# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Hansen v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 2002
- **Citation:** 535 U.S. 1111

## Text

Suprema Court, U.S.
wl FILE O
ee

041112 19% 2 4 2004
No. 01- a

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

CHRISTIAN A. HANSEN and ALFRED R. TAYLOR,
Petitioners,
v,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COuRT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Rosert L. BERNER, JR.
Counsel of Record
Davip P. HACKETT
ADRIANE W. BuURKLAND
Douc.as B. SANDERS
BaKER & MCKENZIE
Attorneys for Petitioners
130 East Randolph Drive
Chicago, Illinois 60601
(312) 861-8000

171787 g

COUNSEL PRESS

(800) 274-3321 + (800) 359-6859 y \o-

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

(1) Whether the responsible corporate officer doctrine can
be stretched to hold a person liable where that person no long °F
had the authority or the capacity to prevent the violations charged
and was not in a decision-making role for the corporation at the
time the violations occurred.

(2) Whether a criminal conviction based on the responsible
corporate officer doctrine for violations of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928(d) & (e), the
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319%c), and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) requires the defendant to have actual
knowledge of each element charged in the offense.

(3) Whether corporate officers and employees of a
corporation in bankruptcy may be liable for violations of
environmental statutes despite bankruptcy laws that deprive
them of the authority to act to correct or prevent the violations.

ll

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Randall W. Hansen, a defendant below, has been served
as a respondent herein.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Questions Presented .....
Parties to the Proceeding ... 1
Table of Contents ............ | MI
Table of Cited Authorities ... \
Table of Appendices ......... , 1X
Opinions Below ............. i |
Statement of Jurisdiction ... nee : |
Statutory Provisions Involved ............... l
Statement of the Case ...... Se eee | Z
A. Factual Background .................... 2
B. Proceedings Below ................. 8
EE 9
Reasons for Granting the Writ ................- 10

I. The RCO Doctrine Requires That The
Corporate Officer Be In Actual Control
Of The Facility At The Time Of The
oe Ee Se i4

\1 ‘ 7 rt
\ ' t->,1 \ i > hy +} " +r sly
Was Violated When ihe Government! Failed

lo Prove That Hansen And Taylor Had Actual

Knowledge Of Each Element Of The
Olfenses 1s
II! Cernuorari Is Necessary lo Resolve The
Contlicting Objectives Of The Federal
Bankruptcy ct And Environmental
vA

statutes y.

(onclusion

TABLE OF CITEDAUTHORITIES

[J
FEDERAL CASES

In re Allegheny International, Inc.,

158 B.R. 343 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992) 28, 2
Bovde v. California,

494 U.S. 370 (1990)
CFTC v. Weintraub,

471 U.S. 343 (1985)
In re Chateaugay Corp.,

944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991)
In re Chicago, Milwaukee, R.R.,

3 F.3d 200 (7thCir. 1993)

Hanousek v. United States,

528 U.S. 1102 (2000)

19, 21, 22,

Mid-Atlantic National Bank v. New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection,

474 U.S. 494 (1986)

In re National Gypsum,
139 B.R. 397 (Bankr.

Ohio v. Kovacs,
469 U.S. 274 (1985)

he Me. He. 24 ee

WO

Cited Authorities

Page
Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments,

94 }.3d 1489 (11th Cir. 1996) .... 17
In re Schepps Food Stores, Inc.,

1600 B.R. 792 (Bankr. S.D. Texas 1993) ..... 29
peees V. UNUCG SIAIES, 2. cave cceens Sa yao:
Tenn-Fla Partners v. First Union Nat'l Bank of Fla.,

229 B.R. 720 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1999) ....... 29
United States v. Ahmad,

101 F.3d 386 (Sth Cir. 1996) ...... 20, 22, 23, 24, 25
United States v. Bestfoods,

524 U.S. 51 (1998) .............. 11, 12, 14, 15, 16
United States v. Carr,

880 F.2d 1550 (2d Cir. 1989) .......000.00... 16, 17
United States v. Dell ‘Aquilla,

150 F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 1998) .......... 15, 16,17, 18
United States v. Dotterweich,

BE ETT CNIS) cece eccceveseusses 10, 20, 23

United States v. Iverson,
162 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 1998) .......000000.. 25

iiieeiilersicisic.sico ty tied

Vil

Cited Authorities

Page

United States v. Kelley Technical Coatings, Inc.,

157 F.3d 432 (6th Cir. 1998) .........-----e- 20
United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co.,

933 F.2d 35 (ist Dist. 1991) ........-. 20, 22, 23, 24
United States v. Park,

Pos @ue @ . Fo. yp) er 9. 11, 12, 14, 20, 23
United States v. Township of Brighton,

153 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 1998) ...........-- 15, 16, 17
United States v. USX Corp.,

6S F346 O11 635d Cig. F995) «. cc cece cen sces’s 16
United States v. White,

766 F. Supp. 873 (E.D. Wash. i) reer rere 20
United States v. Whizco,

841 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1988) ..........------- 27
United States v. Wilson,

133 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1997) .......------ ne 20
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,

SED ETE, GEESE ccckstevevcueswesesenss passim

————x

Vill

Cited Authorities

Page
STATUTES
Tt Ye |) eae ae 29
WU OI i ie kes
ik te | 9
Te ae oe: i, 1,9, 24
42 U.S.C. § 9603(D) oo e ccc e cece cece eee. i, 1,9
42 U.S.C. § 6928 ... 00. e eee cece cece cease i, 1, 9, 23
OTHERAUTHORITIES

Randall S. Abate & Dayna E. Mancuso, /t s All About
What You Know: The Specific Intent Standard
Should Govern “Knowing” Violations of
the Clean Water Act, 9 N.Y.U. Envtl. L. J. 304
SEPP Or cee Er Se ne ra eer eee 19, 20

TABLE OFAPPENDICES

Appendix A — Per Curiam Opinion Of The United
States Court Of Appeals Fer The Eleventh Circuit
Dated And Filed August 24, 2001 ........----

Appendix B — Order Of The United States District
Court For The Southern District Of Georgia,
Brunswick Division Dated And Filed April 26,
Ee CO POPP e Ee CT ere eke La

Appendix C — Per Curiam Order Of The United
States Court Of Appeals For The Eleventh Circuit
Denying Petition For Rehearing Dated And Filed
Cesober 26, 2001 occ ccc ccc cetecceneserces

Appendix D — Relevant Statutes ..........-----

|

Christian A. Hansen and Alfred R. Taylor respectfully
petition for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals, United States \.
Hansen, (App. A, infra, 1a-76a), is reported at 262 F.3d 1217.
The opinion of the district court, United States v. Hansen,
(App. B, infra, 77a-117a), is unreported.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals entered its judgment on August
24, 2001. Petitioners timely filed a petition for rehearing and
rehearing en banc, which the Court of Appeals denied on
October 26, 2001 (App. C, infra, 118a-119a). The jurisdiction
of this Court is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This case involves provisions of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928(d) & (e)
(App. D, infra, 126a-132a), the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(c) (App. D, infra, 120a-126a) and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) (App. D, injra, 133a-135a). Those
provisions are set forth in full in App. D to this Petition.

tl

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Factual Background

LCP Chemicals-Georgia (“LCP”), a division of Hanlin
Group, Inc. (“Hanlin”), owned and operated an industrial
plant on Ross Road in Brunswick, Georgia (“Brunswick
plant”) of approximately 550 acres, which Hanlin purchased
in late 1979. At the Brunswick plant, LCP used a mercury
cell, chlor-alkali process to manufacture chlorine gas, sodium
hydroxide, and bleach, primarily for the pulp and paper
industries. In the chlor-alkali process operations, a
concentrated solution is electrochemically dissociated into
elemental sodium and chlorine gas, with contaminated
wastewater and waste sludges generated in the process.

Prior to the advent of environmental statutes in the 1970s,
multiple companies, including ARCO, Georgia-Power
Company and Allied Chemical (“Allied”), had operated for
approximately 50 years at the site unregulated by any
environmental requirements. Now a Superfund site, the
Brunswick site is being cleaned at the expense of owners
whose environmental contamination predated LCP’s presence
at the site.

LCP continued the mercury cell chlor-alkali process that
had been employed previously by Allied at the Brunswick
plant. Essentially, multiple individual mercury cells housed
in two large rooms (Cellrooms | and 2) processed material
to make products. Those cells contained mercury, which
regularly required replenishment. The operations also utilized
other chemicals and produced hazardous substances. Those
processes generated pollutants that were subject to various
environmental requirements, including for example,

3

wastewater discharge limitations on pH, mercury and chlorine
set forth in LCP’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (“NPDES”) permit No. GA (03247. LCP’s NPDES
permit authorized the Brunswick plant to store wastewaler
on the floor of Cellrooms | and 2 while awaiting treatment
in LCP’s wastewater treatment plant. LCP also generated
hazardous wastes subject to RCRA regulation.

The Brunswick plant operations also were subject to
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”)
regulations designed to ensure for the protection and safety
of workers. To protect workers who might be exposed to
mercury vapors in the mercury cell process, LCP employed
an extensive plant inspection and mercury urinalysis program,
in which workers periodically were sampled. This program,
as well as employee education, training and quality assurance
measures, were developed by Dr. Leonard Goldwater and
Dr. Woodhall Stopford, occupational physicians, researchers
and internists at Duke University Medical Center. Those
workers exhibiting elevated mercury levels could not return
to work until they had been examined by a physician, and
were relocated immediately to other plant locations away
from the mercury cells.

Because LCP’s NPDES permit enabled LCP to retain
water on the floor of Cellrooms i and 2, prior to treatment
by LCP’s wastewater treatment plant, that water's proximity
to the electricity in the cells inherently posed some minor
electrical shock and chemical burn risks. OSHA specifically
addressed these risks by requiring LCP to install elevated
walkways that positioned workers away from freestanding
water. Further, LCP employed an electricity lockout program
to avoid potential shocks. LCP’s operations employed
chemicals including both acidic and caustic substances that

4

could irritate or burn skin. LCP minimized that risk by
providing protective equipment to minimize mercury vapor
exposure and preclude skin contact, proximately located
showers to relieve inadvertent contact, and first aid stations
and training. LCP also held regular safety meetings and plant
safety inspections. LCP policies also authorized all
employees, including those in the cellroom, to work
elsewhere in the facility if they were at any time concerned
abcut their safety.

LCP’s parent corporation, Hanlin, filed a voluntary
petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code on July 10, 1991. Those bankruptcy proceedings
severely restricted the discretionary funds available to Hanlin,
including funds for maintenance and repair, as well as
for environmental compliance at the Brunswick plant.
The Bankruptcy Court ordered Hanlin to set aside $7,000 -
$10,000 per day for professional fees, including special
outside environmental counsel{ Dechert, Price and Rhoads).
Management continued day-to-day management of the
operations, but any capital and extraordinary expenditures
were subject to Hanlin Board of Directors, Creditors’
Committee and Bankruptcy Court approval. Sales of assets
were subject to Bankruptcy Court approval, as were the uses
of the resulting funds. Often the funds from sales were not
made available for use by Hanlin management. Ultimate
decision-making authority about major policies, such as
whether to close the Brunswick plant or to continue to operate
it, Was not reposed in Hanlin management, but resided instead
with the Board, the Creditors’ Committee and the Bankruptcy
Court.

Intense industry competition caused the declining
position of the company and its cash shortfall. As a result,

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with the support of the Creditors Committee and Bankruptcy
Court, Hanlin sought a buyer for the Brunswick plant (and other
facilities it owned). Throughout the spring and summer of 1993,
LCP negotiated with Allied (the previous owner), HoltraChem
and others to purchase the Brunswick plant. Allied was
particularly interested in making the purchase, which would have
allowed Allied to postpone and possibly avoid environmental
cleanup costs for which it was responsible.

For the five months beginning in February 1993, Alfred
Taylor was the Brunswick plant manager. Taylor resigned his
position on July 16, 1993. In the late summer and early fall of
1993, Allied agreed to advance funds to LCP to enhance
environmental compliance, including emergency expansion of
wastewater treatment capacity by using idle tanks, with those
funds to be applied to the purchase price when the companies
closed on the transaction.! The Georgia Environmental
Protection Department (“GA EPD”) participated in those LCP-
Allied negotiations to ensure environmental compliance.
Ultimately, GA EPD’s insistence that Allied agree to clean up
the adjacent river if it acquired the Brunswick plant caused Allied
to forego purchase of the facility. Shortly thereafter, in early
February 1994, the facility was closed.

Due to the cash shortfall occasioned by the bankruptcy, LCP
experienced operational and environmental compliance
difficulties in 1993 and until the plant closure in 1994. Most
notably, LCP struggled to meet its NPDES permit requirements,
which it duly reported to GA EPD in daily, weekly and monthly
Discharge Monitoring Reports.

1. AnAllied employee, Mark White, was assigned by Allied to
run the Brunswick plant as an LCP employee, formally commencing
on October 18, 1993.

