# Brief of Respondent — Maty v. Grasselli Chemical Co.

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386010_0282%3A6

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Brief of Respondent
- **Published:** January 1, 1938
- **Citation:** 303 U.S. 197

## Text

A
wi ¥
INDEX.
Suspsect Inpex. .
; ‘ : fee Page
Brief of respondent...... bay aay ee oe ae aett nee oha a. 1
‘Introductory statement ..... see Moree ter eee See 1
Discussion of pleadings..... RE An Ra rit BeAr Pe 5
Discussion of pertinent facts in relation to pleadings........ 10
Legal question presented........°........................ oa
oe ods ca bs nace eee ok Sew inwiadnnd 12
The original complaint by its language did not indinih the °
phosphate department .....:...:...0.............. ae
I. The decision of the Circuit Court is in accord with ,
© - the decisions of the State of New Jersey...... 18
_ II. The decision of the Circuit Court is in accord with.
the decisions of this Court................... 23
III. The decision of the Cireuit Court is in accord with
the decisions in other jurisdictions and with the
) a vite. ct gat bamsenes ser OE CL Tee 27
Summary of. argument.............. UOT Tre Toy re ee 35
Discussion of petitioner’s brief with respect to the statute of

I Sins See whale aes Che pales cw 6 oka oda wks 36
Petitioner’s brief on this review proceeds beyond the scope of

the single and sole issue relied upon and argued in her peti-

tion for writ of certiorari, and upon which the writ was

granted by this Honorable Court......................... 40

Supplemental brief ............ LE gin fvbTs ia haa ee : 42 °

Discussion of amended pleadings.......................... 42 -
Petitioner.does not contend and cannot contend that the prod-

ucts to which she alleges decedent was subjected are nee

ous, noxious.or inherently dangerous..............-....... Aa
Statement of questions involved.......~.................. 46
Statement of the case............... Orr ea
Argument ............. SY EY LE TET Oe, PTO T EE ies acute -.

I. The trial jeles was correct in heblion that there was
not sufficient knowledge attributable to the defend-
ant company that the products used at its plant were
dangerous and of a nature likely to harm the plain- :
tiff, and that there was no evidence to indieate that.
the deféndant knew or should have known of any
injuries likely to result from the exposure to soda ash “* 77
II. That the plaintiff failed to establish that his illness
was proximately caused by alleged exposure in any
ent of the defendant’s plant or that the al- .
leged exposure was the causa causans of his condition 90
—3730 ‘ . °

rae

A .
ii _ INDEX
aie Page
III. That the plaintiff as a matter of law had utterly failed
to produce evidence that he endured any exposure
to soda ash in the phosphate department, where he
* last worked, and since his last exposure in the sili-
cate department was more than two -years prior to
his instituting suit, his action is barred by the statute
ON 26 ac seg ds ture pacoduascganss 97
IV. The proofs were overwhelmingly in favor of-defendant
and ‘requited that a verdict be entered in its favor.. 101
Discussion of petitioner’s brief, with respect to points BandC.. 101
Conclusion ........: gl eawda se weu on eens Wivaewel iiccaee ened) ee

TABLE oF CasES CITED.

_ Alice State Bank v. Houston, 247 U. S. 240, 62 L. Ed. 1096........ - 40
Andrews v. Marsden, 122 Atl, 171..............-. Cll SRY - . 32
Bemis Brothers Bag Co. v. United States, 289 U.S. 28, 77 L. Ed.

PO TNT ere Sakae eae A 8 Ia ret Reopree 27
Birkes'v. United Fruit Co., 49 F.-{2d) 656.......-....0..--- (ay 28
Buntin v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 41 Fed. 744............---: 27
Calhoun v. Washington Veneer Co., 15 P. (2d) DE Lie ca rkknns o 33
‘Canfield v. Iowa Dairy Separator, 172 Iowa 164, 154 N. W. 434. .. 84
Card v. Stowers Pork Packing & Provision Co., 253 Pa. 575, 98 Atl.

| a rere errs Ritea eae g erm er he Peer ee 33
Casavalo v. D’Auria, 12 N. J. Mise. 81, 169 A*l. 520; affd. 113

Wh Be Tec DD. oa ag ach civic knee pans nasser sasseecnecseads re 22.
Chennault v. Stovall, 160 So. 146............. xt su aan nano as 29 |
Chicago City R. Co. v. McMeen, 102 Ill. App. 318......- ee a 39
Corcoran-v. Wanamaker, 185 Pa. 496, 39 Atl. 1108................ 85
D’Allesandro v. United Marine Contracting Corp., 30 F. (2d)

EN Sere err rr rrr errr ete ery ey Se Pee oe 29
Davis v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 116 N. J. L. 103,182 Atl. 850....... _ 87
DiLello v. Manufacturers’ Land and Improve Co.,11 N. J. Mise.

eer (eanececnah aan Ps. I, Wipe rye ere 22

Giant Storage Battery Co. v. DeLay, 87 F. (
Gilmore v. City of Chicago, 224 Ill. 490, 79 N.
Grammer v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corpofation, 71 F. (2d)

Be flit bc cen Gan anibt raee wees nee Ae raner pe ran eu, s 82
Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U. S. 90, 74 L. Ed. 720............-.----- 92
Hester v. Mullin, 12 S. E. 447.............. ee ee a 34
Jamouneau Vv. Wetherill, 98 N. J: L. 80, 118 Atl. 707.............. 14

- Johnson v. Manhattan- Ry. Co., 289 U. S. 479, 77 L. Ed. 1331...... 41
Lane v. Sayre Water.Co., 69 Atl. 1126....:........-.-. 000s sees - °30
LaPorte v.-U. S. Radium Corp., 13 Fed. Supp. 263............... 12,13
Limpert Brothers v. Stitt, 94 N. J. L. 472, 110 Atl. Roe 13
Magliaro v. Modern Homes, Inc., 115 N. J. L. 151, 178 Atl. 733.... 20

Manhattan Oil Co. v. Mosby, 72 F. (2d) 840...... aS ea cacees pee 15

INDEX iii

3 Sd ; Page

Martin v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co., 227 Pa. 18, 75 Atl. 837............ . Bl

N. & G. Taylor Co. v. Anderson, 275 U. S. 431, 72 L. Ed. 354...... 25
O’Shaughnessy v. Bayonne News Co., 9 N. J. Mise. 345, 154 Atl.

_ 13; affd. 109 N. J. L. 271, 160 Atl. 696 a aaa een geek ee. 8 18
Patton v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 179 U.S. 658, 45-L. Ed. 361... . 95, 101
Penna. R. R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 288 U. S. 333, 7 L. Ed. 819...... 92
Pennsylvania Pulverizing Co. v. Butler, 61 F. (2d) a ee ad 80
Pinkley v. Chicago & Eastern R. R. ,Co., 246 Ill. 370, 92 N. E. 896. . 85
Prudence Company, Inc., v. Fidelity é Deposit Co. of Maryland, os

297 U. S. 198, 80 L. Ed. Mtaacs cue eceoye. tet ea. anise — Al
Roessler ¢ Hasslacher Chemical Co. v. Peterson, 134 Fed. 789...... «85
Rygiel v. Kanengieset, 114 N. J. L. 311, 176 Atl. 605.............. 19
Salyers v. United States, 257 Fed. 255.......................... * 30
Stevens & Sons Co. v. Daigneault, 4 F. (2d) 53.:......:..... ida 89
Sweany v. Wabash Ry. Co., 80S. W. (2d) 216.............. sere ' $88
Union Pacific R. Co. v. Sweet, 78 Kan. 243, 96 Pac. 657...... WE 32
Union Pacific Ry. v. Wyler, 158 U. 8S. 285, 39 L. Ed..983........... 24, 25

_Umited States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U. S. 62, 77 L. Ed.

WT 6cberends nk sud balls fae eeen cape Ee ete 25, 26
Ward v. West Jersey & Seashore R. R. Co., 65 Ns J. L. 383, 47 Atl.

WE kn tanineg nape cedadevebdon tere ee ten ete tan ee 89
Western and Atl. R. R. Co. v. Hughes, 278 U. S. 496, 73 L. Ed. is

ch CEE ET TING PALSY St ie irre LE ti ee 92
Willis & Bro. v. ieniines 94N.J.L. 84, - f Ree 14
Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Helvering, 293 U. 5S. 172, 79 L. Ed. 264... 40

Statute Cirep. i
New Jersey Statute of Ne 3N. J. cep. 8t. 1910, p. 3164,
Section 3; P. L. 1896, P. PS ia ed a4 ce Ree raven st a badaekes 12

<)

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATEs
| OCTOBER TERM, 1937

No. 378

SUSIE MATY, Apministrarer or THE Estate or Groce "
| Mary, Atso Known as Grorcz Marry, .
ek Petitioner,
ie .

GRASSELLI CHEMICAL COMPANY.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT .
OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT.

_ Introductory Statement. f
These proceedings arise out of an action at law insti-

tuted in the United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey by the original plaintiff, George Maty, now
deceased. _He sued the respondent to recover damages for - 8
lung injuries alleged by him to have been caused by expo-
sure to Soda Ash (chemically known as Sodium Carbonate,

2

R. 314, 325 and 331) dust while working as a furnace oper-
ator and general worker in the Silicate Department of
respondent’s plant in Grasselli, New Jersey. The respond-
.ent by its Answer pleaded, among other defenses, that the
cause of action framed by the complaint was barred by the
two year Statute of Limitations of the State of New Jersey.
During the trial plaintiff was permitted to amend the com-
plaint so as to charge the respondent with negligence in its
Phosphate Department as well as in its Silicate Depart-

ment, the said amendment being allowed over objections.

on the part of the respondent predicated upon the Statute
of Limitations of the State of New Jersey both with re-
spect to the cause of action set out in the original complaint
as well.as to the‘new cause of action so created by the
amendment. The trial of the cause resulted in a verdict
for the plaintiff (R. 811). Upon the conclusion of the tak-
_ ing of testimony, responde.:t moved for the direction of
a verdict in its favor upon several grounds (R. 708). After
protracted argument the motion was denied with reserva-
tions-—the trial judge reserving the right to direct a verdict
for the respondent upon further study of the record. In

this connection the trial judge made the” following state-°

ment (R. 722):

“ T am going to let this case go to the jury. because we
have been here so long, but I am telling you, Counsel,
that my view of the matter is that any verdict they
might bring in will have to be set aside by me.’’

Upon application of the respondent, the trial judge granted
a rule to show cause why the verdict in favor of the plain-
tiff should not be set aside and a verdict entered in behalf
of the respondent notwithstanding the verdict for the plain-
tiff, or that in the alternative a new trial be granted (R. 812).

Upon the argument of the Rule to show cause counsel for the
plaintiff stipulated and agreed that in the event the trial

3

.

judge concluded to set aside the verdict of the jury, a di-
. rected verdict be entered for the respondent and that judg-
ment for the respondent follow (R. 757). The argument re-
sulted in the vacating of the order and judgment for the
plaintiff and the entry of a verdict and judgment for the —
respondent (R. 784 and p. 818). The ruling of the trial
" Judge was predicated primarily upon the failure of the
plaintiff to sustain ‘his charge of negligence in that he had
failed to prove knowledge on the part of the respondent,
knowledge of probable injurious effects from the inhalation
of Soda Ash dust being an essential element in seeking to
establish the charge of negligence, and also upon the doubt-
ful proofs as to whether the plaintiff had established that
the negligence charged was the proximate cause of the lung .
condition from which the plaintiff was suffering, and further
‘upon the doubtful proofs as to whether the plaintiff was in
fact exposed to Soda Ash. dust while hé worked in the
Phosphate Department (R. 783 and 784). An appeal was
thereupon taken to the United States Circuit Court of Ap-
-peals for the Third Circuit which affirmed the judgment of
the District Court, but on grounds other than those relied
upon by the trial judge in entering judgment for the re-
spondent (R. 821-823). 89 F. (2d) ‘456. Circuit Judge
Thompson, in speaking for the Circuit Court, said as ‘fol
lows (R. 821 and 822):

‘co * * The learned trial judge * * * concluded -
_ that the plaintiff had failed to prove knowledge on the
part of the defendant, and relying upon our ruling in
Pennsylvania Pulverizing Co. v. Butler, 61 F. (2d) 311,
entered judgment for the defendant.

‘*We do not deem it necessary to review the evidence
‘as to the knowledge of the defendant in view of our con-
clusion that a verdict should have been directed for the
defendant because of the two year statute of limitations.
The original bill of complaint was filed October 1, 1935.
The plaintiff alleged therein that he was employed asa

rnace man i in the silicate a of the defend-

4

' ant’s plant, that the defendant failed to provide him with
a safe place to work, * * *. It was shown that some-
time in 1932 the plaintiff was transferred to the phos-

phate department. The action based upon negligence
in the silicate department was therefore outlawed by
the New Jersey two year limitation period. |

‘‘At the trial the plaintiff undertook to prove that .
his injuries were sustained through the negligence of the
defendant in the conduct of its phosphate department
and obtained leave of court to amend his original bill of

- complaint so as to conform to-the evidence so produced.
We think the court should have refused to allow. the
amendment. The cause of action set forth in the amend-,
ment was a different.cause of action from that set forth
in the original complaint and, therefore, could not be
introduced after the statute of limitations had run.
* * * The negligence alleged in the :amendment in-
volved a different act, different buildings, departments,
conditions and dates of exposure. *. * *”

. Petitioner applied for-a rehearing before the Circuit Court.
and her petition was denied (R. 824). Petitioner thereupon
filed Ker petition with this Court charging that the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. was in error in its
adjudication upon the single question of the applicability
of the Statute of Limitations upon which it passed judgment,
the Circuit Court having held it to be unnecessary to review
the other legal and factual que®tions which were presented ,
_and argued before it upon the@ppeal. The Circuit Court |
. did not therefore in any respects pass upon these other
legal and factual questions. A writ. of certiorari was
granted by this Court upon the petiti6n of petitioner (R.
824). The Statute of Limitations constitutes the sole is-
sue which was presented and argued in petitioner’s petition
for writ of certiorars and brief. It also represents the
single issue upon which the writ was granted by this Honor-
able Court (Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Brief, pp.
4 and 5).

