leipziger, 729 I'.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting United States v. Nelson, 718 F.2d 315, 321 (9th Cir. 1983)). "The alleged prejudice must result from an extrajudicial source; a judge's prior adverse ruling is not sufficient cause for recusal." United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1986). First, Plaintiffs allegations are not extrajudicial because they relate to Judge Silver's performance while presiding over the case and to her adverse ruling. See id. Next, Plaintiffs claims that Judge Silver was "hostile," even if true, do "[piJlot establish[] bias or partiality . ." See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994). This Court has reviewed the transcript of the hearing in question and finds no support for Plaintiffs allegations of bias and prejudice. "A judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration remain immune" from challenge. Id. at 556. Next, with respect to Plaintiffs allegation that Judge Silver refused to review his motions in limine, Plaintiff provides no support for said allegation. Indeed, contrary to this assertion, in her October 16, 2003 Order granting Defendants' Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, Judge Silver specifically states that she had reviewed all pending motions, "including motions in limine and objections... ." [Doc. # 562] Furthermore, Judge Silver's ruling was _ not based solely on Plaintiffs answers to questions posed at the Final Pretrial Conference, but also on her review of "all the pleadings in connection with the trial, including the Joint Pretrial Order and attachments, and of all pending motions (including motions in limine and objections), responses, statements of fact and exhibits thereto.” C. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, this Court concludes that Plaintiffs allegations would not lead a_ reasonable person to conclude that Judge Silver's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED denying Plaintiffs Motion for Change of Judge for Cause pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144 [Doc. # 575]. DATED this 14th day of September, 2004. S/D_ ~ ROGER STRAND US District Court Judge FILED COPY OCT 16, 2003 CLERK S DISTRICT COURT ARIZONA IN THE 'UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE, DISTRICT OF ARIZONA | Gunn McKay, et al., Defendants, ) No. 94-0170-PHX- ) ROS (DKD) Anant Kumar Tripati, ) Plaintiff, ) Vv. ) ) ORDER ) ) ) On June 13, 2003, Defendants lodged a Motion for Summary Judgment which in major part raised the same allegations made in Defendants' motions in limine. However, because the Motion for Summary Judgment was lodged beyond the date for filing, the Court denied it by minute Order of June 16, 2003. That decision, however, did not preclude the Court from hearing the same issues if properly raised on motion in limine. After review of all the pleadings in connection with the trial, including the Joint Pretrial Order and attachments, and of all pending motions (including motions inlimine and objections), responses, statements of fact and exhibits thereto, the Court held the Final Pretrial Conference on September 17, 2003. After hearing from the parties at the conference, the Court granted Defendants’ Motion for Judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. The Court has also considered Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial, which, at Plaintiffs request, the Court has treated as a Response to Defendants’ Motion for Judgment as a matter of law (Doc. No. 557 at 3). The federal claims remaining at the conference were Counts 1, 5, 14, 16, 17, 19, 29, 31, 37 and 43. Remaining state law claims were Counts 2, 3, 6, 9, 10, 21 and 24. The Court's rulings at the conference regarding all claims are memorialized in this Order. At the conference, Plaintiff was given the opportunity to set forth both legal and evidentiary bases to establish that he has a viable cause of action on each count. The Court found that Plaintiffs federal claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994). Additionally, the Court found that the federal claims do not involve violations of the United States Constitution or material violations of federal statutes. The Court further found, after reviewing the motions in limine and responses and hearing from Plaintiff; that taking all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs behalf his evidence is insufficient as a matter of law for a jury to find in his favor on any of his federal or state law claims. I. Federal Claims Barred by Reck sv. Humphrey A. Section 1983 Claims The Supreme Court in Heck v. Humphrey directed lower courts to consider whether or not a judgment in favor of a plaintiff in a § 1983 action "would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence." 512 U.S. at 487,114 S.Ct: at 2372. If it would, the § 1983 action must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can prove 16 that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. a., 512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. at 2372. On the other hand, if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would not necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff's conviction or sentence, then the action should be allowed to proceed unless there exists some other bar to the © suit. 512 U.S. at 487,114 S.Ct. at 2372-73. Where a Plaintiff has been convicted, and where a constitutional issue which is inextricably interrelated to the Plaintiffs issue would resolve the matter had it been appealed and reversed by the appellate court, then no basis exists’ for a civil cause of action under Heck. This determination is made without reference to whether the constitutional issue was actually raised by the defendant in his criminal trial, as the existing outcome of Plaintiffs state appeals process is not an element of the test for determining whether a claim is cognizable under Beck. Rather, the Court looks to what the state court would have held if it had been presented with the constitutional issue. If a judgment in favor of Plaintiff would "necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction,” then he may not bring his claim under § 1983; conversely, § 1983 claims should be allowed to proceed if success on them would not necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding criminal judgment against Plaintiff. a, 512 U.S. at 487, 114 S.Ct. at 2372- 73. Plaintiffs constitutional focus is that he was the 17 target of a racially based selective prosecution, and this issue would have been outcome-determinative in his criminal prosecution. Although Plaintiff argued at the conference that the claims in this action have no bearing on his conviction, it is evident that his civil rights claims cannot be separated from his criminal prosecution, both of which allegedly arose from Defendants' racial animus. Plaintiffs artful attempts to portray the claims in this case as unconnected to his criminal convictions' do not negate his _ position throughout this litigation that the search and seizure at his office were the result of the Maricopa County Attorney's Office's desire to "target" him at least in part because he is a minority. Indeed, Plaintiff proposed to testify at trial that: Richard Mesh and Gerald Grant according to these documents play critical roles.. . They screen all complaints, in their capacity as supervisory staff. They then manufacture whatever needs to be manufacture, to make certain that the wrong that the employee of Maricopa County and Maricopa County Attorney's Office committed is covered up. As a part of the coverup they, according to the documents, offer a_ citizen, especially a racial minority, the chance to either plead guilty or to settle the forfeiture action. these documents also showed that when racial minorities declined to settle, they used the complete resources of Maricopa County and Maricopa County Attorney's Office to fight the case to the hilt. Racial minorities like me, as evidenced by the documents, do to lack of money, giveup and put up with the misconduct spending years in prison. I am spending 52.5 years just because of this practice. (Dec. 16, 2002 Affidavit of A.K. Tripati, Doc. No. 472 Ex. 11119) (spelling and punctuation as in original, emphasis added). According to this affidavit, it was precisely Defendants' alleged policy of selectively prosecuting minorities that led both to Plaintiffs conviction and to the civil rights violations alleged in this action. Plaintiff further argues that his claims, all of which involve the alleged illegal search and seizure, are not barred because the state court of appeals found that there was “overwhelming" evidence of Plaintiffs guilt. Because the evidence against him was "overwhelming," Plaintiff argues, any evidence obtained from the search and used against him at trial would not have altered his conviction. However, Plaintiff did not raise at his criminal trial a selective prosecution defense or any other defense based on his race. Therefore, the state court of appeals could not have considered the issue of Defendants' alleged racial bias. The state court determination that the evidence against Plaintiff was "overwhelming" does not control whether Plaintiffs civil claims are barred by Heck because the issue Plaintiff raises here is a_ substantial one, LQ, whether Defendants prosccuted him based on impermissible racial grounds. The right to be free from racial discrimination in .a criminal prosecution is a fundamental constitutional right. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that prosecutorial discretion cannot be exercised on the basis of race. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S., at 608, 105 S.Ct., at 1531; United States v._ Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 82 S.Ct. 501, 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962). Nor can a prosecutor exercise permptory challenges on the basis of race. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965). MoCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309 n.30, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 1776 n.30 (1987). Selective prosecution claims are analyzed "according to ordinary equal protection standards." Wayte_v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 1531 (1985). Accordingly, to establish selective prosecution, a defendant must show that others similarly situated have not been prosecuted and that the prosecution is based on an impermissible motive. United States v. Ness, 652 F.2d 890, 892 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1126, 102 S.Ct. 976 (1981). In this case, Plaintiff claims minorities were "targeted" for prosecution and asset forfeiture, while "|wyhite's (sic) in greater part, with a great deal of money, were not targeted and were let go" At the conference, Plaintiff said his position is that his race played no part in Defendants’ decision to improperly seize his property, but that they seized the property to initiate a forfeiture and to retaliate against Plaintiff for his challenges to their illegal discriminatory actions against others. (Doc. No. 472 Ex. 1 at 4-5 1 16). Plaintiff provides allegations which meet the first prong of a selective prosecution claim. Plaintiff also provides allegations to fulfill the second prong in his claims that he was targeted because of his race. Thus, Plaintiff established a colorable claim for selective prosecution. If it were determined that Defendants exercised their prosecutorial discretion on the basis of race, then the remedy would be reversal of Plaintiffs conviction. Batson, 476 U.S. at 100, 106 S.Ct. at 1725 (a defendant who can demonstrate that the prosecution exercised its peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner is entitled to a reversal of his conviction). It is not necessary for the prosecutorial discretion to have been based exclusively on racial considerations to be unconstitutional. A civil rights plaintiff is not required to prove that the challenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory purposes. . . . [RJacial discrimination is not just another competing consideration. When there is'- proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision, this judicial deference is no longer justified. Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hons. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66, 97 S.Ct. 555, 563 (1977) (footnotes omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiffs § 1983 clatms (Counts 1, 5, 14, 16, 17, 19, 29, 31, and 48) must be dismissed without prejudice until such time as _ Plaintiffs conviction has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. B. Fifth Amendment Claim Would Have Been Barred by fled; Plaintiffs Fifth Amendment claim (Fifth Amended Complaint., Doc. No. 376, Count Twelve) was dismissed by the screening Order for failure to allege that Plaintiffs property was seized for public use4 (Doc. No. 380 at 5). However, the Court briefly notes that this claim also would have been barred under Heck. This Court has_ previously considered whether : The final Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides: "nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation"; this applies to the states as well as to the federal government. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160, 101 S.Ct. 446, 450 (1980). constitutional claims other than those under the Fourth Amendment might fall within the exception to the Neck doctrine. Observing that the Supreme Court in footnote 7 had cited to Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 US. 279, 307-08,111 S.Ct. 1246 (1991), which held that the harmless error doctrine can apply to the admission of a coerced confession under the Fifth Amendment, this Court concluded that "[t]he analysis of whether the Heck bar applies depends not on the constitutional claim alleged, but on whether the claim, if successful, would invalidate the underlying criminal conviction." Schwartz v. City of Phoenix, 83 F.Supp.2d 1102, 1105 n.2 (D.Ariz. 2000). Here, a claim under the [ifth Amendment for taking without just compensation would have been based on the same facts as Plaintiffs other § 1983 claims and, like those claims, would have necessarily implied the invalidity of Plaintiffs conviction and thus been barred by Heck. C. Conspiracy Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) Barred by Heck Although the Supreme Court in Heck addressed only. whether a § 1983 claim for damages could be brought, the same principle applies to the viability ofa § 1985(3) claim for damages. ate Duarnutef v. Morris, 956 F.Supp. 1112, 1117 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (plaintiffs § 1985(3) claim would necessarily call into question the validity ofhis criminal prosecution); Horton _v. Marovich, 925 F.Supp. 532, 537 (14.D.111. 1996). To allow Plaintiff to proceed on his damages claim for a conspiracy even though Heck bars his claim for damages due to violation of the constitutional rights forming the basis of the conspiracy, would be inconsistent with Heck's rationale.Heck cannot be read to allow a plaintiff to pursue a civil rights damages 22 claim for a violation of conititutional rights when without the allegation of conspiracy damages would not be available for the alleged violation. Accordingly, Count 37 for conspiracy to deny civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(32) must also be dismissed without prejudice until such time as Plaintiffs conviction has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpu IL Plaintiff Has No Sufficient Evidentiary Basis for Any Claim After reviewing Plaintiffs proposed trial exhibits, which are included in Defendants’ Motion in Limine Re: Plaintiffs Proposed Trial Exhibits (Doc. No. 472, 3-inch black binder) and hearing from Plaintiff at the conference regarding the admissible evidence the Court found that Plaintiff has an insufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find in his favor on any of his claims, as set forth below. A. Federal Claims Plaintiff has not established that there is sufficient admissible evidence for a jury to determine, taking into account all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs favor, that the acts and omissions alleged in Counts 1, 5, 14, 16, 17, 19, 29, 31, 37 and 43 constitute violations of his federa! civil rights. All of these claims involve the execution of a search warrant on Plaintiffs place of business in California, and the Court found: (1) there was probable cause for Plaintiffs arrest (Arrest Warrant, Doc. No. 472 Ex. 14); (2) the search warrant, which was based on the arrest warrant, was valid and accurate on its face; (3) all property seized can be said to have been seized as potentially related to the crimes for which Plaintiff was arrested and of which he was convicted, regardless of whether any of that property was actually used as evidence in his criminal trial; (4) Plaintiff has no legally sufficient evidence that the allegedly seized property was not within the scope of the warrant; and (5) Plaintiff consented to the Defendants’ alleged taking of his property. As to Count 14 for violation of the federal extradition statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3182, and the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, Cal. Penal Code §§ 1547- 56.2, any such violation would have been held harmless error had it been raised in the criminal trial since there was probable cause to arrest and extradite Plaintiff. Plaintiff has no legally sufficient and admissible evidence that his extradition from California to Arizona violated his constitutional rights. As to his claims for supervisory liability for alleged violations, Plaintiffhas no legally sufficient and admissible evidence that any official policy, practice, custom or procedure directly caused the violation of his constitutional rights. As stated above, Plaintiff cannot establish by sufficient, admissible evidence that any constitutional violation occurred in the first place. Further, Plaintiff has no sufficient, admissible evidence establishing a causal link between any official policy, practice, custom or procedure and any _ alleged violation of his constitutional or statutory rights. The Court determined also that Plaintiff would be unable to prove by sufficient, admissible evidence the personal participation of many of the Defendants in many of the alleged violations of his civil rights. B. State Law Claims 1. No Jurisdiction Over State Law Claims Plaintiffs state law claims are before the Court 24 based on diversity jurisdiction. Jitle 28 U.S.C. § 1332 governs diversity jurisdiction and requires a minimum amount in controversy of $75,000. Plaintiff alleges he is a citizen of Fiji and Defendants are citizens of Arizona. Lawful, permanent resident aliens are citizens of their home country and, for diversity purposes, of the state of domicile. Karazanos v. Madison Two Assocs., 147 F.3d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1998); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Although Plaintiff does not specifically allege that he was domiciled in California at the time he filed this action, the facts of this case indicate that Plaintiff lived and worked in California at the time of his arrest. Thus, Plaintiff has established that the parties have complete diversity of citizenship. However, at the conference the Court found that Plaintiffs proof of damages is not supported by the law nor is there sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find, (1) that a constitutional violation occurred, (2) that Plaintiff has met the $75,000 minimum amount in controversy requirement, and (3) that Plaintiff had suffered any damages. Accordingly, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims. 2. Insufficient Evidence to Establish State Law Claims Even assuming that the Court did have jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims, the Court found that Plaintiff does not have a_=e sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find in his favor on liability issues on the state law claims in Counts 2, 3, 6, 9, 10, 21 and 24. Assuming the truth of the allegations that the items at issue in fact existed and were seized, Plaintiffs e idence will not support a claim for common law theft or conversion because he voluntarily provided the officers with the items which he now complains should not have been seized. Ill. Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial Plaintiff moves for a new trial, arguing, inter alia, that this Court misapplied the law, misinterpreted his claims, and failed to read the record (Doc. No. 557). Plaintiff contends that the harmless error doctrine should not have been applied to this civil case, where harmless error does not apply to the violation of constitutional rights (jsi, at 3). The Court did not apply the harmless error doctrine to Plaintiffs § 1983 claims. Instead, the Court examined the applicability of harmless error and of gerps. (or structural) error in the discussion of Plaintiffs claims, all arising out of the allegedly invalid search and seizure, because it was necessary to determine whether these claims were barred by their relation to his criminal conviction. am supra. Plaintiff also contends that the Court did not rule on several of his claims and asks for a ruling on those claims (Doc. No. 557 at 5-7). To the contrary, the Court ruled at the conference that all federal law claims and all state law claims are dismissed for the reasons set out in this Order. Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial (Doc. No. 557) will be denied. IT IS ORDERED: That Defendants’ Motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. is GRANTED because Plaintiff has no sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find in his favor on any claim. Plaintiffs claims and the Fifth Amended Complaint are therefore DISMISSED in their entirety; Additionally, and in the alternative, that Plaintiffs federal claims (Counts 1,5,14, 16, 17, 19, 29, 31, 37 and 43) are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE until such time as Plaintiffs conviction has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus; Additionally, and in the alternative, that Plaintiffs state law claims (Counts 2, 3, 6, 9, 10, 21 and 24) are DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction; That Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial (Doc. No. 557) is DENIED; That all other pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT; and That the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly. DATED this 10th day of October, 2003. S/D ROSLYN O SILVER United States District Judge FILED COPY OCT 16, 2003 CLERK S DISTRICT COURT ARIZONA IN THE 'UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE, DISTRICT OF ARIZONA Gunn McKay, et al., Defendants, ) No. 94-0170-PHX- ) ROS (MKD) Anant Kumar Tripati, ) Plaintiff, ) Vv. ) ) ORDER ) ) ) Court Verdict(s). This action came before the Court sitting without a jury. The issues have been heard and reviewed, the Court now enters its verdict(s). Decision by Court. This action came for consideration before the Court. The issues have been considered and a decision has been rendered. IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED having granted Defendants' Motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(a), Federal Rules of CMI Procedure because the Plaintiff has no sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find in his favor on any claim. Plaintiffs claims and the Amended Complaint are therefore dismissed in their entirety Additionally, and in the alternative, that Plaintiffs federal claims (Counts 1, 5, 14, 16, 17, 19, 29, 31, 37 and 43) are dismissed without prejudice until such time as Plaintiffs conviction has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas’ corpus. Additionally, and in the alternative, that Plaintiff's state law claims (Counts 2, 3, 6, 9, 10, 21 and 24) are dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Plaintiff shall take nothing. DATED this 16* day of OCTOBER, 2003. S/D RICHARD H WEARE US District Court Clerk FILED COPY SEPT 27, 2004 CLERK S DISTRICT COURT ARIZONA IN THE 'UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE, DISTRICT OF ARIZONA No. 94-0170-PHX- ROS (DKD) Anant Kumar Tripati, Plaintiff, Vv. ORDER Gunn McKay, et al., Defendants, a Plaintiffs Motion for Change of Judge (Doc. No. 575) having been denied by United States District Judge Roger G. Strand (Doc. No. 593), the related motions to reassign case and to direct the Clerk of Court to comply (Doc. Nos. 589, 592) will be denied as moot. The Court now considers the remaining pending motions. A. Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration Plaintiff moves for reconsideration of the Rulings entered at the September 17, 2003 Final Pretrial Conference and memorialized in the October 16, 2003 Order. ‘'he pending Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. No. 566) again urges the grounds presented in the Motion for New Trial (Doc. No. 557), which was denied in the 30 October 16, 2003 Order (Doc. No. 562). The pending Motion for Reconsideration will be denied. Motions for reconsideration should be granted only in rare circumstances. Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 909 F. Supp 1342, 1351 (D.Ariz. 1995). "Reconsideration is appropriate if the district court (1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law." School Dist. No. 1 J. Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc. 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 Qth Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 USS. 1236 (1994). The Court finds no clear error or manifest injustice that would necessitate reconsideration of the Order dismissing this action. B. Other Pending Motions Defendants move to strnke Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial. Because Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial has already been decided (see Doc. No. 562), Defendants' Motion to Strike (Doc. No. 565) will be denied as moot. Plaintiffs Motion to Judicially Notice Decisions (Doc. No. 568) and Defendants' Motion to Strike Reply (Doc. No. 577) will be denied as moot. Pursuant to Local Rule 1.10(), Plaintiff has submitted notices of pending matters and moved that the Court rule on his motions. Because all pending matters are addressed by this Order, Plaintiffs Motion to Decide Pending Matters (Doc. No. 576), Motion for Ruling (Doc. No. 583), and Motion for Ruling (Doc. No. 586) will be denied as moot. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: (1) That Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. No. 566) is denied; (2) That Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Motion for New ‘Trial (Doc. No. 565) is denied as moot; (3) That Plaintiffs Motion to Judicially Notice Decisions (Doc. No. 568) is denied as moot; (4) That Defendants' Motion to Strke Reply (Doc. No. 577) is denied as moot; (5) That Plaintiffs Motion to Reassign Case to Another Judge (Doc. No. 589) and Motion to Direct the Clerk of Court to Comply With Document 588 and Reassign Case at Random (Doc. No. 592) are denied as moot; and (6) That Plaintiffs Motion to Decide Pending Matters (Doc. No. 576), Motion for Ruling (Doc. No. 583), and Motion for Ruling (Doc. No. 586) are denied as moot. DATED September 24, 2004. S/D MAR H MURUGUIA for ROSLYN O SILVER US DISTRICT COURT JUDGE FILED COPY OCT 26 1993 CLERK S DISTRICT COURT CALIFORNIA IN THE ‘UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA No. CV 93-2781 ER(B) Anant Kumar Tripati, Plaintiff, VS. Gunn McKay, et al., Defendants, ) ) ) ) ) ORDER ) ) ) Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, came on for decision before the Magistrate Judge on October 19, 1993, without oral argument. An opposition and Reply was received. After careful consideration of the papers heretofore filed, plaintiffs Motion is hereby denied. Summary judgment is authorized if the moving party shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); Fed.R.Civ.P 56(c). Once the moving party has met this initial burden the nonmoving party has the subsequent burden of presenting significant probative evidence tending to support its claim that matenal tnable issues of fact remain. Id. Plaintiff moves this Court for summary judgment based on the following grounds: 1) defendants failed in their answer to assert any affirmative defenses; 2) only defendants Chatfield and Conrad filed an opposition to plaintiffs motion®; and 3) defendants failed to file a statement of Genuine Issues of Material Facts as required under Local Rule 7.14.22 By order dated October 5, 1993, the Magistrate Judge allowed all defendants’ to file them First Amended Answer, which contained affirmative defenses to all of plaintiffs allegations. Furthermore, under the summary judgment rule, the party against whom the motion is directed need not file any contravening affidavits or other material, but is entitled to a denial of the motien where the movant's papers are imsufficent on their face or themselves demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact. See Henry v. Gill Industries, Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 949 (9th Cir. 1993). Hamilton v. KeYstone Tankshin Cora, 539 F.2d 684, 686 (9th Cir. 1976) The Magistrate Judge finds that on their face, plaintiffs papers are insufficient and that genuine issue as to material facts exist 1 The Magistrate Judge agrees with Plaintiff that no opposition was filed on behalf of Maricopa county Attorney and Maricopa County. Furthermore, the Magistrate judge notes that Defendant's attorneys are guilty of sloppy lawyering and that in the future if they are not more careful, their actions may result in negative consequences for their clients. 2 The fact that Defendants failed to comply with local rule 7.14.2 is as another example of sloppy lawyering. and that plaintiff is not entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. It is therefore ordered that plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be, and is hereby denied. Dated: October 25, 1993. SD VOLNEY V. BROWN, JR. United States Magistrate Judge FILED COPY MAR 28, 1994 CLERK S DISTRICT COURT ARIZONA IN THE 'UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE, DISTRICT OF ARIZONA No. 94-0170-PHX- ROS (DKD) Anant Kumar Tripati, Plaintiff, Vv. ORDER Gunn McKay, et al., Defendants, Nee eee eee ee ee” Based upon the stipulation of the parties |[Docket # 79], [TIS SO ORDERED that: On or before March 30, 1994, Defendants shall respond fully to all discovery pending as of February 19, 1994, all objections to said discovery having been waived Jefendants shall respond in a timely manner t any discovery requestae propounded by ntiff within 3O days followiny receipt of the response ordered in paragrapn |! f } i Oraerec by Defendants. 4. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel [Docket #75] is denied without prejudice. DATED this 17th Day of March 1994. S/D STEPHEN L VERKAMP United State magistrate Judge FILED COPY MAR 28, 1994 CLERK S DISTRICT COURT ARIZONA IN THE 'UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE, DISTRICT OF ARIZONA No. 94-0170-PHX- ROS (DKD) Anant Kumar Tripati, Plaintiff, Vv. ORDER Gunn McKay, et al., Defendants, weer ee Oe eee Ne Se” ORDER ADOPTING STIPULATION EXTENDING TIME FOR EXTENSION AS STIPULATED BY THE PARTIES, IT IS HEREBY ORDIERED THAT: Defendants shall have to and including June 1, 1994 an whieh to comply wath Document 79. This extension ois pranted as defendants have changed counsel and at will take counsel about sixty daya to fully comply Defendante shadl file notice of comphlance bey >> mie utilized b this Court to enjoin such tactics. As members of the bar, how can these lawyers, withhold evidence and argue everything is not supported? Their obligation is first to the Court and then to the Defendants. This case was originally filed in 1993 and as of this date, counsel have not investigated the facts. Counsel cannot give this Court a sworn statement that they have personally reviewed all executive minutes, disbursements, employment records, complaints and found them to be nonexistent. They cannot because they exist. See, Section E.1., pages 2 through 7, of Plaintiff's submission of Joint Proposed Pretrial Order dated June 17, 2003; which is incorporated herein as though fully set forth. Count One See, Section F.1.-, pages 7 through 9, of Plaintiffs submission of Joint Proposed Pretrial Order dated June 17, 2003, which is incorporated herein as though fully set forth. Count Two See, Section E.1l., page 9, of Plaintiffs submission oi Joint Proposed Pretrial Order dated June 17, 2003, which is incorporated herein as though fully set forth. Count Three See, Section E.1., pages 9 and 10, of Plaintiff's Order dated; June 17, 2003, which is incorporated herein as though fully set forth. Count Four Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Count Four at status conference on June 16, 2003. Count Five See, Section EA.., pages 10 and 11, of Plaintiff's submission of Joint Proposed Pretrial Order dated June 17, 2003, which is incorporated herein as though fully set forth. Count Six See, Section E.1., page 11, of Plaintiff's submission of Joint Proposed Pretrial Order dated June 17, 2003, which is incorporated herein as though fully set forth. Count Nine See, Section E.1., page 12, of Plaintiff's submission of Joint Proposed Pretrial Order dated June 17, 2003, which is incorporate*Ted, herein as though fully set forth. Count Ten « See, Section E.1., pages 12 through 18, of Plaintiff's submission of Joint Proposed Pretrial Order dated June 17, 2003, which is incorporated herein as though fully set forth. Count Fourteen See, Section F.1., page 14, of Plaintiff's submission of Order dated June 17, 2003, which is incorporated herein as though fully set forth. Count Sixteen See, Section E.1., pages 14 and 15, of Plaintiff's submission of Joint Proposed Pretrial Order dated June 17, 2003, which is incorporated herein as though fully set forth. Count Seventeen See, Section E.1., pages 15 and 16, of Plaintiffs submission of Joint Proposed Pretrial Order dated June 17, 2003, which is incorporated herein as though fully set forth. Count Nineteen 224 See, Section E..1., pages 16 through 18, of Plaintiff's submission of Joint Proposed Pretrial Order dated June 17, 2003, which is incorporated herein as though fully set forth. Count Twenty-One See, Section E.1., pages 18 and 19, of Plaintiff's submission of Joint Proposed Pretrial Order dated June 17, 2003, which is incorporated herein as though fully set forth. Count Twenty-Four See, Section E.1., pages 19 through 7, of Plaintiff's submission of Joint Proposed Pretrial Order dated June 17, 2003, which is incorporated herein as though f: ‘y set forth. Count T wenty-Nine See, Section .F.1., pages 20 and 21, of Plaintiff's submission of Joint Proposed Pretrial Order dated June 17, 2003, which is incorporated herein as though fully set forth. Count Thirty-One See, Section E.1]., page 21, of Plaintiff's submission of Joint Proposed Pretrial Order dated June 17, 2003, which is incorporated herein as though fully set torth. Count Thirty-Seven See, Section E.1., pages 21 and 22, of Plaintiff's submission of Joint Proposed Pretrial Order dated June 17, 2003, which is incorporated herein as though fully set forth. Count Forty-Three See, Section E.1., pages 22 .and 23, of Plaintiff's submission of Joint Proposed Pretrial Order dated June 17, 2003, which is incorporated herein as though fully set forth 2. DEFENDANTS' CONTENTIONS Plaintiff Anant Kumar Tripati§ ("Tripati"), previously convicted of committing bank fraud in Wyoming Federal District Court in 1983, was under suspicion by the Maricopa County Attorney's Office of committing fraudulent schemes in Maricopa County, Arizona involving the forgery of various documents related to obtaining the bail and release of Eduardo Lopez and his brother, Rosario Lopez. The Lopez brothers were arrested by the Phoenix Police Department as the result of a lengthy undercover narcotics investigation. The Lopez brothers were indicted on November 4, 1991 on charges of leading organized crime; conspiracy to transport, import and sell narcotic drugs; sale of narcotic drugs; and other charges. Bond was set at $1,400,000 each Tripati's participation in this scheme involved misrepresentation of the value of certain property in or near Blythe, California, to be used as collateral for bail of the Lopez brothers. One of the Lopez brothers was actually rele4.sed on one of the fraudulent bonds and fled to Mexico. Based .on the Maricopa County Attorney's Office investigation of Tripati's actions, two separate search warrants were issued for the search of Tripati's office in Beverly Hills, California. Separate search warrants were issued out of both Arizona and California for the search of Tripati's office. The Arizona search warrant was issued by the Honorable Ronald S. Reinstein, Judge of the Maricopa County Superior Court on June 23, 1992. Also, on June 23, 1992, Judge Candace J. Beason of the Municipal Court, Los Angeles Judicial District issued a search warrant no. 34227 authorizing the search of Tripati's 9 £20 business at 8484 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 600, Beverly Hills, California. On June 24, 1992, representatives of the Maricopa County Attorney's Office accompanied representatives of the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office and served the search warrants at 8484 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 600, Beverly - Hills, California. Simultaneously with the service of the California search warrant, Tripati,was placed under arrest by the authority of the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office representatives, who were also police officers in California and who were present and oversaw all aspects of the search of 'l'ripati's office and his arrest. The items which were seized from Tripati's office consisted of thirty (30) distinct items and were impounded as evidence of the crimes for which Tripati was charged. in Arizona. Mr. Tripati was booked at the West Hollywood Station and he fought extradition to Arizona. After a Governor's Warrant was obtained and served upon Mr. Tripati, he was extradited from California to Arizona and was booked at the Madison Street Jail on October 11, 1992.. Mr. Tripati was convicted by a jury of fraudulent schemes and artifices on July 16, 1993. Defendants deny hat any material, other than the material listed in the Evidence List, was ever taken from Tripati's place of business. Defendants specifically deny seizing any items other than those listed, including software by the name of "ARVITA". Defendants also specifically deny that they any other purpose or ulterior motive in searching Plaintiff's place of business other than to search for items 7 believed to be used by Tripati in an on-going fraudulent scheme. Defendants further state that the Maricopa County Attorney's Office does not have a policy, nor has it ever had a policy, of "targeting" or singling out any minority group for prosecution. The Maricopa County Attorney's Office charges' individuals based on the standards set out in the Grand Jury. Charging Manual and in no way relies on a particular individual's race, Sex, religion, or national origin in charging individuals with a crime. Finally, ‘the Maricopa County Board Of Supervisors has never fostered any "code of silence" or