# Appendix — Matlaw v. Hug (No. 07-121) > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386009_1249%3A2 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Appendix - **Published:** January 1, 2007 ## Text Supreme Court, U.S. FILED 07-121JUL 27 2007 In The Supreme Court of the Gnited States LESLIE VALERIE MATLAW (d/b/a LESLIE V. MATLAW, P.C.), Petitioner. versus U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE JEFFREY COLE (NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS), Respondent. Appendix LESLIE V. MATLAW, P.-C. *N.b., Petitioner proceeds 28 East Jackson herein pro se; presently, Tenth Floor, #M-995 she seeks both admission Chicago, IL 60604-2263 to this Court’s Bar and (312) 804-3527 already-admitted Counsel Counsel for Petitioner *Counsel of Record APPENDICES Item, Contents Page APPENDIX A — Seymour v. Hug, 485 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2007) ........... la APPENDIX B — May 7, 2007 Order entered in Seymour v. Hug et al., Doc. No. 154 in No. 04-C-2041 (N.D. IIll.; unpub’d)..... 10a APPENDIX C - January 20, 2007 Order and December 18, 2006 Order, each having been entered in Seymour v. Hug (Appeal of Matlaw), Seventh Circuit No. 06-2502 (unpub'd) ............... 13a APPENDIX D — December 15, 2006 Order entered in Gathe v. Housing Authority of the City of Lafayette, Doc. No. 12-1 in No. 06-CV-1455 (W.D. La.; unpub’d) . .17a APPENDIX E — August 3, 2006 Decision, Doc. No. 140 in No. 04-C-2041 (N.D. Ill.; unpub’d) ........ 2la APPENDIX F — May 19, 2006 Order Denying Motion originally filed by Petitioner on April 26, 2006 and thereafter amended and supplemented (Post-Judyiment “Rule 72 Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Order,” Doc. No. 103 in No. 04-C-2041 (N.D. Ill.; unpub’d)..... 30a APPENDIX G - April 11, 2006 Final Settlement Order (entered April 14, 2006), Doc. No. 89 in No. 04-C-2041 (N.D. Ill.; unpub’d) ................33a (continued) Item, Contents APPENDIX H - March 30, 2006 Orders of the New York Surrogate’s Court (Doc. 86, No. 04-C-2041 (N.D. Ill.; unpub’d)) and Reports of the NYSC Guardian Ad Litem (Docs. 84-1 and 84-2 in No. 04-C-2041 Creda Se EE och babet cv nereackeeene y's APPENDIX I — November 8, 2005 Opinion and Order and November 9, 2005 Opinion on Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, Doc. Nos. 65 and 69, respectively, in No. 04-C-2041 (N.D. Ill.; published at 413 F. Supp. 2d 910 (N.D. Ill. 2005), EE Es PED ob co ave beet iene shee eees Page APPENDIX A: Seymour v. Hug, 485 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2007). United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit DONNA L. SEYMOUR, Plaintiff, v. CAROL HUG er al., Defendants-Appellees. APPEAL OF: LESLIE V. MATLAW Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division No. 04 C 2041, Jeffrey Cole, Magistrate Judge. ARGUED FEBRUARY 20, 2007 - DECIDED MAy 3, 2007. Before MANION, KANNE and WOOD, Circuit Judges. KANNE, Circuit Judge. Attorney Leslie V. Matlaw repre- sented plaintiff Donna Seymour in this case. Ms. Matlaw, act- ing on her own behalf, seeks to set aside the settlement agreement reached in this case and related orders entered in the district court. Ms. Matlaw lacks standing to bring this appeal and therefore the appeal is dismissed. 2 I. HISTORY Plaintiff Donna L. Seymour filed a lawsuit in March 2004 alleging that she had been discriminated against on the basis of race in violation of the Fair Housing Act when she tried to purchase a home in suburban Chicago. The de- fendants are the real estate agents, potential sellers, and others associated with the contested transaction. The case was ini- tially assigned to District Judge George M. Marovich. In Au- gust, 2004, the parties consented, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §635(c), to proceed before Magistrate Judge Ian Levin. Judge Levin retired from the bench and the Executive Committee of the Northern District of Illinois reassigned the case to Magis- trate Judge Jeffrey Cole in May 2005. In June, 2005, the parties reported to Judge Cole that they had reached a settlement and were in the process of fi- nalizing the settkement document. Judge Cole dismissed the case with leave to reinstate within sixty days and retained ju- risdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. In July, 2005, the parties returned to Judge Cole filing cross motions to en- force the settlement agreement. In a thirty-seven page opinion issued in November 2005, Judge Cole granted the defendant’s motion to enforce the agreement and denied the plaintiff’s cross motion. He con- cluded that the plaintiff and her attorneys had been less than honest during the settlement proceeding. Judge Cole stated that the parties’ intent during the June 2005 settlement was to reach an agreement that covered both the plaintift’s claims and her minor children’s potential claims against the defendants. Al- though the children were not parties to the case, the plaintiff referenced alleged harm to her children in her complaint and during discovery. As such, the defendants wanted, and Judge Cole concluded the plaintiff had agreed to a global settle- ment covering both the mother’s actual claims and any poten- tial claims by the children. To account for the children’s claims, the settlement required an allocation of the total settlement amount between the plaintiff and her children. The plaintiff and the children are residents of the State of New York. Under New York law, the plaintiff does not have authority to settle her children’s claims. Instead, a Peti- tion must be brought before the New York Surrogate Court which makes an independent evaluation of the children’s claims to insure that the children’s interests have been fairly represented. Consequently, the settlement agreement required the plaintiff to petition to the Surrogate Court and obtain ap- proval as a‘condition of settlement. The settlement agreement also required the plaintiff to bear the costs of petitioning the Surrogate Court. Judge Cole concluded that plaintiff and her attorneys acted improperly in their representations to the defendants dur- ing the settlement and in their petition to the Surrogate Court. According to Judge Cole, the plaintiff decided that the entire settlement amount should go to her and none should be allo- cated to the children. To achieve this goal, the petition to the Surrogate Court incorrectly represented that the children had no independent claims and therefore had no interest affected by the settlement agreement. The language in the settlement agreement was also altered to make it appear that it did not cover any potential