# Petitioners Brief — Washington Coach Co. v. National Labor Bd.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petitioners Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1937
- **Citation:** 301 U.S. 142

## Text

FILE COPY ors

JAN 29 1

CHART IOS ELWc kc

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

Octoser Term, 1936.

No. 469.

Wasuinoton, Viroinia aND Marytanp Coacn Company,
Petitioner,

Vv.

_NationaL LasBor Retations Boarp,
Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT.

ee

BRIEF ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER.

ee

J e
Rosert E. Lyxcu,

4 Wittum J. Hvueues, Jr.,
Shoreham Building,
Washington, D. C.,

\ Attorneys for Petitioner.

Wuuusm E. Leary,

Reeves R. Hixon,

E. Louise CHAanpier,

Shoreham Building,
Washington, D. C.,
Of Counsel.

,

ssn
erence reeset epee
Parss or Breox 8. Avams, Wasurxeororn, D. O.

WIMION BRLOW .................. 0006: Stee
URISDICTION .... ... eee te a
STATUTE INVOLVED ..1:...........c¢0ceeeeees
JUESTIONS PRESENTED ............ Dg e :

)UTLINE OF ARGUMENT ................ ea nes

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

Preliminary: The Board’s Petition, the Order of
the Board and the Decree of the Court Below. .

Charges i in the Board’s Complaint ......... ‘ne dais
Petitioner’s Answer to the Board’s Complaint. .
The Board’s Findings of Fact ................ -

Effect of the Unfair Labor practices Upon Inter-
‘State rangi LP A at ee, ee eeerees

Petitioner’s Contentions in the Court Below......
3ASIS OF DECISION OF THE COURT BELOW. .
SPECIFICATION OF ERRORS TO BE RELIED ON
ARGUMENT:

PART I: THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUS.
TAIN THE FINDINGS

A. Where a Constitutional Right is Alleged to
Have Been Violated the Federal Courts Can
Make Their Own Independent Determina-
tion of All Questions of Law and Fact......

The Evidence: Preliminary ...............

C. The Practica] Problem of How an Employer
, ‘Can Exercise His Right to Discharge His
Employees About the Time of the Formation
ee 8 ee, Pree e eee ree

w

12
17

Lndex Continued.

. The Right to ‘‘Clean House’”’

. The Data as to the Discharge of Each Indi-
vidual Employee

. The Alleged Efforts of the Management to
’ Prevent the Formation of the Union

PART IIT: UNCONSTITUTIONALITY

. The Act Herein Is Unconstitutional in Its
Entirety .

. Petitioner Has the Necessary Standing to
Argue Inseparability

. The Cases on Inseparability Do. Not Prevent
the Judicial Inquiry Herein Asked

. The Way the Court Below Passed Upon the
Question of Separability

. The Act Shows a Comprehensive Scheme to
Regulate Employer-Employee Relationships
in Local Industry as, Well as.in Interstate

. Summary of the Object of the Act

. If the Object of the Act Was to Enact a Com-
prehensive Scheme. to Regulate Intra-state _
Activities as Well as Inter-state the Act Has
Not Been Misconstrued But is Unconstitu-

H. The Proof That the Act Is Unconstitutional
as to Intra-state Industry

I. Under This Court’s Decisions on Separabil-
ity the Entiré Act Is Unconstitutional

Conclusion

TABLE OF CASES.

. Adair v. U. S., 208 U. S. 161
Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board,
No. - 365
Austin v. a of Boston, 7 Wall. 694

\
\

Index Continued: ili

res . Page
Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 678, 685 ............... 62
ee OC og abv oe sdodsaessnwkens 48
Boyer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 124.F. 246 ........ 25
Bradley Lumber Co. v. Nat. Labor Relations Board, 84
i Er rar re Pew a Perr rE 16
Butts v. Mechanics Transportation Co., 230 U. S. 126,
MC rls tie conse k bw a saeg ae a aeixe0 +0608 61, 62
ge 8 rrr rr eerie 28
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 998 U. 8.238 ............ 48,44
Civil Rights Cases, 109 2 eee 61
Coburn v. Cedar Valley Land Co., 25 F. 791 .......... 25 .
Coppaye v. Kansas, 236 U.S.1 ..+...... pnneas denies 10
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. &. 22 .........scccccsees 13, 14
Darnell y. Indiana, 226 U. 8. 390 ................... 42
Davis v. Foreman, 3 Ch. 654 (Eng.) 1894 ............ 25
Dillingham v. McLaughlin, 264 U. S. 370 ............ 42
Dorchy v. Kansas, 264-U. S. 286 ...)..........s0ceee 44
‘ El Paso Electric Co. v. Elliott, et al., (U. S. D. C. West-
| Ee a errr er rrr rer 03

Employer’s Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463, 500-504 ... 60
Federal Trade Com. v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U. S.

ee Mt Weeds hl wakes season chee wan an 4a cakens 10, 12
Foster Bros. Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. National Labor

Relations Board, 85 F. (2d) 984 .......... 10, 11, 45, 46
Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Board, 85 F. (2d) 291 ....... 53
_Helvering v. Rankin, 295 U. S: 123, 131 ............ 10, 12
muckunm ¥. Comey, 300 U. B. 160... wc ccc ccecccscwcss 42
Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44, 66, 67 ................ 47,59
[llinois Central R. Co. v. McKendree, 203 U. S. 514,529 64.
Jamés v. Bowman, 190 U. S. 127, 140 ................ 63
Kern. River.Co. v. U. S., 257 U. S. 147, 153-4 ......... — 49
Lee v. New Jersey, 207 U. 8. 67°N,.....5.....-. 220 42
Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Fe , 206 U. S. 170 25
Miller v. Warner, 42 App. Div. 208 ................. 25
Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U. S: 346, 351 ................ 49

National Labor Relations Board v. Friedman—Harry
Marks Clothing Co., 83 F. (2d) 731; 84 F. (2d) 1000 53
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin

a ED ova kccedsdeesctwecessces 53
National Labor Relations Board v. Mackay Radio &

Telegraph Co., Jan. 11, 1937 (unreported) ........ 42
New York ex rel "Hateh v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 152 i aek 42

Index Continued.

Northern Securities Case, 193 U. S. 197, 402 ..
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon, 253 U. S. 287 .
Phillips v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 283 U.S.
— 589, 600
Prendergast v. New York Telegraph Co., 262 U. S. 43,
50 :
Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U. S.
330, 369 17, 18, 24, 44, 65
Riccio v. Hoboken, 69 N. J. L. 649, 662
Saint Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. U. S., 298 U. S. 38

Schechter v. U. S., 295 U. S. 495

Stout v. Pratt, 12 F. Supp. 864 (W. D. Mo., Otis J.)..
Supervisors of Albany County v. Stanley, 105 U. S. 305 42
Tagg Bros & Moorehead v. U. S., 280 U. S. 420 :
Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Brotherhood, 281 U. S. 548, 571

Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82
Union Pacific R. Co. v. Ruef, 120 F. 102
U. S. v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1
U. S. v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, 641
U. S. v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214
'U. S. v. Steffens, 100 U. S. 97, 98, 99 -..........
Utah Power & T. Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 184, 185 ......
Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 241, 340, 342 44, 64
Yazoo & Mississippi V. Railroad Co. v. Jackson Vine-
gar Co., 226 U. S. 217

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

‘Octoser TERM, 1936.

No. 469.

‘Wasuinaton, Viretnia AND Maryianp Coacn Company,
Petitioner, |

V.

NationaL Lasor Retations Boarp,

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CiRCUIT.

BRIEF ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER.

ne een

OPINION BELOW.

The Opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reported
in 85 F. (2d) 990. It will be found inthe Record at page
589. _! |

JURISDICTION.

The decree of the United States Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit was entered October 8, 1936,
(R. 598). The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari was filed
herein October 17, 1936, and was granted October 26, 1936.

2

(R. 601.) The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under
Section 240 (a) of the Judicial Code as amended, and Sec-
tion 10 (e) of the National Labor Relations Act, (29 U. S.
C. A., Sec. 151).

STATUTE INVOLVED.

The National Labor Relations Act may be found at 29
U. 8. C. A., See. 151; it is before this Court m toto as an
Appendix to Petitiongr’s brief in The Associated Press v.
National. Labor Relations Board, No. 365 of the present
term. . ; ,
QUESTIONS PRESENTED.

Petitioner is an interstate bus company with eighty (80)
employees. In December of 1935 after noticing growing
» inefficiency, increase in break-downs, disaffection, etc., the
company determines to ‘‘clean house’’ and starts breaking
in new bus drivers. In February of 1936 it finds out that a
professional union organizer, disguised as a workman, has
gotten a job with Petitioner under false pretenses and has
‘‘organized’’ the men. Rumors of sabotage increasing, the
company on March 4, 1936, ‘‘cleans ‘house’’, discharging 18
out of 57 unjpn men, retaining, however, the President of the
Union. The company proves the inefficiency of each indi-
vidual discharged, though the Board refuses to allow the
company to put in evidence their efficiency records. There
is conflicting testimony that the company ‘told several men
they were discharged for union activities. The Board
orders reinstatement with back pay, around $25,000 to date —
—to be paid Union men who haven’t worked. On these
facts the following questions are presented:

1. Is the Act as construed and applied to Petitioner 4
valid regulation of interstate commerce?

2. If the Act is declared unconstitutional as applied to
local industry in the companion cases now before this Court,
is it not unconstitutional as to Petitioner, the Act revealing
a comprehensive plan to regulate all industry, intra-state as

3

well as interstate, and the one application being insep-
arable from the other?

OUTLINE OF ARGUMENT.

Contrary to the decision below, the law is that where,
as here, a constitutional right is involved and the juris-
diction of the Court is at issue, the Courts-can make their
own independent determination of the facts.

On the facts, Petitioner has met the burden pecs’
by the Act (as construed by the Board) and has justified
beyond a reasonable doubt its right to discharge the eighteen
employees.

As to the law, the Act herein is unconstitutional as a
regulation of both intra-state and inter-state commerce.
To avoid burdening the Court, Petitioner will not repeat
the arguments to this effect in the companion cases herein,
but will devote the present Brief to discussing the possi-
bility that the Act may be declared unconstitutional as
to intra-state or local industries in one of. the companion
cases herein, in which event the question arises: if the
Act is unconstitutional as to intra-state or local industries,
is it’s application to Petitioner, an inter-state bus company,
separable or must the entire Act fall. As to this question -
of Inseparability, Petitioner’s argument is:

(1) that it has the necessary standing to argue -Insepar-
ability; (2) that if the Act is unconstitutional as to intra-
state or local industry, it is a nullity, the “Findings and
Policy” and the Act itself disclosing objectives which could
not possibly be achieved or even intelligently sought after,
by application to Petitioner and other inter-state companies
alone. Hence it’s application to Petitioner would be for
a purpose other than intended by the Act itself and the
judgment below should be reversed.

4

STATEMENT OF FAOTS.

Preliminary: The Board’s Petition, the Order of the Board
. and the Decree of the Court Below:

The National Labor Relations Board, respondent herein,
filed a petition in the Court below, the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, (R. 1), or the enforce-
ment of its Order of May 21, 1936, requiring Petitioner
to cease and desist from certain alleged unfair labor prac-
_ tices and further ordering it to take certain affirmative
action, namely, offer re-employment to 18 discharged em- -
ployees and make them whole for any loss of pay they
_ had suffered by reason of the discharge, (R. 4). The Court
below granted Respondent’s Petition, (R. 598), and the
present certiorari followed.

At the outset of the proceedings before the Board, Peti-
tioner appeared specially and filed an objection to the juris-
diction of the Board assérting the unconstitutionality of the
National Labor Relations Act on the same grounds as in the
companion cases herein (R. 26-28) Being overruled Peti-
tioner, without waiving its objection te the Board’s juris-
diction, filed an Answer. to the Board’s , ion 28).

