# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Brandt v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago (No. 07-289)

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386009_1407%3A1

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 2007

## Text

~ Supreme Court, US.
| FILED

() 07-289 AUG 30 2007
No, __OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Gn the
Sunreme Court of the United States

MICHAEL D. BRANDT, REBECCA L. DARUGAR,
and ALDO S. K. VAN ENCK, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated,

Petitioners,

¥

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY
OF CHICAGO, et al.,
Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

James L. Bowers IRENE K. DyMKAR

631 NortH CENTRAL AVE. Counsel of Record
Cuicaco, IL 60644 300 W. Apams STREET
(773) 379-9262 Suite 330

Cuicaco, IL 60606-5107
(312) 345-0123

Counsel for Petitioners

August 30, 2007

Becker Gallagher - Cincinnati, OH - Washington, D.C. - 800.890.5001

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether, in light of the Court’s decision in Morse v.
Frederick, _ U.S. ____, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (June 25, 2007),
the Seventh Circuit erred in applying the standard in
Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) for school-
sponsored speech to petitioner students’ personal non-
disruptive speech protesting the manner in which a school
election had been administered.

\d

ii
RULE 14.1(B) STATEMENT

A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose
judgment is the subject of this petition is as follows:

Plaintiffs-Appellants and Petitioners: Michael D. Brandt,
Rebecca L. Darugar, and Aldo S. K. Van Enck, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated. These parties are
no longer minors, so they are not appearing by their parents.

Defendants-Appellees and Respondents: Board of
Education of the City of Chicago, Chris N. Kotis, Janice M.
Rosales, Christine Laughlin, and Mary Clancy.

ili

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CTR ET ioc vio.e ve coeur cee ene i
RULE 14.10) STATOMENT .w cc cic uesees ii
TAREE CH CON os oe bv cecnteaesdss . iii
TABLE OP AUTIROUITORS qn cock evcchcdeues v
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ....... 1
GS ay era ee l
IC cb. beet iba we 2

THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AT ISSUE .. 2
SUATORGINE GE ERUUE GARE oe ita wecterern 3
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ...... 9

I. THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO CORRECT THE CONFLICT
BETWEEN THE DECISION OF THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT IN THIS CASE AND THE DECISION
OF THIS COURT IN MORSE V. FREDERICK,
__ US. __, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (JUNE 25, 2007).

A. The Seventh Circuit Should Not Have Applied
the Kuhimeier Standard to Petitioner Students’
Nondisruptive Political Protest That Occurred
6 ee 10

iV

B. As in Tinker, Petitioner Students Were
Engaged in “Pure Speech,” with the T-shirt
Message Being That the Election Had Been a
PO Wee A CR ea Re ET EO RS

C. Petitioners’ Speech Was Not Disruptive and
Thus Was Protected, According to Zinker. . .

D. School Administrators Had Engaged in
Prohibited Viewpoint Discrimination. .....

E. Petitioners’ Damages Were Quantifiable and
Substantive, Not Minuscule as the Seventh
TRIS SEF oeaeapthi Mer ree SNe ee Panne

I tic tLe a ee te ee
APPENDIX

Appendix A: Order of the 7th Circuit denying
Se Cs ic TE ose a ie ee Cee es

Appendix B: Decision of the 7th Circuit (Feb. 20,
CE ras Sh ee a eee eee

Appendix C: Decision of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois granting in part and
denying in part defendants’ bill of costs (May 8,

ko 5 oe a ce ee a ee a ee 162

Appendix D: Memorandum Opinion and Order of the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of

14

15

16

TE: SO OE 5b eed son ee kes 22a

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Illinois v. Doe,
See es PE a bw sw ehce wee ele es 1, 19

City of Watseka v. Ill. Public Action Council,
796 F.2d 1547 (7" Cir. 1986), judgment aff'd 479
Se EE a ke os ae be ee 17, 18

Crue v. Aiken,
Se ee ee tT CM. POO) 6k cc ccc vc ene bees 18

Elrod v. Burns,
ee a ee ED 5k hou 6028 ke CAs ee 17

Giules v. Marineau,
361 F.3d 320 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied _iU'S.
__, 127 5. Ch. HO4 Gane @, 2007) .... 11, 15, 17

Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier,
ee a, Ce oo oo Ko ook ees 9, 10, 11, 12

Morse v. Frederick,
__ US... kar S. CA. 2618 Game 25,
Texas v. Johnson,

ot Be ek a ane ae 12

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Comm. Sch. Dist.,
er Rh Ree kc ke bee beeen passim

vi

Virginia v. Black,
Pe Plaintiffs’ alternative argument that the T-shirts were “art” and
that “it goes without saying that art is expression protected by the
First Amendment” is waived because Plaintiffs fail to develop their
argument with supporting evidence and pertinent legal authority.
See Estate of Moreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 747, 759 (7th Cir.
2005) (“Perfunctory or undeveloped arguments are waived”); see
also United States v. Turcotte, 405 F.3d 515, 536 (7th Cir. 2005)
(“unsupported and undeveloped arguments are waived.”) (citations
omitted).

35a

A. Particularized Message

The Court thus evaluates whether the “gifties” T-shirt and
the wearing of the T-shirt had a “particularized message.” See
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 296.
Many of the gifted students’ statements about the T-shirt and
their wearing of the shirt to school do not indicate that they
were protesting the T-shirt election. For example, Michael
Brandt, the designer of the T-shirt, stated that the T-shirt was
“supposed to look silly, meaning, it was suppose to look
funny. It’s suppose to be ironic that we were graduating
eighth grade, making [sic] step into higher education and, at
the same time, it’s got a very goofy looking kid -- to have a
very goofy looking kid on the front of a shirt that stands for
the milestone of going into higher education was just ironic.”
(Defs.’ Stmt., Ex. M., M. Brandt’s Dep. at 109-10.) Other
gifted students -- Rebecca Darugar and Aldo Van Enck --
testified that the T-shirt was made to represent the gifted
class. (Defs.’ Stmt., Ex. Z, R. Darugar Dep., at 114-15;
Defs.’ Stmt, Ex. UU, A. Van Enck Dep. at 17.) Further,
gifted student Nicholas Haak testified that when they wore the
T-shirts for the first time it was “kind of ironic that we were
doing it on April Fools’ Day as an April Fools’ joke.” (Defs.’
Stmt., Ex. DD, N. Haak Dep., at 70-71.)

On the other hand, Rebecca Darugar also testified that the
gifted students wore the T-shirts in protest of Kotis’ decision
that forbade them from wearing the T-shirts to school. (Defs.’
Stmt., Ex. Z, R. Darugar Dep., at 58.) Another gifted
student, Daniel Schmidt, testified that they made and wore the
T-shirts to taunt the administration, although he did not
explain why the gifted students were taunting the
administration in the first instance. (Defs.’ Stmt. P 64, Ex.
CC, D. Schmidt Dep. at 49.) Furthermore, Michael Brandt
told the Local School Council that the gifted class thought

36a

they had won the T-shirt election and felt frustrated that the
school did not explain to them how the voting was conducted.
(Pis.” Resp. to Defs.’ Stmt. P 71.)

Although Defendants argue that the students simply wore
the T-shirts in defiance of the administration’s prohibition of
the shirts, the Court must view the facts and all reasonable
inferences in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs. Accordingly,
based on the facts discussed above, especially Michael
Brandt’s complaint to the Local School Board, Plaintiffs have
established that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to
whether the students wore the T-shirts in protest of the T-shirt
election.

B. Likelihood of Being Understood

The Court next turns to the second half of the relevant
inquiry, namely, whether viewers would understand the T-
-Shirt’s particularized message that the gifted students were
protesting the T-shirt election. See Community for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 296. Plaintiffs have set forth
evidence that the gifted students circulated a petition about the
“gifties” T-shirt, although Plaintiffs never explain what the
petition actually said or provide the Court with a copy of the
petition. (See Defs.’ Stmt., Ex. Z, R. Darugar Dep., at 67.)
In any event, Plaintiffs also point to evidence that because the
Gifted Program Coordinator interviewed two regular students
about the T-shirts, other students were aware of the gifted
students’ claim that the election had been unfair. (Pis.’ Stmt.
Add’! Facts P 9.) Finally, Plaintiffs contend that because
Defendants confined the gifted students to their home room
whenever anyone in the class wore the T-shirts, other
students knew of the gifted students’ protest. (id. PP 11, 12.)

