# Motion for leave to File a Brief as — Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Comm'n of Wash. > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386010_0226%3A11 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Motion for leave to File a Brief as - **Published:** January 1, 1937 - **Citation:** 302 U.S. 186 ## Text Office - Supreme Ccurt, U. S —P APR 24° 1937 October Terw 1936, xo se 8. ‘ , xe. — DAVID .H. RYAN, ws. THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al. Ln A APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF _. THE STATE OF WASHINGTON Motion of Mason-Walsh-Atkinson-Kier Com > pany for leave to file Brief as Amicus _ Curiae, and Brief of Amicus Curiae lw. G. GRAVES, ae : ARNOLD L. GRAVES, | Counsel for Mason-Walsh-Atkinson- - ' Kier Company ag Amicus Curiae. - GRAVES, KIZER & GRAVES, EMPIR® PRINTIC® 00., BPORANE j . SUBJECT INDEX Page { Brief as Amicus Curiae... IGT. GER IR OO 1 Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amicus i sisctioiictaniind . @ Statement ......... EE Sts eM EAT EA ee 4 Argument — A. Cession of Jurisdiction to United States. FF S. Pusthase by United States with Consent of State...... 9 C. Grand Coulee Dam Project Within Constitutional . Power of Congress....... Fiiiieia ood teale do iescea adauade xaeatebasdoatuienes -14 I ee ee .@ Se ora cok es 1 hp CNS AFR lO OP wee . ce ee ee oF eee ' . i cen meen a ge ERE EET OC COTE LTTE LLL ALLA LE LOC AI ae : —— a at TABLE OF CASES CITED : Pages Arizona v. California, 283 U. S. 423......c-scccssseesseeee 11, 16, 22 - Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U. S. 439.000... 9, 13, 18 . Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, = AP Ua I acta ailind oli sina inccen inicio y--- 11,17, 23 ; F 7 Concessions Company v. Morris, 109 Wash. 46.......... 7,9 Fort Leavenworth R. R. v. Lowe, 114 W. a 525 aes 8, 9,10 | Gibson v. United States, 166 U. S. 269... 21 Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713....-...-------------0------ 21 New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 81 Law Ed. Adv. Op. No. 5, Pp. 202.....-..j-----e-cesssoenees 11,18 ew v. Mouse (Cal.), 265 Pac. CYT 13 Sharon v. Hill, 24 Fed. 726............ 13 Standard Oil Co. v. California, 291 U: S:-at.............. 9 State ex rel. Jones v. Mack (Nev.), 7 Pac. 76i.......... 13 Steele v. Halligan, 229 Fed. 1011-02-02... 13 - Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U. S. 647......... ees 9 United States v. Arizona, 295 U. $.174..cccnenncnenen 15 United States v. Tucker, 122 Fed. 518......-cccceccoen 12,13 United States v. Wurtzbarger, 276 Fed. 753................ 13 United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 07 OR 22 . Wills v. State, 50 Tenn. PD scsciisiaiscedbeochiaehcndenaiesaieanicetin 13 TABLE OF STATUTES CITED Remington’s Revised Statutes of Washington, EE FIRE ccisntiiclonticsionsdiniiasininetiameninpliomanemenaien ae | Remington’s Revised Statutes of Washington, TUITE aiid toch cialienirhpecnccinsadlbaseiaedaiineiicbiicconenatcchitdaienidices 6, 8, 11,19 Art. I, § 8, Clause 17, Constitution of United States.. 10 U.S. C. A. Title 16, §§ 24, 57,95, 124... eeeeeeeeene 13 Ze Ee Che Supreme Court of the United States Ortober Term, 1936 Na. 774 DAVID H. RYAN, , Appellant, - vs. THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ; THE STATE OF WASHINGTON _ ‘Motion of Mason-Walsh-Atkinson-Kier Com- _ pany for leave to file Brief as Amicus Curiae, and Brief of Amicus Curiae -W. G. GRAVES, ARNOLD L. GRAVES, Counsel for Mason-Walsh-Atkinson- Kier Company as Amicus Curiae. ava KIZER & GRAVES, - Of Counsel. : » Bt mG ee teen oe er ris ee ee ee ae 3 SUPREME COURT OF THE UN ITED STATES October Term, 1936 | -_ Ta No. 774 DAVID H. RYAN, | Appellant, . .. THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AS AMICUS CURIAE May It PLEASE THE ‘Court: The undersigned, as counsel for Mason-Walsh-At- kinson-Kier Company respectfully moves this Honor- ‘able Court for leave to file the accompanying. brief in thiS case as amicus curiae. There has been filed in this cause a stipulation by counsel ‘for the respective parties that the accompany- ing — may be so filed. W.:G. GRAVES, _ ARNOLD L. GRAVES, Counsel for Mason-Walsh-Atkinson- ’ Kier Company ¢ as Amicus Curvae. GRAVES, KIZER & GRAVES, i Counsel. . a | oe re RE IS ee ‘ ee BER RA ea ae i ee a vs ante 9 ‘We: are here met with the objection that the ° Legislature of a Staté has nospower to cede away her jurisdiction and legislative power over any portion of her territory, * * * “, “In