5

Discussion of Pleadings.

_ A complete understanding of the pleadings is of funda-
mental importance in the consideration of the legal ques-

‘ tion presented upon this review. .

_ his action was commencéd on October 1, 1935. The
summons annexed to the complaint is tested as of that date
(R. 787). The summons and complaint were served off
the respondent on October 3, 1935 (R. 789).

_ Paragraph 1 of the complaint-alleges generally that the
plaintiff was in the employ of the respondent at its plant
in Grasselli, New Jersey in November 1933 and for some-
time prior thereto (R. 788). The respondent by dfs answer
admitted that the plaintiff was for ‘a time employed by it -
at Grasselli, New Jersey, but denied that he was so em-
ployed in November: 1933 (R. 793).

Paragraph 2 of the Complaint alleges that the plaintiff
was employed as a furnace man, operator and general
worker in the Silicate Department of defendant’s plant (R.

__738). In answer to this paragraph, defendant admitted
that plaintiff was ‘‘for a time employed as a furnace man in

_ the silicate department of defendant’s plant, but denies that
he was employed in said department after November 1,

— 1932’? (R. 793).

’ Paragraph 4 of the complaint charges that ‘‘during the
course of his employment in and around the said depart-—
ment’’, plaintiff came into contact with certain substances
to which he was exposed and which he inhaled, and that as
a result of the negligence charged, he became incapacitated
in November 1933 (R. 788). (Italics ours.)

_ Except as clarified in the above respects as to the time,
place and nature of plaintiff’s employment, the respondent’s
answer constituted a general denial, and set up five separate ,

‘ ‘defenses, the Third and Fourth Separate Defenses dealing ‘i
specifically with the Statute of Limitations. Respondent ~

6
specifically pleaded affirmatively that the cause of action
-framed by the complaint which dealt exclusively with the
Silicate Department of the A@Spondent ’s plant at Grasselli,
New Jersey, was barred by the two year Statute of Limita-
tions of New Jersey ae and 794).

Paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of the complaint contain the perti-
nent parts thereof insofar as the present=xeview is con-
cerned (R. 788).° In and by these paragraphs plaintiff set
forth a cause of action charging acts of negligence while he
was employed as a furnace operator in the Silicate Depart-
ment of respondent’s plant at Grasselli, New Jersey. Para-
graph 1 of the complaint is general i in nature and refers to
plaintiff’s employment at the plant of the respondent. Para-
graph 1 in- referring to respondent’s plant is limited by
paragraphs 2 and 4 of the complaint wherejn specific and
particular reference is made to the Silicate Department
wherein plaintiff worked as a furnace operator. The com-
plaint does not by its language cover any other department
of respondent’s plant except the Silicate Department. It
was admitted by plaintiff’s counsel in open court that when
the complaint was prepared by him it was intended to co
the Silicate Department only and not the Phosphate Dep Ais
ment. This will aonce appear from the following colloquy
between plaintiff’s counsel and the trial judge (R. 128) :

‘‘Mr. Turtur: And the only reason why I didn’t want

" to see any other portion except the Silicate Department
was because I didn’t know until’ the day before the de-
positions were taken that this Phosphate room came

into the picture.

‘The C : In other words you didn’t know that
the statu run.

re: : r: No, not until one day before did Mr.

Maty mention the phosphate department.”

The Depositions referred to by counsel-were taken on May |
15, 1936 (R. 1). In connection with the above colloquy, the
’ trial judge said to plaintiff’s counsel (R. 129):

7

‘“‘The Court: You see the conclusion-is inescapable,
that you ‘are composing this phosphate argument to
meet the statute.’’

The distinction between the Silicate Department and the
Phosphate Department becomes important by virtue of
the following facts: While working in the Silicate Depart-
ment, the plaintiff was employed as a furnace operator (R.
5). Plaintiff testified that he worked in this Department
until the Winter of 1932 when he was transferred to the
Phosphate Department (R. 30). The original shop records
of respondeng establish that the transfer was made on No-
vember ¥ (R: 592). The Phosphate Départment is
located in& separate and independent building located about
five hundred feet from the Silicate‘Department. He had
different bosses there (R..61). After this transfer to the —
Phosphate Department, plaintiff never returned to the Sili-
cate Department (R. 61). While employed in the Phosphate
Department plaintiff worked as a general worker. He testi-
fied that he worked outdoors three days a week and indoors
two days a week and that his work was of a wholly different |
character from that in the Silicate Department (R. 31).
’ Since the plaintiff left the Silicate Department on Novem-_ |
* ber 1, 1932; any cause of action charging negligence as to >.
* that Department was barred by the Statute of Limitations
. of New Jersey on and after November 2, 1934. The suit:in
this cause was instituted on October 1, 1935,—almost a year
after any action with respect to that Department was barred
by the Statute of Limitations. In other words, the cause
of action framed by the complaint and in fact intended by
plaintiff’s counsel to be framed and covered by the com-
plaint had been barred almost a year before the suit was (a
commenced. The plaintiff himself ‘testified that he did not "ee
get sick in the Phosphate Department (R. 36). . Pe
The complaint alleged generally that plaintiff was em-
ployed in respondent’s plant until November 1933, and al: .

ae)

« _ _ 7 . %>

8

leged specifically in paragraphs"2 and 4 that while em-
ployed at respondent’s plant, he wasyemployed as a furnace
operator in its Silicate Department (R. 788). Respondent

g by its apswer specifically and particularly stated that plain-

tiff was not employed in the Silicate Departmént after
November 1, 1932, and by its Third and Fourth Separate
Defenses set-up the two year ‘Statute of Limitations and
* thereby gave particular notice that the cause of action set
forth in the complaint was barred. on the very day the suit
was commenced (R. 793 and 794). Plaintiff filed his reply
denying the allegation of the respondent’ s answer and join-
ing issue thereon (R. 795).

_ A trial of this cause was commenced on May 19, 1936,
but after a day of testimony was terminated by a mistrial
in order to allow other cases of shorter duration to be
tried. The trial judge at first limited the proofs to the
Silicate Department, but subsequently allowed the plaintiff
to amend his complaint so as to include the Phosphate
' Department. Ne formal amendments to the complaint
were filed (R. 89 and 90). In anticipation of a new trial
on June 9, ~1936, respondent gave plaintiff notice of a
motion to limit tle proofs during the trial to the Silicate
Department on tWe grounds set forth in the notice (R. 810
and 811). The motion of respondent to limit proofs was
_originally granted. The trial judge held, that paragraph 1
of the complaint was limited by Paragraph 2 thereof ( R.
95 and 96). Plaintiff thereupon applied for leave to amend |
the complaint so as to include the Phosphate Department.
Considerable argument ensued during the course of which .
the trial judge said xi 118 and 119) :

‘“‘The Court: eas personally question the
- good faith of your + aoe I think it is made simply
“. to avoid the Statute; but teaving that out of considera-
tion, you have the legal situation of charging negli- ©
gence in one department, whichturns out to be barred
oo

\
\

- - ,
ill . i=s a a ee mae toe

by the Statute, and wish to’amend and charge negli-

‘ gence in another department and under different con- .

‘ditions. * * * - |
The Court: No, I would like to seé any case that
would "permit such a radical departure from the origi-
-nal-eause of action.’’ |
The amendment of the complaint was allowed with reser-
vations and serious doubts on the part of the trial judge

in the correctness of pis ruling (R. 107-143).

By virtue of the motions made with respect to amend-

awents to she complaint, an amended complaint was filed
by plaintiff (R. 803-805). Plaintiff alleged in paragraph 2
that he was employed as a ‘furnace man, operator and
general worker in the Silicate. Department and Phosphate
Department of the respondent’s plant, and in Paragraph 4
he alleged that ‘‘during the course of his employment in
and around the said department and/or departments’’, he
suffered certain injuries. It is to be noted that even after
being allowed to amend his complaint, the plaintiff. pleads
with mental reservations. He does not charge negligence
in any absolute and out and out terms in both the Silicate

and Phosphate Departments, but refers to ‘‘the said depart-
ment and/or departments.”’ (Italics ours.) At that late
stage plaintiff expresses great uncertainty in his pleadings
_with respect to whether he was injured in one department
or in the other department. The plaintiff himsel€-insisted
and testified that he got sick in the Silicate Department
and not in the Phosphate Department (R. 36).

Respondent filed an answer to the complaint as amended -
- (R. 805-808). It expressly reserved all objections and ex-.

ceptions taken by it during the course of the trial with

respect to the amendments to th® complaint. It admitted -

that plaintiff was employed as a furnace worker in the
Silicate Department until November’ 1, 1932, and that
thereafter he was employed inhe Phosphate Department

ry

Ae

Sovew~ ats

aad

- 10

ee

until October 23, 1933. Respondent pleaded affirmatively

_ the Statute of Limitations (R. 806, 807).

Discussion of Pertinent Facts in Relation to Funtime.

Plaintiff worked iff the Silicate Department as ‘a furnace
operator until November 1, 1932 (R. 592). He was trans-
ferred on that date to the Phosphate Department where
he worked until’ he terminated his employment in October
1933. The Phosphate Department i is located in a building
entirely separate and independent from the building wherein
the Silicate Department is located, and about five ‘hundred.
feet away (R61). After this transfer, plaintiff never re-
turned to the Silicate Department:(R. 61). While in the

“Phesphate Department he worked. as a general laborer

(R. 591-597). In the Silicate Department he operated fur-

facture of silica glass. This product is manufactured out
of Soda Ash (Sodium Carbonate) and silica sand. In the
Phosphate Department, he worked four: days on the. out-

side near the water front and one day a week indoors .
_ (R. 594 and 625). The plaintiff himself testified that_he
worked outdoors three days a week and two days a week

of

- naces and took various steps in connection with the manu- .

indoors (R. 72). While working in the Phosphate Depart- .

ment, the plaintiff did not handle Soda Ash at all. In this

Department Soda Ash is used on the other side of the build:

ing from where he worked (R. 592 and 594). In discussing

the product Soda Ash (Sodium Carbonate) it is well to
understand that we are not dealing with a chemical which
is dangerous, poisonous or noxious in character. Soda Ash

is an entirely harmless product which has no substantially,
greater effect on the human system when inhaled than

ordinary street dust. It is a mild alkali and is somewhat
stronger‘in alkalinity than Sodium Bicarbonate. It is not
in fact or even. considered to be,a caustic product (R. 314,

_ 325, 330-340 ; 350-358).

z

By

On October 1, 1935, plaintiff commenced this action
against respondent charging it withenegligence i in the Sili-
cate Department. » He had left that department on Novem-
ber 1, 1932. e respondent pleaded affirmatively that the
cause of action set forth in the complaint ‘was barred by the -
Statute of Limitations, and réspondent further gave plain-
tiff particular notice by paragraph 2 of its answer that his
employment in thesSilicate Department had .terminated on
November 1, 1932. The cause of action framed by the com- ©
plaint was barred by the Statute of Limitations almost -a
year prior to the date on which the suit was commenced.
The complaint covered only alleged exposure in the Silieate
Department and was intended to.cover only that department

-when it was prepared.. That fact. was admitted*by counsel

in open court. Plaintiff terminated his employment in the

2 Phosphate Department in October, 1933. On June 10, 1936,

plaintiff was permitted to amend his complaint ‘by setting
up a new cause of action relating to the Phosphate Depart-
ment. Any cause of action whiclr plaintiff might have had ©

. as to the Phosphate Department was barred on or about_

November 1, 1935. The result of all the foregoing is that
on June 10, 1936, the plaintiff was permitted to resurrect .
by amendment a cause of action with respect to the Silicate
Department which was barred on November. 2, 1934, by
amending the complaint i in an action commenced on October
i, 1935, and further to resurrect by amendment a cause of
action with respect to the Phosphate Department which was

_ barred on or about October 24, 1935, by amending the com-
~plaint in an action predicated upon the Silicate Department .

alone commenced on October 1, 1935. Recapitulating, -
pertinent dates are: ,

November 1, 1932—last date of alleged exposure in Sili-
cate Department. —

October 23, 1933—last date of employment i in Phosphate
—-

Pd

SEE

Tem

> . 12

October 1, 1935—date of filing suit see on Silicate
Department.

June 10, 1936—date of amendment " iets the Phos- —
phate Department.

Legal Question Presented.
Had the trial judge under the facts and circumstances

_ presented the legal right to allow the plaintiff to amend his -

complaint on June 10, 1936, so as to include the Phosphate
Department and: thereby resurrect a. cause of action both
as to the Silicate Department which was outlawed on the
date suit was commenced and as to the Phosphate Depart-
mert which was outlawed on Octeber 24, 1935? The trial
judge on several occasions held that he had no such legal
right. He finally did allow the amendment with serious
doubts and reservations. The Circuit Court of Appeals for _
the Third Circuit coneluded. not to considgr the several —
legal arid factual questions presented onthe appeal, and
held that the trial judge committed legal error in allowing
the amendment, and on that ground alone the judgment in
behalf of the respondent should be affirmed.