37a

Again, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences
in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, as the Court is required
to do at this procedural posture, they have established that
there is a genuine issue of material fact whether the other
students understood the particularized message about the T-
shirt election.

C. Basic Educational Mission

Although there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the wearing of the T-shirts to school expressed a
particularized message understood by its viewers, the Court
must also determine whether the gifted students’ speech was
inconsistent with Beaubien School’s basic educational
mission. See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266 (citing Fraser, 478
U.S. at 685). Specifically, students “cannot be punished
merely for expressing their personal views on the school
premises ... unless school authorities have reason to believe
that such expression will ‘substantially interfere with the work
of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students.’”
Kuhimeier, 484 U.S at 266 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509).

Evidence in the record suggests that tensions existed
between the gifted and regular students and that some
incidents had occurred between gifted and regular students.
(Defs.’ Stmt. P 93; Pls.’ Stmt. Add’l Facts P 14.) Also, there
were some safety concerns involved. (/d.) There is also
evidence that the design on the T-shirt may have insulted
students with physical deformities. (Pls.’ Stmt. Add’l Facts P
5.) Furthermore, some of the regular students were upset that
the T-shirt controversy might disrupt their eighth grade
yearbook, their class trip to Springfield, and graduation. (R.
167-1, Pls.” Appendix, Ex. D, Crisis Team Report, at 1.)
Based on this evidence, there is a genuine issue of material
fact whether the producing and wearing of the T-shirts to

:

38a

school substantially interfered with the school’s work or
impinged upon the rights of other students.

II. Qualified Immunity

Nevertheless, the individual Defendants assert that the
doctrine of qualified immunity protects them from this
lawsuit. In general, qualified immunity shields government
Officials performing discretionary functions from civil
litigation. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102
S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The goal of qualified
immunity is to “avoid excessive disruption of government and
permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on
summary judgment.” Jd. Denying summary judgment any
time a material issue of fact exists as to the underlying
constitutional claim undermines the goal of qualified
immunity. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S.Ct.
2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). Accordingly, “where the
defendant seeks qualified immunity, a ruling on that issue
should be made early in the proceedings so that the costs and
expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is
dispositive.” Id. at 200.

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, “if the law did
not put the [public official] on notice that his conduct would
be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified
immunity is appropriate.” Jd. at 202. When determining
whether qualified immunity shields a public official from a
Section 1983 action, the Court undertakes a two-part inquiry.
Jones v. Wilhelm, 425 F.3d 455, 460 (7th Cir. 2005). The
Court’s first inquiry is whether the facts, viewed in the light
most favorable to Plaintiffs, show that the individual
Defendants violated a constitutional right. /d. (citing Saucier,
533 U.S. at 201). If the facts comprise a constitutional
violation, the Court must determine whether the constitutional

39a

right was clearly established at the time of Defendants’
conduct. Wernsing v. Thompson, 423 F.3d 732, 742 (7th Cir.
2005) (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201).

Assuming arguendo that Plaintiffs have established that
Defendants violated their First Amendment right to free
speech because a genuine issue of material facts exists as to
that question, the Court turns to the second qualified
immunity prong because failure to establish either prong is
dispositive. See Jones v. Wilhelm, 425 F.3d at 460. Under the
second inquiry, Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that
their First Amendment rights were “clearly established.”
Wernsing, 423 F.3d at 742. To do so, Plaintiffs “must
demonstrate either that a court has upheld the purported right
in a case factually similar to the one under review, or that the
alleged misconduct constituted an obvious violation of a
constitutional right.” Id.

Plaintiffs heavily rely on Tinker to demonstrate the second
qualified immunity prong. In Tinker, two high school students
and one junior high student wore black armbands to school
“to exhibit their disapproval of the Vietnam hostilities and
their advocacy of a truce, to make their views known, and by
their example, to influence others to adopt them.” Jd. at 514.
The school administration subsequently prohibited the
armbands and suspended the students in violation of a school
policy after which the students brought a First Amendment
action in federal court. /d. at 504-05. Because the students’
conduct was not disruptive, more specifically, because there
was nothing in the record that established that the wearing of
the armbands “would substantially interfere with the work of
the school or impinge upon the rights of other students” the
Supreme Court concluded that the school could not prohibit
the students from wearing the armbands. /d. at 509, 514.