their relation to the general government, the States of the Union stand in a very different - position from that -yhich they hold to foreign - governments. Though the jurisdiction and author- ity of the genera] government are essentially dif- - ferent from’ those of the State, they are not those of.a different country; and the two, the State and general government, May deal with each other in any way they may deem best to carry out the — purposes of the Constitution. * *~° * Such cession is really as much for the benefit of the State as it is for the benefit of the United States. | * * * 99 , ‘ - When it is established that the Legislature of the State of Washington has power to .cede jurisdiction over territory lying within the ‘State-of Washington to the United States government, and when it is estab- _ lished that: it has ceded such. jurisdiction the conclu- sion follows as a logical. necessity that the State has parted with the power to tax persons or property within such territory. Concessions Company v. Mor- . ris, 109 Wash. 46, Fort Leavenworth Railroad Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, Arlington Hotel Company v. Fant, 278 U. S. 439, Surplus Trading Company vy. ~ Cook, 281 U. S. 647, Standard Qil Co. v. California, 291 U. S. 242. : - _B. PURCHASE BY UNITED STATES WITH _ CONSENT OF STATE. . ea The intention of the Legislature to cede exelusive jurisdiction to the United States over all land ac- Railroad Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 582: — quired by it for the purpose of “" rene seems beyond question. If so,-the case is disposed of. On the other hand, if the statute, notwithstanding its ex-/ - plicit language, be construed ‘as not ceding jurisdie/ tion, nevertheless exclusive jurisdiction has been ac - quired by the United States. A cession of jurisdic- tion by the State, of course, is one- way in which the United States can: acquire exclusive jurisdiction but. it is not the only one. * Another is purchase with the consent of the State. Bean | 7 ‘a _ By Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitu- tion of the United States, Congress is given power— | ‘*T'o exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever,.over such district * * * and to exercise like authority over ‘all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock= —_ and other need- ful buildings.”’ * _ The effect - of this clause of the Coustitatien has . never been doubted. Tt is stated i in Fort Leavenworth ' “When the title is acquired by’ purchase by ‘consent of the Legislatures of the States, the fed- eral jurisdiction is exclusive of all State: author- ity. This follows from the declaration of the- Constitution that Congress shall have ‘like author- ity’ over. such places ds it has over the district which is the seat of government; that is, the power. of ‘exclusive legislation in all cases what- soever.’ Broader or clearer tanguage could not - .. be used to exclude all other authority than that of - Congress; and that no other authority oan be exercised over them has been the uniform opin- 11°° ~ ion of Rederal and State tribunals, and of the Attorneys General.” aa ‘The requisites of exclusive jurisdiction in the Uni-. ted States then are: re | | eat 1.~ Purchase of land by the United States. . 2. Consent to such purchase by. the State Legis- lature. | 3. A purpose within the meaning of the clause. As to the first requisite it was stipulated (R. 76, 88, 103) that. title to all'of the land upon which the work 3 of the contractors was performed had been purchased -*hy-the United States. ne \ Next, the consent to such purchase by the Legisla- » ture of Washington. Remington’s Revised Statutes, § 8108: hie Wee i aes | ‘The consent of the state of Washington be . and the same is hereby given to the acquisition * * * by the United States of America * * * for the sites of locks, dams, piers, breakwaters, keepers’ dwellings, and other necessary structures and purposes required in the improvement of the Tivers * * *-of this’state, * * #9 . _ Third, the purpose of the United States in unde¥- taking the project. As,stated in the Act of Congress the . purpose is the improvement of navigation.of the Colum-..-. bia River by means of a dam and the subsidiary power. plants and other structures. That such a project for — _ Such a_ purpose is within the constitutional power of | Congress to authorize is established by Arizona v. Cali-‘. fornia, 283 U. 8. 423; Ashwander vy. Tennessee Valley _ Authority, 297 U. 8. 