Charges in the Board’s dicanpedee:

The Board’s complaint herein, (R. 19), resulted from a
charge, (R. 9), and a supplemental charge, (R. 14), by Local
No. 1079 Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric
Railway and Motor Coach Employees. It allegeggthat Peti-
tioner operates and controls motor bus transportgtion lines
for the transportation of passengers and express from
Washington, D.'C., to various places in Virginia and Mary-
land and return; that in connection therewith it maintained.
a garage and repair shop in Clarendon, Virginia, wherein
the busses are serviced and repaired, in the course of inter-
state transportation of passengers above referred to, (R.
20, Paragraphs 2 and 3) ; that these operations of Petitioner
occurred in the course and current of commerce within the

5)

District of Columbia and among the States and between
the District and the States and are an integral part of the
operations of an instrumentality of such commerce and con-
stitute commerce. among the States and between the Distict
of Columbia and the States, (R. 20-21, Paragraph 4). It is
then alleged that Petitioner discharged 21 employees, bus
drivers and mechanics, and had refused to re-instate them,
for the ‘reason that they joined the labor union in question
and engaged in concerted activities with other employees
for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual
aid and protection, (R. 21, Paragraph 6). By this action
of Petitioner it is alleged Petitioner interfered with, re-
strained and coerced and presently was interfering with,
restraining and coercing its employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and that by such
acts Petitioner did thereby engage in and was thereby
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8, Subdivision 1 of the Act, (R. 22, Paragraph 7).
It is also alleged the discharge of the men and the refusal
to re-instate them constituted discrimination in regard to
the hire and tenure of employment of the-men, and that the
Petitioner did thus discourage membership of the men in
the labor union, and that this was likewise an unfair labor
practice within the meaning of Section 8, Subdivision 3 of
the Act, (R. 22, Paragraph 8).
The following is then alleged :

‘‘The aforesaid unfair labor practices of she respon-
dent have occurred and are occurring in the course and
current of commerce within the District of Columbia
and among the States and between the District of Co-
lumbia and States of the United States and, on the
basis of experience in the motor bus transportation and
other industries, burden and obstruct such commerce
and the free flow thereof, and have led and tend to
lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing such
commerce and the free flow thereof, by impairing the
efficiency, safety and operation of instrumentalities of
such commerce,’’ (R. 23, Paragraph 9.) ,

. é
Petitioner's Answer to the Board’s Complaint:

Without waiving its Constitutional objections asserted
in its special appearance Petitioner in its Answer substan-
tially admitted the allegatians of the Complaint with respect
to the nature of its business. It likewise admitted -that
it had discharged and refused re-instatement to the em-
ployees named in the Complaint but denied that it had done
so because of their membership or activity in the union
being formed, (R. 28-37). It stated that it had noticed
growing inefficiency among the men since September of
1935 about which time a professional union organizer dis-
guised as a workman obtained eniployment and began to
organize the union. From that time on there was disaffec-
tion among the men, and the work did not seem to get done
properly. The management thought that something out of
the ordinary was occurring but was unable to locate what
it was. It tried various remedial measures, but no perma-
nent remedy was fonnd. These conditions continued until
about February 1, 1936, at which time the management
determined that many of the employees were- becoming so
inefficient that it would be necessary to replace them in the
near future. About February 1 it began to ‘‘break in’’
drivers to take the place of the six bus drivers who subse-
quently were discharged; and who are named in the Com-
plaint. The management also held conferences early in
February with a view to weeding out the less efficient em-
ployees in the repair shop. It was not until February 28
that the management discovered that a union was being
formed. About this time a rumor got out that there was
going to be a strike and various patrons telephoned or
called wanting to know whether the service would be dis-°
continued. Reports also were spread about that the brakes
on the busses were faulty and thére was danger that the
drivers would lose control of the busses. Considering the
entire situation the management determined around Feb-.
ruary 28 that drastic action must be taken and so concluded

7

to discharge the six bus drivers above referred to and to
weed out the less efficient men in the repair shop. This was
done.

Petitioner in its Answer reiterated. its objections to the
Constitutionality of the Act already filed with the Board
and alleged that if under the above circumstances it was a
violation of the Act to discharge the men, the Act as con-
strued and applied constituted a deprivation of Petitioner’s
rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment, (R. 28-37).

The Board’s Findings of Fact:

The Board found after a Hearing ‘that Petitioner had
illegally discharged 18 of the 21 mentioned, 4 being bus
drivers and the remaining 14 mechanics and service em-
ployees, (R. 532, Finding 11 (1 to 18)) the object being to
weed out the employees active in union affairs (R. 539). As
to the shop employees it found that they constituted an
integral part of petitioner’s interstate transportation sys-
tem, (R. 545, Finding 13). The Board found that the dis-
charges constituted a discrimination in regard to the hire
and tenure of employment within the meaning of Section 7
of the Act, and that, therefore, Petitioner was engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8, Sub-
divisions 1 and 3 of the Act, (R. 539, Finding 12).

Effect of the Unfair Labor Practices —_ Inter-State
Commerce:

The Board found that the alleged unfair “— practices
occurred in the course and current of inter-state commerce,
(R. 545, Finding 13), and that on the basis of its experi-
ence in motor bus transportation Petitioner’s conduct in _
discharging the 18 employees burdened and obstructed
inter-state commerce, and led and tended to lead to labor
disputes burdening and obstructing such commerce and
the free flow thereof, by impairing the efficiency, safety and

. 8

operation of instrumentalities of commerce, (R. 546, Find-

ing 14). Finally the Board found that Petitioner’s alleged

unfair labor practices affected commerce within the mean-

ing of Section 8, Subdivisions 1 and 3 and Section 2, Sub-

divisions 6 and 7 of the Act, (R. 547, Paragraphs 3 and 4).
The Board’s Order:

The Board ordered Petitioner to cease and desist: (a)
from discouraging membership in the union by discg§nina-
tion in regard to the hire and tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment; (b) from interfering
with, restraining or coercing its empleyees in the exercise
of their rights as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, (R.
548). | ¥

The Board further ordered Petitionér to offer to the 18
employees reinstatement to their former positions, with all
rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and make such
employees whole for any loss suffered by reason of their
discharge, (R. 548).

Petitioner’s Contentions in the Court Below:

In the Court below Petitioner undertook to prove
from the record that every contention made in its An-
swer as to its reasons for discharging the employees in
question was fully substantiated by the Record. It
_ faced the Court with the practical problem of how an
employer could exercise his right to discharge his em.
ployees about-the time of the formation of a labor -union.
It asserted that on the facts in: the present case it had
a right ‘‘to clean house’’ at the time in question, and
that any Act of Congress which was so interpreted by
a Board in Washington that the burden of proof in con-
nection with the discharges of the employees herein was
thrust upon the employer such that he was required to
show that the employees were not discharged because of
their_union activities operated to destroy the employer’s
right to discharge and thus deprived him of a substantial

9

right in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
* Amendment. Petitioner also analyzed the data with re- -
spect to the discharge of each individual employee’ and
~ showed, we contend, ample reason for the discharge of
every single one of them. It showed that only 20 of the 57
members of the union had been discharged, and that the
President of the union Ws still in the Company’s employ.
It also complained of the Board’s refusal to permit it to put
into evidence the efficiency records of the various employees
discharged and to compare these records with the efficiency
records of the employees retained. The reason for the
Board’s refusal to permit this evidence was some sort of a
notion on the part of the Examiner, (a member of the
Board) that the efficiency records did not measure up to
his standard of accuracy, and he did not know whether they
had been kept properly or not. It was pointed out to him
that it made-no difference whether the records were ac-
curate or inaccurate; that if as a result of these records
the Company came to the conclusion that a state of in-
efficiency existed and later acted upon it, they were admis-
sible to overcome the seeming presumption that the men
were discharged because of union activities.

Petitioner also urged that the Act was unconstitutional as
applied to the regulation of intra-state manufacturing activ-
ities and hence was unconstitutional as a whole, revealing
as it did a comprehensive attempt to regulate all industry,
intra-state as well as inter-state, and that thé allegedly Con-
stitutional application of the Act to inter-state commerce
was inseparable from the seemingly unconstitutional appli-

cation to purely intra-state industry.
x

BASIS OF DECISION OF THE COURT BELOW.

The Court below held that while the testimony on behalf
of the employer ‘‘was not without weight’’, rt could not be
said that there was no substantial evidence to support the
Board’s findings, citing

10 |

Federal Trade Commission v. Algoma Lumber Co.,
291 U. S. 67, 73;
Helvering.v. Rankin, 295 U. 8. 123, 131;

to the effect that bearing in mind Section 10 (e) of the Act
provides that findings of the Board as to facts if supported
by evidence shall be conclusive, the above two cases pre-
vented thé Court from considering the testimony anew and
making its own findings (R. 594, 592).

As to Adair v. U. S., 208 U.S. 161, and. Coppage v. Kan.
sas,.236 U.S. 1, urged by Petitioner on the Constitutional
questions, the Court held that these decisions had impliedly
been overruled or distinguished by this Court’s decision in
Texas and New Orleans R. Co. v. Railway Clerks, 281 U. S.
548 (R. 594-596). As to Petitioner’s contention that the Act
applied not only to inter-state commerce but to local indus-
try and being uncbnstitutional as to the latter was uncon-
stitutional in its-ehtirety, the Court below referred to its —
Opinion handed down the same day as the decision in the ©
present case in Foster Bros. Manufacturing Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 85 F.. (2d) 984, wherein it held that
Congress in the Act herein never intended to regulate intra-
state commerce, the power conferred upon the Board in
Section 10 (a) of the Aet to prevent unfair labor practices
being restricted to unfair labor practices ‘‘affecting com-
merce’’. Hence the Court held that there was no ground
for Petitioner’s argument that an important and insepara-
ble part of the Act having been condemned the whole Act
must fall, (R. 597-598). |

SPECIFICATION OF ERRORS TO BE RELIED ON.

1. The Court erred in sdstaining the National Labor Re-
lations Act as a valid exercise of the power of Congress to
regulate commerce as against Petitioner’s claim it is in
violation of the First and Tenth Amendments.

2. The Court erred in ‘sustaining the constitutionality of
the Act herein as against Petitioner’s contention that the

11

Act was unconstitutional in that it improperly delegated

judicial powers to the National Labor Relations Board.

_ 8. The Court erred in sustaining the constitutionality of
the Act herein as against Petitioner’s contention that as

construed and applied herein it deprives Petitioner of his

liberty and property without Due Process of Law in viola-

tion of the Fifth Amendment. &

4. The Court erred in sustaining the constitutionality of
the Act herein as against Petitioner’s claim that the Act,
being unconstitutional as an attempted regulation of intra-
state commerce, was likewise unconstitutional as a regula-
tion of inter-state commerce, the provisions of the Act.as to
the two types of commerce being inseparable.

5. The Court erred in respect of Error Four above in
holding that no question of separability was presented by
reason of its thebry, announced in Foster Bros. Manufac-
turing Co. v. Board, 85 F. (2d) 984, that Congress never in-
tended the Act to apply to intra-state commerce. ,

6. The Court erred in sustaining the otder of the Board
holding that upon the evidence Petitioner was guilty of an-
unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8 of the
Act.

7. The Court erred in sustaining the action of the Board -
in preventing Petitioner from submitting in evidence the
efficiency records of the union men discharged, together
with the efficiency records of the non-union men not dis-
charged in order that a comparison between the two sets
of employees might be made.

8. The Court erred in sustaining the action of the Board
in thrusting upon Petitioner the burden of proof that the
union employees discharged were not discharged for uhion
activities. : Aue

9. The Court érred in sustaining the action of the Board |
in thrusting the burden of proof upon Petitioner thatethe:
union men discharged were discharged for good reasons as
against Petitioner’s claim that Petitioner had a constitu-
tional right to discharge them for no reason at all, in con-
trast to a good reason.

12

10. The Court erred in requiring the re-instatement of
the discharged employees with back pay, thus depriving
Petitioner of its right to trial by jury, in violation of the
Seventh Amendment and requiring Petitioner to offer to
make a contract, for an indefinite period with the employees,
in violation of the equitable principle that Courts cannot
make or require the making of contracts and in any case
will not require the specific performance of a personal ser
vice contract. -

ARGUMENT.
Part I.
The Evidence Does Not Sustain the Findings.

A. Where a constitutional right is alleged to have
been vioJated the federal courts can make their
own independent determination of all

questions of law and fact.

The Court below stated:

‘*Section 10 (e) of the act provides that the findings
of the Board as to facts, if supported by evidence, shall
be conclusive. It is settled that in reviewing the find-
ings of such a body, the ceart will not considerthe tes-
timony anew and make its own findings since the weight
to be given to the evidence and the inferences to be
drawn therefrom are matters for the fact finding body,
and the function of the court in review is merely to re-
verse and modify such findings as have no evidence to
support them and aré clearly impxoper. Federal Trade
Commission v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U. S. 67, 73;
Helvering w Rankin, 295 U.S. 123, 131.”’. (R. 592).

The Court apparently examined the Record from the basis
of the above statement and the cases cited. It stated:

‘‘The testimony on behalf of the employer was not
without weight, but it nevertheless appeared that the
eighteen employees, all of them being union men, were

discharged within a period of ten days after the first |

13

step towards the formation of the union was taken,
and within a week after the offigiais of the company
received information thereof. During this period they
were actively endeavoring to prevent the union move-
ment and to persuade their employees from joining or,
continuing therein. When these efforts failed, the dis-
charges followed. Under these circumstances it cannot
be said that there was no substantial evidence to sup-
port the Board’s findings, and consequently the peti-
tion of the Board cannot be dismissed for failure of
proof.’’ (R. 594.) .