claims by the children. Judge Cole concluded that the plaintiff and her attorney had deceived both the Surrogate Court and the defendants because the chil- dren’s potential claims had been an integral part of the original settlement. Judge Cole ordered the plaintiff and her attorneys to make a second petition to the Surrogate Court and readjust the settlement agreement to properly reflect the parties’ agree- ment as to the children’s potential claims. Judge Cole also met informally with the parties and suggested that the defen- dants be compensated for the attorney’s fees incurred for enforcing the setthkement agreement. The plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration a week after the original opinion but Judge Cole denied the motion. In April 2006, Judge Cole entered the new settlement agree- ment reached by the parties. He again dismissed the case with leave to reinstate, this time with ninety days, and also stated thaj,he would retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement. Two weeks later, Ms. Matlaw, on her own behalf and before Judge Marovich, filed objections to the settlement agreement pursuant to Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ms. Mat- law objected to Judge Cole’s findings that she had been dis- honest in the settlement proceedings and before the Surrogate Court. She also argued that the April 2006 settlement had ef- fectively reduced the amount of attorney’s fees and costs that she would receive. Apparently, in light of Judge Cole’s November 2005 order, the parties had allocated a portion of the original settle- ment amount to the defendants’ attorney’s fees incurred in en- forcing the settlement agreement. Ms. Matlaw stated that she was to receive a percentage of the award received by the plain- tiff. Consequently, her fee amount was reduced under the April 2006 settlement agreement because the overall amount awarded to the plaintiff was less. However, the April 2006 settlement agreement does not mention Ms. Matlaw or any payment of fees to her. Any agreement between her and the plaintiff relat- ing to fees was done separately and not placed in the April 2006 settlement agreement. Judge Marovich issued an order on May 19, 2006 denying Ms. Matlaw’s objections and informing her that his participa- tion in the case ended when the parties consented to the mag- istrate judge's jurisdiction back in August 2004. His order cited 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3) and informed Ms. Matlaw that the ap- propriate procedure was a direct appeal to the court of appeals. Ms. Matlaw then filed a notice of appeal on May 26, 2006 ap- pealing Judge Marovich’s denial of her Rule 72 objections and Judge Cole’s November 2005 opinions. Ms. Matlaw presently characterizes her Rule 72 objections as a Rule 59 motion. In July, 2006, Ms. Matlaw filed a Rule 60 motion before Judge Cole to amend the April 2006 settlement agreement ar- guing there had been a mutual mistake of fact and law by the parties. Judge Cole denied Ms. Matlaw’s Rule 60 motion in August 2006. During the briefing of this appeal, the defen- dants filed a motion with this court arguing Ms. Matlaw’s ap- peal is frivolous and that she should be sanctioned pursuant to Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The de- fendants also have a pending motion for sanctions before Judge Cole. Ii, ANALYSIS Ms. Matlaw seeks to overturn the April 2006 settlement agreement and Judge Cole’s November 2005 and July 2006 opinions that were critical of her conduct in this case. She ar- gues that she is able to bring this appeal on her own behalf be- cause: (1) Judge Cole’s opinions have negatively affected her reputation, and (2) the April 2006 settlement has effectively re- duced the amount of attorney’s fees and costs she would have otherwise recovered in this case. The “general rules [is} that a nonparty cannot challenge on appeal the rulings of a district court.” Gautreaux v. Chicage Hous. Auth., 475 F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 2007) (cit- ing Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988) (per curiam); B.H. ex rel. Pierce v. Murphy, 984 F.2d 196, 199 (7th Cir. 1993)). We have recognized that an attorney can bring an ap- peal on her own behalf when challenging a district court deci- sion imposing monetary sanctions on the attorney, but this rule does not allow an appeal of otherwise critical comments by the district court when no monetary sanctions have been im- posed. Crews & Assoc., Inc. v. United States, 438 F.3d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 2006); Clark Equip. Co. v. Lift Parts Mfg. Co., Inc., 972 F.2d 817, 820 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Bolte v. Home Ins. Co., 744 F.2d 572, 573 (7th Cir. 1984)). Judge Cole has not imposed a monetary sanction on Ms. Matlaw in this case and therefore she cannot base her appeal on the alleged damage to her professional reputation regardless of how harmful Judge Cole’s comments might have been. Ms. Matlaw notes that our position of limiting an appeal to monetary sanctions conflicts with the positions taken by other circuits. We recognize that other circuits allow ap- peals involving critical comments but those circuits have split among themselves over whether the district court must formally sanction the attorney to allow the appeal or whether critical comments by themselves, without a formal sanction, are suffi- cient for an appeal. See Bowers v. Nat’! Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 475 F.3d 524, 542-44 (3d Cir. 2007); Butler v. Biocore Med. Tech. Inc., 348 F.3d 1163, 1166-69 (10th Cir. 2003); Pre- cision Specialty Metals, Inc. v. United States, 315 F.3d 1346, 1350-53 (Fed. Cir. 2003; In re Williams, 156 F.3d 86 (ist Cir. 1998) (discussing the positions of the various circuits in this area of law). We reaffirm our decision that it is appropriate to limit and ap- peal to situations involving monetary sanctions only. This lim- itation On our jurisdiction is based on the realization that allowing appeals by those allegediy harmed by a judge’s com- ments, including “[l]Jawyers, witnesses, victorious parties, vic- tims, [and] bystanders” would result in a “breathtaking expansion in appellate jurisdiction.” Bolte, 744 F.2d at 573; see also Hoagsland ex rel. Midwest Transit Inc. v. Sandberg, Phoenix & Von Gontard, P.C., 385 F.3d 737, 740 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Jurisdictional rules ought to be simple and precise so that judges and lawyers are spared having to litigate over not the merits of a legal dispute but where and when those disputes should be litigated. The more mechanical the application of a jurisdictional rule, the better.”) (internal citations and quota- tions omitted). Our rule faithfully adheres to the traditional maxim that as an appellate court we “review . . . judgments, not statements in opinions.” E.E.0.C. v. Chicago Club, 86 F.3d 1423, 1431 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Black v. Cutter Lab., 351 U.S. 292,297 (1956)); see, e.g., Acevedo v. Canterbury, 457 F.3d 721, 723 (7th Cir. 2006) (“ ‘[W]e review judgments, not opinions. ”) (quoting Rubel v. Pfizer, Inc., 361 F.3d 1016, 1020 (7th Cir. 2004)). Finally, as we have recognized in Bolte, an attorney is not without a remedy because a petition for man- damus is available. 