288; New York ex rel. Rogers y. 12 - Graves, 81 Law Ed. Adv. Op. No. 5, p. 202, and many _ another case which it is unnecessary to cite.. Likewise 1 it is established by a long line of authorities, that such a project is within the meaning of clause 17 of the Con- stitution: : . . iil XY From the earliest times the courts have given to I this clause of the Constitution a broad and. liberal con- struction and have never narrowed its application by ‘ strict or inflexible rules. The courts have construed the language of clause 17 ‘‘and other needful build- ; ings’? as embracing all structures and places necessary for carrying on the governmental as distinguished © i from the proprietary business of the government. In United States v. Tucker, 122 Fed. 518, the court expresses the onght as follows: whe S red or te vare eerre ROOTS - ‘While there might: possibly be some difficulty, if the question was res integra, as to the strictly proper construction and applicability to the case of locks and dams of the wofds ‘for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock yards, and other needful buildings’ used in the clause of the Constitution. above quoted, the cases seem to leave no doubt that the broadest construciion has been wisely put upon. that language—one which _makes it cover all structures and all places neces- _ sary-for carrying on the business of the national a oiuercwet. ” Many shieatinn which 7" no poestbility can be com- ‘ prehended within. the phrase ‘‘forts; Magazines, ar- senals, dock-yards”? or can be considered as of like kind have been held to be within the ee ‘‘and other ‘needful aaaeae. > Thus: — 13 ; Post Offices and Federal Court Houses, State ex rel. Jones v. Mack (Nev. ), 47 Page. 763. : ‘Soldiers Homes, People v. Mouse, (Cal.), 265 Pac. 944. Indian Schools, United States v. Wurtzbarger, 276 Fed. 753. Customs House, Sharon v. Hill, 24 Fed. 726. “Federal Penitentiary, Steele v. Halligan, 229 Fed. 1011. Military Cemetery, Wills v. State, 5Q Tenn. 141. Locks and — United — V. ‘Tucker, 122 Fed. 518. | National Parks, Arlington Hotel Co. v. Pant, 278 U. S. 439, : ' The Arlington Hotel Company v. Fant case, supra, deals with the Hot Springs National Park. We call the court’s attention to the fact that Congress has as- . serted the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States over Yellowstone National Park, U.S.C. A., Title 16, § 24, Act of May 7, 1894, Chapter 22, § 1, 28 Stat. 73; Sequoia, Yosemite and General Grant N ational Parks, U. 8: C.K. Title 16, § 57, Act of Ji une 2, 1920, Chap- ’ ter 218, § 1, 41 Stat. 731; Mount Rainier National ? Park, U.S. C. A; Title 16, § 95, Act of June 30, 1916, “hits 197, § 1,.39 Stat. 243; Crater Lake N ational Park, U. S.-C. ‘A., Title 16, § 124, Act of August 21, 1916, Chapter 368, § 1, 39 Stat. 5a. 8 14, . C. GRAND COULEE DAM PROJECT WITH- IN CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF CONGRESS. Apparently the Supreme Court of Washington does not question either the rule that a cession of jurisdic- tion by the State vests exclusive jurisdiction in tlie United States or the rule that purchase of land with the consent of the State Legislature vests exclusive _ jurisdiction in the United States. The following ex- cerpts appear to give the court’ S reasons for its deci- sion (R. 46) : ‘“‘The point that we make and stress here, and upon which we rest our ultimate conclusion here- in, is that, while the statute conferred consent upon the United States to acquire land within the territory of the state, the state’s power to cede jurisdiction is limited, by the statute, to . those instances where it clearly appears that the . land is to be used by the United States for a con- stitutional or governmental purpose.”’ (R..50) : _ “The facts, taken as a whole, argue conclu- sively, in our opinion, that’.the state never in- tended to cede, and the United States never in- tended to take, exclusive _— over the project. io iar _The basis of the. court’s opinion then is its ‘eonclu-. sion that the Grand Coulee Dam project is beyond the scope of the governmental functions of’ the United States and in excess of its power under the Constitu- tion because the purpose of the United States in un- dertaking:the work is not ‘‘a constitutional or gov- ernmental purpose.’’ This finding is not made from a consideration of the Act of Congress authorizing the . ee ee eee eT ee PLL PLL RS ERI SL SLE RIOR EEN LEBEN IE LEE BR ARTSY 2 -ersorye Gere RIE EER MINS cone mate tens need —e 15 project—but from certain clauses in contracts re- lating to preliminary surveys and clauses in the speci- fications drawn up by engineers employed by the ‘bu- reau of reclamation. In other words, the declaration by Congress ‘For the purpose of * in En improving - navigation * * * the project known okie ites ‘Grand Coulee Dam’ on the Columbia River are hereby authorized and adopted, * .* *?’ ig not. proof . of the purpose of the United States, but a clause in @ contract relating to a detail of the work inserted to - insure compensation to injured workmen, is proof of the fact that the purpose of the project as a whole is — beyond the scope of the Constitutional powers of the Federal government. - As a matter of logic this reasoning is faulty. Since Congress alone has power to authorize the Grand Cou- lee Dam project (United States v. Arizona, 295 U. S. 174) it follows that the purpose for which the project is authorized is the purpose of Congress. The Con- . stitution gives to Congress the power to regulate com- _ merce. Without an Act of Congress no officer of the United States,.not even the President, has power to authorize the construction of a dam in navigable waters. United States v. Arizona, supra. It follows . that whatever any official of the United States or the © _ State of Washington may have said or done, or may have omitted to say or do, is irrelevant to the ques- tion of whether the United States has undertaken the _ project for ‘‘a constitutional or governmental pur- pose.”’ An official may exceed his authority, may mis- take the purpose of Congress, or may misconstrue the’ Bees 16 Act of Congress, but his error cannot in logic control the court’s decision upon the question whether a project undertaken ‘pursuant to authorization by an Act of Congress is within the constitutional power of Congress to regulate commerce under the commerce clause of the Constitution. - The Act of Congress authorizing the Boulder Can- yon Dam in the Colorado River declares the purpose of the project to be river regulation, improvement of | navigation, flood control, irrigation, domestic use and power. In other words, the declaration of the pur- pose of Congress in that Act is identical with the declaration of Congress’. purpose in the Act author- izing the Grand Coulee Dam project. The Attorney General of Arizona urged ° this court in Arizona v. California, 283 U. S. 423, that the im- provement of navigation, notwithstanding the terms of the Act,. was not intended. We quote his argument as it Bie gine at pages 444-445 of the official report: “Instead of being designed to improve naviga- tion, the compact was drawn with the unmistak- able intention of dedicating the river to uses in- consistent with navigation. That is not a mere speculation, but appears from the express lan- - _ guage of the compact. * * “‘The Act specifies, definitely and contnetaby, only two uses to which the project shall be put. One is the storage and sale of water. The other is the generation and sale of electrical power. Both uses would be hurtful rather than helpful to navigation, if there were any navigation to be hurt or helped. ‘“‘It requires no argument to show that the navigation of a river, which has become non-nav- eepemmenys erste et re ne Sepee ee — . =. . oe seen mera “seen penis ELS EPO BEM LSP OSLO BO BIE CTA 17 igable from lack of water, cannot be improved — ~ by taking more water out of it. * = om In spite . f the cogency of this argument this court upheld the Boulder Canyon Project Act as a valid exercise of the governmental and constitutional fune- tions of the United States because of the declaration by Congress in the Act of its purpose to improve nav- igation. (pp. 455-456) | _“Tnto the motives which induced members of Congress to enact the Boulder Canyon Project ‘Act, this Court may not enquire. (Citing cases. ) The Act declares that ‘the authority to construct the dam and reservoir is conferred, among other things, for the purpose of ‘improving navigation — and regulating the flow of the river.’ Ag the river is navigable and the means which the Act provides are not unrelated to the control of navi- gation (citing cases), the erection and main- tenance of such dam and reservoir are clearly within. the powers conferred upon Congress. Whether the particular structures proposed are reasonably necessary is not for this Court to de- termine. (Citing many cases.) And the fact that purposes ‘other than navigation will also be served could not invalidate the exercise of the authority - conferred, even if those other purposes would not alone -have justified an exercise of Congressional power. (Citing cases.)