40a

Although Plaintiffs contend the facts in Tinker are
sufficiently similar to the case at hand, Plaintiffs’ reliance on
Tinker as clearly established law is not dispositive of the
Court’s inquiry because the Supreme Court has modified the
Tinker holding. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 108 S.Ct. 562, 567, 98 L.Ed.2d
592 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 3164, 92 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986). The
Seventh Circuit has articulated that since the Tinker decision,
“the Supreme Court has cast some doubt on the extent to
which students retain free speech rights in the school setting.”
Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 736 (7th Cir.
1994). Another Seventh Circuit panel recognized that
“Supreme Court decisions since Tinker indicate that the
teaching of civility and the inculcation of traditional moral,
social, and political norms may override student expression,
or at least that it is permissible for a school board to so order
its educational priorities.” See Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse
Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1539 (7th Cir. 1996). Because the
Supreme Court has modified the Tinker holding, Tinker alone
is not dispositive of the Court’s “clearly established” inquiry
as Plaintiffs suggest.

Thus, the Court must determine whether the alleged
misconduct constituted an obvious violation of a constitutional
right. See Jones v. Wilhelm, 425 F.3d at 460. The Court’s
“relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right
is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a
reasonable [public official] that his conduct was unlawful in
the situation he confronted.” See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202
(inquiry “undertaken in light of the specific context of the
case, not as a broad general proposition”); see also Hosty v.
Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc). In other
words, the Court looks to whether a reasonable public official
in the individual Defendants’ positions would have understood

4la

that his or her actions were unlawful in the factual situation at
hand. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640-41, 107
S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (law at time of conduct
must have been “clear in relation to the specific facts
confronting the public official when he acted”); see also
Wernsing, 423 F.3d 742 (“contours of the right must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand
that what he is doing violates that right”). Although this is an
objective test, subjective factors are not ignored, such as the
information Defendants possessed at the time they prohibited
the alternative T-shirt. See Hammond v. Kunard, 148 F.3d
692, 696-97 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. at 641).

Here, there is evidence in the record that there were
tensions between the regular students and the gifted students
and that Defendants had safety concerns as a result of these
tensions. (See Defs.’ Stmt. P 114, Ex B., Rosales Dep. at
46.) To remedy the situation, Kotis and Rosales attempted to
address the T-shirt controversy by meeting with the gifted
students and their parents, suggesting that the students talk to
the Local School Board, giving the students options of when
and how they could wear the T-shirts, and consulting a Crisis
Intervention Team. (Defs.’ Stmt. PP 70, 125, 127.) Although
Principal Kotis prohibited the wearing of the T-shirt and
restricted the gifted students to their home room if the
students wore the T-shirt to school, once the Crisis
Intervention Team concluded there were no safety concerns,
Principal Kotis allowed the students to wear the T-shirts
again. (R. 167-1, Pls.’ Appendix, Ex. D, Crisis Team
Report, at 1; Defs.’ Stmt. P 133.)

Under these circumstances, the contours of the gifted
students’ First Amendment rights would not be sufficiently
clear to a reasonable official that what he or she was doing

42a

violated those rights, especially because Defendants’
restrictions concerning the T-shirts took place in the
nonpublic setting of a school. See Muller, 98 F.3d at 1537
(“Speech in nonpublic forums is subject to significantly
greater regulation than speech in traditional public forums”).
Moreover, case law regarding student speech under the First
Amendment is nuanced, and thus the law is not as clear cut as
Plaintiffs argue. As the Seventh Circuit recognized “many
aspects of the law with respect to students’ speech, not only
the role of age, are difficult to understand and apply.” See
Hosty, 412 F.3d at 739. The Hosty Court further reasoned
that “public officials need not predict, at their financial peril,
how constitutional uncertainties will be resolved.” Jd.