6

The volume of wastewater increased and exceeded the
LCP wastewater treatment plant ‘capacity, compelling LCP
to utilize the floor of Cellrooms 1 and 2 and idle tanks to
hold the wastewater while awaiting treatment. Faced with
excessive wastewater, LCP also chose to pump the water to
empty Bunker C oil tanks for storage before treatment and
final discharge from the wastewater treatment plant. During
1993, LCP experienced other operational probiems, including
an accidental bleach spill, which the company promptly
reported to GA EPD.

As a result of the wastewater compliance problems,
GA EPD informed LCP that it would revoke LCP’s NPDES
permit on September 23, 1993. LCP appealed that proposed
permit revocation, which legally stayed the revocation.
On November 19, 1993, GA EPD sought a TRO ordering
the Brunswick plant closed. State court Judge Amanda
Williams was assigned the matter and personally visited the
Brunswick plant on December 6, 1993, with representatives
from LCP, GA EPD, Allied Signal and HoltraChem. After
the tour with Judge Williams, the GA EPD withdrew the
request fora TRO.

Following the eventual closure of the plant in 1994,
GA EPD turned the Brunswick plant over to the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (“U.S. EPA”). U.S. EPA
listed the facility as a Superfund site and commenced a
cleanup, which remains ongoing. Predecessors to LCP at the
site, Allied, ARCO and Georgia-Power Company, are paying
for the cleanup.

The Government then chose to criminally prosecute
individuals who had been employed by Hanlin for the
environmental problems that LCP experienced in 1993 and
1994. Federal jurisdiction in the district court arose from

———_ —_

5

the criminal indictments against those individuals for
violations of United States environmental statutes RCRA,
CERCLA, and CWA.

The criminal indictments charged the Petitioners with
exceeding the NPDES permit limits during specified time
periods between June 1993 and January 1994 (Counts 2-21);
for storing wastewater on the cellroom floors and permitting
some to escape to the environment during specified time
periods between May 29, 1993 and February 1, 1994 (Counts
22-32); for storing wastewater in Bunker C oil tanks between
July 23, 1993 and February 1, 1994 (Count 33); for knowingly
endangering employees by exposing them to impermissibly
stored wastes and wastewater between May 29, 1993 and
February 1, 1994 (Count 34); for failing to notify the U.S.
Government of unpermitted releases of chlorine or
wastewater to the environment between July 21, 1993 and
October 23, 1993 (Counts 35-41); and for conspiring to
commit those violations between July 1, 1985 and February
1, 1994 (Count I).

Seventy-five year old Petitioner Christian Hansen ts one
of the charged and convicted employees. He formed Hanlin
in 1972, and served as President and Chief Executive Officer
(“CEO”) and Chairman of the Board of Directors until early
April 1993. At that time, he was ousted as CEO and Chairman
of the Board by the Bankruptcy Court, at the Board’s request.
Thereafter, he remained an employee and a Board member.
As an employee, he undertook specific projects at the request
of the Board. In late June 1993, the Board asked him to visit
the Brunswick plant and to investigate the operational and
environmental problems. When Taylor resigned as Brunswick
plant manager on July 16, 1993, Christian Hansen became
de facto plant manager for approximately two months, until

8

Allied/HoltraChem invested money in the facility and
installed Mark White as plant manager on October 18, 1993.
Prior to that date, Christian Hansen returned to New Jersey
on an emergency basis for medical treatment of his acute
rheumatoid arthritis. He remained there as a Hanlin employee
with no authority, responsibility or involvement with the
Brunswick plant.

Petitioner Alfred Taylor worked for LCP at the
Brunswick plant from 1979 until February 1994. As plant
manager, Taylor stressed safety and assured employees of
their right to refuse to perform any activity if they felt it was
unsafe. Taylor reported overflow to GA EPD and to the LCP
Board of Directors. A few months after becoming plant
manager, Taylor proposed that the Brunswick plant be shut
down piecemeal to permit rebuilding one cellroom at a time.
He prepared a statement of the costs associated with this
alternative, and gave his proposal to Randall Hansen. Randall
later told Taylor that the Board would not allow the
Brunswick plant to be closed. Approximately two months
later, on July 16, 1993, Taylor resigned as plant manager.
In September 1993, Hansen requested Taylor to return to the
Brunswick plant. Taylor agreed to return only on the condition
that he would not have to assume managerial type duties.
Taylor remained at the Brunswick plant until it closed in
February 1994.

B. Proceedings Below

A jury convicted Christian Hansen of all counts,
including two counts in which the operative events predated
his tenure at the Brunswick plant and 19 counts that arose
from events that occurred after his departure. The district
court denied Christian Hansen’s post-trial request for a

9

judgment notwithstanding the verdict and/or a new trial on April
26, 1999. The Eleventh Circuit aftirmed the conviction and
denial of post-trial relief from the judgment.

A jury convicted Alfred Taylor of 20 counts, including
1] counts that arose from events that occurred after he was no
longer a manager at the Brunswick plant. The district court
denied Taylor’s post-trial request for a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict and/or a new trial on April 26, 1999. The Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the conviction and denial of post-trial relief
from the judgment.

On August 24, 2001, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
issued a 74-page per curium opinion, in which the Court
affirmed all of the Petitioners’ convictions on all counts.
In affirming Petitioners’ convictions, the Eleventh Circuit did
not acknowledge its improper reliance on the RCO doctrine as
a basis for finding liability under environmental criminal
statutes. The Eleventh Circuit also failed to acknowledge its
departure from the reasoning in Park and other Circuit Courts
of Appeals which clearly hold that a person cannot be criminally
liable for violations that occurred when that person was not ina
position of responsibility or control.

C. Jurisdiction Below

The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, because the prosecution was brought by the United
States under federal environmental laws, including the
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(A); the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928(d) & (e);
and the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation
and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b).

10
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Certiorari is warranted in this case because the Hansen
decision is at odds with this Court’s interpretation of the
requirements of the responsible corporate officer (“RCO”)
doctrine and fundamental precepts of criminal law.
The Eleventh Circuit held Hansen liable for 22 violations
and Taylor liable for 11 violations that occurred when they
were not corporate officers, and when Hansen was not
working at, or affiliated with, the Brunswick plant, and Taylor
had no managerial duties at the Brunswick plant.’
The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that Hansen was not an
officer of the corporation, was not even present at the
Brunswick plant and had “‘left his decision-making position”
at the time violations underlying 22 counts of his conviction
occurred. (See Op., App. A at 1 la-12a, 28a.) The Eleventh
Circuit also acknowledged that Taylor resigned in July 1993
and only returned to the Brunswick plant as an employee
without any remaining managerial or supervisory control.
(/d., App. A at 12a.) Then, without so much as a citation, the
court affirmed the convictions despite the undisputed facts
that neither Hansen nor Taylor were officers of the
corporation, neither were in a position of responsibility or
authority, and neither could prevent or correct the violations
charged.

The RCO doctrine arose from this Court’s decision in
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943), in which

2. Hansen Counts 2, 6-10, 14-15, 19-21, 23, 25, 29, 30-32, and
38-40 occurred when he had no authority at the Brunswick plant and
was not even working at the plant. Taylor Counts 23, 25, 29-32, and
38-41 all occurred after Taylor resigned from management and
returned to the Brunswick plant only as an engineer without any
management or supervisory responsibilities.

1]

this Court held that a corporate officer who has a “responsible
share in the furtherance of the transaction” could be held
liable, in addition to the corporation, for violations of law.
This Court determined that the corporate officers who
were subject to this liability could be determined by the
prosecutors, the trial judges and the juries. That determination
proved to be too little guidance, and in United States v. Park,
421 U.S. 658 (1975), this Court again considered a corporate
officer’s liability under the RCO doctrine. In Park, this Court
gave more specific guidelines, and held that RCO liability
could attach “if the defendant had, by reason of his position
in the corporation, responsibility and authority either to
prevent in the first instance, or promptly to correct, the
violation complained of, and failed to do so.” Id. at 673-74.
Despite the clarification this Court provided in Park, courts
have interpreted the scope of RCO liability differently and
have applied it inconsistently in prosecutions of corporate
officers for environmental crimes.

In Hansen, the Eleventh Circuit ignored the necessary
ingredient of control as required by Park. Its decision is
symptomatic of the improper reduction of the Government's
burden of proof through the elimination of the mens rea
requirement that this Court has more recently determined
violates the Fifth Amendment right to due process of law.
See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 616 (1994); United
States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 70 (1994); see
also United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998) (requiring
actual involvement in or control of environmental operations
before a parent company may be liable under CERCLA).

The Hansen decision conflicts with this Court’s prior
application of the RCO doctrine because it imposes liability

12
on persons who had no responsibility or authority to prevent
or correct the charged violations. The Eleventh Circuit so
distorted the RCO doctrine that it affirmed Hansen’s
conviction for violations occurring when he was no longer
working at the Brunswick plant, after he had returned home
to New Jersey, and while he was hospitalized for treatment
of his rheumatoid arthritis. Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit
twisted the doctrine to affirm Taylor’s convictions for
violations occurring after he had resigned from his short stint
as plant manager, and after he had been lured back to work
for the company only after negotiating with them that he
would not be in a position that entailed any management or
supervisory responsibilities. Despite admitting these facts and
without providing any rationale, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed Petitioners’ convictions under its flawed
interpretation of the RCO doctrine for violations occurring
during the time Petitioners were removed from all
management and supervisory responsibilities. Under this
Court’s holding in Park, and more recently in Staples, X-
Citement Video, and Bestfoods, the Eleventh Circuit should
have reversed Hansen’s and Taylor’s convictions.

Three issues are presented here:

First, despite this Court’s clarification of the RCO
doctrine in Park and other Circuit Courts of Appeals clear
holdings that a person must be in actual control of a facility
before environmental liability will attach, in affirming the
district court’s decision, the Eleventh Circuit eliminated the
“actual control” requirement. The Eleventh Circuit extended
liability to persons who were not corporate officers and had
no opportunity to prevent the violations, including Hansen
who was not even working at the facility when the violations

—— To ite

13
occurred. The Eleventh Circuit did not give its reasoning,
explain its decision or cite to any authority for this dramatic
departure from the RCO doctrine. (See Op., App. A at 28a.)

Second, Circuit Courts of Appeals are split on the issue
of whether a person convicted under the RCO doctrine must
have actual knowledge of each element of the charged
violation, even in the face of this Court’s clear direction in
Staples and X-Citement that statutes similar to RCRA and
the CWA require a demonstration of mens rea. The Eleventh
Circuit improperly eliminated the “actual knowledge”
standard by deeming the regulations at issue to be public
welfare statutes and allowing the jury to convict without the
Government proving that the Petitioners had the mens rea
necessary to commit the violation.

Third, Petitioners present an important issue of federal
law that should be settled by this Court: whether criminal
liability should be reduced or eliminated when the
corporation is in bankruptcy because the corporate officers
are no longer in a position to make decisions that could
correct or prevent the violations. In the district court, the
Government argued to the judge and jury that the Brunswick
plant needed to be closed, but Hanlin’s filing for bankruptcy
protection effectively limited those managers’ actual control
over the Brunswick plant. Hansen, Taylor and the other
corporate officers lacked the authority to take actions such
as closing or selling the Brunswick plant, or allocating funds
to prevent or correct the violations. In fact, the Board of
Directors and the Creditors’ Committee specifically refused
to close the Brunswick plant when co-defendant Randall
Hansen presented Taylor’s recommendation that the
Brunswick plant be shui down to prevent environmental
releases.

14

I. The RCO Doctrine Requires That The Corporate
Officer Be In Actual Control Of The Facility At The
Time Of The Occurrence

The Eleventh Circuit, without citation to authority or
justification for its decision, unilaterally extended the RCO
doctrine to make liable those employees who are not
corporate officers, are not in a position of authority or control,
and are not working at or associated with the facility at the
time the offending releases occurred. By doing so, the
Eleventh Circuit has completely ignored this Court’s holding
in Park requiring that a corporate officer have the ability to
prevent or correct a violation before that officer will be held
liable. Such a requirement is logical, given that the doctrine
is titled and based on the necessary fact that the corporate
officer be “responsible” for the violation.