Argument.

The applicable part of the New Jersey Statute of Lim}-
tations reads as follows:

‘All actions hereafter ousreing for injuries%o per-
sons caused by the wrongful act, negléct or default of
any * * * cdrporation or corporations within this
State, shall be commenced and instituted within two
years next after the cause of sych action shall have
accrued and not after.’’ (3 N. J. Comp. St. 1910, P.
3164, Section 3; P. L. 1896, p. 119.)

Perhaps the most excellent decision on the applicability
of this statute locally is found in LaPorte v. U. S. Radtm

4 ‘

18
2 S

-Corp., 13 Fed. Supp. 263, D. C. of N. J. 1935), decided by
District Judge Forman. This case raised the question as

to whether the plaintiff in‘an action at law for damages

caused by injuries to the plaintiff’s intestate is entitled to

an injunction restraining the defendant from pleading the .

Statute of Limitations .as a bar to the plaintiff’s alleged
cause of action on the ground of equitable fraud. On page

272 District J udge Forman, after setting out the above

statute, said as follows:

‘*TIn Thorpe v. Corwin, 20 N. J. Law, 311, 317, the Couft
said: ‘The Statute of Limitations makes the” ‘lapse of
time a positive and legal bar. When once it-has begun
to“run against a person under né6 legal disability, it
pursues its course uninterrupted by any subsequent

events; and when the period prescribed-by the statute |

has elapsed, the bar is complete, and its force can
neither be strengthened nor impaired by anything that
has happened in the meantime. * * * The statute

the rights of the parties, by. the giant. force of the
_ statute.’

That is law today in New Jersey. a v. Con-
over, 95 N. J. Law, 89, 112 A. 324.’’ Rosey

Statutes of limitation are statutes of quiet, and they are

beneficent in that they put an end to disputed claims, pre- --

vent litigation, and give rest and repose. No matter what
may be the criticism of the casuist, in the eyes of the law
these statutes are no longer regarded as- harsh, but furnish
a defense as meritorious as any other. In Limpert Brothers
v. Stitt, 94 N. J. L. 472, 110 Atl. 832 (E. & A., 1920), Mr.\Jus-
tice Parker, in dealing with the Statute of ay gan said
on page 473 (N. J. L.):

“As to ‘defendant hot being peaietiesh, ‘statutes. of
limitation are in the interest of terminating litigation;
defendants are entitled to .rely on them, and would be
legally prejudiced by ‘their non-enforcement. a

leaves nothing for presumption. Time alone. settles —

| 14
Notwithstinding the formal diana in procedure pre-
scribed by the new Practice Act of New Jersey, the classi-

fication of actions at common law and their substantial dis-
tinctions as a basis of remedial law still continues. Willis

_ & Bro, v. Gaventa, 94 N. J. L. 84, 110 Atl. 120 (Sup. Ct., |
1920); Jamounegu v. Wetherill, 98 N. J. L. 80, 118 Atl. 707

Sup. Ct., 1922). 6

In discussing the facts of the cause at bar and the appli-

eability thereto of cases decided in various jurisdictions
and the general statements of law therein contained. touch-

ing upon the legal question of the right to amend a com-

plaint after the Statute of Limitations has run so as to. bar

the action, regard must be had to the unequivocal fact that

in all of these cases the original cause of action declared
in the complaint: was not barred at the time of the commence-
ment thereof so that the answer filed by the defendant did not
set up as a defense the Statute of Limitations, and the
Statute of Limitations became available as a defense only on

‘the date when an amendment to the complaint was‘presented

and offered. In the instant.case the situation is entirely dif-
ferent and is entirely unlike the facts‘presented in any other

reposted case. In the present case which was commenced on >

October. 1, 1935, the cause of action set forth in the complaint
had been barred on.N ovember 2, 1934, and the respondent

by its answer affirmatively declared that the plaintiff did

not work in the Silicate Department after November 1,
1932, and that as a consequence the cause of action declared
in the complaint was barred by the Statute of Limitations
and the Statute was specifically and affirmativety pleaded.

The amendment introducing the Phosphate Department |

and setting up a new cause of action as to that’ Depart-

- ment was presented and allowed on June 10, 1936, and over
phate Department .had been barred by the Statute.- Mae_ _
two years after the gause of action even as tothe Phos-
cause of action as to the Phosphate Department. was harred

15
on October 24, 1935. The original complaint did not in fact

or in law cover any department other than the Silicate

'- Department and coungel for the plaintiff admitted in open

%

court that it was not intended to cover any other depart-

ment.
". This distinction is so fundamental as to be dispositive of
the legal issues presented. It goes to the very crux of the

case. It presents neither the legal situation of a-bad com-

plaint corrected by a good amé*dment, nor a bad amend-
ment incorporated i in.a good complaint. It is, so far as the
Statute of Limitations is concerned, a bad complaint plus
a bad amendment, with the surprising and entirely illogical
interpretation advanced by the — that as a result
both are good. :

In examining the

ted, it will at once appear
that none of them are h respect to this fundamental
legal question. Br and frequently misleading general
statements of law will be found, but.such statements must
be carefully scrutinized because they are helpful only in
relation to the particular facts before the Court in these
cases.

Circuit Judge Sanborn made a very pertinent statement
in the case of Manhattan Oil Co. v. Mosby, 72 F. (2d) 840
(Highth Cireuit, 1934). He said on page 843:

“‘Manifestly, if a cause of action is actually barred
by the statute of limitations it cannot be resurrected by
inserting it, through amendment, into 4 petition which
states an entirely different cause of an. °° 7

The Original Complaint by ite Language Did Not Include

the Phosphate Department.

‘fe and by paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of the —wr 4 plain-
. tiff set forth a cause of action charging acts of negligence

- while he was employed a8 a furnace operator in the Silicate

| ' Sn of respondent’s plant. ee 1 is gen-

16

_ eral in nature and refers to plaintiff’s employment at the

plant of the respondent, but is limited by paragraphs 2

, and 4 wherein specific and particular reference is made to

the Silicate Department. In paragraphet plaintiff charged
that “‘dusing the course of his employment in and arownd
the said department’’ (referring to the Silicate Depart-
ment particularly mentioned in paragraph 2 as the par-
ticular place of: plaintiff’s employment), he came irito con-
tact with the substances which he says caused his’ illness,
‘‘all of which was the result of the negligence of the de-
fendant.’’ In paragraph 5 of the complaint plaintiff under-
took to particularize with respect to the acts of negligence

‘with which he says the defendant was chargeable in and
’ around the Silicate Department. The complaint does not

by its language cover any other department of respondent’s

plant except the Silicate Department: It is not sufficiently -

broad and comprehensive by its language from a legal or ©
even theoretical point of view to include the Phosphate -

Department. To suggest that the complaint as framed in-
cludes the Phosphate Department as well as the Silicate

Department is to suggest that the complaint as framed in-.

cludes every other one or more of the numerous departments
of respgndent at its plant in Grasselli, New Jersey. All
of these departments have different operations, involve
different products, different buildings and many other dif-
ferent facts and circumstances. this connection it must
be borne in mind that the resperdent’s answer specifically
stated that plaintiff was not employed in the Silicate De-
Se after November 1, 1932 (R..793): ‘Some of the
other departments of the respondent’s plant are the follow-

185) ; Sulphide (R..197) ; Lithepon (BR. 205) ; Glanber’s Salts
(R. 210); Barium Products (R. 219); Barium Chloride (R.
219); C. & R. Department (R. 220). There are other

°

’ ing: Shipping (R. 155); Sulphate (R. 162); Sulphur (R. ©

ee

numerous departments which are not specifically referred
to in the Record.

The complaint when prepared was not intended to cover

any department of the respondent’s plant other than thé\__

‘Silicate Department. The allegations: Of negligence of
which the plaintiff complained, wlien ane considers the
proofs offered to sustain sueh allegations, related selely
to the Silicate Department, and dealt with inadequate
ventilation, ‘‘puffing’’ of furnaces, holes in the conveyor,
ete. The proofs offered with respect to the Phosphate

Department were entirely different because plaintiff hati-~

dled only liquids or wet materials while working indoors
one day a week, and he worked in several general capacities
. as a laborer outdoors and near the water-front four days
a week. The Phosphate Department was contained in a
building over five hundred feet away from the Silicate De-
partment, The allowance of the amendment whereby the
Phosphate Department was added to and béctme part of
the complaint constituted an unqualified change in the gist
of the original cause of action in a most material respect.

- It must therefore be takeg as recognized and accepted as

¢

a fuygamental premise tuat the original complaint by its ~

language did not in law and fact and was not intended in
fact to include the Phosphate Department. Petitioner’s
feeble and almost apologetic argumepgsthat it did include
‘the Phosphate Department falls of its own, weight, and is
not \genable particularly in view of plaintiff’s counsel’s ad-

misSion in open court, that he did not in fact contemplate ©

any department other than the Silicate Department when

. he prepared the ¢omplaint (R. 128). We must therefore

_ proceed to a discussion of the judgment of the Circuit Court

that the District Judge committed legal error in allowing |

¢ the amendment. Sena : /

, 2h
: j \

——)

. = St ee:

‘5

18
me The Decision « of the Circuit Court is in Accord With the
_ Decisions of the State of New Jersey.

“In O'Shaughnessy * v. Bayonne News Co., 9 N. J. Mise. -

345,154 Atl. 13 (1931) (affirmed by the Court of Errors

- and Appeals in 109 N. J. L. 271, 160 Atl. 696 (1932), the
_ original complaint alleged that. plaintiff by qhe express
Reser of the defendants became a passenger in the auto-
obile truck owned by one of the defendants ; that the truck

_ was so negligently operated that plaintiff Je aie
- alighting from said automobile truck at or near the intersec-
tion of said G Grove Street with “Bight Street, in said City of

Jersey City” was thrown to the ground and suffered in- _ -

. juries. The accident happened on February 25, 1928. The-

* action was commenced in time. The two year statutory period
~of limitation ran against plaintiff’ s cause of action on
- February 25, 1930, or more than eleven months prior to
plaintiff ’s application to amend his complaint. In advance
of trial plaintiff moved. to amend. his complaint by alleg-
ing that the operator of the truck negligently and without

_ warning started the‘same after the plaintiff had alighted —

. therefrom and while the plaintiff was in the act of crossing
Grove-Street. The amendment was allowed.‘ It was in
connection with these facts and circumstances that Judge
. Ackerson made the i general observations (Mise. i
p. 347) :

‘Tt is quite generally held that if the identity of the
transaction forming the cause of action originally de-
clared upon is adhered to, an amendment @g@ not ordi-
narily regarded as substantially changing Ge ¢)
claim or as stating a new or substantially different

_cause of action. So an amendment will not as a rule
be held to state a new cause of action if the facts

alleged show substantially the same wrong with re- ._

spect to the same transaction, or if it is the same mat-
ter more fully or differently laid, or, if the ‘gist of the

_ action or the subject*of controversy remains the same; |

19

‘and this j is true inal the form of liability asserted,
-or the alleged incidents of the transaction may. be
different. Technical rules: will not be Applied i in deter-

inal and amended pleadings are identical, since in a
strict sense almost any amendment may be said. to
change the original cause of action. 49 C. J. 510, 511.

‘‘Tn a tort action an amendment may vary the state-
ment of the original complaint as to the manner in
which the plaintiff was injured, or as to the manner
of the defendants’ breach of duty, without necessarily
setting up a new cause of action.

‘“Tn the case sub juglice the injury charged in the orig- —

- inal complaint was alleged to have arisen out of the

hegligent operation of defendants’ ‘automobile. The

place where the plaintiff was injured is not the gist
of the cause of action.”’

Z In Rygiel v. rene eee 114 N. J. L. 311, 176 Atl. 605

_ “(H. & A,, 1934), the action was instituted on February 10,
¢ 1932, It was commenced within the statutory period. The
complaint charged the defendant with negligence in the
maintenance of a stairway, as a result of which plaintiff
suffered injuries‘on May 20, 1931.. On November 25, 1933,
and during the trial of the cause the plaintiff was allowed
to amend his complaint to state that his injuries were sus-

@ined on May 21, 1931. The defendant. pleaded the Stat-

ute of Limitations with respect to the cause of action as.

_ amended. The defense’ was sustained and a nonsuit al-
lowed. On appeal, the judgment on the nonsuit was re-
versed. It was in relation to these facts and circumstances
that Mr. Justice » Heher said (N. J. L. p. 312) :

‘‘The. ‘ati decidendi of the cited cases is that an

amendment will not, as a rule, be hel@® to state a new

“> cause of-action, if the facts alleged show substantially

the same wrong with respect to the same transaction,

or if it is the same matter mor fully or differently °

laid, or if the gist of the actiofi or the subject of con:

mining witether the cause of actions stated in the orig-

Vv

aoe

90 «f

troversy remains the same. ‘Gist’ is-the essential
ground or object of the action in point of law, without
which there would be no cause of action; the cause
for which an action will lie; the ground or foundation
of a suit, without which it would not be maintainable;
the essential ground or object of the suit, without _
‘which there is no cause of action.”’ Casavalo v. ‘D'Auria,
supra.