These “constitutional uncertainties” in student speech are
illustrated by Plaintiffs’ confusion over the concept of
imprimatur. In Kuhlmeier, the Supreme Court held that if
parents, students, and members of the public reasonably
perceive a student’s expressive conduct to bear the imprimatur
of the school, the school could censor the student’s conduct
as long as the school’s actions were reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns. See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at
271-73. Plaintiffs argue that Kuhimeier is not controlling
because the school did not sponsor the “gifties” T-shirt. The
relevant inquiry, however, is whether the public, parents, and
other students would perceive that the T-shirt reflected the
school’s imprimatur, that is, that it appeared that the school
approved the T-shirt design. Here, it is undisputed that the
design of the “gifties” T-shirt included the words “Beaubien
Class of 2003" and “Beaubien Bulldog,” and thus the public,
students, and parents might reasonably perceive that the
“gifties” T-shirt was actually approved by the Beaubien
administration. Consequently, the Beaubien administration
was entitled to exercise greater control over this particular
type of student speech. See id. at 271.

43a

Accordingly, under the legal uncertainties concerning
First Amendment rights to free speech in the school setting,
the school administration’s prohibition of the gifted students’
T-shirt was not an obvious violation of the students’ First
Amendment rights. See Jones v. Wilhelm, 425 F.3d at 460. In
sum, a reasonable official in the individual Defendants’
position could not have known definitively whether the
prohibition of the T-shirts violated the gifted students’ First
Amendment rights. See Wernsing, 423 F.3d at 750. As such,
Plaintiffs have not met their burden in establishing that their
constitutional rights under the particular circumstances of this
case were “clearly established” at the time of the alleged
constitutional violation. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
at 640-41. Thus, the doctrine of qualified immunity shields
Kotis, Clancy, Rosales, and Laughlin from Plaintiffs’ First
Amendment claims. The Court’s conclusion is further
supported by the decision in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308, 319-20, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975), in which
the Supreme Court articulated that:

Liability for damages for every action which is
found subsequently to have been violative of a
student’s constitutional rights and to have caused
compensable injury would unfairly impose upon the
school decisionmaker the burden of mistakes made in
good faith in the course of exercising his discretion
within the scope of his official duties.... Denying any
measure of immunity in these circumstances would
contribute not to principled and fearless decision-
making but to intimidation. The imposition of
monetary costs for mistakes. which were not
unreasonable in the light of all the circumstances
would undoubtedly deter even the most conscientious
school decisionmaker from exercising his judgment
independently, forcefully, and in a manner best

44a

serving the long-term interest of the school and the
students.

Id. at 319-20 (internal citation and quotation omitted). The
Court thus dismisses Plaintiffs’ claims against Kotis, Clancy,
Rosales, and Laughlin‘ in their individual capacities.

IfI. Monell Claim

Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim against Kotis, Rosales,
Laughlin, and Clancy in their official capacities is a claim
against the Board of Education as a local governmental unit.
See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66, 105 S. Ct.
3099, 3105, 87 L. Ed. 2d 444, 121 (1985) (citing Monell v.
Dep’t. of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690, n.55,
98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978)). In other words,
official capacity suits brought against individuals are “another
way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer
is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at 165 (citation
omitted). Because Plaintiffs’ claims against the individual

“ For an individual to be liable under Section 1983, she must have
caused or participated in the alleged constitutional violation. Pepper
v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 805, 810 (7th Cir. 2005). Thus,
Plaintiffs must establish that the individual Defendants “acquiesced
in some demonstrable way in the alleged constitutional violation.”
Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 2003); see
also Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 731 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(Section 1983 does not create vicarious liability). The record does
not support the proposition that Defendant Laughlin caused or
participated in the prohibition of the “gifties” T-shirt. Thus, the
Court also dismisses Laughlin on the ground that she was not
personally involved in the alleged deprivation of Plaintiffs’ First
Amendment rights.

45a

Defendants in their official capacities are claims against
the Board and thus duplicative, the Court dismisses the
individual Defendants in their official capacities from this
lawsuit.

To state a constitutional claim against the Board, Plaintiffs
must establish that an official custom or policy caused a
deprivation of their First Amendment right to free speech. See
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91; Sornberger v. City of Knoxville,
Illinois, 434 F.3d at 1006, 1029 (7th Cir. 2006) (under
Section 1983 government agency cannot be liable on theory
of respondeat superior). To demonstrate that an official
custom or policy caused the alleged violation of their First
Amendment rights, Plaintiffs must establish one of the
following scenarios: (1) the Board has an express policy that,
when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation; (2) the
Board has a widespread practice that, although not authorized
by written law or express policy, is so permanent and well-
settled that it constitutes custom or usage within the force of
law; or (3) a person with final policymaking authority caused
the constitutional injury. Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375,
379 (7th Cir. 2005).