*’ In Ashwander v. Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, the power of Congress to construct the Wilson Dam and Power Plant across the Tennessee River and to. sell the electric energy generated was questioned. This court remarks (p. 329): : | ‘While, in its present condition, the Tennessee River is not adequately improved for commercial navigation, and traffic-is small, we are not: at:lib- Pee ae * ES NE RR oe eR nae re eens . ‘ EE SS LO RT ET A RE ere pene SOE ET NE te ee “RS oe ° ” ¢*, j ° : a : -_ — ee eae. AN tone raed TELL LO ME Reyes inn ant ene a bn iit Sidi cicn oc : : Ae BOO gee — S : : a 18 erty to conclude either that the river is not sus- ceptible of development as an important water- way, or that Congress has not undertaken that development, or that the construction of the Wil- son Dam was not an appropriate means to’ accom- plish a legitimate end. : “The Wilson Dam and its power plant must be taken to have been constructed’ in the exercise of the constitutional functions of the Federal Government. val ) In Arlington Hotel Company v. Fant, 278 U. 8. 439, it appeared that a portion of the land was leased to a private hotel company. The attorneys for the plain- _ tiff.in error made a similar. argument to this court. At page 441 of the report counsel say: : “The site of the Arlington Hotel has never. been devoted to or used for any governmental . purpose of any character. .It has always been used by the United States solely in its capacity _ of owner-and landlord, for profit, and the United States cannot, in that capacity, acquire or ar jurisdiction of any character ov@ it, * * | e Answering this contention Mr. Chief Justice Taft re- marks (p. 455) : «¢# * * Nor is the- constitutional basis for acquisition any less effective because the springs thus kept safely available for the Federal pur- pose do in the abundance of their flow also sup- ply water sufficient to furnish aid to the indigent and to those of the public of the United States who are able to pay for hotel accommodation on - the little. park . surrounding the hospital and the springs. * * or In the case of New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, | q -decided by this court. January 4, 1937, reported in © samen io i ad: ROPE II IAS RE a BORE APPLE ILL IEE PRET NT ne EE BET a See Ey SER gs emepeeeeereeenge =n us ~~ 2 a a 19 Law Edition Advance Opinions, Volume 81, No. 5, page 202, the relator claimed his salary as general counsel for the Panama Railroad Company as ex- @ empt from the state income tax of New York. The court first determines that the -creation, manage-— ment and operation of the Panama Canal are proper governmental functions, and, secondly, that the rail- road was built to aid in this purpose. The court goes on to remark (p. 206) : . . ; ‘We attach no’ importance to the fact that the railroad company has utilized both its ships and ‘railroad to carry private freight and passengers. The record shows that this is done to a limited | extent compared with the government business ; end that it is only incidental to the governmental operations. The primary purpose of the enter- a prise being legitimately governmental, its inciden- ge tal use for private purposes affords no ground for objection. * * * . “It is suggested that the dairy, hotels, and other _ enterprises, built and maintained by the com- _— pany, are not governmental instrumentalities. Even if we accept that conclusion—which, in view - of their usé forthe personnel of the railroad and - canal, we are far from doing—it would not alter the fact that the railroad itself, in connection with . the canal, is a Federal instrumentality.” . Equally erroneous is the conclusion that. the State of .Washington did not intend to cede exclusive juris- . diction to the United States. This conclusion ob- viously cannot be based upon-a construction of the’ statute of the State of Washington: by which the Leg- islature cedes jurisdiction. Remington’s Revised Statutes of Washington, § 8108. ©The words ‘“‘and my a Bbpreere secre verseenryarpnim aomeers one _ =~ 20 -the jurisdiction of this state is hereby ceded to the _ United States of America” obviously show “an_inten- | tion of the Legislature to cede. The conclusion of the court that a cession was not intended therefore can be based"only upon the proposition that the. pow- er of the Legislature to cede jurisdiction is limited to projects within the constitutional power of Congress to