‘‘Wheresa » plaintiff, ‘by amendment, sets up no new
matter or claim, but merely, restates in a different
form, more correctly and specifically, or more clearly
and concisely, the same cause of action declared in the
original complaint, or merely avers that, through mis- -
take, the time is erroneously stated in the complaint,
it is not the statement of a new ‘or.different cause of
action, and the statute will not avail for the period
between the original arid amended pleadings.”’

The case of Magliaro v. Modern Homes, Inc., 115 N. J. L.
151, 178 Atl. 733 (E. & A., 1935), is based upon aii action in

contract. It was instituted within time. In paragraph 1

of his complaint, plaintiff pleaded that he agreed to exca-

- vate, lay sewers, fill and construct a road upon defendant’s
promise to pay to plaintiff 80% of the work completed each

month upon presentation to defendant of the engineer’s —
statement. certifying the amount of work completed, and
performance “generally was alleged. The defendant refused
to pay plaintiff because it disputed the rock removal and ,
the quantity of the earth excavation certified by the engineer,
and therefore pleaded by way of defense that plaintiff failed
to perform his contract with the result that defendant was
obliged to complete the work at a cost exceeding the contract
price. At the trial plaintiff was permitted over objection to
amend paragraph 1 of his complaint by restating it as it

_ was originally, and adding that the payment of the monthly

estimates’was a condition precedent to his proceeding with
the work. The defendant-objected to the amendment on the
ground of that of surprise and that it presented a new cause

* . 21

_ of action after the running of the Statute of Limitations
against the original cause. The amendment was sustained
on appeal. Here again it was in connection with the facts
and circumstances appearing in the case that Chancellor

Campbell quoted with approval the statement hereinabove
set out and taken from the opinion of Judge Ackerson in the

case of O'Shaughnessy v. Bayonne News Co., supra, and

further said as follows (N. J. L. p. 157):

‘Applying this rule to the case in hand the situation
presented is, as before stated, that the plaintiff pleaded
the terms of his contract so far as was necessary. to

present his cause of action under the independent cove-

nant to pay the installment under the contract; the de-
fendant by its counterclaim asserted a subsequent
breach of the contract by the plaintiff and sought to
recover damages by reason thereof; the plaintiff might
well have stood upon the allegations of his complaint
as to the terms of his contract but saw fit by the amend-
ment in question to.more fully set forth the terms of

such contract so as to. more safely and surely meet the ©

defendant’s cause of action against him under its
counterclaim. By so doing he was not substituting a
new cause of action.: His cause of action remained as
it was originally, upon the contract, for breach of its
independent covenant to pay an installment of the con-
sideration, The plaintiff instead of amending the com-
plaint might. well have moved to amend his reply, or
answer (as it should have been) to the counterclaim by.
asserting the same facts as contained in the amend-
ment in question. This would have met the situation
and certainly no stibstantial complaint could have been
made thereto and still the same protective purpose
would have — accomplished. ’’

The frivegiling cases decided by the court of New Jersey
are relied upon by the petitioner to sustain her contentions
with respect to the propriety of the amendment of the com-
- plaint. In all of these cases and the.cases to follow arising

.
on
as g-

AA

22

out of New Jersey, the cause of action when. originally in-

- stituted was entirely within time and was’ not then barred
by the Statute of Limitations. In the following New Jersey

cases, the courts in considering the legal principles above
set out refused to allow the amendments to the complaint.

In Di Lello v. Manufacturers’ Land and Improvement Co.,
11 N. J. Mise. 164 (1933), the complaint charged the defend-

ant with negligence in permitting to exist in the concrete .
sidewalk a raised and ‘broken ‘condition, and in allowing the

sidewalk to become so raised and broken that it became
dangerous to the public. The plaintiff claims that he suf-
fered injuries on August 20, 1930. His suit was commenced

within. the two year period of the Statute of Limitations. »
More than two years after the alleged accident, plaintiff:

moved to amend his complaint by alleging that the defendant
was negligent in that it carelessly constructed or caused to
be constructed the concrete sidewalk in question by reason
of which the sidewalk-became raised and broken. The

7 “amendment was not allowed. Circuit Court Judge Eldredge

reviewed the authorities in New J ersey generally, including
the case of O’Shaughnessy v. Bayonne News Co. , supra, and

| . aad as follows (p. 167) : 8

‘‘ Applying this test, we think the siiniaiinl cannot
be allowed. The charge in the amended complaint is
not substantially the same wrong with respect to the
same transaction as that alleged i in the original com-

_ plaint. The wrong in one is failure to repair and main-
tain, while the wrong in the other is failure to properly
construct. Nor is it the same matter more fully and
differently laid, but rather it is a different matter set-

_ ting up a different cause of liability. Neither can it be .

' said that the gist of the action nor the subject of the
controversy is the same.

In Casavalo v. D’ Auria, 12 N. J . Mise. 81, 169 Atl. 520;

- affirmed 113 ‘N. J. L. 328 (1933), the original complaint

gist of the original cause of action had been changed. The

23

charged that the defendants ‘‘negligently and contrary to
their duty in the premises failed to maintain the said stair-
way in a proper, safe condition, and failed to have any
railing on said stairway to protect the ucers from falling
from said stairs into the cellar areaway directly alongside

. - of said stairway, and also failed to properly light the said

stairway, so that the said stairway or stoop was not safe for
the use of persons lawfully using the same.’? The suit was
commenced within time. After the Statute of. Limitations
had run, the trial court allowed an amendment to the com-
plaint charging that ‘‘defendants having undertaken and
having attempted to make the necessary repairs to the stair-
way or stoop leading to said store, did so in a negligent and

careless manner, so that the said stairway or stoop was not —

safe for the use of persons lawfully using the same.’’ It
_was held to be error in permitting the amendment since the

Court said in this regard (Misc. p. 83) :

‘In the instant case; the gravamen of the original
complaint was the breach of an alleged duty to maintain
‘the stairway in a reasonably safe condition, while the

gist.ef the gause of action pleaded in the amended com- -

plaint is t negligent performance of an assumed duty
to make repairs. It therefore follows that there was
error in permitting respondent to amend the complaint
in a manner indicated. si .

In considering the foregoing cases it will at once appear
that had the instant case been considered by the New Jersey
Courts, the amendment would not have been allowed and a
verdict would have been directed for the respondent. .

II. ‘The Detision of the Circuit Court is in Accord With the
Decisions of This Court. 7

3 ‘The Circuit Court of Appeals i in affirming the judgment
of the District Court on the limited ground. that the trial

24

judge should not have allowed the amendment to the com-
plaint held that the cause of action set forth in the amend-
ment was a different cause of action from that set forth in ©
the original. complaint and, therefore, could not be intro-
duced after the Statute of Limitations had run. The Court
‘held that the negligence alleged in the amendment involved
a different act, different buildings, departments, conditions,
and dates of exposure. The Court was unquestionably cor-_
rect in its conclusions in these respects. 89 F. (2d) 456, on
page 821. The Circuit Courg cited and referred to the case
of Union Pacific Railway v. Wyler, 158 U. S. 285, 39 L. Ed.
983 (1895), solely with respect to the general rule of-Jaw.
that an amendment relates back to, the time of the filing of ©
‘the original complaint where the amendment does not create |
a new cause of action, but that where-the cause of action re-
lied upon in the amendment is different from that originally
asserted, the reason of the rule ceases to exist and the rule
no longer applies, with the result that the running of the
Statute of Limitations against the amendment is not ar-
rested. This general rule of law stands unchallenged and
with its original integrity in all the cases decided by this
Honorable Court since the decision in the Wyler case. The —
Circuit Court having correctly held that new cause of action
was created by the amendment, the general rue of law of
relation back to the time of the filing ‘of the original com-
plaint which is-still generally and universally accepted was
not applicable. Furthermore and in this connection, it will
at once be apparent that even the general rule of relation

back to the time of the filing of the original complaint can’ —

avail petitioner nothing for the reason that the cause of
agtion set forth in the original complaint was barred by the
Statute of Limitations-on the day and at the time suit was
commenced. The Wyler case laid down certain tests for
the purpose of determining whether a,new cause of action
was created by the suggested amendment, and these tests

ss

25
were predicated upon the determination of ‘whether the
theory of the action was changed from-fact to fact—repre-

senting a departure from fact to fact—or from law to law--
representing a departure from law to law. Only in the appli-

_cation.of these tests as absolute and invariable tests has the

law enunciated in the Wyler case been in anywise modified.

In other respects the law of that case and the general prin- '
ciples therein enunciated remain and stand.inviolate. This

Will at once appear from the following statement of Mr.
Justice Cardozo in the case of United States, v. Memphis

Cotten Oil Co., 288 U. S. 62, 77 L.. Ed. 619 (1933), wherein.

he said on page 68 (U.S.) in referring to these tests as laid
down in the Wyler case: |

— - * tow decisions have made it ‘clear that
this test is no longer accepted as one of general validity.

. * *9)

In N. & G. Taylor Company . “Anderson, 275 U. S. 431,
%

72 L. Ed. 354 (1928), N. & G. Taylor Company as a partner-

ship entered into.a contract with the defendant dated
November 1,,1916. On January 31, 1917, the partners or-

ganized a corporation under the same name. On March 7, -
1918, suit was instituted against the defendant by the plain-

tiff in its corporate nathe. In May, 1924, and after the Stat-
ute of Limitations became operative, the plaintiff sought to
amend the complaint by alleging the original contract be:

tween the partnership and the defendant; the acquisition of
all assets including the contract by the partnership, etc. The |

amendment was allowed by- the trial judge. Mr. Justice
Butler held that the amended declaration substituted a new

cause of action which cannot be deemed to relate back to the

commencement of the original action. He relied upon and
specifically referred to the case of Union P. R. Co. v. Wyler,

158 U. S. 285, 39: L. Ed. 983.. The Taylor case was decided —

in 1928 and followed without question the general rule of

26 ° J

law enunciated in the Wyler ‘ease which was decided in

1895.:

The case of United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Com- |
” pany, 288 U. 8, 62, 77 L.-Ed. 619 (1988), arose out of a suit

to recover overpayments of income taxes. It raised the
question as to whether a claim for: 4 taygrefund which has
been seasonably filed, but which fails to state the grounds -.
upon which the refund is demanded, may be amended by
specifying the grounds-at any time before the claim in its
original form has been finally rejected, ‘though it be after
the time when a wholly new claim would be barred by limi- |

tation. Both the Government and the taxpayer invoked

‘analogies suggested by pleadings in a law suit. Mr. Justice
Cardozo referred to the general.rule of law that an amend-
ment of a pleading will take effect by relation and thus

relieve against the bar of an intervening limitation if the
identity of the cause of action is still substantially the same,
“but that the.limitation will prevail if under the guise of

am amendment there is the’ substitution of a new cause. of

action im place of another wholly different.”’. (U.S., p. 67.)

-On page 69 (U. 8.) he said further :

ae 8 Definitions and analogies borrowed teins
pleadings i in a lawsuit will have their place and recog-
~ nition, but in due subordination to the differences of
end and aim. Viewing the problem thus, we’ must say
whether a statement by the taxpayer of supporting ~
facts and reasons is to be agsimilated to a bill of par-
ticulars explanatory of a claim, or is something so
essential a there can be no claim — “.”?

This Court affirmed the action of the lower unk in allow-
ing the amendment principally on’ the basis of administra-

_-tive practice. The claim for the tax refund was filed with
. an administrative department and did not constitute a com- -
plaint or — in a court of law. 2

> xe Se eS ee

ats ze mee . ~ -_ _ - . are - ---——— Bis ’

_ In Bemis Brothers Bag Co. v. United States, 289 U. 8.
28, 77 L. Ed. 1011 (1933), there was presented the question of a
_ as to whether a claim for a refund of a tax had been pre-
-. ‘sented in such form as to be subj amendment after a
' wholly new claim would be ba by limitation. Here.
. again we have a claim filed with an administrative depart-
ment where the amendment merely clarified a valid claim
‘seasonably fifed, and did not, to borrow by analogy from + —

pleadings in a law suit, create a new cause of action.

In all the foregoing cases, the s&s were commenced or
claims filed in time and before the Statute of Limitations
had run.so as to constitute a bar. It was only when the
amendments were submitted that the Statute of Limita-
tions was asserted and set up as a defense in bar. ~ ~.

III. The Decision of the Circuit Court is in‘Accord With the .
Decisions in Other Jurisdictions and With the © -
Weight of Authority. | ;

_ The case of Buntin v. Chicago, R. I. d P. Ry. Co., 41 Fed. .
744 (W. D. Mo., 1890), involved’ an action for damages
resulting from the Railroad Company for overflowing the
plaintiff’s land. The original petition alleged the construc-
" tion of an embankment, by reason of which the stream was
diverted from its course. Nine years later an amendment
was asked alleging that the construction of a bridge in a 4
negligent mariner had occasioned the overflow. The ‘de- é>
_fendant demurred to the evidence on the®rround of the-
‘statute of nitations with respect to the amendment. Thé ~
demurrer was sustained on fhe ground that the amendment
constituted a new cause of action which was barred by the
_, Statute of Limitations. Jdge Phillips said ig part as fol-
loys (p. 749) : ; pt .
“Tt is true that courts will allow amendments with
liberality, in order to prevent the — of the

7 >.
i
i ry
j
’
]

o*

3S

statute of limitations; but this indulgence cannot go

to the extent, in order to avoid the statute, of permit-
ting the plaintiff to substitute an entirely new. ground
of recovery, requiring entirely different evidence, so
~ .as to recover thereon, when he could not have done so

if this amefided petition were an original petition. .