744 F. 2d at 573. Ms. Matlaw’s other argument for standing is that she has effectively lost money in this case because the April 2006 settlement agreement resulted in reducing the amount of attorney’s fees that she was otherwise to receive. However, her claim to attorney’s fees was not spelled out in the settlement agreement and it was plaintiff Seymour’s actions in this case that resulted in the April 2006 settlement and the al- leged reduction in Ms. Matlaw’s attorney’s fees. Thus, any dis- pute over whether Seymour’s actions breached the client agreement is between Seymour and Ms. Matlaw. This is a tra- ditional contract claim that should be brought in another pro- ceeding. There is no need for the district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this dispute because the original federal claims have already been dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. §1367(c); Baer v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 72 F.3d 1294, 1298-1301 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting a district court’s ability to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a fee dispute between an attorney and client when the agreement to award attorney’s fees is codified in the settlement agreement). Finally, we note the defendant’s pending Rule 38 motion for sanctions. A pending motion for sanctions is also before Judge Cole. We concluded that it is better to allow Judge Cole to evaluate that motion first and therefore we deny the defen- dants’ Rule 38 motion. We also note our view that it is in the best interest of all involved that this case be at an end. fil. CONCLUSION The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The defen- dant’s motion for sanctions of June 23, 2006 is denied. A True Copy: Teste: ‘Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit USCA-02-C-0072-—5-3-07 APPENDIX B: May 7, 2007 Order entered in Seymour v. Hug et al., Document Number 154 in No. 04-C-2041 (N.D. Ill.; unpublished). 10 Case 1:04-cv-02041 Document 154 Filed 05/07/2007 Page | of 1 United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois « Name of Assigned Judge Jeffrey N. Cole or Magistrate Judge Sitting Judge if Other than Assigned Judge mi CASE NUMBER 04 C 2041 DATE 5/7/2007 CASE TITLE _ Seymour v. Hug Status hearing held on 5/7/2007. Defendants’ motion for sanctions and for fees [142] is withdrawn. All other pending motions [90], [95], and [98] are denied as moot. SEE TEXT BELOW FOR FURTHER DETAILS. TAT At my request, the parties appeared in court to discuss the Seventh Circuit’s decision of 5/3/2007. Mr. Sanchez and Mr. Howard appeared for the Defendants, Ms. Donaldson was un- able to appear. Ms. Matlaw appeared for hersclf. I discussed with the parties the closing sentence of the Seventh Circuit's opinion in which, after denying the defendant's application for attorneys fees pursuant to Rule 38, Federal Rules of Ap- pellate Procedure, the Court expressed the same view and asked Mr. Howard if he would be willing to withdraw the Motion for Fees. I made it clear to him that he was under no obligation to do so, and I acknowledged his agreement with me prior to the time the fee petition was filed that there were interests that often transcended an award of fees or simply winning or losing a component of litigation, but that events had occurred that precipitated and indeed mandated the filing of the motion. There is simply no question but had those 1] events not occurred, Mr. Howard would not have filed the motion for fees. At my request, and in light of the lumi- nously clear statement in the Court of Appeals opinion dis- missing Ms. Matiaw’s appeal, Mr. Howard agreed to withdraw the pending motion for fees. If ever there were a case where the message of Ecclesi- astes should be should be heeded, this is it: “For everything there is a season, and a time for every purpose under heaven. * * * a time for war and a time for peace.” Ecclesiastes 3:1,8. With the withdrawal of the motion for fees, the case is, as the Court of Appeals hoped, at long last, “at an end.” Slip op. at 8. There are no further proceedings pending in the federal court, and any attempt to revive or revisit any aspect of this litigation would not only be barred but would be in the up- most bad faith and would warrant a significant fee award to the defendants and/or their counsel (depending on the nature of the allegations). At every stage of this case, Mr. Howard and Ms. Donald- son comported themselves admirably and exhibited those qualities of character and professionalism that all lawyers should possess, but too few do. Therefore, Defendants’ mo- tion for sanctions and for fees [142] is withdrawn. All other pending motions [90], [95], and [98] are denied as moot. APPENDIX C: January 20, 2007 Oral Argument Order and December 18, 2006 Order, each having been entered in Seymour v. Hug (Appeal of Matlaw), Seventh Circuit No. 06-2502 (unpublished). Gnited States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604 December 22, 2006 Before Hon. ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge DONNA L. SEYMOUR ] Appeal from the United Plaintiff, ] States District Court for } the Northern District of No. 06-2502 v. ] Illinois Eastern Division J CAROL HUG and ROGER, ] No. 04 C 2041 HUG doing business as ] RE/MAX TEAM2000, ] Jeffrey N. Cole, PATRICIA BROWN-WYRICK, ] Magistrate Judge CENDANT MOBILITY ] CORPORATION, et al., ] Defendants-Appellees,,. ] ] George M. Marovich, APPEAL OF: ] Judge. LESLIE V. MATLAW | Upon consideration of the APPELLANT’S MOTION TO EXPEDITE DECISIONMAKING, filed on December 19, 2006, by the pro se appellant, IT IS ORDERED that the motion is DENIED. Gnited States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604 NOTICE OF ORAL ARGUMENT Date: January 18, 2007 By the court: No. 06-2502 DONNA L. SEYMOUR, Plaintiff, v. CAROL HUG and ROGER HUG, doing business as RE/MAX TEAM 2000, PATRICIA BROWN-WYRICK, CENDANT MOBILITY CORPORATION, et al., Defendants-Appellees, APPEAL OF: LESLIE V. MATLAW Appeal for the United States Northern District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division No. 04 C 2041, George M. Marovich, Judge IT IS ORDERED that this case be orally argued on Tues- day, February 20, 2007, in the Courtroom of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 219 S. Dearborn, Room 2721, Chicago, Illinois at 10:30 a.m. Oral argument will be no more than 10 minutes for each side. Counsel are advised that the panel of judges assigned to oral argument may decide, after reading the briefs, that less time is required for oral argument. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that counsel notify the Cal- endar Clerk (312-435-5850) who will present oral argument by completing and returning the enclosed post card to the court. 15 Notice must be received in the clerk’s office no later than § business days prior to the scheduled argument date. Copies of this notice have been sent to counsel of record. APPENDIX D: December 15, 2006 Order entered in Gathe v. Housing Authority of the City of Lafayette, Document Number 12-1 in No. 06-CV-1455 (W.D. La.; unpublished). Case 6:06-cv-01455 Document 12-1} Filed 12/15/2006 ~— Page 1 of 3 RECEIVED DEC 15 2006 /S/gbr Robert S. Shemwell, CLERK Western District Of Louisiana LAFAYETTE, LOUISIANA IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA LAFAYETTE/OPELOUSAS DIVISION Emily B. Gathe Civil Action 06-1455 versus Judge Tucker L. Melancon Housing Authority of Lafayette Magistrate Judge C. Michael Hill ORDER Before the Court is a Motion to Admit Visiting Attorney Pursuant to LR83.2.6W filed by Gregory L. Landry, counsel for plaintiff Emily B. Gathe, to permit Leslie V. Matlaw to appear and participate as a visiting attorney, trial attorney and co-counsel in this action [Rec. Doc. 3]. As required by LR83.2.6W, the applicant notified the Court of the pending disciplinary proceedings against her, In Re: Leslie Valerie Matlaw [Illinois Bar Number 9709176], Illinois Supreme Court’s Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission Inquiry Number 05-C1-5384, [Rec. Doc. 3, Affidavit of Leslie Matlaw at par. 6] as well as a proceeding pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. This motion was Originally set for hearing on September 27, 2006 at 2:00 p.m. [Rec. Doc. 5] and reset for hearing on December 12, 2006 at 11:30 a.m. [Rec. Doc. 7]. 18 In In re Evans, 524 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals set forth both the procedural and substantive requirements of denying a pretrial motion to ap- pear pro hac vice. Procedurally, if the court has evidence of behavior that it believes justifies a denial of admission pro hac vice, the court must provide the attorney with adequate notice of all alleged misbehavior or unethical behavior that will be charged against him and the court must set a hearing on the issue. Specific allegations must be made; general ac- cusations about an attorney’s demeanor are insufficient. The hearing must be on the record and present the attorney with adequate opportunity to defend himself and his professional reputation. Jn Re Evans, 524 F.2d 1004, 1008 (Sth Cir. 1975). Substantively, admission to a state bar creates a presump- tion of good moral character that cannot be overcome merely by the whims of the District Court. An applicant for admis- sion pro hac vice who is a member in good standing of a state bar may not be denied the privilege to appear except on a showing that in any legal matter, whether before the particu- lar district court or in another jurisdiction, he has been guilty of unethical conduct of such a nature as to justify disbarment of a lawyer admitted generally to the bar of the court. Jn Re Evans, 524 F.2d 1004, 1007-8 (Sth Cir. 1975); see also USA v. Nolen ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 3598522 at 8 (Sth Cir. 2006). As the Illinois Supreme Court disciplinary proceedings and the matter before the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals are ongoing, this Court is not in the position to determine whether Ms. Matlaw’s conduct during her representation of Donna L. Seymour, plaintiff in the litigation, Seymour v. Hug, et al, No 04c2041, United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, rises to the level of dis- barment. Accordingly, at this time, the Court does not have sufficient information to act on applicant's request. IT IS ORDERED that the hearing scheduled for Tuesday, December 12, 2006 at 11:30 a.m. is UPSET to be refixed 19 upon a decision by the Illinois Supreme Court disciplinary council and the decision by the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap- peals. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that applicant file in to the record of this proceeding a copy of all of the parties briefs in the Seventh Circuit proceeding as they are filed. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court or his designee shall serve a copy of this order on applicant Leslie V. Matlaw, at the address provided in her Motion to Admit Visiting Attorney (Rec. Doc. 3]. THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Lafayette, Louisiana, on this 12th day of December, 2006. /S/ Tucker L. Melangon United States District Court Judge Copy Sent: DATE: 12-15-06 BY: /S/gbr TO: Matlaw -mailed 20 APPENDIX E: August 3, 2006 Decision, Document Number 140 in No. 04-C-2041 (N.D. Ill.; unpublished). IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION DONNA L. SEYMOUR, Plaintiff, _ ) v. ) Case No. 04 C 2041. CAROL HUG and ROGER HUG, _) d/b/a REMAX TEAM 2000; ) Magistrate Judge PATRICIA BROWN-WYRICK; ) Jeffrey Cole CENDANT MOBILITY CORP., ) a Corporation; and CURTIS ) CASTLE and CAROL CASTLE, ) Defendants. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER INTRODUCTION This case has its genesis in Donna L. Seymour’s unsuc- cessful attempt to purchase a home in a suburb of Chicago from realtors, Roger and Carol Hug, Patricia Brown-Wyrick and H&H Realty, Inc. and Cendant Mobility Corp. and Curtis and Carol Castle. According to Ms. Seymour, although she had successfully negotiated a contract for the purchase of the home, the defendants “sold it out from under her” when they discovered she was African-American. On March 18, 2004, Ms. Seymour filed a complaint alleging unlawful discrimina- tion against her on the basis of race in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604, 3605, 3617, and breach of contract under Illinois state law. A week later, she amended her complaint, and she did so again on August 20, 2004. Dis- covery ensued as did intensive settlement discussions. After much back and forth, the parties agreed upon terms of settlement. Since the plaintiff's minor children were impli- cated in the case, although not formally named as parties, the defendants insisted on a release of any potential claims by oe) them approved by the Surrogate’s Court in New York. It was agreed that some (minimal) amount of the $40,000 that was being paid to Ms. Seymour would be allocated to her children so that there could be no question about whether the release was supported by consideration. On this issue, the defendants were unyielding. Ms. Seymour’s lawyers agreed that there would be an allocation and counsel for the defendants were informed that there was a settlement and its terms were spelled out through an exchange of emails. From that point on, things dramatically devolved: Ms. Seymour informed her lawyers she would not agree to any al- location, and her volte face was concealed from defense counsel by her lawyers. In addition, the allocation require- ment in the formal settlement agreement was deleted by Ms. Seymour’s lawyers, and the importance of the deletion mini- mized and misrepresented. Contrary to the terms of the settle- ment agreement and the requirements of New York law, Ms. Seymour’s lawyers failed to “fully apprise” the Surrogate’s Court of all of the information needed to make an informed determination of whether the settlement “was in the chil- drens’ best interests.” Quite the contrary; they affirmatively misled the Court by making it appear that the children had no possible claims and no involvement the discrimination against their mother. Ultimately, the defendants became suspicious and de- manded answers, which were not immediately forthcoming. Ultimately, all that had occurred was revealed. Both sides in- sisted that they were in the right, and that they had been ill- used by their colleagues. Cross-motion to eniorce their respective versions of the settlement agreement ensued. The squalid details are discussed in Seymour v. Hug, 413 F.Supp.2d 910 (N.D.III. 2005). | concluded that the defen- dants’ were in the right and that Ms. Seymour’s lawyers had misled their colleagues and the Surrogate’s Court in New York. | ordered what in effect was specific performance of 23 what | found to be the agreement that Ms. Seymour and the defendants had made. The defendants, not surprisingly, had sought an award of attorneys’ fees. Since the request was es- sentially unsupported and unexplained, I ordered additional briefing. /d. at 933. The plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration was denied on November 10, 2005. /d.! Thereafter, in an informal meeting in my chambers with counsel for both sides, including Ms. Matlaw, I suggested that counsel might consider agreeing on a mutually accept- able figure that would compensate the defendants for the work that they had done in connection with the plaintiff's motion to enforce the settlement agreement and in their cross-motion. In due course, Ms. Seymour’s lawyers complied with the terms of the settlement agreement and ap- prised Judge Seibert of all that had occurred. In early April 2006, an agreement on fees was reached between the defen- dants and Ms. Matlaw and her co-counsel that was approxi- mately half the amount that the defendants contended they had expended in legal fees. On April 10, 2006, I entered an order - prepared by Ms. Matlaw’s co-counsel - captioned “Settlement Order.” To the opening sentence, “this matter coming on to be heard on the motion for entry of a settlement order and the Court being fully advised in the premises,” - | added in my handwriting, the following: “that the case is settled:” I initialed my handwritten addition.* The order went on to provide that within 14 days certain payments would be made, which in- cluded payments for attorneys’ fees to the defendants that ' The punctuation after the word “settled” is a colon, not a question mark. > The motion for reconsideration was based on a false factual premise, which the plaintiff's lawyer, Ms. Matlaw, ultimately was forced to concede. The motion for reconsideration was il-considered and baseless Ms. Matlaw and her co-counsel had undeniably agreed to do. Paragraph 3 of the order provided that the case was dismissed without prejudice, with the court to retain jurisdiction for 90 days to enforce the settlement agreement. On April 26, 2006, Ms. Mailaw, acting on her own behalf, filed “Objections” with Judge Marovich to my order of April 11, 2006, even though Judge Marovich had no jurisdiction since the case was here by consent since August 25, 2004. On May 3, 2006, I granted the defendants’ motion to modify the order to extend for 10 days compliance with the settlement agreement. Meanwhile, on May 19, 2006, Judge Marovich denied Ms. Matlaw’s objections since jurisdiction to hear any appeal from final orders or magistrate judges in consent cases lies exclusively with the Court of Appeals. See 28 U.S.C. §636(c)(3). Judge Marovich’s order was docketed on May 23, 2006. On May 26, 2006, Ms. Matlaw filed her notice of ap- peal to the Seventh Circuit of Judge Marovich’s denial of her “objections” to my April 11, 2006 order, which the notice of appeal states “is also being appealed herein.” While her case is pending in the court of appeals, Ms. Matlaw has returned here and asked me to “rescind” the post- November 10, 2005 fee arrangement she admittedly made with the defendants.? She contends that Rule 60(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, authorizes the relief since the agreement is “unenforceable having resulted from a material Mutual Mistake of Fact (that defendants could incur liability to the Minors upon their achieving majority, and that Plain- tiff’s Initial Petitions to Approve Settlement on their behalf, in not advising of such “springing liability,” was materially deceptive in the manner by which she sought the Judge’s ap- proval.” (Amended and Supplemented Memorandum of * Although the agreement was not signed, Ms. Matlaw’s supporting memorandum concedes both its enforceability (in the absence of fraud mistake) (Memorandum at unnumbered page 2). 25 ~ Law in Support of Counsel’s Request for Partial Relief From Judgment at unnumbered page 2) (parenthesis in original). Astonishingly, Ms. Matlaw notes that she seeks no sanctions against the defendants. (/d. at unnumbered page 5).4 This statement, especially in the overall context of the case, “bring[s}] to mind George Jacques Danton’s famous phrase — l‘audace, encore de |l’audace, toujours de l’audace (audacity, more audacity, always audacity) ....” United States v. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846, 850 (2d Cir. 1983) (parenthesis in original). The motion is supported by general propositions about mutual mistake of fact and their effect on contract formation. But “general propositions do not decide concrete cases.” Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also Daubert v. Merrell Dow, 509 U.S. 579, 598 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“ ‘general observations’ ” suffer from the common flaw that they are not applied to the specific matter and “therefore they tend to be not only general, but vague and abstract.”); Wisehart v. Davis, 408 F.3d 321, 326 (7th Cir. 2005) (Posner, J.). oc é In the instant case, the argument that there has been a “bedrock mutual mistake of fact or of law,” and a “uniform misapprehension of New York law” is frivolous and ignores the November 8, 2005 opinion and the denial of Ms. Mat- law’s motion for rehearing on November 10, 2005.5 There were no material mistaken assumptions on which Ms. Mat- law and the defendants based their fee agreement. It is non- sensical to suggest that there was a mutual mistake of fact ‘The parties are agreed that the pendency of Ms. Matlaw's appeal in the Seventh Circuit does not deprive me of jurisdiction to hear this motion, and | am proceeding on that assumption. * [Nb (Petitioner's Note): This footnote contains no text.) regarding what I found to be the materially deceptive manner in which Ms. Matlaw sought the Surrogate’s Court’s ap- proval. Ms. Matlaw certainly did not agree with that holding, and indeed, protested vigorously at the oral argument today that she was innocent of any wrongdoing. Thus, the parties did not proceed on some shared misperception about what the opinion said or its validity.* Similarly, there was no mutual mistake of fact regarding the question of consideration for the release of the children. As explained in the November 8 and 10, 2005 opinions, the defendants insisted that there be an al- location to the children so that there could be no future claim that the release was invalid because unsupported by consider- ation. It did not matter whether the defendants’ concerns about New York law’s requiring consideration for a release were well-founded or whether New York law did or did not actually have such a requirement. As discussed in detail in the November 10" opinion, the defendants bargained for some payment to the children to alleviate the possibility of a future claim, and Ms. Seymour’s lawyers agreed to it. Thereafter, Ms. Seymour changed her mind, but her lawyers chose not to tell the defendants and allowed them to proceed on the mistaken assumption that there was going to be an allocation. Consistent with their concealed breach of the settlement agreement, Ms. Seymour’s lawyers gulled the Surrogate’s Court as described at length in the November 8" and 10" opinions. The only mistake of fact in this case is unilateral and was the defendants who relied, foolishly as it turns out, on Ms. Seymour’s lawyers’ representations. Finally, Ms. Matlaw’s present contention that there was a mu- tual mistake of fact regarding the applicability of the statute * If Ms. Matlaw concluded that the opinion was correct, that ts not a mutdal mistake of fact as that term is used in the law. of limitations to any claims that might be brought by the chil- dren is singularly disingenuous. (Plaintiff's Memorandum at unnumbered page 9). As pointed out in the November 10" opinion, the statute of limitations was never discussed with defense counsel. 413 F.Supp.2d at 934. If Ms. Matlaw thought the November 8 and November 10 decisions wrong, her recourse was not to have agreed to pay the defendants’ attorneys’ fees in connection with the miscon- duct that I found existed, but rather to have allowed a fee award to be entered - if in fact it was deemed appropriate - and then to appeal that award. She chose a very different course, and she is bound by her voluntary decision.’ In ef- fect, Ms. Matlaw’s agreement with the defendants regarding the question of liability for attorneys’ fees constituted a settle- ment agreement with the defendants on the discreet issue of her liability for attorneys’ fees. A settlement agreement is a contract and is governed by principles of law applicable to contracts generally. Lumpkin v. Envirodyne Industries, Inc., 933 F.2d 449, 455 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 939 (1991). Parties to a settlement agreement, otherwise enforce- able, cannot avoid the agreement merely because one of them has second thoughts. Jaylor v. Gordon Flesch Co., 793 F.2d 858, 863 (7th Cir. 1986). This principle is reflective of the more encompassing principle that since equity does not act to relieve parties of voluntarily undertaken obligations, in order to rescind a settlement agreement, the disgruntled party must demonstrate through clear and convincing evidence that the agreement was entered into as a result of fraud or mutual Following the November |0# denial of the motion for reconsideration, Ms. Seymour terminated her relationship with Ms. Matlaw and agreed to all the terms of the settlement, with which she fauhfully complied. Ms. Seymour was thus acting on her own behalf. mistake. Cameron v. Bojusz, 305 Ill.App.3d 267, 271, 711 N.E.2d 1194, 1197 (1999); Melzer v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 193 Ill. App.3d 59, 549 N.E.2d 817 (1989). Those factors are strikingly absent here.® Neither the shortness of life nor the scarcity of judicial resources can countenance an approach to settlement agree- ments that makes them test runs, subject to revision whenever a party decides she does not like the terms. In sum, there was no mutual mistake of fact on which the original settlement was bottomed, and there most assuredly was no mutual mistake of fact (or law) on which Ms. Mat- law’s agreement to pay attorneys’ fees to the defendants was based. Ms. Matlaw’s current motion simply ignores all that has occurred in the case, and effectively puts out of view the November 8" and November 10" opinions. It is, in some ways, nothing more than a thinly disguised motion to recon- sider those decisions. Apart from being frivolous, it is un- timely under Rule 59(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ms. Matlaw’s motion for partial relief from judgment [125] [126] is denied.? ENTERED: /S/ Jeffrey Cole United States Magistrate Judge DATE: 8/3/06 * Even preposterous terms are enforceable if that is what is actually intended. Beanstalk Group, Inc. v. AM General Corp., 283 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.). * Ms. Matlaw said that the mutual mistake was not apparent until Judge Seibert had issued his orders, although she could not explain how those orders affected the present issues. Moreover, Judge Seibert’s orders were issued months before Ms. Matlaw’s present motion. Ms. Matlaw also said that she continues to represent Ms. Seymour even to this day and thus, quite apart from the fact that orders are matters of public record, she would have known about the order, which she now claims 1s so critical to her motion. APPENDIX F: May 19, 2006 Order Denying Motion originally filed by Petitioner on April 26, 2006 and thereafter amended and supplemented (Post-Judgment “Rule 72 Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Order’), Document Number 103 in No. 04-C-204] (N.D. Ill.; unpublished). 