authorize. We place side by side the purposes of | the Boulder Canyon Dam as quoted at page 456 of the opinion of this court in Arizona: v. California, supra, and the purposes of the Grand Coulee Dam taken from the Rivers and Harbors Bill of the 74th Congress , thus: Boulder Canyon Dam .Grand Coulee Dam River regulation Controlling floods Improvement of navig# Improving navigation tion | Flood control Regulating the flow of the © streams of the United States Irrigation Storage and delivery of , stored ‘waters Domestic use i Reclamation of public lands + and Indian reservations Satisfaction of preSent Other beneficial uses. perfected rights © : For power - For the genération of elec- tric energy as a means of financially aiding and as- sisting such undertaking Can it for one isiatins be doubted that the conclu- sion of this court concerning the Boulder Canyon Dam ‘‘the erection and maintenance of such a dam and reservoir are clearly within the powers conferred 21 upon Congress’’ applies in all its force to the Grand Coulee Dam project? | a; Appellees make the further’ contention that a part of the dam will rest upon the bed of the Columbia River, title to which is vested in the State of Wash- ington. The answer to this contention has often been given by this court. It is, that whatever ownership to the bed of navigable streams may vest in the State such ownership is subordinate to the paramount right of the Federal government to assert its title to so much of the stream bed as is necessary to the improvement of navigation. oe : | In Gilman v.. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 718, 714, this court said: ; , ~ __“‘Commerce includes navigation. The power to. : regulate commerce comprehends the control for - that’ purpose, and to the extent necessary; of all the navigable waters of the United States which are accessible from a State other than those in ° which they lie. For this purpose they are the ~ . public property. of the nation, and subject to all the requisite legislation by Congress, * * #9 — and in Gibson’v. United States, 166 U. S. 269, 271: —- navigable ig ayy under the control of the United States for € purpose of regulating and improving navigation, and although the title to the shore and submerged soil is in the various States and individual owners under them, it is always subject to the servitude in respect of nav- -igation created in favor of: the Federal Govern: ment by the Constitution.’ y iat ee eee 22 In United States v. Chandler-Dunbar. Co., 229 U. S. 53, a condemnation suit by the United States- against the Owners of the bed of a navigable stream who had acquired title thereto from the State of _ _ Michigan, the court remarks (p62) : | “It [the ownership of the stream bed] is sub- ordinate to the public right of navigation, and however helpful-in protecting the owner against - the acts of third parties, is of ne avail-against the exercise of the great and absolute power of Con- gress over the improvement of navigable rivers. That power of use and control comes from the power .to. regulate commerce between the States and with foreign nations. It includes navigation and subjects every navigable river to the control of Congress. All means having some positive , relation to the end in view which are not forbid- den by some other provision of the Constitution, are admissible. If, in the judgment of Congress, the use of the bottom of the river is proper for the placing therein structures in aid of naviga- tion, it is not thereby taking private property for a public use, for the owner’s title was in its very nature subject to that use in the interest of public navigation.” —_. Arizona v. California, 283, U.S. 423, is an°action for an injunction enjoining the erection of the Boul- der Dam in the Colorado River brought by the State of Arizona against the Secretary of the Interior of the United States and the States of California, ete. It appeared that a statute of Arizona required the approval of the State Engineer of the plan of dams erected by the United States government. The court held that the United States has power to construct a dam across a navigable river for the purpose of ‘ improving navigation and neéd not first obtain ap- 2 Oe . . ; g a ‘a proval of its plans by the State in which the dam is to be located even though this be expressly required by a statuté of such State. On epage 451 the court Says: ; without conforming to the police régulations of a State. (Citing cases.) If Congress has power to authorize the construction of the dam and res- ervoir, Wilbur [Secretary of the Interior] is un- der no obligation to submit the plans and specifi- cations to the State Engineer for approval. And the Federal Government has the power to create this obstruction in the- river for the“purpose of improving navigation if the Colorado River is navigable. (Citing cases.)”