# Jurisdictional Statement — American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. United States > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386010_0087%3A02 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Jurisdictional Statement - **Published:** January 1, 1936 - **Citation:** 299 U.S. 232 ## Text ~— ~ INDEX. “4 SUBJECT INDEX. al Page nc aaa oak eae 1 Statutory provisions sustaining jurisdiction................... 2 Order of the Federal Communications Commission, the validity of which is involved .............. ‘eibehagneee saukdh Laban aes 3 Dates of decree and of application for appeal............ ae se 4 PN Me I os a cea Bolas aha kn na'ale ecadiak ake a a ale eee bee 1 Cs SU SII ka oi ok sik eo ons ee eee ek D BEE occ cesieecreissusnéunadeds chnsdads vatasesandenkaasawenns 7 TABLE OF CASES CITED. ° Colorado v. United States et al., 271 U. S. 153............... omc 6 Home Furniture Co. et al. v. United States et al., 271 U. S. 456..... 6 Louisville and Nashville R. Co. v. U. S., 238 U. S.1................ : G Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. vy. United States, 287 U. S. 134........... 6 St. Louis and O’Fallon R. Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 461........ 6 STATUTES CITED. Act of October 22, 1913 (Urgent Deficiencies Appropriations Act), 38 Stat. L. 219, 220; U. S. C., Title 28, Sections 47 and 47a........... 2 * Communications Act of 1934, Sections 220 (a) and (g)............. 2 ' Communications Act of 1934 (48 Stat. L. 1093; U. S. (. Title 47, Beatin Gaia) ). Beebies GEE CO) sos cnc ck wakendtwanns ines sennwena 2 Constitution of the United States, Fifth Amendment................ 5 * “Telephone Divisions Order No. 7-C,” of the Federal Communications 4 SG Sa kv ada des den CAdab ecah Sead a Des —7827-C a at Pm i Re ha Ma te a OO a Dasara OREN IELTS SM I LOT ROMER SEI MENSA E ME TREN TERRE. NN IN MN IN “ IN THE DISTRICT -COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK In Equity. No. 81-366 ae TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COM- . PANY et AL. Plawntiff s ; OHIO ASSOCIATED TELEPHONE COMPANY ert at., Additional Plaintiffs; EASTERN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COM- PANY et an, Intervening Plaintiffs, a Vs. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA anp FEDERAL COM- MUNICATIONS COMMISSION, Defendants, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF RAILROAD AND UTILITES COMMISSIONERS, Intervening Defendant. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION. Filed April 6, 1936. ¢ Pursuant to Rule 12 of the Supreme Court of the United States, plaintiffs, intervening plaintiffs and additional plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs), in support le 4 SF PT I } 2 of their petition for appeal, file this their statement of the basis upon which it is‘contended that the Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdiction upon appeal to review the final decree of this court in the above entitled cause: (a) Statutory Provisions Sustaining Jurisdiction. The statutory provisions which sustain such jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States are as follows: 1. Section 402 (a) of the Communications Act of 1934 ‘(48 Stat. L. 1064, 1093; U. S. C., Title 47, Section 402 (a)), which reads as follows: **Sec. 402. (a) The provisions of the Act of October 22, 1913 (38 Stat. 219), relating to the enforcing or setting aside of the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, are hereby made applicable to suits to enforee, enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend any order of the Commission under this Act (except any order of the Commission granting or refusing an application for a construction permit for a radio station, or for a radio station license, or for renewal of an existing radio station license, or for modification of an existing radio station license), and such suits are hereby an- thorized to be brought as provided in that act.’’ 2. Aet of October 22, 1913—Urgent Deficiencies Appro- priations Act (38 Stat. L. 219, 220; U. S. C., Title 28, See- tions 47 and 47a). This act authorizes direct appeals to the Supreme Court of the United States from decrees of this Court granting or denying an injunction against the opera- tion of orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission guch as the order involved in this cause. 