Not only does the Eleventh Circuit decision conflict with
the holding in Park, but it also conflicts with this Court’s
holding in United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998)
(interpreting CERCLA). This Court’s reasoning in Bestfoods
is directly applicable to the RCO doctrine issue in this case.
In Bestfoods, a civil case, the Court considered whether a
parent corporation could be liable for the CERCLA violations
committed by its subsidiary. Under the CERCLA provision
at issue in Bestfoods, a person may only be liable if that
person “owns” or “operates” a facility. This Court held that
“operating” a facility for purposes of CERCLA required
managing, directing, or conducting operations specifically
related to the release or disposal of hazardous waste
or compliance with environmental regulations. /d. at 70-71.
This Court specifically limited liability to those persons with
a direct link to the release of hazardous waste that formed
the basis of the statutory violation. Even in the civil context,

15

this Court recognized that a nexus must exist between a
defendant’s conduct and the specific activity resulting in the
environmental violation. Clearly that same nexus must be
present in the criminal context, where defendants face severe
penalties and the Government must prove defendant's
connection to a violation beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Eleventh Circuit ignored the nexus that this Court held
was necessary for liability in Bestfoods. The Eleventh Circuit
did not cite to Bestfoods in its opinion despite the fact that the
statutory provision at issue in Bestfoods, and the RCRA and
CERCLA statutes at issue in this case require a person to “own”
or “operate” a facility — essentially to be in a position to control
the facility or the activity that forms the basis for the liability.
In fact, the Court admitted that the acts occurred “after Hansen
left his decision making position,” but then casually, without
any citation to the record linking Hansen to those acts, stated:
“the acts occurred at [Hansen’s] direction.” (Op., App. A at 28a.)
Not only does the Court’s statement admit the legal impairment
to liability because Hansen was not in “actual control,” but it is
also factually deficient. The Government did not prove that
Brunswick employees followed any of Hansen’s directives.
Further, the Government did not link any of Hansen’s directives
with the specific violations that were charged. The Eleventh
Circuit simply refused to take a critical look at or address head-
on Petitioners’ arguments.

Certiorari also is warranted by the conflict in the Circuit
Courts of Appeals on the “actual control” issue. The Eleventh
Circuit’s decision is at odds with the holdings of several other
Circuit Courts of Appeals that have addressed the “actual
control” issue. See United States v. Dell ‘Aquilla, 150 F.3d 329
(3d Cir. 1998) (interpreting the Clean Air Act); United States v.
Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 314 (6th Cir. 1998)

16

(interpreting CERCLA), United States v. Carr, 880 F.2d 1550
(2d Cir. 1989) (interpreting CERCLA and the CWA). Each of
these cases has found that the corporate officer (or corporate
parent, as in Bestfoods) must exercise actual control before
liability attaches.

For example, the Eleventh Circuit decision conflicts with
the reasoning used by the Third Circuit in Dell ‘Aquilla, 150
F.3d at 334 (interpreting the Clean Air Act), a case that is directly
on point here. In Dell ‘Aquilla, the Third Circuit vacated the
grant of summary judgment and held that individual defendants
had to be directly involved with the operation of a facility at the
time that each violation occurred, and that prior involvement
with the facility would not result in liability for later violations.
Id. at 334. The Third Circuit relied on the Bestfoods
interpretation of “operator” under CERCLA which did not
specifically address corporate officer liability, but required the
Government to demonstrate that the person being charged
actually participated in or had some nexus to the liability-creating
conduct. The court reversed the district court because the district
court erred in assuming that once liability was demonstrated
for a Clean Air Act violation, it was proved for future violations
regardless of the capacity of the defendant to control the
polluting activity. Similarly, the Third Circuit has rejected the
argument that liability attaches based solely on the officer’s
active involvement in the corporations day-to-day affairs. United
States v. USX Corp., 68 F.3d 811, 824-25 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding
that to find CERLA liability, the Government must show that
the person sought to be held liable actually participated in the
liability-creating conduct).

The Sixth Circuit employed the same reasoning in United
States v. Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 1998),
which holding that a CERCLA operator had to exert “actual

+7

control” and “must perform affirmative acts” before liability
will attach for environmental violations. /d. at 314. The Sixth
Circuit held that the failure to act, even if coupled with the ability
or authority to do so, would not confer operator liability. The
Second Circuit considered a similar question in United States v.
Carr, when it stated that despite its expansive view of who was
“in charge” under CERCLA, it still required that “in charge”
include only those people who had supervisory control over the
facility. 880 F.2d 1550, 1554 (2d Cir. 1989).

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Hansen even conflicts
with the Circuit’s own reasoning in another environmental case
addressing a similar situation. See Redwing Carriers, Inc.
vy. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489 (11th Cir. 1996)
? (interpreting CERCLA). In Redwing Carriers, the Eleventh
F Circuit held that partners of a limited partnership were not liable
; for environmental violations unless they had either participated
in the operations of the violating facility, participated in the
activities that resulted in the disposal of hazardous substances,
or that the partners actually exercised contro] over or were
otherwise intimately involved in the operation of the partnership.
Id. at 1505. The court required direct involvement by the person
in the activities charged as violations of the statutes or evidence
that the person was in a position of control.

The Eleventh Circuit ignored the Redwing Carriers

1 decision, and its decision in Hansen to extend liability to a person
: who is not a corporate officer and not in actual control stands in
stark contrast to the reasoning of the Third Circuit in
Dell ‘Aquilla, the other Circuit Courts of Appeals, and this Court.

This departure is more incredible because the court admitted

that the acts forming the basis of several of the Counts

“continued after Hansen left his decision-making position,”

while at the same time concluding, without citation to a single

18

case or the record, that those acts occurred at Hansen’s direction.
Similarly, the court failed to discuss the Counts where Alfred
Taylor was no longer in a position of actual control. Just as the
Third Circuit held in Dell ‘Aquilla, the Eleventh Circuit should
have reversed the district court because the Government failed
to show that Hansen or Taylor continued to function in a capacity
of responsibility or control for each violation of RCRA, the
CWA and CERCLA that occurred. See Dell ‘Aguilla, 150 F.3d
at 334.

The Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Hansen is elusive.
By holding the Petitioners liable when they were without any
power to effect change in Brunswick’s environmental operations,
the Eleventh Circuit potentially extended liability to a seemingly
endless class of employees who may have worked at a facility
prior to, during, or after the violation occurred but never had
any responsibility for the violation. The decision essentially
assumes liability without the necessary showing of a nexus
between the act or omission forming the basis of the liability
and a person’s responsibility for that act or omission as required
by the RCO doctrine. This Court has an opportunity to resolve
whether Petitioners were appropriately held criminally liable
under the RCO doctrine for violations where there was no nexus
because Petitioners were not able to exert actual control over
the facility at the time the violations occurred.

Il. The Fifth Amendment Right To Due Process Was
Violated When The Government Failed To Prove That
Hansen And Taylor Had Actual Knowledge Of Each
Element Of The Offenses

The “actual knowledge”’ issue has been addressed by this
court in Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 616 (1994), and
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 70 (1994).
In those cases, this Court held that converting a federal statute

19

that provides criminal penalties into a public welfare statute,
rather than treating it as a standard criminal statute as intended
by Congress, is unconstitutional because it reduces the
Government’s burden of proof in violation of the Fifth
Amendment right to due process of law. The criminal provisions
of the CWA and RCRA do not impose strict liability on a
defendant and the lower courts’ converting them to public
welfare statutes by removing the mens rea element 1s
unconstitutional and violates due process.

While the Court has addressed the mens rea requirement
of other federal statutes, the Court has yet to address the mens
rea requirement of environmental criminal statutes such as the
CWA and RCRA. As Justices Thomas and O’Connor stated in
their recent dissent to the denial of a petition for a writ of
certiorari in Hanousek v. United States, 528 U.S. 1102, 1103-
05 (2000), now is the time for the Court to resolve the split in
the Circuit Courts of Appeals and determine that the CWA and
RCRA cannot be public welfare statutes in light of their express
mens rea requirement and the serious penalties they impose.
This case presents the Court an opportunity to clarify the
confusing and contradictory standards expressed by the C ircuit
Courts of Appeals and reaffirm the holdings of Staples and
X-Citement in the environmental context.

_ The confusion in the scienter requirements of the RCO
doctrine results from the failure of prosecutors and courts to
distinguish the occasions when the RCO doctrine is applied to
true public welfare statutes from those where the RCO doctrine
is applied to regulations that call for explicit knowledge and
impose severe criminal penalties, such as the CWA and RCRA.
See Randall S. Abate & Dayna E. Mancuso, It’s All About What
You Know: The Specific Intent Standard Should Govern
“Knowing” Violations of the Clean Water Act, 9 N.Y.U. Envtl.

20

L. J. 304, 311-19 (2001). Several courts have properly held the
government to its burden to prove defendant’s knowledge of
each element of the crime and declined to apply the public
welfare doctrine to environmental statutes. See United States v.
Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386 (Sth Cir. 1996) (declining to hold that the
CWA 1s a public welfare statute); United States v. MacDonald
& Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 51-52 (1st Dist. 1991)
(distinguishing RCRA, which requires specific intent, from the
public welfare statutes at issue in Dotterweich and Park);
see also United States v. White, 766 F. Supp. 873, 894-95
(E.D. Wash. 1991) (same). Other courts have applied the gloss
of the public welfare doctrine to knowing violations of RCRA
and the CWA and held persons criminally liable as responsible
corporate officers without the requisite showing of specific
intent. See United States v. Kelley Technical Coatings, Inc., 157
F.3d 432, 438-39 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Wilson, 133
F.2d 251, 262-63 (4th Cir. 1997).

In this case, the Eleventh Circuit without explanation
declined to follow this Court and those Circuits that have
properly determined that the public welfare doctrine does not
apply to RCRA and the CWA. The Eleventh Circuit’s decision
directly conflicts with the reasoning of this Court 1n both
X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64, and Staples, 511 U.S. at 618,
and with the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Ahmad, 101 F.3d
at 39, and the First Circuit in MacDonald, 933 F.2d at 51-52.
In Hansen, the Eleventh Circuit has vastly broadened the scope
of liability in the environmental criminal arena — despite the -
grave penalties that may result from convictions under RCRA
and the CWA.

In Staples, this Court reaffirmed the common law rule that
the Government must prove mens rea for statutory crimes.
This Court rejected the Government’s argument that the National

21
Firearms Act (“NFA”) was a public welfare statute simply
because it regulated inherently dangerous activity. An important
element of this Court’s reasoning was that the severe penalties
of up to ten years imprisonment that may result from NFA
violations was a reason to maintain the Government's burden
of proof. This Court’s statement in Staples applies equally here:
“punishing a violation as a felony is simply incompatible with
the theory of the public welfare offense.” Staples, 511 U.S. at
618.

In line with Staples, this Court next reversed a
Ninth Circuit decision that interpreted a statute as lacking a
mens rea requirement. See X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64.
In interpreting the Protection of Children Against Sexual
Exploitation Act of 1977, this Court held that the “knowingly”
requirement applied to each element of the crime. When making
its decision, this Court stated that “[oJur reluctance to simply
follow the most grammatical reading of the statute is heightened
by our cases interpreting criminal statutes to include broadly
applicable scienter requirements, even where the statute by its
terms does not contain them.” /d. at 70. This Court again rejected
the argument that a statute imposing harsh penalties could be
considered a public welfare statute and determined that the
statute’s mens rea requirement must be applied to each element
of the crime. /d. at 71. The statute in X-Citement Video — like
the CWA and RCRA — carried penalties of up to ten years in
prison and substantial fines.

Members of this Court have expressly called into question
the application of the public welfare doctrine to the CWA in
terms that are applicable equally to RCRA. Hanousek, 528 U.S.
at 1103-05. Justices Thomas and O’Connor noted that the
seriousness of the penalties (felonies with three to six years In
prison) “counsels against concluding that the CWA can

22

accurately be classified as a public welfare statute.” /d. at 1104.
More troubling to the Justices was the broad sweep of such a
classification: classifying criminal statutes, such as the CWA,
as public welfare statutes simply because they regulate conduct
that is known to be subject to extensive regulation and that may
involve risk to the community would criminalize almost all
industrial activities. /d. In Hansen, Petitioners were sentenced
to harsh penalties — imprisonment for nine years for Hansen
and six and one-half years for Taylor. These sentences arose
from violations of the CWA, among other environmental
Statutes, and illustrate the Justice’s reasoning in Hanousek
against classifying the CWA as a public welfare statute.

The Fifth Circuit followed the reasoning of X-Citement
Video and Staples and held that the CWA was not a public welfare
Statute and that the Government had to prove mens rea before
liability could be found. Ahmad, 101 F.3d at 390-91. The Fifth
Circuit held that the CWA was not a public welfare statute
because CWA crimes were classified as serious felonies and
there was no clear statement from Congress that mens rea was
not required to find a violation. /d. at 391. The Fifth Circuit
also considered whether the jury instructions in Ahmad
adequately conveyed the mens rea requirement. The Court held
that the instructions were faulty and required reversal of the
conviction because “[a]t best, the jury charge made it uncertain
to which elements ‘knowingly’ applied.” Jd. Because this
presented the reasonable likelihood that the jury did not apply
the “knowingly” element to each element, the Fifth Circuit
reversed the defendant’s conviction.

While the First Circuit’s decision in MacDonald predates
this Court’s decisions in Staples and X-Citement Videos, it
applies the same principles to RCRA in reversing a conviction
based on the presumption that the defendant knew of the

23

violations simply because he was a corporate officer. 933 F.2d
at 55. The court stated: “[W]e know of no precedent for failing
to give effect to a knowledge requirement that Congress has
expressly included in a criminal statute. Especially is that
so where, as here the crime is a felony carrying possible
imprisonment of five years and, for a second offense, ten.”
Id. at 45 (citation omitted). The court held that a mere showing
of official responsibility under Dotterweich and Park was not
an adequate substitute for the government proving knowledge.
Id. at 55.

The Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in this case is directly
contrary to this Court’s reasoning in X-Citement Video and in
Staples, as well as the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Ahmad and
the First Circuit’s reasoning in MacDonald. Here, the Eleventh
Circuit ignored those precedents and did not instruct the jury
that the Government had to prove that the Petitioners acted
“knowingly” for each element of the offense. Because of the
blanket use of the RCO instruction, Hansen and Taylor were
convicted of violations under each statute without proof that
they had the requisite scienter.

This was especially true for Count 34 under RCRA for
Knowing Endangerment, a violation that carries a penalty of up
to ten years imprisonment. In Hansen, the jury was not instructed
of the appropriate mens rea element of the Knowing
Endangerment charge. A “Knowing Endangerment” violation
requires a finding that Petitioners knew that their actions created
an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, as required
by the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e). (See App. D at 129a.)
Specific, not inferred, knowledge of the imminent danger is the
standard for a violation. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(f). (See id.) Because
the district court gave an RCO instruction at trial, the jury was
allowed to convict Hansen and Taylor based on their roles in

24

the corporation and the inference that they knew of a RCRA
violation instead of proof that they knowingly failed to prevent,
detect or correct a violation, as required by the statute.

Like MacDonald and Ahmad, this case should be reversed.
First, the Petitioners were convicted based on their corporate
status, not based on their actual knowledge. Second, the district
court failed to give effect to an express knowledge requirement
found in the statute. Third, the crime for which they were
convicted is a felony that carried severe penalties of up to ten
years imprisonment.

The jury instructions for the charges under the CWA also
were faulty and warrant reversal of the Petitioners’ convictions.
The CWA expressly requires proof that the person charged with
the violations possess the mens rea specified in the statute.
Courts have recognized that this mens rea requirement is not
superceded by the use of the RCO doctrine. The result is that an
officer’s corporate status is just one of several factors that lead
to an inference of actual knowledge, the mens rea standard in
the CWA. The CWA specifically confers liability on “any
responsible corporate officer,” 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6), making
the question of responsibility one of the elements necessary to
prove a CWA violation. (See App. D at 125a.)

The district court failed, however, to instruct the jury about
the circumstances that determine when a corporate officer may
be held responsible — including issues about the officer’s
knowledge, capacity to prevent, and knowing failure to prevent,
the offending discharge. Instead of requiring the Government
to prove this element, the district court instructed the jury that
“wherever I have used the term ‘corporate officers,’ | mean
responsible corporate officers.” By doing so, the district court
eliminated the CWA mens rea element, converted the CWA into
a strict liability statute and allowed Petitioners to be convicted

25

merely because of their status. The district court’s holding and
the Eleventh Circuit’s affirmation of that holding have been
specifically rejected by the Fifth Circuit in Ahmad and by Justices
Thomas and O’Connor in their dissent to the denial of certiorari
in Hanousek, and resulted in Christian Hansen and Alfred Taylor
being sentenced to nine years and six and one-half years
imprisonment, respectively, without proper proof.

The Eleventh Circuit’s reliance on the Ninth Circuit's
Iverson case to justify its decision on the mens rea, issue also is
without merit. A closer look at /verson demonstrates that it does
not support the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit. See United
States v. Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 1998). In fact, the
Eleventh Circuit’s decision is at odds with the Ninth Circuit’s
approval of the RCO jury instruction in /verson. /d. In Iverson,
the Ninth Circuit approved an instruction that required the jury
to find: that the defendant had knowledge of the facts that lead
to the offending discharge of pollutants; that the defendant had
the authority and capacity to prevent the discharge, and that the
defendant failed to prevent the ongoing discharge. /d. at 1022.
In Hansen, the jury was allowed to convict without specifying
that liability was arising under the RCO doctrine, and without
requiring a finding that the Petitioners had knowledge of the
facts that lead to the offending discharge of pollutants.”

This Court has held that where there is a reasonable
likelihood that the jury has applied the instructions in a manner
that does not give full effect to the statute at issue, the jury may

3. Although the defendant in /verson and this case faced similar
charges, the facts in /verson are distinct from those here. In /verson, the
defendant personally discharged the pollutants, ordered discharge at an
alternative location for easier release, conducted the business of the
company even after he was “retired,” and knew that his conduct was
illegal.

26

have been misled about the elements of the offense. When a
jury is instructed on an impermissible legal theory, reversal
is warranted. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990).
In addition, when an instruction is ambiguous and capable of
an erroneous interpretation, reversal is warranted when there is
a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged
instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of
constitutionally relevant evidence. /d. In this case, any one of
these faulty instructions warrants reversal of the Petitioners’
convictions, and as a whole, the improper jury instructions
overwhelming weigh in favor of reversal.

The RCO doctrine should not eradicate the mens rea —
requirements of the underlying statute that attaches liability, and
under the CWA and RCRA the corporate officer must have
“actual knowledge” of the situation giving rise to the crime.
Nevertheless, Hansen’s and Taylor’s convictions under the CWA
and RCRA were reached without the Government proving that
the Petitioners had the mens rea necessary to find liability.
In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the misapplication
of the RCO doctrine by permitting the CWA and RCRA to be
converted into public welfare statutes and reducing the
government’s burden of proof in contravention of the decisions
of this Court and other Circuit Courts of Appeals.

Ill. Certiorari Is Necessary To Resolve The Conflicting
Objectives Of The Federal Bankruptcy Act And
Environmental Statutes

This Court should also grant certiorari to resolve
the friction between the bankruptcy and environmental
regulations. The contro] that Petitioners had in this case over
the Brunswick plant was further inhibited by Hanlin’s
bankruptcy, yet the Eleventh Circuit failed to address Petitioners’

27

arguments that their management authority and responsibilities
were fundamentally changed by Hanlin’s bankruptcy, limiting
its perfunctory discussion to Randall Hansen’s arguments.
(See Op., App. A at 29a-31a.)

Bankruptcy laws and environmental laws have competing
objectives. While the objective of bankruptcy laws Is to preserve
a corporation’s assets for reorganization or for the benefit of its
creditors, the objective of environmental laws is to protect the
health and environment, without consideration of the cost to
effectuate that goal. Courts have been forced to balance between
these competing goals, and the tension between those
two objectives has long been recognized. See In re Chicago,
Milwaukee, R.R., 3 F.3d 200, 201 (7th Cir. 1993); In re
Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1002 (2d Cir. 1991)
(“We agree that the Bankruptcy Code and CERCLA point toward
competing objectives.”’).

While the Eleventh Circuit’s statement that bankruptcy does
not insulate a debtor from environmental statutes (see Op., App.
A at 30a) is true to some degree, the reality is much more clouded
and courts have limited a debtor’s environmental liability in
bankruptcy although conflicts remain regarding the
circumstances that warrant such limitation. See Olio v. Kovacs,
469 U.S. 274, 281 (1985) (state environmental clean-up order
that can be performed only by the payment of money is a claim
against the bankrupt estate and is dischargeable in bankruptcy);
In re Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1002 (claim resulting from pre-
petition release may be dischargeable); United States v. Whizco,
841 F.2d 147, 150-51 (6th Cir. 1988) (to the extent an injunction
required debtor to expend resources to clean up site, it was a
dischargeable claim); but see Mid-Atlantic Nat'l Bank v.
New Jersey Dept. of Envt'l Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 506 (1986)
(limiting ability of trustee to abandon contaminated property);

28

In re Nat'l Gypsum, 139 B.R. 397, 407 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992)
(refusing to discharge debts associated with debtor’s
undiscovered sites).

The above-mentioned cases highlight the conflicting
objectives of bankruptcy and environmental laws and courts’
attempts to resolve those conflicts, but they do not address the
issue presented to the Eleventh Circuit and this Court by the
Petitioners. Nor did the Eleventh Circuit’s perfunctory analysis
(see Op., App. A at 29a-3 1a), because Petitioners did not contend
that LCP, as the debtor, should be absolved of environmental
liability. Petitioners argued that the bankruptcy shifted control
of the corporation from its management to the Bankruptcy Court,
the Board of Directors and the Creditor’s Committee, imposing
an overlay of bankruptcy rules that severely circumscribed
management’s ability to take action on behalf of the corporation.
Thus, the issue raised before this Court, which has not been
addressed below or by other courts, is whether a corporate officer
or employee can be held criminally liable for environmental
violations even when he had no authority to act to prevent,
control or mitigate those violations because the corporation was
in bankruptcy.

Once LCP entered bankruptcy as a debtor-in-possession,
the Board and the bankruptcy court, not Petitioners, possessed
the authority to commit the resources that the Government argues
were necessary to alleviate the environmental conditions at the
Brunswick plant.’ See CFTC v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 352-
53 (1985); In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 158 B.R. 343, 353-54
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992). Under the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor-
in-possession’s officers and directors are placed in the dual role
of running the corporation in the ordinary course of business

4. The Brunswick plant managers could not make a decision to
shut down the Plant, yet under the Government’s theory, that was
the way to cure its problems.

29

and carrying out the fiduciary responsibilities of a trustee,
including maximizing the value of the estate for the debtor’s
creditors. See Tenn-Fla Partners y. First Union Nat'l Bank of
Fla., 229 B.R. 720, 736 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1999).
Consequently, management has conflicting responsibilities
placed on it when confronted with an environmental expense
that has both the possibility of depleting the estate and the
potential to incur liability for environmental violations.

Management’s control is further limited because the
corporation is under the control of the bankruptcy court.
See In re Schepps Food Stores, Inc., 160 B.R. 792, 799 (Bankr.
S.D. Texas 1993) (“Bankruptcy Code provides a supplemental
scheme of governance over the estate’). In order to “use, sell,
or lease” its property “other than in the ordinary course of
business,” a debtor-in-possession, must obtain approval from
the bankruptcy court. 11 U.S.C.A. § 363(b)(1). Environmental
expenses for compliance and cleanup are expenses that may be
outside of the ordinary course of business and require bankruptcy
court approval. See Jn re Allegheny Int'l, 158 B.R. at 353-54.
This shift in-eontrol, the new duties of a debtor-in-possession,
and the limits placed on an officer’s or director’s actions as a
result of bankruptcy must have a corresponding effect on the
criminal liability of individual officers or directors at a bankrupt
company.

In this case, after the bankruptcy petition was filed, funds
for maintenance, repair and environmental compliance were
restricted, and all decisions for continuing plant operation, major
projects, capital and extraordinary expenditures, and the sale of
assets, were subject to approval by the Board of Directors, the
Creditors Committee, and the Bankruptcy Court. Petitioners
tried, but were not allowed, to adequately allocate funds to
correct the offending releases, and alternatively, proposed that
the Brunswick plant be shut down until the problems there could
be solved. Because Petitioners could not authorize expenditures

30

for the Brunswick plant that, under the Government’s theory,
may have prevented the violations, Petitioners should not be
found criminally liable for failing to make those expenditures.

The Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Hansen places Petitioners,
and other officers and directors in similar circumstances, 1n an
untenable position that will likely chill qualified persons from
taking or remaining in management positions in bankrupt
corporations for fear of personal criminal liability. Moreover,
because Hanlin’s bankruptcy limited Petitioner’s actual control
over the operations of the Brunswick plant and its operations,
not recognizing this reduction in control compounded the effects
of the blanket RCO jury instruction.

CONCLUSION

This Court should grant this petition to correct the
misapplication of Supreme Court precedent and resolve the split
between the Eleventh Circuit and the other Circuit Courts of
Appeals that have applied the RCO doctrine to environmental
statutes. Further, this Court should grant this petition to address
the tension between the environmental laws and the laws of
bankruptcy. Accordingly, the Petitioners respectfully request that
this Court grant this petition for a writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

RosBert L. BERNER, JR.
Counsel of Record

Davip P. HACKETT
ADRIANE W. BuRKLAND
Douc.tas B. SANDERS
BaKER & McKENZIE
Attorneys for Petitioners
130 East Randolph Drive
Chicago, Illinois 60601
(312) 861-8000

APPENDIX

la

APPENDIX A — PER CURIAM OPINION OF THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT DATED AND
FILED AUGUST 24, 2001

-~

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-11638
D.C. Docket No. 98-00023-CR-2-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHRISTIAN A. HANSEN, ALFRED R. TAYLOR, et al.,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia

(August 24, 2001)

Before BIRCH and DUBINA, Circuit Judges, and
HANCOCK’, District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

Alfred R. Taylor, Christian A. Hansen, and Randall W.
Hansen appeal their convictions for conspiracy to commit

* Honorable James H. Hancock, U.S. District Judge for the
Northern District of Alabama, sitting by designation.

2a
Appendix A

environmental crimes, violating the Clean Water Act,
- violating the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and
violating the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act. On appeal, they each assert
several alleged trial and sentencing errors. Finding no merit
to their claims, we AFFIRM.