Unquestionably, had this amended petition been filed,
at the time it was, as an original petiffon, it would have

- been subject to demurrer, for the reason that the causp

of action was barred by the statute of ses -

3..—
And farther (p. 750):

“If the parfy introdpces a new claim, it presents a
new issue; and, as that i is the firs} time the defendant
has had an opportunity to interpose the plea of fhe
bar, it must follow that his right cannot be taken away
bythe doctrine of relation, which goes back to the first
act,—the filing of the original petition; otherwise, the

» party might perpetuate indefinitely-a cause of action

by suing for one thing, and, after the lapse of the stat-
-utory period o? limitation, go back to the cause of ©
_action already barred, and revive it under the caguee,
of an amendment.’’ ; ;

The case of Birkes v. United Fruit Co., 48 F. (2d) 656
(D. C., 8. D. N. Y. 1930), arose out of a motion to dismiss

_ the second amended complaint on the ground that the cause

of action therein alleged was barred by the statute of lim-
itations. The first amended complaint charged. that the
crew of a vessel owned and operated by the defendant-wil-

- fully and wantonly stabbed and assaulted plaintiff’s intes-

tate, the master. The second- amended complaint alleged

that the defendant failed to. provide a seaworthy ship, in.

that among the crew there Were men of vicioys and crim-
inal propensities to the imminent danger vf the passengers
and other members of the crew. Judge Bondy in sustain-
ing the defense of the statute of limitations as to the second.
amended aaa set said on page 657:

~ | Corp., 30 F. (2d) 718 (D. C. E. D. N. ¥°1928).

"© - 99 -
sapere ie am “The original cdmplaint apparently was
based on the right to recover for the willful miscon- &
duct of the crew in assaulting the master. Basing the es Fo

‘amended complaint on unseaworthiness or on negli-
gence in providing a crew among whom were men of |
felonious and criminal propensities, or in providing a |

_ ship that was improperly . construtted, constitutes in
* Jegal effect a change in the cause of action. 7 e on

See also D’Allesandro v. United Marine Contracting

In Chennault v. Stovall, et al., 160 So. 146 (1935), whére

is found a situation on all fours with the instant -one, in
that an action in tort was brought-against . the defendant,
alleging a conspiracy to have oceulTéd | on February 1,
1932, suit was brought on January 16, 1934. Faced by .
one year statute, which-clearly eliminated his claim, plain-,

/ tiff attempted to amend by changing the date of the last

; conspiracy to February, 1933, which tender was refused =
by the Court." The language is as follows:

4 - “The orfginal petition, as it ‘stood, filed in 1934 upon
a tort alleged to have been.cpmmitted in 1932, without
any showing of delayed knowledge, was upon an action, ve
on the face of the pleadings, forever barred by the pre-
scription of one year, and therefore set forth no cause ¢
or right of action. In the amended ‘petition it is al-
Teged that, owing to-a clerical error, the year 1932 was
written instead of 1933. Granting this to be true, nev-
ertheless the action on its face was barred. -

‘In the case of National Park: Rank +. Conperdia
Land & Tjmber Company, 159 La. 86, 105,S0. 234, 240,.
the rule is stated’as follows: © ‘The authorities are

_numerous to the effect that where ‘he original bill of a
complaint, or petition, is brought before the prescrip- oj

_ tive periéd has expired, or petition is amended after . :
the expiration of the prescriptive period so as to state
a cause of action, the amendment will relate back ta the |
time of. filing thé original pleading and save the action
from the bar of the Statute of Limitations, but that

t}

Cine
Ee ee ®

>

a?

300 aa
. al ° - “ ;
‘it (the amendment) will not relate back to the time of
the filing the original pleadings so as to save the action |
from the bar of the Statute of Limitations, where the
original pleading fails to state. any cause. of action
whatever.’ ’’

The case of Salyers v. United pure Fed. 255 (Highth
Circuit, 1919), was cited with appfoval by this. Court

-inN.€G. Taylor Company v. Anderson, supra. The plain-

tiff had several causes of action and merely alleged one
of them in his complaint, and the Court refused to allow

an:amendment after the statute had run as to the amended

claim. The language follows (p. 259) : :
‘‘But we have here an instance where the plaintiff
having two causes of action has stated but one of them
in his original petition, although the amount demanded
is large enough to cover both of his causes. of action,
- and then seeks by amendment to set up facts vital to
and constituting the second cause of action. An amend-—
ment setting up such new and second cause of action
- will not relate back to the date of the original petition,
. but will be governed by its own date, and if the bar
, of the Statute of Limitations or a bar to the right to
- maintain such new cause of action has intervened,
the new cause of action must fail.’’

- Pennsylvania, in the case of Sane v. Sayee Water Co.,

69 Atl, 1126 (1908), held that an amendment tendered after
’ the statute had run should be refused and accordingly

refused to correct’ a | defective pleading by saying as fol-

lows: | é

‘

‘‘Tt was held that a new sail of action cannot be:

introduced, or new parties brought in or new subject-

matter be presented, or a fatal and material defect in-
_ the pleadings be corrected after the Statute of Limi- -
- tations has become a bar. That there was a fatal and
material defect in the original pleadings was decided |
by this Court when: the case was here before, and we

31

are > not familiar wih any authority that would permit

an amendment which in effect introduces ‘a new cause

of-action and cures a fatal and material defect i in the
pleadings after it is pointed out by this Court on appeal
and when the Statute of Limitations has become a bar.

There should be a finality to all litigation, and the judg- -

- ment entered by this Courtswhen the case was ‘béfore

us three years ago was final on ‘all questions raised by *

the. original pléadings. | The Statute of Limitations is
‘bar to a recovery on-any new suit subsequently
brought, or, what amounts to the same thing, ‘an attempt
to institute a new action by amending the original
pleadings. , , '

th Martin v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co, 227 Pa. 18, 15 Atl. 837
(1910), the accident-occurred on tine 21,°1904. The
original statement of claim was filed on November 2, 1904.
The negligence was that the car was running at an exces-
sive rate of speed and that there was no headlight on the
car, and that no-bell was rung or gong: sounded as the car
approached the crossing ; and that the decedent ‘suffered
‘ injuries while attempting to cross a _ public street. On Sep-
tember 4, 1906, plaintiff sought to amend the statement-of
claim by alleging that the decedent, an intending passenger,
signalled the car to stop which it did, and while in the act
_ of boarding the car, and before he was securely on it, the
car suddenly started and threw him to, the ground and un-
der the car.. Fhe Supreme Court on appeal | held that the

amendment should not have been allowed because the Stat- .

ute of Limitations had become a bar. Mr. Justice Elkin
in speaking for the Court said (Atl., p. Dacula

wie 3 5 | therefore, a case of adding to or
amplifying the original statement wjthin the rule recog-
nized in-some of our-cases, but, on/ the contrary, a dif-

ferent theory is relied-on, new grounds are set up,

sand other acts of negligence entirely different are al-
leged. * @ @ “4

9

— ——

4

32

7 /

In Gilmore v. City of Chicago, 224 Ill. 490, 79 N. E. 596
(1906), plaintiff filed her complaint alleging that she sus-
tained personal injuries by stepping into a hole in a side:
walk. She charged that the defendant had control of a
certain public. sidewalk on the north side of a certain pub-
lie street, called Thirty-Eighth Street -at or near the inter-

_ section of Thirty-Kighth Street with Princeton Avenue, and
'. between Princeton Avenue and Shields Avenue. She later ;

amended the’complaint by striking out the words ‘‘Prince-
ton Avenue”? wherever the same occurred in the =
and inserting in lieu thereof the words ‘‘Stewart Avenue.’
Defendant pleaded the Statute of Limitations to the com-
plaint:as amended, and this defense -was sustained on the
ground that a new cause of action was stated in the amended
complaint.

In Union Pacific R. Co. v. Sweet, 78 Kan. 243, 96 Pac. 657

| (1908), the original petition charged the railroad with set-
- . ting out a fire-on or adjacent to its right of way in the Town

of Wakeeny. During the trial, the plaintiff sought to amend -
his petition by charging the railroad with setting out a

fire at the time mentioned in the petition at. a point about

five miles from Wakeeny. The amendment was allowed
after thé defendant had pleaded the Statute of Limitations.
This was held to be error since the new cause of action set
forth in the amended petition was barred.

The case of Andrews v. Marsden, 122 Atl. 171 (1923
Penna.), arose out of an action to recover goods alleged to
have been illegally seized under a distress warrant. The
plaintiff originally alleged that the defendant ‘‘with. force
and arms’”’ seized and carried away personal property of the
plaintiff’s. At the trial eight years later, the plaintiff at-

tempted to amend to show that he was a tenant of the defend-

ant’s and that the levy was madé under a landlord’s warrant.
and that it was illegal. He also asked to amend the date of

the wrongful distraint from March 5, 1912 to February 2,

33

1912. ‘The Court refused both fhe amendments and entered
a nonsuit from which the plaintiff appealed. Said the aes
(p. 171):

‘‘The fale is well settled that after the Statute of
Limitations has run plaintiff shall not be permitted by ~
amendment to ‘shift his ground of complaint, introduce
a ne use of action, cure a fatal defect in the plead-

—ings, change his cause from a common-law to a statu-
tory proceeding, or deprive the defendant of any valua-
ble right.’’’ Card v. Stowers Pork Packing @. on <
vision Co., 253 Pa. 575, 579, 98 Atl. 729.

And further (p: 172):

“The evidence offered by the plaintiff was bial.
sible under the pleadings, as it failed to sustain the |
cause of claim. A non-suit, accordingly, was properly
entered. The offer to amend came too late, inasmuch as
the proposed amendment set forth a new cause of
action, barred by the Statute of Limitations.’’. e

The case of Calhoun v. Washington Veneer Company, 15
Pac. (2d) 943 (Wash. 1932), i is very similar to the instant
case on the facts. In this case, suit was started in Septem-.
ber, 1931. The plaintiff worked in the glue room of the de:

_ fendant company from April 20, 1926, until on or about
the middle of May, 1928. This room was not ventilated
in accordance with the statutes of the State. He worked

» from the middle of May, 1928, until November 17, 1928, in
another room which was properly ventilated. .On page 946
the Court said: |

‘<* * * Under the allegations * * * that Claude
Calhoun worked for respondent in and about the glue
room from on or about April 20, 1926, until en or about
the-middle of May, 1928, and from the middle of May,

' 1928, worked in another room, nat alleged to have been |

improperly. ventilated in violation of the Factory Act,
until November 17, 1928, it is manifest that any injuries~*

Sh | / a ©.
: i | ; \ _ :

*.

‘ *34

a

received from violation of the Factory Act by respond-

_ ent, culminated and accrued about the middle of May,
1928, His action was not commenced until September, |
1931, which was more than three years after the in-
juries had accrued under the ee Act and ‘would
have been berred- a ile Sie

In this group of cases we ‘also have the situation where °
the original suits were commenced if time and before the
Statute of Limitations had run so as to constitute a bar.
It was. only when the amendments were submitted that the
Statute of Limitations was. asserted and set up as a defense
in bar. :

In the case of Seer v. Mullin, 12 8, Ki. 447 (N. C., 1890),
an action was brought to recover damages for slander, and .
presented the following facts. A complaint was filed on
January 20, 1889, alleging slanderous words uttered in
April 1888. To this the defendant answered and pleaded
the statute of limitations. Faced with a.six months statute
of limitations that barred his claim, plaintiff, at the trial on
April 18, 1890, offered’to amend, which was granted. He
then filed an amended complaint setting up a caise of action
. for other words uttered by the defendant on another occa-
sion, to wit: on September 14, 1888. The defendant filed his
answer to the complaint as thus amended and set up the
statute of limitations. The trial court held that upon the
amended complaint the plea of. the statute should be
sustained. Upon a non-suit being entered'in favor of the
° ‘defendant, the plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court -
affirmed his action, stating as follows (p. 447):

‘‘ Amendments in this respect must be such, and only
such, as are necessary to promote the completion of the
action begun. In the present case the action begun, as
‘set out in the first complaint, was for words spoken in
April, 1888. The amended complaint sets out a new and
distinct cause of action for other words spoken in Sep-

EA RPI RE een

tember, 1888, and, as to the latter, new and distinct.
- cause of action, the amended complaint must-be treated
.. as the begimning of the action. Ely v. Early, 94 N. C.1;.

State v. Turner, supra; Robbins v. Harris, 96 N. C. 557,

2S. E. Rep. 70; and the ¢ cases cited in them. There i is

no error.’’

Here for the first time is presented a case where the Statute

of Limitations was pleaded as a defense in bar to the origi-_
. nal cause of action set forth in the original complaint and

the defense was sustained as a good defense. An amend-
ment, was thereupon offered with respect to other words
uttered at a date subsequent to the date referred to in the

- original complaint, and the amendment was denied by the

trial judge and his ruling affirmed on appeal. This case
presents the closest case available on the facts to the case
at-bar, and sustains unqualifiedly the judgment of the Cir-
cuit aie of . Ane in the instant case.

Summary: of Argument.