A. Final Policymaking Authority

Plaintiffs argue that Principal Kotis was an individual with
final policymaking authority in the area of school conduct and
discipline, and therefore the Board is liable for Kotis’ conduct
under the third Monell scenario. Under Section 1983, an
individual’s status as a final policymaker is a question of state
or local law. Killinger v. Johnson, 389 F.3d 765, 771 (7th
Cir. 2004); see also Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S.
469, 483, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). To
identify public officials with final policymaking authority, the
Court reviews state and local law, as well as custom or usage

46a

having the force of law. Killinger, 389 F.3d at 772 (citation
and quotations omitted).

Plaintiffs specifically contend that Principal Kotis is an
individual with final “decision making” authority in the area
of school conduct and discipline based on UDC Rule 2-5. (R.
165-1, Pls.” Mem. In Opp. to Board’s M. Summ. J., at 4.).
Plaintiffs, however, confuse “decision maker” with “final
policymaker.” Not every decision a public official makes
involves policymaking as required under the Monell
framework. See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 482. “The fact that a
particular official -- even a policymaking official -- has
discretion in the exercise of particular functions does not,
without more, give rise to municipal liability based on an
exercise of that discretion.” /d. Instead, the public officer
“must be responsible for establishing final government policy
respecting such activity before the municipality can be held
liable.” Id. at 482-83.

Pursuant to the Board of Education Rules:

Principals of schools are the responsible
administrative heads of their respective schools and
are charged with the organization, supervision,
administration, and discipline thereof. They shall
establish and enforce such regulations, not contrary to
the Rules of the Board of Education, the Uniform
Discipline Code, or the regulations of the General
Superintendent of Schools, as in their judgment may
be necessary for the successful conduct of their
schools.

(Defs.’s Stmt. P 9, Ex. E, Bd. of Educ. Rules, Section 6-12.)
From the unequivocal language of Section 6-12 of the Board’s
Rules, principals in the Chicago Public Schools have the

47a

discretionary authority to make decisions contingent upon the
Board Rules, the UDC, and the regulations of the General
Superintendent of Schools. The Board’s Rules, however, do
not confer the authority for principals to make city-wide
policy decisions. See Killinger, 389 F.3d at 771 (“mere
authority to implement pre-existing rules is not the authority
to set policy”). That authority is left to the School Board. See
105 ILCS 5/10-20.5; see also Duda v. Board of Educ. of
Franklin Park Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 84, 133 F.3d 1054, 1059-
60 (7th Cir. 1998) (Board of Education has authority to
manage schools and adopt rules and regulations needed for
that purpose); Spinelli v. Immanuel Lutheran Evangelical
Congregation, Inc., 118 Ill.2d 389, 404, 113 Ill.Dec. 915,
515 N.E.2d 1222 (1987) (same). Consequently, Principals
Kotis is not a “final policymaker” as Plaintiffs claim.

Nonetheless, Plaintiffs contend that because UDC Rule 2-
5 is unconstitutionally overbroad it provides the basis for
Principal Kotis’ policymaking authority. Specifically,
Plaintiffs argue that the disciplinary rule is “effectively and
actually a delegation by the Board of Education of
unconstitutional power and authority to any and all Chicago
Public School principals and administrators.” (R. 165-1, Pls.’
Mem. In Opposition to Boavd’s M. Summ. J., at 4.)° In

> Plaintiffs also argue that the disciplinary and dress codes
constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint of the students’ free
speech. Not only is Plaintiffs’ argument cursory and undeveloped,
Plaintiffs’ contention that Defendants’ conduct constituted viewpoint
discrimination is simply not supported by the record. See Cornelius
v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 813, 105
S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985) (prior restraints in nonpublic
forums permissible when reasonable and viewpoint neutral);
Anderson v. Milwaukee County, 433 F.3d 975, 979 (7th Cir. 2006)