I. BACKGROUND

Christian Hansen (“Hansen’’) founded the Hanlin Group
(“Hanlin”) in 1972, and served as its President, Chief
Executive Officer, and Chairman of the Board until early
April 1993. R19-160. Hanlin operated an industrial plant in
Brunswick, Georgia, as LCP Chemicals-Georgia (“LCP”),
R21-41, and Hansen served as the plant manager for
approximately two months in 1993. R19-166-67. Randall
Hansen (“Randall”), Hansen’s son, was hired as an executive
vice president in 1992. R21-193. He became Chief Executive
Officer in April 1993 and served in that capacity until
November 1993. R21-195. Alfred Taylor (“Taylor”) began
working for LCP in 1979, and became the Brunswick
operations manager in 199]. R21-243-44. He served as plant
manager from February until July 1993. R21-244-45.

Hanlin purchased the Brunswick plant in 1979.' R21-
41. The plant, which is on a site adjacent to tidal marshes

1. The site has been used by various companies for 50 years,
and was unregulated by any environmental regulations until the
1970s. The site was operated as an oil refinery from 1919 to 1937 by
Atlantic Richfield [ARCO], as a manufacturing site from 1937 to
1955 by Dixie Paint Company, and as a chlor-alkali facility from

(Cont'd)

3a
Appendix A

and Purvis Creek, operated continuously year-round,
manufacturing caustic soda, hydrogen gas, hydrochloric acid,
and chlor-alkali bleach. About 150 people worked at the plant
in two “cell buildings” or “cellrooms.” Each cellroom was
about the size of a football field and contained fifty mercury
“cells,” the units used to produce the bleach, soda, gas, and
acid ultimately sold by LCP. R8-200-2. “The production
process generated hazardous wastes, including elemental
mercury, mercury-contaminated sludge (or “muds”’),°

(Cont'd)

1955 to 1979 by Allied Chemical. R16-85-86. Allied Chemical used
graphite anodes impregnated with PCBs during the chlor-alkah
process, and buried the contaminated anodes on the site. R21-54,
229. It is now a Superfund site, and is being cleaned at the expense
of the government and these earlier owners.

2. In a memorandum regarding mercury consumption, dated
4 October 1993, Taylor noted that mercury “[c]onsumption was
particularly high in 1988” and for 1990-1993. Govt. Ex. 19-5. An
attachment showed “excess” mercury from consumption of 243, 102
pounds from 1986 to 1993. /d.

The “mud” was spread onto the cellroom floors to dry, the
mercury was recovered from underneath and on top of the mud, and
the mud was put into drums for disposal. R19-190-93. When the
wastewater covered the floors, the mud could not be stored until the
water receded and it was dried. /d. at 191. The drums were stored
underneath the cellrooms. R20-62. The drums were labeled and dated
when the mud was first put into the drum “because [the plant] only
had a ninety-day storage period under [the] permit.” /d. at 62-63.
There were “times” when the mud was “redrumed” and again labeled
for another ninety-days. /d. Hanson testified that Taylor was aware
of the muds in the drums. /d. at 62.

(Cont'd)

4a
Appendix A

wastewater, chlorine contaminated wastewater, and extremely
caustic wastes with high pH values.” /d. at 2-3; R16-112-14.
The wastes were subject to various environmental
regulations, including wastewater limitations on pH, mercury,
and chlorine set forth in LCP’s National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (“NPDES”), and to regulations of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), 42
U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2).

LCP constructed a wastewater treatment system in 1989
and 1990, and was allowed, by NPDES permit, to discharge
- the treated wastewater into Purvis Creek. Although LCP
represented that the system would have a continuous
treatment capacity of 70 gallons per minute in the project
description submitted to we prone EPD, Govt. Ex. 10-3b
at SWS 00001807, the filtration and storage systems installed
had a capacity of only 35 gallons per minute, R20-20-21;
Govt. Ex. 1-12. LCP did not notify the Georgia EPD of the
lower wastewater treatment capacity. R20-290. The plant was
authorized to store wastewater which was awaiting treatment
in the wastewater treatment plant on the floor of the
cellrooms. R16-118; R21-145, 161. The cellrooms were
constructed of concrete, with a downward slope which
diverted the wastewaters to a sump’ and then to the
wastewater treatment holding tanks. R19-33-34. If the
cellroom became incapable of holding the wastewater, it

(Cont'd)

At Taylor’s direction, mud that accumulated in the wastewater
stored in tank railcars was “drained off to the wastewater treatment
area.” R20-356-57.

3. A sump is a hole with a grate over it. R19-34

Sa
Appendix A

leaked out onto the ground and accumulated in a lake. R16-
131-32. LCP also used “Bunker C” oil tanks for additional
wastewater storage. R19-291; R20-42-45. Due to accidental
spills, bleach sometimes accumulated on the Cellroom |
floor. R19-258. During the early 1990s, the maintenance at
the plant began deteriorating. R20-177, 179. Replacement
parts were not made available, and wastewater began
accumulating around the plant. /d. -

The operations were subject to Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (“OSHA”) regulations for the
protection and safety of the employees. The workers exposed
to mercury vapors in the mercury cell process were provided
with liquids to drink in order to stay hydrated and deplete
the mercury, and their exposure was periodically monitored
through an extensive mercury urinalysis procedure. R20-145-
46; R21-251-52. Employees who showed exposure‘to excess
mercury were not allowed to return to work until they were
seen by a medical physician, and were then relocated to other
plant locations away from the mercury cells.* R20-146, 164-
65, 168-69, 174; R21-255, 258; R22-12, 24.

In August 1992, OSHA inspected the plant “due to an
employee complaint about safety hazards associated with
water on cell room floors.” Govt. Ex.-10-7i. OSHA found
this to be a “willful violation and demanded that no
employees be allowed to work in contact with the water while
the equipment was energized,” and “forced” LCP “to erect a

4. LCP retested and counseled any employee who tested above
150 micrograms per liter, and employees with a confirmed result
above 250 micrograms were removed from further exposure until
their level went below 150. R21-253-55.

6a
Appendix A

boardwalk system above the water level around all the
equipment until the water c[ould] be eliminated
permanently.” /d. LCP added wooden elevated walkways in
the cellrooms to prevent the workers from having contact
with the water on the floor and to reduce the workers’ risk of
electrical shock or chemical burns.* R16-118; R21-145-46,
161. The chemicals used in LCP’s operations were very
alkaline and caustic and could irritate and burn skin.° R16-
93; R19-43, 197; R20-188; R21-263-64. To minimize the
workers’ risk of skin irritations and burns, LCP held routine
safety meetings, encouraged and received safety inspections,
and provided the employees with training, protective
equipment to preclude skin contact, and first aid stations and

5. The water occasionally rose high enough to splash onto or
soak the walkways, and they became slick. R20-181, 322. OSHA
also required that LCP utilize a lockout procedure for employees to
work on a cell or pump because of the potential electrical hazards.
R19-45; R20-190. In the lockout procedure, an operator ensured that
the electrical power was shut off before a mechanic was permitted to
begin work. R19-46-47; R20-190, 323.

6. One former employee, Duane Lorenzo Carver, testified that
he received second and third degree burns on his thighs from caustic
that had soaked through his clothes. R19-182, 197. In reference toa
question regarding the conditions of the cellrooms in 1993, he said
that, while digging out the sump, he misstepped and fell into the
sump hole, which was filled with wastewater, “about chest deep.”
R19-201-03, 227-228. Carver said that he showered immediately and
suffered minor burns on his stomach and legs. R19-203, 229. Carver
was unable to recall the exact date, and admitted the accident could
have occurred any time between 1987 and 1993. R19-226. Carver
testified that, although the employees were told to report all 2. ~idents
to management, he did not report the accident, and thus did not receive
any medical attention. R19-230.

7a
Appendix A

showers to relieve inadvertent contact. R19-47, 194, 233-
34, 246, 300-01; R20-170, 181-82, 185, 188, 190-91; R21-
249. All employees, including those assigned to the
cellrooms, were authorized to work elsewhere in the plant if
they were concerned about their safety. R19-302; R20-186-
87, 320-2; R21-156.

In 1991, LCP’s parent corporation, Hanlin, filed a
voluntary bankruptcy petition with pre-petition obligations
exceeding $100 million. R19-119,; R21-194. Shortly
thereafter, Randall was hired as an executive vice president
of LCP and charged with “developing thé business and
financial plans necessary to turn around the financial
condition of the chemical business.”” R21-193, R16-97.
Randall worked closely with Hanlin’s bankruptcy attorneys,
the law firm of McCarter and English, and the environmental
law firm of Decher, Price and Rhoads. R19-140-43; R21-
194, 215.* Randall also worked closely with LCP’s corporate
environmental manager and site environmental managers.
R20-64-65; R21-210, 215. During the bankruptcy
proceedings, available funds for maintenance, repair, and
environmental compliance were restricted. R1 9-50-52.
Randall attempted to find additional funds by selling excess
equipment and reducing the payroll but the funds remained
limited. /d. The ultimate decision-making for all major

7. Randall Hansen had worked for Hanlin in a financial capacity
from 1986 until 1989.

8. During the bankruptcy proceedings, Hanlin set aside seven
to ten thousand dollars per day for professional fees. R19-147.

Sa

Appendix A

bankruptcy creditor's committee and court. R19-121, 143-
47, 174-75; R21-196. Although funds were requested to
address the cellrooms’ wastewater problem, the funds were
usually not released. R21-259-60.

In February 1992, the Brunswick plant manager, James
L. Johns, advised Randall in writing that, without “extensive
work,” to keep the wastewater treatment system operable,
they would be unable to “operate the plan for more than a
few days without ‘willfully’ violating EPD regulations which
we will not do.” Govt. Ex. 1-8a at HA 00024857.’ In April
1992, Randall visited the Brunswick plant and met with plant
manager James L. Johns for “an update on regulatory
compliance requirements.” Govt. Ex. 10-7b. He indicated
that he would provide guidance on the approval of funds for
a study for the NPDES permit, LCP’s commitment regarding
the 1 June 1992 Georgia EPD deadline for cellroom floor
repairs, and the possibility of a study or remediation plan for
the “brine impoundments.” /d. In June 1992, Randall was
advised in writing that a conference with OSHA on 8 May
1992 noted 26 serious violations and 11 non-serious
violations. Govt. Ex. 10-7d.

During the summer of 1992, the Brunswick plant
management changed.'® R16-104-05. In August 1992, Taylor

9. The memo was addressed “Production Reliability” and noted
that “[l]ack of money has limited the plant production capability and
imposed substantial risk on maintaining acceptable production
levels.” Govt. Ex. 1-8a at HA 00024856. The wastewater treatment
issues were one of nine noted problems. /d., HA 00024856 and 57.

10. J.L. Johns, the plant manager at the beginning of 1992,
retired due to heart problems. R16-104. During the six month search
(Cont'd)

9a

Appendix A

advised Randall that Brunswick was “unable to meet current
permit limitations,” that he anticipated “more restrictive”
limitations, and that the “[p]erformance of the waste water
treatment system [was] a serious threat to the continued
operation of the plant.” Govt. Ex. 1-12. Taylor said that while
the “generation of waste water ha[d] greatly increased due
to leaking brine tanks, [poor condition of the] brine pumps
[and]... brine filters, heavy rainfall, the necessity to destroy
bleach, and numerous operating problems,” at the same time
the capacity of the wastewater system was limited by the
reduced capacity of the filtration and storage systems, was
“further reduced” by the “[{l]ack of maintenance,” and the
system was “frequently shut down due to mechanical
problems and operator errors.” /d. In November 1992,
Randall visited the Brunswick plant to interview a candidate
for plant manager, and spoke with the acting manager, Hugh
Croom. R19-30. At that time, Croom advised Randall of
problems with the caustic filters and the intentional dumping
of caustic on the cellroom floors by some unknown employee.
R19-30-31, 56-58. Croom testified that Randall “was just as
concerned as we were about the problems” and authorized
Croom to hire a task force.'' R19-50, 58.

(Cont'd)

to replace Johns, Hugh Croom, the plant manager for the LCP chlor-
alkali plant in North Carolina, transferred to Brunswick and acted as
plant manager. /d. at 103-05. Croom returned to the North Carolina
plant in January 1993, and admitted that problems with the wastewater
treatment plant and his concerns for maintaining a production rate
and for the safety of the employees and the community contributed
to his desire to leave Brunswick. R16-134-36.

11. The dumping abated once the task force was hired and the
valve area was monitored. R19-58.

10a
Appendix A

In February 1993, LCP offered the plant manager job to
Taylor. R21-244. During his tenure as manager, Taylor
stressed safety and strict adherence with LCP’s training and
safety programs, and assured employees the right to refuse
to perform any activity if the employee felt 1t to be unsafe.
R19-302-03. When the wastewater overran the cellroom
berms and streamed outside the building, the overflow was
reported to the EPD and to the LCP Board by letters signed
by Taylor. R20-25-27. The amounts reported in the letters
were consistent with the data that the plant had at that time.
R20-27.