30) United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois Name of Assigned Judge George M. Marovich or Magistrate Judge oa Sitting Judge if Other than Assigned Judge CASE NUMBER 04 C 2041 DATE 5/19/06 CASE TITLE Seymour v. Hug Plaintiff's Objections are denied. Motion hearing set for May 24, 2006 is stricken. / S / George M. Marovich , For further details see below. Docketing to mail notices. STATEMENT When plaintiff Donna L. Seymour (“Seymour”) filed her complaint in March 2004, the case was assigned to this Judge. On or about August 19, 2004, every party to this case signed a consent form, thereby consenting to proceed before the Magistrate Judge for all proceedings through and includ- ing judgment. On August 25, 2004, this Court entered an order reassigning the case to the Magistrate Judge. Since that time, this case proceeded before the Magistrate Judge (originally Magistrate Judge Levin and, since May 6, 2005, Magistrate Judge Cole). On April 11, 2006, Judge Cole entered an order dismissing the case without prejudice due to the parties’ report that the case had settled. Judge Cole re- tained jurisdiction over the case for 90 days and stated that the dismissal would be automatically changed to a dismissal with prejudice if the case were not reinstated within 90 days. After additional motions, Judge Cole entered an order on May 3, 2006 modifying the April 11, 2006 order and granting defendants ten days to comply with the settlement agreement. \ Plaintiff’s attorney has now noticed before this Court ob- jections to Judge Cole’s order, citing Rule 72(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as the authority. Nothing in Rule 72 provides this Court the authority to review Judge Cole’s order. Rule 72(a) allows a party to file objections with the district court with respect to an order a magistrate enters with respect to “a pretrial matter not dispositive of a claim or defense of a party” that the district judge “referred” to the magistrate judge. See Fed. P. Civil P. 72(a). By its plain lan- guage, Rule 72(a) applies only to orders on pre-trial, non-dis- positive matters the district court referred to the magistrate. Nor does Rule 72(b) apply. That rule allows a party to file with the district court objections to an order by a “magistrate judge assigned without consent of the parties to hear a pre- trial matter dispositive of a claim or defense of a party . . .” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) (emphasis added). These rules do not apply because, in this case, the order Magistrate Judge Cole entered was neither an order on a pre-trial matter referred to him by this Judge nor an order on a dispositive matter referred without consent. Rather, these parties con- sented to proceed before the Magistrate for all proceedings through and including final judgment. In a case such as this, where the parties have consented to proceed before the Magistrate for all matters through and in- cluding judgment, the parties stil] have a means of having the Magistrate Judge’s orders reviewed, but it is not at the district court. Rather, 25 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3) allows such a party to “appeal directly to the appropriate United States court of ap- peals from the judgment of the magistrate judge in the same manner as an appeal from any other judgment of a district court.” See 28 USC § 636(c)(3). Because the Court has no authority to review Magistrate Judge Cole’s order, this Court hereby denies the plaintiff's objections and strikes the May 24, 2006 hearing date. APPENDIX G: April 11, 2006 Final Settlement Order (entered April 14, 2006), Document Number 89 in No. 04-C-2041 (N.D. Il.; unpublished) 33 Case 1:04-cv-02041 Document 89 Filed 11/09/2005 Page | of 2 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION DONNA L. SEYMOUR, Piaintiff, V. Case No. 04 C 2041. CAROL HUG and ROGER HUG, d/b/a REMAX TEAM 2000; Magistrate Judge PATRICIA BROWN-WYRICK; Jeffrey Cole CENDANT MOBILITY CORP., a Corporation; and CURTIS CASTLE and CAROL CASTLE, Defendants. SETTLEMENT ORDER This matter coming on to be heard on the motion for entry of a settlement order and the Court being fully apprised in the premises, {handwritten insertions: “/S$/JC_ that the case is settled : ”] IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: |. Within fourteen (14) days of the date of entry of this order Defendants shall deliver the following checks: a. A check made payable to The John Marshall law School in the amount of $13,333.00 delivered to F. Willis Caruso, 28 E. Jackson Blvd., Suite S00, Chicago, Illinois 60604 b. A check made payable to Donna Seymour in the amount of $27,607 delivered to her attorney, Andrew C. Bluinenberg, 440 Route 146, Clifton Park, New York, 12065 34 2. Within fifteen (15) days of the date that the Check for $13,333.00 made payable to The John Marshal! Law School clears, The John Marshall Law School shall deliver to the Defendants the following checks: a. Acheck made payable to Cozen O’Connor Trust. for the benefit of Certain Underwriters of Lloyds. Ref. REPM No. 084334.000 in the amount of $3,000. b. A check made payable to Sanchez & Daniels Client Account in the amount of $14,916.00. 3. The case is dismissed without prejudice and the Court retains jurisdiction for enforcement of this Settlement Order for ninety (90) days. 4. Atthe end of the ninety (90) days, if the parties have not requested additional action by the Court, the Court will enter a Final Order dismissing the case with prejudice. Enter: /S/ Jeffrey Cole {handwritten: Magistrate] Judge Dated:__ 4/11/06 - Order Prepared by: F. Willis Caruso The John Marshall Law School Fair Housing Legal Clinic 28 E. Jackson Blvd., Suite 500 Chicago, Illinois 60604 (312) 786-2267 APPENDIX H: March 30, 2006 Orders of the New York Surrogate’s Court (Document Number 86 in No. 04-C-2041 (N.D. Ill.; unpublished)) and Reports of the New York Surrogate’s Court Guardian Ad Litem (Document Numbers 84-1 and 84-2 in No. 04-C-2041 (N.D. Ill.; unpublished)). 