It is submitted that where the action of a partisan Board
composed of laymen is alleged to be in violation of a per-
son’s constitutional rights the power of the Cou to ex-
amine the facts is considerably broader than as stated in
the Algoma Lumber Company case, supra. Thus in Crow- -
ell v. Renson, 285 U. 8. 22, 60 this Court said:

‘*In cases brought to enforce constitutional rights,
the judicial power of the United States necessarily ex-
tends to the independent determination of all ques-
tions, both of fact and law, necessary to the perform-
ance of that supreme function. - The case of confisca-
tion is illustrative, the ultimate conclusion almost in-
variably depending upon the decisions of questions of
fact. This court has held the owner to be entitled to
‘a fair opportunity for submitting that issue to a judi-
cial tribunal for determination upon its own indepen-
dent judgment as to both law and facts.’ Ohio Valley
Water Co. v. Ben Avon, 253 U. S. 287, 64 L. Ed. 908,
P. U. R. 1920E, 814, 40 S. Ct. 527, supra. See also
Prendergast v. New York. Telegraph Co., 262 U. S. 43,
‘50, 67 L. Ed. 853, 858, 43 S. Ct. 466; Tagg Bros. 4d
Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 74 T.- 24,
50 S. Ct. 220, supra; Phillips v. Commissioner of In
ternal Revenue, 283 U. S. 589, 600, 75 L. Ed. 1289, 2299,
51S. Ct. 608.’’ (Crowell v..Benson, 285 U.S. at 60, 61).

A case of confiscation under the Fourteenth Amendment
is no different in principle from one of outright usurpation
under the Fifth. We know of no reason why, where an Act

aa
14

is constitutionally assailed, utility companies should have a
monopoly upon the Federal Courts’ judicial examination
either of facts tending to show jurisdiction in a Federal
Board initially to act or facts necessary to be found to sus-
tain the Board’s action.'. Certainly, as suggested in Crowell
v. Benson above there can be no question of this Court’s
right to examine the facts in respect of confieeatery rates
in utility cases. As recently as St. Joseph Stock Yards Co.
v. U. S., 298 U. S. 38, this Court reiterated the rule. In that
case the District Court felt that it was bound to accept the
findings of the Secretary of Agriculture on the question of
confiscation, if such findings were supported by substantial .
evidence, and that it was not within the judicial province :
to weigh the evidence and pass upon the issues of fact.
When the case came to be argued in this Court the Gov-
ernment’s chief contention was, not that the District Court ~
was right fit this expression of the law, but that in spite of
what the District Court said it had in fact made an inde- ~-.
pendent examination of the facts. This Court in deciding
the case drew a distinction between the scope of judicial
review where the action assailed is within the scope of legis-
lative authority, and action which transcends the limit of
legislative power. In the.first case the Court naturally does
not sit as a board of revision to substitute its judgment for
that of the Legislature or its agents as to matters within ~
the province of either, and so when it appoints an agent to —
act within the sphere of legislative authority it may endow
the agent with power to make findings of fact which are
conclusive, assuming there is a fair hearing, etc. In such
cases this Court said the judicial enquiry into the facts goes
no further than to ascertain whether there is evidence to
support the findings, the weight of the evidence being a
_ matter for theadministrative Board.

But, this Court said, the rate-making power is limited by
the Constitution, which prohibits the deprivation of prop-

1 Bee cases collected in Mr. ee ee fees See oe
Jeseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. 8. 38.

| : : 15

erty without Due Process of Law. Upon such a charge the
power of the Court.to exfimine the evidence is entirely dif-
ferent. This Court said, and it is a strong and able state-
ment:

‘‘Legislative agencies, with varying qualifications,
work in a field peculiarly exposed to political demands.
Some may be expert and impartial, others subservient.
It is not difficult for them to observe the requirements
of law in giving a hearing and receiving evidence. But
to say that their findings of fact may be made conclu-
sive where constitutional rights of liberty and property
are involved, although the evidence clearly establishes
that the findings are wrong and constitutional rights
have been invaded, is to place those rights at the mercy
of administrative officials va seriously to impair the
security imherent in our judicial safeguards. That
prospect, with our multiplication of administrative
agencies, is not one to be lightly regarded. It is said
that we can retain judicial authority to examine the
weight of evidence when the question concerns the right
of personal liberty. But if this be so, it is not because
we are privileged to perform our judicial duty in that
case and for reasons of convenience to disregard it in
others. The principle applies when rights either of
person or of property are protected by constitutional
restrictions. Under our system there is no warrant
for the view that the judicial power of a competent
court can be circumscribed by any legislative arrange-
ment designed to give effect to administrative action
going beyond the limits of constitutional authority.

iy . This is the purport of the decisions above cited with
respect to the exercise of an independert judicial judg-
ment upon the facts where confiscation is alleged.’’
(St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. U. S., 298 U. S. 38).

We assert, therefore, without any further examination.
of the authorities that the Court below had power to make
its independent examination of the testimony, and this Court
has the same power. In the present case this question is -
not of any great complexity and so the chief objection noted
in Mr. Justice Brandeis’ concurring Opinion in Sf. Joseph

16

Stock Yards Co. v. U. S., swpra, i.e., the magnitude of the
task of judi¢ial re-examination of facts, does not apply.

It may be noted that in Bradley Lumber Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 84 F. (2) 97, 100 the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, contrary to the decision
below, specifically held in a case similar to the-present that

the findings of the Board were subject “te a full judicial .

review’’.

The question, therefore, before this Court on the present
record is whether, the union being composed of 57 em-
ployees, the discharge of 18 union men under the facts and
circumstances of the case amounted to an unfair labor prac-
tice within the meaning of the Act, and whether the Act as
construed and applied with respect thereto did not amount
to a deprivation of Petitioner’s rights under the Due Pro-
cess Clause. If the present Record shows that the dis-
charge of the 18 union men was not because of any union
activities but a mere exercise of the normal right of dis-
charge it foliows that such discharges cannot constitute an
unfair labor practice within the meaning of the Act, and
hence the Act being construed by the Board and the Court
below to penalize such a discharge has deprived petitioner
of its right of freedom of contract or, in another aspect,
its property right to manage its own business, in violation
of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The
enquiry is, therefore, in this respect a question of fact; in
another respect, namely, as to whether the decision of the
Board and the Court below construing the Act has not oper-
ated to thrust the burden of proof upon the employer to
justify a discharge of union men about the time of the for-

mation of a union, is a question of mixed law and fact which

likewise, under the authorities above cited, i is open to re
examination by this Court.

¢ We proceed, therefore, to an examination of,the evidence.

17

B. The evidence: preliminary:

It ie not even alleged in the Complaint herein that the
discharges herein were for the purpose or intent of inter-
fering with, restraining or coercing the employees in the
exercise of their right of self-organization conferred by
Section 7 of the Act. It is merely alleged that by the dis-
charges Petitioner ‘‘did interfere with, restrain and coerce
and is interfering with, réstraining and coercing its em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Section
7 of the National Labor Relations Act’’, (R. 22). Petitioner
objected to the jurisdiction of the Board on this ground
but was overruled on the ground Petitioner was ‘‘quib-
bling’’ (R. 40-42). In other words, the position of the
Board must be that no matter what the intent or pur-
pose of the discharges if in -fact they were detrimental
to the right of self-organization conferred by Section 7
of the Act they may be prohibited. Logically, therefare,
the Board’s gant be that even if the discharges
constituted the al exercise of the right of the
carrier to select its employees or to discharge them’’ as
state@ by this Court in Tezas and New Orleans R. Co. v.
Brotherhood, 281 U. S. 548, 571, still, if the effect of the dis-
charges is to interfere with the right of self-organization,
the employer is forbidden to act. This position seems
clearly at variance with this Court's decision in Texas and
New Orleans R. Co. v. Brotherhood,. supra, and Railroad
Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U. S. 330, 369,
wherein the normal exercise of the Fight to hire and dis-
charge was upheld. We feel, therefore, that the burden is
upon the Board to prove, even thodgh it is not alleged, that
the discharges in question wére for the purpose and with
the intent of discouraging the formation of the labor union.
Unless there is proof of such an intent it is submitted the
Statute would be clearly unconstitutional im pénalizing the |
bare acts themselves for this would amount to a clear dimi-
nution of the emnployer’s Constitutional right te hire and

discharge at will.

\
18

C. The practical problem of how an employer can. exercise
his right to discharge his employees about the time of
the formation of a labor union.

The right to hire and fire has been repeatedly upheld in .
. the Courts. (Tezas and N. O. R. Co. v. Brotherhood, 28)

U. S. 548, 571; Ratlroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co.,
295 U. S. 330, 369.) Even the present Act does not—osten-
sibly at least—take this right away from the employer. The
practical problem however is: Suppose an employer some
time prior to the formation of the union has made up his
mind to ‘‘clean house’’. How is he going to exercise this -
right? In what way can he protect himself in exercising —
his unquestioned right to discharge? If in point of fact
he cannot discharge union men without the burden of proof
being put upon him to show that they were not discharged
because of their union activities, does not the Act, as con-'
strued and applied to his particular case, operate to destroy
his right to discharge and thus deprive him of a substantial
right in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

This is precisely the situation in the present case.

Dr. Leiserson, Chairman of the Railway Mediation Board
and the Board’s expert witness in the present case, had a
simple solution of this problem, which was that the em-
ployer was not supposed to know anything about the forma-
tion of the union. (R. 390, 396) As showing the Board’s
attitude, this witness’ construction of the Act is en-
titled to considerable weight by reason of his position,
the fact that he was the Board’s expert witness .and
his long contact with legislation of this character. In
answer to direct questidns he.jndicated that when an em-
ployer discharged men dbout the time of the formation of
a labor union the burden of proof was on the employer to
show that he had not discharged the employees because of
their union activities. (R. 390, 391, 393.) Dr. Leiserson
testified that in discharging any prominent union man ‘‘ob-
viously the purpose is to scare everybody so that there
will be no organization’’. (R. 391.) He admitted that about

é

‘19

the only way the employer could protect himself would
be by Keeping efficiency records which would disclose his
“right”’ to discharge the man in question at that particular
time." \
Mr. Leon Arnold and Mr. England, President and Secre-.
tary of the Company, testified, as to the discharges on
March 4, that the Company had been considering ‘‘cleaning
house’’ for a long time prior thereto. The evidence is un-
contradicted that for a long period of time prior to the dis-
charges the officers of the Company had noticed a growing
inefficiency in, fhe work of the employees dating back to
September of 1935. (Arnold, R. 46, 47, 56, 57.) Arnold,
the President, had heard complaints from: passengers in
regasd to the lack of cleanliness of the buses and delays in
operation. He had talked it over with England, the Secre-
tary, and Wilsey, the foreman of the shop. Wilsey did not
know the reason for it. (R. 46, 48, 56, 58.) aie
Toward the end of November, Mason, a-private investi-
gator who had been employed by the Company over a pe-
riod of years to make periodic investigations of the men,
made a secret investigation, riding on the busses. No
special instructions were given him as to this investigation
or as to any of the previous investigations. (R. 219.) He
reported disloyal conduct on the part of Hall a bus driver;
also: Hall’s wife complained that Hall was running around
with another woman, riding her on the ‘bus beside him.
(R. 292.) Also that drivers West and Magaha had failed
to collect the proper fares on occasion. England, the Secre-
tary of the-Company, considered West and Magaha either
dishonest or careless. (R. 329.) He would have fired West
and Mahaga ata other drivers in December if the weather
had permitted them to break in. new men. (R. 340, 345.)
_ There were complaints against Crissman, a bus driver,
to the effect that he was unreasonable and rude to passen-

+ Yet when Petitioner attempted to put im evidence the efficiency records
of the discharged employees the Examiner ruled them out. See p- 9, Assign.
7, pp. 11, 20, 29 this Brief. ;

20

gers. So much was this so that a passenger himself went
to the Company about it. (R. 399, 406.)

Smith, a bug driver, had had a number of accidents. Eng-
land claimed that he hed a right to take the number of acci-
dents into consideration in firing a man irrespective of
whether the man was to blame for them. (R. 333.) Magaha —
had been involved in twelve accidents in 1935 and ‘one in
1936. (R. 327, 331.)

~Mr. Arnold and Mr. England complained to the shop
foreman, Wilsey, about the increase in break-downs on the
road and about the busses being dirty. (R. 409, 410.) In
December they made up their mind toe do something about it
and started to break in new men to take the places of those
they intended later to discharge. (R. 77, 98,121.) They
continued to break in new men during J anuary and Febru-
ary and had six or seven new drivers ready in January.
(R. 340, 341.) On account of the increase in accidents and
road calls England installed a system of keeping records of
them about December the fifteenth. These records the Peti-
tioner attempted to put in evidence but the Examiner re-
fused to allow them on the ground that he did not under-
stand them and did not know whether they had been kept
properly or not. (See Spec. of Error 7, p. 11, this Brief.) -
It was pointed out to the Examiner that it made no differ-
ence wher the records were accurate or inaccurate; if as
a result of these records the Company came to the conclu-
sion that a state of inefficiency existed and later acted upon
it this was admissible to overcome the seeming presumption
that the men were discharged in March because of their
union activities. (R. 307, 311.) The Examiner, however,
continued in his refusal to allow their admission, which
seriously injured the Petitioner. He did however permit
England to testify of his independent knowledge, without
resorting to the records, that the number of road calls in-
creased from January the first to March the fourth, 1936.
- (R. 307, 312.)