48a

general, a plaintiff may challenge rules, regulations, or laws
as facially unconstitutional under two theories -- the
overbreadth doctrine and the void for vagueness doctrine. See
Fuller v. Decatur Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ. Sch. Dist. 61, 251
F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir. 2001). “The overbreadth doctrine
allows a plaintiff to ask that a law be struck down based not
on how it affects the plaintiff but on how it might be applied
to third parties not before the court.” Anderson v. Milwaukee
County, 433 F.3d 975, 979 (7th Cir. 2006); see also
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612, 93 S.Ct. 2908,
37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) (“statute’s very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or expression” ). “Facial challenges to overly
broad statutes are allowed not primarily for the benefit of the
litigant, but for the benefit of society -- to prevent the statute
from chilling the First Amendment rights of other parties not
before the court.” Secretary of State of Maryland. v. Munson,
467 U.S. 947, 958, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 2847, 81 L.Ed.2d 786
(1984). Because of the overbreadth doctrine’s far-reaching
effects, courts must apply it “with hesitation” and “only as a
last resort.” Los Angeles Police Dep’t v. United Reporting
Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 39, 120 S.Ct. 483, 145 L.Ed.2d
451 (1999) (citation omitted).

Under the Uniform Discipline Code, there are six groups
of misconduct, including: (1) misconduct that includes
inappropriate student behaviors, such as running in the hall;
(2) misconduct that disrupts the orderly educational process
in school, including leaving the school without permission; (3)
conduct that seriously disrupts the educational process, such
as gambling; (4) conduct that includes assault, extortion,

(same); see, e.g., Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d
1530, 1538 (7th Cir. 1996).

49a

vandalism, and other offenses; (5) conduct such as burglary
and gang activity; and (6) conduct such as arson, murder, and
kidnaping. (Defs.” Stmt. P 11, Ex. F, Uniform Discipline
Code at 19-25) At issue is Group 2 misconduct, namely,
conduct that disrupts the school’s educational process. Under
Group 2, the disciplinary code lists ten behaviors that
constitute such disruptive conduct, including defying the
authority of school personnel and failing to abide by school
rules and regulations. (/d.; Pls:’ Stmt. Add’l Facts P 37.)
Here, the gifted students failed to abide by the Beaubien
School Dress Code No.2, which states in relevant part:
“Clothing with inappropriate words or slogans is not
permitted.” (Pis.’ Stmt. P 9.)

Plaintiffs argue that UDC Rule 2-5 is overbroad because
it is a rule which states that students cannot violate a rule and
is therefore redundant. The Court disagrees. As the Seventh
Circuit recently instructed “common sense must not be and
should not be suspended when judging the constitutionality of
a rule or statute.” See Anderson v. Milwaukee County, 433
F.3d at 978. Under the common sense interpretation of the
disciplinary code, it is evident that Section 2-5 is specifically
directed at student conduct that disrupts the school’s
educational process. “Failing to abide by school rules and
regulations” means that if you fail to follow the school rules,
such as the school dress code, your conduct is considered
disruptive. There is nothing redundant about the code and its
directive is sufficiently narrow and reasonable because it
applies to the school rules and regulations and is limited by
reference to those rules. See id. at 979. The Tinker decision
and its progeny further support this conclusion because speech
in nonpublic forums, such elementary schools, is subject to
significantly greater regulation than speech in traditional
public forums. See Muller, 98 F.3d at 1537. Thus,

50a

restrictions of speech in nonpublic forums need only be
reasonable. Anderson v. Milwaukee County, 433 F.3d at 980.

Next, Plaintiffs contend that UDC Rule 2-5 and the dress
code are void for vagueness. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that
“with no way of identifying the source of content of the
underlying rules, a student might not even know about the
rules until they were violated. A rule must provide at least
minimal notice so that a student may conform his or her
actions to the rule.” (R. 133-1, Mem. In Support of M. Part.
Summ. J., at 11.) Plaintiffs also argue that the rule is
circuitous and confusing.