? In Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 ¥ ‘S. 288, the power of the United States to. dispose of electric energy generated at the Wilson Dam in the Tennessee River was challenged. This court first found that the erection of a dam in a navigable river was within the constitytional power of ‘Congress. At page 330 the court says: “* * * The-Government acquired full title to the dam site, with all riparian rights. The power of falling water was an inevitable incident of the | construction of the dam. That water power came into the exclusive control of the Federal Govern- ment. The mechanical] energy was convertible into electric energy, and the water power, the right to convert it into electric energy, and the electric energy thus produced, constitute property belonging to the United States. * * *” | ADDENDUM While fully conceding (R. 76) that the Ryan con- tracts were performed wholly upon lands acquired by ‘“‘The United States may perform its functions: = i a il alls yl lh . . : Sie tele eee ye am Pl ta lh ae OS ee . ° a ee ee eee Z 24 Q the United States prior to the commencement of the work, in the Silas Mason case appellees remark, some- what casually, that Section 36 (upon Exhibit C) is school land and that the title to it is.in the State of Washington. ~ Neither the dam itself, nor any of the structures appurtenant to it, nor any of the works of the contractors are upon this land or directly con- tiguous to it. Neither is the land part of the contrac-_ tors’ camp. In fact, it is across the river opposite.to the contractors’ camp. For these reasons the Supreme . ; Court of the State of Washington does not even no- - _ tice this contention of appellees in its opinion. _ A ref- erence to Exhibit C, the map and the letter accom- panying it, and pages 104, 105 and 107, of the tran- | _seript of the record (Silas Mason ease) show that this land is known as the ‘‘Engineers’ Camp”’ to distin- - guish it from the contractors’ camp (Mason City). It - has been reserved pursuant to _Remington’ s Revised Statutes, §§ 7410, 7412, as ite. of residences for the engineers of the Umited States Bureau of Recla-. mation. (R. 104, 10%) This reservation by the State for the benefit of the United States will, if it be ma- terial, “ripen into a grant from the State to the Uni- ted States upon completion of the project.’’ For the purposes of this case the question of title is irrelevant ~ and immaterial because the land is neither used nor useful in, connection with any work of the contrac- tors in either of the present cases. ; a, 4) CONCLUSION * It is respectfully submitted that the land acquired by the United States government for the purpose of the Grand Coulee. Dam project is both by express cession by the State and by purchase by the United States with the eonsen?® of the State removed from ~ the jurisdiction of the State of Washington and is within the exélusive jurisdiction of the United States, It follows that the State of Washington is without power to levy any tax upon an occupation conducted exclusively upon such territory. _ Respectfully submitted, | W. G. GRAVES, - ARNOLD L.. GRAVES, Counsel for Amicus Curiae, GRAVES, KIZER & GRAVES, Of Counsel. : : Office - Supreme Cour, U. S : — OCT 4 1937 Being bee me Tite | CARLES ELMORE CROF as , — ~* SUPREME COURT. OF THE UNITED STATES *~ | : : ee | y _ DAVID H. RYAN, ) Appellant, ) } . Vs. ) No. 8 _ THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al, ) : Appellees. ) — . AP ¢ "REPLY BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE -_ -— E. P. DONNELLY, \ Counsel for Appellees. E. W. SCHWELLENBACH, Post Office Address: Ephrata, Washington. _-IN THE SUPREME COURT : OF THE UNITED STATES | . a OCTOBER TERM, 1937, _ 4. .—% ; . 4 ~ DAVID H. RYAN, : ) ee oe Appellant, 7 vs. ) No. 8 THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al., ) : “ —__ Appellees. ) - 7 ~ - = REPLY BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE—~ E. P. DONNELLY, Counsel*for Appellees. ny E. W. SCHWELLENBACH, Of Counsel ts _ Post Office Address: a te Ephrata, Washington. | | , --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386010_0226%3A11. Public record. Not legal advice.