3 (b) Order of the Federal Communications Commission, the Validity of Which is Involved. This appeal involves the validity of that certain order of the Federal Communications Commission designated ‘‘Telephone Division Order No. 7-C,’’ which order pre- scribes a Uniform System of Accounts for telephone coiu- panies subject to the provisions of the Communications Act of 1934 and having average annual operating revenues ex- ceeding $50,000, and requires all such telephone companies to keep all accounts in conformity therewith after Decem- ber 31, 1935. | ' The said order and the instructions constituting the sys- tem of accounts prescribed thereby comprise, as officially published by the said Federal Communications Commis- sion, 121 printed pages, and it is impracticable to set them forth herein verbatim or to further summarize their perti- . nent provisions. A copy of said order and instructions is attached to the bill of complaint herein as Exhibit B. Said order of the Federal Communications Commission was issued pursuant to the authorization contained in Sec- tion 220 of said Communications Act of 1934, sub-sections (a) and (g) thereof being as follows: **Sec. 220. (a) The Commission may, in its discre- tion, prescribe the forms of any and all accounts, rec- ords, and memoranda to be kept by carriers subjeet to this Act, including the accounts, records, and mefno- randa of the movement of traffic, as well as of the receipts and expenditures of. moneys ‘*(g) After the Commission has prescribed the forms and manner of keeping of accounts, records, and memoranda to be kept by any person as herein pro- 2e ba nee + vided, it shall be unlawful for such person to keep any other accounts, records, or memoranda than those so prescribed or such as may be approved by the Comnis- sion or to keep the accounts in any other manner. than that prescribed or approved by the Commission. Notice of alterations by the Commission in the required man- t ner or form of keeping accounts shall be given to such persons by the Commission at least six. months before the same are to take effect.’’ (c) Dates of Decree and of Application for Appeal. The decree of this court sought to be reviewed was en- tered Mareh 24th, 1936. ° The application for appeal was presented on April 4th 1936. . ’ (d) - Nature of Case. The suit was brought in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York and was heard by a specially constituted court of three judges, pur- suant to the provisions of said Urgent Deficiencies Appro- priations Act of October 22, 1913. The purpose thereof was to enjoin, set aside and annul the said order of the Federal Communications Commission designated ‘‘Telephone Di- vision Order No. 7-C’’, which requires plaintiffs, on and after January 1, 1936, to keep all their accounts in ac- cordance with the system of accounts prescribed thereby. The bills of complaint allege that numerous requirements of said system are so contrary to the fundamental prin-. ciples of correct accounting and so arbitrary and unreason- _ able as to#Mfount to an abuse of the Conmission’s power, are beyoml the authority of the Commission and are void, and that thev will cause plaintiffs serious financial loss BARI ab APPT TG ANN Reet Sata x hae oe 5) and will deprive them of their right to keep a reasonable and adequate set of accounts, in violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States; that certain requirements of said system lay down rules which are so vague as not to constitute legal standards of conduct, and that the enforcement thereof by the penalties prescribed by the said: Act or otherwise would violate the rights of plaintiffs to due process of law as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Plaintiffs alleged that the requirements complained of were nonseverable from the other provisions of said system, and prayed that said order and system of accounts-as a whole be enjoined. The final decree of the court, from which this appeal is sought, denied the prayer of the plaintiffs that said order and system of accounts as a whole be permanently enjoined, and said decree enjoined the enforcement of only two of the several requirements complained of. The decree therefore constitutes a decision adverse to plaintiffs. There is appended hereto a copy of the opinion delivered by this court upon the rendering of the detree sought to be reviewed. a (e) Cases Sustaining Jurisdiction. Since the enactment of the Communications Act of 1934, no cases involving the validity of an order of the Federal Communications Commission have been taken on appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States. There are, therefore, no cases reported in which Section 402 (a) of the Communications Act of 1934 has been interpreted or commented upon. However, Section 402 (a) merely pro- vides that the provisions of the Urgent Deficiencies Ap- propriations Act of October 22, 1913, relating to the en- forement or setting aside or orders of the Interstate Com- y - cueannines “ - aad | Fog SST RAR SERS alee Et t Wenpreeraeteany fete eae 6 merce Commission are made applicable to suits to enforce, enjoin, set aside, annul or suspend orders of the Federal