fostered a policy of paying punitive damages awards tc encourage County employees to "target" any minority group for prosecution or engage in any illegal or improper activity. Plaintiff has the burden of proof’ as to each fact the existence or non-existence of which is essential to the claim for relief he is asserting. See, California Evidence Code, §500 (1995). Wrongful Search And Seizure Claims: [Counts One,* Two and Three] With respect to Plaintiff's claims arising out the alleged improper or "wrongful" search and seizure of his business premises and seizure of certain evidence, Defendants affirmatively state that they were acting pursuant to facially valid search warrants supported by probable cause. See, United States v. Sayakhom, 186 F.3d 928, 934-36 (9th Cir. 1999). Defendants further state that they were acting for a lawful and legitimate purpose, namely the investigation and prevention of criminal activity. See, Case v. Kitsap County Sheriff's Dept.; 249 F.3d 921 228 (9th Cir. 2001). Defendants have qualified and absolute immunity for Plaintiff's claims relating to the alleged wrongful seizure of his property. Further, Plaintiff has failed to provide any "specific, nonconclusiory factual allegations" in support of his claims arising out any alleged wrongful search and seizure. See, Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, Defendants McKay, Mesh, Romley, Harris, and Archuleta had no active participation in the arrest, search and seizure and should not have to proceed to trial and defend against these claims. Invasion Of Privacy Claims: [Count Four] Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed this claim at the status conference on June 16, 2003. Abuse Of Process Claims: [Counts Five and Six] Plaintiff bears the burden of proving the essential elements of both his State and Federal abuse of process claims against these Defendants. Namely, Plaintiff must show that Defendants used legal process in a wrongful manner, not proper in the regular conduct of a proceeding, to accomplish a’ purpose for which it was not designed and that the Defendant acted with an ulterior motive; that a willful act or threat was committed by Defendants not authorized by the process and not proper in the regular conduct of the proceedings; and finally, that the Defendants misuse of the legal process was a cause of injury, damages, loss or harm to Plaintiff. See, Calitornia Jury Instructions, Civil, *BAJI 7.70. Plaintiff's Federal anc California state claims for abuse of process must be dismissed as a matter of law ee i | because his-underlying conviction still stands. McArdle v. Tronetti, 9611 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1992). Defendants have either qualified or absolute immunity to Plaintiffs abuse of process claims. See, Case v. Kitsap County Sheriffs Dept., 249 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2001); Augustine v. McDonald, 770 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1985). Further, Defendants were acting for a lawful purpose, namely the investigation and. prosecution of crime. Thus, the Defendants were justified in searching Plaintiff's business premises and seizing certain evidence in connection with fraudulent activities conducted by the Plaintiff in Arizona. Furthermore, Defendants McKay, Mesh, Romley, and Archuleta had no active participation in the search and seizure and forfeiture and should not have to proceed to trial and defendant against these claims. Tortious Theft Claim: [Count Nine] Tortious theft is a common law tort for which Plaintiff would bear the burden of proof as to each essential element of the cause of action. Plaintiff lacks sufficient evidence to prove the necessary elements of this cause of action. Defendants affirmative defenses to these claims consist of the fact that they were acting under facially valid search warrants which were, issued with probable cause. Defendants were legally justified in searching Plaintiffs premises and _ legitimately seized certain property of Plaintiff used in connection with fraudulent schemes committed by Plaintiff. Defendants have qualified and absolute immunity from Plaintiff's tortious theft claim and all common law tort claims brought-by Plaintiff. See, Augustine - v. McDonald, 770 F.2d 1442 (9th ci r 1985). Furthermore, Defendants McKay, Mesh, Romley, and Archuleta had 'no active participation in the search and seizure and forfeiture and should not have to proceed to trial and defend against these claims. Plaintiff's Impairment To Business Goodwill; Interference With Economic Advantage C/aims: [Counts Ten and Twenty-One/] Plaintiff bears the burden with respect to his claims for contractual interference and impairment of business goodwill generally. Defendants affirmatively state that they were not aware of any of Plaintiff's alleged contractual relations and further did not search Plaintiff's business premises or seize his property for any illegitimate purpose. Defendants pursuant to valid search warrants seized certain evidence from Plaintiff's business premises pursuant to an on-going criminal investigation. Further, Plaintiff has failed to mect the "stigma plus” test set out in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) and has failed to prove any of the factors considering whether the goodwill of a business has been impaired by any alleged actions of the Defendants. See, WMK Technologies, Inc. v. Milltr, 197 F.3d 367, 374, 375 (9th Cir. 1999). Additionally, Defendants McKay, Romley, Mesh, Archuleta, Tolino, and Grant had no. active participation in the search and seizure and forfeiture and should not have to proceed to trial and defend against these claims. Wrongful Extradition Claims: [Counts Fourteen and Sixteen] Defendants complied with both the Federal and California Extradition Acts. Plaintiff was a fugitive from justice as an arrest. warrant was issued prior to 231 his arrest in California. Plaintiffs arrest and extradition were entirely proper. Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915 (Ith Gar. 1986). Plaintiff fought extradition froth California to Arizona from California to Arizona as such his claims pursuant to Gerstein should be dismissed. Furthermore, Defendants Chatfield, McKay, Romley, Blake and Archuleta had no _ active participation in the extradition of the Plaintiff and should not. have to proceed to trial and defend against these claims. Equal Protection Claims:, [Count Seventeen] Plaintiff has admitted at his deposition that these Defendants did not target him because of his race. Because Plaintiff cannot show that his conviction had anything to do with his racial background, this claim should be dismissed. See,, Johnson v. State of California, 321 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2003.) Plaintiff must put forward .specific non-conclusory factual allegations that establish improper motive causing a cognizable injury. See, Jeffers v. Gomez,. 267 F.3d 895 (9 Cir. 2001). Defendants specifically deny that they "targeted" or prosecuted Plaintiff due to his racial background and state that Plaintiff's place of business was searched and certain property of Plaintiff was seized pursuant to valid search warrants and that this was performed for a legitimate purpose, namely investigating and prosecuting on-going criminal acts by Plaintiff in the State of Arizona. Furthermore, Defendants Romley, Grant, Archuleta and McKay had no active participation in the search and seizure and forfeiture and should not 232 have to proceed to trial and defend against these claims. Due Process Violations Claims: [Count Nineteen, including Counts Twenty-Two, Twenty. Eight, Thirty-Two and Thirty-Three] The Plaintiff has the burden of proving one or more of the _ individually-named Defendants intentionally acted under color of law and caused a deprivation of the Plaintiffs rights. (Ninth Circuit Model Civil Jury Instructions: 11.1.) The Plaintiff has the burden of proving his rights were violated by an official policy of Maricopa County in order for municipal lability to attach. (Ninth Circuit Model Civil. Jury Instructions: 11.12.) Also, the Plaintiff must prove that the policy actually caused a violation of his rights. (City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 395 (1989).) Maricopa County cannot have respondeat superior liability. (Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).) The Plaintiff does not have credible and admissible evidence in order to establish all of .the elements of these claims. Additionally, the Defendants affirmatively state that no such policies, practices or procedures as alleged by the Plaintiff actually exist.No act/omission of any individual Defendant caused any violation of Mr. Tripati's rights. No | official __ policy, practice or procedure of Maricopa County caused any violation of Mr. Tripati's nights. Additionally, the Plaintiff has the burden of proving as to Defendant Romley that he was deliberately indifferent with respect to the implementation of official policies of the County Attorney's office or with respect to the alleged failure to 233 promulgate certain policies which, in turn, actually caused a violation of the Plaintiffs rights. (L.W. vs. Grubbs, 145 F.3d. 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1996).) The Plaintiff does not have credible and admissible evidence in this regard. No such policies or practices as alleged by the Plaintiff exist. Furthermore, Defendants Grant, Romley, McKay, Mesh, Tolino and Archuleta had no active participation ‘in the search and seizure and forfeiture and should not have to proceed to trial or defend against Counts Nineteen, Twenty-Eight and Thirty- Two. Interference With Prospective Business Relationships: [Count Twenty-One] Plaintiff has the burden of proving the .elements of his claims regarding interference with prospective business’ relationships and _ prospective economic advantage as set out in Settimo Associates v. Environ Systems, Inc., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 757 (1993). Defendants specifically deny that they were aware of Plaintiff's business relationships and that the search of his business premises was performed subject to two certain property, namely the investigation and prosecution of criminal activities committed by Plaintiff in the State of Arizona. Furthermore, Defendants McKay, Romley, Mesh, Archuleta, Tolino and Grant ‘had no. active participation in the search and seizure and forfeiture and should not have to proceed to trial and defend against these claims. Breach Of Contract’ Claims Under California Law: [Count Twenty-Four] 234 Defendants claim that any alleged ‘breach of contract claim Plaintiff may have did not arise under California law, but instead it arose in Arizona. Further, Defendants deny that any contract existed. Defendants deny that any consideration existed for any contract alleged by Plaintiff. Defendants allege that it was impossible to perform on any contract alleged by Plaintiff and that any contract claimed by Plaintiff was void against public policy. Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that there was a contract and that the contract was breached by Defendants and that Plaintiff suffered damages therefrom. Furthermore, none of the individually-named Defendants had any involvement in the alleged agreement which the Plaintiff claims was breached and they should not have to proceed to trial and defend against these claims. Failure To Supervise Claim: [Count Twenty-Seven] The Plaintiff has the burden of proving that Defendant Romley was deliberately indifferent with respect to the supervision of his subordinates and that such a lack of supervision actually caused a violation of the Plaintiffs rights. (L.W. vs. Grubbs, 92 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 1996).) Mr. Romley cannot be held liable on a respondeat superior basis. (McKinnon v. City of Berwyn, 750 F.2d 1383, 1890 (7th Cir. 1984).) Mere failure to control a subordinate is not a basis for imposing supervisory liability. (Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).) The Plaintiff has no credible or admissible evidence in order to establish all of the elements of this claim. Mr. Romley demes the Plaintiffs claims and affirmatively alleges absolute and qualified immunity. 