36 STATE OF NEW YORK FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT SARATOGA COUNTY SURROGATE’S COURT County of Saratoga ) State of New York ) ss Surrogate’s Office Recorded on the 30" day of MARCH, 2006 In 46 [ illegible ] Orders 92 / § / Debra D. Baker, Court Clerk In re the Estate of ) ORDER PETER. MADKIN, JR. ) — File #1836-78 A Minor. ) Judge Harry W. Siebert, Jr. The petitioner Donna Seymour, the parent and guardian of the above Minor ward, having moved this Court, on Decem- ber 7, 2005, to approve a Settlement Agreement and Consent Order in Case No. 04 C 2041, and the parties having come to be heard on the 10" day of January, 2006, Now, upon reading the petition, which was filed December 7, 2005 and reviewing the recommendation of the Guardian ad litem, James G. Snyder, it is ORDERED that the petition be granted in full and specifi- cally that: A) The above Minor Ward receive One thousand dollars ($1000) to be issued from the settiement proceeds to Donna Seymour as Guardian of Peter Madkin, Jr. jointly with Saratoga Co. Surrogate’s Court. 37 B) That an allowance be made to James G. Snyder, Esq. as guardian ad litem of Peter Madkin, Jr. in the amount of $2126.00. C) That an allowance be made to Andrew C, Blumenberg, as attorney for petitioner, in the amount of $1,000. D) Donna Seymour, Guardian file with this Court proof of deposit of said funds. Enter. Dated: March 30, 2006 /S/ Harry W. Siebert, Jr. Surrogate [Fax header] 4/10/2006 11:46 518-884-4774 S ARA CO SURR CT PAGE 02/05 Case 1:04-cv-02041 Document 86-2 Filed 04/10/2006 Page | of 5 STATE OF NEW YORK Saratoga County Surrogate’s Court SURROGATE’S COURT [ File Stamp ] SARATOGA COUNTY FILED MAR 7 2006 In the Matter of Guardianship Proceeding of REPORT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM PETER LANE MADKIN, JR. File # 1836-78 I, James G. Snyder, Counselor-At-Law, having been duly appointed the Guardian ad Litem of PETER LANE MADKIN, Jr., infant for the purpose of appearing for and protecting his interest in the above entitled proceeding, do hereby report as follows: FIRST: That the interest of said infant is that of proposed recipient of a portion of money out of the proceeds of the lawsuit commenced and prosecuted by Donna Seymour, his mother in Illinois. SECOND: That I have examined the papers purporting to be the Petition and Affidavit of Minors Guardian to Approve Settlement dated 5/20/05 and proof of service herein and all other papers in this proceeding and the previous petition and order seeking similar relief. The proceeding was brought in [ilinois District Court for racial discrimination in the pur- chase of a home by my ward’s mother. She sued the case as plaintiff individually without including her children as plain- tiffs. The matter in Illinois can be settled in the amount of $40,000.00, if approved. Petitioner proposes to receive 39 $24,776, as her share of the settlement less attorneys’ fees with $1,000.00 each going to her children. She originally pe- titioned this Court for approval of a similar settlement with- out requesting that her children receive money. That petition was approved by this Court. Subsequently, the magistrate in Illinois directed that some portion of the settlement proceeds be distributed to the children. Petitioner has proposed $1,000 to each child. It appears that one of the reasons the money for the children was proposed is that the defendants in said case seek releases from the children in addition to the ag tiff. i THIRD: I have researched these issues extensively and have had several phone conversations and correspondence with Petitioner’s attorneys and on of the defense attorneys in the Illinois action. In my opinion, New York law does not re- quire that the infants receive any portion of this settlement unless they were [4/10/2006 11:46 518-884-4774 S ARA CO SURR CT PAGE 03 / 05] parties to this action. Furthermore, it is difficult to under- stand how they would have any viable claims in said action as the facts have been explained to me. All of the above notwithstanding, J recommend to this Court that the settle- ment as proposed be approved and the release be signed as presented. As guardian ad litem for said ward, I cannot de- cline the offer to my ward of $1,000.00 no matter how it is obtained. The plaintiff’s attorneys are entitled to their one- third pursuant to a retainer agreement. After payment of the expenses of this matter in Surrogate’s Court, Donna Seymour should be entitled to the balance of the settlement proceeds. Dated: March 3, 2006 / S/ James Snyder Guardian ad Litem 40 [Fax header] 4/10/2006 11:46 518-884-4774 S ARA CO SURR CT PAGE 04/05 Case 1:04-cv-02041 Document 86-2 Filed 04/10/2006 Page 3 of 5 STATE OF NEW YORK. Saratoga County Surrogate’s Court SURROGATE’S COURT [ File Stamp ] SARATOGA COUNTY FILED MAR 7 2006 In the Matter of Guardianship Proceeding of REPORT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM DEVIN LAUREN MADKIN File # 1836-79 I, James G. Snyder, Counselor-At-Law, having been duly appointed the Guardian ad Litem of DEVIN LAUREN MADKIN, infant for the purpose of appearing for and protecting his in- terest in the above entitled proceeding, do hereby report as follows: FIRST: That the interest of said infant is that of proposed recipient of a portion of money out of the proceeds of the lawsuit commenced ar prosecuted by Donna Seymour, her mother in Illinois. SECOND: That I have examined the papers purporting to be the Petition and Affidavit of Minors Guardian to Approve Settlement dated 5/20/05 and proof of service herein and all other papers in this proceeding and the previous petition and order seeking similar relief. The proceeding was brought in Illinois District Court for racial discrimination in the pur- chase of a home by my ward's mother. She sued the case as plainuff individually without including her children as plain- tiffs. The matter in Illinois can be settled in the amount of $40,000.00, if approved. Petitioner proposes to receive 4] $24,776, as her share of the settlement less attorneys’ fees with $1,000.00 each going to her children. She originally pe- titioned this Court for approval of a similar settlement with- out requesting that her children receive money. That petition was approved by this Court. Subsequently, the magistrate in Illinois directed that some portion of the settlement oroceed: be distributed to the children. Petitioner has prop »