Communications Commission. The following cases, involving orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission and brought pursuant to the pro- visions of said Urgent Deficiencies Appropriations Act, are cited as sustaining the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States upon direct appeal to review the decree herein: | Louisvile and Nashville R. Co. v. U. S., 238 U.S. 1, 10; ‘Colorado vy. United States, et al, 271 U.S. 153, 161;_ Home Furniture Co. et al. v. United States, et al, 271 U.S. 456, 459; St. Louis and O’Fallon R. Co. vy. United States, 279 U.S. 461, 481-482 ; Norfolk & We stern Ry. Co. v. Unite " States, 287 U.S. 134. It, is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdiction of this appeal by virtue of Section 402 (a) of the Communications Act of 1934 (U.S. C., Title 47, Section 402 (a)),; and the Urgent Deficiencies Appropriations Act of October 22, 1913 (U.S. C., Title 28, Sections 47 and 47 (a)). Dated April 4th, 1936. C. M. Braceten, Cuas. T. Russet, Epwarp L. Buackman, Auan J. McBean, Solicitors for Plaintiffs and Intervening Plaintiffs; Auten T. Kuots, Haypen N. Smita, Solicitors for Additional Plaintiffs. APPENDIX. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTIIBRN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK. Amentcan TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH Company et al., Plaintiffs; Onto AssoctatEep TELEPHONE Company et al., ie Additional Plaintiffs; Waastern TELEPHONE AND TELE- crapH Company et al., Intervening Plaintiffs, Vs. ° Unirep Srares or AMERICA AND FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS Commission, Defendants; NationaL Association OF RaIL- roAD AND Urtinities Commissioners, Intervening Defend- ant. Opinion. Before Martix T. Manron and Avcustus N. Hann, Circuit Judges, and Joun C. Knox, District Juiee, Constituting a Statutory Court under 28 U.S. C. 47. Manton, Cireuit Judge: - Plaintiffs, common earriers of communication by wire, file this bill under the Urgent Deficiencies Act, October’ 22, 1913, ¢. 32, 38 Stat. 208, 219, made applicable by §402(a) of the Communieations Act [June 19, 1934, ce. 652, §402(a), 47 U.S. C. 402(a), 48 Stat. 1093]. They seek to restrain the Federal Communications Commission from enforeing its Order No. 7-C issued June 19, 1935 and effective January 1], 1936 to govern the system of accounts for. telephone com- panies engaged in interstate commerce and having average annual operating revenues exceeding $50,000. A tempo- rary stay was granted pendit.. decision on the permanent | injunction. The issues are submitted for final determina- | tion on affidavits and the arguments thereon. | The accounting system now in operation was promul- | gated by the Interstate Commerce Commission as the ‘“Uni- form System of Accounts for. Telephone Companies, First’ Revised Issue,’’ effective from January 1, 1933. Upon ob- , . wows rte. 8 jections by twenty-two state commissions, the Interstate Commerce Commission had taken under advisement sug- gested changes in this 1933 system. Its inquiry ended very shortly before jurisdiction over telephone companies was transferred to*the Federal Communications Commission created by the Communications Act of June 19, 1934. In view of this faet, the Interstate Commerce Commission, although it issued no order, rendered a report of the pro- ceedings before it, for the convenience of the incoming Commission [Accounting Rules for Telephone Companies, 203 1. C. C. 18). In this report, some of the matters now objected to, were discussed and disapproved. The Com- munications Commission, after supplemental investigation, hearings and conferences, did not follow the Interstate Commerce Commission in its disapproval of these pro- visions and incorporated them in the system now under re- view. The National Association of Railroad and Public Utility Commissioners, which claims to represent the com- missions having jurisdiction over telephone companies in forty-six states, has endorsed the proposed system and has appeared in this case by intervening as a party defendant. In addition, the New York State Public Service Commission pleads for the order as amicus curie. The attack on the order requiring the uniform system of accounts is based upon the claim that it is invalid because it violates the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution and §404 of the Communications Act,‘(a) sinee it is unsupported by a report stating conclusions and basic findings; (b) the re- quirements exceed the statutory power of the Commission and are so contrary to the fundamental principles of correct accounting as to constitute an abuse of that ‘power in so far as they treat of original cost, contributions, certain classi- fieations of telephone plant and depreciation thereon, and just and