235 Denial Of Access To The Courts Claim: {Count Twenty-Nine] This claim is related to Plaintiffs breach of contract claim in that he has claimed that Defendants have denied him access to the courts by failing to produce certain discovery. However, it is clear that Plaintiff is merely attempting to attack his underlying conviction. This Count should be dismissed. Defendants specifically deny that they have in any way denied Plaintiff access to the courts. See, Swekel v. City of River Rouge, 119 F.3d 1259, 1264 (6th Cir. 1997) Cert: denied 522 U.S. 1047 (1998).. Furthermore, none of the individually-named Defendants had any involvement in the alleged agreement which the Plaintiff claims was breached and they should not have to proceed to trial and defend against these claims. | Retaliation Claim: [Count Thirty-One] Plaintiff must demonstrate genuine issues f material fact that Defendants engaged in a state action that was "designed to retaliate against and hill political expression." See, Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 202) (citing to, Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338. (9th1Cir. 1986).. Defendants specifically deny that they in any way retalated against Plaintiff, but instead were simply investigating criminal activities committed by the Plaintiff for which he was convicted. Claims Under §1985(3): [Count Thirty-Seven] Plaintiff bears the burden of proving the essential elements of this claim, including the fact that 236 he was discriminated against. Plaintiff has admitted that Defendants did not target him because of his race and, thus, this claim must be dismissed. Defendants affirmatively state that they did not discriminate or target Plaintiff based on his racial background, but simply proceeded in a criminal investigation related to Plaintiff's criminal activities in the State of Arizona and acted under facially valid search warrants based on probable cause in their search of Plaintiff's office and subsequent seizure of certain property. Trevino v. Gates Claims: (Count Forty-Three] Plaintiff has the burden of proof with respect to each and every essential element of his claim against the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors. Defendants affirmatively state that they have qualified and/or absolute immunity for Plaintiffs claims. Defendants further specifically deny that they have approved punitive damages awards in order to support or further any alleged wrongdoing by County employees. Plaintiff has failed to show or present any evidence that any action taken by the Board constituted a violation of his Constitutional rights. See, Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2002)(citing to, Sonoda v. Cabrera, 255 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, the Plaintiff has not presented any evidence of approval of payment of punitive damages awards regardless of the reason for the approval. Plaintiff's Claims For Damages: Plaintiff has made numerous baseless claims for damages against these Defendants for a _ software program he alleges Defendants wrongfully seized from his business premises. 237 Plaintiff has the burden of proving compensatory damages, in a §1983 case and the * amount of damages depends largely upon the credibility of Plaintiffs testimony concerning his injuries. See, Choate v. County of Orange, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2000). In the instant case, Plaintiff has utterly failed to produce or provide Defendants with any specific credible factual evidence supporting his alleged claims for damages. Simply put, the Plaintiff cannot provide this Court or these Defendants with any credible proof of his alleged damages. Further, Maricopa County has absolute immunity, from punitive damages. City of Newport v. East Concerts, 153 U.S. 247 (1981). STIPULATIONS AND UNDISPUTED FACTS The parties are unable to come to any agreement as to stipulated and undisputed facts. PLAINTIFF'S CONTENTIONS OF DISPUTED FACT As probable cause was manufactured to obtain warrants the facial validity of the warrants do not matter. In his Complaint Plaintiff asserts there was no probable cause. If Defendants say they had probable cause, it was manufactured. The premises were searched to close the business, forfeit the assets and both these unlawful purposes were attempted. However, this Plaintiff prevailed in the forfeiture. r, § All the items taken from the office were not listed on the inventory by Defendants. Defendants seized the property to interfere with Plaintiff's prospective business relationships. Plaintiff saw Dean Chatfield take the evidence and 238 Teresa Archuleta confirmed she was asked to destroy them. By 11-30-93' and 2-13-04 letters from the parties entered into contracts. For Jeffrey Alan Bernick and Michael Sullivan to enter into stipulations that made up documents 87 and 95, Plaintiff must have had to give up something. Why else would lawyers waive objections and agree to pay all costs? 801(d)92) statements by Archuleta and 801(d) (2) statements on the disks that Plaintiff saw Dean Chatfield take; show Defendants target racial minorities for search and seizure and forfeiture. Their prosecution guidelines and policies are irrelevant. As Defendants policies to prosecute are not at issue, their charging practices are irrelevant. As during executive sessions members’ of the Board of Supervisors, in bad faith, approve all punitive damages, they have by their practice caused the wrongs in the Complaint. 10. Plaintiff specifically saw Dean Chatfield remove ARVITA, the software copyright’ application, bids from vendors, Plaintiff's income statement, documents that support Exh. 8. However, he did not list these in his inventory and the warrant did not allow him to take these items. 11. Dean Chatfield, in the presence of the Plaintiff took documents that showed approval of punitive damages and facts set forth in Exh. 8. Exh. 8 was prepared from handwritten notes taken by Plaintiff when he reviewed the complaints. This is why Plaintiff knows what they are. 12. Plaintiff will not do research for the Defendants. Defendants need to research the records of Maricopa County, executive minutes, records of disbursements(record of complaints about employees. 239 They should also note that all documents of the County are not automated. Had they complied with prior discovery requests and produced the information requested by Plaintiff in the June 20, 2003 letter, they would have found the complaints existence, punitive damages were paid. H. DEFENDANTS' CONTENTIONS OF DISPUTED FACT A search of Plaintiffs business premises was pursuant to two (2) separate facially valid warrants based on probable cause. There was no improper or ulterior motive behind the search of Plaintiff's business premises and the search was conducted for a lawful purpose. The only items taken from Plaintiffs place of business were those thirty (30) items listed in the Evidence List for Case No. 92-043. Defendants did not arrest Plaintiff or seize his prope~y to interfere with any alleged existing business relationships or any economic advantage Plaintiff may have had with other individuals or entities. Defendants did not have any contractual relationship with Plaintiff and did not breach any contract with Plaintiff related to the production of certain discovery. Defendants specifically deny that certain "evidence" exists which Plaintiff claims Defendants destroyed, including certain computer disks and tape recordings. Defendants deny that they have any policy of targeting minorities for prosecution. The Maricopa County Attorney's Office charges individuals with crimes on the basis of a "reasonable likelihood of conviction at trial" as stated in the 1989 240 grand jury manualThis standard is more stringent than the "Probable Cause 'Only" standard of the American Bar Association. 9. ' The Maricopa County Board of Supervisor Defendants deny that they have a policy and practice of paying punitive damage awards on behalf of County employees to encourage and further any policy to wrongfully prosecute or target minorities or for any other improper purpose. I. ISSUES OF LAW IN CONTROVERSY A. Plaintiff 1. Defendants are not entitled to any immunity because they violated clearly established law. Burns v. Reed, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (1991); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S.Ct. 2606 (1993). These claims fall within Heck, fn. 7, as fuliy briefed. UCEA claims about the arrest are not Heck barred. Groman.v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d. 628, 636 (31."1 Cir. 1995). The claims on the search, seizure and forfeiture are not Heck barred as they fall within Heck, fn. 7. Likewise, the access to court claims are not Heck barred as they relate to destruction of evidence regarding this case. There is no immunity for manufacturing probable cause. Greenstreet v. County of San Bernandino, 41 F.3d 1306, 1310 (9th Cir. 1994). Take. away the manufactured facts in the Chatfield’ Affidavit - there is no probable cause and insufficient facts in the affidavit. 14. On July 1, 1992 California courts allowed Defendants to take the property to Arizona. However, they took the property to Arizona on June 24, 1992. Hence, they are not immune as they had no right to the property on June 24, 1992. Ross v. Neff, 905 F.2d. 1349. (10th Cir. 1990). Just ‘like Ross, here 241 Defendants had no right to take 'the property on June 24, 1992. Only on July 1, 1992 were Defendants given authority to take the property. As they took the property before July 1, 1992 they are not immune. Plaintiff has dismissed the invasion of privacy claim. Under California law there is no common law immunity 7. The manner in which the warrant was executed in this case cannot be said to be objectively reasonable. Berquist v. Cochise County, 806 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir., 1996) because "reasonableness depends not only when a seizure was made but also how it was carried out" Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985). The warrants did not authorize Defendants to seize ARVITA as well as supporting documents for copyright; bids from vendors to acquire ARVITA; evidence of wrongdoing by Defendants regarding the _ subject matter set forth in Exh. 8, Plaintiff's business records etc. Assuming for arguments sake, the Defendants were seizing evidence of a crime (which is false) they were still not Allowed to take the items above. Likewise, Defendants were required to list all items they took, but they did not. Once again, this violates clearly established law. Defendants have the burden of showing that they acted reasonably, that they listed all the items they took, that they did not take the items set forth above and in the Complaint Marks v. Clarke, 102 F.3d 1012, 1026-33 (9th Cir. 1996). Their reliance on a facially valid warrant does not shield them from hability Marks, supra Lawmaster v. Ward, 125 F.3d. 1341, 1351 (10th Cir. 1997) Ginter v. Stalicup, 869 F.2d 384 (8th Cir. 1989)(property taken on a warrant cannot be destroyed. officers liable). Likewise, there is no prosecutorial immunity in these (9tt matters Gobel V. Maricopa County, 867 F.2d 1201 Cir. 1989) Kalina v. Fletcher, 18 S.Ct. 502 (1997). Plaintiff's testimony is sufficient evidence. The jury has the duty to decide what weight and credibility it will give to the testimony. United States v., Hickey, 917 F.2d 901, 904 (6th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff's beliefs are not elements of equal protection but it is the Defendants "motivation" which is an element. 801(d)(2) statements by Archuleta are admissible evidence. She advised Tripati that race was a factor. Judge v. City of Lowell, 160 F.3d 67 (18t Cir. 1998); Bell, infra. In 1993 this action was filed in California. 'By a 11-ZO- 93 and 2-13-94 letter the contract was entered and subsequently. reaffirmed by counsel. Hence, California law applies. Archuleta's statements are admissible evidence (see, 8 above). For 1985(3) Defendants motives are elements and what the Plaintiff believes is of no consequence. Bell v. Milwaukee,746 F.2d. 1205 (7th Cir. 1984). Improperly authorizing punitive damages in bad faith on a case by case basis subjects Defendants to liability; but for the conduct, there would have not been this complaint. Trevino v. Gates, 23 F.3d 1480 (9th Cir. 1994). Plaintiffs testimony as to 801(d)(2) statements by Archuleta are not hearsay, even if she is dead. Savarese v. Agniss, 883 F.2d 1194, 1200, fn 9 (8rd Cir. 1989). It is up to the jury to decide whether or not it 243 believes the testimony of the Plaintiff on damages. United States v. Hickey, 917 F.2d 901,904 (6th Cir. 1990). What Defendants are saying is simple,they are law enforcement ‘agents, so whatever they say 1s true, but Plaintiff is a felon and prisoner, so everything he states is false. In essence they are saying, "Judge, trust us, we won't lie to you. When we tell you Tripati is lying, he is lying. We never lie to you." However, this is exactly what the jury has to decide. Dean Chatfield took the documents, and they have been destroyed. So now, Defendants, are denying taking the materials and placing the integrity of the "positions they hold at issue". However, this is no reason for this Court to believe them over Plaintiff. The jury must decide this issue. Their entire argument in a nutshell is "Plaintiff is a liar but we as public officials are not lying." B. Defendants Defendants are entitled to qualified and absolute immunity from Plaintiff's claims. Imbler V. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). Plaintiff is challenging’ his conviction under Heck v. Humphrey which requires dismissal of Plaintiff's claims. 