21 ,

Conditions as above described continued during January
and February. In February certain patrons of the Com-
pany told Arnold that they had heard that busses would not
be running subsequent to Saturday, February the twenty-
ninth; that the men were going on strike; also that one
driver had stated that he was going to get off the bus at
the top of Picket’s Hill and let it run wild. (R. 50, 60-63,
69.) About this time one of the drivers told him that a
policeman had stopped him on M Street and said that there
was a report that the brakes on the Arnold busses were in
bad shape. This led to Mr. Storer, the brake Inspector for
the Washington Traffic Bureau, making an inspection. (R.
63, 64.) Storer found circumstances which “were at least
suspicious and so reported. (R. 63, 64, 77-82.)
' As already stated, Arnold had a number of conferences
with England and Wilsey, the shop foreman, relative to the
equipment and operation of the busses and the delays and
road calls from time to time during the months from Octo:
ber on. (R. 60.) There was an exceptionally large number
of road delays and break-down of busses in the latter part
of February. Complaints as to cleanliness were more num-
erous in the four or five months prior to March. (R. 60, 61,
109, 112.) England offered in evidence records of the Com-
pany showing the increase in these break-downs and ser-
vice calls, but the Examiner refused to admit them on the
ground that the Examiner did not understand the various
notations on the records and apparently the records were
not good enough for the Examiner. (R. 114, 115, 117.)

Some time in February the management discovered that
a man named Griffin, a professional labor crganizer who
had secured employment with the Company under the pre-
tense that he was a workman, had beer: organizing the men
into a union some time from September forward. (R. 47-49,
51.) .

As a result of all of these things and the accumulated diffi-
culties from September to February the management deter-
mined to ‘‘clean house’’. (R. 366, 367.) About this time

ee

came the rumors that no busses would be running subse-
quent to February the twenty-ninth, and that one would be
allowed,to run away down hill. (R. 61.) Arnold called in
Wilsey and England and asked Wilsey for a report on his
men. The men that Wilsey- and England recommended to
be dismissed were dismissed, and the new men they had
been breaking in put on the jobs in addition to various men
’ obtained in answer to an advertisement placed in the news-
, paper. (R. 122.)

; Both Arnold, the President of the Company, and Eng-
land denied that the union activities of the men had had
anything to do with their discharge and pointed out that the
Company still had more union men in its employ than it
had discharged. (R. 51, 62, 96, 100.) (Of the eighty em-
ployees, fifty-seven were members of the union, and of these /
only twenty were discharged. The President was not dis-
charged.) The Examiner refused to allow the Petitioner
to show that while some union men had been fired other
union men were still in the employ of the Company, and
that England believed at the time that those continued in-
the employ of the Company were union men. (R. 353, 355.)
This prevented Petitioner from rebutting the ‘‘presump-
tion’’ that because some of the union men were fired about
the time of the formation of the union they were fired be-
cause of the union. It also prevented the Petitioner from
showing the efficiency of the union men retained compared
with the efficiency of the union men discharged.

D. The right to “clean house”.

_ On the basis of the evidence cited under Part I-C we ask
this Court how it can be said that the discharges of the 18
union men under the circumstances stated were so entirely
without any other basis than the men’s union activities that
there must be an irresistible conclusion that they were
discharged because they joined the union. The growing
difficulties from September and October until February, the
lack of efficieucy, increase in road calls, signs of disaffec-

»

23

tion, rumors of sabotage, rumors of a strike, were all mat-
ters which the Company was entitled to take into consider-
ation in leading up to its conclusion to ‘‘clean house’. The
fact that.it determined in December to break in new men.
shows that the discharges were not because of the union

_ for the testimony shows that the officials of the Company
knew nothing about the formation of the union until some
time in February. Further, the conclusive fact appears
that all the union men were not discharged. Nor is there
any testimony to tlie effect that the management singled
out or even knew the ring-leaders of the union. As a mat-
ter of fact, the President of the union is still in Petitioner’s
employ. The Examiner prevented the Petitioner compar-
ing the efficiency records of the union men still employed
with the records of the union men fired, which in itself
seems to Petitioner to be reversible error. But even with-
out this is it so clear to this Court that there was no other
reason for the discharge of these men than the formation
of the union?

We say that if the evidence in this case is sufficient to
raise the inescapable conclusion that the men were fired be-
cause of their union activities then the Act, as construed
and applied herein, throws upon the employer the burden

f proof that in exercising his constitutional right to dis-
’ charge he must be prepared to prove conclusively that the
men discharged were discharged for some reason other
than their union activities. This overlooks the fact that an
employer has a constitutional right to discharge employees
for no reason at all. If the exercise of this right is, by the
present Act, so restricted as to cut down the constitutional
right so that an employer can discharge only for a good
reason, it follows that the right has been curtailed in an
important aspect, and the legislation is, therefore, uncon-
stitutional.

Conceding for the sake of argument that an employer has’
no right to discharge employees for the purpose of destroy-

ing a labor union, though even this we believe is still open

24

to argument on the basis of Railroad Retirement Board v.
Alton R. Co., 2950. 8. 330, 369, and Adair v. United States,
208 U. S. 161, the exercise of this right as any other con-
stitutional right should be prohibited only upon the clear-
est showing. In-a border line case, and we do not concede
that this is one, the! tendency of the Courts should be to
sustam the constitutional right rather than to extend re-
strictions upor it or upon its exercise. After a long period
of difficulties with inefficient employees, the fact that at or
about the time of the formation of a labor union the em-
ployees became so inefficient and the reports of their pro-
posed conduct so serious to a transportation line that one
third of the union employees were discharged, does not
prove their dismissal was due to union activities. Joining
a union carried on, in part, by a vice-president of that union
in the private office of the President of the Transportation
Company, may have been one factor in the case which led
the men to believe that they, and not the directors were
running the.company. Whether the mental attitude cre-
ated by the men joining the union was the cause of their
‘conduct and statements need not be sought out by the exec-
utives of the corporation. Conditions were such, actual
and reported, that a transportation company could not exist
if they continued. Who is to say that Arnold was not justi-
fied, therefore, in taking drastic action when presented with
a drastic state of conditions such as the stoppage of busses
as weil as possible dest:uction thereof. If the threats were
carried out, as reported to Arnold, the damage would have
been done, the losses tremendous and with a company
heavily in debt, it might have proved ‘disastrous. Arnold
was not required to wait until the horse was stolen to lock
the stable door.

We submit to this Court that if this Act is to be inter-
preted to destroy any rough and ready method the em-
ployer has for determining which employees he wants and
which he does not want the Act is clearly unconstitutional —
by imposing a bureaucratic supervision of his constitu-

~

25

tional right to hire and dischary* at will. These questions
are of some interest in the present case as it eannot, by the
farthest stretch of the imagination, be contended that there
were not various reasons for the discharge of the individual
employees herein in addition to the reasons leading up to -
the management’s determination to ‘‘cleen house’’.

We say the conduct of this case and of all cases of this
character will inevitably lead the Board into roving inquisi-
tions into the justice or injustice of the discharge of indi-
vidual employees, into questions of policy of employers,
into whether there were good reasons for the discharge of
any particular employee, and thus the freedom of the em-
ployer will be destroyed and his business supervised by .a
Bureau in Washington. It is noted that the Board in its ar-
gument in the Court below makes the point that an order to
restore the employge to duty with back pay does not es-
tablis&®a permanent condition. If it does not it is en-
tirely futile. The ordinary relationship of employer and
employee is substantially a personal service contract.
Courts of equity have always disclaimed any power to issue
mandatory injunctions compelling the specific enforcement
of contracts of personal service. This is substantially
what an order ‘to re-instate the employee amouats to. *It
seems folly too to believe that an order of re-instatement,
virtualiy a command to keep a particular employee em-
ployed or go out of business, can ever be beneficial either
to the employee or to the company. The employee will as-
sume that the company is making up one of Dr. Leiserson’s
favorite efficiency records against him with the object of
discharging him later on after the company has accumu-

‘See Mr. Justice Holmes’ Opinion in Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feld: \
man, 256 U. 8. 170. See also Boyer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 124 F. 246;

Union Pacific R. Co. v. Ruef, 120 F. 102; Coburn v. Cedar Valley Land Co.,

me 791; Miller v. Warner, 42 App. Div. 208; Davis v. Foreman, 3 Ch. 654,
-), 1894.

One of the reasons is the inequity which follows from the lack of mutuality.

Thua a Court compelling an employer to re-instate the employee would have no

way to compel the employee to continue to work for the employer and so a basic

‘inequity would exist.

i

lated enough good reasons for his discharge to satisfy the
Labor Relations Board in Washington. This one fact seems
proof enough that the employer’s right is being cut down
_ and this too without any corresponding benefit to the em-
ployee. ;

E. ‘The data as to the discharge of each individual employee.

The following information appears as to each individual
employee and should be considered as the Petitioners ‘‘de- |
fense’’ for discharging them when it determined to ‘‘clean
house’’: *

West: Employed two years and eight months as a bus
driver; Financial Secretary of Union; discharged without
any reason being given; no accidents, but Mason, called
‘*spotter’’ by the Board, reported he failed to collect fares.
The Board, in its Findings of Fact, seemed to indicate that
this happened only once. The record, however, showed it
happened three times (R. 293, 294). He was discharged
partly because of the reports about him from Mason and
partly because there were complaints about him (R. 326,
339). There was some trouble also about the Relief Fund
and West had said that ‘‘there won’t be any Relief Fund
in a few days’’. (R. 356, 364.)

We submit that if the management had determined to ©
‘‘clean house’’, which is the uncontradicted testimony, there
was ample reason for deeming West less desirable than
one as to whom there was no complaint or any previous

Hall: Employed two years and five months; Union man;
the investigator Mason heard him complain to passengers
in the bus he was driving about the company using a small
bus; told the passengers to get together and see Arnold
about it so they would not have to stand in the afternoon
when the bus carried mail; said the company put small

busses where large busses should be used and vice versa;

*

27

talked continually on route. This was in December, 1935, -
before any information about the Union came to the Peti-
tioner (R. 292). On another occasion on the same day Hall
continued to complain to the passengers and agitate them
with regard to a larger bus; told the passengers that he,
Hall, had told the supervisor that he was a dirty rat. Hall’s
wife reported to England, the Company’s Secretary, that
Hall was*running around with a woman, riding her on the
front seat of the bus and not collecting any fare from her.
The woman was breaking up her home and Mrs. Hall asked
him to discharge him which might break up the affair.
. England said that he would try to straighten it out with-
out dismissing him but later did dismiss him on the basis
of Magon’s report and on what his wife had said. Prior to
dismissing him he had spoken to Hall about the woman
on several occasions but his warnings did no good. His
wife called Englaril several times about it. He did not
dismiss him in January but. dismissed him with the other
men in March as‘in March he had the new men broken in
(R. 336, 337). .

In the Board’s brief below Hall ’s- irregularities are re-
ferred to as not of a4 serious nature, occurring several
months prior to the discharge. In addition, the Board
complained that ‘he particulars of the “‘spotter’s re-
ports’’ were not specified. This confirms Petitioner’s
contentions that while ostensibly the Board is engaged in
the task of ascertaining whether. the employees were dis-
charged because of the Union, in reality the Board has
slipped into the inevitable error of most Government agen-
cies in a position of authority and is exercising a general
power to review the reasons for the particular discharge,
thrusting the burden of justifying the discharge on the re-
spondent. The Board’s finding as to Hall shows that the
Board is exercising a general power of supervision aver the
Petitioner’s right to discharge. (R. 933-534 )

- _ We submit there was ample reason to discharge Hall as

° ™~ . '
28
between Hall and a pane as to whom there was no diffi-
culty.

Magaha: Bus sperater ‘for two years; no reason giyen
him for discharge. Magaha’s records showed accidents
February ©”, 1936, December 12, 1935, November 18, 1935,
November i, 1935, September 30, 1935, September 21, 1935,
August 21, 1935, A 8, 1935, July 28, 1935, December 3,
1935, January 26, 1935, and January 28, 1935 (R. 329, 331).
Some of these accidents Magaha admitted he was to blame
for. Investigator Mason’s report also showed that on De-
cember 8, 1935, he failed to collect proper fares (R. 327).
England, secretary of the company, testified that he took
the reports and the accidents into considerdtion when he
discharged Magaha (R. 331). In addition, England claimed
‘that he had a right to discharge a man for accidents even
though the accidents were not the man’s own fault; that
the company did not keep drivers with them who had acci-
dents (R. 333-334), the length of time they kept the men
being dependent upon the kind of accident (R. 334).

The right of the Petitionér to discharge Magaha was crit-
icized below by the Board on the ground that Petitioner’s
evidence lacks specification as to the complaints; that the
irregularities wefe not of a serious nature and no particu-
lars were specified. Magaha’s accidents were referred to
with the remark that ‘‘he had had several’’ in the two years
preceding his discharge but none were serious.

We submit that thirteen accidents in two years, guilty or
not guilty, like the three generations of idiots in Mr. Jus-

‘tice Holmes’ opinion in one of the Sterilization Cases,’ ‘tis
a enough’’.