“A law is void for vagueness if it fails to give fair warning
of what is prohibited, if it fails to provide explicit standards
for the persons responsible for enforcement and thus creates
a risk of discriminatory enforcement, and if its lack of clarity
chills lawful behavior.” Anderson v. Milwaukee County, 433
F.3d at 978 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)). For a plaintiff
to succeed on a vagueness claim, she must demonstrate that
the rule is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.
Fuller, 251 F.3d at 667 (citation and quotation omitted). In
the context of school disciplinary codes, the Supreme Court
gives the following guidance: “Given the school’s need to be
able to impose disciplinary sanctions for a wide range of
unanticipated conduct disruptive of the educational process,
the school disciplinary rules need not be as detailed as a
criminal code which imposes criminal sanctions.” Fraser, 478
U.S. at 686.

Although Plaintiffs unequivocally argue that they are
facially attacking the disciplinary rule and dress code, they do
not attempt to show that the that the rules are unconstitutional
in all of their applications as opposed to “as applied” to the

Sla

students themselves. See Fuller, 251 F.3d at 667-68; see also
United States v. Rodgers, 755 F.2d 533, 544 (7th Cir. 1985)
(“party seeking to overturn a statute for vagueness on its face
must in essence establish that it is unconstitutionally vague in
at least a substantial number of the cases to which it could
apply”). Consequently, Plaintiffs’ attempt to facially attack
the disciplinary rule and dress code as unconstitutionally
vague simply fails because they do not address the code’s
overall applications. See Fuller, 251 F.3d at 667-68.

In short, UDC Rule 2-5 in conjunction with the dress code
is not overbroad or vague and does not confer any policy
making authority to Principal Kotis as Plaintiffs contend.
Thus, Plaintiffs’ argument based on the third Monell scenario
fails because Principal Kotis did not have final policymaking
authority under the circumstances.°®

B. Express Policy
Plaintiffs also argue that UDC Rule 2-5 and the school

dress code embody an express policy that caused and directly
contributed to the students alleged constitutional deprivation.

® Plaintiffs’ arguments that the Board’s delegation of authority to
the Department of Law and that certain Board members’ inaction
establishes municipal liability are not only undeveloped, but
Plaintiffs fail to cite any legal authority to support these claims.
Thus, Plaintiffs have waived these arguments. See Estate of
Moreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 747, 759 (7th Cir. 2005)
(“Perfunctory or undeveloped arguments are waived”). In fact,
these claims do not fall under the Monell rubric, but instead appear
to be loosely based on the doctrine of respondeat superior which
cannot apply to governmental units such as the Board of Education.
See Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, Illinois, 434 F.3d at 1006,
1029 (7th Cir. 2006).

52a

This argument relies on the first Monell scenario, namely,
that the Board has an express policy, that when enforced,
deprived the gifted students of their First Amendment right to
free speech.

“The express policy theory applies, as the name suggests,
where a policy explicitly violates a constitutional right when
enforced.” Calhoun, 408 F.3d at 379 (policy must violate
constitutional right “on its face”). Because the Plaintiffs’
claim partially rests on the Beaubien School dress code,
Plaintiffs have not established that there is a Board of
Education policy at issue. See id. at 380. In other words, the
Beaubien School dress code cannot form the basis of liability
under Monell because it is not a Board policy or custom in the
first instance. See Chortek v. City of Milwaukee, 356 F.3d
740, 748-49 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Only those individuals with the
requisite policymaking authority are capable of establishing
‘official policy’ as required by Monell”). As discussed,
because Principal Kotis does not have the requisite policy
making authority under the circumstances, Plaintiffs’ claim
based on the disciplinary code in conjunction with the school
dress code must fail. See id. at 749. The Court thereby
dismisses Plaintiffs’ claims against the Board.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ Partial
Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court grants Defendant
School Board’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants
Laughlin’s and Clancy’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
Defendant Kotis’ Motion for Summary Judgment, and
Defendant Rosales’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Finally,
the Court denies Defendants’ Motion to Strike as moot.

Dated: March 13, 2006

53a
AMY J. ST EVE

United States District Court Judge
JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

Decision by Court. This action came to hearing before the
Court. The issues have been heard and a decision has been
rendered.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that
Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment [131] is denied.
Defendants’ motions for summary judgment (135, 138, and
139] are granted. All other pending motions are denied as
moot. Memorandum Opinion and Order is entered.

Date: 3/13/2006

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386009_1407%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