It is respectfully urged as 8elf-evident, that the gravamen
or gist of the allegations of negligence with respect to venti-
lation under allegedly hazardous conditions in the Silicate

‘Department is a different cause of action from that of
_ similar conditions in the Phosphate Department, located, as

it was, in a building at least five hundred feet away from the

Silicate Department. The exposure was different; the.
plaintiff’s employment was different, and was with liquids;

the ventilation was different, it was in a different building,

and with the majority of the work performed out-of-doors. .
.. Certainly had the transfer of the plaintiff on November 1,

_ 1932, been to a plant in another State, there could be no
-- identity of “‘gist”’; ; yet, this is not a hypothesis more extreme

under the circumstances. When the limits of the negligence,
as alleged, are reached, it is submitted that it makes no
difference how far or how near the — may be—if he

36

is in fact removed. from the effects of that negligence as

alleged. The injury here is alleged as a result of certain .
conditions; the specific acts of negligence or omissions
amounting to negligence are perhaps the most important

. factors i in the complaint and it is submitted that an amend-

ment, allowing proof of an entirely different exposure, ~
should not be allowed.

It is respectfaNy urged that the fact that the statute had
run on the exposure in the Silicate Department must be
taken to be established, both as a matter of local law and
general authority.

Discussion of,Petitioner’s Brief With Respect to the Stat-
ute of Limitations (Point A, Petitioner’s Brief, pp: 10-19).

Petitioner seeks to contend that the amendment to the
complaint sg as to include the Phosphate Department con-
stituted an entirely immaterial addition ‘to the Complaint,
and further that the original complaint was entirely ade-
quate to include the Phosphate Department without any
amendment whatsoever. The argument of the petitioner to
sustain these inconsistent contentions is most labored and
illogical, and overlooks the pertinent facts that the Com-
plaint when prepared by plaintiff’s counsel was not intended
in act and in law to relate to or include any department other
than the Silicate Department (R. 128), and that when plain- ,

‘tiff’s counsel and his architect-expert made a physical in-

spection at respondent’s plant on May 11, 1936 (R. 695)
they inspected only the Silicate Department. In this con-
nection it will be recalled that suit herein~was commenced
on October 1, 1935 (R. 787), and the trial of this cause was
commenced on June 9, 1936 (R. 89).

An examination of the original Complaint establishes
that the plaintiff attempted thereby to allege and the Com-
plaint did in fact allege only the following facts (R. 788) ;
That plaintiff was employed at the defendant’s plant until

37

November 1933 ; that during sotne part of the time (the exact .
time is not fixed in the Complaint) he was employed as a .
furnace operator in the Silicate Department, and that dur-

ing: the course of his employment in said Department he
came in contact with certain substances due to the negligence

of the defendant which caused him to become incapacitated

in November 1933. The complaint does not specifically
allege continuous employment until November 1933 in the
Silicate Department; it alleges only that he was employed

_ at the defendants’ plant unti] November, 1933, and that the
defendant was guilty of the negligence as charged only
while he was employed in the Silicate Department. The .

- allegation in Paragraph 4 of the complaint that the plaintiff
became incapacitated in November{*1933, does not directly
or inferentially charge continuous negligence until Novem-_
ber,.1933 ; if charges only. that as a result of the defendant’s
alleged negligence ‘‘in and aro the said department’’
(referring to the Silicate Departenal which is referred to
specifically in paragraph 2 of the complaint) without men-
tioning the exact’ period of time employed in that depart-
ment, he became incapacitated in November 1933. In this
connection it will be recalled that defendant by its answer :
stated that plaintiff was not employed in the Silicate De-

. partment after November 1, 1932 (R. 793), and the cause
went to trial on the issues as thus framed. As hereinbefore
argued, to suggest that the complaint as framed includes
the Phosphate Department as well as the Silicate Depart-

ment is to suggest that the complaint includes every other
‘one or more of the numerous departments of respondent’s
plant, and this where all of these departments involve dif-
ferent operations, different products, different buildings, :
and many -other material facts: and circumstances. The ' Fe
essential elements of negligence charged and sought to be
proved as to the Silicate Department were entirely different

©

- 38

in “material: thease town those sought to be pene as to
the Phosphate Department.

. Petitioner’ s brief stggests that defendant was hot sur-
3 wet or prejudiced by the proofs with respect to the Phos:
‘phate Department. Petitioner overlooks the fact that de-
fendant by its original Answer filed to the original com-
_ plaint pleaded the Statute of Limitations as to the original
* cause of action.framed by the Complaint, and since that de-
fense. was. definitely available’ and constituted an absolute
bar, defendant had a vested legal right in a dismissal of
the plaintiff’s suit, and had also a vested legal right to have
plaintiff’s application to amend the complaint denied to the
end that an action barred by the Statute of Limitations as
ofvthe date it was. instituted may not’ be resurrected and
brought to life by an amendment. This argumeng of peti-
tioner is best answered by the language of - Mr.. Justice
Parker speaking for the Court of Errors and Appeals of
New Jersey in the case of Limpert Brothers vy. Stitt, supra,

In the ease of New Y ork Central & Hudson. River Rail-

road v. Kinney, cited on ‘page 15 of petitioner’s brief,
wherein Mr. Justice Holmes made the general statement that

“' “where a défendant has had notice from the beginning

that: the plaintiff sets up and is trying to enforce a claim
against it of specified conduct, the reasons for the Statute
of Limitations do not exist’? (U.’S., Pp. 346), he made
this statement only in connection with the facts which
appeared in that case. The original complaint had in
fact stated a cause of action under the Federal Employ-
ers’ Liability Act as well as at common law and under ~
the New York Statutes, so that the amendment alleging that -

the plaintiff and defendant were engaged in interstate com-
merce at the time of the accident added nothing-to the
complaint as-it originally stood. The general statement of
law is anet therefore applicable to the facts i in the case at bar.

39

The case of Grayson v. Lynch (page 16 of petitioner’s
brief), deals only with the question of variance. Mr. Justice
Brown held in that case that the fact that the Precise

_ place of contracting the disease could not be established
did not bar recovery because the description of the exact
place where roving cattle were infected wifh disease was

wholly immaterial. This situation was wholly unlike that
appearing in the case at bar where were involved ‘‘a dif-
ferent act, different buildings, departments, conditions and
dates of exposure,’’ different operations, products and other
different facts and cireumstances upon which the Circuit |

_ Court relied (R. 820). |

- % In the case of Chicago City R. Co. v. McMeen, 102 Ill.

_ App. Ct. 318 (1902), cited and discussed in petitioner’s brief,
the cause of action set forth in the original complaint had
not been barred when suit was commenced. The Statute of
Limitations was asserted as a defense in bar only when the
amendment was added. Here again the amendment did not
deal with different acts, conditions, operations and other .
material factors, but dealt only with a car standing in the
middle of a street other than the street referred to in the’
original complaint. ‘The ‘same specific acts were charged .
and established under both complaints. .

The case of Seaboard Air Line v. Remm, is relied upon by —
petitioner in her brief on page 18. In that case the original
complaint had alleged that the defendant had operated its
line in Virginia, North Carolina and elsewhere, and had.
therefore alleged interstate commerce without using the

' specific words ‘‘interstate commerce.’’ The amendment
sought only to use these words, and the amendment was
allowed. There was — no change under the circum-
stances. .

o -

: fei Fi ‘ a , “a .

Petitioner’s Brief on This Review Proceeds Beyond the
Scope of the Single and Sole Isf#e Relied Upon and

Ar@ued in heF Petition for Writ of Oertiorari, and Upon
Which the Writ was Granted by This Honorable Court.

In the petitioner’s petition for writ of certiorari and brief,
she assigned four specifications of errors on the part of the
E- Circuit Court of Appeals (Pages 4 and 5). Specification

* No. 1 alleged error on the part of the Court in fefraining

; - from reviewing the evidence as to the knowledge of the
_ respondent. The Circuit Court had held that it was. not
‘ hecessary to review the evidence with respect to knowledge
; . in view of its conclusion that a verdict should have been

—, directed for the respondent because of the two-year Statute
bo of Limitations (R. 821). It is most obvious that there was

no need for the Circuit Court to review the several other

legal and factual questions presented and arguéd since its
decision on the question of the Statute of Limitations was
dispositive of the whole case in so far as the judgment of the

District Court was concerned. Specifi¢ations Nos. 2, 3 and
. 4 refer wholly and exclusively to the question of the Statute
_ of Limitations. The Statute of Limitations constitutes the
Be single issue presented and argued in the petition for writ
of certiorari. It represents the sole issue which was dis-
cussed in respondent’s brief in opposition to petition for —
writ of certiorari. It also represents the single issue upon
| which the writ was granted by this Honorable Court.
| : _ In petitioner’s brief on this review she undertakes to

discuss and argue all the legal and factual questions which

| _ “were presented to and argued before the Circuit Court of
; Appeals upon the appeal from the District Court. This
we understand to be contrary to the settled and uniform.
practice of this Honorable Court as declared in the follow-

ing cases: Alice State Bank v. Houston, 247 U. S. 240, 62

\ L. Ed. 1096 (1918) ; Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Helvering, 293 |

4]
U. 8. 172, 79 L. Ed. 264 (1934) ; Phidence Compony, Inc. v.

Fidelity & Deposit Comipany of Maryland, 297 U. S. 198, °

80 L. Ed. 581 (1936); and Johnson. v. Manhattan Railway

Company, 289 U. S. 479, 77 L. Ed. 1331 (1933). We under-
stand from these cases that upder. the facts Ay circum- .

stances presented in these proceedings on this review the
only question for consideration is that stated in the peti-
tion for writ of certiorari, namely, the Statute\of Limita-

tions, and that the review by-this. Honorable ma os will be 3

limited accordingly, #7 ~ ° 3 |
We are, however, in the unfortunate position of not
being able to determine at this point with complete definite-

ness to what extent, if any, this Honorable Court will hear -

argument upon and consider the issues, other than the Stat-
ute of Limitations, which were presented to and\ argued
before the Circuit Court of Appeals. This represents a
dilemma which has been created by the wholly gratuitous

action of the petitioner in going beyond the scope | \of her

petition for a writ of certiorari, and thereby acting in con-
flict with the settled and uniform practice of this Court.

This situation having thus been created by petitioner and

being one which respondent cannot in anywise control, ‘re-

- spondent has no alternative except to discuss and argue

the several other legal and factual grounds presented to and
argued before the Circuit Court although not considered
by that Court which, in addition'to the ground of the Statute
of Limitations upon which the judgment for the respondent
was “sustained by the. Circuit Court, must result in the

judgment of the District Court being sustained. In other

words, the- judgment of the District Court can readily be

' . sustained on the ground of the Statute of Limitations upon -
which the Circuit Court affirmed the judgment, as well'as. —
_ upon the several other grounds urged i in behalf of respond- |

* entin m the District Court and i in the Circuit Court.

4

42

That part of this brief appearing hereinbefore preceding
this caption was prepared and completed before we were
apprised of the fact that the petitioner was. going to dis-
cuss the other legal grounds argued before but not con-
sidered by the Circuit Court. We have concluded to permit
that part of this brief to4emain in its original form for
reasons of legal propriety and orderly procedure, having
regard to the proceedings leading up to the.granting of the
writ.of certiorari. The affirmance’of the judgment of the
District ‘Court by this Honorable Court upon the ground
of the Statute of Limitations as accepted by the Circuit
Court will make wholly unnecessary a consideration of the
other grounds hereinafter discussed. These other grounds
are similarly adequate and conclusive to affirm the judg-
ment of the District Court in favor of the respondent.

The-discussion which follows can have any relevancy or
purpose only upon the assumption that the trial judge was
correct in allowing the complaint to be amended so as to in-
clude not only the Silicate Department, but the Phosphate
_ Department as well, and that the Circuit Court fell into
error in holding that the trial judge’ committed legal error
‘in allowing the amendment by reason of the operation of
. the Statute of Limitations. The discussion must therefore
take place in the light of the amended complaint, and not
in the light of the original complaint. oe

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF.
ee _ Discussion of Amended Pleadings.
5 Cucaannies 1 and 2of the amended. complaint sins that

plaintiff was employed as a furnace man, operator and gen-
eral worker in the Silicate, Department, Phosphate Depart-
ment.and Dorr Department of the defendant’s plant in
Grasselli, New Jersey in November, 1933, and for some time
prior thereto (R. 803 and 804). Defendant by its answer ad-

43 -

‘mitted that plaintiff was employed as a furnace worker in

its Silicate Department up to November 1, 1932,.and that
he was employed as a laborer in its Phosphate Department

.! from November 1, 1932 until October 23, 1933 (R. 805).

Paragraph 3 of the amended complaint alleges generally
that it was defendant’s duty to use reasonable diligence to

protect the plaintiff from unnecessary dangers or risks, .

and to provide plaintiff with a reasonably safe place to work
(R. 804). Defendant answered this paragraph by denying
that it violated any duty which it owed to plaintiff (R. 805).

- Paragraph 4 of the amended complaint charged that the
plaintiff ‘“‘during. the .course of his employment in and
around the said department and/or departments * * *
came into close contact with metallic, mineral, gas and/or

other injurious substances * * * and plaintiff was ex-

posed to and forced to breathe in the said * iy or
stances.’’ (Italics ours.) We again direct the attention of

the Court to the uncertainty i in pleading with respect to the

exact department in which plaintiff contends he suffered his
alleged injuries, and in this connection we also direct the

Court’s attention to the fact that plaintiff testified and in- -

sisted that he became sick in the Silicate Department and not

in the Phosphate Department (R. 36). The allegations of

this paragraph were denied in defendant’s answer (R. 805).