Crissman: Bus driver; employed six and a half years;
Union member; no reason given him at time of discharge.
A passenger, an employee of the Bureau of Internal Rev-
enue named Joy, complained about Crissman’s discourtesy
and general lack of good sense (R. 325, 399, 401). On one
occasion Crissman refused to take a transfer from him and

1 Buck v. Bell, 274 U. 8. 200.

~*~

29

was very loud and discoyrteous: On another occasion he
was again’ discourteous to him about a transfer and made
him feel like a fool (R. 405). On another occasion there was
a rain, a lady got-on the bus, put her fare in the box and
the man with her was abost to get in with a small dog on
a leash. Crissman wouldn’t let the dog in and made both
the man’ and the woman get off the bus in the rain though
there were vacant seats in the bus at the time. On another
occasion he said Crissman made short, snappish and rough
remarks to the passengers. ~ These various incidents re-
garding Crissman were sufficient and numerous enough to
arouse Joy to the point of complaining officially to, the éom-
pany (R. 404, 406). Crissman called up and said he was
sick and could not work the morning after February 29th,
due to his activities the night before (R. 350). This pro-
duced the following revealing comment from the examiner,
Mr. Carmody:

‘‘Mr. Carmody: These bus drivers live in gold fish

bowls, don’t they, in most companies, and not much of
their private life that isn’t brought out by your check-
ers and investigators, and spotters is there?’’ (R. 350)

The Board in its brief below pooh-poohs the complaints
against Crissman, comments on the complaints being eight
months old, states they were of minor importance and com-
plains that there was no specification of the particulars.

We submit that Petitioner had ample reason for dis-
charging Crissman in comparison with a driver against
whom there were no complaints. It must be remembered
as to the above that Petitioner was prevented from com-
Paring the data against the above drivers and against the
other employees discharged, with the records of the various
employees retained. The Examiner refused to allow this
(R. 307,311). ~

The remaining employees discharged were employees in
the garage. To our way of thinking the Petitioner had-con-

30

siderable reason for discharging each one of them. Peti-
tioner is not compelled to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that it was properly exercising its constitutional right to
discharge the men in question. Thus as to Beall, he had
had no heavy duty experience, being a slow worker and
hard to. keep at work. In addition he had some outside diffi-
culty in the way which prevented him staying on the work.
He would leave the job in the afternoon after working in
the morning and generally speaking was a hard man to
keep on the job. On one occasion he had put in a clutch
and they later had to take it out the same day, which cost
the company money (R. 449).

As to Birch he was doing pretty well but he paid very
little attention to anything likely to help him. Wilsey, the
foreman, had to keep after him all the time and watch him
very closely ; he would destroy almost as much as he would
make. ‘41e talked with him a number of times and tried to
help but he did not seem to improve (R. 449).

It is true that neither Beall nor Birch had received a
complaint concerning their work or been reprimanded but
of course at this time there was no general order of the
Board requiring employers to observe this practice. In its
brief below the Board refers to the company’s statements
about Beall and Birch as being ‘‘vague and unsubstan-
tiated allegations of inefficiency’’. This gives us an in-
sight into the Board’s viewpoint. Upon a charge such as
the present the Board evidently will not take at its face
value a company’s observation, from the lips of its shop
foreman that certain mechanics were not as good as they
could be. Such reports must be ‘‘substantiated’’. Sub-
stantiated by what, we ask? We contend that even if the
‘reports were wrong the company is absolved from blame
in discharging the man if in fact it discharged him on the
basis of the reports. ©

Garrison, Moore and Dove were bus washers. -England,
the Petitioner’s assistant general manager, testified that
passengers had complained of soiled clothes in the buses
during the winter; that the company had to pay for clean-

_

31

ing clothes in a number of cases, about a dozen times in
1935; that the fault must have been that of the night bus
washers and accordingly Moore and Garrison were dis-
charged (R. 302-305). Dove was disoharged for the same
reason (R. 348). England had complained-to Wilsey, the
shop foreman, about the dirty busses and Arnold had beeh
‘‘riding him about it’’. Wilsey fired the men for this rea-
son, because of their inefficiency in keeping the buses clean
(R. 348, 448).

Smith: Garage worker. He gassed and oiled the busses,
Wilsey blamed Smith for letting a bus run out of gas ona
couple of occasions. After the morning run the busses would
come in the garage and they would find the gas caps off and
oil over the fenders and down the sides of the hood and oil -
filter caps missing. They had to buy these things by the
dozen. Smith was to blame for it (R. 448).

As to McCauley, a garage employee, he originally had
been a laborer engaged in putting chains on cars. The night
foreman reported to Wilsey, the shop superintendent, that
he was a very poor mechanic. Wilsey replied ‘*Well, Ili
get rid of him and see if I can pick you up a new man’’.
This took place around the 11th of February. (R. 447)

As there is no testimony the management knew anything
about the Union until the end of February it would seem:
that the Petitioner’s defense of its right to discharge Mc-
Cauley should be allowed. .

Atwell: Garage employee. His work had only been satis-
factory in spots. There were complaints about pilot bear-
ings and clutch bearings burning out; the greasing was bad.
He had broken up a grease gun and fittings were lying all
around the place. This seemed to be a constant condition.
Part of it could be attributed:to Atwell, who was respon-
sible for the greasing at night (R. 441, 442). Wilsey had a »
grease record of the man that showed the jobs that were
bad. They kept him on a long while but finally fired him
(R. 441-442).

Miller: A garage employee. The foreman reported to
the superintendent a couple of times that he was not much

32

of a mechanic and that he, the foreman, wanted a better
man (R. 451). |

He was not a first rate mechanic. On a certain job he -
left parts around and acted as no mechanic ordinarily does
(R. 507, 508). Record slips kept by the shop superinten-
dent showed Miller’s lack of ability (R. 508-511). He was
supposed to mark down the time he worked on each bus on
these slips, but did not do so (R. 511). They made up their
mind in the middle of January to discharge him (R. 511).
Miller, when he came to. work would not pick his work up
and the foreman would have to almost take his hands and
lay them on the work (R. 512).

On one occasion a brake job turned cut bad and he blamed
this on Miller (R. 515, 517).

Theodore W. Frederick: Frederick. ¥ was the acting day
foreman. There had been a number of breakdowns as al-
ready shown and these had increased over a period of
months and there was also some foreign substance showing
up in the carburetors which prevented their working prop-
erly (R. 409-511).. The men were continually in huddles
neglecting their work. In part the shop superintendent
Wilsey blamed this condition on Frederick, the day fore-
man, and this was one of the things that led up to his desire
to ‘‘clean house’’ (R. 423, 424, 429, 430). :

Philmore W. Frederick: He was a mechanic’s helper in
the garage employed on the day shift. The shop superin-
tendent stated that the last two or three months he was
‘“becoming kind of dominant and would react against any
orders more or less’’ (R. 442). To be a good mechanic he
- should have had tools and would not buy them, not even a
pair of pliers or a five cent tool. -When he asked him about
this Frederick replied ‘‘You don’t pay enough money: to
buy fools’’ and ‘‘Why don’t you pay enough wages”’ (R.
442, 443). He didn’t think this was the proper way for
Frederick to talk and made the same remark to Frederick’s
brother, the acting day foreman, saying as to Philmore
Frederick ‘‘The boy is feeling his oats’’, He was insolent

33

on another o¢casion. Thére was bickering between them
but he let it go. Frederick seemed to have reached his ca-
pacity as a mechanic the first year he was there. Wilsey took
him off the job of washing cars and put him on the day
crew though he refused the first time to work on the day
crew which was a better job. He did not seem to want to
become a more skilled laborer and reacted against Wilsey’s
effort to make him one. He showed no mechanical improve-
ment thereafter. Seven weeks prior to his discharge they
put him on a spring job in the shop but he got so tangled
and tied wp on the job that the superintendent was dis-
gusted and said to him ‘*Boy, you’ll never be anything but
just a grease ball’’ (R. 443). i = es
' McDonald: A mechanic in the garage. Engaged in body
work; the shop superintendent kept a record of each man.
On McDonald’s record appeared the words ‘‘Stall, lazy
and not neat’’ which referred to his workmanship. The
* inside of the bus should be kept neatly, the moldings and
the weldings smooth. McDonald was a sort of an appren-
tice to Wilsey, the shop superintendent, who was compelled
to explain things to him constantly. He had the habit of .
making a mess all about him which had to be cleaned up
(R. 445, 446). :
Harmon: Working foreman on the night shift. Harmon,

like Theodore Frederick, was held by the management to |

be responsible for the unsatisfactory conditions in the shop
and was discharged on this account. He had been dis-
charged twice before (R. 413, 419).

We contend that on the basis of the information fur-
nished the management by the shop superintendent, Mr.
Wilsey, and coming to tht management from other sources,
coupled with general conditions which had gotten steadily
worse since October, the Petitioner was amply justified in
discharging the various employees mentioned. It may be
that the record may show giifferences of opinion between
the management and the various employees or between the
management and the discharged day and night foremen as.

34

to whether the employees discharged were efficient or in-
efficient. It is submitted, however, that the question before
the Board was, not whether in actual fact the particular
employees discharged were good workers or bad workers
but whether the Petitioner, through its assistant general
manager England or the shop superintendent Wilsey in
fact discharged the employees because of their opinion that
they were inefficient. It might be that some of the men dis.
charged were efficient. Wilsey and England may have
thought otherwise. Certainly the record of each individual
as above shown at least supports the view that compared
with other employees the particular persons discharged
were undesirable looked at from their work in the past. If
the management determined to ‘‘clean house’’ it was per-
missible for it to discharge its least efficient employees or
even, if it saw fit, to take a chance on the new employees
who answered the advertisement. Going back to the Peti-
tioner’s action in so discharging them and attempting to
read into the discharge of 20 Union men an effort to destroy
the Union when the Petitioner retained in its employ more
Union men than it discharged, including the Union’s Presi-
dent, is to throw the burden of proof upon Petitioner to
_ prove a negative fact and this we submit amounts to a de-
privation of Petitioner’s constitutional right to discharge
at will. It is significant that not one word appears in the
record to the effect that in engaging the new men who an-
swered the advertisement any question was asked them as
to whether they were Union or non-Union men or intended -
to join the Union once thay were employed. If there had
been any desire to cripple the Union in firing the old men
it is reasonable to suppose that there would have been a
strong intimation to this effect in engaging the new. The
evidence in this case, no matter what view this Court takes
of the conflicting testimony with regard to Mr. Arnold’s
and Mr. Engiand’s statements about the Union, in the last
analysis is limited to proof that the Petitioner discharged
a certain number of Union employees, without singling out

35
the ringleaders, at about the time a Union was being

_ formed. The Petitioner showed good reason for effecting
a wholesale discharge at around this time. If upon the
evidence in this case Petitioner is to be convicted of having
attempted to destroy the Union by his action we come back

to. the question already asked in this br +: In what way

F. The alleged efforts of the management to Prevent the
formation of the union.

management. The most that the Board could say below is
- that the President of the Petitioner Company ‘‘queried’’
six of the bus drivers as to their membership in tHe Union
and then related certain unpleasant experiences he had
had with the labor Union. (R. 542) Certainly this

36

repealed by the present statute. We do admit, however,
that as construed and applied herein the President of any
company who says anything whatever during the formation
of a labor Union is likely to be unable to overcome the pre-
sumption that he made such a statement to prevent the
Union being formed.

Next, to eke out the proof reference was made below to
the advertisement for help wanted. (R. 531, 532, 541)
There was nothing mysterious or concealed about this
advertisement, and we have no apologies to make for it
except to say that, as counsel for Petitioner, if we had
been consulted about it beforehand we would have ad-
vised the Petitioner that there was very serious danger that
this advertisement, like the President’s very temperate and
decent remarks, might also add to the presumption that it
was part of a general plan to destroy the Union.

Next, the Board in its Findings (R. 531, 532, 541) points
to the circular, described as ‘‘a personal message from

1 It is imteresting to note Dr. Leiserson’s views of an employer's right with
respect to a labor union. He stated on crose-examination:

‘*When you say ‘rights with respect to the labor union’ he has no
basiness with the labor union, and the labor union is a matter of the
employees, and he has no more rights with the labor union than he has,
for example, with an association of people who sell him things.’’ (RB

He also stated in response to counsel’s questions as to how tenderly the em-
ployer must tread as to recognizing the union:
** First, let us begin with—here you have got an organisation, say, of
59 peo and of course if the employer were really following the lee,
he ee ae ey oe they had, and which Were mem-
un

information. * * *
**Q: accidentally? A: Except as told him, because he was
supposed to hs pose out of it.’’ (RB. 896.)