3. Probabie cause existed for the issuance of the warrants to search Plaintiff's place of business, thus, those officers executing the warrants justifiably rele on such warrants and are immune from suit. Plaintiff cites Greenstreet v. County of San Bernadino, 41 F.3d 1306 (9" Cir. 1994) to support his position that Defendants are not entitled to immunity, but Greenstreet only considered an officer's qualified immunity and not absolute immunity. Further, 244 Greenstreet did not involve the "manufacturing" of evidence. The court simply held that there was not sufficient evidence presented in the affidavit to support probable cause. The warrants issued for the search of Plaintiff's place of business were facially valid and, as such, provide qualified and/or absolute immunity to the Defendants. Plaintiff cites Ross v. Neff, 905 F.2d 1349 (10th Cir. 1990), however, Ross involved the arrest of the plaintiff in Indian Country and did not involve the seizure of property. Qualified immunity was upheld by the court. Defendants have either qualified or absolute immunity due to their status as prosecuting attorneys or investigators to Plaintiff's common law tort claims under both Federal and California state law. See, Augustine v. (9th McDonald, 770 F.2d 1442 (Cir. 1985); Turner v. Martire, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 863 (2000) does not have sufficient admissible to prevail on his impairment of business goodwill or advantage claims. Plaintiff has admitted at his deposition that his racial background was not a factor in Defendants alleged prosecution of him, thus, his Equal Protection claims must be dismissed. Plaintiff's alleged breach of contract claim does not arise under California law and for that reason alone must be dismissed. Further, Plaintiff cannot prove the necessary elements of this claim. Plaintiffs claims related to a "conspiracy" under §1985(3) must be dismissed because he has admitted that he was not targeted because of his racial background. Further, Plaintiff has not come forward with factually specific admissible evidence to support his conspiracy claim. See, Karlm-Panahi v. Los Angeles 245 Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th cir. 1988); Woodrum v. Woodward County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989); Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiffs Trevino v. Gates claims must be dismissed because he has failed to establish some nexus between the Board approving the payment of punitive damages awards and some specific alleged injury to him. Plaintiff has significant evidentiary burdens to overcome related to numerous documents and proposed testimony based on lack of foundation and relevance. Plaintiff's only evidence of a conspiracy or wrong doing by these Defendants is his own testimony and an alleged affidavit of Teresa allegedly based on conversations Plaintiff had with Teresa Archuleta, who is now deceased.. Plaintiff has not provided credible specific admissible evidence with respect to his claims for damages. Defendants will address other specific legal deficiencies in the Motions . In Limine being filed simultaneously with this proposed Joint Pretrial Order. SEPARATE TRIAL OF ISSUES Separate trial of any issue herein is neither advisable nor feasible. WITNESSES. Plaintiff's Witnesses 11. Following Witnesses Will. Be Called Anant Kumar Tripati He will testify in accordance with the summary of his testimony sect forth in his Joint Proposed Pretrial Order dated June 17, 2003. ADOC Custodian. Will authenticate ADOC grievance records. 246 Fred Romero. Will testify as to Plaintiff's business operations, income,Arvita and the consequences of Defendants' actions upon the Plaintiff. Vincent Tolino. Mr. Tolino will testify that Donald Conrad, Dean Chatfield and Vincent Tolino withheld from the Governors of Arizona and California - violations of UCEA - because the disclosure would have adversely affected Defendants. Dean Chatfield. Mr. Chatfield will testify he arrested Plaintiff on June. 24, 1992 and held him in custody. He will confirm he made the arrest prior to complying with UCEA and did not disclose this to the Governors. Mr. Chatfield will confirm the arrest tape is authentic. Mr. Chatfield will confirm he obtained the order from California Judge Candace Beason on July 1, 1992 to transport the property to Arizona but he, in fact, brought the property to Arizona on June 24, 1992. Donald E. Conrad. Mr. Conrad will testify how he aided in manufacturing probable cause and obtained assistance from other Arizona agencies. G. Richard K. Romley. Is the only witness who can testify as to his reasons for not investigating the complaints he reviewed for unlawful search and seizure, unlawful forfeiture, etc. There is no substitute for his testimony. He is the only one who can testify about the custom and tradition. No-one else, but Richard M. Romley can testify to the following facts: Michael Cooke lodged a complaint about fabrication of probable cause to seize property, initiation of forfeiture in violation of the constitution, not listing all property taken. He reviewed the complaint and ordered no action be taken biased conduct, destruction of evidence, withholding material evidence. He reviewed the complaint and ordered no 247 action be taken. David Lamb lodged a complaint against Dean Chatfield for manufacturing probable cause, destroying items seized, not, listing all items seized. He reviewed the complaint and ordered no action be taken. Alfredo Sanchez Garcia .lodged a complaint against Gunn. McKay for creating probable cause, racially biased conduct, wrongful forfeiture. He reviewed the complaint and ordered no action be taken. This is just an example of complaints (all of which are in Exh. 8) which Richard Romley reviewed, ordered no actions by taken, and covered up the misconduct. Mr. .Romley did not promulgate any policies to prevent such acts not happen and he signed off on the complaints. By letter dated June 27, 2003 Michael J. Frazelle Esq. declined regard. With the documents - his testimony may have been avoided. On June 24, 1992 Dean Chatfield took the documents. H. Betsey Bayless. Betsey Bayless is the only one who can testify as to the reasons why during the executive sessions, she and other board members determined that punitive damage claims be paid, deciding the issue on a case by case basis. No-one but Betsey Bayless can testify to the following facts: Complaint by Daniel Rodriguez E Spinoza was filed for wrongful seizure, wrongful forfeiture, manufacturing probable cause as well as_ racial profiling. Betsey Bayless authorized payment during executive sessions of the damages. John Pacheco filed a complaint asserting items were stolen during search and seizure, not listed in the inventory, and items were destroyed by staff. Betsey 248 Bayless during executive sessions reviewed’ the complaint and authorized payment Maureen. Heaton filed a complaint regarding abuse of process, during executive authorized damages. There is no substitute for her testimony as no- one else can give the evidence. By letter dated June 27, 2003 Michael J. Frazelle, Esq. declined to produce the executive session minutes. With the documents - her testimony may have been avoided. On June 24, 1992 Dean Chatfield took these minutes and documents. 2. Witnesses That May Be Called These witnesses are not going to be called unless Defendants "open the door". Their relevant, except, if the door is opened. Helen Maureen Jones. This witness SHALL AND WILL NOT BE CALLED, UNLESS AND UNTIL, DEFENDANTS, ARGUE PROBABLE CAUS%, ARGUE PLAINTIFF DEFRAUDED OR TRIED TO DEFRAUD THE WITNESSES, AS THE BASIS FOR PROBABLE CAUSE AND/OR IF DEFENDANTS TRY TO BRING UP PLAINTIFF'S CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS. She will testify probable cause was manufactured and Plaintiff did not try to defraud her. Roger Rudman. This witness SHALL AND WILL NOT BE CALLED, UNLESS AND UNTIL, DEFENDANTS, ARGUE PROBABLE CAUSE, ARGUE PLAINTIFF DEFRAUDED OR TRIED TO DEFRAUD THE WITNESSES, AS THE BASIS FOR PROBABLE CAUSE AND/OR IF DEFENDANTS TRY TO BRING UP PLAINTIFF'S CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS. He will testify probable cause was manufactured and Plaintiff did not try to defraud him A. Melvin McDonald. This witness SHALL AND 249 WILL NOT BE CALLED, UNLESS AND UNTIL, DEFENDANTS, ARGUE PROBABLE CAUSE, ARGUE PLAINTIFF DEFRAUDED OR TRIED TO DEFRAUD THE WITNESSES, AS THE BASIS FOR PROBABLE CAUSE AND/OR IF DEFENDANTS TRY TO BRING UP PLAINTIFF'S CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS. He will testify that as counsel he knew Plaintiff did not defraud anyone and that probable cause was manufactured. Robert Taugner. If Defendants argue forgery, this witness will testify that his affidavit is based on speculation and conjecture and is false and that one cannot say:, whether the documents are false or valid. He will testify about other similar complaints against him. Judy Gabbert. If Defendants argue forgery, manufacture of evidence, she will testify, she got a call from Ronald Reinstein and after the date of that cali, all documents created prior to that call by ADOC employees were changed. She will also confirm that she was unaware that her staff had given Plaintiff copies of prior documents, for had she been aware, the contents of documents after the cal] from Reinstein would not have changed. She will testify about other similar allegations against her. Judge Ronald Reinsteln. If Defendants argue forgery or manufacture of evidence, he will testify as to how he called and had Judy Gabbert change documents. He will also testify about other similar allegations against him. G. Judge Gregory H. Martin. If Defendants argue forgery, he will testify 'his order had no factual basis and was an accommodation to Judge Jonathan. Schwartz also other similar allegations against him. 250 Witnesses That Most Likely Will Not Be Called Objections of Defendants To Plaintiff's Witnesses Anant Kumar Tripati. The Defendants expect to object to many areas which Plaintiff has indicated that he may testify. Defendants expect to object to Plaintiff's testimony on the basis of relevancy, lack of foundation and personal knowledge, hearsay, and prejudice. ADOC Custodian. Defendants object to this witness being called on the basis that the subject records are not relevant and are prejudicial due to the fact that they would tend to confuse the jury as to what issues are really in controversy. Fred Romero. Defendants object on the basis of relevance, lack of foundation, and prejudice. Vincent Tolino. Defendants have no objection to this witness. 1E. Dean Chatfield. Defendants have no objection to this witness. 1.F. Donald E. Conrad., Defendants have no objection to this witness. L.G. Richard AL Romley. Defendants object on the basis that Mr. Romley was not involved in the alleged search of Plaintiff's business premises or the seizure of his property. Further, other witnesses can testify as to any alleged practices and procedures of Maricopa County. Mr. Romley is a prominent public official and Plaintiffs only purpose in calling him is to harass these Defendants. Plaintiff claims that only Mr. Romley can testify regarding certain complaints filed by various individuals, however, defense counsel has searched Maricopa County Superior Court database and found no claims for these listed individuals. Simply put, there is no evidence that these individuals ever 25] existed much less filed complaints against any of the Defendants. Plaintiff is once again "manufacturing" evidence in an attempt to get what he wants. 1.H. Betsey Bayless. Defendants object on the hasis that Ms. Bayless was in no way, involved in the search of Plaintiff's business or the seizure of his property nor has the Plaintiff produced any credible and admissible evidence that she has approved the payment of any punitive damages awards - regardless of the reason or motivation for such approval. Plaintiff's sole purpose in-attempting to call Ms. Bayless is to harass these Defendants. Ms. Bayless has never approved the payment of punitive damages in connection with her service on the Maricopa County Board of Supervisor. Plaintiff has no other evidence than the names he _ supposedly "remembers" from pleadings the "scanned". Interestingly, Plaintiff can allegedly remember the names of all the individuals listed in Plaintiff's Exh. 8 but cannot remember a cause number or any other specific information about the other individuals who allegedly filed claims. Plaintiff does not 'have sufficient evidence to proceed with any claim against Defendant Bayless and his naming her is for purposes of harassment only. 2.A. Helen Maureen Jones. The. Defendants object to..Plaintiff calling Helen Maureen Jones and her expected testimony. Plaintiff claims that Ms. Jones will testify that probable cause was manufactured. Plaintiff does not claim in his Fifth Amended Complaint that Defendants manufactured evidence - this is a new claim presented by Plaintiff. Further, the testimony that Plaintiff expects to elicit from Ms. Jones goes to the validity of his 252 underlying conviction. The testimony is’ barred pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey. Defendants further object on the basis of relevancy, foundation and prejudice. Roger Rudman. Defendants object to this witness on the basis that the expected testimony is not relevant, lacks foundation, is prejudicial, and goes to Plaintiff's underlying conviction. A. Melvin McDonald. Defendants object to this witness on the basis that the expected testimony is not relevant, lacks foundation, is prejudicial, and goes to Plaintiffs underlying conviction. Robert Taugner. Defendants have no objection to this witness. Judge Gregory H. Martin. No objection. Defendants' Witnesses 1. Following Witnesses Will Be Called A. Dean C. Chatfield, Criminal Investigator (retired) with Maricopa County Attorney's Office. 