During the spring of 1993, Taylor attended a company
meeting with Randall and Croom in which they discussed
the condition of the Brunswick plant and possible solutions.
R19-18-19. Taylor and Croom recommended “eithers’ ung
the plant down or shutting it down long enough’ salvage
one cellroom and rebuild the second cellroom, and then
starting back up with just one cellroom.” R19-20, 22. Taylor
worked up “the figures and costs” and submitted it to Randall,
but Randall later advised them that “[t]hey won’t let me do
it.” R19-22-23, 64. By letters to EPD, Taylor reported that
the plant had exceeded the maximum daily allowable
discharges seventeen times, and explained that the discharges
were due to “heavy rainfall,” “miscommunication between
operations supervision,” “a slight miscalculation,” and
“storm, rainfall and process leaks.” Govt. Ex. 10-1d, e.g.
Taylor noted that the “waste water treatment operating
efficiency and outfall discharge” was “positive[ly] affect
[ed]” by LCP’s decision not to replace a leaking brine-tank.
Govt. Ex. 10-1g.

t
7
'
'
“
|

lla
Appendix A

In April 1993, the Board of Directors, with the approval
of the bankruptcy court, removed Hansen as Chairman,
President, and CEO of Hanlin after he attempted to expel
the outside directors from the board. R19-122-23, 160, 167-
68. The Board and the bankruptcy creditors’ committee asked
Randall to serve as LCP’s interim CEO and Chief Operating
Officer [COO]. R19-160; R21-195, 200. His primary focus
was financial and, with the support of the bankruptcy
creditors committee and court, he sought to sell the company
to a responsible party who could operate the business and
have the financial resources to deal with the various
environmental conditions. R19-147-48, 164, 174-75; R21-
200-01, 219. In this capacity, Randall received daily reports
concerning the Brunswick plant’s operations and problems.
R16-97-98. After Hansen’s removal as CEO, he was no longer
a corporate officer and became a director and employee. R19-
136, 160, 168. Sometime later, the Board sent Hansen to
Brunswick to help run the plant. R19-166-67.

Taylor reported five discharge violations in April, and
indicated that two violations were due to a problem in the
wastewater treatment system that had been corrected, one
violation was attributable to rainfall, and one violation was
due to leaks which had been repaired. Govt. Ex. 10-1h. Taylor
indicated that “[a]n upset in the wastewater treatment system
caused a release of ineffectively treated wastewater” but that
“the discharge was rerouted until the system resumed normal
operation.” /d. Taylor reported 16 discharge deviations in
May 1993, which he indicated were caused by an equipment
failure which had been repaired, “overloading the wastewater
treatment system,” and rainfall. Govt. Ex. 10-1i. In June,
Taylor reported 21 excessive discharges which were

2a
Appendix A

attributable to “upsets” and “operational problems” in the
wastewater treatment system and equipment failures. Govt.
Ex. 10-1) and 10-1k. Hansen visited the plant in late June
and began working with Taylor. R19-167.

In July 1993, Taylor resigned as plant manager. R21-
245. Upon Taylor’s resignation, Hansen assumed the running
of the plant and served as plant manager from July through
September 1993. R19-24, 167; R20-354. Taylor subsequently
returned to the plant as a full time employee as a process or
project enginéer on the condition that he not have to “assume
managerial type duties.” R21-246. He remained involved in
environmental issues, however, and in October 1993,
questioned the assistant production manager regarding the
loss of mercury. R20-325, 337-38.

The Georgia Environmental Protection Division notified
LCP in writing in June 1993 that it proposed revoking the
NPDES permit to discharge treated wastewater in Purvis
Creek based on “continuous violations ... since May 1992
of pH, total residual chlorine, and mercury.” Govt. Ex. 13-
ld at 1. It explained that, although it had provided LCP
“Notice of Violation” letters twice in 1992 and had requested
that LCP “take all necessary measures to come into
compliance,” “these violations have continued” and

“significant noncompliance” was documented in 10 out of
13 months from May 1992 through May 1993. /d. The
notification summarized that there had been “no progress

. In upgrading the plant or its operation” since the
noncompliance had begun to be a serious problem. /d. at 2;
R20-274-276. Randall submitted formal written comments
on the revocation stating that “LCP has already taken steps

13a
Appendix A

to improve the situation by installing additional filter
capacity, repairing or replacing equipment and reducing the
load on the system” and referring to a 23 July plan addressing
future corrective measures. Govt. Ex. 10-6 at 4.

In July and August 1993, Hansen directed the plant
employees to begin pumping the wastes into the large
“bunker” tanks that had once been used to store oil although
he knew that the wastewater mixed with oil could not be run
through the wastewater treatment system, R20-48, 183, 328-
29, 350. The plant environmental/safety manager reported
the use of the tanks to Randall in July. Govt. Ex. 10-7x. After
the EPD moved to revoke the plant’s permit, Hansen advised
the employees to “increase the flow on the wastewater
treatment system to a level that was to keep the water from
running out the [cellroom] door” and into the lake. R20-358-
59. During their respective terms as plant manager, Hansen
and Taylor were advised of and observed “water [ ] flow[ing]
out the back door of the cellroom” as a result of a break in
the cellroom berms, and “overflow[ing] on the ground.” R20-
327-28, 335-36, 341. The employees complained to Hansen,
Taylor, and Randall about “the water condition, the
deterioration of the plant with the pipes, the leaks, and the
safety equipment,” and, despite assurances that conditions
would improve “[a]s soon as [the plant] g[o]t some money,”
the plant did not get “any money” and conditions did not
change. R21-146-50.

The NPDES permit was revoked on 23 September 1993.
R20-275. LCP filed an appeal which stayed the revocation.

4a
Appendix A

R20-275. Although EPD sought a temporary restraining
order, 1t was denied by the state court judge.'’ R20-302-03.

During this same period of time, Allied Signal and
HoltraChem indicated interest as buyers, and a financial
agreement was worked out in which Allied Signal would
provide needed money, personnel, and raw materials or
maintenance parts for the plant, including an extra wastewater
treatment facility. R9-228, Exs. A & B; R19-149-51; R20-
18, 80. As a part of the financial agreement, Allied Signal
loaned employee Mark White to LCP to serve as plant
manager in October 1993.'? R19-152-53; R20-18. With the
influx of Allied Signal’s resources, conditions at the plant
improved. R20-80. The purchase agreement eventually fell
through and shortly thereafter the facility closed. After the
plant closed, Randall, through the bankruptcy counsel,
requested $1,500,000 in additional funds from the bankruptcy
court to deal with the environmental impact of closing but
the request was denied. R9-228, Ex. C at 2, 7, Feb. 8, 1994,
letter from M. Patrick M. Nuciarone.

12. By letter, the bankruptcy creditors’ committee advised the
State judge of the bankruptcy proceedings and “the likely
consequences that would result from any closing of the Brunswick
plant.” R9-228, Ex. B at 1. The committee represented that “even if
actual production at [the plant] was to cease, Hanlin would have an
obligation to continue to spend considerable amounts of money at
[the] plant in order to avoid the possibility of an environmental
catastrophe.” /d. at 2. A possible environmental impact of shutting
the plant down included “additional mercury leakage.” R20-147; R19-
83-84. |

13. White continued at the plant as manager until the plant
closed. R20-18.

lSa
Appendix A

The Georgia EPD turned the closed plant over to the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for cleanup
and EPA estimated that the cleanup will cost more than $50
million. R20-380; R21-57. Taylor, as one of the ten LCP
employees approved by the EPA to participate in the site
cleanup, assisted in the decommissioning of the cellrooms
and ran the water treatment plant built by the EPA. R21-55-
56. The cleanup was paid for by the government and Hanlin’s
predecessors at the site: Allied Signal (successor to Allied
Chemical), ARCO, and Georgia-Power Company. R21-39-
40.

The government indicted Christian Hansen, Randall
Hansen, Douglas Brent Hanson, and Alfred R. Taylor for
conspiracy to commit environmental crimes at the site
between | July 1985, and 1 February 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 371,
(Count |), and various substantive crimes.'* R1-1-1. The
charges included: violating the Clean Water Act (“CWA”),
33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, by exceeding
the NPDES permit between June 1993 and January 1994
(Counts 2-21); violating the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928(d)(2)(A) and
(e), and 18 U.S.C. § 2, by storing wastewater on the cellroom
floor and permitting some to escape into the environment
between 29 May 1993 and | February 1994 (Counts 22-32),
storing wastewater in the Bunker “C” tanks between 23 July
1993 and | February 1994 (Count 33), and knowingly
endangering employees by exposing them to impermissibly
stored wastes and wastewaters between 29 May 1993 and

14. Two other plant employees, Duane Outhwaite and
Christopher Dunn, were charged separately and entered into plea
agreements. R8-200-7 n. 5.

loa
Appendix A

1 February 1994 (Count 34); violating the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b)(3), by failing to notify
the U.S. government of unpermitted releases of chlorine or
wastewater into the environment between 21 July and 23
October 1993 (Counts 35-41); and violating the Endangered
Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B), 1538(g), and
1540(b)(1), by taking an endangered species, a Wood Stork,
as a result of discharging mercury into the marsh, Purvis
Creek, and the Turtle River (Count 42). R1-1. Hansen was
charged with Counts 1-42, Randall was charged with Counts
1-34 and 42, Hansen was charged with Counts 1-6, 10-22,
24, 26-32, and 34-42, and Taylor was charged with Counts
1-32, and 34-42. /d. Hanson, the former environmental and
health and safety LCP manager, pled guilty to a CERCLA
offense (Count 41) and the offense under the Endangered
Species Act (Count 42) and testified against Hansen, Randall,
and Taylor.'*> R3-83; R20-6. At the conclusion of the

defendants’ case, the district judge granted their motion for

acquittal as to Count 42 but denied the motion as to all other
charges. R6-123. Hansen was convicted of all counts, Randall
was convicted of all charged counts, and Taylor was convicted
of Counts 1-3, 10-11, 22-26, 29-32, 34-35, and 38-41. R22-
214-15. Their renewed motions for acquittal and motions
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and/or for a new
trial were denied. R7-145, 146, 153-54, 163; R8-200.

Hansen was sentenced to 108 months of imprisonment,
a fine of $20,000, a special assessment of $2,050, and two

15. Hanson was sentenced to eighteen months of imprisonment,
and one year of supervised release on each count, concurrent. R8-
123.

ee

17a
Appendix A

years of supervised release. R8-214. Randall was sentenced
to 46 months of imprisonment, a fine of $20,000, a special
assessment of $1,700, and two years of supervised release.
R9-236. Taylor was sentenced to 78 months of imprisonment,
a special assessment of $1,000, and two years of supervised
release. R8-215. Each defendant appealed, and was allowed
to remain on bond pending appeal. R8-219, 221; R19-226,
238-40.

On appeal, Hansen raises four issues: (1) the district court
erred in admitting the government’s expert witness testimony;
(2) the district court’s instructions misstated the reasonable
doubt standard, improperly applied the concept of reasonable
corporate officer, improperly defined the elements of
knowing endangerment, and effectively eliminated the mens
rea requirement from each statutory violation; (3) the
_ evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and
(4) the district court erred in concluding that it lacked the
authority to depart from the applicable sentencing guidelines.
Randall argues that: (1) district court erred by not granting
his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence
was insufficient to support his conviction for knowing
endangerment under the RCRA and the government never
proved causation on counts 2-33; (2) the district court’s
instructions were erroneous on the elements of the charged
substantive offenses and on the responsible corporate officer
instruction as an alternative basis for criminal liability;
(3) the district court erroneously admitted high prejudicially
and irrelevant evidence; and (4) the district court erred by
declining to depart downward. Taylor maintains that the
district court erred: (1) by not granting his motion for
judgment of acquittal and for a new trial based on

18a
Appendix A

insufficiency of the evidence; (2) in its instruction concerning
the wastewater treatment system; and (3) in sentencing him.

H. DISCUSSION
A. Admission of Expert Witness Testimony

Hansen argues that the district court erred in admitting
testimony from government expert witness Daniel Teitelbaum
because the government failed to disclose Teitelbaum’s
checkered history of credibility and the court failed to conduct
a hearing regarding the testimony. Hansen also maintains that
the district court erred in admitting the testimony of
Teitelbaum and government expert witness Christopher Reh
because the testimony was unreliable, irrelevant, and highly
prejudicial. The government responds that Hansen waived
the arguments regarding Teitelbaum’s testimony by failing
to object to the testimony at trial.

The week before trial, Hansen moved for a Daubert'®
hearing and to exclude the testimony of expert witnesses
regarding certain allegedly scientific conclusions and
exhibits. R4-94-95; R6-110-1. Noting that the motion was
directed to the expert testimony regarding the effect of high
mercury levels on endangered species as charged in Count
42, the district court denied it, finding that the motion did

S. Ct. 2786 (1993). In Daubert, the Court held that, when “[flaced
with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, ... the trial judge
must determine . . . whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1)
scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand
or determine a fact in issue.” /d. at 592, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.