We submit that shows the atmosphere of bureaucratic bumptiousness in which
the present case was heard. As against Dr. Leiserson there is the clear state
ment of the Chairman of the Committee at the Senate Hearings to the effect
that ‘‘there is rio law that can prevent you from discussing the matter amicably
and peaceably with the workers, * * ° nor is there in this Bill anything to —
prevent an employer discussing with his employees the merits or demerits of

the various kinds of organizations’’. Also at the same Hearing Senator

37

_ Leon Arnold the President’’. Even if thie message had .
been put out with the direct object of convincing the men
that it was a bad thing to form the Union we say that the
President had a perfect right under the Constitution to do
this. Again we say that the Act herein does not repeal the
right of Free Speech. The message was so far from co-
ercion that only a mind fixated upon the notion that all
employers are irretrievably bent upon grinding down their
- employees could find anything objectionable in it. We ask
this Court in all seriousness to read this message, which
appears in a footnote below,’ and arrive at its own conclu-
sion as to whether any Congress in its senses intended any
such message to constitute a violation of the Act.

But aside from this the explanation of how the message
came to be sent out March 2, 1936, is so simple that the
effort of the Board to spell out some dark conspiracy in its
appearance at that time indicates either the absurd fixation
already referred to or the entire absence of any substan-
tial evidence such that any mud at all is good mud to throw
at the employer. ‘The fact is, and we challenge this Court
to examine the Record in this respect, the message resulted
from a sort of ‘‘pep’’ service which the Company sub-
scribed to a year in advance. The so-called ‘‘pep’’ talks
were received in a batch. On a page in the beginning of the
book containing on separate sheets the messages in ques-
‘tion there are a series of numbers, not consecutive, but
which indicate the particular messages to be sent out, de-

‘ Footnote.—‘‘A Personal Message From Leon Arnold, Washington, Va.

& Md. Coach Co., Arnold Operated.
antines groups of individuals in a basiness organize themselves into
cliques.

ebster’s definition of a cliqie is, ‘a narrow circle of persons associated
by common interests; a small and exclusive set, or coterie; generally used in
8 bad sense.’

The reason that the word clique is ‘generally used in a bad sense’ is that
the small and exclusive set composing it usually thinks more of promoting
the selfish interests of the clique than the collective interesta of the organi-
zation.

The members are more concerned in serving their own ends than in
serving the customers of the business who provide them with employment
and pay their wages.

sure way to acquire a poor standing, both in position and pay, in a
business organization is to acquire a good standing in a elique.’’ (R. 582)

\Y/

38 rd
pending upon the nature of the business. _ A slip is sent the ©
Company suggesting which particular messages to send out
in rotation. This particular message was sent out in ac-
cordance with the Company’s instructions, exactly as it
turned up in rotation. The Company did not pick out any
particular number each week, and the whole supply was
purchased at once. (R. 55.) The message of March the
first was a routine message which happened to come along
at that time. (R. 290, 291.) This is pilloried by the Board

as a ‘‘coincidence’’ (R. 532, 541.)

Next is the appearance of Joseph Arnold, the President’s
son, at the organization meeting (R. 530, 531, 540), wearing

‘ a driver’s cap. The Board’s idea apparently is that he wore

the driver’s cap to conceal his identity though he worked
every day in the week with the men as a fellow employee
and was well known to’them. Arnold’s explanation was
that he wore the driver’s cap because he had mislaid his
hat. (R. 374-384.) Anticipating the objection that the em-
ployees knew young Arnold, cap or no cap, (he, did not
wear a mask) the Board argued (R. 540) that Clark, the
organizer and a représentative of the National Organiza-
tion, did not know young Arnold even though the men did.
This reduces Arnold’s attempted deception to the infantile —
basis of going to the meeting in a driver’s cap knowing he

. could not. escape recognition by all-his other fellow em-

ployees, but in the hope that he could deceive Clark alone. -
(R. 182-184, 189, 190, 373, 384.) No such theory is possible.
The incident however illustrates the inclination of the Board
to take anything into consideration good, bad or indifferent

_ as evidence against the Petitioner.

We now come to Harmon’s testimony that Wilsey said
that Arnold would put his busses on a lot and burn them —
before he would recognize the Union (R. 139, 140); that
Arnold told Harmon while sitting in his car the night of

, the organization meeting that he would not recognize the

Union; that Frederick had testified that Wilsey said he ©
was not being discharged for joining the Union but because
of the ‘‘ander-handed way’’ he had gone about it (R. 190) ; |

39

that England made a similar statement to him at the time
of his discharge (R. 141) ; that Atwell and Miller testified
that upon being discharged by England the latter said the
Union was at the bottom of the .matter (R. 270, 487);
Bealle’s testimony that when Wilsey discharged him Wil-
sey said the Union was the cause (R. 233); Frederick’s
testimony that Wilsey discharged him because he had a
Union application blank. (R. 241.)

The Board’s comment below on this phase is that
England and Wilsey met this damaging testimony by
unconvincing denials. . *“‘Unconvincing’’ is a mere epithet. ©
England was a witness of the Board which presum-
ably thought he would tell the truth when -it called
him to testify. He is accused of “‘testifying generally’’,
that he did not tell any of the discharged employees that
their discharge was founded on Union activities. (R. 301.)
He added that when the discharged men asked questions
‘the did not answer them’? (R. 301), presumably following
Dr. Leiserson’s probable advice.. Wilsey’s denial that the
- Union activities of the employees had anything to do with
their discharge is referred to sarcastically, like the ‘“Der-
sonal message’’, as a ‘‘coincidence”’. (R. 414.)

This Court will realize that in the situation of these dis-
charges, it is an easy thing for a number of. workmen to out-
Swear one employer. It is a significant feature of the testi-
mony in the present case that not one single alleged state-
ment as to discharge for Union activities was heard by »
more than one employee. It is reasonable to suppose that ©
if there had been a serious effort to prevent the formation
of this Union some substantial effort, some attempt ‘along
the line of a direct threat would have been made. There
would be the usual testimony that the management was en-
gaged in ‘‘boring from within’. There is no such showing
in the present case. The Board’s own witnesses Arnold
and England testified that they made no effort whatever to
discourage the men and their denial ought to stand on a

, higher footing than the obviously interested statements of

€ men relative to their discharge for. Union activities,
which statements are unconvincing, if for no other reason,

than the fact that assuming them to be true they were made -
when it was all too late, and the Union was already formed.
It is too much to argue that after a Union is formed the
Petitioner would discharge twenty out of fifty-seven Union
men on the theory that their discharge would be a lesson to
the remainder. This argument might have some sense if
it were coupled with further testimony that an effort was
then made to get the remainder of the fifty-seven to resign
or otherwise to destroy the Union. But there is no such
testimony in the present case. The management's alleged
efforts to destroy the Union ceased upon the discharge of
the men; their efforts were meaningless or they were not
efforts at all, or did not ooour at all. We believe the latter.
As against this elaborate effort to spell out a conspiracy
to destroy the Union already formed, an effort trenching
on the one hand on-the guarantee of Free Speech, on the
other hand upon plain ordinary common sense, are the
substantial reasons already developed in the present Brief
for the determination to ‘‘clean house’’, and the reasons
supporting the discharge of each particular employee. We
say again that in an exceedingly complex matter of this sort
wherein the-order of the Board is so drastic as to amount
to a question of economic life or death for the Company
this Court ought to be convinced only by the clearest pos-
sible evidence. We ask this Court to consider the ease with
which a change like that herein may be made, the ease with
which a specious proof may be adduced, supported by the
favorite argument of ‘‘ocoincidence’’, and the difficulty. of
the disproof by the Company of these easy charges. We
ask this Court again to consider the matter in the light of
the argument already made that for all practical purposes
the Act, as construed and applied herein, has operated to
thrust the of proving a negative fact, the absence
of any rt to destroy the Union, upon the Petitioner.
viewpoint will reveal the ‘‘clear error’’ referred to
present Chief Justice in Texas and N. O. R. Co. v.

rf

Brotherhood, 281 U. 8. 548.

41

Part II.
Unoonstitutionality.
A. The act herein is unconstitutional in its entirety.

As already stated, Petitioner at the outset of the proceed-
ings before the Board appeared specially and filed an ob-
jection to the jurisdiction of the! Board asserting the un-
constitutionality of the Act on the same grounds as in the
companion cases herein, namely:

1. On the ground that the Act was a delegation of
legislative power to the Board in violatian of Section 1,
Article 1 of the Constitution; :

2. That the Act was a delegation of judicial power
in violation of Section 1 and Section 2, Paragraph 1,
Article 3 of the Constitution on the grgwnd that Sec-
tion 7 of the Act as construed and agytied herein was
in contravention of the Fifth Amendment, the Board
construing ihe said Section 7 to-grant an absolute and
unqualified right of self-organization to employes un- .
restrained by the necessity of the exercise of such right
subject to the rights of Petitioner and the public:

3. On the ground that Section 8, Paragraphs 1 and 3
of the Act in themselves and as construed and applied
deprived Petitioner of its liberty and property with-
out Due Process in violation of the Fifth Amendment ;

4. On the ground that Section 10 as construed and
applied denied Petitioner the right of trial by jury and
the right to have facts so tried examined in a Court
of the United States according to the rules of the com-
mon law in violation of the Seventh Amendment, the
said Section 10 likewise conferring on the Board judi-
cial power in violation of Sections 1 and 2, Article 3
of the Constitution;

5. On the ground that the Board in construing and
applying the Act exercised powers contrary to the res.
ervations of the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution,
(R. 26-28).

Petitioner’s objection to the jurisdiction of the Board on
tte above Constitutional grounds being overruled, Peti-

42

tioner, without waiving its objection to the Roard’s juris-
diction, filed an Answer to the Board’s Complaint, (R. 28).

The above Constitutional objections are likewise reiter-
ated in the Specification of Errors in | the present Brief. (P.

10.)

Inasmuch as the cinatitutienaliiy of the present eet has
been assailed from‘every possible angle in the case immedi-
ately preceding the present and the cases following it,
counsel herein out of deference to the time of the Court will
not repeat the arguments contained in the able Briefs in
these companion cases, but respectfully ask leave to make
them a part of the present Brief by reference.

As the recently unreported decision of the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in National Labor Rela-
tions Board v. Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co., (January
11, 1937), may not be made part of the various Briefs herein
we respectfully refer this Court to this decision and speci-
fically rely upon its judgment holding the Act unconstitu-
tional as in violation of the Fifth and Seventh Amendments.
This case, like the present, admittedly involved interstate
commerce.

‘As the present case seems to be the only admittedly inter-
state case counsel for Petitioner will devote the remainder
of the present Brief to questions arising in the present case
alone.

B. Petitioner wi the ‘necessary standing to — insepara-
bility:

Petitioner herein is aware of this Court? s decisions in
New York ex rel Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 152 and other
cases’ to the effect that a party cannot invoke the decision
of this Court in respect x a provision of a Statute which
is not invalid as applied to him. Petitioner, however, is
not in this situation. Petitioner’s argument under this

1 Such as, Supervisors of Albany County v. Stanley, 105 U. 8. 8305; Yasoo ¢
Mississippi V. Railroad Co. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U. 8. 217; Austin Vv.
Aldermen of Boston, 7 Wall. 694; Lee v. New Jersey, 207 U. 8. 67; Dilliag-
ham Vv. McLoughlin, 264 U. 8. 370; Darnel Vv. Indiana, 226 U. 8. 390; Hicklia
v. Coney, 200 U. 8. 169.

43 .

point is that the Statute shows on its face a comprehensive
scheme to regulate intra-state as well as inter-state activi-
ties, with an object in view which could not be attained
through the regulation of interstate relationships alone.
Hence it appears affirmatively that Congress would never
have passed the Statute to regulate the few remaining lines
of inter-state activity if it could not constitutionally regu-
late labor relations in intra-state industry as well. In this
aspect the question is one of statutory construction, ‘i.e.,
having already in the Railway Labor Act of 1934 regulated
the railroads and allied transportation systems with re-
spect to labor, can it be fairly argued that, the ‘‘compre-
hensive scheme’’ and the ‘fobject’’ of the Act being out-
lawed, Congress intended in the present Act to regulate
the few remaining inter-state activities such as bus com-
panies and communications systems. In this respect the
present case seems somewhat similar to the Trage-Mark
Cases, 100 U. S. 82. ) ee’;

Petitioner feels that when this Court has’ before it a
number of cases involving the intra-state application of the
Act, with the Records in support thereof, it is entirely
proper for the present Petitioner to argue the lack’ of in-
tention on the part of Congress to apply the Act to Peti-
tioner if the Act is held unconstitutional as beyond the
Commerce Clause in an intra-state case. If the present
Petitioner cannot raise this point under the present circum-
stances it seems clear that the question never could be
raised by one in Petitioner’s position and so the Statute
might be misconstrued or applied unconstitutionally, with
no recourse,*

Court is dependent solely upon the constitutionality of the Act. (See See.
10-e of the Act) Not only the litigants in question but the Court itself must
consider the, Act in its constitutional aspect in order to arrive at a finding
' that jurisdiction exists.

—ee

44
O. The cases on inseparability do not prevent the judicial
inquiry herein asked: ;

‘The Separability Clause in Section 15 of the present Act
is not conclusive upon the Courts, but is merely an aid in
determining the legislative intent and not a binding com.
mand:

Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238;
Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286;
Railway Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U. S.

330, 362.