Paragraph 6 alleged that ‘‘defendant had knowledge of

the dangerous effect of the inhaling and breathing in of any

of the said substances aforementioned * * *” (R. 804).

This was denied i in defendant’s answer (R. 806). |
The remaining allegations of the amended complaint are

not of importance for the purposes of this discussion. They

were denied by defendant (R. 804-806). |
Defendant in its*answer set up five separate defenses (R.
806-808). The first defense pleaded the Statute of Limita-

_ tions and other legal questions arising therefrom in connec-

tion with the roling of me trial judge allowing the complaint

44
to be amended so as to include the Phosphate Department.
The second defense presented the defense of assumption of
risk. The third and fourth defenses raised the defense of

the Statute of Limitations. The fifth defense: dealt with the
fellow servant rule.

Petitioner Does Not Contend and Cannot Contend that the
Products to Which She Alleges Decedent was Subjected
are Poisonous, Noxious or Inherently Dangerous.

In the complaint it is charged that the plaintiff had been
subjected to ‘‘metallic, mineral, gas and/or other injurious
substances’’ (R. 788 and 804). This constitutes a general
allegation with respect to the products used, and together
with the facts presently to be suggested establishes that the
suit herein was instituted on a bare chance and without any
idea or hope of ultimate success. The decedent testified that ©

‘he took samples of products from the respondent’s plant

prior to his final leaving in November, 1933. These sam-
ples consisted of silica glass, silica F. Grade, phosphate of
soda, soda ash and metasilicate (R. 36-40). They were de-
livered to decedent’s attorney on October. 4, 1935 (R. 39).
This suit was instituted on October 1, 1935 (R. 787). In
other words, this action was instituted on a chance on Octo-

‘ber 1, 1935, without decedent’s attorney having any knowl-

edge whatsoever of the products which decedent handled or
were being used in the departments where he worked. This
set of facts explains the general and incorrect designation
both in the original and amended complaint of the products
which it is charged caused the decedent’s illness—‘‘ metallic,
mineral, gas and/or other injurious substances.’’ De-

- cedent’s case was predicated upon a theory advanced by Dr.
-- Alexander Gettler, a toxicologist.. The aforementioned sam-

ples were delivered by defendant’s attorney to Dr. Gettler
on October 4, 1935 (R. 247), and he gave his report thereon .

‘ on May 6, 1936 (R. 248). The burden of petitioner’s case

An

is nee upon the contention that soda ash (carbonate of
soda) dust caused the illness of decedent. Dr. Gettler placed
soda ash, phosphate of soda and metasilicate in the same
category because they react the same (R. 241). He testified
that soda ash when coming in tontact with water hydrolizes -
and produces caustic soda which is a very strong corrosive
-- substance—also known as sodium hydroxide (R. 241 and
246). Dr. Gettler’s report to decedent’s attorney, although
not in evidence, was apparently to the same effect (R. 315 ©
and 316).- Dr. Gettler was recalled as a witness several days
after his original testimony and in the face of other testi-
mony of a chemical nature, including the testimony of an _
independent chemist selected by the Trial Judge, was con-
strained to change his testimony and conclusions. His new
and final testimony was that soda ash (carbonate of soda) -
when mixed with water goes through a chemical process of
ionization and forms a substance of mild causticity (R.
360). -All of which caused the following comment of the
Trial Judge (R. 576)-:

‘‘The Court: Well, as 1 tibia it, Dr. Gettler’s
theory was this severe caustic, which collapsed on:ex- .
amination, that theory, and I won’t permit the jury to
consider it, and then your other theory seems to be that
inorganic dust, irrespective of its alkaline qualities,
has this effect.’’

The trial judge so charged the jury — respect to Dr.
Gettler’s testimony (R. 745).

Since soda ash, phosphate of soda, and metasilicate come
under the same general chemical category, and since the
brunt of the plaintiff’s attack during the trial was and in
_ petitioner’s brief is directed to soda ash, we shall proceed
to discuss this product and show that it is entirely harm-
less, and that it does not come within the category of poi-
sonous, noxious or inherently dangerous substances.

The largest manufacturer of soda ash in the United
States is the Solvay Process. Company, which. has one of
its plants in Syracuse, New York (R. 314). Dr. Chaffe,
who has been connected with that plant as medical director
for 35 years, testified for the defendant (R. 308). This ©
company manufactures alkalis,—its main products are car-
bonate, bicarbonate and caustic soda (R. 308). He testified
that soda ash is ‘not a caustic; it is carbonate of soda; that

- caustic soda or sodium hydroxid is a caustic (R. 314). He

further testified—‘‘I have never seen in hundreds of men
working there since I have been there any caustic effect
from the carbonate of soda. I have seen plenty from the
caustic soda, sodium hydroxid, which is strongly caustic
and will destroy skin’’ (R. 316).

. Mr. Davis, a chemist of the respondent, testified that

soda ash is commonly known as sodium carbonate and is

an alkali; that sodium bicarbonate, soda ash and caustic
soda are all general alkalis with — caustic strengths

' (RB. 325 and 326).

The trial judge soba Dr. Wiener of Newark as an
independent chemist (R. 330). His testimony corroborated
the testimony of Dr.-Chaffe and Mr. Davis (R. 330-332)..
Dr. Wiener conducted an experiment in open court to test
the caustic strength of soda ash and sodium hydroxide by
applying it to the skin of his hands. The soda-ash gave no —

' irritating effect whatsoever, but. the sodium hydroxid

caused a small scar (R. 353 and 354).
' The final testimony even of Dr. Gettler agreed with the
foregoing (R. 356).

Statement of denaitinns Involved.

. * The trial court was correct in holding that there was
not sufficient knowledge attributable to the defendant com-

pany that the commodities used at its plant were dangerous. -

and of a nature likely to harm the plaintiff, and there was

47.

no evidence to indicate that the defendant knew or should
have known of any injuries. likely to result from the « ex-
posure to soda ash.

2. The plaintiff failed to establish that his injuries were
proximately caused by the exposure to soda ash in the
“defendant’s plant, or that the exposure was the causa
causans of his condition. :

3. The plaintiff utterly failed to produce evidence that
_ he endured any exposure to soda ash in the Phosphate
Department where he last worked, and since his last ex-
posure in the Silicate Department was more than 2 years
prior to his instituting suit, his action was and is barred
by the Statute of Limitations. : ?

Statement of the Case.

Plaintiff, George Maty, testified that he was-employed by
the defendant in October, 1928 (R. 4), and worked in the
Silicate. Department. That he began to develop an itch
in June or October of 1931, during the warm weather,
’ after which he developed a carbuncle, in December, 1931
(R.15 and 16). His skin was especially bad under his arms,
exuding yellow water (R. 25), and-he was sent to a skin
specialist, Dr. Oleynick, at Elizabeth (R. 28). That in the
winter of 1932 he was transferred to the Phosphate Depart-
- ment where he spent each week, 2 days outside and 3 days

inside (R. 30). * That his-work inside dealt with liquids.
That there was soda ash in the Phosphate Department, .
about 50 feet from where he was working (R. 32).. That in
October, 1933: (R. 32), he was advised. by the company
doctor that he had relaxed rings on his side (R. 34). That
he then told the doctor that he was a sick man and had lost
weight (R. 35). That he had the itch under his arms and
in the region of the groin (R. 41). He further testified that
he then took samples of the chemicals that he worked with

48

in the Silicate Department, but that he did not take any
samples from the Phosphate Department because he did
not get sick in the Phosphate Department (R. 36 and 37).
_ That he stopped working in November, 1933, because he
felt sick from his itch, which prevented him from walking
(R. 41.) . That in April, 1934, (after he had left the employ
of the defendant), his itch was getting worse around the
groin and body ‘and his hernia was getting weaker (R. 46
and 47). That he was treating himself for the itch and he
was sick from that and from his rupture, and that he tried
to get it out, going to the Alexian Brothers Hospital at
_ Elizabeth, where he was operated on for the hernia (R. 47),
remaining there 17 days, and that 3 days after his arrival
home he began to cough up bad things and spit (R. 47 and
48). That in -the Phosphate Department, the only dust
came from the phosphate (R. 52). He further testified that .
he was transferred in April or May, 1933, to the Phosphate
Department, which was about 500 feet away from the
Silicate Department, in a different building (R. 61), and
_ that he never returned to the Silicate Department there-
after. That he left the Silicate Department at the end of
1932, when he was transferred to the Phospate Department,
- at which time he worked 3 days outside and 2 days inside
(R. 72 and 73). That it looked like May or April, 1932, that
he went to the Phosphate Department (R. 72). That his
work outside was done in the open about’50 feet from the
river (R. 73). *That on the ifiside, he worked with liquids
ee (R. 73) and that this work continued until he left the job
“a _in November, 1933 (R. 75). That he got sick in the Silicate
Department; he was‘a sick.man in the Phosphate Depart-
ment. That he got sick the first time in the Silicate Depart-
ment, and in the Phosphate Department he had his wrist
turned and received a hernia (R. 77). That when he
worked in the Phosphate Department, in the Dorr plant,
he ground the rock and mixed it with sulphuric acid, mak-

asin ii nd OR i
.

-¢

A

49

_ ing a muddy deposit (R. 78). That there were enough

windows in the Phosphate Department (R. 79). That
in the bin there were no windows, but that. he only worked
there 4 or 5 times (R. 84). That the things he worked,
with in the Phosphate Department were pliosphate rock
’ mixed with sulphuric acid and water (R. 85), and that
the soda ash was on the side but that was not his job (R.
86). That the breaking of the phosphate rock, which was
his job, gave some dust but not so much (R. 87). That his
work with the sulphuric mixture gave off only steam (Re
87). -
The plaintiff produced: as a witness, Paul Messaros, who
worked at the Grasselli Chemical Company; in the Silicate
Department, from February 26, 1931, until September 5,
1934, when he was transferred to the Phosphate Department
(R. 161 and 162), and who testified that Maty only worked
with him two or three weeks in the Phosphate Department

(R. 160). Finally, upon questioning by the Court, he testi-

fied that he did not work with Maty in the Phosphate De-

partment at all (R. 173). On motion of the defendant, all

of this witness’ testimony with respect to the Phosphate
Department was stricken from the record (R. 171-173).

Joseph Laskoti, who worked in the Silicate Department
from October 4, 1922, until February 4, 1929 (R. 183 and
184), testified that he worked both in the mix room (R. 186),
and on the furnace, and that the only time he was absent
from work was once in 1925, when he was sick with a rash
(R. 195). That he was only with Mr. Maty for 2 months,

“uring which time they were both employed i in the Cements
Department (R. )

Tony Chuba, being called for the plaintiff, testified that
he had been employed by the Grasselli Chemical Company
off and on for 18 years (R. 196), and that the only complaint

‘he ever had was a stomach aclie (R. 202). That the only

time he worked in the Phosphate Department was when he

had been sent there from time to time for odd jobs, and

’ that he was in the Silicate Department for the entire period

of his employment, and during the period spent with the
company by the plaintiff (R. 216).

John Andricik testified that he had worked in the Barium
Products Ddpartment of the defendant’s plant; that he had
never worke the Silicate Department. That for a period
of 6 weeks, when the Barium Products Department had been
closed, he worked in the Phosphate Department. That this
was during the summer of 1933.(R. 222), and that while he
worked there, he only saw Maty about two or three times
(R. 223 and 224).

Dr. Stephen Steele, a physician from Linden, New Jersey,
testified that he first saw the plaintiff in 1931, when he com-
plained of headaches and dizziness, but,no mention was
made of a cough. He also treated him for 2 weeks in 1934,
when-he complained of a cough, expectoration and pain in
the side (R. 227). He further testified that he had never
seen a case like ats and that he never had a dust case

(RB. 229), 7

The plainti ead Dr, Alexander Gettler as his chief
witness, testified that he had analyzed the chemitals
submitted to him by the plaintiff on October 4, 1935 (R. 247)

*(Note: After the suit was started), and that he gave his
u report thereon to counsel for the plaintiff on May 6, 1936
i - (R. 248). That he has had no experience with the itihalation
“i of soda ash or phosphate dust in factories (R. 232), and that —
| a he has never had a case where material was inhaled (R. 235).
a "That he never examined a man who had inhaled caustic
powder (R. 235). He further stated that soda ash, tri-
sodium phosphate and sodium silicate react about the same
and that soda ash, when coming in contact with water,
crystallizes and becomes caustic soda, which is a very strong .

i , : a: YR) ee ono ante Re yea et

51
corrosive substance. He added that when caustic soda came
.in contact with any tissue of the body, it produced 3 effects:

(1) Decomposed the proteins.
(2) Decomposed the fats.

(3) Dehydrates the tissue by drawing out the water, with
the result that irritation, corrosion, swelling and edema set .
- in (R, 241).

That these conditions are irritating to the lungs. That soda
ash and phosphate of soda, coming in contact with the lung
tissue, which is a wet substance, dissolves, hydrolyzes and
produces caustic soda, also known as sodium hydroxide (R.
245 and 246). That he has read practically ali of the books
on toxicology, but has never seen a case in the literature in-
volving inhalation of soda ash (R. 248 and 249). That the
greatest effect of the dust particles is due to the change
which occurs when they come in contact with moisture, i.e.,
after. they are hydrolized (R. 252 and 253). That soda ash
would have the same effect if it got into the mouth, provided:
it remained there, and that the only reason # did not cause
such trouble is because the saliva continues running ‘and
“washes the tongue continually (R. 254)..