PR ere

ORY Lay Art Seo aU

19a
Appendix A

“not identif]y] the source, the substance, or most importantly
the underlying methodology of this testimony” and that,
therefore, there was “no underlying methodology or reasoning
for the court to assess.” R6-110-1-2, 4.

During the trial, Teitelbaum confirmed that he had
previously testified as an expert witness, and explained that
“it has been a regular portion of [his] practice over the
years.”’'’ R20-230-31. Hansen neither objected nor examined
Teitelbaum after the government moved to tender Teitelbaum
as an expert, and the court directed that the jury consider
him an expert in his field. /d. at 232.

Teitelbaum testified regarding the plant employees’
potential exposure to hazardous substances. Based on his
review of “the large number of biological samples,” “many
interviews,” the “documents concerning the health and
hygiene program,” and other documents, he found “a
Substantial amount of spillage of sodium hydroxide,”
“numerous chlorine leaks,” and spills and leaks of
hydrochloric acid at the plant. R20-233-35; see also 248-49.
He noted that, because the sodium hydroxide spillage had a
very high pH and was quite caustic, contact with the spillage
could cause a first-to third-degree burn, or even be lethal.

17. On cross-examination, Teitelbaum stated that this was the
first time that he had testified as “a consultant for the U.S. Attorney,”
but explained that he had testified “for OSHA many times,” “for the
Department of Justice a number of times,” and for “the EPA.” R20-
255-56. He was asked whether he considered the government to be a
“pretty good customer” for his services, and responded that he did
not “take any money from the government” for consulting services.
Id. at 256.

20a

Appendix A

Id. at 233-34. Teitelbaum explained that exposure to the
chlorine leaks could cause “severe injurivs to eyes, upper
airways, and lungs, and, under some circumstances, death.”
Id. at 234. He commented that hydrochloric acid was a
“classic poison” which would also cause burns and potential
death. Jd. at 234-35. Based on the biological samples, he
concluded that the employees were “in danger of death or
serious bodily injury.” /d. at 244-45, 248. Finally, Teitelbaum
noted that the data showed the mercury levels in the workers’
urine were “between two and five times the acceptable level
of excretion, based on the World Health Organization or the
NIOSH recommendations.” /d. at 244-45. No objections were
raised to his testimony. /d. at 232-63.

At sentencing, the probation officer noted that he had
“discredit{ed]” one of Hansen’s witnesses “because he was
not even at the LCP Plant” and “did not have firsthand
knowledge to see this.” R13-26. Hansen’s attorney responded
that, based on the probation officer’s theory, Teitelbaum’s
testimony should also be discounted “because he never went
to the plant before it was shut down.” /d. at 28. The district
judge commented that Teitelbaum “made a very credible
witness. I think the best witness that the Government had.”
Id. at 29.

We review for abuse of discretion both the district court’s
decisions regarding the admission of expert testimony and
reliability of an expert, Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael,
526 U.S. 137, 152, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1176 (1999), and the
denial of a Daubert hearing, United States v. Nichols, 169
F.3d 1255, 1263 (10th Cir. 1999). “Absent an objection, we
can review the challenged evidence only for plain error.”

21a
Appendix A

Christopher v. Cutter Labs., 53 F.3d 1184, 1192 (11th
Cir. 1995).

Scientific expert testimony is admissible if ‘*(1) the expert
is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he
intends to address; (2) the methodology by which the expert
reaches his conclusions is sufficiently reliable as determined
by the sort of inquiry mandated in Daubert; and (3) the
testimony assists the trier of fact, through the application of
scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” City of
Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th
Cir. 1998). In Daubert, the Supreme Court suggested a
flexible inquiry regarding the methodology considering such
factors as “whether it can be (and has been) tested,” whether
it “has been subjected to peer review and publication,” the
“known or potential rate of error,” “the existence and
maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s
operation, and the degree it is accepted as reliable within the
relevant scientific community.” 509 U.S. at 591, 593-94, 113
S. Ct. at 2795-96. Daubert hearings are not required, but
may be helpful in “complicated cases involving multiple
expert witnesses.” City of Tuscaloosa, 158 F.3d at 564-65
n. 21. Adistrict court should conduct a Daubert inquiry when
the opposing party’s motion for a hearing is supported by
“conflicting medical literature and expert testimony.” Zanner
v. Westbrook, 174 F.3d 542, 546 (Sth Cir. 1999). Consistent
with Daubert, the evidence must be scientifically related to
the disputed facts at issue in the case. Allison v. McGhan
Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999).

22a
Appendix A

Hansen's motion ior a Daubert hearing was neither
addressed to the charges to which Teitelbaum testified, or
his testimony in general, nor supported by the source,
substance, or methodology of the challenged testimony.
Hansen failed to object to either Teitelbaum’s qualification
as an expert or his testimony during trial. Teitelbaum’s
testimony was based on his review of biological samples,
interviews, and docur.sents, and assisted the trier of fact in
understanding the potential injuries that could result from
the conditions at the plant. The district judge did not abuse
his discretion by denying the motion or by admitting the
testimony.

To the extent that Hansen raises a Brady"* claim that the
government suppressed exculpatory or impeachment
evidence by failing to disclose Teitelbaum’s “checkered” past,
we find that it is without basis. In order to state such a claim,
a defendant must show (1) “that the government possessed
evidence favorable to the defendant (including impeachment
evidence) ... ; (2) that the defendant does not possess the
evidence nor could he obtain it himself with any reasonable
diligence ... ; (3) that the prosecution suppressed the
favorable evidence ... ; and (4) that had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that
the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.”
United States v. Meros, 866 F.2d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 1989)
(per curiam). In this case, the evidence which Hansen alleges

18. Brady v. Marvland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1196-
97 (1963) (“The suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable
to the accused upon request violates due process where the evidence
is material to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or
bad faith of the prosecution.”).

ee Te et as 9 ae

Ate WEEE Bec hnganggy ee +)

23a

Appendix A

the government failed to disclose consists of court opinions
either disregarding or discrediting Teitelbaum’s testimony.
Although Hansen argues that the government knew of this
discredited testimony based on Teitelbaum’s previous
testimony for the government, Hansen fails to show that the
government was in actual possession of the information or
actually suppressed it. Further, the information was available
to Hansen through reasonable diligence both before and
during the trial.'* The cases were all available through legal
research and information on them could have been, but was
not, addressed during Teitelbaum’s testimony. Finally, the
cases relied on by Hansen all relate to Teitelbaum’s testimony
in tort actions as to causation of a specific injury. They do

19. Hansen argues that Teitelbaum’s testimony was
“discredited” in four cases: General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S.
136, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997), Sweger v. Texaco, Inc., Nos. 88-1781,
88-1834 and 88-2745, 1991 WL 35345 (10th Cir. Feb. 22, 1991);
Land v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 345 (1996), and National Bank of
Commerce v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 942
(E.D. Ark. 1998). In General Elec. Co., the Court found that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony
of Teitelbaum (and other expert witnesses) because the studies on
which he relied were not sufficient to support his conclusion. 522
U.S. at 146-47, 118 S. Ct. at 519. In Sweger, the court found that
Teitelbaum’s testimony did not provide the necessary certainty to
establish causation. Sweger, slip op. at 1, 5-6. In Land, Teitelbaum
appeared as the plaintiffs’ medical expert. 35 Fed. Cl. at 352 n. 7.
The hearing officer found Teitelbuam’s “ ‘preliminary’ medical
opinion” regarding the cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries to be “of little
value because Dr. Teitelbaum did not conduct physical examinations
of the plaintiffs.” /d. In National Bank of Commerce, the court found
that Teitelbaum’s view of the causation of the plaintiff’s cancer was
“undercut by the inadequacy of ... reliable scientific proof of
causation.” 22 F. Supp. at 967.

24a
Appendix A

not, therefore, have probative value as to his testimony
regarding potential health effects of the chemicals or the
employees’ risk of death or serious injury after exposure to
these chemicals. Hansen is unable to show a reasonable
probability that the information would have changed the
outcome of the proceedings.

Christopher Reh, an employee of the National Institute
for Occupational Safety and Health (“NIOSH”), also testified
for the government. R20-192. The district judge qualified
him as an expert in the field of industrial hygiene.”° /d. at
194. Reh explained that he was assigned to the Brunswick
plant as the project officer after NIOSH received “a valid
request for a health hazard evaluation” from one of the plant’s
unions in 1987.?' /d. at 196. He said that, during the initial
site visit, he and his team met with Taylor, a plant engineer,
and a few union representatives to discuss the request.”* /d.
at 196-98. They visited the plant, and observed “mercury in
many places on the cellroom floor in cracks or crevices,”
and passively monitored mercury exposure in the workers’
“breathing zone.” Jd. at 198-99. They found that the plant
was not using the creatnine monitoring scale, but was

20. Neither Hansen nor his codefendants questioned Reh
regarding his background or his area of expertise and raised no
objections to Reh’s qualification. R20-194.

21. Reh indicated that they were requested to evaluate the health
hazards associated with mercury, chlorine, and hydrochloric acid.
R20-199, 203; Govt. Ex. 40-1b.

22. The NIOSH team consisted of Reh, a medical doctor, and
another industrial hygienist. R20-198.

Pe eh er ea

25a

Appendix A

reporting mercury levels by “micrograms per liter.” /d. at
204. The monitors found that mercury exposure exceeded
the NIOSH and OSHA recommended levels.”’ Tayler’s
objection to further testimony from Reh on the grounds of
relevance was overruled. /d. at 201. Reh and his team advised
Taylor of their findings by letter and recommended use of
creatnine correction urine mercury monitoring which would
indicate the amount of mercury per gram of creatnine. /d. at
201-03; Govt. Ex. 40-1b. From the results of the first visit,
the team made a second visit to conduct a more in-depth
study in 1988. R20-202. During the second visit, the team
used an active sampling method to determine 28 workers’
breathing zone exposure levels, collected urine samples from
58 workers, and administered questionnaires to and
conducted physical examinations of 65 workers. /d. at 205-
07. Taylor was provided with a written interim report in 1988
and a final report in 1991, both of which showed that workers
had mercury levels above recommended standards.”* /d. at
207-08, 210, 214; Govt. Exs. 40-1c and 1d.

23. Reh explained that the NIOSH recommended exposure
levels (“REL”) were 50 micrograms of mercury per cubic meter of
air and that the OSHA permissible exposure levels (“PEL”) are 100
micrograms of mercury per cubic meter of air. R20-200. He said that
all of the sixteen monitored workers showed RELs above 50, and
eleven © the monitored workers had levels above the PEL. /d. at
200-01.

24. Reh reported that they found that 29 of the tested 58 workers
had urine mercury levels which exceeded the World Health
Organization recommended standard of 50. R20-208, 210. The
average level was 136 micrograms per gram of creatinine, with a
range from 2 to 689. /d. at 210.

26a

Appendix A

The government offered Reh’s testimony to show that
the workers were placed “in imminent danger of death or
serious bodily injury” and that Hansen, Randall, and Taylor
were aware of the workers’ exposure to hazardous substances.
This testimony supports both of those propositions. The
district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the
testimony of Reh.

B. Insufficiency of the Evidence

We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse
of discretion, and the denial of a motion for judgment of
acquittal de novo. United States v. Pistone, 177 F.3d 957,
958 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam). To uphold the denial of a
motion for judgment of acquittal, we “need only determine
that a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the evidence
established the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id. When considering the sufficiency of the evidence, we
“view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom
in the ight nvest favorable to the government.” United States
v. Slocum, 708 F.2d 587, 594 (11th Cir. 1983).

_

1. Pesiion of authority

“To prove aiding and abetting, the government must
demonstrate that a substantive offense was committed, that
the defendant associated himself with the criminal venture,
and that he committed some act which furthered the crime.”
United States v. Hamblin, 911 F.2d 551, 557 (11th Cir. 1990).
“(T]he government must show that the defendant shared the
same unlawful intent as the actual perpetrator” but does not
need to prove that “the defendant was present at the scene

27a
Appendix A

when the crime occurred, or that he was an active participant.”
Id. at 557-58; United States y. Pepe, 747 F.2d 632, 665 (11th
Cir. 1984) (“aider and abettor . . . need not even be present’).
“Encouraging” a violation and “discouraging” the reporting
of the violation, United States v. Sinskey, 119 F.3d 712, 718
(8th Cir. 1997), and “personally attempting to avoid [a
violation’s] detection by the [RCRA] inspectors,” United
States v. Self, 2 F.3d 1071, 1089 (10th Cir. 1993), have been
held sufficient to show that a defendant aided and abetted
the commission of a crime.