'Mr. Chatfield will testify with respect to his investigation of Tripati and his obtaining search- warrants for his place of business and seizure of items related to Tripati's suspected fraudulent activities in Arizona. Mr. Chatfield will provide testimony with respect to his conversations with law enforcement officials in Los Angeles, California in order to obtain a California search warrant for Plaintiffs place of business. Mr. Chatfield is expected to testify regarding the arrest of Tripati, as well as the search of Tripati's business and what specific items were seized from the business premises. .B. Donald _E. Conrad, formerly Maricopa County Attorney. 243 Mr. Conrad is expected to testify regarding his traveling with Dean' Chatfield, Investigator Terry Blake, Phoenix Police Detective Joe Soto to Los Angeles, California where they met Investigators Rich Goldston and Gary Judge of the Los Angeles County Attorney's Office. Mr. Conrad is expected to testify regarding the search of Plaintiff's business and as to what items were actually seized during the search. He is also expected to testify with respect to Mr. Tripati's arrest at his place of business. Further, he is expected to testify with respect to his prosecution of the State's case against Mr. Tripati. C. Terry Blake, Phoenix Police Department Investigator. Mr. Blake is expected to testify regarding his involvement in the investigation of Tripati and the search of Tripati's place of business and what items were seized during that. search Department. Mr. Soto is expected to testify regarding his involvement in the investigation of Mr. Tripati and his involvement in the search of Tripati's place of business and what items were specifically seized from the business. Vincent H. Tolino. Maricopa County Attorney's Office. Mr. Tolino will testify to his involvement in obtaining a Governor's Warrant for the extradition of Tripati from California to Arizona for prosecution. . Detective Nate Jackson, Maricopa County Sheriff's Office. Detective Jackson is expected to testify as to his involvement in obtaining a Governor's Warrant and extradition of Tripati from California to Arizona. 254 G. Ronald F. Harris, Final County Attorney's Office. Mr. Harris, formerly of the Maricopa County Attorney's Office, is expected to testify as to what property was actually seized from Tripati's place of business. He is further expected to testify that this property was subject to forfeiture due to its use in criminal activities by Mr. Tripati and for no other reason. Mr. Harris is also expected to testify that he had no conversations with any other attorneys or employees of Maricopa County regarding prosecuting Mr. Tripati because of his race sex, religion, they state in this order.The evidence does not support them, so they have decided not to disclose them. They have decided to conceal evidence that is adverse to them - though relevant. EXPERTS No experts were retained by Plaintiff EXHIBITS Plaintiff Affidavit of Plaintiff Fifth Amended Complaint Letter from MCAO Archuleta interview June 16, 1993 memo March 17, 1994 Order 7. April 6, 1994 Order 404-406 Evidence Supplemental affidavit Supplemental affidavit Return to warrant Return to warrant Report Arrest warrant Complaint Correspondence Affidavit with letter Floor plan Goldston declaration 720. Goldston declaration January 16, 1993 letter January 12, 1993 letter January 21, 1993 letter January 24, 1993 letter February 5, 1993 letter February 26, 1993 letter January 19, 1993 letter March 4, 1993 letter Racketeering lien Complaint Chatfield affidavit. Harris affidavit 33. May 10, 1994 letter February 22, 1994 Order May 18, 1994 Order Release form Inmate contraband/property release Grievance Grievance March 5, 1993 Order January 25, 1994 Order April 5, 1994 Order September 19, 1994 Order December 12, 1994 letter [error: 12-22-94] February 19, 1995 memo: [error: 02-09-95] p46. February- 9, 1995 memo [Error: Order vacating cease and desist .(02-09-95)} Affidavit Warrant request July 12, 1993 letter January 18, 20.00 memo November 24, 1999 memo Affidavit Information report Letter [error: Surety's, bonds) Discovery Archuleta affidavit Interview tapes Arrest tape Taugner declaration Arvita Martin Order Sultan affidavit Guy affidavit Opening June 20, 2003 letter June 27, 2003 response Objections To Plaintiff's Exhibits By Defendants 1. Affidavit of Plaintiff:- Duplicative; relevance: hearsay; foundation; undue prejudice outweighs probative value. 2. Fifth Amended Complaint: 403 F.R.E.; not all of Plaintiffs Counts are still viable; relevance; undue prejudice outweighs probative value. 3. Letter from MCAO and handwritten notes: 901, 1002 F.R.E.; hearsay; foundation. 4. Archuleta interview: 106, 805, 901, 1002 F.R.E.; Dead Man Statute; foundation; hearsay. 5. June 16, 1993 memo: 805, 901, 1002 F.R.E.; Dead Man or national origin. SEPARATE TRIAL OF THE :SSUES Separate trial] of the issues in this case is not feasible. WITNESSES Witnesses Who Shall Be called By Plaintiff Plaintiff shall call the following witnesses at the trial: 1. Anant Kumar Tripati: Anent Kumar Tripati shall testify as follows: otwz..0 ‘1. lam a citizen of the Fiji Islands and have initiated 258 this litigation against Gunn McKay, Dean Chatfield, Terry Blake, Donald E. Conrad, Richard Mesh, Richard M. Romley, Ronald Harris, Vincent ‘Tolino, Gerald Granit Teresa Archuleta, Ed King, .Betsey Bayless, Tom Rawlei, Don Stapley, Mary’ Rose Wilcox and Maricopa County. * These defendants and each of them are all citizens of the State Of Arizona who have acted as agents of Maricopa County. under color of State Law and have been sued by me in their individual as*well as their official capacities inspite of the fact that I have previously been convicted, I, until my. arrest on June 24th, .1992 owned and operated Legal Research Associates, a National Litigation. Support firm which Was, operated out of 8484 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 600, in-Beverly Hills, California:90211, Exhibit 18 is the floor plan of my office as it existed on June 14th, 1992 the date Of the arrest and search and. seizure. A. 1 provided litigation support to lawyers, outside legal counsel for cities such as. the City Of Phoenix, Mesa, Tempe and other: legal as well: as public entities.’ 5, Al a litigation support firm research sid complicated controversial issues, drafted documents. for lawyers, hired .experts and made certain, the lawyers had, enough time for the courtroom as well as-fully prepared to represent his/her client. | did not go to court. We had over 65 lawyers, paralegals and investigators—who worked on a contract basis. Our firm was extensively written .about in various papers and we were in the process of providing additional services. I had a client base of in excess of 7,000 lawyers and an annual income of in excess of $1,500,000. 259 During the course of my providing assistance to my clients on controversial issues, I| obtained documentary evidence which supports the facts that I have set forth in this affidavit. In particular, the entities | assisted gave me the materials and I also had investigators, former employees of Maricopa County, off duty police officers, conduct investigations for and on. my behalf: and acquire the materials which I reviewed and found supported the facts in this affidavit. 8. Once | obtained documents, | personally read ma reviewed cach and every document and personally scanned them. on dicks 9, | personally observed defendant Dean Chatfield on June 24, 1992 remove these disks from my office, at which time he was aimed with his service weapons. | also observed Dean Chatficld remove audio tapes and these tapes had details of my conversations with Teresa Archuleta regarding my research and finding supported by documentary evidence which | obtained from employees of the Maricopa County Attorney's Office and ‘others associated with Maricopa County. Since September 21, 1993 I have tried to take depositions of Teresa-Archuleta so as to have her statements on the record but have been prevented by lawyers for Teresa Archuleta and defendants in this case, from taking these depositions, though they had agreed. 11. Teresa Archuleta and [| bad. one of other discussions on March 27, 1992 at length regarding the policies and practices of Maricopa County to target the racial minority and disadvantaged for law enforcement activities. She confirmed the existence of such practices 260 and sent me documents which farther supported my findings. I took the documents, reviewed them, scanned and stored them on the d4 le which Dean. Chatfield, I saw, took on lime 24,1992 from. my office and in my presence. I had the policy of taping all conversations that involved me. Dean Chatfield, on June 24th,1992, I saw, took all these tapes. The tapes of my conversations with Teresa Archuleta show that she warned me that Dean Chatfield, Richard Mesh and Gunn McKay were targeting me as a direct result of my challenging the conduct of Maricopa County. That tape also shows that she advised me had I not been an East Indian, they would not have targeted me. During my conversations that are on that tape, she told me that if I backed off, nothing would happen to me. I had further discussions with Teresa Archuleta on August 18, 1992, at which time, she informed me that had I listened to her, I would not be in custody. Lawyers for defendants by documents 87 and 95 agreed to give me all these materials but they Dave yet to .give these to me. ; Documents I had obtained from employees of Maricopa County and Maricopa... County Attorney's Office show that Maricopa County Attorney's Office and Mari. cepa County have had the long staining operating procedure to target racial minorities like me for arrest, for prosecution. These records also show that they also have the long standing practice and proceeded to target property owned by racial minorities for seizure and forfciture: 16. 1 am an East Indian, and a racial minority. | was in fact challenging the practice and procedures of Maricopa County, Maricopa County Attorney's Office and in particular Richard M. Rowley, 261 Gtmn McKay, Dean, Chatfield, Teresa Archuleta, Richard mesh to target for arrest and prosecution and to forfeit property owned by racial minorities. To be more specific, about 85 people mostly Mexicans were arrested and their property were being forfeited by defendants. Whitc's in greater part , with a great deal of money, were not targeted and were let go. | was helping challenge the practice on behalf of the Medcans. 17. Documents that I had obtained during the process from Teresa Archuleta and other employees of Maricopa County and Maricopa County Attorney's Office, were scanned by me on computer disks. [| personally observed Dean Chatfield take the disks from my office on June 4,1992. These documents showed that when an cmployee is hired to work by Maricopa County and the Maricopa County Attorney's Office, that employee becomes aware that "nobody's perfect" and that the only way that employee can protect himself / herself from his / her own mistakes, is to protect other employees. Based on my understanding I know that this concept is what is traditionally called the "no rat" rule. If this rule is violated, the person involved receives swift but silent disapproval. The practice is never to do anything which might embarrass another . employ, of Maricopa a County or Maricopa County Attorney. LL&8. These documents showed that to draw critical attention to Another employee is a' taboo. The documents reflect the fact that it is demanded that employees cover uP the mistake of . mother employee further *showing that while complaints from the public arc felt to be avoidable, fellow employees go to great. lengths to see that public complaints are ruled to be unfounded and without any basis. 19. Richard Mesh and Gerald Grant according to these documents play critical roles in this regards. They screen all complaints, in their capacity as supervisory staff: They then manufacture whatever needs to be manufacture, to make certain that the wrong that the employee of Maricopa County and Maricopa County Attorney' s Office committed is covered up. As apart of the cover-up they, according to the documents, offer a citizen, especially a racial minority, the chance to either plead guilty or to settle the forfeiture action. these documents also showed. That when racial minorities declined to settle, they used the complete resources of Maricopa County and Maricopa County Attorney's Office to fight the case to the hilt. Racial minorities like me, as evidenced by the documents, do to lack of money, give-up and put up with the misconduct spending years in prison. I am spending 02.5 years just because of this practice. 