reasonable charges; (c) amendments in requiring obedience to standards so vague and indefinite as to .be un- intelligible, or violate the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. -Before other diseussion, it should be settled that the order is not void for lack of a report stating the conclusions and findings of fact by the Comniission. Section 220(a) of the Communications Act provides: a 9 “The Commission may, in its diseretion, prescribe the forms of any and all accounts, records, and memo- randa to be kept by carriers subject. to this chapter * * * 99 : There is an identical provision in the Interstate Commerce Act, §20(5).. When a system of accounts is laid down under these sections, the action is a legislative, rather than a judicial function. It is making a new rule to be applied in the future, not applying an already existent rule to past facts. This is the characteristic of legislation. See Keller y. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U. 8. 428, 440; Prentis vy, Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210, 226. And to claim that findings are essential to support this order is to ignore this difference. ~ Assigned Car Cases, 274 U. S..064, 583. An administrative body can exercise a delegated legis- lative function without first reporting the data upon which it decided that the proposed rule should be established. Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 80 L. Kd. 133. Since the Commission is authorized to act ‘‘in its discre- -tion’’, there is no requirement that it find the facts upon which its authority to act is conditioned as in Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 193; United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R. Co., 294 U. 8. 499; United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 293 U.S. 454. The case last cited points out the differ- ence at p. 462. In holding an order void for lack of-a finding on a jurisdictional fact, the court said: “The Act (Boiler Inspection Act) does not confer upon the Commission legislative authority to require the adoption on locomotives of such services as, i its discretion, it may from time to time deem desirable.”’ Section 220 (a) conferring power to prescribe the account- - ing system does confer upon the Commission power to act’ in its discretion. _ Nor does § 404 of the Aet render an order under § 220 (a) void if a report is lacking. Section 404 provides: ‘‘Whenever an investigation shall be made by the Commission it shall be its duty to make a report in 10° writing in respect thereto, which shall state the conclu- sions of the Commission, together with its decision, or- der or requirement in the aaa and in case dam- ages are awarded such report shall include the findings of fact on which the award is made.”’ = This section requires findings of fact only in the event damages are awarded. The order No. 7-C does not award damages. Although the Commission, as outlined above, did extensive preliminary work before entering the order, a report of its conclusions is not a condition to the order’s validity. The conclusions of the Commission are very evi- dent from the order itself. In support of this position, there is the fact that § 404 and 220(a) of the Communications Act are identical with § 14(1) and § 20(5) of the Interstate Commerce Act. It has not been the practice of the Interstate Commerce Commission to preface‘its general accounting orders with reports, and the incorporation of these sections in the Communications Act is an indication that Congress approved this adminis- trative interpretation. See McGaughen v. Hershey Choco- late Co., 283 U. S. 488, 492, 3; National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 140, 146. The Communications Act made the judicial procedure ap- plicable in proceedings to enforce or test the validity of the Communications Commission orders similar to like proceed- ings affecting the orders of the Interstate Commerce Com- mission (§ 402 [a]). We must, therefore, in reviewing this order, be guided by the rule that in respect t6 orders of the Conmission, the court may not ‘‘under the guise of exert- ing judicial power, usurp merely administrative functions by setting aside a lawful administrative order upon our conception as to whether the administrative power has been wisely exercised.’’ Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Illinois Central R. R.£Co., 215 U. S. 452, 470. -See Interstate Com- merce Comm. v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 222 U. 8. 541, 547. It is not enough to reason that the order is unwise, inex- pedient or at variance with the court’s own views as to what is practicable. This rule guides judicial review of any legis- . te. si gatas SS Maier rd ether se * 11 lative act. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co. v. Mc- Guire, 219 U.S. 549, 569. | We have already pointed out that the order prescribing a uniform system of accounts is.df a legislative character. When § 20(5) of the Interstate Commerce Act was before the Supreme Court in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co. (224 U. S. 194), and Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v. United States (231 U. S. 423), the . court, while. characterizing the Commission’s power as leg- islative, also held it not unlawfully delegated saying at 214: ‘““The Congress may not delegate its purely legisla- tive power to a commission, but, having laid down the general rules of action under which a commission shall proceed, it may require of that commission the applica- tion of such rules to particular situations and the in- vestigation of facts, with a view to making orders ina particular matter within the rules laid by the Con- aa And referring to § 20, said: ¢ ~ «* * * The Commission is permitted, in ifs dis- cretion, to require a uniform system of accounting, and to prohibit other methods of accounting than those which the Commission may prescribe. In other words, Congress had laid down eeneral rules for the guidance of the Commission, leaving to it merely the carrying out of details in the exercise of the powers so conferred. This,’ we think, is not a delegation of legislative authority.”’ Noi commission aevounting order is to be reviewed judici- ally for the purpose of determining whether it conforms to the court’s views as to what constitutes proper, efficient, practical accounting methods but it is for the court to say only whether the commission has atted within statutory and constitutional limits. See Norfolk & Western R. R. Co. v. United States, 287 U.S. 134, 143. Therefore, our inquiry as far as it goes beyond a con- sideration of power within the statute is merely whether the order is ‘‘so entirely at odds with fundamental principles (ee te ea gD Rg Pale le ks ata 7 RNR HAN ST UE Pam bow inpesT rer MRI aa 12 — of eerrect accounting as to manifest an abuse of power.”’ See Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. United State8, 5 Fed. Supp. 7, 14 (KE. D.N. Y.). | Section 213(c) in specific terms authorized the commis- sion to obtain from telephone carriers at any time informa- tion concerning original cost of their properties whigk may be needed for rate fixing purposes. United States, 287 U. 8. 134; United States v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. R. Co., 273 U.S. 299. The plaintiffs object that ne depreciation is allowed on property held for future use in account 100.3. Except in those rare instances when the entire cost of depreciation covers only the wear and tear on equipment in use, the plant held in reserve will depreciate because of obsolescence or deterioration as it is not entirely dependent on use. The exclusion of depreciation on this account as an item to be considered in rate determinations may be supportable but it appears unjustifiable to bar depreciation on this item altogether. Where the property is withdrawn from service for any portion of its life, upon its final retirement, the depreciation reserve set up for it would be inadequate. This can be adjusted by charging the depreciation to sur- plus rather than as a current account. Thus a true reflec- tion of the adjusted value of the property would be ob- tained, and yet the accounts will so set off the item that it may be excluded from consideration as a current expense for rate purposes. Instruction 21(B)(3) directs a vikndinias of property which has been acquired by the prior owner as a contribu- tion, to record the contribution which the seller had re- ceived. This is done by crediting account 175 ‘‘contribu- tions of telephone plant’’ and debiting ‘the same amount on the asset side, to account 100.4 ‘‘Telephone plant acquisi- tion and adjustment’? [Instructions 21(B)(4)]. Since this requirement is in addition to the usua! entries covering * the purchase, it results in swelling the assets and liabilities by a fictitious entry. It constitutes a double recording of this portion of the transaction. This part of the property - is recorded once in the usual record of the transaction, and to require its inclusion a second time is unreasonable. No sufficient reason is advanced for such treatment. The de- | sired record could be made without this inflation by a sub- division of account 100.4. It is unreasonable to .require duplication and the plaintiffs are injured in so far as they are denied a reasonable and true accounting record by this provision. | Instruction 2(b)(1) is also objected to. It provides: ‘* All charges to the accounts prescribed in this clas- sification for telephone plant, income operating reve- nues, and operating expenses, shall be just and reason- able and any payment by the company in excess of such just and reasonable charges shall be included in account 323 Miscellaneous income charges.’’ The information this requirement makes available is es- sential! to any determination of reasonable rates within 201(b) of the Act [ch. 1(45) of the Interstate Commerce . Act] since they are directly affected by such charges. In the present system, instruction 22 (10) (a) stipulates that the telephone plant accounts be charged with ‘‘reasonable amounts"for interest during construction period.’’ The concept is no more indefinite there than the one more w idely applied in the proposed system. The idea of ‘reasonable’? is old in the fixation of publie utility rates and every rate determination involves consideration of charges here made subject to a distinction between reasonable and unreason- able. Although in isolated cases the question -may be very close, generally the classification will not be impossible. As an accounting measure merely, the rule canfiot be re- garded as beyond the Commission’s power. Exception is also taken to the rule as requiring obedience to a standard as vague and indefinite as to be uneconstitu- tional within the doctrine announced in United States v. Cohen Grocery (255 U. S. 81); Tedrow v. Lewis & Son Co. (255 U. S. 98), and A. B. Small Co. v. American Sugar. Re- fining Co. (267 U. S. 233). First, it appears that the re-’ quirement that profits on transactions involving necessaries should not be unjust or unreasonable is without the special- ized content of the word ‘‘reasonable’’ with regard to charges involved in the determination of rates. This serves to distinguish the plaintiffs’ 6ther cases. Cf. Connally v. General Construction Co., 264 U. S. 385; Cline v. Trink Dairy Co., 274 U. S. 445; Champlin Refining Co. v. Okla- homa Corp. Commission, 286 U.S. 210. Second, telephone baste ee ee ee rae Set LR RM el CA LGR tM San Oe FING has ps EGA hic aa thls . . . . 18 companies need incur no risk since those occasional eases which may be doubtful can be submitted for approval under § 220(g¢) of the act and instruetion 9 of the order. To the claim that the Commission is likewise without a standard for judgment, the answer is that the concept of ‘‘reason- able” is traditionally defined in utility regulation with suf- ficient cértainty. The necessity of this order becomes apparent upon con: sideration of the interrelations of telephone companies. License agreements between subsidiaries can furnish ex-. amples of charges clearly not ‘‘just and reasonable.’’ Yet ‘any exact definition would be objectionable as arbitrary. _ -Furthermore, these items, in being subject to interpreta- tion by the Commission and definition as applied to specific facts, are sufficiently definite to guide the Commission. Cf. Pennsylvania Co. v. United States, 236 U.S. 351, 361; Inter- state Commerce Comm. v. Alabama Midland Ry., 168 U.S. ° 144, 170. It j is required that the capital stock expense be set up in account 134.2 which falls in thé general class of ‘‘Prepaid Accounts and Deferred Charges.’’ 134,2(c) provides that the amortization of this account shall be accomplished by charges to ‘‘ Miscellaneous debits to surplus.’’ Instruction 20(a) states that the telephone plant accounts, 201-277, shall include the general expense of organization of the accounting company. While the system may appear to be inconsistent in this respect, Montgomery, Auditing Theory ~ & Practice. [5th Ed. 1934} p. 416, endorses the write-off of. organization expenses to charges against earned surplus, | and this would be not unreasonable in view of the account- ant’s differences on the point. See Paton Accountant’s Handbook [2nd Ed. 1934] p. 42. If inconsistency exists, it may be corrected by the Com- mission before this requirement can be enforced. What . we say must not be regarded as an endorsement of the in- discriminate exclusion of these expenses from the rate base. See Ohio Utilities v. Pacific Utilities Comm., 267 U. S. 359. Nor does it mean that expenses of stock flotations subse- quent to organization are always necessarily to be regarded as organization expenses. 19 Except as indicated herein in connection with the depre- ciation for plant and equipment held for future use, and contributions, the injunction herein prayed for must be> denied, but a decree will be entered restraining the enforce- ment of the instructions given as to these two items. A decree for plaintiffs as limited in this opinion, may be entered. February 18, 1936. | M4 <3 Martin T. Manton, Circuit Judge; Avcustus N. Hann, Circuit Judge; Joun C. Kwox, District Judge. (7827-C) --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386010_0087%3A02. Public record. Not legal advice.