The effect of a separability clause is simply to reverse
the presumption in favor of inseparability and create the
opposite one of separability, Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
supra.

The result is that the presumption must be overcome by
considerations which establish ‘‘the clear probability that
the invalid part being eliminated the Legislature would not
have been satisfied with what remains’’,

Carter v. Carter Coal Co., supra, citing
Wiliams v. Standard Oil Co.; 278 U. S. 235, 241;
— and L. Co. v. Pfost, 286 U..S. 165, 184-

As this Court said in Carter v. Carter Coal Company:

‘Whether the provisions of a statute are so inter-
«woven that one being held invalid the others must fall,
presents a question of statutory construction and of
legislative intent, to the determination of which the
statutory provision becomes an aid. ‘But it is an aid
merely; not an inexorable command.’ Dorchy v. Kan-
sas, 264 U. S. 286, 290. The presumption in favor of
separability does not authorize the court to give the
_statute ‘an effect altogether different from that sought
by the measure. viewed as a whole.’ Retirement Board
v. Alton R. Co., 295 U. 8. 330, 362. ae
‘‘The. statutory aid to construction in ne way alters
the rule that in order to hold one part of a statute un-

45

constitutional and uphold another part as separable,
they must not be mutually dependent upon one another.
Perhaps a fair approach to a solution of the problem
is to suppose that while the bill was. pending in Con
gress a motion to strike out the labor provisions had
prevailed, and to inquire whether, in that event, the
statutes should be so construed as to justify the oon
clusion that Congress, notwithstanding, probab! y would
not have passed the price-fixing provisions of the
code.’’ (Carter v. Carter Coal Co., supra.)

Petitioner accepts the burden of showing the clear proba-
bility that, the comprehensive scheme aside, Congress would
never have passed the present Statue to regulate in a bona
fide manner bus companies and allied lines of activity alone,
and that such an application would, in the words of this
Court in Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., supra, give the
Statute ‘‘an effect altogether different from that sought by
the measure viewed as a whole’’. .

D. The way the court below passed upon the question of
separability: |
The Court below in its Opinion (R. 597) after stating that

Petitioner had attacked the Act upon the ground of insepa-
rability and referring to the Carter Coal Case stated:

‘“‘There would be some basis for the application of -
this line of reasoning in the pending case if the Board’s
construction of the act were tenable, and it were rea-
sonable to interpret the act as applying to intrastate
as well as interstate activities. But as we have en-
deavored to show in an opinion filed this day in Foster

' Bros. Mfg. Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, the
' power conferred upon the Board to prevent unfair
labor practices, as set out in Section 10 (a) of the act,
is restricted to unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce, and commerce is defined to mean trade, traffic,
commerce or transportation among the several states
or with foreign countries, Congress therefore did not
intend to regulate intrastate as well as interstate com-
merce, and there is no ground for the argument that

ee

we

an important and inseparable part of the act having
been condemned, the whole act must fall.’’ (Record,
page 597, 598).

The Opinion in Foster Brothers Manufacturing Co. v.
National Labor Relations Board will be found reported in .
85 F. (2d) 984. That case involved a bed manufacturing
company in Baltimore, Maryland. The Board held as in
the present case that the company’s discharge and refusal
to re-instate ten employees was an unfair labor practice.
The Court held that the power of the Board to prevent
unfair labor practices under Section 10 (a&) was restricted
to an unfair labor practice ‘‘affecting commerce’’. Under
the Scheckter and Carter cases it held that the activities
of an intra-state manufacturing concern like the Baltimore
company did not ‘‘affect commerce’’ and hence they were
beyond the power of Congress to regulate. It stated that
it might be immaterial whether the question to be decided
was to be considered one of statutory regulation or of
~ constitutionality, but since it could not be supposed that
Congress intended to pass an unconstitutional law the Court
preferred to rest its decision on the ground that Congress
never intended the Act to apply to the circumstances of
the Foster Brothers case. “4

As will be shown later under the present point it seems
impossible to believe that.Congress did not intend the Act
to apply to the circumstances of the Foster Brothers case,
and so the Court below was in error in resting its decision ~
upon a question of statutory construction rather than un-
‘ constitutionality. We contend that if Petitioner argued
below the question of inseparability, and if the Court below
decided it against Petitioner on the basis of its decision in
the Foster Brothers case, which decision avoided the con-
stitutional question by invoking a doctrine of statutory
construction; Petitioner’s only remedy in the present case
is to show that the Court below was in error on the ques-
tion of statutory construction. In any case, aside from the

47

grounds of the decision below the validity of Petitioner’s
present argument on the question of inseparability will
turn upon the ground upon which this Court rests its
decision in the intra-state cases to be argued with the pres-
ent case. No matter what the basis of the decision of the
Court below, if this Court should hold in the intra-state
cases herein that the Act is unconstitutional, then the pres-
ent Petitioner would seem to have the right to make the
present argument as to inseparability. We proceed then
to this argument. (

E. The act shows a comprehensive scheme to regulate em-
ployer-employee relationships in local industry as well
as in inter-state commerce: ©

The Act shows on its face that it was intended to regu-
late local industry as Well as companies engaged in inter-
state commerce:

(a) The title of the Act is admissible to show the
Congressional intent (Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. 8. 44, 66-
67). The Act is entitled ‘An Act to Diminish the
Causes of Labor Disputes Burdening or Obstructing —
Inter-State and Foreign Commerce, To Create a Na-
tional Relations Board and for Other Purposes.’’ The
Act is not limited to the prevention of disputes aris-
ing in inter-state commerce but covers any labor dis-
pute in any industry which might ‘‘burden”’ or ‘‘ob- .
struct’? commerce, however indirectly.

(b) - Section 8 prohibits employers from engaging in
certain ‘‘unfair labor practices.’’ The Act does not
limit the prohibition to employers while engaged in in-
ter-state commerce but covers all activities. This is
further shown by the definition of employers in Sec-
tion 2 (2) as ‘‘any person acting in the-interest of an
employer, directly or. indirectly.’ The ensuing spe-
cific exceptions are a further indication of the all-
inclusive meaning of eniployers.

(c) Employee is defined by Section 2 (3). to include
all employees with the exception of agricultural labor-
ers, domestic servants, etc. What would be the neces-

4

sity for the exclusion of domestic servants unless the
Act was intended to apply to all others engaged in
local or intra-state labor?

(d) Further proof of the above is found in Section
10 (a) empowering the Board ‘‘to prevent any per-
son from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed
in Section 8) affecting commerce.’’. (Italics ours).

(e) ‘‘Affecting commerce’”’ is not.limited to ‘’»-
curring in. inter-state or foreign commerce’’, which is
defined in Section 2 (6). ‘‘ Affecting commerce”’ is de-
fined in Section 2 (7) to mean:

‘*In commerce, or burdening or obstructing com-
merce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or
tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or ob-
structing commerce or the free flow of commerce.”

This means the Board can prevent ‘‘unfair labor prac-
- tices’’ in any local industry if such practice however
indirectly tends to lead to a labor dispute however in-
directly burdening or obstructing commerce.

(f) Section 1 of the Act ‘‘Findings and Policy”
may be resorted to to show: the legislative intent.
Beard v. Rowan, 9 Pet. 301; United States v. Butler,
297 U. S. 1. Note in the ‘‘Findings and Policy’’ that
the denial of the right to organize and the refusal to
accept the procedure of collective bargaining leads to
strikes, that strikes obstruct commerce by ‘‘materially
affecting, restraining or eontrolling the flow of raw
materials or manufactured or processed goods from:
or into the channels of commerce, or the prices of such
materials or goods in commerce’’; that strikes cause
diminution of employment and wages in such vol-
ume as substantially to impair or disrupt the market for »
goods flowing from or into the channels of commerce.
This Section does not restrict ‘‘employers’’ to employ-
ers engaged in inter-state commerce. It does not re-
strict ‘‘strikes’’ to strikes occurring in inter-state com-
merce, and in particular, it does not restrict the effect
of strikes to burdening and obstructing. inter-state
commerce. On the contrary, strikes are apparently held
to burden and obstruct anything and everything. They
cause diminution of employment not-in inter-state com-
merce but anywhere. The whole Section refers not
to disputes in inter-state commerce, but to disputes in

49

local industries ‘‘affecting’’ the flow of goods and imdi-
rectly affecting the flow of goods into the channels of
commerce.

The further finding that the inequality of bargain-
ing power burdens and affects the flow of commerce
and tends to aggravate business depressions by de-
pressing wage rates, ‘‘the purchasing power of wage
earners in industry and by Spt pore. Brin stabiliza-
tion of competitive wage rates and worki g conditions
within and between industries’’ shows that Congress
was not referring to the bargaining power of employ-
ees'in inter-state commerce only. Applied to the pres- -
ent case what possible effect would the inequality of
bargaining power among the employees of bus com-
panies and communications systems, even including all
the stock yards employees and those working on grain
elevators, have upon economic conditions generally in
this country? Excluding railroads what effect has the
purchasing power of employees in the other lines of
inter-state commerce upon a business depression? Fur-
ther, Congress refers to wage rates “‘tmindustry,’’ not
inter-state commerce, as having an effect upon business:
depressions.

(g) The administrative interpretation of the Act is
a guide to its construction (Kern River Co. v. U. 8.,
297 U. S. 147, 153-4; Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U. 8. 346,
351). The administrative interpretation has been ‘*na-
tion-wide and fancy-free.’” |

1 The following table compiled from the First Annual Report of the National
Labor Relations Board for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1936, shows how
few clear inter-state cases the Board has taken under consideration con-
trasted with the large number of cases involving local manufacturing or

production
Intra-State Cases (Local Manufacturing or Production) : Interstate Cases or Doubtful
Gate City Oottor Mills Mosinee P. Mills Co. Pen vania Greyhound Lines,
Wayne Knitting Mills Gibbs Dedarwae Go. eer Mes Management
Frushauf Trailer Oo. (2 cases) Englander Spring Bed Oo. b
Co., In Wesaunn By wy - nied han Go -
ne e Co.
Roliway Bearing Oo. Inc J & Laughlin Steel Corpo United Aircraft Mfg. Oo.
Bove Mills ‘Co I rnin Bervice Co., I We — ,% ee
.. Ine. . Ane. ew q
Wheeling Steel Co. (represents. United Parlor Peomince ine Mechay eas, and Yutegresh Oc.
tion ) . Standard Lime & Stone Oo. Consumers Ine.
El Paso Electric Co. (2 cases) Allen & Oo., Inc. Alantic Refini
Vegetable Oil Products Oo., Inc. Alabama Mills, Inc. tional Moreantile Ms
Duplex Printing Press Co (rep- Wheeling Steel Corporation tine Co. .
Tesentation ) F. ©. Castelli Oo., Ine National New York Packing &
Duplex Printing Press Oo. Columbia Radiator Oo Shipping Co. .
) International Nickel Oo., Ine Washington, Virginia & Mary-
Athos & Burlap Co., Inc Juneau Gold M Ooach Oo.
eros The W Oo. The Associated Press

50
(h)- As to the interpretation of

practices ‘‘affect-

ing’’ commerce, is it not a strange thing that in every
single solitary published case decided by the Board it
has held that the activities in question ‘‘affected’’ com-

. merce entirely regardless of the business the Company .
was engaged in (See Commerce Clearing House, Labor
Law Service, Paragraphs 15401,. 15564).

(i) The magnitude of the organization created by
Congress and the. enormous funds that it has appro-
priated.to maintain it is an indication that the Act was
never intended to apply merely to inter-state com-

merce (omitting railroads).

We conclude therefore from the above that Congress in-
tended the Act to apply to ‘‘intra-state’’ cases, as the word
is used in the present Brief.

Intra-State Cases (Local Manufacturing or Production)

Ootambias Enameling & Stamp
rie Printing Co

Clinton Cotton Mills Mesta Machine Oo.
Commercial Alcohol Mooresville Cotton Mills
Co.—American D ans Renown Stove Oo.
United States Stamp - Bradley Lumber Oo. (2 cases)
National Casket Oo., , Utterstrom Brothers,
Sands Manufacturing Oo. Cc. G. Conn, a :
Baer Silk es Co., Ine. St. Clair’ Rubber Oo.
Fisher Flouring Mills a ae ey Co. of America
: Fn mm t
Beaver Lois Mills pm Cotton Mills
Timken Silent Automatic Oo. Crucible Steel Co. of America
Cleveland Chair Co (representation)
Oe. ie. Marks ‘Clothing Robért H. Foerderer, Inc

, a. & Sons Co. Wholesale Radio Service, Inc.
Gray-Knox Marble Co. (repre

sentation)

Haffelfinger Wall Paper
Kentucky Firebrick Co.
Aluminum Co. of America
Osrlisle Lumber Oo.
Indiana Textile Mills, Inc.
‘Robinson & Golluber

Jeffery DeWitt I * Oo., Atlas Drop Fo Co.
Inc. Louis Hornick a
Bell Oil 4 oe Bemis Brothers Bag Co.
Fashion lece Dye Works Oo., Sanat Knitting Mills
E Tlena Knitting Mills
American Hat Mfg. Oo. Samson Tire & Rubber Corpora
Canvas Glove Mfg. ao Ine. tion
. Anwelt Shoe Mfg. Tucker Oi] Co...
Ansin Shoe Mfg. _ Demarest Silk Co.
Yale Underwear Oo. The Optical Products Oo.
‘Dwight Manufacturing Co Gardner-Denver Co.
Oregon Worsted Boss Manufacturing Co. (2
Canton + i nameling Ri de Xni Mil
2 vers nitting 8
- Co. Aluminum Products Co
Pittsburgh Steel - Trenton Mills. Inc.
— Motor Service Oo., —— -Norwich Silk Mills,
ne

Interstate Cases or Dowbt}
The Associated Press (represe
tation}
American Oil Co.
Agwilines, Inc.
om Inc.
8t. Joseph Stock Yards Co.
D & H Motor Freight Co.
Lykes Brothers—Ripley Stes
ship Co.