20. According to the documents, in Maricopa County it is the unwritten policy that no employee is to lodge a complaint against another employee and no employee is to testify against another employee. This is traditionally known as the code of silence and it does more than prevent testimony. It ‘mandates that no officer report another for misconduct, that supervisory officers not discipline other officers for misconduct, and that any and all investigations against employees be discouraged. Based on my experience, | can state without any degree of hesitancy, that this practice is so insidious and dangerous, as defendants use thei extraordinary power over the lives of others. As the documents I had scanned onto disks showed this practice and as | was in the process of challenging this practice, Dean Chatfield, in my presence took the documents: 21. | was in my office On June 24th, 1992 and personally observed Dean ‘Chatfield removed my property. he was armed so | was unable to resist him. Dean Chatfield told me he :was acting under the authority of the State Of California. He led me to believe by specifically.. telhing me that he was authorized by the California Courts to execute the warrant he was executing 'dray office. | saw Chatfield, in addition to taking the tapes of my conversations with , Teresa Archuleta, to other tapes. These tapes that he took reflected in toto the discussions I had with Teresa Archuleta regarding the policies and practices Of Maricopa County and Maricopa County Attorney's Office, to target minorities, to initiate forfeiture and criminal actions without probable cause. The tape also showed that I had a great deal of records on computers disks. The tape showed that Teresa Archuleta agreed with me that Maricopa County and Maricopa County Attorney's Office targeted for law enforcement purposes, racial minoritics and _ disadvantaged individuals. 22. The tapes showed that Teresa Archuleta advised me that Gunn McKay, Dean Chatfield, Teresa. Archuleta and Richard Mesh had discussions regarding the challenges that I was making and in the process of making. It also showed that Teresa Archuleta advised ine that they had discussed the matters with Richard M. Romley, who approved the plan to take whatever course of action they needed to take, so as to stop me from lodging the challenges I intended to raise. The tapes further show that Teresa Archuleta warned me to 264 back off further warning me that if failed to back off, I would end up in prison with the Mexicans that we were assisting in the Maricopa County Superior Court. According to Teresa Archuleta on the tape, it was.. imperative I not lodge a successful challenge. 2.3t. Had the defendants complied with documents 87 and 95 and given me all the records. I sought by and through my Public Records Request I would have got the tapes and documents - that support the facts, stated in this affidavit. 24. I had a computer file "MC.BB" which I saw Dean Chatfield take on. June 24th, 1992.. This file is .not listed in the inventory list' have since received. This file had*doduments created: * by defendants Richard M. Romley, Dean Chatfield, Gunn. McKay, Terry Blake,. Donald E. Conrad, Richard Mesh, Ronald Harris, Vincent Tolino, Gerald Grant, Teresa Archuleta and other employees of the Maricopa County Attorney's Office and Maricopa. County. The file had a great. many complaints against defendants, for making false and fake allegations and filing inappropriate actions against people, most of whom were radial minorities. These documents showed the existence of a pattern or practice wherein Maricopa County, Maricopa County Attorney's Office and defendants named, falsely accused people of being members of drug all so that defendants could initiate false charges and forfeit property. cartels, engaging in crimes, On June 24, 1992 | saw Dean Chatfield take another file "MC. SSS" which is not listed in the inventory that I have since been given. This file that numerous documents concerning false .arrests made by defendants, Maricopa County, Maricopa County Attorney's Office and it's employees. 265 I also observed Dean Chatfield take a file "MC. SSS" and "MC. INT" on. which there were documents that reflected the fact the defendants received a great deal of claims about false arrest and _ false imprisonment and they paid quite a bit of money so as to settle these claims. . These files and another file "N. ICSOR" had documents that showed defendants seizing property. and other items without probable cause and mainly because racial minorities were involved. This ...file also included copies of claims paid by defendants. 27. ‘personally observed Dean Chatfield take a file "MC. arr: which had documents:' reflecting the fact that defendant target their law enforcement. authorities with an eye towards getting minorities. I specifically recollect documents created by Richard Mesh, Vincent Tolino, Gimn McKay, William Clayton. These documents showed that in actions taken by employees of Maricopa County, Maricopa County Attorney, and defendants , race is generally the motivating factor. | also remember documents bearing the signature of Richard M. Romley as authorizing -and condoning the actions targeting racial minorities Included in these files wad a file "MC:."which had documents, complaints by people that they were targeted based on their racial heritage. 28. Another file taken by Dean Chatfield was "MC. COV." This file had copies of complaints against Maricopa County, Maricopa County Attorney's Office, defendants named and employees of these defendants, with investigative reports finding violations and with notations that Rick Romley wanted the complaints hushed up as the employees were loyal employees and taking disciplinary actions would be bad for their 266 morale. I personally saw Dean Chatfield take a file "MC. GUN" which had copies of complaints against Gunn McKay, Dean Chatfield, Teresa Archuleta, Richard Mesh, Gerald Grant, Ronald Harris and others for targeting racial minorities and engaging in the misconduct that I have described. This file had the entire background, since birth, of Dean Chatfield, Richard Romley, Gunn McKay, Teresa Archuleta, Richard Mesh and other employees. The information showed that these people have had a well documented history of complaints against them for misconduct . I saw Dean Chatfield take a file "MC.ARS" which had copies of documents, showing . that on 20 plus incidents, employees of the Maricopa Count' Attorney's Office bad: . * —flown I driven outside the State Of Arizona and conducted activities, including searches and' seizures, similar to that in this case. This showed many complaints were made rip but no action was taken on the complaints. 31. Dean Chatfield took a file !'WC. FTS" which had numerous ‘documents, showing. - lawyers antiothers complaining against these named defendants and other employees of the. Maricopa County Attorney's Office and Maricopa County. They state that these people, due to. ° ' their not being adequately trained, not being adequately supervised, due to their not abiding by existing rules and regulations, have been engaging in the type of wrongs I complain of. These documents hive handwritten notations by supervisory staff. to hush the complaints. . 32. Another file "MC. DOC" has copies of documents with many allegations that employees of Maricopa County Attorney, including named defendants, have been engaged in fabricating evidence and making false statements, manufacturing probable cause to seize and forfeit property and falsely asserting they have had lawful authority to in matters they did not. A file "Md. FB" taken by Dean Chatfield shows use of force and improper tactics by employees of Maricopa County and Maricopa County Attorney's Office to seize and forfeit property, to arrest people. File "MC.FB" had documents that showed. on more than 50 instances, employees of Maricopa County and Maricopa County Attorney have falsely asserted their authority in matters. they had no authority. The file "MC.SSS" had numerous documents showing that defendants, to pressure people, have contacted other state and federal agencies for help. These files show that they engage in such acts, in matters where people challenge their conduct The file "MC.COV" has showing cover-up of wrongful seizures. | remember that in file "MC.SSS" there were in excess of 30 plus instances, where components have been made, that people whose property were seized. wrongfully, have lost their businesses etc. 35. The file "MC. NT" has documents which show a lot of complaints from people that they were targeted as they challenge the practices of Maricopa Ory / Maricopa County Attorney and /or exercised their First Amendment Rights. File "MC. ST" had in excess of 45 documents showing irregularities in extradition. and Gerstein violations. Dean Chatfield took this file in my. presence.:- 36. When Teresa Archileta was alive, my attempts to have her deposed were obstructed by these defendants, though my request was made prior to February 19, 1994 and though they agreed to produce her for depositions. Teresa Archuleta has since died, hence | hive utilized the statements she made to me during my various communications with her, as she was an employee of the Maricopa County, an agent of the defendants when she made the statements. It is my belief * the defendants did not produce her to be deposed and did not want her to respond to my discovery request, as they did not want her to confirm the substance of our conversations. They had reasons to believe she was giving me information. As promised by Teresa Archuleta, to me, on March 2'7,1992, Dean Chatfield, Donald E. Conrad and Terry Blake, came to my office in California on June 24, 1992. Dean Chatfield arrested me. Dean Chatfield searched my office and brought the seized items to Arizona, he had no authority from the California courts. Seven days after the its were brought to Arizona, concealing the fact that the items were already in Arizona and not in the custody of California officials, Dean asked Richard Goldston, a California peace officer, to obtain authorization from the California courts to bring the items to Arizona... The authorization was obtained, seven days after the fact. Dean Chatfield, Donald E. Conrad, and Terry Blake were all aware that they were not California peace officers and could not execute warrants in California. Dean. Chatfield searched my office with Donald E. Conrad’s Terry:.. Blake, without any authority from the California courts. These items that seized: were the subject matter a forfeiture action, but I prevailed in that forfeiture, as the defendants 269 could not prove I used the items to commit any crimes or | had any knowledge that the items were used to commit crime. when | forced the defendants to their proofs they moved to dismiss, as they had. no evidence. : | called Teresa Archuleta, a defendant in this case, and spoke to her on August 18,1992. She upon my questioning her informed that defendants Conrad, McKay, Archuleta, Blake, , Chatfield had a meeting regarding me and that their plan was approved by Richard Mesh and Rick Roxaley. She advised me that, according to McKay I was a "Sand Nigger" who had to be restrained and that they had agreed to do all that was needed to shut me up. Up questioning, she informed that Vincent Wino had to submit the false documents to have extradited aid that he did conceal the fact that these defendants did arrest me in California and searched my.office. She also informed me that Ronald Harris will be aiding them in forfeiting the property and Gerald Grant would create all obstacles possible. Archuleta advised me that they had talked to the Department Of Insurance and they would do all to assist. She did confirm that they had no prior authorization from California to arrest me and search my office. When I asked why she falsely published the fact that I was involved in three murders and a member of the Lopez drug cartel, she stated Conrad & McKay had so asked her so to, and she had to play with the team. She did remind me to think about what happen in the case of the Tucson four, stating that if they can put someone on death row, I am nothing, because they want me out of sight and. Not held somewhere, that I will not be able to do anything. She stated that this is just the way, things are done, 270 when minorities are involved. She advised me that. she would not be ‘able to help. What was interesting about what she said is that, I reviewed tape interviews that Dean Chatfield did conduct Dean Chatfield was stating what Archuleta said. He was asking people to. help him place a nail in my coffin, telling them that he wants me tucked away for life, and in most of these instances, Donald Conrad was.witb. him, Another interesting aspect of what Archuleta stated is that, everything she said, has been proven to be true. When I got the insurance documents, the documents reflected discussions of the type and plan of that type Archuleta she stated. When I began forcing the defendants to their proof they starte [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386010_0402%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.