Dr. Gettler was recalled as a witness by the plaintiff
several days after his original testimony, and experiments
were made in open court by Dr. Gettler and Mr. Davis, a
chemist for the defendant company, as a result of which Dr.
Gettler changed his testimony as follows:

$3 He then testified that water changes and hydrolyzes
_ sodium carbonate, i.e., soda ash, to an alkaline substance, —
and this alkaline substance is ionized sodium hydroxide.
_The Court directed the -witness’ attention on several occa-
sions to the change in the nature of his testimony in this
important respect. The witness further stated that sodium
hydroxide was more caustic than sodium carbonate, and Beit

a

__ Oh O_O

52

_. that either was caustic only when moisture met it. That

sodium hydroxide is more caustic than sodium carbonate,
simply because there are more hydroxyl ions present and
that it is the hydroxyl ions that cause the corrosion, and
that sodium hydroxide was ‘‘very much more powerful be-
cause of the greater concentration,’’ and that the less water.
added, the less ionization. That even bicarbonate of soda
that is taken for the stomach gives hydroxy] ions in coming

-in contact with water, but it is a very weak alkaline. The

doctor further admitted that he did not mention ionization -
in his original testimony, and that his theory was different
from that which he had advocated previously and was then
that any alkali mingled with water forms hydroxy] ions and

. that the number of these ions depended upon the kind of

alkali and that the smallest number is in sodium bicarbo-

_ nate, the next largest number is in sodium carbonate and
- the last and largest number is in sodium hydroxide (R. 335-

348; 356-361).

The testimony of the doctor was entirely dibedited by
the Trial Judge who stated that he would not permit the
jury to consider the same (R. 576) since Dr. Gettler had
withdrawn his original theory, and me jury was so charged
(R. 745). ,

The plaintiff also called Dr. Raphael Pomeranz, who teati-

“fied that he diagnosed the case from the x-ray plates alone

and without any physical examination or other tests as
originally a lung abscess with a probable bronchiectasis
(R. 259-262). |

Dr. John E. Runnells was called by the plaintiff and testi-
fied that he examined the plaintiff on September 25, 1935,
and that his examination revealed a pulmonary abscess.
That. he saw him before the trial and found him progres-

sively. worse (R. 267). That he has had no experience in:

cases of persons who had inlialed soda ash (R. 268), and that
there are many known causes of pulmonary abscesses, and

«88

some unknown causes (R. 269). That he has read the med-
ical journals but has never recalled seeing a case of the
effect of caustic soda on the lungs (R. 270 and 276): That
in his opinion, if you grant* that the plaintiff did inhale
soda ash and that it produced the caustic effect testified to

by the chemist (R. 269), and if this irritation was caused by

caustic soda, that that might be the producing cause of the
abscess, and that anything that would produce a chronic ir-
ritation of the lung, might produce an abscess (R. 271). He
further testified that he could find from the x-rays no sug-
gestion that dust of any sort was the cause of the lung con- ©
dition of the plaintiff (R. 277), and that in the absence of any
irritating effect upon the mouth and the nostrils and the © .
closed respiratory organs, he would be doubtful about the —

‘ inhalation of dust having had.any effect upon the lungs, as
_ it would be neeessary for such dust, being inhaled, to affect
the nostrils and mouth (R. 278-280). The testimony of.
Dr. Runnells that was. predicated upon his hypothesis of
caustic soda or sodium hydroxide, was stricken from the
xecord on the ground that the: testimony of Dr. Gettler to
this effect had been withdrawn (R. 371). Dr. Runnells’ testi-
‘mony disclosed that he based all of his answers upon that
testimony and he stated that ‘‘if soda ash produced the cor-
rosive effect that has been testified, then he would have had
along continued.chronic inflammatory condition of his bron-
chial mucous membrane and his lungs’’ (R. 269). Dr. Run-
nells had testified after Dr. Gettler had given his first testi-
mony and before he had been recalled and changed the effect
of his original testimony.

- Dr. Runnells further testified that an irritating substance .
inhaled into the lungs would enter them bilaterally, unless
there was an obstructiop on either side and the irritating
effects would be disclosed on both sides (R. 654 and 655).
That a person inhaling any irritating ‘substance which af-
fected his lungs would first notice a condition in his nostrils -

o

oe

54

and organs entering into the lungs (R. 660-663) and that
difficulty in light penetration would be found on both sides
of x-ray plates where a substance of irritating nature had ~
been sufficiently inhaled (R. 655)... He also testified that he -
did not attend Mr. Maty, but merely examined him (R. ‘649

- and 653), and that the left lung was clear, with the right

showing evidence of a lung abscess, and that this established
the fact that the left lung contained no obstruction (R. 656).
That the only. condition he found in the left. lung was the
natural fibrosis that everyone has, and that the amount of
fibrosis in the left lung in the x-rays of the on was of

no consequence (R. 658).

‘Dr. I. Edward Gluckman was also called as an i aaa on
behalf of the plaintiff. He testified that he: made one exam-
ination of the plaintiff on October 23, 1935, and that-he

| diagnosed an abscess of the lung (R, 283). He further testi-

fied that he had no experience with soda ash and phosphate
of soda (R. 286). That some people are more susceptible

to irritants than others (R. 287), and that he had never seen
_ in any medical journal or book or anywhere else, a case in
‘which an abscess of the lung occurred from the inhalation

of the phosphate soda dust or soda ash dust, and that this -
was the first time he had ever seen soda ash or phosphate of

soda chemically analyzed and a report given by a man like. .
Dr. Gettler (R. 288). That the plaintiff may have been

hypersensitive and, therefore; he would not necessarily alter

his conclusion that the abscess was due to an inhaled irritant, .
because of the fact that no one alse having been subject to

the dust sustained the same injury (R. 291). He testified
further that it is impossible to state positively what caused

a lung abscess, because of the fact that if you have some. sort

- of an irritant, you have to conclpde that that irritant had:
something to do with the irritation of the lung, and that you

cannot tell positively that it was soda ash or phosphate of

soda or anything else, it being impossible to pin it down

i)

specifically to one particular irritant, unless that irritant
' was present and then they have to suppose that it had some-
thing to do with it (R. 295).

. The testimony of Dr. Gluckman that was predicated upon
his hypothesis of caustic soda or sodium hydroxide as an_
irritant was stricken from the record on the ground that the
testimony of Dr. Gettler had been withdrawn (R. 371). Dr.
Gluckman had testified after Dr. Gettler had given his first
testimony and before he had been recalled and aaa the
effect of his original testimony..

The plaintiff rested after the testimony of Dr. iii.
Defendant moved to strike out certain testimony, and also
moved for a nonsuit which motion was denied and an ex- .
ception taken (RB. 301- 307). The defense then proceeded
with its case. _ : | |

Defendant produced Dr. Ralph W. Chaffe, who testified
that he has been for 35 years the plant physician for the.
_ Solvay Process Company, a company manufacturing alka-
lies, carbonate, bicarbonate, caustic, soda and soda ash.
since 1882. That as such, he has had charge of both the
occupational illnesses and non-occupational illnesses (R.
307-312). That the soda-ash department maintains between.
200 and 300 men daily and that in the caustic soda depart-
ment about-250 men are employed. That the men are in
contact: with dust continually and all have dust on their
clothing (R. 312 and 312). That in the caustic soda depart-
ment very fine particles of caustic dust alight on the skin
and are called mosquitos, because of a slight biting, but
there is none of that in the carbonate of soda or the soda
ash department (R. 313). That in his 35 years of -experi-
ence at the Solvay plant, he has never. found or heard of a
case of lung injury resulting from the inhalation of soda
ash dust (R. 313). That.soda ash is not caustic but that the
caustic soda or sodium hydroxide is a caustic (R. 314), and
that the only irritation that he had ever seen from soda ash

56

was that around the wrists where the arms were rubbed by
the sleeves, which was caused the same as any other dust
would cause an irritation, 1. e.,a mechamical irritation. This
occurred only during the summer when the men are warm,
and that they had never considered it a chemical irritation
(R. 315). That he had only had one case of dermatitis that

had ever been said to be due to soda ash and that this is the ©
only case of external injury he ever heard of (R. 315). He |

testified further that he had never heard of carbonate soda
being called a caustic and had never found it corrosive or
productive of abscesses. That he had never seen, in hun-
dreds of men working there since he had been there, any
caustic effect from the carbonate of soda, but that he had
seen plenty from the caustic soda, which is strongly caustic

-and will destroy skin (R. 316). That the only place res-

pirators are used by the men is in. the store room where
long banks of soda ash are stored that are sometimes pulled

‘down with long-handled poles in. amounts. varying from 10

to 15 tons at a time and that this is only to prevent the men

from filling up their nasal passages, but that in the ordinary:

manufacturing and packing of soda ash, no respirators are
worn. .That soda ash gives off only the same type of irritant
that any form of dust causes (R. 317 and 318). That they
have two men working there who were there when he came
35 years ago and that the labor turnover is very low in.that
department. He further testified that he had never heard
of any respiratory injuries resulting from the inhalation
of soda ash (R. 319).

Charles T. Davis, called by the defendant, testified that

versity and that he was employed by the defendant com-

pany. He stated that no amount of water added to soda

ash will produce a chemical change, and that Dr. Gettler’s
statement to that effect was inaccurate (R. 326). He testified

further that he was foreman in the Silicate Department,

‘he was a chemical engineer, a graduate of Harvard Uni- |

o7 .

commencing Augusf, 1928, that he had an office in that build-

ing ; that he hired Mr. Maty on December 5, 1928, employing |
him as a furnace man (R. 399), and that the workings of.

the Silicate Department were as follows (R. 400-413) :
‘That soda ash was contained in a separate silo and was

_ transported by means of a pneumatic conveying system to

a scale tank where it was weighed and from there it went
to the furnace room by means of a steeloverhead conveyor,

confined in a welded steel housing and that from there it
was charged into:the furnace through a continuous screw
conveyor. That the screws are encased in solid pipe and
that the entire system from the mix room to the screw con-
veyor itself is sealed, and that there was no leakage. Thats -
_a factory, the Silicate Department is very clean and without

dust, and that the question of presénce of dust is entirely
comparative, and that considering this to be a manufacturing
operation, there was no dust there (R. 558 and 559). That

the plaintiff was under his supervision during his entire em-.

ployment with the company (R. 581 and 582). That there
could not be a tremendous amount of loss from dust because

of the fact that the soda ash is an expensive commodity and .

that the amount entering into the product and the amount
analyzed as being existent in the completed product were

compared in order to ascertain the loss by waste (R. 582.

and 583). Dust conditions were never like smoke and were

_ never heavy and dust from the mix room was negligible (R.
584), and there were no holes in the overhead conveyor
(R. 586).

Mr. Davis further testified that the plaintiff’ s * eittes
caused him to spend his time approximately as follows:
10° to 15% on the charging platform, 20% observing the
burners on the sides, 25% on the discharge end-and 5 to

- 10% at the auto-clave (R. 587). He also testified that’ the

ventilation of the entire department was adequate and that
no complaint was ever made by the plaintiff or any other

58 — eh
employee concerning dust, but that he had heard the plain-
tiff complain about the itch (R. 590), and that he had never
* seen any itch on Maty’s exposed parts. That no complaint.
was ever made of a cough, nor did he ever hear Maty cough
(R. 591), but.that Maty requested to be-transferred to an-
other department, because his itch bothered him more
when hé worked around heat, and that a favorite topic of
conversation with him was his itch (R. 591 and 592). That
on November 1, 1932, he, Maty, was transferred to an out-
side job in the Phosphate Department where it would be
cooler. The witness further testified that the plaintiff
never worked with soda ash while in this department, as
‘that was in the other side of the building, and was used |
‘solely for the neutralization of phosphoric acid into disod- _
ium phosphate. That Maty had no contact with soda ash in
this building (R. 592 and 593). That for 4 days of each week
the plaintiff was assigned to a job outside the building ap-
proximately 300 feet from the waterfront and that he worked’
on rocks, which he weighed and dumped, and that there
was no. soda ash there (R. 594 and 596). He further stated.
that when the plaintiff worked on the outside, his job did
not take him on the inside of the building. That following
the 4 days he worked outside, on the 5th day he would work
as a shift breaker on the Abbey Mills and around the tanks
* (R. 594-596) and that he was not allowed to work in the

-. bins or anywhere around heat, in order to keep him as cool

as possible. That all the materials that he worked with in-
. side were. liquid in nature, except the phosphate rock (R.
602), and that there was no dust (R. 605). The he did
not at any time work with soda ash or meta silicate in
this department (R. 603), and that dust conditions were
extremely good. That there was plenty of ventilation (R.
605), and that no dust arose from the tanks (R. 609), and |
that during his entire period with the company, since 1924
{R.. 605), he has never heard of anyone suffering injuries

59

to the renphontony system while working i in either the Sili-
' cate or Phosphate Departments (R. 605).

Joseph R. Heard, called by the defendant company, testi-
fied that he was a chemist in the employ of the Solvay
Process Company, in Syracuse, New York, and had been
connected with them since 1924 (R. 349). That they were
manufacturers of soda ash, caustic soda and other products,
and that he had been in charge of the chemical phase of all
products manufactured at this plant (R. 350), and that
the department for the manufacturing of soda ash was the
largest. department i in the plant (R. 373). That the dust
_at the Solvay plant was and is so heavy in the soda ash
department that it was plainly visible in the air and had
accumulated on th

[Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.]

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386010_0282%3A6. Public record. Not legal advice.