;

51

F. Summary of the object of the act:

The doctrine of ‘‘piercing the veil?’ has already been ap-

_ plied by this Court in the Schechter and Carter cases. Any-.
one .reading the present Act and considering the Board’s
application of it will see that its real object is not to regu-
late inter-state commerce but to set up for social and eco-
nomic ends a nation-wide scheme for the assistance of la-
bor and the séttlement of ‘disputes between Labor and

Intra-Btate Oasee (Local Manufacturing or Production) Interstate Oases or Doubtful
Bemis Bros. Bag Co. Auth Electrical Specialty Co.,
Lion Bhoe. Oo. Inc.

Lehman Bros. Inc. J. Freeser & Sons, Inc.
8 & K Knee Pants Oo. Toledo Shipbuilding Oo.. Inc. (2
Mann Edge Tool Oo. (repre- cases
- gentation ) 4 Quidnick Dye Works
Mann “er Tool Co. (complaint) Magnolia Petroleum Co.
Edward E. Oox, Printer, Inc. American Tobacco Oo.
Sunshine Hosiery Mill Whiterock Gasrries, Ine.
Sneath Glass Co. = Fall River Works Oo.
Foster Brothers Manufacturing Fit-Rite Slipper Oo., inc.
an Fuse Tobacco Oo Predentict ee onin « Mills
John Blood & Sons Oo. Memphis Furniture Manufactur-
Wallace Man Oo, ing Co. (2 cases)
Gordon b Clark & Reid
Brown and Williamson Tobacco Atlas Mills
Co. J. W. Sanders Ootton Mills, Inc.
Ward > ee Stanley Works Co.
Pioneer Pearl Button Oo. Richards Wilcox Manufacturing
Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc. Co.
Sommervile Manufacturing Oo. Chesapeake Manufacturing Oo.
—Somerset Mfg. Co. Claussner Hosiery Co.
- Gray-Knox Marble Co. Nolan Motor Oo.

Belmont Stamping & Ensmeling Schonfeld & Reis
laint

yertown Burial Casket Co.
Belmont Stamping & Enameling Fisher Bod Corporation
Co Chevrolet Oo,

Internationa! Filter Co. (2
cases)

Of the 180 cases covered by the above tabulation only 20 directly involved
interstate commerce, any doubt being resolved in favor of classification

~ as inter-state commerce. The balance, 160 cases, involve local
" Concerns. Of course, Petitioner does not contend that these latter companies

by Petitioner’s counsel without access‘to the official records, some of the cases
the uaod 88 infra-state may in fact be inter-state cased in the strict emery

Panies, steamship companies, pipe line companies, or communications systems, .
The intra-state companies above referred to are local businesses such as dye

rubber, tools, prin presses, ete.

The administrative interpretation of the Act is therefore overwhelmingly
in favor of Petitioner’s contentions that it was intended to apply to local
man’ oe and production. In truth only such an ee arervtation would

© slightest chance of achieving the broad results te ‘‘ Findings of
and Policy’’ shows it aims at. :

52

Capital. The Act had its inception not in the needs of the
non-railroad branches of inter-state commerce, (it seems _
folly to contend it), but in the chagrin of labor unions when
this Court in the Schechter case held invalid Section 7 (a)
of the NIRA Act. Why not admit that the ultimate object
of the present Act is to fasten the doctrine of labor un-
ionism, like a State Religion, upon every business in the
country with more than two employees? (See Report, Sen-
ate Committee on Education and Labor, May 1, 1935). We
go further and say that the further object of the Act is
even more sinister, namely, compulsory collective bargain-
ing. Section 8 (5) making it an unfair labor practice .to
refuse to bargain collectively with representatives of the
employees is practically the same as compulsory arbitra-
tion. Either ‘‘bargaining’’ means offers back and forth
leading to a contract or it means nothing. The essence of
an offer is that the other party may accept it. If, there-
fore, a series of offers back and forth prove unacceptable
they tend to become progressively lower or more accepta-
‘ ble. As the Act apparently requires the employer to keep
on making or receiving offers it follows that the real ob
ject and achievement of the Act is a form of compulsory
arbitration under the guise of compulsory collective bar-
gaining. It has the added vice of. requiring the parties to
make a contract, for if collective bargaining is not to lead
to a contract it amounts to mére conversation.

G. If the object of the act was to enact a comprehensive
scheme to regulate intra-state activities as well as inter-
state the act has not been misconstrued but is uncon-
stitutional:

It seems almost incredible to Petitioner that in the face
of the plain intention of the Act and its consistent admin-
istrative application the Court below came to the conclv-
- sion that it was not intended to apply to ordinary intra-
state industry and manufacturing concerns. It is signifi-

53

cant that other Courts have held otherwise. Thus in Board
v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Co., 83 F. (2d) 98, a case
exactly similar to the Foster Brothers case, the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit impliedly held the
Act unconstitutiona:, making no mention whatsoever of
atiy possible misconstruction of the Act by the Board. To
the seme effect is the decision of the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit in Fruehauf Trailer Co. y.
Board, 85 F. (2d) 391. To the same effect is the decision |
of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Board v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 83 F. (2d)
731 and 84 F. (2d) 1000. The District Courts have like-
wise decided intra-state cases on the basis of unconstitu-
tionality and not construction. Thus in El Paso Electric
Co. v. Elliott, et al (U.S. D. C., Western Dist. Texas) the
Court (Judge Boynton) held the Act unconstitutional in
toto. To the same effect was the decision in Stout v. Pratt, ©
12 F. Supp. 864°(W. D. Mo., Otis, J.), wherein the Court
stated that it was the ‘‘clear intent’’ of the Act to subject
the relations between employers and employees even in
small intra-state companies to the control of the Labor
Relations Board. me : :

The recent decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for ©
the Ninth Circuit in National Labor Relations Board v.
Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co. (January 11, 1937), to
the effect that the Act herein was intended to regulate in-
ter-state commerce: alone seems to beg the question as the
Opinion does not consider whether mining or manufactur-
ing ‘‘affects commerce’’ within the meaning of the Act.
As construed by the Board intra-state manufacturing ac-
tivities having any effect at all, however remote, upon in-
ter-state commerce come within the scope of the Act. The
constitutionality of any Act of Congress does not arise in
vacuo but as the particular Act is construed and applied to
the particular cases. If, therefore, the Board has consist-
ently construed and applied the present Act to cases of
intra-state manufacture on the theory that labor disputes

ae *

54 i

in such industries affect inter-state commerce, the admin-
istrative construction and application of the Act, coupled
with the avowed ends and purposes of the Act revealed by
the Act itself, constitutes a showing that the Act was really
intended to apply to intra-state commerce in the sense that
as construed and applied the Act holds most forms of in-
tra-state commerce really .inter-state commerce.

It would seem from the above that the Board has not
really misconstrued the Act but has taken the plain man-
date of Congress at its face value, which is to regulate all
industry with reference to labor relationships. If so, the
Act has not been misconstrued by the Board but is uncon-
stitutional in respect to the regulation of intra-staté indus-

try.

H. The proof that the act is unconstitutional as to intra-
state industry:

As to this, in order not te burden the Court and du-
_ plicate the arguments of other counsel in the compan-
ion cases herein, counsel for Petitioner respectfully re-
quest the Court to consider as Petitioner’s argument
the various arguments made in the companion cases
herein relative.to the unconstitutionality of the Statute
as applied to intra-state industry. It seems more fit-
ting to counsel ‘that such arguments should be considered
in connection with the concrete facts of the particular
cases which have arisen. We feel confident that, bearing
in mind the late Mr. Justice Holmes’ admonitions in the
_ Northern Securities Case, 193 U. S. 197, 402, and -the re-

marks of the present Chief Justice in the Schechter Case,
the Commerce Clause can never be extended to cover the
regulation of intra-state industry no matter what ‘‘the
distant repercussions’’ may be.

55

I. Under this court’s decisions on separability the entire act
‘is unconstitutional. :

As already stated the question in the present case may be
viewed from the standpoint either of statutory construction
‘or inseparability. In other words, either the Act was not
intended by Congress to apply to Petitioner if its all-in-—
clusive application to intra-state commerce is destroyed,
.or the Act is unconstitutional in the sense that being un-
constitutional as to intra-state commerce it is unconsti-
tutional as to everything, there being no way to disentangle
one aspect of the Act from the other. From the latter view-
point itis agp that under this Court’s decisions on
separability the Act is unconstitutional as a whole.

At the outset counsel for Petitioner find it difficult to per-
ceive how this Court can ever adapt the machinery of the
Act to a different object than the object revealed by the
Act itself. If, therefore, the object of the Act is the regi-
mentation of all industry, intra-state-as well as inter-state,
with respect to the relationships of employer-enrployee, the
application of the Act by judicial excision to interstate in-
dustry alone constitutes the application of the Act to a dif-
ferent object than that intended by Congress. Thé Statute,
by judicial construction, would be put to a use not intended
by Congress when it was enacted. It is submitted therefore,
initially, that the Courts do no service to Congress by hold-
ing constitutional a Statute piece-meal when the object of
the Statute as a whole is different from the object of the
Statute in its constitutional part. |

Back of every Statute is a purpose. If the purpose of the
present Statute is to regulate industry as a whole, with re-
spect to labor relations, is this purpose effected by ekeing
out through judicial construction a regulation of only a
hundredth part of industry? In this connection, it must
not be forgotten that the object of the Act is not, at least’
ostensibly, to encourage labor unions for the purpose -of

ba

56

preventing strikes, but the prevention of strikes because of
their effect upon the general economics of the country.

Tt is difficult to perceive how the prevention of strikes in
bus companies, even in the additional industries regulated
under the Packers and Stockyards Act and the Grain
Futures Act, would prevent the evils so roundly denounced
in the ‘Findings and Policy’’. In this aspect this Court's
decision in the Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, seems very
close to the present state of facts. In these cases there
was before the Court a Statute covering the registration

-enerally of trade-marks without being restricted to trade-
marks used in inter-state commerce. An indictment for a
violation of the Statute was before the Court, The Court .
considered the Power of Congress to enact the Statute, trac-
ing it solely to the Commerce Clause. The Court said:

**When, therefore, Congress undertakes to enact a
law, which can onl be valid as a regulation of com-
mece, it is hematin, A to expect to find on the face of
the statute, or from its essential nature, that it is a

~ regulation of commerce with foreign nations, among
the several States, or with the Indian Tribes. If it is
not so limited, it is in excess of the ee of Congress.
If tts main — be to establish a regulation a
plicable to all trade, to commerce at all points, esperr-

_ ally if it is — that tt is designed to govern the
commerce wholly betwecn citizens of the same State, it
ts obviously the exercise of a power not confided to
Congress.’” (United States v. Steffens, 100 U. S.,-at—_
page 97. Italic ours). ° | oar

“The Court then held that the Act made no distinction be- _
tween trade-marks used in inter-state commerce and trade-
marks involving intra-state commerce alone. The Court

said:

‘*It is, therefore, manifest that no such distinction 1s
found in the Act, but that its broad purpose was to
establish a universal system of trade-mark registration,
for the fit of all who had already used a trade-
mark, or who wished to adopt one in the future, without

57

regard to the character of the trade to which it was to
be applied, or the locality of the owner.” (United
States v. Steffens, 100 U.S. at page 98. Italics ours).

The'Court then considered the argument of separability,
namely, that even though the: Statute was unconstitutional
as to intra-state trade-marks it could be held constitutional
as to trade-marks used in inter-state commerce. As to this.
the Court said: ”

‘‘While it may be true that when one part of a
statute is valid and constitutional and another part is
unconstitutional and v6id, the court may enforce the
valid part where they are distinctly separable so that

\ each can stand alone, it is not within the judicial prov-

\ ince to give to the words used by Congress a narrower
meaning than they are manifestly intended to bear in
order that crimes may be punished which are not das-
cribed in language that brings them within the con-
stitutional power of that bo y.’’ (United States v.
Steffens, 100 U. S. 99).

It is submitted that the quotations above seem applicable
almost word for word to the present Ac

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386010_0168%3A03. Public record. Not legal advice.