The indictment alleged that the defendants, “after
learning that the Brunswick facility was disposing of
hazardous wastes . . . without a RCRA permit, continued to
operate the Brunswick facility in such a manner as to continue
the disposal of these hazardous wastes without expending
adequate funds. . . to prevent the disposal of such hazardous
wastes into the environment.” RI-1-11. The jury was
instructed that the defendants were responsible for the acts _
of others that they “wilfully directed,” “authorized,” or aided
and abetted by “willfully joining together with [another]
person in the commission of a crime.” R22-181. The district
court denied Taylor’s motion to acquit or for a new trial on
these charges finding that “the Defendants worked for LCP
in positions of responsibility and authority while ... the
violations took place.” R8-200-23.

a. Hansen
Hansen maintains that the evidence failed to show that

he was in a position of authority after he was deposed as
CEO in April 1993 until he began serving as plant manager

KL
ee EE

28a
Appendix A

on 16 July 1993, and after he was officially replaced as plant
manager by Allied employee Mark White on 18 October
1993. Therefore, he contends that the district court erred in
not granting his motion for judgment of acquittal as to the
18 counts that occurred after 18 October 1993 (Counts 6-9,
14-15, 19-21, 23, 25, 29, 30-32, 38-40), the two counts that
occurred between April and July 1993 (Counts 2 and 10),
and the count that arose on 22 October 1993 (Count 33).

The testimony at trial indicated that Hansen was aware
that wastewater was permitted to flow out the cellroom back
door in June 1993,*° and directed the use of the old Bunker
C storage tanks for storage of wastewater, including the
inadequately treated wastewater from the treatment system,
from: July through September 1993.*° Although the acts
continued after Hansen left his decision-making position, the
acts occurred at his direction. This evidence was sufficient
for the jury to reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that his acts were in furtherance of the violations. The district
court did not err in denying Hansen’s motion for judgment
of acquittal or motion for new trial.

25. Testimony of LCP former assistant production manager
James Dunn, R20-327-28, 341.

26. Testimony of former LCP health and safety manager
Douglas Brent Hanson, R20-48-49, LCP maintenance handler and
expeditor George Mower, R20-183, and LCP former production
manager Duane Outhwaite, R20-350. Outhwaite testified that the
storage tanks were used for wastewater overflow to keep the
inadequately treated wastewater from “running out the door” and to
help prevent the deep pools of wastewater from forming on the
cellroom floors. R20-350, 358.

PARSE EE OM Decorah tem pee.
s

1 NE OSE Beate ty ak eG

29a
Appendix A
b. Randall

Randall claims that the government presented no
evidence that he personally treated, stored, or disposed of a
hazardous waste, personally effected a CWA violation, or
instructed an agent to do so. He maintains that, under the
laws of bankruptcy and corporate governance, he lacked the
authority to close the plant or to allocate the funds for the
needed capital improvements. He contends that LCP needed
the bankruptcy court’s approval to use the bankruptcy estate’s
assets, or to obtain a new debt, to perform the needed repairs
at the Brunswick plant.

In February 1994, LCP applied to the bankruptcy court
for the funds “to shutdown” the plant and for new equipment,
but the motion was denied. Def. Randall Ex. 1, Amended
Notice of Motion at 5; R9-228, Ex. C and 8 Feb letter. Hanlin
Board of Directors member James Mathis testified that
Randall was responsible for “run[ning] the day-to-day
operations of the company” once he became the interim CEO
and COO. R19-160. He said that the Board was “very
interested in whether the environmental problems-whether
we were in a position of compliance with the environmental
- regulations. But the information that we had indicated that,
really, compliance was not a problem.” /d. at 164. He
explained that, as a result of the weekly reports on the plant’s
operations, the Board believed that “there were really no
excursions of any significance going on”. /d. at 165.”’ Mathis

27. Mathis testified that there were places on the report forms
for the “number of excursions” or environmental noncompliances
which “were filled in with ‘zeros’ each time.” R19-165. He said that
they later learned that the zeros were clerical errors. /d.

30a
Appendix A

said that Randall “had the primary responsibility” for
providing information regarding the environmental
compliance issues to the Board and that Hansen fed
“information to Randall in that regard.” /d. at 166. He agreed
that the decision to sell the plant would have been a board
decision requiring the approval of the bankruptcy court. /d.
at 174-75.

LCP, as a debtor in possession, could “use the property
of the estate in the ordinary course of business,” but needed
court approval to “use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary
course of business, property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C.
§ 363(c)(1) and (b)(1). It could “obtain unsecured credit. . .
in the ordinary course of business,” but needed court approval
“to obtain unsecured credit or to incur unsecured debt other
than” “in the ordinary course of business.” /d. at 364(a) and
(b). Bankruptcy does not insulate a debtor from
environmental regulatory statutes. In reviewing an injunction
to clean up a hazardous waste site, the Supreme Court
commented:

[W]e do not suggest that [the debtor’s] discharge
{in bankruptcy] will shield him from prosecution
for having violated the environmental laws .. .
or for criminal contempt for not performing his
obligations under the intunction prior to
bankruptcy.... [W]e do not hold that the
injunction ... against any conduct that will
contribute to the pollution of the site or the State’s
wasters is dischargeable in bankruptcy . . . Finally,
we do not question that anyone in possession of
the site .. . must comply with the environmental

3la

Appendix A

laws .... Plainly, that person or firm may not
maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of the
State, or refuse to remove the source of such
conditions.

Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 284-85, 105 S. Ct. 705, 710-
11 (1985). See also Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dept.
of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 507, 106 S. Ct. 755, 762
(1986) (A bankrupt debtor in possession “may not abandon
property in contravention of a... regulation that is
reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety
from identified hazards.”’).

Although Randall claims that his role as Executive Vice-
President and acting CEO was limited to financial matters,
he also received daily reports about the plant’s operations
and environmental problems, R16-97-98, R21, 359, wrote
and received memos regarding specific plant operational
problems, Govt. Ex. 104, 1-6f, 1-8a, 1-12, received monthly
written environmental reports, Govt. Ex. 10-1o-10-1nn, 10-
7c-7d, 10-7f, and oral environmental reports, R21-64, 359.
He admitted that Hanlin’s bankruptcy was not an excuse for
violating environmental laws. R21-219-21. There is no
indication that he asked the Hanlin Board or the bankruptcy
court to close the plant. The evidence indicates that he
apparently misled them into believing that environmental
compliance was not a problem. After the Georgia EPD
attempted to revoke the plant’s NPDES permit in June 1993,
Randall contested the revocation, explaining that the plant’s
CWA violations were due to a lightning strike and equipment
failures, and asserted that “LCP has already taken steps to
improve the situation.” Govt. Ex. 10-6. This evidence was

32a
Appendix A

sufficient for the jury to conclude that Randall actions were
in furtherance of the violations.

c. Taylor

Taylor argues that he should not be held responsible for
the environmental violations that occurred after he resigned
as plant manager, specifically counts 2-3, 25, 29-32, 38-41.
Taylor resigned as plant manager on 16 July 1993, R21-245,
but returned shortly thereafter as a project engineer and
continued in that position until the plant closed, R21-246-
47, 317-18. As project engineer, Taylor was directly involved
in responding to the plant’s environmental and safety
problems and, at Hansen’s request, developed a list of short-
term solutions to the problems with estimated costs. R20-
338; R21-247-48. Taylor’s proposed solutions were
subsequently funded. R21-247-48.

Although Taylor left his managerial position, he
continued to work in a position in which he directed or
authorized acts of the employees on environmental and safety
problems.”* Testimony at trial indicated that, in October 1993,

28. Despite Taylor's resignation as plant manager and his re-
employment as project engineer, he was considered to be in a
management position. See R20-152 (D. Brent Hanson testified that
Taylor was his immediate supervisor both before and after his
resignation and re-employment); id at 335 (Dunn testified that Taylor
“probably would have been plant manager” in late 1993), 337 (Dunn
said that in “October of °93 I would assume [Taylor] was plant
manager.”); id. at 312, Govt. Ex. 13-4 (19 January 1994 letter from
Georgia EPD acting unit coordinator Susan Eason to “Plant Manager”
(Cont'd)

33a

Appendix A

Taylor was aware of the wastewater overflow from the
cellrooms, the excess loss of mercury, and the use of the tank
cars for wastewater storage, and that he supervised the release
of the overflow.” This evidence was sufficient for the jury
to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that these acts were
in furtherance of the violations. The district court did not err
in denying his motion for a new trial.

2. Hazardous substances or materials

Taylor and Hansen argue that the government failed to
prove that the untreated wastewater contained enough

(Cont'd)
Taylor in which she referenced Taylor's explanation for “NPDES
excursions” at a 6 December 1993 meeting). But see Govt. Exs. 13-
2ff, gg, hh, ii, and jj (letters from Mark S. White, as “Plant Manager,”
to EPD dated October-February 1994).

29. Testimony of James Dunn. R20-335-39. Taylor directed a
memorandum addressing the mercury losses and suggesting a solution
to LCP employee Chris Dunn on 4 October 1993. Govt. Ex. 19-5.
Dunn responded “yes” when asked whether Taylor was aware of the
overflow release from the backdoor of the cellroom. R20-327-28.
Dunn testified that Taylor observed the overflow “on the ground.”
Id. at 336. Dunn said that he told Taylor he was having trouble
pumping the waste into the tank cars and that mercury loss was due
to “leaks coming out of the products or it was tied up in hazardous
waste muds.” R20-337, 339. By memorandum, Taylor proposed a
flow plan for the projected waste streams of “19 to 125 gallons per
minute” when the wastewater treatment system was only working at
a 40 gallon per minute capacity. /d. at 340; Govt Ex. 19-4a. Wilbur
Outhwaite testified that Taylor advised that the employees needed to
empty the wastewater from the tank cars. R20-356.

34a
Appendix A

mercury and caustic to meet the environmentaL laws’
definition of hazardous substances or materials, or that the
untreated wastewater was improperly stored.

a. Hazardous substances as defined

OSHA chemist Clinton Leroy Merrell testified that
samples which were submitted from LCP on 9 September
_ 1992 tested as containing 8 to 30 parts per million of mercury,
and six to ten-percent caustic, with a pH of 14. R21-163,
165-67; Govt Exs. 45-6, 45-9. Former LCP plant manager
Hugh Leroy Croom testified that, in January 1993, the
untreated wastewater may have had “a high pH, and. . . some
mercury,” but would not have contained mercury sludge. R16-
91, 131-32. He said that the pH could be high enough to be a
danger “at times” but that it did not stay high and varied
according to the spills. /d. at 132; R19-35-36. However, he
testified that muds containing mercury and caustic were
washed onto the cellroom floors every three or four days
when the treatment system’s filters were back washed. R16-
127-28; R19-103. When asked whether the wastewater on
the cellroom floors would be considered a hazardous waste,
Croom responded “[m Jost of the time, probably it was.” R16-
112-13; see also id. at 128 (Croom admitted that wastes on
the cellroom floor were listed as hazardous wastes).

Dr. Teitelbaum testified that a fall and submersion into
caustic soda with a pH of 14 would cause a third-degree burn
over the entire body with a likelihood of death. R20-241-42.
LCP former employee Duane Carver testified that, some time
between 1987 and 1993, he stepped into the cellroom sump
hole and went in up to his waist. R19-226-28. He knew that

35a

Appendix A

the pH was “pretty high” because he quickly felt it. /d. at
228. He showered and was able to get most of it off so that
he “didn’t get burned all the way” and-did not seek medical
attention. /d. at 229-30, 251.

Environmental Protection Agency regulatory expert Paul
Peronaud explained the hazardous waste classifications to
the jury, R21-11-13, and the jury was instructed as to various
types of hazardous wastes, R22-199-200.*

30. Specifically, the jury was instructed:

[T]he following wastes are listed as hazaidous wastes
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, that
is, RCRA: ‘

K-106 is wastewater treatment sludge from
the mercury cell process in chlorine
production.

K-071 is brine purification muds from the
mercury cell process in chlorine production,
where separately prepurified brine is not used.

And U-151 is simply mercury.

Now you are instructed that a solid waste exhibits the
characteristic of toxicity for mercury if, using the test
methods set forth in the regulations, a representative
sample of the waste contains mercury at a concentration
of equal to or greater than 0.2 milligrams per liter.

Under the law, liquid wastes which are “corrosive” are
identified as hazardous wastes. A liquid waste is
(Cont'd)

36a

Appendix A

The Waste Water Treatment Operators Logs for the
periods of the indictment showed that the wastewater often
contained more than 200 parts per billion of mercury.*' Govt.
Exs. 4, 5, 6-1. Former LCP employee Dunn testified that
Taylor directed the employees to “put a sign up” labeling the
wastewater in the rail cars as “[h]azardous waste materials.”
R20-345. Taylor testified that the pH of the plant’s wastewater
was normally between seven and ten, and in concentration
of eight to ten percent. R21-262, 264.

(Cont'd)
considered to be corrosive if a representative sample of
the waste is aqueous and has a pH less than or equal to 2
or greater than or equal to 12.5. ‘

| instruct you that when a hazardous waste listed under
the regulations is mixed with a solid waste, the resulting
mixture is a hazardous waste if the reason for the listing
of the hazardous waste is that it 1s a toxic waste.

R22-199-200.

31. LCP former employee Car

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386009_1124%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
